

cal differences between the realms. On this basis they presume that the natural sciences are prestigious and of a higher order than the other cognitive realms. For the nature of the object of study of the natural sciences is inert and thereby objective, while the nature of the object of study (reality) of the social sciences is that of a conscious and free being and thus not as objective as that of the realm of the natural sciences. This distinction of lower and higher order, which is a distinction of kind and not of degree, between cognitive disciplines is almost of the kind we find in the Indian context between 'vyavahāra' and 'paramārtha' or the empirical and the trans-empirical or the phenomenal and the noumenal where the realm of the noumenal or the *adhyātma* is of a higher order than the realm of the phenomenal or *vyavahāra*. This distinction has not been mentioned in these terms by any of the supporters of the thesis of duality of realms. Yet, they all tend to express that natural science is of a higher order at the epistemic or ontological level as if it belonged to the realm of *adhyātma* (or noumena), while the realm of the social sciences is of a lower order or a realm which belongs to *vyavahāra* or the phenomenal level.

This seems wrong, as has been argued earlier. In fact, the nature of the object of any discipline, whether it is natural science, social science or the humanities, stands in the same order. To see this unity from the perspective of content the Sāṅkhyan model of *tri-guṇa* may be used. In this model the three *guṇas*: *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are ontologically of the same order and thus share several common characteristics of *prakṛti*. For they are all constituents or elements of *prakṛti*. Yet, each of the *guṇas* possesses some unique characteristic, i.e. *sattva* stands for existence or the real, while *rajas* stands for motion and *tamas* stands for darkness or inertia. Analogously, all the disciplines in spite of having different objects of study have some common characteristics in general at the constitutional or foundational level, in the sense that all the objects whether animate or inanimate, i.e. whether body, mind, intellect or will, are constituted of *tri-guṇa* and thus are of the same order at the deeper ontological level.⁷

Similarly, in the perspective of method the inter-relationships

of the realms can be viewed with the help of the Sāṅkhyan analysis of *tri-guṇa*.⁸ All the *guṇas* in the Sāṅkhya system, in spite of having unique characteristics, work together or cooperate with each other and are intermingled in the sense that no *guṇa* by its very nature can work or even exist in the absence of the other *guṇas*, i.e. the very presence of one *guṇa* requires the presence of the other two. Their function is compared with the combined function of the oil, the wick and the flame of a lamp which though opposed to each other yet cooperate to produce light. Accordingly, in every substance or object, which is a construction or combination of *guṇas*, any one particular *guṇa* will always have dominance over the other two. Consequently, the nature of a thing or an object will be characterized or determined on the basis of the dominance or preponderance of one *guṇa*, say, *sattva*, over the other two *guṇas* of the same object; the object will be characterized as *sattva guṇa pradhāna*.

Now, if we apply this analysis of the nature of the functions of *tri-guṇa* to understand the inter-relationships of the realms in terms of the method we will see that though every discipline has a certain method according to the nature of the object of study, i.e. a method which is more suitable or *pradhāna* to some particular type of object of study, yet the method of one discipline can be applied to other disciplines also. We may say that certain types of methods like the method of discovering causal structure may be dominant in the natural sciences, but this does not prevent the applicability of this method to realms other than those of the natural sciences. Conversely, the use of methods which are dominant in the social sciences can be used in the realms of the natural sciences. For example, in the social sciences methods are based on the notion of empathy, reciprocity, imagination, etc. But the notion of imagination is very crucial in any scientific research or any creative activity, and is not barred from the realm of the natural sciences. Nor are these methods incompatible with the presence of those methods which are dominant in the natural sciences and are based on the discovery of the causal structure of phenomena, use of quantitative techniques, analysis based on observation and experiment and inductive and deductive forms of reasoning. Thus, the method dominant in one discipline does not prevent the use of the method dominant in other disciplines. In fact, if

we look at the variety of methods used by scientists as shown by the history of science, we find that none of the methods used were of such a nature that they could not in principle be used in the social sciences or the humanities in addition to the methods which were dominant in their own realms. In other words, there is nothing unique in these methods, which bars us from using them in fields other than those belonging to the natural sciences. This view is in opposition to the view held by Daya Krishna that 'in the social sciences there is a multiplicity of trends or methods which is not available in the natural sciences'.

In addition to the above perspectives of content and method the thesis of the unity of cognitive realms is also established on the basis of attitude. In the perspective of 'attitude' my contention is that an extension of Daya Krishna's views about philosophy (that it is the lifeblood of social reality) to other cognitive disciplines will prove the thesis of the unity (in terms of cognitive similarity) of realms. His remark about philosophy that it is the articulation of reason by way of positing a series of arguments and counter-arguments seems to me to be true not only of the social sciences or social reality, but also of the natural sciences or natural reality. There are several ways of defining science, two of which may be called content viewpoint and attitude viewpoint. Broadly, from the point of view of content a discipline is called scientific if its object of study is animate or that which is given in nature. From the point of view of attitude a discipline is called scientific if its attitude is critical, reflective, sceptical, open-minded, etc. Similarly, there are various ways of defining philosophy. Among them content and attitude are most relevant and important in support of the thesis of unity. In terms of the content viewpoint philosophy is a system-building activity while in terms of an attitude it is the reasoning process itself. The content-based picture of philosophy is specific while the attitude-based picture of philosophy is general. In the former we find different schools of thought given by various philosophers as attempts to answer several key problems of philosophy. In the latter philosophers are concerned in general with laying down principles of logical or philosophical reasoning. This role of philosophy, in the second sense, can be seen to be similar to the role

of *dharma* in the traditional theory of *puruṣārthas* (i.e. *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, *mokṣa*) where *dharma* is the common principle or determining factor (*niyāmak tathya*) for the rest of the *puruṣārthas*, i.e. *artha* along with *dharma* and *kāma* together with *dharma* and *tatva jñāna* or *bhakti* along with *dharma* will enable one to achieve *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* respectively. In the same way philosophy defined in terms of attitude is common or essential to all the cognitive disciplines. Consequently philosophy is not only the lifeblood of social reality as Daya Krishna suggests, but it is also the lifeblood of all the cognitive realms.

It seems to me that those who want to make categorical differences, emphasize only the differentiating features which are secondary from the point of view of essential similarity (on the basis of content, method, attitude and explanation) while those who want to see an essential unity or sameness in all the disciplines emphasize common features as primary. These primary features are those which are shared or presupposed by every discipline known as a cognitive discipline. It does not mean that the whole issue concerning the unity of disciplines is merely a matter of looking or emphasizing similarity or differences. It is, of course, not so simple as it appears. But, my aim here is to show that in spite of some differences there are several common features which are more significant and relevant. It would be an incorrect way of thinking that merely on the basis of some similarities, total similarity is being emphasized. It would be equally incorrect to say that on the basis of a few unique features total distinctness could be maintained. There are differences between the realms. But that alone does not amount to total distinctness of the realms. The common thread among them is that they all essentially, as pointed out above from the various perspectives, stand in the same boat.⁹

The thesis of the unity of various disciplines is further strengthened by a consideration of explanatory models in these disciplines. All the disciplines assume either the deductive-nomological (D-N) model of scientific explanation or inductive or probabilistic (I-S) model of scientific explanation. This follows from the fact that the aim of explanation is not merely a description, but to show why a thing has occurred or was expected to

occur. To fulfil this aim any explanation, whether that of an event or of an individual's action, has to be based on either of the models of scientific explanation. The essential requirement of these models of explanation is that the event which is to be explained, has to follow initially from some empirical conditions and some relevant universal or probabilistic laws or generalizations, purely thetic or nomo-thetic.

Thus, the D-N or I-S model of scientific explanation is the underlying explanatory method of all cognitive enquiry. This supports the thesis of unity of various cognitive disciplines from the perspective of the explanatory model. There is no essential incompatibility of other models of explanations with the explanatory requirement of these models of explanation.

NOTES

1. In the present paper the issue of the nature of the object of study of logic and mathematics has not been discussed. It is surprising why Daya Krishna, while dealing with the issues of nature of reality or the nature of understanding in the realm of the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities at length, has not discussed these issues with respect to the realm of logic and mathematics which are known as formal disciplines.
2. This criterion of goodness in terms of success is very much like the Buddhist theory of reality where *arthkriyākāritva* is treated as the essential characteristic of reality. Accordingly, false knowledge can be true or real if it leads to successful action. In the context of action, its parallel can be called the theory of *saphalākāri*, where an action, in spite of having been based on false belief, can be called good if it leads to success.
3. Although Daya Krishna has talked in detail about the problem of appearance and reality with regard to various realms, e.g., in the realm of philosophy, science and spirituality or mysticism, he has not given any example of appearance in social reality or in the social sciences. However, following are some of his views, regarding these realms, which need to be re-thought.

First, his claim that philosophy deals with reality, which is abstract and never immediate, perceptual or intuitive in nature does not seem to be true with regard to Indian philosophy. In fact, his distinction between philosophy and mysticism or spirituality on the basis of two different models of delusions—stick-bent variety and rope-snake variety—cannot be accepted in Indian philosophy.

Second, his view that the realms of mysticism and spirituality are the realms which deal with the revelatory, experienced type of reality and are totally irrelevant to coherence and logical argument, is also not acceptable.

Further, besides the arts and music these are the realms for him which are totally based on experience and practice and do not require theoretical articulation, conceptual comprehension and rational understanding or analysis. This, again needs re-thinking.

Third, his belief about the incommunicability of the knowledge of reality achieved by spiritual or mystical seers and the relationship between the master and the disciple in these realms where a disciple cannot go beyond his master also needs closer examination.

4. Although the terms empirical reality, physical reality and physico-chemical reality do not occur in his 1984 article, these are terms used by him at various places and thus need clarification.
5. In fact all those want to give a separate status to the social sciences offer various arguments among which the following three are well known and widely accepted:
 - (i) Argument of self-fulfilling prophesy.
 - (ii) The logical connection argument.
 - (iii) Argument on the basis of the distinctive nature of social reality and the categories used in understanding if the last one is much wider than the earlier two. Daya Krishna is primarily concerned with the last one.
6. Besides, there are thinkers who not only believe in the distinctiveness of realms like physics, biology, psychology, astronomy due to vast advancement or specialization, but also believe in the distinctiveness of the various branches or sub-disciplines of a discipline. For, each discipline or sub-discipline has its own technical vocabulary and different experimental or statistical methods. Consequently, each is primary like the Leibnizean Monad in the sense that no interaction between them is possible without any extra effort and thus no possibility of theoretical unification is to be expected. In this article no attempt is made to deny the distinctiveness of the language. There is certainly a difficulty in understanding each other's terminology. But this difficulty seems to be more of a psychological rather than logical nature and thereby does not imply that one cannot talk of similarity of domain the synoptic way as would be argued in the next section of this paper.
7. The scientific version of this unity of subject matter for the purpose of theoretical unification of science is expressed thus: everything in this world is made out of particles or by some ultimate simples or physical entities.
8. Some contemporary western thinkers on this methodological issue of the theoretical unification of sciences think that although the subject matter of each of these disciplines is radically different, yet on the basis of methods they are all same, i.e. unity of disciplines can be established on the basis of the use of elementary mathematical method or statistical method. But, here, unity of discipline is not established on these lines, nor I have tried to show unity or similarity of disciplines on the basis of possibility of mathematizing of all the disciplines. (In this latter approach anything will be called

scientific if it can be integrated into a deductive system, i.e. into a deductive systematization or axiomatization. Consequently, not only logic and mathematics, but also physics, metaphysics, theology, ethics and law will be called scientific. For, all of these realms can be mathematized in terms of giving a deductive system or an axiomatic structure and thereby establish the thesis of unification of all the sciences and demolish the distinction between truth of reason and truth of fact or formal and empirical disciplines.)

9. One may say that to establish the unity of the disciplines merely on the basis of primary features or common features is a trivial attempt. But, the question is, what does it mean to call something trivial? Does a position nearer or closer to commonsense or truth have to be called trivial?

Rejection of a Plea for an Innocent Capitalist*

A Critique of Daya Krishna's Views on
Some Key Concepts of Economics

SURESH CHANDRA

In this discussion I have made an attempt to evaluate Daya Krishna's views on some key concepts of economics. These concepts have attracted the attention of post-Marxian economists. Though Daya Krishna has written several papers on the issues of economics I would like to concentrate my attention on one of them, 'Surplus Value, Profit and Exploitation—An Attempt at an Analysis of Some Concepts in Marxian Economy'.¹ This is the earliest paper in the list of his publications in the field of economics. Therefore it is possible that all that I have written by way of criticism of Daya Krishna has already been written by others. However, I have assumed that no two persons can think *exactly* alike. It is possible that all that I have written in the discussion has already been written in substance by others. But I hope no other person possesses my style of writing.

To the three concepts mentioned in the title of Daya Krishna's paper—the concepts of surplus value, profit and exploitation—we can add two more, the concepts of capital and wage. With the help of these five key concepts he has attempted to compare capitalism with communism as conceived by Marx.

* This paper was written before the collapse of Soviet Union and the fall of Pretoria regime.

rality to appreciate the 'other', not only in thought but life as well. Otherwise, one will do so only if the 'other' mirrors one's own 'self'. But, then, one would be appreciating oneself and not the 'other'.*

Yogesh Gupta seems as unhappy with my emphasis on and respect for differences and plurality as Shalya. Perhaps there is something in the ethos of Indian thinking which makes unacceptable the reality of genuine difference and plurality even when the social reality in which Indians live and which they accept happens to be one of the most differentiated and pluralistic in the world. In any case, as Yogesh Gupta is aware, the counter-assertion of similarity is not a denial of the difference and the problem, as always, is what to do with that difference. She herself says at the end of her paper that 'one may say that merely on the basis of primary features or common features to establish the unity of disciplines is a trivial attempt. But the question is what does it mean to call something trivial? Can a position nearer or closer to commonsense or truth be called trivial?' But, first, commonsense and truth are not necessarily the same thing and, second, how has it been established that the assertion of similarities is nearer to commonsense or truth than the assertion of differences? The assertion that 'everything is Being' or that 'everything is Brahman' may be extremely profound in certain contexts, but it does not help us in understanding the differences amongst things. The first question, therefore, always is whether the differences that are being pointed out are genuine differences or not. And, the simplest way to refute what I am saying would have been to point out that the role of beliefs in constituting social reality is no different from the way they function in respect of the sort of reality studied in the natural sciences and which is generally designated by the term 'nature'.

* Only one thing more. Shalya has charged me with only recommending the measurement of freedom and not doing anything to create one myself. This is not exactly true. I have written a paper entitled 'An Attempt towards the Creation of Political Index Numbers' published under the title 'Les Coefficients politique' in a French journal. But even if I had not written anything on the subject, I do not see how the idea becomes untenable. The division between theoreticians and applied thinkers is a well accepted fact in all empirical disciplines.

This could have been pointed out in two ways. First, by denying that beliefs play any role at all in constituting social reality, that phenomena such as 'the self-fulfilling prophecy' do not exist or have been understood in a totally wrong way. Second, by urging that beliefs play a constitutive role in what is usually designated as 'nature', and that this is different in no way whatsoever from the way they function in constituting what is designated as social reality. But neither Yogesh Gupta nor Shalya has tried to argue in this straightforward manner, even though Shalya seems to incline towards the latter alternative in many of his statements.

However, some further clarifications seem to be called for as Yogesh Gupta's paper seems to be based on some basic misunderstandings regarding my position on this issue. First, it should be clearly understood that while the term 'social reality' does not comprise all or most of what is supposed to be the object of study in the natural sciences, the 'natural sciences' themselves are a part of 'social reality'. The term 'social reality' itself is slightly ambiguous as it may include all that human beings create, individually or collectively, or only that part of it which primarily concerns man's relationship with other human beings in a predominantly institutional setting where some pre-existent roles and norms define the interactive situation in a pre-eminent manner. In the articles with which Yogesh Gupta has been concerned, the term has chiefly been used in the first sense and hence contrasted mainly with what may be called the non-human world.

Now, 'beliefs about nature' seem no different from 'beliefs about anything else' and hence may be expected to show the same features which we have described regarding beliefs in the context of social reality. Thus, whether true or false, they also lead to action based on them when they are 'believed to be true'. However, normally we do not have conflicting beliefs about 'nature' in a particular society at a particular period of time and what may be called 'nature's nature' is not supposed to be affected by what men do on the basis of their beliefs about it, a situation which usually does not obtain in the case of what is called 'social reality'. One may of course conceive of nature as animated by personal forces on the human pattern but, then, the relation between man and nature also becomes patterned on the

relationship between two societies, the one superior (nature) and the other inferior (man). But even in such a situation, most of the behaviour of men towards what is called 'nature' is substantially different from the way they behave towards other human beings and such behaviour is more or less governed by what passes for 'knowledge' with respect to such objects in that society.

And, as such knowledge is primarily of a causal nature which alone is basically relevant in the context of action, it is such knowledge that predominantly comes to define this realm also. There seems to be some misunderstanding about what I have said in the course of my writings at various places on this subject. Causal knowledge is not absent in the context of social reality; only, it is subservient to something else. Also, causal relationships, or rather any relations of dependence where we can exercise some influence to make the other come into being, begin to function not only in a subservient manner but do not seem to characterize the realm or define it in any significant manner. The important question with respect to these domains does not seem to be, 'What are its causes?' or 'What brought it into being?', but rather 'What is its meaning or value, or worth?'. This, as I have repeatedly emphasized, becomes increasingly evident in those social science disciplines which deal with areas closer to the humanities and becomes almost transparent in realms with which the humanities deal with. In fact, 'nature' may be regarded as that in whose case the causal considerations are almost exclusively preponderant, and those aspects of any phenomenon may be designated as 'natural aspects' where the causal perspective predominates. And as man has a body, 'nature' infects everything that he does, and as he is not merely a body, 'nature' never suffices to define anything that he does. Many of the objections of both Yogesh Gupta and Shalya seem to be the result of neglecting this dual Janus-faced nature of all human reality which I have always emphasized.

There are findings and phenomena which may be said to undercut my whole way of looking at the problem. It may be said that my whole idea of science is too Newtonian or Cartesian, or even that I ignore the possibility of an alternative science as exemplified, say, in the works of Goethe, that the knowing sub-

ject is too much involved in the knowing process at all levels and that as an agent he transforms reality at all levels. And, that if we take the findings of para-psychology seriously into account we would have a very different picture in detail, and I am certainly not the one to deny their import or significance. But I have a feeling that those who habitually take recourse to them do not seriously examine either the counter-evidence in respect of what they are saying or the implications of what they are asserting. The so-called disturbance by 'the observer' of 'the observed' in quantum mechanics, for example, has got nothing to do with the psychological nature of the observer. The 'observer' they are talking about is the physical instrument and the disturbance will take place even if there were no such thing as consciousness in the world. But what is even more important is the fact that all this 'indeterminacy' has not stood in the way of 'increasing knowledge' of sub-atomic phenomena or of acquiring greater control over it for human purposes, whether good or ill. Similarly there is only talk of 'an alternative science'; there has been no attempt to develop it. And, all the time the science that is being decried goes merrily along its path developing all the while, even if many people do not like the way it is developing. As for para-psychology, one can only say that no one knows what to do with its findings. Nor do the para-psychologists know what to do with, say, cybernetics or bio-engineering. There is just no unified picture even in one discipline, what to talk of the whole field of knowledge as it exists at present. At a deeper level, I think the distinctions I have pointed out will be relevant till we have human beings the way we have had up till now.

Before concluding this discussion on the paper of Yogesh Gupta I think I ought to say something about the specific discrepancies and problems she has pointed out in her discussion of my two papers entitled 'Distinctions between Natural Sciences, Social Sciences and Humanities' and 'Philosophical Theory and Social Reality'. The ambiguity in the term 'humanities' derives from the fact that normally, it is the cognitive disciplines with respect to the arts and literature that are designated by that term. But as 'literature' itself involves one sort of a 'cognition' of human reality, it is also, at times, directly included under it. The

inclusion of philosophy and history under the term is traditional, but many people treat history these days as primarily a social science. The inclusion or exclusion of a discipline under the usual threefold division of the cognitive disciplines only reflects the particular aspect which is given predominance and importance at a particular period of time. The more basic issue, however, relates to the necessity of the distinction amongst the cognitive disciplines themselves.

Suresh Chandra has chosen to discuss the article on 'Surplus Value, Profit and Exploitation: An Attempt at an Analysis of Some Concepts in Marxian Economy'. He appears to have been seriously misled by the title into thinking that my article was primarily concerned with Marxian, i.e. communist economies, as that alone can explain the title of his rejoinder: 'Rejection of a Plea for an Innocent Capitalist (A Critique of Professor Daya Krishna's views on Some Key Concepts of Economics)'. First, my concern in the paper is not with Marxian (communist) economies, but with Marxian economics, which is a totally different thing. Second, the paper is not concerned, even remotely, with propounding *my* views of those 'very concepts of economics'. Rather, it is a critique of what Marx has written on the subject, specially with regard to the concepts I have mentioned in the title of my paper. As the response is based on such basic misunderstandings regarding the purposes of my paper, there would be little point in discussing what he has said. However, as the comment displays some common misunderstandings regarding Marx's thought on the subject, it may not be amiss to point them out here.

First, Marx is not concerned with the individual capitalist, but with capitalism as a system of production as distinct from other systems of production. Second, Marx is not concerned with a moral condemnation of capitalism, or for that matter, of any other system of production. Third, Marx is not concerned with the 'profit' of any single individual, but rather with the way 'profit' functions in the capitalist mode of production. Fourth, 'exploitation' is a technical term in Marx and it may function in a positive manner in contributing to the development of the forces of production, as it is supposed by him to have done in the early

stages of capitalism. Fifth, the labour theory of value is the theoretical foundation of Marxian economics, and has to be treated as such.

Now, all of these statements may be mistaken, but then they have to be shown to be such. Suresh Chandra has done nothing of the kind. Not only this, in his anxiety to defend the Soviet system from the ills attributed to capitalism, he has forgotten that all the so-called ills in the passage which he has quoted, beginning with 'the proletarianization of the peasantry by land enclosures. . .', referred to the well-known events in England which occurred with the advent of capitalism there. Had he read the text carefully, he would not have made the mistake he did, for the very next sentence states, 'The human suffering involved is described with biting vigour in the first volume of *Capital*' and obviously Marx could not have been writing about the Soviet Union. The problem relates to what is known as 'the accumulation of capital', and the point is that the Soviet Union could not find any better or more humane ways to achieve it than was done under capitalism.

So great is Suresh Chandra's penchant for defending the Soviet Union that he misunderstands even the simple points that have been made in the article. Take, for example, the question of 'imitative industrialization'. Suresh Chandra writes as if I am characterizing *only* the Soviet Union in those terms, while the fact is I have explicitly mentioned France, Germany, pre-socialist Russia, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Canada and Japan also as examples of 'imitative industrialization' in the discussion that runs to almost two full pages of the article. The main point again is that neither the direction of investment nor the auspices under which industrialization was undertaken, were substantively different in these cases from what happened later in the Soviet Union.

Today when the governments and the peoples of the Soviet Union and the East European countries have themselves not only destroyed the rosy picture of the past entertained by many persons all over the world, but also dismantled the whole political and economic apparatus built under the name of 'socialism', I wonder what Suresh Chandra would think or say about it.

Daya Krishna Bio-Bibliographical Data

Daya Krishna was born on 17 September 1924. Educated at the University of Delhi, he has held research fellowships at Hindu College, Delhi, Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, and Delhi University. He was a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow from 1960 to 1961, and Senior Fellow at the East-West Centre, Hawaii from 1962 to 1963. He has been Visiting Professor at Carleton College, Minnesota, and at University of Hawaii in 1971-72. He was, till September 1984, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the UGC Special Assistance Programme in Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur (India). He has been National Fellow of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (1987-89) and of the Indian Council of Social Science Research (1990 and 1991). Currently, he is associated as one of the editors in the Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture.

MEMBERSHIP OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

1. Member, International Committee constituted by the International Council of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, UNESCO, to judge the best article submitted for the international competition sponsored by its journal, *Diogenes*. The Committee consisted, amongst others, of André Malraux, Louis Mumford and D.W. Brogan (1956).
2. Member, UNESCO project on Research Trends in Humanities and Social Sciences (special consultant for Philosophy in South East Asia and Japan).
3. Member, Editorial Board, *Diogenes*.
4. Consultant, Humanities Project, East-West Centre, Hawaii.
5. Consultant, UNESCO Anthology on Violence.
6. Member, Advisory Board, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla.

7. Member, Philosophy Panel, University Grants Commission.
8. Member, Research Committee, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi.
9. Member, Governing Body, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi.
10. Editor, *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, New Delhi.
11. Member, General Council, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi.
12. Member, Editorial Board, *Philosophy, East and West*, Hawaii.
13. Member, Board of Governors, Tibetan Institute for Higher Studies, Sarnath.
14. Chief Editor, *Hindi Diogenes*, Jaipur.

PARTICIPATION IN CONFERENCES/SYMPOSIA HELD IN INDIA AND ABROAD

1. East-West Philosophers' Conference, Canberra, Australia, 1957. Member, Indian delegation to the conference.
2. International conference on Representative Government and Public Liberties in the New States of Asia and Africa, Rhodes Island, Greece, 1958. Participant member, contributed the opening paper for the conference on 'What is Democracy?' with Bertrand de Jouvenel.
3. UNESCO Preparatory Meeting to plan for a project on Investigation of Research Trends in Humanities and Social Sciences, 1964.
4. Fifth East-West Philosophers' Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1969. One of the five persons invited to write key papers for the conference on which week-long discussions were to be held.
5. International seminar on Philosophy: Theory and Practice, Madras, 1970.
6. International conference, Institute of Intercultural Research, Zurich, 1973.
7. Technology and Cultural Values in South-East Asia, Bangkok, 1974.
8. International conference of UNESCO'S Advisory Body on

- Interdisciplinary Research in the Social Sciences and the Humanities, Paris, April 1976.
9. Observer-participant on behalf of the International Council of Philosophy and Humanistic Sciences and International Science Education at international symposium on Science and Technology for Development Meeting at Singapore, 1979.
 10. International conference on Place of Human Rights in Cultural and Religious Traditions, Bangkok, 1979.
 11. International seminar on Transcultural Universals, Canada, 1983.
 12. Meeting of experts on Teaching and Research in Philosophy in Asia, Bangkok, 1983.
 13. Conference on God: The Contemporary Discussion, San Juan, Puerto Rico, USA, 1984.
 14. Workshop on Representations of Self in Literature, East-West Centre, Hawaii, 1984.
 15. Seminar on Comparative Philosophy, Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Hawaii, 1984.
 16. Meeting of the International Council of Philosophy and Humanistic Sciences, Bangkok, 1984.
 17. Special invitee to give one of the plenary addresses at the international conference on Thinking; conducted a special workshop, January 1987.
 18. Sixth East-West Philosophers' Conference, Hawaii, 1989.
 19. Convivium II, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, 1990.
 20. Colloquium on Culture and Rationality, Mt. Abu, 1991.
 21. Convivium III, New Delhi, 1993.

MAJOR FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

1. Visiting Fellowship, Rockefeller Foundation, 1960-61.
2. Senior Fellowship, East-West Centre, Hawaii, 1962-63.
3. Visiting Professor, University of Hawaii, USA, 1970.
4. Visiting Professor, Carleton College, USA, 1971.
5. National Fellowship, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, May 1987-Dec. 1989.

6. National Fellowship, Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, Jan. 1990-Dec. 1991.

AUTHORSHIP OF BOOKS, MONOGRAPHS

1. *The Nature of Philosophy*, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956.
2. *Planning, Power and Welfare*, Congress for Cultural Freedom, Delhi, 1959.
3. *Considerations towards a Theory of Social Change*, Manaktalas, Bombay, 1965.
4. *Social Philosophy: Past and Future*, Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1969.
5. *Modern Logic: Its Relevance to Philosophy* (ed.), Impex India, Delhi, 1969.
6. *Indian Education Today: Prospects and Perspectives* (ed.), Rajasthan University Press, Jaipur, 1973.
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After reading his paper I felt that Daya Krishna has attempted to show that a capitalist is as innocent (or non-innocent) as a communist. Therefore, so far as one's choice of participation in an economic system is concerned, the choice of Marxism is in no way superior to the choice of capitalism. He has certainly not considered the possibility of any other economic system than these two, as if these two systems exhaust all the possibilities, that all other systems are reducible to one or the other of these two. Perhaps Daya Krishna has the attitude of all those post-Marxian economists who either favour Marxism and reject capitalism, or favour capitalism and reject Marxism. The only difference, if there is a difference, is that Daya Krishna favours capitalism by discovering everything in it that is found in a communist state like the Soviet Union. Another reason for his tilt towards capitalism lies in the fact that he is committed to the ideology of democracy and rejects the political ideology of socialism. But this attitude too is not novel.

Just after a few paragraphs of his paper Daya Krishna starts establishing the innocence of the capitalistic system. This he does by attacking the Marxian view that the capitalist himself creates no value. It is only labour that creates value by participating in the production process. However, since the capitalist owns the means of production he forces labour to produce surplus value in order to extend the volume of his profit and capital. Referring to the view of Marx concerning the issue of value creation, Daya Krishna writes: 'The denial of the value creating role to the capitalist follows, perhaps, from his essential dispensability to the process of production.' The denial of the value creating role to the capitalist certainly *does not follow* from his dispensability to the process of production, it is rather his dispensability to the process of production that follows from the denial of the value creating role to the capitalist. Daya Krishna has put the cart before the horse. The capitalist creates no value because he is not a part of the production process, hence he is dispensable to the economy; he is a parasite to be eliminated rather than nurtured by an economy. In this context, Daya Krishna objects to Maurice Dobb's interpretation of 'labour' in terms of the "expenditure of a given quantum of human energy" on the ground that such an expen-

diture of energy is also possible on the part of the capitalist.³ But the quantum of human energy is spent by the capitalist only for one end, to maximize the suffering of labour. The accumulation of capital and profit depends ultimately on the excess toil of the labourer. However, Daya Krishna defends the capitalistic system in a very subtle but misleading way. According to him, 'The capitalist . . . is merely a name for the bearer of certain functions which cluster around the concepts of commercial, industrial, and finance capitals. These functions belong to the areas of marketing, entrepreneurial and finance capitals. It is difficult to see how these functions are dispensable to the functions of a complex economy.'⁴ If a communist state cannot dispense with these functions, this means that it cannot do away with the capitalists from the state. The capitalists would continue existing in the state, in spite of the Marxist ideology. The only difference would be that they will now bear some new name; they will not be called 'capitalists'. If Daya Krishna is right then Marx was not an economist; he was a linguist. And what he attempted to do was not any kind of economic revolution, it was simply a linguistic revolution. One way in which the capitalists can be stopped from causing masses to suffer, or workers to be exploited, is to remove the word 'capitalist' from the dictionary. There will be no capitalists, so there will be no suffering caused by capitalists. But I would suggest that the word 'suffering' rather than the word 'capitalist' should be abolished, for the simple reason that the function of capital cannot be given up in any kind of economy. Perhaps those Indian philosophers made a remarkable suggestion who thought that suffering is an illusion, that in reality no one suffers. If there is no real suffering then there is no real economic problem of suffering to be solved. Even the controversy between the capitalist thinkers and the Marxist thinkers becomes futile.

The key concept of the Marxian economy is surplus value. It is this concept that is the foundation of profit and exploitation. Therefore it has attracted the attention of Marx, and hence also the attention of Daya Krishna. A critique of Marx presupposes a careful handling (or mishandling) of the concept of 'economic development' as his major weapon. According to him, 'The emergence of surplus value . . . is a sign of a developing economy

and is, in fact, merely another name for it.⁵ Thus, an economy can dispense with surplus value only at the cost of its development. Even for an economy which is static, surplus value is required. What would happen to the 'pure consumers' like sick persons, invalid people, children, etc., if labour does not produce surplus value? Thus, whether an economy is developing or stationary, it cannot survive without surplus value. But the occurrence of surplus value by itself cannot lead a society to economic development. Unless the surplus value is used for investment there is no question of economic development. As Daya Krishna himself says, 'The appropriation of surplus value for the purpose of investment rather than consumption . . . is the key for the economic development of a society.'⁶ But then it is wrong to say, as he has said earlier, that economic development is simply another name for surplus value. It would have been another name for economic development if surplus value is used only for investment and not for consumption, hoarding and other wasteful ways of expenditure. Even if we stop all wasteful expenditure, it is impossible to use all the surplus value only for investment. If the means of production are not in the hands of the workers, as happens in the capitalist countries, then there is no guarantee that the surplus will only be used as capital for investment. This follows from the definition of 'capital'. It depends on the sweet will of the capitalist to do what he wishes to do with his capital (surplus value). The surplus value is his *personal* capital. Does Daya Krishna think that surplus value has only one use, that of investment? And can we infer 'economic development' simply from the fact that 'all the surplus value has been invested' without seeing on what *kind* of goods it has been invested? Is it investment or the *quality* of investment that decides economic development? Daya Krishna knows the difference. He criticizes the Soviet Union for its 'heavy investment in capital goods, rather than consumer goods'.⁷ But if economic development depends on the *quality* of investment, then it will be quite risky to hand over the state to the capitalists for the reason that 'profit' is the only motive that leads the capitalist to make investment. It is not *national interest* but the *market demand* that decides the capitalistic investment policy. Why should not a capitalist prefer the produc-

tion of opium over the production of wheat if there is no restriction on the former? The major concept of capitalistic ethics is 'profit', and it will be quite unethical on his part if he gives up his profit.

According to Daya Krishna, 'The technical fact of appropriation or deduction is *economically* unrelated to the fact as to who appropriates or deducts or in what form the appropriation or deduction takes place. The crucial difference lies only in the fact whether the surplus value appropriated is used for *investment* or *consumption*. Such a decision can be made only by those who own the means of production or, to put it in more operational terms, who exercise direct effective control over them.'⁸ Daya Krishna's analysis imposes a picture on our mind that so far as investment is concerned, what is done in a capitalist country is not different from what is done in a communist country. In both the economic systems there are some people who make the 'investment decisions', and they are the same people who happen 'to exercise direct effective control over the means of production'. Thus the capitalistic system is as innocent as the communist system. But those who make investment decisions in the communist system obtain only 'wages', whereas their counterparts in the capitalist system earn 'profit'. The concept of wage is quite different from the concept of profit, the former has limits but the latter has no limit. The difference between wage-earners and profiteers is not simply linguistic; it is the difference between 'earning one's daily bread' and 'earning profit out of one's Daily Bread'. What is the capitalistic ideal? Isn't it the ideal of profit? Increase as much personal profit (capital) as is possible. It would certainly make a lot of difference to the economy of a state if the profiteers rather than the wage earners make 'investment decisions'. Suppose there are two goods *x* and *y*. The production of *x* is profitable whereas the production of *y* is non-profitable. But the production of *y* is urgently required by the nation. If the decision of investment is given to the profiteer, there is no reason why he should not opt for the production of *x*. His logic as well as his ethics would guide him to invest on *x*, for the simple reason that he obtains more profit from *x* than from *y*. It is for this reason that the communists visualize a nation of wage-earners. The appropriation of surplus

value by the capitalists would be its misappropriation.

Referring to the economic policy of a communist state Daya Krishna quotes Maurice Dobb's remark, 'Since wages in *one form or another* are the only form of income, social incentives will be exclusively associated with *work*, and the sole aim of economic policy will presumably be to increase *wages* at the most rapid possible rate.'⁹ This is a clear case of visualizing a nation of wage-earners. Of course such a nation is quite dull. It lacks the multi-coloured character of the nation of profiteers. It is impossible for there to be profiteers without there being wage-earners, and even those who earn neither wages nor profits. In order to establish the innocence of the capitalistic system Daya Krishna makes an attempt to blur the distinction between 'profit' and 'wage'. Commenting on the remarks of Dobb concerning wages he says, 'If the income of persons who appropriate surplus value and make decisions with respect to its investment as capital is called "wages" and, thus, assimilated to the earnings of the labourer, or the peasant from whom it is appropriated, then certainly it is true that "in one form or another" wages are the only form of income in any society.'¹⁰ Daya Krishna has clearly redefined the concept of 'wage' and has assimilated it to the concept of 'profit'. He has done this assimilation for the simple reason that he wants to show that the capitalists too are a part of the production process, their profit is nothing but a form of wage. If all those who appropriate surplus value and make decisions with respect to investment receive wages in a communist country, then wages are also received by the capitalists. A capitalist too appropriates surplus value and makes investment decisions. In the heat of his argument Daya Krishna forgets the definition of 'profit' accepted by him. His paper has not rejected the Marxian definition of profit; rather, his attack on Marxism is grounded in this definition. As he himself says, 'the term "profit" in the Marxian economy means "surplus value" and the "rate of profit" means the ratio of surplus value to the total capital, including both constant and variable capital.'¹¹ But 'wage' certainly does not mean 'surplus value', so also 'the rate of wage' does not mean the ratio of surplus value to the total capital. A wage earner is certainly not a profiteer, and so also a profiteer is not a wage earner. The concept of wage

belongs to a different scale from the scale of profit. Daya Krishna's view is the result of the confusion of two scales. He has attempted to measure temperature through a barometer. And the thermometer has been used to record rainfall. But the thermometer cannot function where a barometer is required. Those who obtain profit cannot be said to have obtained their wages. And those who have got their wages cannot be said to have obtained their profit, though it is possible for one and the same person to be both a profiteer and a wage earner. Philosophers should not suffer from confusion of categories. Perhaps they avoid confusion of categories only when they write their papers on the confusion of categories. Granted that those who appropriate surplus value and take decisions about investment in a communist state earn profit. But the profit so earned would not be the personal profit of these people; it would be the profit of the state. Their wage would be independent of the fact that they have earned this profit.

The most attractive feature of Daya Krishna's article is the evolution of a capitalist who has neither 'personal capital' nor 'personal profit'. He is an extremely innocent and harmless creature. Consider his remark, 'The mistake seems to arise from thinking of "profit" as a form of *personal revenue*. . . . Under capitalism, only a part of the appropriated surplus value is used as revenue for consumption. The rest is used as *capital* and reinvested for production. If some individual uses it as personal revenue, *ipso facto*, he ceases to be a capitalist. The emphasis on the word "personal" is equally mistaken, for the problem of "profit" is not a problem in micro-economics, but in macro-economics.'¹² Daya Krishna is certainly using the term 'capitalism' in the sense of 'state capitalism', an expression with which we are quite familiar these days. The notion of 'profit' is a part of macro-economics only in the context of state capitalism where we are interested in the economy as a whole rather than the economic issues of the individual. But would state capitalism allow the private or personal holding of the means of production? If neither the capital nor the profit is 'personal' then the means of production too are not personal. And if the 'profit' earned by an individual is not his personal revenue, then he should deposit the profit in the state

treasury rather than in his personal account in the bank. As a matter of fact Daya Krishna's capitalist should have no bank account of his own, for he would cease to be a capitalist if he considers any profit to be his personal profit. Again, saying that a part of surplus value is used as consumption and a part as capital for investment is true about any economy and not only about the capitalistic or communistic economy. If all that is produced is consumed immediately, then there is no survival. The possibility of survival presupposes that some amount is kept for future consumption (capital for investment).

According to Daya Krishna 'exploitation' is inevitable for two simple reasons. First, because any society needs economic development. And so long as there is economic development, exploitation would continue. Second, the class of parasites, that is, the class of pure consumers which produces no value whatsoever cannot be totally eliminated from society. As he says, 'it does not require much ingenuity to see that if there are any persons in a society who do not create value, there must be "exploitation" in that society. Or if there is a more or less rapid rate of capital construction there is equally more or less "exploitation" in that society.'¹³ According to Daya Krishna, it is not only children, sick people etc., who create no value and belong to the class of pure consumers, even some of those who work and get wages are simply pure consumers without being value creators. The examples are people from the administrative and political machinery, etc., who can hardly be said to participate in the production process. Perhaps the difficulty will disappear if we also consider the 'social cost' and do not restrict ourselves to only 'biological cost'. As Daya Krishna points out against the Marxian analysis, 'Marx, while computing the value of labour power, included what may be called the "biological costs" only. That there are "social costs" to be incurred if any persons were to live, he conveniently forgot to take into account. It would certainly have been inconvenient to consider a part of the administrative, civil and military costs as belonging to the value of labour power.'¹⁴ But I feel that there was no necessity to omit the 'social cost'. Consider the so-called case of 'biological cost'. Is it right to describe a child as an individual who is busy in exploiting his parents? Can we say that the

parents have to produce 'surplus value' in order to feed the child? A labourer is not being exploited if he works for maintaining his child. So also he cannot be said to have produced surplus value in order to feed his child. Similar is the case of 'social cost'. Labour would certainly not be exploited if it incurs social cost, the cost which makes the production process possible. There is a sense in which social cost is reducible to biological cost. If the propagation of the human species is a biological fact, so is its protection and preservation a biological fact. Maybe Marx is silent about the social cost because he included the social cost in the biological cost.

Daya Krishna, as we have already seen, connects 'exploitation' with 'economic development'. According to him, 'If there is economic development we can always infer exploitation, for it is merely the appropriated surplus value used as capital for investment rather than as revenue for consumption.'¹⁵ There is no logical connection between 'surplus value' and 'exploitation' as may appear at a superficial glance. Even according to Daya Krishna the connection between these concepts is contingent. If the whole of surplus value is used as revenue for consumption then there is no exploitation. Exploitation occurs only when the surplus value is used as 'capital for investment'. According to Daya Krishna, as also perhaps according to Marx, surplus value is in itself an innocent concept. What is non-innocent is its *use*. According to Marx surplus value is the *personal* capital (profit) of the owner of the means of production. This capital is not used for filling the 'consumption basket' of the workers. It is meant for the personal use of the capitalist, be it filling up his own consumption basket or hoarding or investment. It is in this sense that surplus value is the foundation for exploitation. But according to Daya Krishna the very use of surplus value as capital for investment is exploitation. However, the expression 'capital for investment' is also innocent. What is non-innocent is the goods on which the investment is made. Investment could be on capital goods or on consumer goods. Daya Krishna has no objection to the production of consumer goods. What he objects to is investment on capital goods at the cost of consumer goods. So it is not the investment as such that is objectionable, for the reason that

the 'revenue for consumption' would go waste if there are no consumer goods. Therefore, the development of the consumer goods industry is also not objectionable. What is objectionable is the investment on the capital goods industry. But could there be any development of consumer goods industry without there being development of capital goods industry? Even if the development of any industry, capital goods or consumer goods, makes exploitation inevitable, the question that has not occurred to Daya Krishna is the question of minimizing the impact of exploitation. He is right when he denies the possibility of 'optimum development' or 'saturation point'. The stage of optimum development or saturation point is a fiction. As Daya Krishna points out, 'The concept of a "saturation point" cannot ever be *defined* without a reference to population and standard of living. . . . Unless we assume these two to be static, the "saturation point" cannot be reached.'¹⁶ And if there is no saturation point, then economic development becomes a continuous process. And if it is a continuous process then exploitation cannot be eliminated. Granted that Daya Krishna is right on the issue that exploitation cannot be avoided if economic development is allowed. But is it impossible to minimize exploitation? Can exploitation be minimized under the capitalistic system where the means of production are in the hands of private profiteers? So far as exploitation and misery is concerned Daya Krishna does not find any difference between the capitalistic and the communistic systems. He refers to the Soviet Union's 'proletarianization of the peasantry by land-enclosures, the creation of wage-labour by making it impossible for handicraft to survive, the indirect exploitation of even the existing peasantry by cheaper bread and dearer manufactured goods, the increasing capitalization of agriculture, the intensive use of labour and even forced labour in certain areas of the economy. . . ' and so on.¹⁷ There is a reference to 'handicraft' in this remark. But handicraft is not allowed to survive by both the systems, the capitalistic and the communistic. Handicraft refers to the backward stage of an economy. Daya Krishna perhaps is not pleading for a third economic system, a system which is different from both capitalism and Marxism. Of course one can have a third economic system in which handicraft is not the

backward stage of the economy. But this is neither the place nor the occasion to discuss alternatives to capitalism and Marxism.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has not yet achieved the communist stage visualized by Marx. There is also disparity of wage and income in the Soviet Union. But is the difference between the income of Ivan¹⁸ and Gromyko the same as that between a black labourer of America and a leading capitalist of America? Unfortunately we cannot compare the income of the black labourer with the income of the President of America. The President is only a wage earner. And he earns nothing if his income is compared with the income of an American capitalist. Daya Krishna refers to the 'differential structure of wages'.¹⁹ But this is the differential structure *only* of wages, hence there is a possibility of improving it. The capitalist economy involves a confusion of scales. Daya Krishna refers to forced labour. Though there may be no such situation on the soil of the western capitalist countries, they are in a position to enjoy the fruits of the forced labour practised on alien soils. Even if there are no concentration camps in the western capitalist countries, have not these countries converted the underdeveloped countries into open concentration camps? The well-being and progress of a few capitalist countries of the West depends on the exploitation of the underdeveloped countries. And what is given in return for the exploitation are a few grains of corn and some outdated arms and ideologies. These arms and ideologies are suited for committing suicide rather than fighting the enemy.

Daya Krishna prefers originality and creativity, and therefore rejects the socialistic economy. The socialistic economy lacks these characteristics. Referring to the development of the socialist countries Daya Krishna says that their 'economic development is belated and, therefore, copied and not created'.²⁰ While concluding his paper he again remarks in the last paragraph, 'the economic development under socialism is *imitated* rather than *created*'.²¹ Like Plato, Daya Krishna loves the original and the creative, and rejects copies and imitations. The original is the capitalist economy; its imitation is the socialist economy. He refers to the English as having their original Industrial Revolution brought through their 'commercial banks'.²² But Russian indus-

trialization is completely borrowed. As he says, 'The auspices under which the industrialization has taken place in the Soviet Union is . . . in no sense unique.'²³ Continuing with his analysis he further says, 'Even the direction which such an industrialization has taken is hardly new.'²⁴ Thus the Soviet economy is rejected simply because it is not new, it is imitative.

Daya Krishna does not raise any doubts about the Industrial Revolution of England simply because it was original. But for the Industrial Revolution to occur in England much was expropriated in various forms from the colonies of Asia and America. The first shot of the Industrial Revolution was fired by the 'spinning jenny' followed by the 'power loom' when England did not produce an ounce of cotton. Being an original revolution, the horrors of the English Industrial Revolution were also original. Describing these horrors a writer of English history writes, 'The labourers suffered in both country and town. As the result of *enclosures* the country labourer often lost his rights of pasturing cattle on common land, or of collecting wood from it. His wages were low when prices were high.'²⁵ Suffering was not restricted to colonies only; the people of England also had their share of suffering. Describing the condition of English towns the same historian writes, 'Conditions in the towns were almost worse. Factories were badly built and horribly unhealthy. Hours of work were very long, fourteen hours a day being quite normal. Much of the work could be done by unskilled workmen, and child labour was cheap. Therefore, children were widely employed, while their parents were thrown out of work. In some factories children less than five years old were set to work, and children under ten were employed in certain coal mines.'²⁶ I doubt whether any industrial revolution that is merely a copy and an imitation has been reported to have employed children below five years of age to work in the factories. So also we have not heard of children below the age of ten to have worked in coal mines. And these were children who were English, not blacks from Africa or India or the red-coloured children of the original America. For his personal profit a capitalist sometimes gives up his racial prejudices.

It would not be out of context to see how the soil of America,

which is supposed to be the saviour of democratic ideals, was made fertile by the blood of Red Indians and their successors, the black negroes. The following are some of the facts which are known even to our school children about the fate of original Americans: 'The conquered people were forced to perform hard labour and if they resisted, they were massacred. Many died of disease and of the horrible exploitation they were subjected to.'²⁷ The magnitude of crime can be judged by the fact that 'the indigenous population of the Spanish territories called the Hispaniola, modern Haiti and Dominican Republic in South America was reduced from 250,000 to 500.'²⁸ Such annihilations and reduction were carried on throughout the Red Indian world. The misery of blacks from Africa followed the elimination of Red Indians. All the twentieth-century communist revolutions against capitalism are no match for the amount of suffering caused by 'white capitalism', i.e. capitalism coupled with racialism. The fact that the British and the Americans continue supporting the Pretoria regime of South Africa shows that white capitalism has not yet given up its character of expansion by annihilation.

In the end I would like to say against Daya Krishna that it is better (less risky) to be an imitation and a copy rather than an original creation. Perhaps the copy may avoid the horrible features that existed in the original.

NOTES

1. *The Review of Economic Studies*, England, January 1965.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.* It escapes Daya Krishna's notice that even in the capitalistic system the functions mentioned by him can very well be performed by the 'wage earners'. These functions are not essential to the definition of a capitalist. The function of a capitalist is only to provide capital. Daya Krishna has not considered the evolution of such concepts as 'sleeping partner', 'absentee landlord', 'Managing Director', etc.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

9. Ibid., p. 106.
10. Ibid., p. 107.
11. Ibid., p. 106.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 103.
14. Ibid., p. 99.
15. Ibid., p. 100.
16. Ibid., p. 104.
17. Ibid., p. 101.
18. Refers to the character in a novel by Solzhenitsyn, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*. Ivan is a sufferer of the system.
19. Daya Krishna, 'Surplus Value Profit and Exploitation', p. 107.
20. Ibid., p. 102.
21. Ibid., p. 108.
22. Ibid., p. 102.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. L.G. Brandon, *History of England*, The Indian Publishing House, 1933, p. 297.
26. Ibid., pp. 297-98.
27. *The Story of Civilization*, Vol. 1, NCERT, Delhi, 1978, p. 165.
28. Ibid.

Response to My Critics

DAYA KRISHNA

The critical response to my writings may be divided into those relating to what I have said about (1) logic and reality, (2) Indian philosophy, (3) philosophy and philosophizing, and (4) freedom, values and social philosophy. I would divide my reactions, therefore, under these broad headings and state as clearly as possible my position on these issues in the light of the comments that have been made.

LOGIC AND REALITY

My articles on logic have been the subject of critical attention on the part of Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, Pranab Kumar Sen, Virendra Shekhawat and Dharmendra Kumar. Dharmendra Kumar's article was published long back in the *Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy* and has been included here not only because it deals with the same article as does the comment of Shekhawat, but also because it is one of the most thoroughgoing criticisms of what I have written in that paper.

Sibajiban Bhattacharyya primarily considers the issue I had raised in my article entitled 'Law of Contradiction and Empirical Reality', and gives an exhaustive survey of the diverse ways in which the law has been formulated in both the western and the Indian traditions along with the different ways in which the subject matter of logic has been conceived in recent times. All in all, I have not only learnt a lot from his paper, but also feel strengthened in the belief that my basic approach to the relation between

logic and empirical reality was not mistaken. Some points, however, may still be made on the subject in the light of what he has written on it.

First, in most of the formulations, the word 'same' or 'identical with' have been used, and it is well known that these give rise to all sorts of problems, especially in the empirical context. Bhattacharyya has shown hardly any awareness of the problems involved in the use of such terms even when this was one of the central points made in the paper which provides the context for a discussion of the issue concerned.

Second, he does not show any awareness of the problem posed by the fact that the logical variables range over sentences or propositions which have truth-values, that is, are true or false, at least in a two-valued logic. But, if this is so, the concrete sentences or propositions concerned must, in principle, be logically capable of being established as true or false. But 'true' and 'false' are not characteristics of sentences independently of what they are 'about', except in the case of those which are supposed to be analytically true or false, if one accepts the analytic-synthetic distinction with respect to them. In case one does not accept the distinction, one would have to treat all sentences as either analytic or synthetic, assuming of course that the division is dichotomous and exhaustive in character.

The problem with a logic of truth-values is not only that 'truth' and 'falseness' cannot be predicates of all sentences and hence the so-called sentence-variable cannot be allowed to range unrestrictedly over all sentences, but also that there is an essential asymmetry between the universal and the existential quantifier in that the former, in principle, is incapable of being established as true while the latter, in principle, is incapable of being established as false. The first implies an infinite conjunction, while the latter implies an infinite disjunction on the usual understanding of these quantifiers, and if so, the difficulty follows necessarily from the logical characteristics of a conjunction or disjunction which are unending by definition.

The inevitability of talking about 'truth' in the case of logic, or of at least that part of it which deals with declarative sentences, radically distinguishes it from mathematics where no such prob-

lem arises. Hence, to transfer the usual views about the nature of mathematics to logic is, *ab initio*, mistaken, since logic can only be supposed to deal with that which, in some sense, can be characterized as true or false. 'Propositions' can be so characterized, but 'numbers', 'universals', 'concepts' and 'symbols' cannot, in any meaningful sense, be said to be true or false. The attempt to substitute the notion of 'satisfaction' in place of 'truth' to accommodate the extension of logic to non-declarative sentences is of little help, as whether what is said by a sentence which is declarative or non-declarative, is 'satisfied' or not would have to be known by going beyond the sentence to that which it talks about.

There is, of course, a sense in which even 'truth-functional' logic is not about truth. As I pointed out long back in my article entitled 'Logic and Ontology', what is required for the application of all that is said in this context is to have any object whatsoever which can only be in two states such that when it is in one, it cannot be in the other. It is the mutual exclusivity of the two states and the necessity of the object to be in the one or the other that define the situation. But even in this interpretation, one has to find an object which fulfils this condition, and to the extent there are objects which do not fulfil the condition, it would not be applicable to them.

I am, of course, happy to find that all the different ways which Bhattacharyya has formulated in the course of his discussion of my contention tend to support it either directly or indirectly. To deny 'that logical laws in general and the law of contradiction in particular, are meant to be applicable to the world of experience' (the first way), or to say that they are 'normative laws of thinking' (the second way), is to accept that the law is not relevant in matters relating to empirical reality. As for the Buddhist objection that as all moments of time are alike, a thing which is red at one moment of time cannot become brown at another moment of time, for if there was no reason for it to be so earlier, there can be none *now* (the third way), I can only say that I do not find it plausible on two counts. First, a Buddhist normally does not accept the notion of a 'thing' persisting over time, and so the question of a thing *becoming* brown at a later moment of time is as meaningless for him as the thing *continuing to remain* red

at a later moment of time. The thing along with its attributes can only be momentary, and hence to talk of it 'becoming brown' or 'remaining red' is equally meaningless. Also, strictly speaking, there perhaps can be no 'earlier' or 'later' moments of time in Buddhism or, at least, they cannot literally be spoken of as such. Second, the Buddhist has misunderstood the argument, for it was not the contention that it was the difference in the moment of time which was the cause of the thing becoming brown in place of red, just as the earlier moment of time was not the cause of the redness when it was red. The argument from the non-difference between the moments of time is both 'unjustified' and 'irrelevant', to use Bhattacharyya's own terms employed in a different context.

As for his fourth way, I am happy to be in the company of the great Raghunātha Śīromaṇi who, according to him, 'has argued that it is impossible to find any quality, attribute, etc. of a material object of *restricted* size where the law of contradiction holds unconditionally . . .'. Only, I do not understand what is meant by the phrase 'eternal entities having eternal properties' in the case of which Raghunātha is supposed to make an exception. Mathematical objects may perhaps qualify for such a description, but then the article under discussion specifically restricts the issue to the application of the law of contradiction to empirical reality.

Bhattacharyya concludes his discussion in this section by saying, 'The development of alternative systems of logic in the sense that some laws which are valid in one are not valid in another shows that logical laws are not positive laws of reality, but are postulates.' But, surprisingly, he writes immediately after, that 'The law of contradiction is the only means available to us for proving the unreality or non-existence of something.' But, how can it do this, if logical laws have the nature he has just ascribed to them, and if logic has the sort of nature he has described in the four ways mentioned above? The whole thrust of my writing on this issue from *The Nature of Philosophy* onwards has been to question this dogmatic assumption of almost all philosophy and I thought he had provided me additional arguments to almost clinch the issue. Yet, such seems to be the hold of the traditional dogma that after giving all the arguments for the irrelevance of logic to

the empirical domain he reverts to it by proclaiming its supermagisterial power to declare what shall be considered as 'real' or 'unreal'.

Bhattacharyya has said many new and interesting things about the concepts of 'appearance' and 'reality' in this paper, but as they do not touch my discussion of these concepts even tangentially, it would hardly be relevant to discuss them here. I may only say that the distinction is not only relative, but also pragmatic, varying from context to context, as I had argued at length in my very first book entitled *The Nature of Philosophy*.

Pranab Kumar Sen has chosen to discuss my paper on *The Synthetic A Priori* and in his usual meticulous, step-by-step, methodical way, shows the weaknesses and strength in what I had tried to say in my paper. He has reformulated my argument and suggested that the third step in the argument is incorrect and hence the conclusion which, I think, necessarily follows from them, cannot be regarded as correct. The step that, according to him, is incorrect, reads in his reformulation as 'If there are necessary relations among facts, then there are synthetic *a priori* propositions.' (No. 3.)

In a detailed discussion of this premise in section IV he gives the reasons why he thinks the contention to be incorrect. He gives two examples to demonstrate that there can be 'necessary' relations between 'facts', and yet these necessary relations cannot be regarded as 'synthetic' in any meaningful sense of the term. His examples are:

1. The proposition 'Either the earth is round or the earth is flat' (Q) is a necessary consequence of the proposition 'The earth is round' (P). Yet this relation cannot be regarded as synthetic, even though both the propositions are 'factual', in the sense that 'both of them are true only in a contingent way'.

2. The proposition 'If the earth is round then either the earth is round or the earth is flat' is again necessary but not synthetic.

And hence he argues that my proposition that 'If there are necessary relations among facts, then there are synthetic *a priori* propositions' is mistaken.

But what kind of fact is designated by the proposition 'Either the earth is round or the earth is flat'? Surely, 'The earth is round' is a factual proposition in the sense that it may be taken as designating a fact. So also, the proposition 'The earth is flat'. But it does not seem to obviously follow from this that 'Either the earth is round or the earth is flat' also designates any fact at all, particularly when the connective 'either . . . or' is treated as a *logical* connective or a *logical* operator deriving its *total* meaning *without any residue* whatsoever from the two-valued, truth-functional logic of a dyadic operator. The meaning of the connective 'either . . . or' in the strictly logical context of the traditional truth-functional logic has little to do with its meaning in ordinary usage. This would become immediately clear if we ask whether Sen is using the connective 'either . . . or' in its 'non-exclusive' or 'exclusive' sense. If he is using it in the former sense, then the proposition 'Either the earth is round or the earth is flat' will permit the earth to be *both* round and flat. In case he is using it in the 'exclusive' sense it obviously will not permit this possibility. But in both cases the logical derivation of either 'P or Q' from 'P' is valid, as in both cases the compound proposition is 'true' if one of the constituent propositions is 'true'. But the logical requirement says nothing about what the other proposition or propositions formed by the logical connective 'either . . . or' *should* be. There is no *restriction* imposed on 'Q' such that only certain propositional values of the variable 'Q' can be substituted for it. One could, for example, have said with equal validity that 'If the earth is flat', then, 'either the earth is flat, or the moon is made of green cheese, or (that) God exists, or (that) there can be action at a distance, or . . . any other proposition that can legitimately be regarded as a proposition, if one allows any such entities as 'proposition' in one's system. The point obviously is that logical connectives used in a purely logical way do not, and cannot, result in the creation of any *new* compound fact of a conjunctive, disjunctive, implicative or of any other kind, just because the connectives happen to connect propositions which designate some fact or other. The misunderstanding that this is not so arises from the continued use of connectives which ostensibly appear to be the same, whether used in their logical

meanings as *defined* by truth-functional tables which themselves are completely determined by the number of truth-values that we allow in a system and the minimum number of propositions that we want our logical operator to have.

These are, or ought to be, well-known elementary facts about modern logic. But the truth is hidden even from its well-known practitioners by the continued use of the earlier terminology from the pre-truth-functional period of logic resulting in non-awareness of the fact that the truth-functional interpretation of the logical connectives assigns a radically different meaning to them than was the case in the past. The illusion that there was no radical break, but some sort of a continuity with the past usages is strengthened by the repeated insistence in most textbooks on modern logic written even by eminent persons that the truth-functional operators *preserved* the *minimum* sense of the corresponding *verbal* connectives the way they were *actually* employed in ordinary usage, forgetting that the issue was not *empirical* at all. No one ever asked them if they had ever tried to find out what was the actual usage, or what would they do if the facts were found to be otherwise.

The confusion has become worse confounded by the use of the term 'truth-values' and the terms 'T' and 'F' in the 'truth-tables' as it suggested that 'truth-functionality' was concerned with 'truth' and 'falsity' in the usual sense of these terms. The development of three-valued logic in the first place and that of n-valued logic later should have been sufficient to dispel these illusions. But illusions die hard, and the recourse to a probability interpretation of n-valued logic where all the other values were supposed to lie between O and I which were supposed to represent the 'F' and 'T' of the usual two-valued logic only tended to keep the illusion alive, especially amongst those who could not see what was actually happening below the surface by these radical transformations in the nature of logic.

I have argued these points at length in my various papers on the subject, particularly the last one that I wrote on this theme entitled 'Logic and Ontology'. But Sen does not seem to have paid any attention to them or thought it worthwhile to do so. However, though objecting to the third stage in his more elegant

reformulation of my argument, he has come to the rescue of the notion of the synthetic *a priori* by raising the question regarding the nature of logical laws themselves.

But before Sen proceeds to do this, he suggests that the reason why the fact designated by the propositions 'If the earth is round, then either the earth is round or the earth is flat' is true as the fact stated by the proposition 'Either the earth is round or the earth is flat' includes the fact designated by the proposition 'The earth is round', and assimilates this to the explicit relation of 'inclusion in the syllogistic argument where one of the premises has necessarily to be universal in the sense that the predicate has to be affirmed or denied of "all" the subjects in the proposition'. Unfortunately, it is not the relation of 'inclusion' which renders the relation between 'The earth is round' and 'Either the earth is round or the earth is flat' necessary, but the logical connective 'either-or' which relates the two propositions 'The earth is round' and 'The earth is flat'. For, if it were not so, the proposition 'The earth is round and the earth is flat' could also be derivable from the proposition 'the earth is round' as it is 'included' in it also. But, as everybody knows, 'If the earth is round then the earth is round and the earth is flat' is incorrect, while 'If the earth is round, then either the earth is round or the earth is flat' is correct. This would not have been so if the *reason* for the correctness were 'inclusion', as Sen seems to think. It obviously is because of the difference in the nature of the logical connectives concerned.

The recourse to 'all', I would suggest, is equally illusory. There are, as everybody knows, two different kinds of 'all', the 'all' of induction by simple enumeration and the real inductive 'all' about which nobody really knows anything. I have pointed this in passing in the article concerned and discussed it extensively elsewhere. The illusory mask of the traditional syllogistic 'all' is torn by the way modern logic chooses to translate it in terms of a conditional proposition. The translation of 'All men are mortal' is given as (x). 'If x is a man, then he or she is mortal' which everybody knows, would be true if there were no human beings on earth, for the falsity of the antecedent is supposed to make a conditional statement true. The analysis, of course, does not take

into account the dispositional nature of the predicate which will render it even more difficult to establish the falsity of the proposition. As for its 'truth', it is impossible in principle to establish it if the 'all' is to be treated as a real 'all' that is, as an *infinite* conjunction of particular facts.

Sen has wondered why I have not taken advantage of the easily available examples, some of which he has mentioned in his paper. Firstly, this is not correct. I have repeatedly discussed these examples, from my first paper entitled 'Law of Contradiction and Empirical Reality', onwards, and even earlier, in the chapter on 'Logic and Reality' in my book *The Nature of Philosophy*. In fact, even in the paper discussed by Sen, I have given the example of a proposition which he indubitably regards as an example of the synthetic *a priori*. The example I gave was that the two propositions 'Francine is taller than Shail' and 'Shail is taller than Sujata' together necessarily, imply the proposition 'Shail is taller than Sujata'. But I had concluded that while the relation between the propositions was 'necessary the relation between the facts designated by the propositions was not so'. The exact sentence I wrote was '... Francine is taller than Shail' and 'Shail is taller than Sujata' together necessarily imply the third proposition 'Francine is taller than Sujata' without, in any way, involving a necessary relation between the facts designated by the propositions concerned.' ('The Art of the Conceptual', p. 49). I could have obviously argued for the necessity of the relation between the facts designated by the propositions as Sen wants to do. The reason why I did not do so was that I had consistently argued earlier for the position that the so-called relations of symmetry and transitivity based on ordinary common experience have no 'necessity' about them, as any extension or 'deepening' of experience further may result in our 'finding' that the 'obvious' incompatibility is not 'really' so. The developments in modern science, specially in physics, have repeatedly demonstrated this. It is for this reason that 'the incompatibility of colours, and of shapes, and for that matter, of *all* determinates under the same determinable; the asymmetry of some relations and the transitivity of some' (p.17) do not yield any *specific* synthetic *a priori* truths, even though they appear to do so.

However, Sen is right when he suggests that my reason for choosing the hypothetico-deductive-verificationist way was that there the logical principles are involved in the process of derivation of one factual proposition from another in such a way that if the derived factual proposition is found to be false then we feel necessitated to think that there must be something wrong somewhere in the premises from which it has been derived. The logical principles do not only *necessitate* the derivation; they also *necessitate* that if the derived proposition is false, then there *must* be falsity in either all or some of the premises involved in the derivation, or some inadequacy in the logical principles themselves. In spite of all the paradoxes in the logic of confirmation, this is the hard-core bedrock of scientific method, even though we have always the option of 'doubting' the experimental results obtained, or suggesting that something else can account for it, or taking recourse to probabilities and saying that one 'counter-result' does not invalidate what is believed to be 'true' on other grounds. But whatever the strategies one may adopt to 'save' the 'truth' of the premises in face of the 'falsity' of the conclusion, one will have to accept the necessity of coming to terms with it and revise the premises in such a way that the incompatibility is removed if one wants to stay in the 'knowledge' game. One may, of course, opt out of it and *believe* simultaneously all sorts of incompatible things, as one usually does in life.

Sen's first suggestion that the foundations of the synthetic *a priori* lie in the logical laws themselves may be correct. But, even if true, it will only remain a pyrrhic victory unless we are prepared to say that the *use* or the *employment* of these laws in the understanding of the empirical world inevitably introduces an element of their *necessity* into the relationship between 'facts' which are sought to be understood through their employment. The foundational problem is not about the nature of logical laws, as Sen seems to think, but about the *relation* these laws bear to the empirical reality which they help us to understand and without which it perhaps would not be understood at all, at least at the human level at which we all are. The problem, in other words, is as to how much the *application* of logic to the understanding of empirical reality infects it with its own necessity and how much of

the latter's contingency affects it in its own turn. I myself have generally argued for the latter alternative. But in this paper my main contention was that the usual understanding of the method involved in the 'scientific' understanding of phenomena leans in the other direction, and that it was incompatible with the usual understanding of these concepts, that is, the synthetic and the *a priori*, at that time. Since then much water has flowed and the distinctions both disputed and also rendered more complex and subtle, but I hope the issues raised therein remain relevant still.

If Sibajiban Bhattacharyya has concentrated mainly on my article entitled 'Law of Contradiction and Empirical Reality' and Pranab Kumar Sen on 'The Synthetic A Priori', both Virendra Shekhawat and Dharmendra Kumar have dealt with the issues raised in the article entitled 'Types of Coherence'. Basically, the issues are the same, as I am questioning the accepted relationship between 'logic' and 'reality' in both these articles, as well as in many of my other writings which have not been paid much attention to by any of these three persons who have chosen to write on this aspect of my writings in the field of philosophy.

Shekhawat's main contention seems to be that had I paid sufficient attention to the relation between mathematics and 'reality' and treated it as a model for the relation between logic and 'reality', I would not have had the problems that I have posed in my article entitled 'Types of Coherence'. But the argument is about the non-sustainability of the analogy between mathematics and logic in this respect for the simple reason that logic is supposed to be concerned with something called 'truth' which is never the direct concern of mathematics. That is why it does not *prima facie* make sense to say that if one logic, on interpretation, does not hold 'true', we are always free to construct new logical systems that would in fact yield the required results as, according to Shekhawat, we always do in the case of mathematics. The only difference between an 'uninterpreted' logical system and an 'interpreted' one is that in the former we have either just sentence-variables or sentence-variables that are internally structured, while in the latter there are just concrete sentences in their place. There are no diverse domains of interpretation, in

some of which the interpreted formal system holds and others in which it does not. We are not supposed to tailor our logic to facts; it is facts that are supposed to be tailored *a priori* to our logic.

The recent attempts to build alternative logics may seem to support Shekhawat's idea regarding the assimilation of logic to the paradigmatic model of mathematics. But I think the alleged similarity is not only superficial, but essentially misleading, for the simple reason that the extensions have taken place either to build a logic which may deal with sentences other than the declarative or to deductively explore what would happen if, as Bhattacharyya has pointed out, some of the assumptions were given up or additional ones added. Perhaps the only example of an extension made to accommodate discrepant facts was the development of three-valued logic to account for the phenomena encountered in the field of quantum mechanics. But the very idea of changing one's logic to suit the so-called 'logic of facts' makes little sense, as logic is supposed to be concerned with propositions that are supposed to be either true or false. The interpretation of many-valued logic in terms of the probability values between 0 and 1 meaning falsity and truth, seems to support this. Also, 'facts' are not supposed to be 'true' or 'false' but only 'statements' about them and, if so, it would be an odd way to go about the business of knowledge, or at least empirical knowledge, to change our logic if we find something wrong with the results it gives us. The problem of truth is certainly a semantic one, but it is strange to find Shekhawat charging me with 'disregarding the distinction of the syntax and semantics of logical or mathematical systems'. The distinction is a commonplace of western philosophy and is taught to all students as the distinction between 'formal' and 'material' truth in the context of the teaching of Aristotelian logic. The question is not about the distinction, but about the relationship between the two—and it is the accepted view about that which I questioned in the article concerned.

The distinction between the 'formal' and 'material' is not usually supposed to be held in Indian logic, and hence perhaps the question of the relationship between them also may not be said to arise there. Shekhawat's references to Indian philosophy

do not touch this aspect of the question, and hence are mostly tangential to the discussion. However, some of the statements made seem extremely unclear, if not just incorrect. What could possibly be meant, for example, by saying that 'Sāṃkhya theory successfully provides a purely mechanical explanation of four sets of value, namely *apavarga*, *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* in the light of this postulated ultimate purpose.' Or, take the statement that the number of *pramāṇas* accepted should be such that they should neither result in the acceptance of something as real which should not be accepted as such or the exclusion of something which should have been accepted as real. But this will be to make our judgement about the reality of something independent of the *pramāṇas* and thus would make the *pramāṇas* totally irrelevant in the context of the determination of reality. It is, of course, not only in the context of his references to Indian philosophy that he has made statements which at least *prima facie* seem to be mistaken. One finds such statements in the context of western philosophy also. To say, for example, that 'Factual propositions may be empirically false (in the sense that no object corresponding to the proposition is in fact observable), yet theoretically true' does not *prima facie* make sense. First, a factual proposition, if it is factual, can only be *empirically* false, i.e. it cannot be false in any other way. Second, there is no point in calling it theoretically true, for it is false, it cannot be rendered true by any sleight of hand in terminology.

Dharmendra Kumar's article is in a different key altogether. Unlike Sibajiban Bhattacharyya who had suggested that the most current views about the nature of logic render my objections irrelevant as they are based on a view of logic which practically no one holds nowadays, or Virendra Shekhawat who suggests that my objections may be met by making logic sensitive to the specification of diverse domains on the model of mathematics, Dharmendra Kumar's is a straightforward defense of the traditional classical standard position on the subject. I wonder what he would say to all that Bhattacharyya or Shekhawat have said in their papers for, in a sense, they may be said to repudiate most of the presuppositions on which his discussion of my paper on

'Types of Coherence' may be said to be based. Yet, an independent consideration of his discussion may be in order as he has raised a large number of important and subtle points in the course of his detailed examination of my contention.

The first charge that Dharmendra Kumar has made against me concerns the confusion between 'consistency' and 'coherence', and the use of the terms interchangeably in the course of my discussion. But, 'consistency' and 'coherence' are not very different in the context of formal, deductive systems, and it is in this context that the overlapping and interchangeable use has generally occurred. Similarly, phrases like 'the coherence of a particular set of primitive assumptions' or the 'coherence of a set of syntactical rules' are used in a specific context where the issue being discussed is that while we are quite clear about what it would mean for any specific set to be inconsistent, we do not generally know whether they are consistent or not, if a generalized consistency proof cannot be given for them. In other words, while 'inconsistency' can be established by an actual derivation of p and $\neg p$ from them, 'consistency' can only be a matter of faith. (Dharmendra Kumar is, of course, right in pointing out that the term 'syntactical rules' covers both the 'formation' and the 'transformation rules', but that need not have created any confusion since both the use of the term 'assumptions' and 'rules' clearly indicates that what is being discussed is their functioning as *grounds* for derivation in a deductive system.)

The main thrust of many of the other objections raised by him seems to consist in pointing out that I am continuously confusing, or even deliberately exploiting, the 'ambiguities' and 'multiple roles' of words in the natural language with the crystal clarity which they *definitionally* have in the context of their use in logic. Now, in a certain sense, the fault for this lies in the history of logic as it has developed in the West, and also on the very nature of the issue under discussion, viz. the relation between pure logic where these very terms have a technical definition and ordinary, day-to-day empirical discourse where some specific, concrete context is supposed to be provided to them. The history of logic has treated conjunction, disjunction and implication, designated by such terms as 'and', 'either-or' and 'if-then' respec-

tively, as sentence-connectives having some logical properties along with 'all' and 'some', used in both empirical and logical discussion, simultaneously and indiscriminately. Normally, one would have expected the votaries of logical clarity to have coined different terms to indicate the strictly logical usages and to avoid any confusion with the way these terms were used in the natural languages. However, that was not done for two reasons: one, it was thought that the logical usage was only an abstraction giving precision to what was already involved in the ordinary usage; and two, it was thought that in some sense logic was both prescriptive and constitutive of what may be called valid processes of thought in general.

But whatever the reasons, the development of truth-functional logic should have removed the confusion as the so-called conjunction, disjunction and implication were, according to it, nothing but three out of the sixteen possible truth tables of a dyadic logical operator in a two-valued logic. Logically, no truth-table can be more privileged than the others, and if one were to ask about the corresponding names of the dyadic logical operators which are defined by the other truth-tables in the natural languages, one would be at a loss for an answer except in the cases of those which are designated usually by the 'exclusive "or"' and 'equivalence'.

'Truth-functional' logic, however, gives rise to its own illusions as most people, including Dharmendra Kumar, think that it is concerned essentially with sentences which can be 'true' or 'false', an illusion strengthened by the use of such terms as 'sentence-variables', 'sentential-functions', and 'truth-values' meaning 'truth' or 'falsity'. The illusion should have disappeared long back with the advent of 'many-valued' logics, for surely if logic is free to postulate as many values as it pleases for the entities it intends to deal with, they need not be confined to 'sentences' alone, nor those 'values' be understood in terms only of 'truth' and 'falsity'. The usual subterfuge is to 'interpret' 'many-valued' logic in terms of probability-values lying between 0 and 1, which are identified with 'falsity' and 'truth' of traditional 'two-valued' logic. But there is no necessity about this interpretation and, in any case, this need not be the only interpretation. In fact, even in a 'two-val-

ued' logic, we need not talk of 'truth' or 'falsity', or even of 'sentences' or 'propositions'. Any object which can have two and only two states such that it cannot be in both of them at the same time and has to be in at least one of them, would do. A ball, for example, which has two holes to be in, under these conditions, would fill the requirements as well as so-called sentences which can be 'true' or 'false'. The abstract, formal relations postulated apply to all sorts of entities and have nothing specific in them so as to apply only to sentences which have the properties of 'truth' and 'falsehood'.

One may go on to examine specific objections raised by Dharmendra Kumar in his article, but basically it is a question about the epistemological issues clustering about logic and the acceptance of the possibility of a philosophical critique of it. Dharmendra Kumar seems to write as if he does not believe in the possibility of either. He objects to the examples I had given, but does not see that the examples are illustrative of the issue. Take, for example, the example that 'from the truth of 'I shall be reading Plato' and 'I shall not be reading Plato' I cannot infer the truth of the conjoint statement 'I shall *both* be reading Plato and not be reading Plato'. The example was taken to illustrate that under the *minimal* logical properties of the connective 'and', from two 'true' propositions, their conjunction *can always* be inferred. Now, one may either deny that the two separate propositions 'I shall be reading Plato' and 'I shall not be reading Plato' are both 'true' or that this conjunction cannot be 'true', or that any sentence designating a state of affairs as 'possible' cannot be characterized as either 'true' or 'false'. But whatever *choice* one makes in the situation can hardly be made on purely logical grounds, and each has well-known difficulties of its own. The point that was being made in the context of the discussion was simply that for a certain substitution-instance for the sentences p, q, the usual logical rule that from their separate truth their logical conjunction could be inferred would be incorrect. The point in fact was made by Prior who developed a logic of time and modality taking into account the essential indeterminacy of the future in this context. As his article was explicitly referred to and

quoted from in my paper, it is surprising why Dharmendra Kumar did not pay any attention to this aspect of the situation.

Similarly, take the issue of the quantifiers 'all' and 'some' without which not much of inference is supposed to be possible. But leaving aside all the problems pointed out in the article concerned, there is another and far deeper problem regarding them. The universal proposition, in principle, can never be established as 'true', just as the so-called 'existential' propositions can never, in principle, be proved to be false. But if it is so, and it cannot be otherwise on their being logically construed as infinite conjunctions and disjunctions respectively, what could it possibly mean to characterize them in terms of 'truth-value'? And, if one cannot do so, what is the point of building a logic with them, as it can only be built by ignoring something which, at the empirical level, is the heart of the matter. But as at the formal level, the difficulty can be ignored for nobody is really interested whether some proposition or types of proposition can be proved 'true' or 'false', the logician goes on building his system as if the propositions *were* true or false. But for anyone genuinely interested in truth and falsity, they are not just 'T' and 'F', or 'I' and 'O' as the logician generally treats them, but highly complex predicates varying in nature with the types of propositions to which they are sought to be applied. Logic is not immune to philosophical criticism, and this becomes possible only because reason itself is far wider than logic.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

The responses to my articles on Indian philosophy range from the assertion that what I have said against the alleged 'spiritual' character of Indian philosophy has already been convincingly refuted by Balasubramanyan and Karl H. Potter (N.S. Dravid), to the contention that even though the facts I have pointed out and the arguments I have given might be correct, the conclusions I have drawn do not necessarily follow (J.N. Mohanty). It is not quite clear to which article of Potter Dravid is referring to, as he has not cared to specify the reference in his paper. If the reference is to his earlier paper entitled 'Indian Philosophy's Alleged

Religious Orientation', wherein he had discussed in detail the arguments given by me in my paper entitled 'Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy', then, as Dravid most probably knows, I have replied to it in detail in my paper entitled 'Indian Philosophy and *Mokṣa*—Revisiting an Old Controversy'. If, on the other hand, he is referring to Potter's reply to this paper entitled 'Why Can't an Indian Philosopher be Indian?', then all I can say is that Dravid's idea of what constitutes a convincing rejection of an intellectual position is totally different from mine. But, basically, what Dravid is interested in maintaining in his paper, is not the so-called 'spiritual' character of the Indian philosophical tradition as *against* other philosophical traditions, but that 'philosophy as a whole is a spiritually-oriented enterprise'. Now, if this applies to all philosophical traditions, whether Indian or non-Indian, then it does not give us any distinctive differentiating character regarding the Indian philosophical tradition which would distinguish it from other philosophical traditions. Further, it is not quite clear if this is merely a descriptive statement describing a particular state of affairs which has happened to prevail up till now, or a definitional stipulation that anything which is not such shall not be designated as 'philosophy' by Dravid, or a prescriptive demand by him that though what is usually considered as 'philosophy' may not have such an orientation, it *ought* to have it, in his opinion. These distinctions are important, for if it is only a definitional exercise, Dravid would have won his point, but only at the cost of triviality. On the other hand, if it is just a descriptive contention then it would permit, at least logically, the possibility of the occurrence of 'non-spiritualistic' philosophies, if not in the past then at least in the future. But if Dravid thinks that philosophers ought to be 'spiritualistic' in his sense even if there is a possibility of its being factually otherwise, he has to give grounds for his preference on the basis of which he thinks others should make the same choice. In any case, on this understanding of his position, the possibility of 'non-spiritual philosophies' will always be there and there will remain no *a priori* reasons why Indian philosophy in the past could not have been non-spiritual in principle.

As Dravid has referred to logical positivism in his article and presumably regards it as a school of philosophy, it may be taken

that he does concede the possibility of philosophy being non-spiritual in character, even though he may consider it perverse or mistaken for it to be so. The characterization of Indian philosophy as 'spiritual' then would be a factual claim subject to being tested against the evidence relevant to the purpose. And, Dravid has tried to do just this by saying that the Sanskrit term for philosophy is '*Adhyātma Vidyā*' which, according to him, means 'oriented to self or the concept of self' and not 'dealing with self', and that all schools of Indian philosophy can be understood to be 'spiritual' in this sense. Further, according to him, 'to be oriented' means 'to be determined by' and thus a 'spiritually-oriented' philosophy is that which is 'determined by' the idea of self which it has. And, it is this 'mode of determination' 'which is different in different philosophies', and thus determines the differences between them. To illustrate his point, Dravid chooses the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya philosophies, and suggests that their understanding of the nature of the self 'determines' their 'standpoint with regard to the whole realm of objective realities'. But, Dravid had warned us that by 'spiritual orientation' he 'does not mean dealing with spirit as object of enquiry'. But if such is not the case, then how could the Vaiśeṣika or the Sāṃkhya or any other school of philosophy *describe* the nature of the self in the way he has described them as doing. Surely, the Vaiśeṣika or the Sāṃkhya school must have given some reasons for holding the nature of the self to be such and not otherwise. As for the idea of self 'determining' everything else in the system, it is not clear how the whole of the *padārthas* which is the hardcore of the Vaiśeṣika thinking can possibly be derived, much less 'determined', by it? Can, for example, the dispute about the admissibility of *abhāva* as a separate *padārtha* be settled by an appeal to the Vaiśeṣika theory of self, or can Raghunātha Śīromāṇi's enterprise in his *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam* be understood in its terms? As for the Sāṃkhya, the author has been even more lackadaisical. He has just asserted that the 'self-orientation' of the system can be understood by seeing that its world-view is determined by contrasting it with its view of the self. In other words, the world is what the self is not, and hence the idea of the self may be said to determine the idea of the world by characterizing it as possessing

the attributes opposite to it. But he has forgotten that in the case of two entities so opposed to each other as *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are in the Sāṃkhya system, each can be characterized as the negation of the other. 'The self is what the world is not' is as true as 'the world is what the self is not', and thus, the 'world orientation' may be regarded as basic as the 'self orientation', without making us wiser in any way.

In fact, most systematic philosophies would have some theory of the self, just as they would have some theories of the world, and if they are not too loosely structured there is bound to be some relation between them so that one may find some similarity or complementarity between their views about the self and the world. But this would not make them either 'self-oriented' or 'world-oriented'. In fact, if one adopts the strategy adopted by Dravid in his article, then it would be almost impossible for any philosophy not to be 'self-oriented' if it has any theory of 'self' at all for its theory about everything other than the 'self' would either show *similarities* to it or be *different* from it in certain essential respects and, according to Dravid, in either case it is bound to be 'self-oriented', as he has tried to show in the case of both the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya in his paper. Not only this, if some philosophy like that of the Buddhists appears to radically deny the notion of the 'self', it does not matter, for it also denies the substantive reality of everything else, and thus may be said to build its philosophy on the way it builds its view of the 'self' and hence may be said to be 'oriented to self', in his sense of the term. And, though Dravid has not mentioned the Cārvāka, it is easy to see how on this logic, it can also be shown as 'oriented to self', for as it treats the body alone as 'self' it also treats only that which can be perceived as 'real'. The only problem on this view would arise with respect to those philosophers who have not dealt with the problem of self at all or those philosophical texts which deal with problems other than those of the self. And, there are many such in the Indian philosophical tradition, particularly those in the Navya-Nyāya tradition after Gaṅgeśa. The rich and varied tradition of Navya-Nyāya philosophers around Mithila and Navadvīpa which flourished for centuries from AD 1300 onwards, is sufficient evidence of this. Dravid, of course, would deny the

title of 'philosophers' to this whole galaxy of names and treat their works as 'non-philosophical' in character. But that would be a pyrrhic victory indeed and, I am sure, poor satisfaction to one who is such a good scholar of Navya-Nyāya himself. In any case, we may leave the choice to Dravid himself between giving up the so-called 'orientation to self' as an *essential* characteristic of all philosophy and declaring parts of commonly accepted philosophical enterprise in India as 'unphilosophical'.

If Dravid thinks it to be almost self-evident that philosophy cannot but be 'spiritual', and that both Potter and Balasubramanyan had refuted my arguments to the contrary in the context of Indian philosophy a long time back, Mohanty finds the term 'spiritual' to be essentially ambiguous and yet grants the correctness of most of the facts I had pointed out as well as the validity of most of the premises I had employed in questioning the claim that Indian philosophy is distinctively 'spiritual' in a sense in which western philosophy is usually not thought to be so. As he writes: 'For me, the most serious problem is that I do not understand what such a characterization means.' Perhaps, Mohanty did not see the detailed formulation of the characterization in the article entitled 'Indian Philosophy and *Mokṣa*: Revisiting an Old Controversy' where I had not only clearly indicated what, according to me, were the basic issues in this debate but also questioned the relevance of bringing in the ideal of *mokṣa* in any discussion regarding the characterization of Indian philosophy as 'spiritual'. As I wrote there: 'A philosophy is usually characterized as "spiritual" or "non-spiritual" because of the way it conceives of the nature of "reality" and not because of the manner in which it conceives of the ultimate or highest ideal for man. It is the answer to the question about the reality of matter that determines whether a philosopher is to be considered as "spiritual" or not, and not its answer to the question about the supreme end which human beings ought to pursue.'

But even if we forget the ontological dimensions of the question and concentrate only on the relation of Indian philosophy to *mokṣa*, as Mohanty wants us to do, it should be obvious that an examination of the contention has been the central concern of

my papers entitled 'Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy' and 'Indian Philosophy and *Mokṣa*—Revisiting an Old Controversy' and, to some extent, of 'Three Myths about Indian philosophy' also. The first article is primarily concerned with an examination of Potter's central contention regarding the integral relation between the so-called *darsanas*, i.e. speculative philosophy, as he calls it, and *mokṣa* and tries to show that Potter's contention does not withstand close examination. The second article which seeks to give a reply to Potter's detailed consideration of my arguments in the first article, i.e. 'Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy', explicitly formulates the issue concerning the relation of *darsanas* to *mokṣa* in the following way:

- (1) Is the concept of *mokṣa* distinctive of Indian philosophy in the sense that no analogous concept is to be found in the western philosophical tradition?
- (2) Even if such an analogous concept can be found in the western philosophical tradition, is it a fact that it (i.e. *mokṣa*) occupies such a central pivotal place in the Indian philosophical tradition that the latter cannot make sense or even be possibly understood without reference to it?

The detailed examination of these two formulations as presented in the article concerned has not been taken note of by Mohanty. Instead, he has shifted the terms of the debate and suggested that even though large parts of what I have said may be correct, yet there is a way of looking at the whole question that would assure that the traditional way of understanding the relation between Indian philosophy and *mokṣa* can be defended. He suggests that in order to do justice to the tradition's 'self-understanding' on this point, we should bear two things in mind. 'First of all, every *darśana* as theoretical system, had a certain conception of *mokṣa* built into it, determined by and, in turn, determining certain broad metaphysical concepts.' And, 'therefore, the different systems were not different attempts to demonstrate the possibility of the same practical ideal of *mokṣa* but each was an attempt to demonstrate the possibility of its own ideal of *mokṣa* as interpreted within its own system. And part of that demonstra-

tion was to show how the understanding of that goal was connected with the broad categorical structure of its own system.' The second thing that, according to him, we should keep in mind is, 'to maintain that the *darśanas*—all or at least many of them—undertook a certain task or even defined themselves as intellectual enterprises in terms of a certain task, is by no means to claim that a *darśana*—or even any of the said *darśanas*—successfully carried out the project.' Not only this, 'the worry that all concepts of a *darśana* are equally relevant—or even have any relevance at all—for the founding project is, one may suggest, due to the implicit assumption that a *darśana* is a perfectly close-knit system in which every component stands in organic relation to every other.'

Now, if we give up the presupposition of a 'close-knit', 'organic' relationship between all the elements of a philosophical system and also admit the possibility that it might or might not succeed in carrying out the 'founding task' it had set for itself and that this 'founding task' itself might be differently conceived, even though the same word might be used to convey that task, then it is obvious that all the so-called *darśanas* would have to be treated as being concerned with *mokṣa* on the simple ground of their having declared it to be their primary task. But, then, it is not clear why, on the same logic, any other *śāstra* which also proclaims itself to be concerned with *mokṣa* should be denied the characterization of its being seriously and intrinsically related to it. Mohanty is prepared to wonder as to 'how seriously one needs to take such claims, whether this was not a matter of style—at most one of conforming to a recognized cultural norm'. He adds that 'with regard to the *darśanas* one may want to take such claims more seriously: the issue is, how seriously?'

But why does the claim made on behalf of the *darśanas* deserve to be taken more seriously than one is prepared to do in the case of the other *śāstras* when the situation in both the cases is more or less the same? And, why make a distinction between some *darśanas* and others by characterizing the one as *ādhyātmika* and the other as *ānvīkṣikī*, and treating the former as more closely, or seriously, related to *mokṣa* than the latter, when the latter 'self-consciously' proclaims it as much as the former. Mohanty,

in fact, is not even entitled to make the distinction, particularly after his construal of the practical ideas of *mokṣa* as 'system-specific' in the sense that 'each was an attempt to demonstrate the possibility of its own ideal of *mokṣa* as interpreted within its own system'. If every system is engaged in demonstrating the possibility of its own ideal of *mokṣa*, then surely there can be no ground for drawing the distinction between the *ādhyātmika* and the *ānvīkṣiki darśanas*. Not only this, there can be no ground for making a radical distinction between the *darśanas* and the other *śāstras*, if they happen to make the same claim. The possible distinction in terms of the essential intellectuality of the enterprise in the *darśanas* as against the other *śāstras* is irrelevant on two counts. First, the others may also have a strong underpinning of intellectuality as, say, in some of the *Vyākaraṇa granthas* such as *Vākyapadīya*. Second, the requirement of intellectuality has not been formulated as a necessary condition by Mohanty for being related to *mokṣa* or even for being designated as 'philosophical'. He has, for example, included *yoga* amongst the *ādhyātmika darśanas* when it is primarily a *prayoga-śāstra* and has little intellectual content, at least in the *Yoga-sūtras*. In fact, the intellectual arguments it employs against Buddhists and some other philosophical systems is against its own declaration of the whole *pramāṇa-vyāpāra* as a *vṛtti* and the definition of *yoga* as '*citta vṛtti nirodhaḥ*'.

Mohanty, of course, seems inclined to treat the *darśanas* as *prayoga-śāstras*, if his reference to the analogy of the relation of technology to applied physics, and of applied physics to theoretical physics, and of theoretical physics to philosophy of science (physics), is taken seriously. This, of course, goes counter to his earlier contention that each *darśana* has its own conception of *mokṣa* which immanently and integrally arises from its own way of conceiving things and intellectually justifying it against others. But the analogy, if taken seriously, would prove just the opposite, for it cannot be Mohanty's contention that the best way of understanding the enterprise of theoretical physics is to see it in terms of the technology it gives rise to. The close relation between science and technology, as is well known, is a recent phenomenon. Earlier, the two used to develop independently, with only occasional interaction between them. And, even today the inner

ethos and telos of theoretical physics is very, very different from that which obtains in technology. If the relation between the *darśanas* and *mokṣa* (the analogue of technology in this model) is to be conceived on this model, then it will only confirm what I have been trying to say. Indian philosophy would, then, have to be conceived primarily as an intellectual-conceptual-ratiocinative enterprise concerned with issues relating to the network of knowledge and reality and the problem of validity with regard to any claim made concerning them. The relation of all this to *mokṣa* would, on this view, be only peripheral and tangential, though there may be more interplay between them in certain thinkers and at certain times. But this would not make *mokṣa* the central defining *leitmotif* of the *darśanas*, just as technology is not the defining characteristic of theoretical physics in the example given by Mohanty.

What exactly is the *leitmotif* or the 'founding project' (as Mohanty chooses to call it) of any intellectual enterprise, is, of course, difficult to say. And, the whole concept is so close to what is known as 'the intentionalist fallacy' that I wonder how Mohanty who is convinced that the 'fallacy' is really a fallacy could have chosen to base his whole defense of the so-called 'self-understanding' of the philosophical tradition in India on it. Even if we confine the notion of the 'founding project' to that which is immanently available in the text, Mohanty would find it difficult to discover one, as he obviously does not believe that there can, in principle, be any such thing as 'the understanding' or 'the interpretation' of any text. And, what if we adopt the 'deconstructive' strategies with respect to the texts or, for that matter, make a radical difference between the manifest and the latent content of these texts? There would also be the added problem of designating the texts in which this 'founding project' is to be discerned. Shall it be the Vedas or the Upaniṣads or the Sūtras, or whatever is regarded as authoritative by the *darśana* concerned? The Vedas are not supposed to be concerned with *mokṣa* and are generally assigned a period of at least a thousand years for their composition—a long time for a 'founding project' to be 'founded'. Besides this, there are all the problems I pointed out in my article 'The Vedic Corpus—Some Questions', which have not

even been sought to be answered by anyone up till now. As for the Upaniṣads, many of the most important of them are integral parts of the Sāṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas or Āraṇyakas and, in fact, are some sort of selections out of them. And, the few that are not so can hardly be said to provide that 'founding project' which Mohanty wants to see at the foundations of the philosophical enterprise in India. But even if it be conceded that they do provide some sort of a 'founding project' to philosophical enterprise in India, it would be only in the context of one and only one school of Indian philosophy, that is Vedānta. Yet, even in its case there are diverse problems as pointed out in my article 'Vedānta—Does It Mean Anything At All?' The acceptance of the authority of the *Gītā* even by Śaṅkara, and later of *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* by others, gave a turn to the so-called 'founding project' of the Upaniṣads which took it in different directions.

On the other hand, if we search for the founding project, amongst the foundational Sūtras of the different systems of Indian philosophy which proclaim themselves to be of Vedic origin or of Vedic inspiration, we find that their 'founding projects' are not uniform in character. Surely, the 'founding project' of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* cannot be said to be the same as that of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, even though they have a deceptive identity in their proclaimed subject-matter. The *dharma* of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* is obviously not the same as that of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* as is evident not only from the different definitions of *dharma* that they give in the beginning of their respective texts, but also from the way they extensively develop and explicate the theme in the main body of the texts. The *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* do not even promise either *abhyudaya* or *niḥśreyasa*, though it may be inferred by implication that by observing meticulously all the *vidhis* prescribed therein for the various *yajñas*, one would get what is usually denoted by *abhyudaya*. But then, is it being said that the *abhyudaya* will be achieved not by the performance of the *yajñas* in the exact manner described in the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* by Jaimini, but by a knowledge of the *padārthas* as described by Kaṇāda in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*? And, in addition, one is also promised *niḥśreyasa* which the so-called 'dharma' of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* does not provide. It may be noted that though in most writings

on Indian philosophy, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are mostly treated together, the first promises only *apavarga* not *abhyudaya*, while the second promises both *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa*. Also, though *apavarga* and *niḥśreyasa* are usually interpreted to mean the same, there are views suggesting that the term *niḥśreyasa* does not necessarily mean the same as *apavarga*. Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, for example, has argued that 'The word *niḥśreyasa*—dissolved as *niścitam śreyah*—literally means "definitely beneficial", it does not necessarily stand for an extraordinary (*alaukika*) state like liberation only. . . . In fact, as has been pointed out by the commentators, there are two kinds of *niḥśreyasa*—*drṣṭa* or ordinary, such as the obtainment of a garland, and *adrṣṭa* or extraordinary such as the attainment of *svarga*. Thus, the word *niḥśreyasa* is wider in meaning than the word *apavarga*—the state of liberation, being merely one of the many kinds of *niḥśreyasa*.' The 'founding projects' of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, to use Mohanty's phrase, are thus basically different and the two therefore should be treated as different philosophical enterprises.

What about Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Vedānta? Vedānta, we have discussed to some extent already. We may only add that neither the development of Advaita Vedānta from Śaṅkara onwards nor the polemical debate between the Advaitic and the non-Advaitic schools of Vedānta can be accounted for solely, or even primarily, in terms of the differences in their 'founding projects'. In fact, as they appeal to the same texts many a time, they seem to differ in their construal of the nature of the 'founding project' itself, and not just regarding how to carry it forward.

As for Sāṁkhya and Yoga, the latter is primarily a *prayoga-sāstra* and thus hardly deserves to be called an independent philosophical system in its own right. In fact, as *pramāṇa* is listed amongst the *vṛttis* whose *nirodha* is given as a *lakṣaṇa* of Yoga, it may be assumed that Yoga neither encourages nor indulges in *pramāṇa-prameya vyāpāra* which is the heart of philosophy and the necessary condition of most philosophizing. The *Yoga-sūtra*, of course, argues against some of the Buddhist positions, but that is an inconsistency which may be ignored for understanding the nature of the enterprise it engages itself in. The Sāṁkhya may, of

course, seemingly qualify to be the system *par excellence* in Mohanty's sense as it does seem to have ostensibly 'a founding project' conceived as the elimination of the very possibility of suffering, and that too of all types of suffering. But if we are not taken in by the appearance and look after the whole discussion about the nature of *prakṛti* and its diverse constituents and the *guṇas* and the inter-relationships between them, we will see that the philosophical heartland of the Sāṃkhya lies here and not in the identification of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* which, according to it, is the root cause of suffering and therefore the absolute total and radical de-identification is offered as the remedy. This may seem perverse to most students of Sāṃkhyan philosophy, but if they ask themselves why Śaṅkara criticizes Sāṃkhya, even though he starts with a delineation of *adhyāsa* which is totally Sāṃkhyan in character, they would understand the point of our contention. What Śaṅkara is disputing is not the need for total de-identification between the subject and the object or that the identification between them in any form or at any level is the basic *avidyā* which is the root cause of all suffering and hence requires to be uprooted totally to eliminate suffering. What he is arguing against is the whole notion of *prakṛti* with its nature, constituents and the theory of causation underlying it. And, the situation is the same in respect of the Buddhist and Jaina philosophers also. They enter the philosophical arena only when they have some theory to propound, some views to refute, something to contend for. And, in most cases, these have nothing to do with *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* or *kaivalya*. In fact, the internal divisions and differences amongst these traditions seldom centre around the nature of the spiritual quest or its goal, and when it does so, it is mostly outside the philosophical arena, as, for example, in the *Bhakti* tradition in medieval times.

The idea of a 'founding project', then, cannot be of much help in sustaining the contention for which Mohanty wants to use it. First, it commits the 'intentionalist fallacy', which at least he treats as a serious fallacy. Second, if the 'founding projects' are not to be imposed in an *a priori* manner on the texts, but built, intuited, abstracted from *within* them, then they are too diverse and variegated to serve his purpose either. Further, if the enter-

prise of articulating the 'project' is to be undertaken seriously, then it cannot be confined to one single initial text only, but rather seen through the succession of texts as they have developed over a period of historical time. The 'project' itself gets concretized and attains a discernible shape and contour through a succession of attempts which try to embody it in a firmer manner. To see history as a 'betrayal' of the 'founding project', or even as utterly irrelevant to the understanding of what that project was, is to assume not only that 'projects' emerge as complete in all their fullness and clarity, but also that all subsequent thinkers should see themselves and be seen by future historians as necessarily bound by them and *judged* by their success or failure in carrying their philosophical enterprise in its terms. Mohanty has written that 'to maintain that the *darśanas*—all or at least many of them—undertook a certain task, or even designed themselves as intellectual enterprises in terms of a certain task, is by no means, to claim that a *darśana*—or even any of the said *darśanas* successfully carried out the project'. This gap between the founding project and 'success' in executing that project haunts all philosophy and the sciences and provides the space where history 'inserts itself'. But why should the story be seen in this way? Why should the historical development not be seen as a critical comment on the 'founding project' itself or even as a discovery of new and more interesting projects on the way or of the non-viability of the original project, or just a simple cessation of interest in it, or its meeting a natural death through the exhaustion of all its realizable potentialities at a given point of time? Further, if the relation between the 'founding project' and the historical development is as loose as Mohanty has suggested, then no counter-evidence could even be possibly adduced to show that a particular understanding of the tradition or even its 'self-understanding' in a certain way, is mistaken. But that would be a Pickwickian satisfaction and a pyrrhic victory indeed.

Mohanty's second objection, in fact, comes very close to this. He says that there is a hidden premise in my argument which vitiates my conclusion even though the other premises from which I ostensibly draw it are correct. This 'implicit assumption', according to him, is 'that a *darśana* is a perfectly close-knit system

in which every component stands in organic relation to every other'. Now, what is wrong with such an assumption? The very notion of a system involves this to some extent, and a *śāstra* is a system with its *uddeśa*, *lakṣaṇa* and *parīkṣā* spelled out. The commentaries on the texts almost always raise the question regarding the adequacy of both the enumeration and the sequence in the discussion. And, as everyone knows, *gaurava* is always regarded as a *doṣa* and *lāghava* a virtue in the Indian notion of a *śāstra*. Not only this, the whole concept of a *śāstra* is so tightly knit that every move has to be *justified* and not only objections anticipated and refuted but also sometimes objections to objections raised and met with, in order, first, to establish the viability of the objection and then refute it. This, in turn, has affected the notion of a philosophical debate, popularly known as *śāstrārtha* in India, where the rules are strictly laid down beforehand and criteria for what is to count as victory and defeat clearly formulated along with mutual acceptance by both the parties of the competent authority to decide about them. In fact, the very format of the *sūtra* literature tries to shun irrelevance and the *Bhāṣya-vārttika-ṭīkā* literature is aware of this. It should be remembered that most of the so-called 'philosophical' literature in the West would hardly qualify as such from classical Indian standards of what a hard-core *śāstric* text should be. True, many of the Indian texts too are not 'a perfectly close-knit system in which every component stands in organic relation to every other'. But they certainly strive for it, and would treat its absence as a *defect*, something to be rectified and not excused or justified.

Mohanty is right when he says that in the course of historical development, 'many old doctrines are reinterpreted, modified, rejected and new ones added'. But then why not take all this seriously, why try to link it to some mythical 'founding project' in the primordial beginnings about which little can be said with confidence anyway? Or, in other words, why insist on seeing a continuity when what stares one in the face is a Break or a New Beginning? Even the tradition did not hesitate to call something as *navya*, when it saw it that way. Why should the moderns, then, deny the change and the novelty claimed sometimes even by the ancients themselves? Strangely, Mohanty has admitted that 'each

dārsana, contrary (but not contradictory) to that tradition's self-understanding, has a historical development. . .', without seeing the implications of what he has admitted. The contrariety between 'tradition's self-understanding', and 'historical development' ensures that both cannot be true, though both may be false. But Mohanty wants to hold that both *are* true; in fact, he is arguing for just that. The only reasonable explanation is that he is using the term 'contrary' in some non-technical sense where it means 'opposed, but compatible'. That the 'historical development' is unrelated, or even opposed, to the first formulations as evidenced in the basic texts of the various schools of Indian philosophy is more or less accepted by everybody, including Mohanty. How are this 'unrelatedness' and 'opposition' to be construed as only 'seeming unrelatedness and opposition'? This appears to be the basic enterprise in which all the ingenuity of most of the modern interpreters of Indian philosophy seems to be employed. But why the enterprise should be undertaken at all, is not clear to me. Why should we not be satisfied with articulating the Indian philosophical enterprise as it has actually developed over a period of, say, twenty-five hundred years of its recorded history? In any case, whatever the twists and turns of interpretation and whatever the ingenuities evolved to get the variegated history into the pre-conceived mould, it is obvious that there are large recalcitrant tracts of recorded philosophical enterprise in India which are *forcing* the scholars to do this. But once the idea of a 'founding project' to which all subsequent history has to show filial obedience is given up, the whole effort becomes meaningless and redundant, based as it is on the denial of freedom to the human spirit to strike out in directions having little to do with the past.

Mohanty has also made some interesting remarks about my observations about the so-called 'schools' of Indian philosophy and the notion of basic authoritative 'texts' or *śruti*, which are so unquestionably accepted in any discussion or presentation of Indian philosophy. But it seems to me that he has misunderstood my contentions in this regard. First, I have not said that 'there are in fact no "schools" and no "texts"' as Mohanty explicitly states. What I have said is that the present extant text of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, which are usually regarded as the authoritative

śruti 'texts' for the so-called 'orthodox' schools of Indian philosophy have certain extremely disturbing features about them which have not been noticed by those who have written on the subject. I am not saying that 'texts' should not be 'collected or compiled.' But, if they are, this should be explicitly *acknowledged*. And, there should be some underlying *rationale* for the 'collection' or 'compilation' whose adequacy can be evaluated and discussed. Also, a 'compilation' cannot claim the status of a '*śruti*' in the accepted sense of the word, as it is not '*apauruṣeya*' in character. Further, can there be a 'selection' from a *śruti*, as 'selection' implies that all parts of the so-called revelatory text are not equally important and that the totality of the message can be captured without reference to the left-out parts, thus rendering them redundant. What I had pointed out was that many of the major Upaniṣads were a *selection* from *pre-existent* 'texts', and that this fact was neither generally known nor taken into account by those who commented on them or wrote about them. As I had pointed out, the usual 'text' of the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* consists of chapters 4, 5 and 6 of the second *Āraṇyaka* of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, explicitly *excluding* the third *Āraṇyaka* which starts by calling itself an *Upaniṣad*. Now, if this does not call for an explanation, what else would? Śaṅkara refers to it, in passing, as the *Samhitā Upaniṣad*, but neither he nor Mohanty nor anybody else seems to see the far-reaching implications of the situation. As for the Vedas, the problems that I have pointed out do not relate to their being 'collections' or 'compilations', but are even more basic ones regarding what constitutes the Vedic corpus, which is regarded as the *śruti par excellence*. The issues I have raised are too serious to be brushed aside by saying that texts need not necessarily be 'non-arbitrarily circumscribed' or 'authored preferably by one person' or not 'compilations' or 'collections'.

The same may be said with respect to the notion of 'school' in Indian philosophy. If it is an 'open' notion, if a 'school' continues to grow, modify, change, then I have no objection to characterize Indian systems of philosophy in that way. But, are they characterized that way in the presentations we have of them in the histories and text-books on the subject? And, do living practitioners of Indian philosophy in the classical tradition conceive of them in

that way? Is a living thought ever satisfied with presenting and re-presenting a position over and over again, and not changing it, modifying it, developing it in new directions? Why is it felt blasphemous to ask a Naiyāyika, or an Advaitic or a Mimāṃsaka or the adherent of any other so-called 'school' of Indian philosophy what are his 'dissatisfactions' or disagreements with the position of his 'school' on the various philosophical positions that it is supposed to uphold against others? And, if there has been change and development in the past, why not in the present and the future? To use Mohanty's own terminology, has 'history' stopped for these 'schools' or is the opening of new 'horizons' not possible for them? The myth I was attacking was to treat their past as they are being treated in the present, in order to make students of the subject see the past in a different way so that they may treat them in the present in a 'freer', more 'critical' and 'creative' manner and not be engaged in merely presenting them in a more or less adequate manner but develop them in new directions.

As for the myth of 'authority', Mohanty again seems to have misunderstood my contention. The issue is not *śabdaprāmāṇya* though it is that also—but *śruti*prāmāṇya. And, Mohanty has conceded 'that in the hierarchy of *pramāṇas*—arranged in order of relative strength—the *prāmāṇya* of *śruti* stands highest, and so cannot be superseded by any other', and that this was not debated, i.e. '... open to discussion'. I had questioned the unquestioned acceptance of this assumption regarding the so-called '*āstika* schools' of Indian philosophy on the ground that not only was it not clear what *śruti* meant, but also that it was not clear what was meant by the so-called '*prāmāṇya*' of *śruti*. Mohanty has not advanced any arguments to make me revise my opinion. In fact, I suggest that the issue of *śruti*prāmāṇya should be disengaged from that of *śabdaprāmāṇya* and the truth of the statement that the so-called '*āstika* schools' of Indian philosophy seriously accepted it throughout the long period of their historical development be subjected to close scrutiny. The claim, of course, has been made too often, but I submit that it has to be *established* and not taken for granted, as it has been done up till now.

If Dravid has confined his attention, or rather his remarks, for he has nowhere considered my arguments in detail, to my contention regarding the alleged relation of Indian philosophy to *mokṣa*, and Mohanty to the three unquestioned characterizations about Indian philosophy regarding the so-called 'spirituality', 'schools' and 'subservience to authority' which I had characterized as 'myths', Harsh Narain has been fair enough to take into account all that I had written on Indian philosophy. Not only this, he has summarized my major contentions in each paper with scrupulous fairness. But, like both Dravid and Mohanty, he does not seem really interested in the issues I have raised. And, he clears the decks, like Mohanty, by suggesting that we should not ask for too much precision. In fact, he quotes Plato's remark in the *Theatetus* that 'there is something low-bred in being too precise'. But as I do not think there is anything wrong in being 'low-bred', I also do not think there is anything wrong in asking for 'precision', particularly when the Indian theoretical tradition, specially after the advent of Navya-Nyaya, itself tried to seek this precision.

The next step that Harsh Narain takes is to divide philosophy into those that are 'existential' and those which he calls 'dialectical', that is, those oriented not to 'experience', but to logic or language or mathematics. And, he is in no doubt that the former is far superior to the latter and that Indian philosophy is primarily the former and not the latter. As he writes, 'On the Indian view, roughly speaking, the goal of religion is attainment of *summum bonum*; that of philosophy, *summum bonum* and the way to it. Philosophy is born in course of contemplation upon religious verities. It is a by-product, an off-shoot, an off-spring of religion.' Now, an off-shoot or an off-spring may become quite independent of that from which it has arisen and may even be radically opposed to it in spirit and temper and inclination. It is surprising to find that the learned professor is just *repeating* the usual contention even after reading my detailed arguments *against* that contention and not trying to *answer* them. In fact, he *is* aware that the evidence of the so-called systems or 'schools' of Indian philosophy may go counter to what he is saying and so suggests that, 'If we whittle down the scope of Indian philosophy to its popular systems, we

are bound to miss a lot of it.' And so that we may not miss the 'real' theme, he develops a two-level theory of the systems wherein their apparent 'concerns' and 'arguments' and 'problems' need not be taken too seriously, for 'the systems seem sometimes to refer *beyond* themselves and contain suggestions of what somehow lies unsaid and yet *superior* to *themselves*.' And, Harsh Narain adds, 'If we do not read them as such, we shall only *misread* them.' So, all that we say about the systems is bound to be a 'misreading' of them, for their real meaning lies *beyond* them in what they themselves declare to be 'superior' to them. And, how does Harsh Narain substantiate this? Simply by pointing out that almost all 'schools' of Indian philosophy refer beyond themselves to Vedānta for real 'spiritual' seekers in the field of philosophy. Regarding Mīmāṃsā, he writes, 'there is a well-attested tradition that originally there was a great Mīmāṃsā work comprising 20 chapters divided into *Karma-Kāṇḍa* comprising its first 12 chapters forming the extant *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, *Devatā-Kāṇḍa* comprising its next four chapters forming the extant *Sanharsya-Kāṇḍa* ascribed to Jaimini or *Sanharsyaṇa*, and *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa* comprising its remaining four chapters framing the extant *Brahma-sūtras*'. Or, that 'Kumārila advises the seekers of the *ātman* to turn to the Vedānta.' Similarly, 'According to some, the *Nyāya-sūtras* used to conclude with the *sūtra*, 52nd in number, "*Tattvam tu Bādarāyaṇā*", i.e., we should turn to the *Brahma-sūtra* for the ultimate truth.' Besides, Vātsyāyana seems to suggest that for the science of the spirit (*adhyātma-vidyā*) one should turn to the Upaniṣads. As for the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, isn't its ostensible purpose the treatment of *dharma*, and what can be more 'spiritual' than *dharma*?

It is strange that the learned professor should have written all this and not seen that, if true, it establishes just the opposite of what he wants it to establish. How does the inclusion of the *Brahma-sūtra* and the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* under one cover or title obliterate the radical distinction between them, and doesn't Kumārila's statement clearly imply that Mīmāṃsā is not concerned with the seeking of *ātman* and that those who want to do so should go elsewhere? So also, does not the alleged last *sūtra* of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, clearly say that the Nyāya school of philosophy has

nothing to offer to those who are seeking the ultimate truth? And does not Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.1. clearly indicate that the *distinctive differentiating* feature of Nyāya from the Upaniṣads consists in its treatment of the topics mentioned in the opening *sūtra* and does not the long history of the Nyāya support his contention? As for the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, Harsh Narain himself has admitted that 'it seems to have derailed, as noted by some classical writers'. Presumably, what he means is that the discussion of the *padārthas* has little to do with *dharma* which was the proclaimed subject-matter of the *sūtras*. But first, it is obvious that the *dharma* of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* has nothing to do with the *dharma* of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, and that both are quite different from the *dharma* dealt with in the *Dharma-sūtras* and the *Smṛti-granths*. Second, if the so-called 'derailment' occurs in the 'founding *sūtra*' itself, then it cannot be regarded as a 'derailment', and we should look critically at the whole set of presuppositions which have led us to treat them as such.

The recourse to the *Brahma-sūtra* to save the so-called *mokṣa-centricity* of the Indian philosophical tradition would, however, not be of much help, for, as everyone knows, there are as many 'schools' of *Brahma-sūtra* interpretation as the *ācāryas* in the Indian tradition and the polemical disputes between them have continued till almost as late as the nineteenth century. Each *sampradāya*, though ostensibly deriving its authority for being a *mokṣa-śāstra* from the fact that it is explicating the true meaning of the *Brahma-sūtra* treats all the other *sampradāyas* as not only mistaken but false in the sense that what they are teaching as *mokṣa* is not *mokṣa*, but a perversion of it. Moreover, the texts claiming to be *mokṣa-śāstras* are not confined to the texts in the *Brahma-sūtra* tradition only. They are not even concerned with the *Brahma-sūtras* and bypass it completely. As for the so-called reference to '*Tattvaṃ tu Bādarāyaṇāḥ*' in the last *sūtra* of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, a scholar of Harsh Narain's stature should have known of its dubious character. The only scholar who is supposed to have discovered it as an integral part of the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* is Pt. Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya whose *sūtra* text along with his commentary entitled *Vivaraṇa* was published in Pandit New Series, 23, 24 and 25 in the years 1901, 1902 and

1903 by S.T.G. Bhaṭṭācārya. Not only are many of the *sūtras* given by him not found in the other versions of the text such as the well-known *Nyāyasūcībandha* of Vācaspati Miśra I, but the variant readings of the *sūtras* that it has from the presumably authoritative text of the latter happen to be unbelievably large, that is, about 85 in number. In any case, none of the other well-known versions of the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* lists this *sūtra* as an authentic part of the text. Neither Vācaspati Miśra I nor Vācaspati Miśra II or Viśvanātha or Keśava Miśra or Bhaṭṭāvāgīśvara seem to know of the *sūtra*. To build one's case on the existence of a *sūtra* which is accepted by only one writer on the subject who flourished as late as the seventeenth century, is sufficient evidence for the weakness of the contention.*

As for Harsh Narain's plea for a two-level interpretation of the philosophical texts, I can only say that while multiple levels of meaning and interpretation may be a virtue in a poetic text, it can hardly be so regarded in a text that claims to be philosophical. If nothing has a determinate meaning, and anything can be allowed to mean anything whatsoever, then there is little point discussing what is being said, for nothing specific is being said according to this contention. To say in response that in fact everything is being said would not help matters either, for there is little substantial difference between the two contentions. Moreover, such a way of construing the philosophical texts of India is to do great injustice to them as they take great care in clearly demarcating what they propose to establish, that is, the *siddhānta*, against all the other counter-positions known as the *pūrva-pakṣa*. Any reading of the Indian philosophical tradition which destroys the distinction between the *siddhānta* and the *pūrva-pakṣa* can hardly be taken seriously by any person who is genuinely interested in India's philosophical traditions as against its mystical or spiritual traditions.

If Dravid, Mohanty, and Harsh Narain have objected to my

* See in this connection my article, 'The Text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*: Some Problems', in *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. VII, No.2, January-April 1990, pp. 13-40.

attempt to see the philosophical enterprise in classical India as being autonomous and independent of other enterprises in the culture, including the spiritual one, Pratap Chandra has taken me to task for accepting the Vedic tradition in classical Indian philosophy as being the mainstream around which, and in whose context, most of them tend to articulate and organize themselves. According to him, the Indian tradition in every field is multilinear and hence any unilinear presentation is bound to do violence to it. Being a scholar steeped in the Buddhist philosophical tradition, he sees the alleged centrality of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads as unjustified for the simple reason that not only does a large part of the Śramaṇa tradition fall outside it, but also the various Āgamic and Pāñcarātra traditions which form such a central part of the Indian tradition. I plead guilty to the charge. But, first, that is the usual picture presented in most books written on the subject these days and, second, I was questioning the picture even with respect to the so-called Vedic schools of philosophy in the Indian tradition. In an article entitled 'Three Myths about Indian Philosophy' published as early as 1966, I had characterized as 'myth' not only the generally held notion that Indian philosophy is 'spiritual', but also that there are such things as 'schools' of Indian philosophy, and that the Vedas have the status of a 'revealed authority' for them—myths that Mohanty has discussed in his paper in this volume. Moreover, a careful re-reading of the passages he has quoted would (or should) convince Pratap Chandra that in each case I am *questioning* the characterizations he is bringing to our attention and that the 'characterizations' are more in the sense of reporting *what* is generally held by most scholars and laymen alike than my own considered opinion on the subject. In any case, I am thankful to him for drawing my attention to the subject.

K.J. Shah's paper falls in a category so far apart that it is difficult to respond to it in the usual manner. While Dravid, Mohanty, Harsh Narain, and Pratap Chandra have at least paid some attention to what I have written on Indian philosophy and tried to answer the objections I have raised against many of the accepted views about it, Shah blithely ignores all that I have written on the

subject and presents instead a counter-picture of his own. He certainly has every right to do so, but I do not see its exact relevance in the current context of a discussion concerning what I have written on the subject. Even concerning the theory of *puruṣārthas* with which Shah's paper primarily 'deals', he has not cared to *discuss* the issue I have raised in my full-length paper devoted to the subject, entitled, 'The Myth of the Puruṣārtha'. How can any meaningful dialogue occur in such a situation? Still, let me offer a few comments on Shah's counter-picture regarding the theory of *puruṣārthas* presented in his paper.

First, there is no such thing as the *prasthāna-trayī*, even for the so-called Vedāntic tradition in Indian philosophical thought, let alone for the non-Vedāntic traditions which allegedly derive their validating source from the Vedas or those like Buddhism and Jainism which repudiate that source altogether. Pratap Chandra seems justified in his accusation that most scholars write and argue as if there is only one so-called mainstream tradition in India represented by texts which align themselves in some way or other, directly or indirectly, with the Vedas. So deep-seated seems this bias and unconscious this *mantram*-like repetition of the triumvirate of the Upaniṣad, the *Brahma-sūtra* and the *Gītā* that no one seems even to ask himself the simple question 'which Upaniṣad or Upaniṣads?', for the Upaniṣads have continued to be composed at least till as late as the thirteenth century. And all this, when these and other questions have been pointedly raised by me in my article 'Upaniṣads—What Are They?'

These are, however, minor matters, though they do reveal the almost self-enclosed, monadic character of the philosophical community in contemporary India whose windows seem to be open in only one direction, that is, the West. The more important point is what exactly is meant by the terms '*artha*' and '*kāma*' in the theory of the *puruṣārthas*, or at least what K.J. Shah means by them. Is Shah, for example, using the terms '*kāma*' and '*artha*' the way they are being used in such classical texts devoted to them as the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Kāmasūtra*? *Prima facie*, it appears that Shah does subscribe to a meaning of these terms which is closer to these texts, if they are taken as paradigmatic in the understanding of their meanings. For he writes, 'If *artha* and

kāma are pursued not according to *dharma* and therefore also not according to *mokṣa*, they cease to be "*puruṣārthas*", goals of human beings. They become greed and lust.' '*Artha*', therefore, is taken in a sense where its unrestricted pursuit is known as 'greed', and '*kāma*' as that whose unrestricted pursuit becomes 'lust'. This is pretty close to the core sense of these terms in the two paradigmatic texts mentioned above. But Shah, of course, is fair enough to propound that 'equally, if *dharma* and *mokṣa* are not related to *artha* and *kāma*, they become ritualism and escapism'. Fair enough, but then what happens to his exemplars and a large part of the tradition which rejects this? Surely, neither Gandhi nor Ramakrishna nor Ramana Maharshi accepted *kāma* as an integral part of their *puruṣārtha*. In fact, they actively denied and rejected it. Sri Aurobindo is also on record as having written that sex stands in the way of *yoga* and, I am given to understand, even married couples were supposed to observe celibacy in the *āśrama*. As for *artha* in the sense of wealth and/or political power, neither Ramakrishna nor Ramana Maharshi thought of them as legitimate *puruṣārthas* for anyone seeking the road to self-realization seriously. As for Gandhi, it is difficult to say anything definitely, but perhaps we would not be too wrong if we say that, for him, seeking of *artha* was justified only for public purposes and there too only in the context of the purposes for which they were used. They certainly seem to have a place in Aurobindo's vision of the Life Divine, but his own withdrawal from politics and the life of overt action along with the almost continuous underplaying, if not denigration, by most of his disciples, of Gandhi who was conducting the most radical and difficult experiments in the field of political action in India, cast serious doubts on the legitimacy of his fulfilling the role of the exemplar assigned to him by Shah in the context of his theory of *puruṣārthas*.

Much more may be said about the integral theory of the *puruṣārthas* that Shah has built and his attempt to see them as diverse, but inter-related, facets of the goal of self-realization that is so central to all the schools of Indian philosophy, but what disturbs me basically is the fact that there is little attempt, if any, to meet possible counter-evidence and counter-arguments even

when they have been offered against his position. Also, they seem too much of an attempt to present his own theory of the *puruṣārthas* as if it is the traditional one and not to see its radical difference from the way it has been usually understood in the tradition.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHIZING

R.S. Bhatnagar and Ranjit Ghose have discussed what I have written about 'philosophy' and 'philosophizing'. As my very first book was on *The Nature of Philosophy* and one of my most recent articles has been on 'Thinking vs. Thought', they have drawn attention to an aspect of my thought which runs as a subterranean current underneath many of the things I have written about in the course of almost a lifelong involvement with problems and issues which are usually regarded as 'philosophical'. In fact, Bhatnagar has drawn attention to my stray remarks scattered over a number of articles written after *The Nature of Philosophy* such as 'Philosophical Theory and Social Reality', 'God and Human Consciousness', 'Arts and the Cognitive Enterprise of Man', 'Comparative Philosophy: What it Is and What it Ought to Be', which are not only different from, but may even be said to be contrary to what I had said in *The Nature of Philosophy*. However, instead of trying to resolve the discrepancies pointed out by Bhatnagar, it may perhaps be best if I try to articulate what I think about these matters at present.

First, I do consider the idea of philosophy as articulated in *The Nature of Philosophy* basically correct. It forms, so to say, the hard core of the activity that needs a distinctive name for itself and 'philosophizing' seems the most suitable candidate for it and its 'products' may be called 'philosophy'. The only clarification I would like to make regarding what is said there, in the context of which Bhatnagar has written on the subject, is that I had not exactly said that philosophy is concerned with 'concepts', but only that it is concerned not so much with the problems raised by the *specificities* of this or that concept, but rather by the very 'conceptuality' of the concept. This is one reason why 'philosophical' problems may arise during the course of reflection on any subject

whatsoever. Only, when they arise, they seem only tangentially related to the field from which they have arisen.

Second, the activity is a second-order activity of the mind where the reflective consciousness is concerned not with what the 'concepts' are 'concepts of' but with the relation between 'concept' and consciousness on the one hand, and 'concept' and what it is 'concept of' on the other. Reflection, in this context, may take two different directions, giving rise to two different types of philosophical activity. It may be concerned with the generalized referential fact of the concept being always a 'concept of' this or that, or it may explore the world of concepts through building a typology of them derived from, but not exclusively dependent on, the first-level world of which the concepts are 'concepts of'. This 'first-level' world is only 'first-level' in relation to the 'second-level' world of concepts. It may, however, be in some cases itself a 'second-level world' as in the case of many kinds of art objects and other symbolic creations of man. On the other hand, the object of philosophical reflection may be the relation of concept to consciousness in its generality or an exploration of the diverse modalities of consciousness which are both derived from, and independent of, the diverse types of concepts the consciousness is 'conscious of'.

Third, the reflexivity of self-consciousness results in a perpetual possibility of objectivating and thus rendering *problematic* anything which appeared unproblematic earlier. Thus, nothing can escape being the subject of a possible philosophical reflection, including the fact of this possibility itself. But as these include not only that which is cognitive in nature, but also 'feelings' and 'action', the self-conscious reflection that renders them 'problematic' also simultaneously brings into them a 'negativity' of a different kind than that which occurs in respect of the domain which is primarily 'cognitive'. It suggests the possibility of a 'different kind of feeling' or of 'a different kind of action' and when turned to consciousness itself, a 'different kind of consciousness'.

Further, such a 'problematizing' result of the act of 'philosophical reflection' opens the possibility of the 'transforming' aspect of 'truth' but which perhaps may better be described as the 'transformative' function of 'questioning' itself in the context

of philosophy. The 'transcendent aspect' about which Bhatnagar has written emanates both from the 'reflexivity' of the act of 'self-consciousness' which 'problematizes' at every level as much as from the fact that every 'question' or 'problem' gives rise to other 'questions' and 'problems'. The first may be regarded as the 'vertical transcendence', and the second, as 'horizontal transcendence'.

Bhatnagar has raised the question as to how the philosophical enterprise can be regarded as 'cognitive' in character if the cognitive enterprise, according to me, requires 'that what is real and is sought to be known is independent of the beliefs of men, and that the determination of "truth" and "falsehood" is so central to the cognitive enterprise that without that it can hardly be regarded as making any sense at all'. But, Bhatnagar seems to have forgotten that in the context of the article concerned this was only a statement about what is generally held and which I have questioned at a large number of places, particularly in the context of understanding social reality. My response to it is presented in the following section. In fact, it is this contention of mine that Yogesh Gupta has criticized in her paper. Still, it may be worthwhile to make some further clarifications in the matter.

Philosophical enterprise is 'cognitive' in the sense that it is neither a matter of 'feeling' nor of 'action', but always involves argument and counter-argument concerning questions and problems that are primarily theoretical and arise mostly from what I have characterized as the 'conceptuality' of the concepts. As for 'independence', these 'questions' and 'problems' are independent in the sense that once they have arisen, they become as 'objective' as anything else, not only to the mind that has encountered them, but to every other mind that can be interested in them. It should be remembered in this connection that even what is 'constituted' by belief gets independent of it *after* it has been constituted. This is the basic *māyā* of all human reality. As for 'truth' and 'falsehood', perhaps Bhatnagar is right in suggesting that 'adequate' and 'inadequate' may be better characterizations than 'truth' and 'falsehood'. But one may raise the same question regarding them and ask 'adequate to what?' Ultimately, as the arguments try to give grounds for accepting

something and the counter-argument tries to show the loopholes and weaknesses in the *grounds* advanced for *accepting*, the terms 'truth' and 'falsity' may not be so wide of the mark. Yet, it should be remembered that these terms themselves undergo subtle transformations as the context changes. Perhaps, the discussion in the context of the article 'Types of Coherence' may help in this regard.

Ultimately, any attempt at an articulation of what 'philosophy' is, tries at best to mirror what one finds oneself doing, that is, to articulate what one does when one 'philosophizes'. And, as this goes on changing as one grows (or declines) over a period of years, one's understanding of what 'philosophy' is, may also change as time passes by. But I hope there has been continuity in my views of philosophy, even if some new facets have been added to what was said before. One does not so easily give up old insights even when new ones appear on the horizon.

And this brings me to the paper of Ranjit Ghose, which draws pointed attention to this new developing concern of mine which emphasizes more the activity of 'philosophizing' lying behind the diverse formulations of different philosophers. The article that Ranjit Ghose has referred to tries to articulate the extraordinary experience of the seminars on 'Creative Philosophizing' that I used to hold every Wednesday over a long period of time and which Ranjit Ghose had attended when he was a Teacher-Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Rajasthan. In fact, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, had witnessed, for years, what I used to call 'a daily miracle', at which I myself never ceased to be surprised. Almost every day, we had a seminar at a fixed time on some philosophical topic and invariably fresh perceptions and new points, emerged during the course of this discussion, generally from the younger members present in the group. But, though continued over such a long period of time, it could not be replicated elsewhere and, even at the department where almost everybody was a daily witness to it for years, it has gradually been given up, though the memories of the past still linger on and there are intermittent attempts at revival of what was once a liv-

ing reality. Ranjit Ghose is right: the future of such an innovative activity, though not bleak, does not seem very bright either.

FREEDOM, VALUES AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Ashok Vohra, Bhuvan Chandel, D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Dharmendra Goel, Yashdev Shalya, Yogesh Gupta and Suresh Chandra have reacted to my thinking concerning what may broadly be regarded as the field of moral, political and social philosophy. Amongst these, Vohra and Suresh Chandra have written on specific individual papers, while Bhuvan Chandel, D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Dharmendra Goel, Yashdev Shalya, and Yogesh Gupta have examined in detail what has been said at a number of places in different papers or even books devoted to these subjects. As the papers of Yogesh Gupta, Yashdev Shalya, and Suresh Chandra are the most detailed, thorough, and painstaking critique of what I have written in these fields, I will discuss them after considering the more generalized observations of Vohra and Bhuvan Chandel on what I have written on *Freedom*, and of D.P. Chattopadhyaya and Dharmendra Goel on what I have written on *Action* and *Value*.

Vohra in his examination of my paper entitled 'An Attempted Analysis of the Concept of Freedom', has grave objections to the following contentions that I have made in the paper:

- (1) My denial of 'freedom' to higher animals is based on grounds that are weak and it would be better if we follow Wittgenstein's advice and 'consign ourselves to silence' in these matters.
- (2) My confinement of consciousness to the 'spacious present' is mistaken.
- (3) My contention that it is not the specific content of what I choose which is relevant for freedom, but whether 'I' succeed or fail in achieving what I have chosen.
- (4) There is a seeming incompatibility between my saying that 'it is the *conscious* transcendence that gives us freedom' and my contention that it is the success in the

achievement of ends, however chosen, which leads to the feeling of freedom.

- (5) My analysis of the concept of freedom is formal in nature.
- (6) 'The very fact that history of mankind is full of revolutions and revolutionary ideas' proves that I cannot but be wrong.

Now, I think it is wise advice on the part of Vohra to suggest that we be silent about the question whether animals feel free (are free) or not. I only wish he had followed the advice and not argued that just as we tend to think that animals are not free, so too the Superman of Aurobindo might think the same about us, and as many ordinary psychologists and sociologists have already argued in recent times. Vohra, however, has given no substantive reasons as to why the so-called feeling of 'freedom' is basically from the viewpoint of either psychological or sociological knowledge. The basic point that I had tried to argue in my paper was concerned with this very issue and which unfortunately, Vohra has not considered at all. The issue, in other words, was whether the feeling of freedom, which presumably everybody has, can be declared to be illusory. Many scientists and philosophers have declared it to be so, and Vohra does not seem to have given any additional grounds against it, except to make a vague appeal to some sort of dualism between the body and the psyche. My own attempt, on the other hand, was to argue that 'the feeling of freedom' was the sort of thing about which the very question of its being illusory could not be raised, as in its case the very 'appearing' certified its 'reality'. The distinction between 'what appears' and 'what is real' can apply only in those cases where 'what appears' is taken as 'representing' or 'referring to' or 'being a sign or symbol of' something other than itself. Where such is not the case, or not primarily the case, the question of its being 'illusory' or 'veridical' does not arise. 'To feel pain' is to be in pain or to have pain, and there seems little point in my or anyone else's saying that I may be mistaken about it, or that I may not really be in pain even when I am *actually* feeling it. But while most people may agree to hold this view regarding pain, they may

not agree to do so regarding freedom. And, the point of the article was to suggest that the same considerations hold with respect to freedom as the ones that are regarded as fairly decisive in the case of pain. And, as man is not only a conscious being, but also one who is self-conscious, he does not merely feel free but also is aware of the fact that he feels in this way.

The self-conscious feeling of freedom is the feeling of self-consciously being free, and it was contended that the phenomenologically-epistemological here coincides with the ontological just as 'feeling pain' is the same as 'being in pain'. And, as feelings are confined to the 'lived' life of the 'specious present' even when they arise with respect to objects of memory or imagination, so also is the specific feeling of freedom. As for the charge of 'formalism', Vohra has forgotten that it is not 'formalism' of the abstract, theoretical, Kantian kind, but a 'living' formalism derived from the phenomenological-existential structure of self-consciousness itself. One may, if one so likes, call 'pleasure' or 'happiness' formal as it arises primarily from a relation between object and consciousness, the object being any object whatsoever. Similar is the situation with regard to the feeling of freedom. It may arise in all sorts of situations and with respect to all sorts of situations. The specificity of the situations has only a tangential relation to the feelings that are aroused thereby even though the external manipulator tries to build some sort of a cause-effect relationship and ensure the arousal of feelings and emotions by creating stock situations of a certain kind. Not only art, but even social life, tries to do it to a certain extent. The Indian theory of aesthetics tries to transform non-aesthetic situations into aesthetic ones in the living context. But no one seems to have noticed that 'freedom' does not occur as one of the 'rasas' in the Indian theory, not even when *śānta* or *bhakti* are added to the traditional nine *rasas* propounded by Bharata in his *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Similarly, though people continue to create an atmosphere of joy and happiness, few have ever tried to create a feeling of freedom. Perhaps happiness or joy itself is taken as a sign that people *are* feeling free or, at least, not unfree. The relation between 'freedom' and 'happiness' has not been much

explored in philosophical literature, nor perhaps the relation between positive feelings and emotions in general.

The seeming contradiction between freedom as 'the successful pursuit of a given end' and freedom as 'the conscious transcendence of the given itself at any level' emanates from the fact that man is not only a conscious being, but is also self-conscious. The former type of freedom is generally found at the level of consciousness, while the latter occurs only at the level of self-consciousness. The possibility of reform or revolution arises from the latter possibility in self-consciousness, but how much actual freedom is enhanced by them is another matter. The same is the case with all the technological innovations about which Vohra has written so eloquently. My own feeling is that at the level of what is now fashionably called the '*lebenswelt*', it hardly makes any difference, except perhaps negatively, while at the level of what is described as 'objectively judged reality', it creates not only enormous distances between present and the past civilizations, but also in the present between those who have these 'gadgets of freedom' and those who do not. My own thought has not been completely averse to expressing the socio-political conditions of 'phenomenological-existential' freedom, but in this paper I was concerned only with the latter and not with the former. A number of books and papers—some of them discussed by Dharmendra Goel and Yashdev Shalya—have discussed the former but the article to which Vohra has confined his attention attempts to deal with something different and perhaps a more fundamental, or at least more neglected, aspect of the problem. My views in this regard may perhaps be better understood if one reads an article entitled 'Invariants of the Human Situation—Valuations and Limitations', where I try to articulate the structure of the phenomenological-existential human consciousness as it lives through its life between birth and death, caught so beautifully by such Heideggerian concepts as 'thrownness' and 'being-towards-death'.

Bhuvan Chandel has discussed the notions of transcendental and empirical freedom which have engaged my attention over a long period of time and has suggested that there are some almost insoluble problems in the way I have conceived them.

The basic problem regarding any discussion of freedom is that, at the human level, freedom is not just of one type and that, in some sense, it is both an ideal to be realized and an ontological postulate without which no attempt at its realization could even be attempted. There seems to be thus a vicious circle in any discussion of freedom, but I will venture to say that not only is the circle not vicious but that it defines the human situation in its structural aspect which it cannot forego without ceasing to be human. At another level, philosophically speaking, the choice ultimately is only between infinite regress and a circularity in argument, whether it be deemed vicious or not. We may postpone confronting this ultimate choice but finally we have to face it in thought and perhaps in life also, and realize that the two are intimately related to each other and that perhaps there may be nothing wrong with either of them except if we forget that, cognitively, we may accept them only as a last resort, as otherwise the enterprises of both knowledge and action may stop much sooner than is required by the human situation, as that is what makes it meaningful.

The plurality of centres of freedom at the empirical level ensures not merely, as I once thought, the limitation of the freedom of one by the freedom of another but also the enhancement of the joy in one freedom by that of another. In fact, the relation between freedoms is a complex drama where each can help the other in not only realizing his or her own freedom, as the case may be, but also help or hinder the other in the realization of that for which freedom itself is sought and considered worthwhile. We need not forget that one may get bored with one's freedom and that the coming of the other may release one from that freedom. The inter-relations between freedoms are thus extremely complex and I must confess that I had not given them sufficient attention in my thought.

The problem of multiplicity of freedoms at the level of the transcendent is more difficult still, but perhaps it will be better to formulate it in terms of our differences in the conception of the transcendent rather than differences in the transcendent itself. The only points I can reasonably make is, first, that the very diversity in the notions of the transcendent indicates the

necessity for human beings to have a notion of the transcendent just because of the fact of self-consciousness which they all share as human beings. And, second, that while this notion of the transcendent has a tremendous impact on the empirical life of man, it does not negate the structural situation which all human beings have, independent of the differences in their notion of the transcendent. Furthermore, it may also be accepted that man's exploration of the transcendent has as much been in time as his exploration of anything else and that, while we certainly have to take note of the diversity and even the opposition in the conceptions of the transcendent formulated up till now, there is no reason to suppose that man's exploration in the realm of the transcendent has ceased. It is true that claims to finality have been made but, like all other such claims in other fields also, they are primarily rooted in unawareness or ignorance of the possibility of a new exploration. The relation between the infinite and the finite and the timeless and the temporal is such that the former can never be exhausted by the latter, however large the spaces and the time spans may appear to be. Perhaps, the relation between the transcendent and the empirical freedoms may be conceived on the analogy which we have suggested for a relationship between empirical freedoms, that is in terms of the enhancement and fulfilment of all that is positive in human consciousness about which alone we may claim to know anything.

D.P. Chattopadhyaya has chosen to comment on what I have written on action in a number of articles and books spread over a long period. After an extraordinarily fair and comprehensive survey of what I have said in these various writings, he has focussed his critical observation on four pairs of concepts which, according to him, underlie my discussion on action:

1. Action may be immediately value-fulfilling or mediately value seeking;
2. The performer of action may be in his/her solitude or embedded in relation with others;

3. Value-seeking action may be situated in some causal nexus or other or it may be informed by some (extra-causal) transcendental orientation;
4. Action may be instrumental or contemplative in nature.

Behind the distinctions that D.P. Chattopadhyaya has chosen to highlight, there is perhaps the basic distinction between action which is intrinsically valuable for its own sake, or which is primarily undertaken as it is expected to result in something which is supposed to be desirable in itself. Perhaps the clearest example of the former may be found in a child playing by himself or a person going for a stroll along the seashore or anywhere else, or even gossiping with a friend. There is of course no clear-cut distinction as even these activities may be undertaken for some other purpose, except perhaps the activity of the child playing by himself/herself, but even in that case, the child may be engaging in play for some other reason of which we may be unaware. Thus, the distinction itself will perhaps lie ultimately in the attitude towards the action rather than in the action itself. However, once the attitude is brought into the picture, a distinction between consciousness which has the attitude and the action comes into the picture and the problem arises as to what is the relation between the two.

Action depends on all the bodily mechanisms involved in it or presupposed by it as becomes readily evident when one is paralysed or deprived for some reason of the translation mechanism to what is intended or willed into actual action. But even consciousness and its accompanying intentionality in the context of willing the action may itself be seen as dependent on certain bodily mechanisms, particularly those in the brain, as it is also a fact that one loses consciousness and many a time regains it after some intervention on the part of a doctor, or sometimes even in the natural course of things themselves. The relation of consciousness to the body, however, continues to appear enigmatic as there are equally authenticated occurrences of phenomena such as extra-sensory perception, telepathy, clairvoyance and other related phenomena which point to an independence of consciousness from the body and hence it is difficult, in the face

of this conflicting evidence, to have any coherent, consistent theory to account for the phenomena. However, at the phenomenological plane of experiencing, the relation between consciousness and action at the human level can only be seen in terms of bifurcation where consciousness uses the bodily mechanism to effectuate some action and, conversely, even to use the bodily mechanism to induce changes in consciousness such as is usually done through the use of drugs or drinks. In case such cases as those of psycho-kinetic effect are admitted, then the fact of consciousness directly affecting phenomena without the use of a bodily mechanism may have to be granted.

But whatever the complexity of the situation, there can be little doubt that the question regarding the unity of action and its structure which Chattopadhyaya has raised is extremely important. The only relevant thing that I can possibly say in this regard is that as far as the question of the unity of action is concerned, it is ultimately determined, on the one hand, by the span of consciousness in the specious present which it has at the human level and the unit of bodily or motor activity permitted to man by his physiological mechanism. Besides these psychic and bodily limitations, the unit of action may be considered as forming larger and larger wholes of which each may be seen as a sub-unit depending on one's interest and the purpose for which the analysis is being made. On the other hand, the structure of action cannot but be determined by its relation to values and as the values may be concerned primarily either with other human beings or with one's own self or those that have no direct relationship to either the self or to others, and as every action may be supposed to have these three dimensions always present in it, its structure may be regarded as three-dimensional in character. In my article entitled 'The Moral and the Axiological Ought', I had suggested the two dimensions of the value orientation, and in my lectures entitled, 'Social Philosophy: Past and Future', I had emphasized the *ātman*-centric and the socio-centric direction of actions. At this stage I would like to bring the two perspectives together and suggest the three-dimensionality of action where the moral dimension concerns other human beings and, to a certain extent, one's own self also, while the axiological and the *ātman*-

centric dimensions refer to its two other poles with which it is also concerned all the time. Chattopadhyaya has rightly pointed out that the transcendental dimension occurs not only at the *ātman*-centric level but also at the axiological level, that is, where one is concerned with the pursuit and realization of ideal values as evidenced, for example, in art. He is also right in pointing out that the dichotomy between action done in solitude or in essential relationship with others is not quite correct. Perhaps, the three-dimensionality of action may remedy this defect as what I am suggesting is that action has simultaneously all these dimensions so that when one becomes predominant, the others are not entirely absent. Yet it is equally a fact that either of these directions can predominate and does predominate and thereby puts the others into the shade, at least for the time being. Not only this, there seems to be an unresolvable tension and conflict between the three directions which any action always has. It is not quite clear whether the term dimension or the term direction explicates the situation in a clearer manner. But I hope what is being said brings out the point that action at the human plane always has all these three aspects and that consciousness may choose to emphasize the one and pursue it at the expense of the others.

Chattopadhyaya has also suggested that my analysis of action, by emphasizing the instrumentality of action on the one hand and its intrinsicity on the other, has placed the former in the causal nexus of nature and the latter in an acausal or trans-causal or even anti-causal world. He has also pointed out the difficulty in the notion of causality and suggested that many a time action becomes symbolic even when it tries to actualize some value or other. He has also suggested that my identification of the transcendent with that which is outside space, time and causality is not quite correct as at least creativity in the field of art and literature is certainly not bound to causality in the same sense as the term is generally used in the context of natural processes.

The category of the causal however is not confined to the natural world alone with which he seems to identify it rather exclusively. In fact, the examples he has given from historical cognition, art creation and ritual symbolization and religion, all

presuppose the causal will for their own existence and effectivity. The historian may move against the arrow of time, but he does presuppose that the motives he ascribes to the actors in the past did lead to certain kinds of actions which they did and similarly, even the creator of a concrete landscape, such as we have in the Japanese garden, does know that if he plants certain trees or shrubs or grass in a certain way, then he will create a particular effect on the onlooker. The architect talks of the different effects of vertical and horizontal lines, and the painter of hot and cold colours. In fact, all purposive action presupposes causality and the teleological implies that if things are manipulated in a certain way, then most probably they will result in what is desired or aimed at. The confusion perhaps arises because of a failure to distinguish levels of causality and that the second-level causality always presupposes that which is supposed to operate at the first level. The resort to 'reasons' instead of causes only hides from oneself the fact that the so-called reasons are also functioning as determiners of action and that if different reasons had obtained, some other action would have followed. However, as the distinction between the instrumental and the intrinsic is itself relative and goes on changing all the time in one's life, so also is the relation between the causal and the trans-causal, and, at a deeper level, between the temporal and the atemporal and perhaps at a still deeper level, between the illusion of willing to which all human existence is structurally exposed and the increasing realization that perhaps things happen in their own way and that it is not consciousness that is an epiphenomenon but the feeling that it can make a decisive difference to things through an act of its own willing.

The distinction between instrumental and contemplative action which Chattopadhyaya has ascribed to me seems a little strange, for as far as I remember, I have talked of contemplative values and contemplation as contrasted to action. Whether the act of contemplation itself should be regarded as action proper is difficult to say, but personally I think it will only lead to confusion if we do so. Interestingly, there is a discussion in the Advaitic tradition whether the various *upāsānās* described in the Upaniṣads should be regarded as *karma* and Śāṅkara is supposed

to be definitely of the view that they ought to be regarded as such. Perhaps, the issue could be clarified at least to some extent by postulating subtler levels of action, particularly those where the mind itself *exercises* attention to *change* attitudes, intentions, motives or even feelings which one introspectively knows that one has and yet which one would not like to have and many a time, one succeeds a little in doing so. Chattopadhyaya has raised some very subtle questions in this respect, particularly those with regard to the 'ownership' or '*svatva*' not merely of action but also of the body and the mind and the intellect. The tradition normally regards them all as *upādhis* or adventitious adjuncts at grosser or subtler levels. But, if everything is an *upādhi* then the self can only be a *śūnya*, which of course is not a pure nothing but is identical with whatever there is as ultimately real. Yet, there has to be a *svatva* of action if accountability and responsibility is to be there, and if the theory of *karma* is to make any sense.

The relations between action and contemplation on the one hand, and action and knowledge and consciousness and will on the other, are perhaps the heart of the matter and there can be little doubt that Chattopadhyaya has raised some subtle issues requiring further thinking and reflection on the part of all those who are interested in the problem. Perhaps Kṛṣṇa did not say in vain in the *Gītā* that action is one subject on which even the wisest may be deluded. If we remember that the term used by him is '*kavi*' and that the term '*kavi*' means the seer of truth in the Vedas, then we may appreciate the profundity of the dilemma of thought about action.

Dharmendra Goel in his discussion of my thought relating to freedom and value has not confined himself like Vohra to a single paper alone, and that too written as early as 1952. Rather, like Chattopadhyaya, he takes into account books and articles written well over three decades and highlights both the strength and the weakness of my approach. He has been scrupulously fair in presenting my position and his criticisms are, on the whole, reasonable and just. I have underplayed the seeking of a just social order, the creation of institutions, the structuring of society and polity, and all other issues related to these, without which

the pursuit and realization of any value whatsoever is inconceivable, even in principle. But 'underplaying' is not 'ignoring'. A closer look at the texts would have revealed both their presence and the active concern with them. They provide the tension between the 'causal-functional' matrix in which all life is embedded and the 'logico-meaningful', the 'valuational', and the 'transcendental' which it seeks. I have drawn attention to the 'ātman-centric predicament' as much as to the 'socio-centric predicament'. But, basically, I think the conflict between 'moral' and 'trans-moral' values cannot be resolved. And, not only this, the adjudication and resolution between conflicting moral claims seems even more difficult to achieve. The situations of 'dharmaśāstra' or moral dilemmas so poignantly described in the *Mahābhārata* are classic examples of this perplexity.

Goel's invocation of what may be called the fight against injustice, evil, violence and against the pursuit of trans-moral values, raises problems of another dimension. It is not quite clear, to take his own examples, what Beethoven should have done against Napoleon or Ghalib against the forces of the East India Company. Presumably, they had no skills in the art of warfare and even if they had, they perhaps would have had to enrol themselves in the army and fight along with others making little difference to the outcome of the battles. As it was, there can be little doubt that Ghalib and Beethoven behaved the way they did and did not follow the way of action recommended by Goel. Great poetry and music is the legacy they have left, and we all, including Goel, ought to be grateful for that. The examples prove, if anything, the contrary of what Goel attempts to contend.

The issue, however, is a more serious one and I really do not know if there is any straight answer to it. First, what role should 'fight against injustice' play as a value in one's life? Is it only *one* value amongst others, or is it to have primacy over all the others? Also, while one may have a clear idea about a specific act of injustice, it is difficult to know what exactly a 'just society' would be. An ideally just society, whatsoever the phrase may mean, might just be found 'unlivable' by most human beings and not acceptable for that very reason. The two attempts made in this century by the Soviet Union and China have met with such disastrous

results that one would have to consider seriously whether 'justice' is the only basic or major value which a society ought to try to achieve. As for 'violence' and 'war', it is even more difficult to decide when violence is 'justified' or when wars are 'righteous', and how to valuationally counter them, and in what way.

The realm of values, I may add, is one which each one of us encounters in a living-existential way. And hence, when one writes on it, one should articulate one's own lived encounter with the dilemmas and conflicts one has experienced and not just repeat what seems *nice* to say in such contexts. Both Goel and I have lived through difficult times—including those of World War II, partition, and the freedom movement—and we both have, at best, written philosophical papers, not even remotely near the quality of Ghalib's poetry or Beethoven's symphonies. An honest candid reflection today does not seem to suggest that either Goel or I were too much in the wrong. My reflections on values are an articulation of that lived judgement, though it could be as wrong as any other.

If Dharmendra Goel has taken a synoptic bird's eye-view of what I have written on freedom and value in my different writings over a long period of time, Yashdev Shalya has examined in microscopic detail what I have written in my book *Social Philosophy: Past and Future* with occasional references to what I had said in *Considerations Towards a Theory of Social Change*. Shalya's objections are so detailed and multifarious that it is difficult to reply to each of them individually. In fact, there is hardly anything which I have said in the course of these two books to which he has not raised an objection, and yet he has said both at the beginning and at the end that he finds my way of conceiving society, on the whole, all right. But if Shalya's objections are correct, then what I have said cannot be true and if what I have said is, on the whole, true, then Shalya's objections could not be so correct as to decisively affect the conclusion concerned. One reason for this, perhaps, is the very method adopted by him, that is, to engage in a detailed, chapter-by-chapter examination of what was being said, forgetting that what is said is part of a total picture with its own focus, emphasis and lighting. But Shalya has pointed out some funda-

mental problems in my presentation and they deserve elucidation and clarification. Perhaps, the best way of doing it would be to restate my position as best as I can.

The first and basic fact in the understanding of society, according to me, is to differentiate it from nature on the one hand and art object, on the other. How this distinction is to be made, where the lines are to be drawn, is a different matter and people may differ about it. But if we forget 'society' for the moment and only think of the distinction between nature and art, we will see that at least one obvious line of distinction is that whatever may be connoted by the term 'nature', it is supposed to be unaffected in its *existence* by the fact that there are no human beings, while no art object is normally conceived to have this characteristic. 'Nature', by definition, is that which is not dependent for its coming into 'being' or continuing in its existence on any human being or group of human beings. True, there are many so-called 'natural objects' such as plant species or animals which would not have come into being without human intervention, but normally they do not require human beings for their continued existence. Also, the human intervention in their case is an essentially contingent one, for there is nothing inconceivable in thinking that they would have come into existence without human intervention as so many other plant and animal species, usually called 'wild', have. An art object, on the other hand, does not merely require human beings for it to come into being in an essential sense, but requires them for its continued existence as an art object. If man were to disappear, it would lapse into being a 'natural' object and lose that character which made it an 'art' object. One may deny this, but then one will either have to resuscitate the differentiation in some other way or accept that the criteria, norms and methodology we adopt in 'understanding' a work of art should *equally* be applicable to 'understanding', say, the movement of the planets or sub-atomic particles, or the way we 'understand' the latter should be applied to 'understand' the former. But nobody does this, and so we have to accept a distinction between, say, a piece of music that we listen to and the hundred different forms of sound that we also listen to in nature.

Society, however, cannot be classified under either of these heads. Apart from men, it cannot even be conceived and though, in some sense, a creation of human beings, it is not a creation in the same sense in which a work of arts, or even a collectively created work of art is supposed to be. It shares some characteristics of both, but it is *unique* and *sui generis* in that there is nothing like it. There are, of course, societies of bees and ants and even some animals, but they are essentially different in that they are only structurally 'social', and no 'ought-questions' can be raised about them. They are what they are, and nothing more can or need be said about them. Shalya has tried to question this, but I am unable to follow his argument. To bring technology and questions of concept-dependence or even the application of value considerations is surely irrelevant when what I was saying was simply this: that there seems no sense in saying that, for example, the laws of motion or the velocity of light or the Planck's constant *should* have been different from what they are. And this is not only because we have no control over them, but also because we just do not know what it would mean to say that a different law or a different velocity or a different constant would be better than what we have found. With respect to any human society, however, it is always relevant and meaningful to ask if it could not be made *better*, and if so, how and when. Shalya has suggested that if we reflect on the history of technology then it would show that, in a sense, we are treating nature in the same way and showing our satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it as we do with society. But the history of technology is a part of the history of culture and in fact, many thinkers have treated it even as that part of man's culture which determines, to a large extent, other aspects of his culture. Even the knowledge, whether theoretical or practical, which forms the basis of such technology is a part of culture.

It is true that the distinction between 'nature' and 'culture' is drawn within culture itself and hence may be drawn differently. But that a necessity is felt for drawing the distinction in all cultures, points to some radical difference between what man feels to be wholly 'other' to himself and that which he finds not only akin to himself but for which he finds himself responsible to some extent in the sense that he can change and transform it by

his cooperative and concerted will and action in conjunction with others. It is the idea of 'collective cooperative public action' which lies at the heart of seeing society as a human creation and not as something pre-given, independent of all human effort and action as nature is usually supposed to be. There is such a thing as action in a 'public capacity' and in a 'public context' where we try to change and transform society in the direction of what we consider would be better than what we find it to be at the moment. And, thus, we also begin to see that society as we find it today and which we want to change in a certain direction was also the result of such actions done by men in the past in their 'public capacities' in 'public contexts'. The distinction between the 'private' and the 'public' may not be clear in all contexts and 'private' actions may have 'public' consequences, but the distinction is not only made in all societies but it is what makes society the continuous concern of all who live in it and thus it has a kind of being which is so different from nature, on the one hand, and from art, on the other, though sharing certain characteristics of both.

The second important point that strikes me about the human situation is that we are continually bringing 'reality' into 'being' through our actions which are usually based on beliefs whose truth or falsity is irrelevant to the fact that through the actions they motivate, they bring something into being whose 'facticity' has to be taken into account in any future action. With respect to it the 'facticity' of society, thus, is of this strange kind. It is the *result* of myriads of human actions, based on beliefs whose truth or falsity was irrelevant to their effectivity. And, equally, the truth or falsity of my beliefs about it or anything else today is irrelevant to my action on their basis in case I think they are true.

In a certain sense, our 'beliefs' about 'nature' may be said to share the same characteristic. But the crucial difference is that while actions induced by our beliefs about 'values' affect society and thus become 'social facts', they are not supposed to affect 'nature' or change it in any way.

The third point that arises from the awareness of the peculiar nature of society because of what has been described as 'the self-fulfilling prophecy' and the 'suicidal prophecies' is that the entertainment of beliefs does not remain a neutral exercise as

they might be actually believed by someone to be true and thus acted upon and bring a state of affairs into being which would not have been there had the belief not been thought to be true and action undertaken on its basis. But if this is the case then how can the usual hypothetico-deductive verificational method be employed in the case of those disciplines which seek to study society in any of its aspects?

It is this dilemma, then, which differentiates the social sciences from the sciences of nature and it is embedded in the fact that there is supposed to be no such thing as 'self-fulfilling' or 'suicidal' prophecies with respect to that which is the subject of study in the natural sciences. But if this is accepted along with the usual notion of knowledge as the seeking of truth about what is real rather than to influence or change it in one way or another, then the pursuit of the social sciences as serious cognitive enterprises would have to be conceived in a radically different fashion than the way in which the natural sciences are usually pursued. The possible direction which such a self-conscious awareness of the radical difference between the subject-matter of the natural and the social sciences and the crucial difference which consciousness plays in the constitution of the two types of reality, may induce in the research perspective of the social sciences, has been sought to be indicated in *Social Philosophy—Past and Future* which has been the subject of detailed comment by Yashdev Shalya in his article on it.

Now, Shalya or anybody else may deny all of these contentions. He may say that there is no difference between nature and society, that both are constituted by consciousness in its categorial and valuational aspects, that 'beliefs' affect all realms equally through the actions they give rise to, that there is no distinction between causal-functional questions and logico-meaningful questions, etc., etc. And, he may do this on the general ground that 'differences' are ultimately untenable in principle or because of some specific reasons pertaining to these issues. But in either case he/she will have to spell out the consequences of such beliefs in case they are held to be true and also show how man's behaviour, both in the field of knowledge and action, would be affected by it. But as they accept the *possibility* of a dif-

ferent, or even opposite, way of conceiving the situation and its having *possibly* different effects on human behaviour in the field of knowledge and action, the situation would be the same as I have tried to show at many places in the two books Shalya has discussed so meticulously, and in an article specially devoted to this subject entitled 'Self-fulfilling Prophecy and the Nature of Society'.

Shalya has raised many subtle and pertinent questions regarding many of the things I have said and the points I have made in the course of my lectures in *Social Philosophy—Past and Future*. He has asked, what do I mean when I write man and nature with a capital 'M' and 'N', or whether I regard society as a subject like an individual which can choose, or what is the exact status of mental events in my ontology, that is, do I regard them as part of 'nature' or not. Now, society obviously cannot be regarded as a 'subject' in the same sense in which individuals are regarded as such. But if there are such things as 'institutions', 'collective decisions', 'collective action', in the context of which it is meaningful to say that it is 'our decision' and 'our action', then whether we call it a 'collective subjectivity' or not does not really matter. Similarly, the use of capital 'M' and 'N' in man or nature might have most probably been done to convey that which transcends individual exemplifications, or might have tried to point to the essence of the phenomenon concerned, or might just have been an innocent stylistic idiosyncrasy and nothing more. As for whether mental phenomena should be regarded as part of 'nature' or not, I may say that first, in those lectures I was not building a complete, unified, total metaphysical system and, second, that I do not believe any such system can be viably built. But now that Shalya has raised the question, my answer would be that mental phenomena cannot be regarded as a part of nature in the sense in which I have been using the term in those lectures. The real point was to bring out the radicality as well as the importance of the distinction, for even if we were to treat them as part of nature we would immediately have to talk of two kinds of 'nature', each with properties which are not only different from those of the other, but even opposed to them. One may get verbal satisfaction by calling them both 'nature', or even as

complementary to each other, but how it would help matters, I fail to see.

Shalya has taken strong exception to my characterization of western and Indian civilizations as 'socio-centric' and '*ātman*-centric' in character, as well as to my interpretation of some paradigmatic examples to illustrate this. But the function of examples is only to illustrate, and if one does not think that they are performing their illustrative function well, one may choose some others unless one is convinced that what is sought to be illustrated is self-contradictory in character and hence cannot be exemplified. Also, it should be remembered that any characterization of civilizations and cultures can only be in terms of what one regards as broadly *differentiating* it from others, a differentiation which one also considers as important. In the creation of such 'ideal type' pictures, one is not saying that the counter-characterizations are not present at all, but only that they are subordinate, recessive, subsidiary and that the culture itself does not think of its differentiating identity in these terms. Had Shalya tried to distinguish and differentiate between western and Indian civilizations, he would have perhaps seen the problem. As it is, he seems to give the impression that he finds no important differences between them, for his main interest seems to be to find fault with my contention by finding *ātman*-centric characteristics in the western civilization and socio-centric characteristics in the Indian one. Perhaps, he would like to reverse the characterization, or perhaps he thinks all cultures are equally alike and hence do not need any differential characterizations. The basic point, however, is that if one does accept the plurality of cultures, one has accepted the central thesis elaborated in the course of the lectures unless, of course, one subscribes to some sort of determination of cultures by race or geography or even any such thing as modes of production.

Surprisingly, Shalya has objected even to my characterization of 'moral consciousness' as essentially 'other-centric'. Perhaps, it is this lack of focus on the 'other' which has resulted in his not finding anything worth 'agreeing to' in his detailed, meticulous and painstaking examination of what I have written on the subject. One has to genuinely accept and appreciate differences and plu-