

## CHAPTER 5

### Developments in Sāṃkhya and Yoga from Eighteenth Century Onwards

A Reconstruction from the Volume on Sāṃkhya edited by  
G. Larson and Ramasankara Bhattacharya in the *Encyclopedia  
of Indian Philosophies* of Karl H. Potter, Vol. I.

**T**he Sāṃkhya tradition of philosophising has a unique history of its own, different from that of other schools of Indian philosophy in that there seems to be no foundational text constraining the development of this thought. With other schools of philosophy basic foundational *sūtra* texts from which they proceed, exist and these are considered as authoritative for all those who regard themselves as belonging to that tradition. The very fact that the *Sāṃkhya sūtras* came to be written much later and do not occupy a unique and prestigious place in the history of the development of Sāṃkhyan thought, is a significant fact distinguishing Sāṃkhya from all other schools of Indian philosophy. The *Śaṣṭitantra*, which is supposed to be the earliest systematic text of Sāṃkhyan thought in India, never occupied the same place, specially as the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* replaced it soon after in the corpus of Sāṃkhyan writings and even though the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* continued to occupy an important place in Sāṃkhyan literature, it never had that overriding authority which was at least verbally accorded to the basic *sūtras* in other schools of Indian philosophy. This is further illustrated by the fact that in the volume on Sāṃkhya in the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Gerald Larson has divided the development of Sāṃkhya after the composition of the *Kārikā* into what he has called the *Kārikā-Kaumudī-Sāṃkhya*, the *Samāsa Sāṃkhya* and the *Sūtra Sāṃkhya*, thus indicating that the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, the *Tattvasamāsa* and the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* played as important a part in the development of Sāṃkhyan thought as the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. The *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* is supposed to have been written by Vācaspati Miśra I in A.D. 850 while the *Tattvasamāsa* and the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* were probably written sometime in A.D. fourteenth and fifteenth century, respectively. It is true that, according to many scholars, much of the material in the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* is quite old but at least in its present form, most authorities on the subject consider it to be a very late work, generally assigned to some time in the fifteenth century.



Thus, developments in Sāṃkhyan thought from the eighteenth century onwards can only be understood in the context of its earlier development from the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* onwards. The important phases in this development occurred with the *Yuktidīpikā*, the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* and the *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*. The author of the first is unknown, but those of the two later works are Vācaspati Miśra I and Vijñānabhikṣu (A.D. 1515), respectively.

There appear to have been eight commentaries on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (A.D. 350–450) of which five are supposed to be very similar in their contents, with only marginal differences among them. These are: *Suvarṇasaptati* (A.D. 500) (translated by Parmārtha into Chinese), Gauḍapāda's *Bhāṣya* (A.D. 500–600), the *Mātharavṛtti* (A.D. 800 or later), the *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti* (A.D. 500–600) and the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* (A.D. 500–600). However, the remaining three, that is, the *Jayamaṅgalā* (700 or later), the *Yuktidīpikā* (A.D. 600–700) and the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* (A.D. 850–975) are supposed to not only show significant differences between each other but also to suggest some radical departures from the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. The authors of the first two are not known but, as far as the last work is concerned, its author is the famous Vācaspati Miśra I who wrote well-known works both on Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta.

Sāṃkhyan thought on the *padārthas* in the *Yuktidīpikā* departs from that expressed in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. It apparently has a greater affinity with the *Ṣaṣṭītantra* which is earlier than the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, though it shows remarkable differences from it. Moreover, apart from the radical departures, its use of the term *padārtha* seems very idiosyncratic, especially if one remembers that the term *padārtha* had a fairly determinate meaning in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* authored much earlier than the writings of the *Yuktidīpikā*. It is of course true that the *Nyāya Sūtras* have referred to the basic enumeration of the topics in *Sūtra* 1.1.1 as the *padārthas* and that in later literature they are usually designated as such, even though they belong to a completely different type than those mentioned in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*. However, the designation of the fifty "categories" mentioned by the *Yuktidīpikā*<sup>1</sup> as *padārthas* seems strange as they are neither epistemological nor ontological, nor logical. Perhaps the mapping of the world in terms of what the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* regards as *rūpa*, *pravṛtti* and *phala* may help us to understand why he calls them *padārthas*.<sup>2</sup> Under the category of *rūpa* it puts what are usually called *tattvas* in Sāṃkhyan thought which are termed *dravyas* in Vaiśeṣika terminology. Under the generalised category of *pravṛtti*, figure perhaps the dynamic processes or functions which belong to these *tattvas*. But then to be logical one would have to ascribe a specific function or *pravṛtti* to each of the *tattvas* except perhaps to the *puruṣa*. This *pravṛtti* is divided into that which is in the right direction (*hitakāmaprayojana*) and that which is not (*ahitkāmaprayojana*) and the result is what is called *phala* or the consequence which itself in turn is divided into that which is perceptible or manifest (*dr̥ṣṭa*) and that which is imperceptible or unmanifest (*adr̥ṣṭa*). However, both the *pravṛtti* and the *phala* should be further divided into *sātvika*, *rājasika* and *tāmasika* even though this does not seem to have been done in the text concerned. Basically in the Sāṃkhyan perspective,



everything would have to have these threefold dimensions and hence even those *tattvas* which are given under *rūpa* would have to be distinguished in terms of these three basic types.

The world of the *Yuktidīpikā*, however, is not exhausted by this classification as it has yet another type of classification which cuts across this. Thus classification of the *tattvas* is further made into *ādhibhautika*, *ādhyātmika* and *adhidaivika*. The world of the non-living included in the *ādhibhautika* realm consists of the five primary elements, that is, earth, water, fire, air and ether and the five subtle elements that are the *tanmātras* which are associated with these. It comprises not only of material things, but includes also all living beings, such as plants and animals. The categorisation sharply excludes human beings from all other living and non-living beings included in the *ādhibhautika* realm. Human beings are said to belong only to the *ādhyātmika* realm. The *adhidaivika* realm, of course, comprises divine beings who are radically different from all these other types of beings, belonging to a class by themselves.

Thus, the *Yuktidīpikā*, as pointed out above, does not distinguish between the living and the non-living as it includes animals, birds and insects along with plants in the *ādhibhautika* realm and assigns the *ādhyātmika* realm exclusively to humans. This, it should be pointed out, is a strange classification as it denies the continuity between the living world and the human world which generally is a postulate of all Indian thinking. However, a distinction is always maintained in that the human realm is supposed to be the only realm where new action can originate so that even the so-called *adhidaivika* realm is where one only enjoys the fruits of the actions done at the human level. The realm of the living or where the life principle operates has been linked in the *Yuktidīpikā*, classification to the realm of the vital airs which have been divided, as usual, into five. There is also an attempt at a distinction between forms of reproduction in these realms. This operates, however, only in the *adhidaivika* realm as in both the human, that is the *ādhyātmika* realm, and the realm of living beings who are included in the *ādhibhautika* realm, the mode of reproduction is the same.

The whole paraphernalia of classifications in the *Yuktidīpikā* seems to be basically against the spirit of Sāṃkhya which had made a radical distinction between consciousness and primordial materiality. Everything else was supposed to be a modification of the primordial materiality being induced by a fundamental confusion because of the reflection of consciousness in *buddhi* and the changes that this introduces in the primal materiality itself. However, as the *buddhi* itself is supposed to be the first stage in the manifestation of the unmanifest *prakṛti*, the confusion could not have started there. Also, while the doctrine of the five gross elements and the five subtle elements seems to make some sense in terms of the principle of materiality, the movement from *ahamkāra*, *buddhi*, *mana* and the five *jñānendriyas* and the five *karmendriyas* does not make sense, unless it be assumed that all that is object has to have a subjective counterpart. Similarly, the principle of life, which the *jñānendriyas* and the *karmendriyas* directly presuppose is not mentioned separately any where. This, of course, is based on the assumption that



we may postulate the independent existence of *mana*, *buddhi* and *ahamkāra* without any necessary relation to the *jñānendriya* and the *karmendriya* and their objects, that is, the *pañcamahābhūtas* and the *tanmātras*. On the other hand, if they are regarded as necessarily presupposing the *jñānendriyas* and the *karmendriyas*, then one would have to postulate an independent principle of life which would sustain this relationship. Similarly, one would have to bring in the notion of *pravṛtti* in relation to the *karmendriyas*, *jñānendriyas* and perhaps even *mana*, *buddhi* and *ahamkāra*. All in all, it seems that Sāṃkhyan thought which is developed in the *Yuktidīpikā* takes a turn which is different from that of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

The most important Sāṃkhyan thinking after the *Yuktidīpikā* appears to be embodied in the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra I and the *Sāṃkhyapravacānābhāṣya* by Vijñānabhikṣu. Amongst these, the *Sāṃkhyatattva Kaumudī* does not say anything new and is considered to be important only because a number of sub-commentaries were later written on it and also because it is one of the most used works on Sāṃkhya by scholars. The work of Vijñānabhikṣu, on the other hand, is important as it tries to see Sāṃkhya in the wider perspective of other systems, primarily Vedānta and tries to synthesize the two in his own manner. There are hardly any important thinkers after Vijñānabhikṣu until we enter the eighteenth century.

Sāṃkhyan thought after Vijñānabhikṣu whose work itself is a commentary on the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* which are supposed to be a more expanded version of what was written in the *Tattva Samāsa*, takes a different turn, particularly with the writers in the nineteenth century. Most of the work of these thinkers is in the form of commentaries on either the works in the Kārikā tradition, such as the *Tattvakaumudī* or the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* itself or on those in the tradition of the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* such as the *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* of Aniruddha or the *Sāṃkhyapravacānābhāṣya* of Vijñānabhikṣu. The *Tattvasamāsa* which is said to be an earlier and shorter version of the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* also has some commentators. The exact distribution of the Sāṃkhyan thinkers who have written on these different texts is roughly as follows :

Starting from the latter part of the sixteenth to the twentieth century, a number of *Prakarāṇa grāṇthas* have been written. These can be divided into three periods: A.D. 1550–1750; A.D. 1750–1850 and A.D. 1850–1950.

About twelve original works and fourteen explanatory works were written during the first period (1550–1750). In the middle period (1750–1850) we have thirty-four original works and fourteen explanatory works. In the modern period (1850–1950) we have about eleven original works and fifteen explanatory texts. Amongst these a large part of the texts are unpublished. Besides these, we also find some *Vṛtti grāṇthas*. The Mīmāṃsā texts do not generally discuss *pramāṇa-prameya* as do the Nyāya texts but some discussion of it does exist in certain texts.

Larson's volume lists about 33 thinkers from A.D. 1700 to 1976 out of whom a substantially larger number occurs in the twentieth century. There are several reasons for this including the fact that almost everything written on Sāṃkhya in Sanskrit, even if it be an elementary text book, has been included by the editors



in their search for comprehensiveness and in their anxiety not to miss anything written or published during this period. The entries themselves are evidence of this. For example, from Naraharinatha (no.58) to Shri Rama Pandey (no.65) for eight thinkers belonging to the latest phase of Sāṃkhya in the twentieth century, only short descriptions are given and no analysis of their works has been undertaken. A number of other entries in the *Encyclopaedia* are similarly treated and even where there are summaries of some works, important contributions made by them are hardly highlighted. Surprisingly, one of the editors, Larson who has written a very long and scholarly introduction to the volume, has not cared to indicate the significant developments which occurred in Sāṃkhyan thought over such a long period of time or to indicate the importance of the Sāṃkhyan works composed from A.D. 1700 onwards. Moreover, most of the summaries do not highlight the importance of the particular contribution by the author or indicated why his work should have been included in the volume. The sole exception to this is Kalidasa Bhattacharya who has not only made excellent summaries of the thinkers he has dealt with, but has also tried to highlight their contribution and make a critical assessment of what they have said. However, no attempt is made in the *Encyclopedia* to give any overall assessment of these developments as they have taken place or to attempt to give a unified picture of the whole volume for the information and guidance of the serious student of the subject. Surprisingly, while the volume has two editors, that is, Larson and Rama Shankar Bhattacharya, the Introduction has been written only by the former without any indication whether the other editor agrees with all that has been said in it or not.

A critical study of the volume suggests that the most important contributions made during the period covered were by :

1. Pramathanatha Tarkabhusana
2. Panchanana Tarkaratna
3. Rameshachandra Tarkatirtha
4. Hariharananda Aranya

Besides these, it appears that Mudumba Narsimha Shastri (no.39) is perhaps the first important thinker in this period followed by Bhārati Yati (No.44), the summary of whose works has been given by Rama Shankar Bhattacharya and E. Solomon, respectively.

The work of M.N. Shastri has not yet been published, but according to Rama Shankar Bhattacharya, who has summarised its contents, Sastri "has shown remarkable originality in explaining some of the expressions of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*", (p.451). However, he has not highlighted the "original" points which the author is supposed to have made in the *Sāṃkhyataruvasanta* which he has summarised. Some interesting points in the summary are as follows: first, the distinction between two types of *puruṣārtha*, those that relate to ends that are *dr̥ṣṭa* and the others that are, what he calls, *ānuśrāvika* (p.451). The *Yuktidīpikā* had already distinguished between *dr̥ṣṭa* and *adr̥ṣṭa phala* and the distinction between *dr̥ṣṭa* and *adr̥ṣṭa* is well known in the tradition since the time of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* and



perhaps even earlier. Its extension to the theory of the *puruṣārthas* seems, however, new. The notion of *ṛttisārūpya* too appears to have been used creatively to explain the natural and spontaneous identification of consciousness with its *ṛttis*. The use of some of the concepts that occur in the *Yoga Sūtras* (1.4) is a striking feature of this work. For example, the distinction between the three kinds of *pariṇāma*, that is, *dharmapariṇāma*, *lakṣaṇapariṇāma* and *avasthāpariṇāma*, which are talked about in the *Yoga Sūtra* (3.13). The distinction between *dharmā* and *lakṣaṇa* is interesting as the former is supposed to refer to essential properties while the latter is concerned with characteristics that are regarded as temporal in character but the distinction between these two and *avasthā* is not clear. From all this, it is apparent that Mudumba Narasimha Shastri's work is sufficiently important and deserves to be edited and published so that it can be studied more carefully for the interesting formulations that it might contain.

The work of Bharati Yati (1889), consists of a commentary on the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra I. It is interesting as it explicitly makes use of Mīmāṃsā principles of interpretation and evinces a tendency to bring in Vedic authority in the discussion of Sāṃkhya, a tendency which is found in many other thinkers of this period as well. However, surprisingly he seems to have made a statement at the very beginning of his work which, if correctly stated by E.A. Solomon's summary of the work in the Larson volume on Sāṃkhya (*Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, edited by Karl Potter), undermines in a serious way, the whole enterprise of Sāṃkhya as it has been generally understood. The statement by E.A. Solomon reads, "Frustration being of the nature of *rajas*, which is eternal, cannot be completely destroyed, but it can certainly be subdued and hence the relevance of this science".<sup>3</sup> It appears from the statement that it is an attempt to answer the objection by the *pūrvapakṣin* that, if *rajas* is eternal and if it is the cause of the three-fold suffering, then how can the suffering be ever destroyed? The answer that the teaching of Sāṃkhya is still relevant because it helps in subduing suffering, even though it cannot be completely done away with, forgets that Sāṃkhya is talking of the *ātyantikaduḥkhanivṛtti*, that is, the cessation of the very possibility of suffering ever occurring again, and not of its temporary cessation which is promised by the commentator.

A striking fact which emerges from this survey of contributors to the development of Sāṃkhyan thought during this period is that many of the Udāsīna sect also wrote on Sāṃkhya, indicating that this philosophical system was actively pursued by certain *sādhus* in India. Besides as mentioned earlier, a contribution from Krishnavallabhacharya of the Svāmī Nārāyaṇa sect has also written on Sāṃkhya during this period (1926). There is also included a thinker who is said to be a follower of Dayanand Sarasvati. Another important work by Kunjavihari Tarkasiddhanta seems to be a *Vādagantha* as he has argued against the opponents of Sāṃkhya, a very rare type of writing in this school of philosophy.

The transformation in the milieu of even traditional scholars after the establishment of the new institutions of learning by the British in India is a noticeable phenomenon among sāṃkhyan scholars of this period. While it is true that the



institutions of classical learning were formally separate from those of western learning, some interaction occurred between the two, particularly among those who were proficient not only in western learning derived through a knowledge of English, but also possessed some knowledge and interest in the classical knowledge of India through the Sanskrit language. This occurred primarily in Bengal and in many places in the South where an active interest in traditional fields of knowledge among western-trained scholars existed. Some indirect influence of this interaction may be found in the works of pure Sanskritists who have written on traditional subjects during this period. Thus, there is a radical distinction between the scholarly works produced in Sanskrit by traditional scholars during the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth century and those which were produced later. Pramathanatha Tarkabhūšana's (1865–1941), work on Sāṃkhya, for example, shows some traces of this in his sub-commentary on Aniruddha's *Vṛtti* (A.D. 1400–1500) on the *Sāṃkhyasūtras*. His interest in dating Aniruddha's work and in finding whether this came earlier than that of Vijñānabhikṣu and Vedāntin Mahādeva who also wrote commentaries, can be attributed to the new interest which western learning brought to the study of Indian texts in determining their chronological order. Similarly, he seems not only interested in explicating what Aniruddha is supposed to have said but also in studying the Sāṃkhyan arguments, the counter-arguments of the Buddhists, as well as the alternative interpretations of the texts that were made by others, and what could still be said to be potentially implicit in these. Pramathanatha's understanding of the well-known three-fold constituents of *prakṛti* in the Sāṃkhyan tradition, that is, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamasa* is interesting. He regards these not as qualities but as being substantive in character, that is, as *dravya* rather than *guṇa* and argues that they are regarded as properties only in the context of their functioning or the liberation or bondage of the *puruṣa*. *Prakṛti*, therefore, is nothing over and above these three constituents and should not be considered as their receptacle or substratum. He does not ask as to how one might understand the notion of a three-fold substance or what exactly would be the inter-relation of these in case they are regarded as independent substances or whether it is the nature of a substance to be capable of being independent of others, both in terms of its existence and conceivability. In fact, the exact meaning and status of these three constituents, whether they are assumed as qualities or substances has perhaps never been adequately clarified. Similarly, he develops interesting arguments against both the Buddhists and the Advaitins. To the Advaitins who consider that *avidyā* is the cause of bondage, he suggests that ignorance necessarily postulates the reality of something of which one is ignorant and of which one will possibly have knowledge that will lead to the destruction of that ignorance. However, in case *avidyā* has to be understood as absolute negation, that is, whose object is totally non-existent then by itself it cannot be the cause of anything because that which is an absolute nothing can not cause anything to come into being.

On the other hand, if *avidyā* itself is regarded as positive, then not only the knowledge will have to be regarded as "real" but its object would also have to be



given an ultimate reality inferior only to Brahman as it can be sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. However, as the knowledge of Brahman itself is sublated or obscured by *avidyā*, it will have to be regarded as almost co-ordinate with Brahman in the context of *avidyā*'s being regarded as ontologically "real" since it is causally effective in bringing into being the whole world of *prapañca* which Brahman is unable to do.

Pramathanatha has also elaborated some of Aniruddha's arguments against Buddhism, especially with regard to its doctrine of "momentariness" which follows from its criterion of reality, *arthakriyākāritva* or causal efficacy. If the Buddhist argument that the criterion of reality is supposed to be that only that can be regarded as "real" which has causal efficacy is accepted then that which is real can never exist without being causally effective, that is, without producing an effect and as the effect itself is also supposed to be "real", it will also in its turn give rise to another effect and so on *ad infinitum*. That which is real, then, can only be regarded as lasting for a moment for if it is real, it would already have given rise to its effect thus proving itself to be real, a situation which will continue indefinitely, giving rise to the necessity of each real lasting only for a moment and, by definition, not being able to remain any longer. Pramathanatha's objection to this view seems two-fold :

1. How can that be called a cause which has already ceased to be? That which does not exist cannot be a cause?
2. If mere antecedence were to entitle anything to be called a 'cause' then anything which precedes will be entitled to that description and we will not be able to distinguish between those antecedents which are the real cause from those which are not.

Pramathanatha's concern with the chronological issues on the one hand and his independent elaboration of Aniruddha's arguments against the Advaitins and the Buddhists on the other are evidence of a new freedom which even traditional philosophers had felt because of the development of a new ethos in the intellectual world of India in the second half of the nineteenth century. This impression is also strengthened by the fact that many of these scholars were not only conversant with almost all schools of Indian philosophy but had written independent works on them.

Krisnanatha Nyayapanchanana who wrote a sub-commentary on Sāṃkhya in A.D. 1902 was, for example, known more as a Naiyāyika than as a Sāṃkhyan, a fact evidenced by the title of *Nyāyapañcānana* which was awarded to him and which became a part of his name. He wrote on Vācaspati Miśra I's *Tattvakaumudī* which is itself a commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. His work is entitled *Āvaraṇavārinī*. Interestingly, he starts with the sense of frustration or unhappiness which self-consciousness feels to be alien to itself and on this he builds an elucidation and construction of the Sāṃkhyan position, a strategy which Vācaspati Miśra himself had employed. Strangely, however, Vācaspati Miśra I had introduced a discussion in his *Tattvakaumudī* regarding the slaughter of animals in the Vedic *yajña* and



its conflict with the general injunction in the Veda against inflicting injury on any living being. The discussion, though common in Indian literature, is odd in the context of Sāṃkhya as a Sāṃkhyan neither believes in the Vedas nor in Vedic ritual sacrifices for the attainment of worldly and non-worldly ends. The discussion is interesting as it leads to the issue as to whether the demerit incurred by the killing during the sacrifice outweighs the merit which accrues because of doing the *yajña* and whether this outweighing cancels the demerit altogether or whether the effects of the demerit continue and one has to suffer its consequences later in one's life or even after that. The issue is theoretically important as it concerns the relation between the merit and demerit earned by one's good and evil actions and whether the consequences of the two affect each other or are totally independent and hence have no influence on each other. This problem has been raised in the context of *phalsāṃkhyā* by Mīmāṃsā and has been extensively discussed by thinkers following Appaya Dīkṣita, who had raised the issue focally in his work entitled, *Vidhi Rasāyana* on the subject. The Mīmāṃsaka thinkers, however formulate a principle which, at least in this specific context, seems to take care of the problem posed by it. The principle is, "if a discourse starts with a general prohibition but if in the same discourse the prohibition is explicitly suspended (and even the opposite course of action recommended) for certain specific cases, the suspension of the prohibition stands justified because the specific cases are of stronger import". The principle is perhaps meant to state that, in case an exception is itself mentioned under the rules then it cannot be construed as contrary to the general rule as the rule itself provides explicitly for the exception to it. However, it seems that Vācaspati Miśra I has tried to suggest that this may be permitted only if the exception is not clearly contrary to the rule itself. But it does not seem to be so in the case of the injunction regarding the killing of animals during the sacrifice. Vācaspati's point is not clear. The issue might possibly be formulated in a clearer manner if one remembers the principle of organic unities that Moore had argued for in his well-known book, *Principia Ethica*, in which his contention was that the value of the whole is not the sum of the value of the parts but independent of it. Moore, it is true, was not thinking so much in terms of wholes or unities formed out of a plurality of actions where one might be a means to something else or form a complementary part of the totality of the action. On the other hand, if it be argued that each action has an intrinsic value or disvalue which is not affected by its becoming a means to some other end or by its becoming part of a larger action, then the issue of the relation between the demerit incurred by the killing of animals and the merit earned by performing the ritual sacrifice would have to be understood differently. Also one of the interesting points incidentally made by Krishnanatha is that if one confines oneself to the hedonistic calculus of satisfaction and dissatisfaction alone, one would have to ask whether the total satisfaction outweighs the dissatisfaction incurred by the killing. But if the question is posed in terms of incurring merit or demerit, it will then not be so easy to mitigate or to wipe away the sin which was incurred by doing the wrong act. In fact, the problem is



a wider one which has never been focally discussed as, for example, the same issue might arise in the context of *tapas* and *prāyaścitta* by doing which one is supposed to mitigate or wipe out the effects of the evil deeds one has committed, as one would then admit that an action can counteract the effects of another action and affect the calculus of merit and demerit just as much as the calculus of satisfaction and dissatisfaction or pain and pleasure is supposed to do. In fact, the situation is even more complicated as there may be pleasures and satisfaction which presuppose pain or dissatisfaction as their necessary precondition or even as their constituent part. Similarly, an action which is undesirable in itself may be a constituent part or a necessary means for the performance of that which is right or good. The whole notion of *dharma saṁkṣāta* involves these and it is strange that neither the Mīmāṃsakas nor any one else has seriously thought about it in the tradition.

In a discussion of intrinsic and extrinsic validity of awareness, Krishnanātha Nyayapanchanana has formulated a criterion of intrinsic validity of awareness which perhaps comes closest to the notion of analytic truth in western philosophy. The principle as formulated by Kalidasa Bhattacharya is as follows:

“An awareness is intrinsically valid only if the very factors which make us take it as an awareness also guarantee its validity, that is, when for its validation or for the awareness of its validity, other factors or other confirming awarenesses are not required”.<sup>4</sup>

The example which he gives is that of hearing a sentence from the *śruti*, but that obviously is wrong as its validity will only be for that person who believes in the *śruti* and even he will have to interpret its meaning and see whether it coheres with other statements of the *śruti*.

Another interesting issue which appears to have been raised by Krishnanath Nyayapanchanana is the dual characteristic of the awareness of both word and sentence meaning as, on the one hand, it refers to some external state of affairs which may be supposed to be its referential meaning, and on the other, it also creates a difference in the psychic state of the mind which has an effect, sometimes even a radical and profound one, on experiencing consciousness. The latter has been generally neglected in the western discussions on the subject, but it is of great importance, particularly in the case of those sounds, words and sentences which are supposed to be “revelatory” and whose apprehension has a transformative effect on consciousness irrespective of what they are supposed to refer to. It may be noted that this difference is not the same as the one between sense and reference brought to the attention of the philosophical world by Frege in the western tradition. The concept of the *śruti* and the *śabda pramāṇa* become even more intelligible if they are seen in this light.

In his discussion of the distinction between the manifest and the unmanifest *prakṛti*, that is the *vyakta* and the *avyakta*, Krisnanatha Nyayapanchanana points out that this distinction, if seriously taken, will be in conflict with the theory of *Satkāryavāda* which Śāṁkhya is also supposed to hold. The theory of *Satkāryavāda*



states that the effect is already pre-existent in the cause and, if so, whatever is manifest should already be there in the unmanifest state and that, hence, the distinction between the manifest and the unmanifest cannot be from the view point of the "content" of either. There can, thus, be no real destruction just as there can be no real origination if one accepts the theory of *Satkāryavāda*. However, the more fundamental question as to how there can be a distinction between the manifest and the unmanifest at the ontological level has not been tackled. For, firstly, the notion of the manifest involves the "appearing" to consciousness and, secondly, it involves the reality of time. Interestingly, Sāṃkhya does not seem to accept space and time amongst the twenty-four *tattvas*. Besides this, Krisnanatha also seems to treat *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* as inferential qualities which are theoretically postulated to account for the empirical facts of agreeableness (*prīti*), disagreeableness (*apṛīti*), apathy and lack of all interest altogether as denoted by the term *viśāda*.

There is an interesting discussion regarding the reality of the inference of consciousness, that is, whether it should be inferred from the experience of the knowing consciousness or the enjoying consciousness (*bhokṣabhāva*). It is surprising, however, that no one thought of the possibility of inferring it from the fact of volitional action (*kṛtṛtva*).

The role of the subtle body consisting of the *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, *manas* and the five subtle elements was thought by Krishnanatha Panchanana to be a matter of inference from the facts of pain, pleasure and confusion. However, the terms subtle and gross and the distinction between them in philosophical discussion and analysis are not only relative terms, but it may be said that there can be no such thing as gross or subtle in itself. Moreover, if one accepts the distinction one would have to apply it throughout so that the subtle body would then need to have subtle *jñānendriyas* and *karmendriya* as well along with the gross. Interestingly, the Tantra accepted a subtle body as a counterpart of the gross body which we are generally not aware of.

#### Panchanana Tarkaratna

An interesting question as to what exactly is meant by *āgam ekam*, a statement found in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, is raised by Panchanana Tarkaratna. This is supposed to be the basis of the claim that Sāṃkhya is supported by the *śruti*. The philosophically interesting part of the discussion in which Tarkaratna appears to support Vācaspati Miśra I against Vijñānabhikṣu relates to the question of whether *prakṛti* or what may have incorrectly been translated as primal materiality is both unborn, that is, beginningless and eternal and one. The philosophical issue with respect to the first relates to whether that which is beginningless is also endless, while with respect to the claim of oneness is raised the question, "One in what sense?" The first was countered by the Advaitin's assertion that though *avidyā*, or primal ignorance, is beginningless, it does have an end while the second raises



two issues, specifically in the Sāṃkhya context as to how *prakṛti* can be called one when the system also accepts *puruṣa* as a co-eternal entity along with it. Secondly, as it holds *prakṛti* itself to be constituted of *sattva*, *rajasa* and *tamasa* how can it be regarded as one. The discussion about the one recalls the different interpretations given to the famous foundational sentence on which all schools of Vedānta are supposed to be based, that is, “*ekamevādvitīyam neha, nānāsti kiñcan*”. Interestingly, Panchanana Tarakarātna gives two alternatives regarding the notion of oneness: that without a second, as the only one of its kind, or as being that which is a constituent of everything else but which has no constituents within itself. *Prakṛti* can certainly be considered as one in the first sense, but it will be difficult to understand it as being one in the second sense, if it is essentially understood as being constituted of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* which are *prima facie* plural in character. This also goes counter to the supposed contention of Vācaspati Miśra who had suggested that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are entities which are inferred on the basis of the actual experience of agreeableness, disagreeableness and a lack of any interest or emotion, as was discussed by Krishnanatha in his work.

Panchanana Tarakarātna begin an interesting discussion on Mīmāṃsā,<sup>5</sup> particularly in connection with the issue as to whether ritual slaughter in the *yajña* as enjoined in the Vedas produces any demerit for the person concerned. In fact, an aspect not raised earlier is who should earn the demerit of the action concerned—the person who actually kills the animal or the *yajamāna* on whose behalf the *yajña* is being done?

There is yet another valuable debate available deriving from the Sāṃkhya theory of causation as to how anything can really appear or disappear. The point though discussed by earlier writers also, is given an added dimension by Panchanana Tarakarātna who seems to make a new point regarding this. It is suggested by him that disappearance can only mean that it becomes latent as there is no such thing as destruction. It is argued that the further latency of this latency can only mean its final disappearance in the *primal prakṛti* itself where everything is supposed to be non-manifest, that is *avyakta*. Thus, *abhāva* is treated as a lapse into latency and not as having any independent character of its own. But, then this notion of becoming latent itself would need an explanation as also the fact that while the notion of *avyakta* is accepted in the Sāṃkhyan tradition, normally it is applied only to *prakṛti* while all the other *tattvas* are treated only as *vyakta* and not as *avyakta*. In case the notion is extended with respect to all entities, Sāṃkhya will have to explain as to why and how this transition takes place in each of the so called *tattvas*. The problem becomes even more complicated as Sāṃkhya does not accept space and time as *tattvas*, a point that Panchanana Tarakarātna has emphasised in his discussion of Sāṃkhyan metaphysics. But if this is so, how can it maintain the distinction of manifest and unmanifest or becoming latent, which was given to explain what is known as *abhāva* in other systems?

Interestingly, neither Vācaspati Miśra I or Panchanana Tarakarātna tries to suggest that the *tattvas* of all other systems can be reduced to the *tattvas* of



Sāṃkhya and hence need not be considered as independent substantial entities besides those that are enumerated in the Sāṃkhya system. Not only this, the problem of the relationship between the different *tattvas* enumerated in the Sāṃkhya system does not appear to have been attended to, nor is their relation to the primeval *prakṛti* discussed.

Panchanana Tarkaratna also makes the point that, considering the fact that the intellect or *buddhi* in Sāṃkhya is an unconscious or material principle, knowledge cannot be considered as its function. However, the modification of *buddhi* as it is illuminated by the light of consciousness and which, therefore, attains the state of knowledge, is to be distinguished from those states of *buddhi* that are not so illuminated. The idea of the mode of intellect or *buddhi* needs to be further explained as there can be no mode other than that of the *sāttvika*, the *rājasika* or the *tāmasika* in the Sāṃkhyan system. Further, it is not clear as to what the relationship is between *buddhi*, *manas*, the *tanmātras* and the *mahābhūtas*, on the one hand, and the *karmendriyas* and the *jñānendriyas*, on the other. Writers on Sāṃkhya as all the others who write on Indian philosophy are more concerned with explaining what the text says rather than in formulating questions and problems of their own and in discovering whether the text has significant answers to them.

Besides the relation of the intellect with the object of sense perception, Sāṃkhya emphasises the relation of the intellect to consciousness through egoity. When the intellect relates with the object of sense perception it takes the form of the object and asserts it in the judgemental form that it is such and such while in the relation of the intellect to consciousness through egoity the whole is appropriated by the sense of the "I" which then apprehends the object as relevant to it in the context of desire and action. In the second stage, it also identifies with it in a deeper sense as now the 'ego' itself is seen as 'coloured' or 'determined' by the object which is believed to exist in 'such and such a way'. The term *pratyakṣa* is used in Sāṃkhya in two senses, the first sense obviously relates to the usual contact of the senses with the object concerned. The second sense of the term, however, brings the intellect into the picture and uses the term to denote the conjunction of the intellect with this contact of the senses with the object. It is not clear, however, that the second is the same as "introspection" or whether it is being maintained that the first cannot be called perception at the human level unless the second contact also takes place. In fact, there seems to be another problem with regard to this issue, as according to Sāṃkhya no knowledge can occur unless it is illuminated by the light of consciousness which is totally outside the system and which occurs, only because of a confusion. If, on the other hand, as was earlier said in the context of intellect or *buddhi*, a modality of it can occur without having knowledge as it was not being illuminated by consciousness, then Sāṃkhya will have to account for the reasons as to why this illumination or contact with consciousness occurs at certain times and not at others.



Regarding the Sāṃkhyan theory of *Satkāryavāda* Panchanana Tarkaratna suggests that if the theory is accepted, the distinction between the *pāramārthika*, *vyāvahārika* and *pratibhāsika* levels of reality will become untenable. Not only this, one will have to accept that everything including *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahamkāra* are already there in *prakṛti* in an unmanifest form. Also, as in the Sāṃkhyan system, *prakṛti* is supposed to be constantly changing, the distinction between the real and the unreal cannot be based on the ground of permanence and change. However, it is not clear as to how the doctrine of *satkāryavāda* will help in explaining erroneous cognition or deal with the problem of the ontological status of an illusory object or a dreamt object.

Another issue that Panchanana Tarkaratna raises in the context of the statement given by Vācaspati Miśra I is that if *rajas* is the principle of all motion it must be the cause of motion not only in *sattva* and *tamas* but also in itself. This raises the further problem of its being the cause of its own motion. But while Panchanana Tarkaratna draws our attention to the problem, he does not give any satisfactory solution to it.

In the context of the argument that the same object produces satisfaction, dissatisfaction and confusion in different persons due to the dominance of the *sāttvika*, *rājasika* and *tāmasika* elements in them and not due to any differences in the objects own qualities, Panchanana Tarkaratna makes a significant contribution. He says that if it were so, why should it not be true with respect to other qualities such as colour or taste, etc.? However, what is not considered is that the object is also made up of the *rājasika*, *tāmasika* and *sāttvika* qualities and, according to the Sāṃkhyan position, these qualities can only dominate alternatively and not solely all the time. Also unclear is how Sāṃkhya differentiate between qualities such as colour, taste, shape, size, etc., and those which are known as *sāttvika*, *rājasika*, *tāmasika*. Perhaps the latter qualities may be regarded as second order qualities which arise on the basis of the first order qualities, mentioned earlier. This will be analogous to Locke's primary and secondary qualities, though the distinction between them is made in a different context and at a different level. Most of the qualities that we have considered as first order qualities in the Sāṃkhya system are regarded as "secondary qualities" in Locke's system. However, as the *sāttvika*, *rājasika* and *tāmasika* qualities seen to be valuational in character, they may be regarded as third level or tertiary qualities from those which Locke has called "secondary qualities" in his system. In any case, this is the direction that Sāṃkhyan thought did not take but, at least, Panchanana Tarkaratna has pointed out the way by raising questions regarding the relation of qualities such as *sāttvika*, *rājasika* and *tāmasika* to other qualities such as colour, etc. which are accepted in the Sāṃkhyan system.

Regarding the non-composite character of consciousness, it is argued that consciousness cannot be characterised in terms of any entity or quality including that of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. However, Tarkaratna does not discuss what exactly it would mean to say that consciousness is composite in character or whether consciousness is affected in any sense whatsoever because of its identification



with *prakṛti* and the resulting confusion. In fact, if the confusion were not to affect the consciousness, it would not be confusion at all, for *prakṛti* being totally inert cannot be affected by confusion.

In giving reasons for the postulation of twenty-five *tattvas* in Sāṅkhya, Panchanana begins by saying that experience is the primal fact from which all reflection begins and as it does so, it immediately has to make a distinction between consciousness and the object and the relation between them. But then, does this relation belong to consciousness or to the object or to something else. At this point a new consideration is introduced that the analysis should be such that it should permit the possibility of liberation. However, this is not clear as the issue of liberation has not yet arisen.

Another question that arises in this context is why does one have to postulate the senses, the mind, the intellect and egoity in order to understand this relationship of consciousness to the object. However, Tarkaratna does not seem to directly discuss the philosophical problems raised by such a relation and does not point to the distinction between the relations that obtains: (i) between objects, (ii) and those which obtain between objects and consciousness, (or) or between one consciousness and another.

Regarding rationality and objectivity in willing as compared to rationality and objectivity in cognition with which it is usually associated, Tarkaratna suggests that objectivity in willing is the awareness of what I ought to do and the rationality in willing is to be determined by this awareness. On the other hand, he argues that rational discerning leads to belief which gives rise to the idea of the rational objectivity which operates both in knowing and willing. Strangely, however, he thinks that rational objectivity in knowledge comes from the awareness of what ought-to-be rather than "what it is". It is not quite clear as to what are his grounds for drawing the distinction between what ought-to-be and what is the case.

Further he provides an interpretation of the term *aiśvarya*, supernormal powers, which is different from the way it is generally understood. If Kalidas Bhattacharya's summary is to be believed, Panchanana Tarkaratna interprets the term *aiśvarya* to mean a "form of willing" whose rational objectivity consists in the "awareness of attaining the maximum in life". This, however, does not seem to distinguish between the "form" of willing and the awareness of attaining the *maximum* in the field in respect of which the willing is being done. Also, it is not clear how such an understanding of the term is related to the idea of "supernormal powers" with which the term is usually associated, unless one assumes that if the modality of willing completely matches the "maximum" that is desired to be attained than one is bound to attain the "maximum" through the fact of this perfect "matching" between the will and the object of willing.

Another important point that he makes is that *rajas* has to be present in every state as there can be no motion without it and thus *sāttvika* and *tāmsika* must be taken as the positive and negative directions of that movement. Interestingly, one consequence of this is that *tamas* cannot be treated as the mere



absence of that which is positive, but rather as something which is positively evil in itself. This, if taken seriously, will undermine the general understanding of *tamas* as inertia or passivity.

*Vācaspati Miśra and Rameshchandra Tarkatirtha*

One of the surprising things ascribed to Vācaspati Miśra is the distinction between the *parā* and *aparā* with respect to non-attachment and the contention that the *para*, non-attachment, is disinterestedness even in the direct intuition of the difference of consciousness and materiality (Larson, p.541). Another point made by him relates to the contention that when one wakes from dreamless sleep, one passes through all the Sāṃkhya stages in reverse order, a point that is generally not made in the texts. However, he seems to have listed this on the basis of the passages in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Purāṇas*.<sup>6</sup>

He also discusses the types of contentment as well as the content of contentment and the notion of *tuṣṭiparyāya*. However, it is not clear as to what is exactly meant by contentment and whether there is any difference between the contentment that comes from following the path that increases the awareness of 'otherness' in consciousness or from a correct understanding of materiality at any level.

It appears that Vācaspati Miśra I has equated the positions of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism, Advaita Vedānta and *Yoga sūtra* of Patañjali with the following: (i) the world is not caused; (ii) it is a transformation of consciousness; (iii) God changes the ultimate substances into the world.<sup>7</sup> It is doubtful whether the ascription of these positions to the schools mentioned above is correct.

There seems to have been a problem as to how to understand the word "*Samyoga*". *Samyoga* has been understood, on the one hand, as "*yogyatā*" on the part of both consciousness and *prakṛti* to be related to each other and, on the other, of the actual contact caused by the prenatal disposition complex (*adrṣṭa*) of the worldly person (*jīva*).<sup>8</sup>

One of the commentators of the *Tattvakaumudī*, Rameshchandra Tarkatirtha (1881) had included an independent monograph on the subject entitled *Sāṃkhyatattvavilāsīya*, written by his teacher Raghunātha Tarkavāgīśa. Besides this, he displayed a modern trend in writing by writing a biography of Vācaspati Miśra I by listing the available Sanskrit works on Sāṃkhya. He also gives a number of couplets in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* which are mentioned by the different commentators. He is perhaps the first to mention the Chinese interpretations and the number of couplets mentioned therein.

Rameshchandra in examining how the sense of egoity or *ahaṅkāra* arises starts with the Sāṃkhyan formulation that it is the reflection of pure consciousness in the *buddhi* that leads to the conditioning of the awareness as an awareness of the 'I'. However, if it is so, then the sense of egoity or what is mentioned as *ahaṅkāra* should occur in Sāṃkhya after *buddhi* and not before it. Also, the specificity of the 'I' in the *buddhi*, both in a general form and in its specific



form, as belonging to the individual, will have to be distinguished and there will have to be a generalised egoity as well as specific egoities. While Sāṃkhya has not elaborated on this, possibly the postulate of the plurality of the *puruṣa* might help to solve this problem. The sense of 'I-ness' appearing consequent to the reflection of consciousness in the *buddhi* will then merely be a function of the specificity of the *puruṣa* in the plural world of *puruṣas* and not be purely the result of the fact of its being reflected in a radically alien medium, that is, the *buddhi*. The further specification of this egoity or sense of 'I-ness' is also a problem because of the differentially determinant nature of all the other adjuncts with which the *buddhi* is associated including, of course, the *buddhi* itself. But, if this is accepted, then each particular *jīva*, to use a term from a different philosophical system, would have to have its "own" differentiated specific *manas* along with the *jñānendriyas* and *karmendriyas* and all the constituents of the so-called individual in the Sāṃkhyan system. There would still remain the problem of the general sense of I-ness or egoity or *ahamkāra* whose very notion could not be formulated in the system as there is no reflection in the unitary, primordial *prakṛti* which perhaps provide the grounds for it. But all those questions arise from Rameshchandra's view as to how the sense of egoity or *ahamkāra* arises in the Sāṃkhyan system. It is not clear how other commentators on *Tattvakaumudī* have dealt with this issue, or how they differ from the position taken by Rameshchandra on it.

Another issue debated by Rameshchandra is that of the relation between the subtle elements and the gross elements and whether the subtle elements (*tanmātras*) have a form of their own. In case they do not have a form of their own, and are only a necessary part in the chain that relates the gross elements to the mind through the senses, what function then do they perform in the system? Are they only transmitting agents for the conveying of the gross elements to the mind so that the mind can more easily grasp the gross elements in a manner that is suited to its own nature. But even this would involve some sort of a transformation in the material received from the gross elements. On the other hand, if these subtle elements are supposed to have a form of their own then how does this "form" interact with the form of the gross elements before transmitting it to the mind. Also it is unclear as to whether Sāṃkhya would distinguish between 'subtle' and 'gross' at the level of the senses, the mind and the intellect as it does at the level of the gross elements. In fact, the distinction between the *sāttvika*, the *rājasika* and the *tāmasika* cuts across the distinction between the gross and the subtle, and what exactly is the relation between the two is unanswered. In case the subtle elements are regarded as not having a form, it will be difficult to distinguish one subtle element from another one of the same type. Neither Vācaspati Miśra I nor Rameshchandra Tarkatīrtha seem to have addressed this problem.

The issue of the reflection of consciousness in the *buddhi* as giving rise to the awareness of the 'I', it is carried further in the discussion of consciousness and self-consciousness and the distinction between them. The discussion is further



complicated by roles played by the mind, the *buddhi* and the *ahamkāra*, both separately and collectively, resulting in the awareness of consciousness as reflected at this level.

Rameshchandra Tarkatirtha also discusses the notion of "*svalakṣaṇa sāmānya*" which is a strange amalgam of the notion of *svalakṣaṇa* as given by the Buddhists and the notion of *sāmānya* as given by the Naiyāyikas. The idea is that both the specific particular and the universal, of which it is an instance, are apprehended simultaneously, as without this, no *vyāpti* would occur as it requires the simultaneous apprehension of the particular and the universal for it to take place. One has to apprehend not only the universal fireness which is related to smokeness but also the particular specific fire and smoke which are instances of this. Thus, one simultaneously infers both the fireness which is a universal and the specific instance of fire which, though unperceived, is the particular instance to it. For the Buddhists, the *sāmānya* is a *vikalpa* which is superimposed on the particular, while for the Naiyāyika the two are interfused. However, as to whether we can apprehend the *sāmānya* without necessarily apprehending the *svalakṣaṇa* in which it is instanciated as is the case with the *svalakṣaṇa*, which cannot be apprehended without simultaneously apprehending the *sāmānya* involved in it, is a problem raised here. It may be noted that for the Buddhists the *svalakṣaṇa* is a matter of inference or at least should be so, even though it may be directly apprehended in some extraordinary state of consciousness.

What exactly is meant by the *prakṛti* in Sāṃkhya or what do any of its specific formations for example, *Jada*, unconscious or material denote. Rameshchandra Tarkatirtha makes it clear that these terms merely mean that it is other than consciousness and not that they are illumined by something else (Larson, p.510), as in Sāṃkhya awareness whether of the *puruṣa* or of anything else is itself the result of the reflection of *puruṣa* in the *buddhi*. Perhaps this is better illustrated when it said that the otherness to consciousness is something different from materiality as not only a living being but also creation of consciousness and acts of consciousness can be objects of someone else's consciousness and hence function as 'other' to it.

In distinguishing the Sāṃkhya concept of *guṇa* from the Vaiśeṣika concept, he suggests that *guṇa* is essentially for the purposes of some other and hence has primarily a teleological function. This, however, seems hardly tenable as one would then have to accept that the *tamas* and the *rajas* also have a purpose which obviously would be opposite to *sattva*, and their purpose would become independent of that for whom these purposes are exercised.

Why does consciousness have to be postulated as a separate principle? The intrinsic dynamism of *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas* leading to perpetual change needs no explanation as it is intrinsic to them, while the heterogeneous changes leading to *ahamkāra*, etc., do need the postulation of consciousness as there is a teleological element in them which cannot be understood in terms of the dynamic nature of the three *guṇas* themselves.



Another reason according to Rameshchandra Tarkatirtha is that all experience is accompanied by an attitude of satisfaction or dissatisfaction towards the object experienced and this can only be outside the experience and hence some principle like consciousness has to be postulated. An interesting distinction is drawn by him between the "witness-consciousness" and the "knower-consciousness", that is, the *sākṣin* and the *drṣṭā* in that the former is only aware of the processes of consciousness through, of course, the usual processes of reflection, while in the latter, the objects of these processes are also included in the awareness. It may be noted that normally one does not distinguish between the *sākṣin* and the *drṣṭā*, yet the author seems to make a distinction between them, though he uses the term *drṣṭr* instead of *drṣṭā*.<sup>9</sup>

The need for postulating *buddhi* is given in detail<sup>10</sup> by Rameshchandra Tarkatirtha as also why it has to be distinguished from both mind and *ahamkāra* which are very similar to it and the sense capacities which are dissimilar to it. The need for the mind is as perception in many cases does not occur even where there is contact between the senses and the object when one is not attending to it. But then the mind should be identified with the faculty of attention or given the function of attending which generally is not done either in Nyāya or in Sāṃkhya. On the other hand, the need for postulating the *buddhi*, as distinct from mind and egoity is due to the phenomenon of dreamless sleep. However, it is not explained as to why the postulation of *ahamkāra* or egoity cannot perform this function. Also, the function of thinking and ratiocinative discrimination has been completely ignored in the discussion. Many other issues such as the lack of contact between the senses and the object in dreams is not paid any attention to, nor it is considered necessary to explain why other *tattvas*, besides the usual three, do not need to be postulated to account for experience, or to account for, say, imagination or memory. The field of action is totally left out of any consideration, particularly as action can never make sense at the level of perception alone.<sup>11</sup>

There is a strange notion in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of *prakṛtilaya* or of a final absorption in primal materiality which has also been called liberation. Īśvarakṛṣṇa appears to have attributed this attainment to the practice of non-attachment, while Vācaspati Miśra I in his commentary seems to have said that the mere practice of non-attachment without the accompanying consciousness of one's total difference from all objects would not lead to *prakṛtilaya* or this kind of liberation. Rameshchandra Tarkatirtha suggests that the non-attachment which is accompanied by the awareness of consciousness of total separation would alone lead to liberation in the sense of *kaivalya*. It is not quite clear whether this is the exact contention, but in case the notion of *prakṛtilaya* is introduced by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, one would then have to explore the argument to see how it is different from the notion of *kaivalya* in the system.



*Hariharananda Aranya*

As a practicing Sāṃkhyan, Hariharananda Aranya has explicated the Sāṃkhya and Yoga doctrines more from an experiential point of view rather than as objects of philosophical reflection. In his discussion of consciousness he makes a distinction between a change in consciousness that occurs because of a change in the object of consciousness and a change that occurs even when the object of consciousness has remained the same. The latter he has called *lākṣaṇika*, while the former is called *aupādānika*. Oddly enough, he has not raised the question as to whether the latter affects our apprehension of the object in any way, for many a time a change in our consciousness affects the way we apprehend things.

Hariharananda Aranya also makes a distinction between awareness and consciousness as he argues that all stimulations after reaching of the intellect are transformed into awareness, while consciousness remains unaffected by these stimulations.<sup>12</sup> He also raises the issue of the plurality of consciousness.

Explaining the term 'avyakta' as it is applied to *prakṛti*, in a different way from that which is usually accepted in Sāṃkhyan philosophy in this context, he says that *prakṛti* is called 'avyakta' because it is not an object of awareness to the liberated *puruṣa* and not because it is unmanifest as is usually held by the Sāṃkhyans. Hence, according to him, the descriptions of *prakṛti* as *vyakta* and *avyakta* are only in relation to the unliberated and the liberated *puruṣa* and have nothing to do with its own state. He calls this state *avyakta* also as "tamas" which is incomprehensible as no state of *prakṛti* can be purely described in terms of only one of its *guṇas*, least of all, in terms of *tamas*.

*Sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are described by him according to his own understanding as *prakāśa*, (capacity for expression), *kriyā* and *sthiti* and suggests that when these three achieve a state of equilibrium they dissolve into *prakṛti*. Here it may be noted that *sthiti* is understood as the capacity for remaining in a latent state and is identified with *tamas*; but that the concepts of latency and non-latency cannot be applied if *avyakta* is defined in relation to the situation that alone obtains in relation to the liberated *puruṣa* is not considered by him. Also, it is not clear what exactly would be the difference between unconsciousness and liberation if the notion of *avyakta* is understood in the manner proposed by him.

The phenomenal world as understood by Hariharanand is a result of the interaction between primordial materiality, or *prakṛti* and the absolute illuminator consciousness or *puruṣa*. The former is called *sthiti* and the latter *prakāśa*. The third that is *kriyā* stands for the relation between the two and is supposed to possess the character of constant change and transitoriness. However, this formulation is opposed to the earlier formulation where the concepts of *sthiti* and *tamas* were defined differently.<sup>13</sup>

Hariharanand Aranya formulates the relationship between *mana*, *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra* in an interesting way and sees them in a unitary manner as constituting the internal organ or the *antaḥkaraṇa* with three different aspects also related to what he has called *prakāśa*, *kriyā* and *sthiti* and also to *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The



function of the *buddhi* is *prakāśa* and it is essentially *sāttvika* in character. *Ahaṃkāra* or egoity is seen as the dynamic aspect of *buddhi*, or self, through which a self is related to the not-self and is associated with *kriyā* or *rajas*, while mind or *tamas* is supposed to be that aspect by which the self gets attached to the object. But the relation between the *antaḥkaraṇa* and the self does not seem to be clear. Also, while one may understand how the self can be related to the object without attachment, it is difficult to see how the self can be related to the other without illumining it in some sense or other.

However, there is another meaning of *prakāśa* given by Hariharanand Aranya which treats it as the capacity for expression. If so, this will be the free activity of consciousness resulting in its objectification, but then through what does the self express itself? In spite of these difficulties, it is clear that Hariharanand Aranya is trying to creatively rethink the Sāṃkhyan concepts and understand them in a new manner. The attempt to see *mana*, *buddhi* and *ahaṃkāra* as integrally related to each other results in an interesting formulation, suggesting that transformation in any one of them will not affect the conscious or *puruṣas*. He tries to answer the objection as to whether if such a plurality of *puruṣas* is admitted, would each limit the other as all of them are considered to be infinite. His reply to the objection is that it is irrelevant as consciousness is not spatial in nature and hence the idea of one limiting the other does not arise.<sup>14</sup> He may also have taken recourse to the notion that the Sāṃkhyan *puruṣa* is not supposed to be omnipotent or even omniscient and hence even the possible limitation of each by the other cannot be conceived. He, of course, does not raise the issue as to how one would distinguish between one *puruṣa* and another in case the notion of plurality is to be strictly maintained. If there is to be real plurality, then there has also to be a real difference. Would the *puruṣas* be like Leibnitzian monads with the difference that all of them are equally clear and distinct in their consciousness? He also does not seem to raise the question as to whether one consciousness is aware of another, or even if it is aware of itself would it necessarily result in the transformation of the remaining as well. However, as all the three that is *mana*, *buddhi* and *ahaṃkāra*, have been defined in a very simplistic manner, it is not clear what a change in them would mean; for any change will mean the abolition of their function and consequently of themselves also.

The concept of *ahaṃkāra* is treated as *asmitā* or the I-consciousness by Hariharanand Aranya and he suggests that the I-consciousness has two kinds of transformations, one which he calls *vidyāpariṇāma* and the other which he calls *avidyāpariṇāma*. The first, according to him, is *sāttvika*, while the second seems to arise more because of confusion or identification with anything other than itself. He also makes a distinction between a radical transformation which he calls *jātyantarpariṇāma* and the other as a change of state without any change in the type or the species to which one belongs (*avasthāpariṇāma*). It appears that the *vidyāpariṇāma* is a change in *smitā* of the latter kind (*avasthāpariṇāma*) as here the distinction between the 'I' and the other obtains while the *avidyāpariṇāma* is of the former kind (*jātyantarpariṇāma*) as there the I-consciousness undergoes a



radical transformation and begins to conceive of itself as the other which is entirely opposed to it. This may not be correct representation of his position as what he means by the statement is not quite clear (see p.584). However, it is an interesting formulation that the I-consciousness itself gives rise to cognitive consciousness which itself is of many kinds depending on its relationship to the 'other' of which it is conscious.

The operations of awareness which are ascribed to *antaḥkaraṇa*, that is, *mana*, *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra* are divided into those of *śakti* and *avasthā*. The first are dynamic activities like thinking, etc. Similarly, the *antaḥkaraṇa* is supposed to have two kinds of properties: *pratyayas* which include both cognition and conations and *saṁskāras* that is latent dispositions.<sup>15</sup> (The use of the term *pratyaya* for conation seems very odd.) It is also not clear as to what the difference between *śakti* and *pratyaya* is on the one hand, and *avasthā* and *saṁskāra*, on the other. Perhaps *śakti* may be understood as the activity of the internal organ and *pratyaya* as the result of that activity. Similarly, *avasthā* may be seen as giving rise to *saṁskāra*. However, the summary given does not clarify these issues.

Hariharanand Aranya gives a detailed analysis of the activity of cognition which, surprisingly, has been given as *prakhyā*. These activities are *pramāṇa*, *smṛti*, *pravṛttivijñāna* (cognition of activities), *vikalpa* (conceptual constructions) and *viparyaya*.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, *pravṛtti* has five subdivisions: *saṁkalpa*, *kalpanā*, *kṛti*, *vikalpanā* (doubt and hesitation) and *viparyasta* (futile effort).

Hariharanand Aranya makes a radical distinction in the understanding of *śabda* as a *pramāṇa* as he confines it to the spoken word only and that too by an *āpta puruṣa*, which of course, is not the Śāṁkhya *puruṣa*. He explicitly excludes anything written as being the basis of *śabda pramāṇa*.

The notion of *vikalpa* or what has been translated as conceptual construction is divided into *vastuvikalpa*, *kriyāvikalpa* and *abhāvavikalpa*. The last is interesting as here objects are supposed to exist because there are words for them, while in the first, an object is regarded as more or different from what it actually is. In the second, the agency is supposed to be wrongly attributed. Perhaps the notion could be widened and treated differently. However, Hariharanand Aranya has not taken into consideration the fact that any *vikalpa* can lead to genuine activity on the part of one because of the mistaken *vikalpa* which one considers to be true.

A detailed analysis of the five *pravṛttis*<sup>17</sup> is given by Aranya in which the notion of *saṁkalpa* or intentionality has been defined as the application of I-consciousness in conscious activities. While discussing the *avasthā vṛtti*,<sup>18</sup> which he identifies with satisfaction, frustration and confusion, he gives a new and interesting analysis of confusion as arising from excessive satisfaction and frustration.

Hariharanand Aranya uses a new word for love of life called *abhiniveśa* and defines it as dread in general and not only fear of death. He also regards *rāga*, *dveṣa* and the *abhiniveśa* as static operations relating to *kṛti*. He treats *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *suṣupti* as states of the body and equates them with *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in his analysis of them. A new state which has not generally been paid



attention to called *utsvapna* is introduced by him. This has been translated as nightmare and relates these four states to the active states of the body and the mind.<sup>19</sup>

He also discusses the notion of *vyavasāya* or determination which operates in consciousness and distinguishes *sadvyavasāya* (direct perception), *anuvyavasāya* (reflection) and *paridr̥ṣṭa vyavasāya* (undistinguished activity that causes mutation in sleep).

An interesting reason is put forth as to why the ultimate material cause of the object cannot be grasped in the same way as the external object itself is grasped through the knowing and acting capacities of the subject and the object.<sup>20</sup> He ascribes three characteristics to all objects in terms of their knowability (*bodhyatva*), their mutability (*kriyātva*) and inertness (or *jādyā*). Perhaps it would have been better if *kriyātva* could have been translated as the capacity to be transformed or changed by human activity and inertness as resistance to both knowability and transformability.

In the Sāṃkhyan Tradition, Hariharanand Aranya gives yet another distinction between the subtle elements and the gross elements. He treats the former as having only generic properties with no differentiation within them which the gross elements are supposed to possess and hence the former do not give rise to frustration, satisfaction, etc.<sup>21</sup> He raises the question as to what might be the cause of the subtle elements and answers that it might be something akin to mind. In this connection, he postulates the notion of an objective mind or the *virāta puruṣa* to whose waking and sleeping states he ascribes the manifestation and dissolution of the universe. He also gives an argument as to why the cause of subtle elements can only be akin to something internal. The argument is based on the assumption that external qualities such as colour, sound, etc., do not belong to the subtle elements and hence as they cannot be external in nature, they must be internal. This however goes against the notion of *satkāryavāda* for, in case the gross elements are the result of subtle elements, they must possess the same properties though in a subtle form. It is obvious that Hariharanand Aranya is building his own version of the Sāṃkhya system, regardless of whether in this process he is violating some of the fundamental tenets of the system. In fact, the theory of cosmic creation and dissolution as given by him seems to have nothing to do with classical Sāṃkhya. It is an attempt to synthesize the usual non-Sāṃkhyan versions found in the *Purāṇas* and even some portion of the Vedas and to integrate them into the Sāṃkhya system. But the attempt does not seem to be very successful.

Rama Shankara Bhattacharya who co-edited the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Volume IV on Sāṃkhya with Larson has himself written a commentary on Vijnānabhikṣu's interpretation of the *Sāṃkhya Sūtras* contained in his work, *Sāṃkhyapṛavacana Bhāṣya*. However, he sharply differs from Vijnānabhikṣu's interpretation of the *Sāṃkhya Sūtras* and has given substantive reasons of his own for doing so. Besides this, he has also changed the sequence of the *sūtras* in order to make their meaning and discussion more coherent.



Thus, it is apparant that there has been fresh thinking on many of the issues in the Śāṃkhya system from the eighteenth century onwards. In fact, if we take both the quantity and the quality of the work produced in this period, it would seem that there was some sort of renaissance among traditional scholars, who thought and wrote during this period. Some of these were Saṅyāsins belonging to the Udāsīn sect. Others, like Hariharananda Aranya established *āśramas* devoted to the practice of *Sāṃkhya sādhanā*, even though he himself has written new theoretical treatises on both Sāṃkhya and yoga which are well known to those who are interested in the subject.

The observations that we have presented in these pages are based primarily on the summaries given in the Larsen volume and they serve to give a glimpse of the new insights that are found in the works of all the thinkers so far discussed. However, it should be noted that only the summaries written by Kalidas Bhattacharya highlight the new directions in the philosophic points made by these writers and one would have to examine more closely the original material to find what other innovations and novelties are contained therein.

Except perhaps the work of Hariharananda Aranya, all the rest are commentaries either on the *Tattvakaumudī* or the *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*, a mode of writing which generally is treated as being merely expository in nature, providing little room for innovative thought or creative departures on the part of the commentator. However, in practice, this is not true of most commentaries. Philosophical thinking in India has developed through the medium of commentaries which have diverse names such as *bhāṣya*, *vṛtti*, *vārttika*, *ṭīkā*, etc. and modern students of the subject are misled by this form of presentation. It is seldom noticed that this was merely a form of writing which the culture had developed to give a sense of both continuity and change as once an outstanding *bhāṣya* or *vārttika* or *ṭīkā* was written by anybody, it provided a new point of departure in thought for subsequent thinkers who wrote their own commentaries on it in order to highlight its originality and develop their own new insights in the context of what it had said. If one takes the developments in Sāṃkhyan thought during this period seriously, one would be amazed to find how the pervading picture of philosophical developments during this period is not only fundamentally misrepresented, but also that the usual presentation of Sāṃkhyan philosophy in the text books is generally far from the faithful presentation which it claims to be. The same is the case with other schools of thought as we shall see later during the subsequent chapters on *Nyāya*, *Vedānta* and *Alaṃkāra Śāstra* etc.

## YOGA

Sāṃkhya is usually associated with Yoga and the two are treated together in most presentations of Indian philosophy, just as are Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. But this treatment does not do justice to the individuality of these systems, nor to the radical differences between them. However, unlike Vaiśeṣika the case with the



Yoga system is totally different as it is not a theoretical cognitive enterprise at all, nor is it concerned with the usual problems of *uddeśa*, *lakṣaṇa* and *parīkṣā* with which Indian theoretical thought is supposed to be concerned. It is a transcendental praxis or, to use an Indian term, a *prayoga śāstra*, that is, a *śāstra* which is concerned essentially with practice aiming at the achievement of something outside itself and not just a theoretical, cognitive enterprise resulting in the conceptual understanding of something as is usually the case in the *śāstras* which are not essentially concerned with any particular praxis.

The *Yoga Sūtras* of Patañjali, in fact, proclaim themselves as a '*sāsana grantha*', that is, a treatise which deals with injunctions or rules or commands to be observed. Thus, it is not concerned with any discussion regarding what the *tattvas* are or what knowledge is and whose property it is and whether it is *nitya* or *anitya*, or what exactly the meaning of *śruti* is and whether it should be interpreted as primarily concerned with the performance of *yajñas* or with the knowledge of Brahman. The main interest for Yoga lies elsewhere, that is, in delineating the step by step means for the attainment of a particular state of consciousness which it calls '*samādhi*'. The developments in Yoga, therefore, have primarily been in the domain of praxis and almost all schools of spiritual seeking have had their own 'yogas' as a practical applied counterpart of what they seek to realize as the ultimate goal of human endeavour.

Developments in the thinking about yoga and the practices related to it have continued is, from the eighteenth century onwards. But most of them have occurred in non-Sanskritic contexts and perhaps the most significant of them all is Sri Aurobindo's integral yoga which he has theoretically propounded in his book entitled, *The Synthesis of Yoga*, the practical counterpart of which has been experimented upon at the Sri Aurobindo Ashrama in Pondicherry and Auroville, the Yoga township created after Sri Aurobindo's death. There are other movements and developments in the later half of the twentieth century, mainly under western influence and the demand generated by western seekers of yoga which have been associated with the names of such persons as Mahesh Yogi, Rajanish and others. But these shall be discussed later when the developments in traditional Indian thought under the western impact in the nineteenth century and thereafter are examined.

#### NOTES

1. Larson, G.E. and Bhattacharya, R.S. eds. 1987. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, IV: 56-57.
2. *Ibid.*, 64-65.
3. Solomon, E.A. Summary of *Tattvakaumudīvyākhyā* by Sri Bharati Yati in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. op. cit. p. 407.
4. Bhattacharya, Kalidasa. Summary of *Āvaraṇavāriṇī* on *Tattvakaumudī* in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. op. cit. p. 492.
5. Bhattacharya, Kalidasa. Summary of *Mimāṃsā* on *Tattvakaumudī* in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. op. cit. pp. 523-24.



6. *Ibid.* p. 541.
7. *Ibid.* p. 543.
8. *Ibid.* p.543.
9. Bhattacharya, Kalidasa. Summary of Guṇamayī on Tattvakaumudī in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. op. cit. p. 572.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 572-73.
11. The translation of Saṅkalpa on p. 573, *Ibid.*, as intentionality appears to be highly questionable.
12. Bhattacharya, Shankar. Summary of Sāṅkhyatattvāloka in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. op. cit. p. 582.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 583.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 582.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 584.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 584.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 586.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 586.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 587.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 588.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 588.