4. *Op. cit.*, p. 118.
5. *Op. cit.*
6. *Op. cit.*
7. Clark Glymour, in his *Theory and Evidence* (Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 76-77 has pointed out some aspects.
8. Clark Glymour has noted in *Theory and Evidence* (p. 76) that Abner Shimony in his 'Scientific Inference' in R. Colodny, *The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories* (Pittsburgh University Press, 1970) has provided a Bayesian account of this aspect of the demand for variety of evidence.
9. Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Third edition 1969), p. 256.
10. C.G. Hempel in his *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Prentice Hall, 1966), pp. 34-35 has considered the dependence of the confirmation of a single hypothesis, that is, Snell's law, on the variety of evidence 'the greater the variety, the stronger the resulting support'.

Eros, Nomos and Logos

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Wherever life is, 'Eros' may be presumed to be there. Some may go as far as to say that it is at the very heart of creation as 'attraction' or 'differential responsiveness' seems to define the very notion of any 'thing' being that particular thing and not something else. The thing, however, is not 'alone' or 'isolated' or a 'windowless monad' as Leibnitz thought, or as many Indian thinkers have conceived it to be.

'Attraction' is matched by 'repulsion' or 'rejection' as is the case with some of the fundamental forces postulated by physics for understanding the world. Yet, though most of the particles discovered by physics seem to be either positively or negatively charged, or even 'neutral', the 'binding' or the 'strong inter-active' forces in the nucleus give that 'stability' which makes something 'persist' through time. Also, the so-called 'neutral' particles themselves may be seen as constituted by positively and negatively charged particles combined in such a way as to cancel the 'opposite' charges and thus make the particle 'neutral'.

'Eros', thus, need not be conceived as pure attraction, unmixed with any 'counter' or 'negative' impulse, and yet the 'positive' has to preponderate if the movement towards 'unity' or 'togetherness' is to take place. Freud had to postulate a principle opposed to 'Eros' in order to understand the 'negative' in the context of 'life', and he called it Thanatos, i.e. the 'will to die', or that which negates life altogether.

The 'negative' at the human level creates problems of a different kind as it appears in consciousness as something 'undesirable', something to be 'overcome', something to be 'transformed', challenging man's imagination and creativity to attempt its mitigation, if not elimination. The dream of 'immortality' and 'perpetual youth'

have been a result of this, just as the development of 'practical medication' to ward off bodily disorders. The transformative reflection on these gave rise to 'systems of medicine' where theory took precedence over 'practice' and even laid down directions in which the latter was to develop and declare, on seemingly substantive grounds, all deviations as 'superstition'.

The 'religious' and 'meta-physical' systems developed to deal with the 'negative' at all levels displayed the same arrogance, declaring everything that the theory 'proved' could not be, to be 'unreal' or, as in the case of the former, as 'heretical' or 'blasphemous'. The former did the same in theory what the latter did in practice, i.e. 'elimination' or 'denial' of what proclaimed its 'reality' by perpetually questioning what Faith or Reason certified to be 'The True'. But neither Faith nor Reason can deny the 'reality' of what man brings into being through 'imagination' and 'action', or 'experiences' through what he imagines and creates and tries to 'understand' and 'know' that which he has brought into 'being and also himself as the 'agent' or the 'creator' or the 'occasion' through which all this happens, or comes into being.

The 'activity' is itself paradoxical as it simultaneously involves, or presupposes, both 'freedom' and 'causality' which are united, as Kant saw, in the Teleological judgement which is unintelligible and, hence, unacceptable to Reason or Logos, as the Greeks named it, and thus renders man 'unintelligible' to himself. Faith does not care for the 'absurdity' as its 'life' is 'lived' in it, but it too has to come to terms with the question of man's relationship to God or the deity, and the issue whether he can be 'free' in relation to it, or what would it really mean if he were to 'think' about it and make it not only intelligible, but also 'acceptable' to oneself.

The notion of 'freedom', however, not only involves the notion of 'causality', as we said a little while ago, but also the idea of 'rule' or 'restriction' as without it nothing can be built or brought into being. Kant saw this in his notions of 'constitutive' and 'regulative' rules without which one cannot delimit or demarcate or 'get going', or get out of 'Pure Nothing' or 'Pure Being' which, as Hegel says, means the same thing, as 'nothing' can truly be said about it as there can be no 'real predication' except an infinitely extensive 'not this', 'not this' or '*neti neti*', as the Indians said aloof the *Nirguṇa*

Brahmana or that which is absolutely qualitiless. This, in a different language, is 'Pure Possibility' and if something is to be, there must be a 'restriction' on it and, as Whitehead said, God has to be seen as the 'First Restriction' on this, so that the 'world' *can be.*

Logos, thus, brings in the notion of 'law', a law that governs whatever happens, or in accordance with which it occurs, whether we know it or not. This is the 'revolutionary suspicion' which occurs to the self-consciousness of man and he tries to know it so that he may 'understand' all that is, and 'why' it is what it is. But all 'knowledge' raises the question 'what to do with it', and this opens the Pandora's Box as there can be no one settled answer to it, in principle. Whatever be the 'choice'—and the choice will vary with the person concerned—it will bring something into being whose 'effects' cannot be foretold either on oneself or on others. But once it has come into being, it begins to have a reality of its own, independent of the person or persons who brought it into being. It becomes, so to say, a part of the 'natural world order', even though it would not have come into being without the human being or beings who have been the occasion for it. This, however, results in its being seen as an 'object' among other 'objects' in the world demanding to be 'understood' both in terms of 'what it is' and 'what it can do to others'. It begins, thus, to have both a 'structure' and a 'causality' like everything else, except for the radical difference that its 'origin' lies in 'human choice' and thus has to be 'understood' in terms of something that has an essential 'indeterminacy' and 'plurality' in-built in it.

The 'natural world' that is presupposed by man as completely independent of him, may have had also been determined by an initial limiting condition which may be called 'God' or 'the Big Bang' or 'X' to avoid misleading associations, cannot have this 'plurality' or 'indeterminacy', or rather 'indeterminate pluralities' unless it is conceived on the analogy of what we find in the human world.

But once it is conceived of in this way, we will face the same problem, as we do in the case of the human world; something which seems to be at least *prima facie* suggested or supported by the way physics conceives of the evolution of 'matter' and the 'material universe' where 'plurality' and 'indeterminacy' do not deny

'causality', but make us see it only in a different way. In case it is accepted that what we call 'matter' has different 'forms' or 'levels' where each presupposes the 'other' but is not completely 'determined' by it, we would have to think of the idea of different types of 'causality' where the 'autonomy' of catch level or form of organization does not have its own 'freedom' compromized by the fact that it presupposes its being limited by the 'causality' of that which it presupposes, just as its autonomous way of functioning does not 'destroy'; the 'freedom' of that which presupposes it for its 'being' or'reality' or existence'.

The only alternative to this is to accept only one type of 'causality' where the absolute 'contingency' or 'freedom'determines everything else in the sense that it could *all* be predicted or foretold in its minutest detail by one who 'knows' the nature of that 'causality'. The second alternative between 'contingency' and 'freedom' postulated for the initial limiting condition would, thus, be seen to be illusory or only verbal in character as the so-called 'free' being or God or *Īswara* is as helpless in respect of what follows as the so-called 'Big Bang' which the scientists are so fond of postulating these days.

The only other alternative is to give up the continuity between inanimate matter, or what physics, chemistry and the allied sciences study and the world of 'living beings' which itself is radically divided between 'plant life', 'animal life' and 'human life', or as we find man 'living' it now. The continuity between these three forms of 'life' and their 'dependence' on what is called 'matter' is obvious, but so also are the differences between them and the startling fact that each of the 'succeeding life form' depends on the previous one to an extent that is unthinkable and which has been brought to self-consciousness by recent studies in ecology, though even in ancient times man was aware of it and the moral dilemma it posed for him. Yet, it is equally a fact that man's relationship seems immediate and direct with the world of animals and plants, while his relation to the world of 'matter' is 'mediated' through them. The so-called 'biosphere' on which man depends was created by the plant and the animal world and their interaction with each other on the one hand, and what we call 'nature' on the other. The transformation of 'inorganic' matter into that

which is called 'organic' is the real mystery on which all 'life forms' flourish on this planet as we know it.

The story of these successive transformations which might have occurred even earlier in the evolution of matter from 'free particles, into stable nucleir resulting in the formation of what we call 'atoms' on the one hand and the basic 92 elements out of which the whole world is said to be made, is an evidence of this. But the creation or discovery of trans-uranium elements and states of matter beyond the solid, liquid and gaseous, which had been known to man earlier, has led not only to the question whether our traditional understanding of 'matter' was really correct, but also to the challenge of creating 'new' forms of matter that have never 'existed' before, because of the 'new' knowledge we have regarding its functioning. The idea of 'emergence' is slowly giving way to the idea of 'creation' through what may be called 'engineering' at all levels, including that of 'matter' or the physical universe.

But 'creation' is a strange 'thing', or rather an 'activity' whose nature is difficult to grasp, as what comes into being through it for whatever reasons, becomes independent in the sense of having a 'being' or 'nature' of its own which always consists in the impulse to 'self-maintenance', 'resistance to change' and the capacity and capability of becoming a 'creative' centre itself, giving rise to other beings that may be similar or dissimilar to itself, depending perhaps on the fact whether they originate from itself alone, or in combination with others.

The 'causality' that is involved in the notion of 'creativity' has seldom been reflected upon, just as the 'causality' of that which it has brought into being. The same is the case with the 'causality' of a plurality of beings in interactive interaction between themselves, resulting in the production of something which none of them could have brought about on their own. The usual thought in this regard has talked of 'plurality of causes' and 'inter-mixture of effects', but it has always been thought to be the result of a lack of sufficient analysis as the latter, if undertaken, would have revealed that each 'separate' cause has a 'separate' effect distinctly differentiable from others. The idea of a 'one-one' correlation between 'cause' and 'effect' has plagued thought since its beginning, without anyone ever having asked what was meant by 'one', and how

did this 'one' come into being, or how if it *was* 'one', it did become 'many'? In fact, that which is 'many' can become organized and function in a new unitary way and may be regarded as 'one', just as the 'one' may sub-divide into the 'many' which function 'relatively autonomously' in respect of it and are expected to do so, or just disintegrate into a 'multiplicity' where each is independent of the other, and also of that of which they earlier formed a part.

The problem of 'causality', thus, is far more complex than the simplistic way in which it has been thought of, as a category necessary for understanding any phenomenon. The relation between 'parts' and 'whole' where the parts contribute not only towards the maintenance of the 'whole', but also to its effective functioning as a 'unitary entity' in relation to other 'wholes' which are in such an inter-relationship that they *all* mutually influence one another. The perspective that is opened by this way of thinking may, and in fact, has led to the idea of conceiving the 'universe' or 'all that is' as one entity which has no other 'whole' besides itself to influence or be influenced and hence function as 'determining' or 'causing' or 'influencing' only the parts which constitute it as it is 'one' without a 'second' and the 'second' or 'others' that are there are only its 'parts'. This is the notion of a 'universal order' or *Ṛta* which governs everything and thus 'determines' whatever 'is' to be what it is.

But this is to forget that the so-called 'parts' are themselves not only 'whole' but 'active agents' in the maintenance and functioning of the so-called 'universe', which itself is not a completed whole as it is continuously interactive with its so-called 'parts' and 'influencing' and 'being influenced' by them and, in the process, 'changing' them and 'changing' itself. There are no 'wholes' which have no 'parts' with which it does not have this interactive relationship, implying that there is no such thing as 'parts' that are not 'whole', or 'wholes' which have no parts. These ideas have led human reason to believe that there are ultimate elements and that they together form an ultimate 'whole' which it understands as the 'universe', without seeing the contradiction involved in it. The 'elements' could surely have had different organizations and thus could result in different universes. It is bound to be objected that even though the possibility of alternative combinations cannot be denied, the fact is that the universe as we 'know' it at present is

the only universe we have and that we have to understand it. Its 'seeming contingency' arises from 'vacuous possibilities' and the postulation of a universal causal principle avoids this and shows its 'necessity' to be what it is.

But the 'necessity' of what 'is' also entails the 'necessity' of 'what will be' and thus render all human effort and action 'meaningless', just as the 'retrospective' necessity of all that was makes all history meaningless, rendering all the seers, saints, prophets, geniuses, i.e. those of whom we feel justly proud, as having been the victims of an illusion and, in the process, making us also succumb to it.

Reason or Logos, thus, has brought us to an 'absurdity' which is refuted every time anyone 'acts', whether he is a 'genius' or not. Man is the 'living' refutation and the constant 'questioner' of that which the Logos proclaims as 'Truth', truth with a capital 'T', as people are fond of saying it. The truth of 'Logos' is overcome or transcended or even negated by the 'truth' of 'freedom' self-consciously 'felt' and 'experienced' by every human being when he intends and wills and makes the physical and mental effort to act and, if this be an 'illusion' as Logos insists, then we can only say that it is an 'effective illusion', an 'effectivity' that is a sign of something being 'real' and not a nothing, or absolute non-Being which the Logos itself thinks of and characterises as such.

Traditional thought in India saw the dilemma and formulated the concept of *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* and called it *Māyā* i.e. something which could neither be characterized as 'being' or 'non-being' as it was 'unreal' to thought, but still 'causally effective' and through that creating a 'world' which was the source of joy and sorrow and thus leading one to ever renewed 'action' to get 'more' of the one and 'less' of the other, if one could not get rid of it altogether.

But if this is the way one looks at things, then one will have two opposed and conflicting 'ideals' or *puruṣārthas* to realize—the one immanent in the notion of Reason or Logos or knowledge, and the other immanent in will or action. The former will see the latter as based on a foundational illusion or ignorance or *avidyā* that believes or thinks that the 'Real' can never be other than what it is and has always been, something timeless and eternal and unchanging. The latter, which is also based on 'experience', cannot but take the notion of time with its distinctions of past, present and

future seriously along with the notion of 'freedom' which makes one feel and say not only that 'I am', as Fichte thought, or 'I think' as Descartes did, but that 'I can effect or change things or 'situations' as I have the power to do so and hence am responsible and accountable for what I do as it is mine and not anybody else's'.

The distinction between 'mine' and 'thine' thus brought into being is not a notion of 'possession as Kant thought in his *Science of Right*, but an 'ownership' of 'responsibility' for what one does with one's freedom. Mere talk of 'good will' will not help as even the 'good will' shall have to 'will' something and own responsibility for it. But what is this 'will' to will, or for what the 'freedom' is to be exercised or used for, is the central question which needs to be answered, as 'freedom' by itself does not mean anything. Freedom, whether it be 'freedom from' or 'freedom to do' or 'freedom to be', needs always the 'power' to bring something into being which is not there or maintain what is there it would change into something that is 'undesirable' for some reason or other.

But what is this exercise of 'freedom' and what is that which determines what is to be maintained and what is to be changed and, if so, how? If something is to be maintained or changed, it has to be there already and is thus presupposed as an *a priori* precondition of the 'exercise' of freedom that makes us feel and realize that we are free. But what is thus presupposed is itself in most cases a result of the exercise of freedom by others or oneself in the past. It is the 'result' of the exercise of freedom that one finds around one all the time and which one finds 'acceptable' or 'unacceptable', 'desirable' or 'undesirable'. Freedom, thus, confronts itself with its own 'creations' and finds itself 'bound' or 'freed' by them. The ambivalent paradox of the exercise of freedom, thus, is that it may restrict or enhance itself through this 'exercise' and find itself increasingly limited, constrained and enmeshed by what has created, like a spider caught in its own net. But the 'net' that one weaves may involve others and thus, inadvertently, one may become the cause or the occasion for the enhancement or restriction of the freedom of 'others' and not only of the freedom of oneself.

Freedom, thus, may be lessened or enhanced through its exercise just like all other capacities or skills and, if so, its 'exercise' has to be 'self-governed' by at least this consideration in which the

'affected others' are as important as oneself. This is the root of what the Greeks called *Nomos* and the Indians *dharma* in their respective traditions of thinking on the subject. The possibility of the 'negative' here is equal to, or even greater, than that of the positive, particularly as the self-consciousness from which action emanates is inevitably 'self-centred'. The 'other' is only at the periphery of consciousness if it ever is and, in most cases, is seen only in relation to one's own interests which naturally appear as 'centred' in oneself. The inculcation of 'the other-centred consciousness, in that which is structurally 'self-centric' or 'I-centric' has been the perennial problem for man and what is called *Nomos* or *dharma* is the name which man has given to this impossible enterprise, as without it man cannot became 'human' or be 'humanized' for he cannot be completely governed by, or be subject to, some natural order or *ṛta* to which all other beings are subject, as he alone is 'free' and 'feels' himself to be so and behaves as if it were so. How to bring into being something analogous to the 'natural order' which may yet preserve and enhance one's and everybody else's freedom has, thus, been the central problem to which humanity has perennially addressed itself.

The enlargement of freedom, paradoxically, presupposes the existence of an 'order' precedent to it, that is analogous and yet different from the 'causal order' in the universe which it also presupposes for its effective exercise. Unlike the latter, however, it has to be created and maintained by human beings through continuous repeated effort, for it would collapse if it were not done so. But as it is subject to this continuous maintenance on his part, it is also continuously changing because this is involved in the very idea of 'maintenance' as this is done by beings who are 'free' and hence may deviate marginally from what is required due to diverse factors, including the desire to get rid of the obvious deficiencies that have been found in its working, or even to improve it further. The 'human order' that thus comes into being through the continued effort of myriads of human beings is not only subject to continuous changes, but also the 'appearance' of being something analogous to 'nature' with an 'inevitability' of its own, about which human beings can do very little. This, of course, is an illusion as everyone continuously goes on trying to exercise his 'freedom' to

achieve what he wants to achieve, even though he 'knows' that it is unlikely to happen the way he wants it to happen.

The 'feeling' of freedom thus gives rise to its opposite and one feels 'unfree' rather than free which, if reflected upon, might provide a crucial clue to the dilemma structurally involved in the human situation which is defined by the fact that it cannot but be self-conscious of itself and of the 'other' in relation to this 'self-consciousness'.

The relation between the 'self' and the 'other' thus becomes central to the problem of 'freedom'. But the 'other' is not just an individual, personal 'other'; rather, it is a variegated, differentiated 'other' which includes everything, both in its totality, multiplicity and unity which is made possible by the fact of 'self-consciousness' itself. The sense of 'obligatoriness' that this brings into being lies at the heart of the 'moral consciousness' which the 'self-centred' feeling of freedom 'feels' as a 'restriction' on itself and thus as a bondage from which it wants to become 'free'.

The 'seeking' for 'freedom' may take different forms, ranging from those who renounce the 'world' with all the 'obligations' that it entails to the willful 'law-breakers' or 'criminal' who generally thinks he will be clever enough or lucky to escape detection or being found out, or somehow get around the net he has woven for himself. Both these extremes, and the many others lying between them, rest on the mistake or the illusion that this can enhance their 'freedom' or even free them in the minimal sense without the 'other' and its fulfilment of the complementary obligations that it has to one who thinks he can be 'freed' by denying or cheating or deceiving, as the case may be. The actual fact of 'dependence' on others is not annulled or lessened thereby. Rather, the 'unfreedom' increases or takes a different direction or even assumes a different form.

The problem, then, is how to 'turn' or 'change' or 'transform' the feeling of 'unfreedom' brought into 'self-consciousness' by the very structure of self-consciousness which necessarily involves an awareness of the 'other', the multiple others, and an obligation towards them not to hurt or harm or injure in any way whatsoever, if not help them to the extent one can, in becoming 'freer', better, more 'other-centered' and 'helpful' in the best way one

can. This perhaps is what the *Gītā* meant when it said *Parasparaṁ bhāvayantaḥ śreyaḥ, paramvāpsyatha.* The key terms used are *paraspara* and *śreyaḥ*, the former implying a relation of perfect equality between the self and the other, while the latter involves an element of 'universality' and 'objectivity' or at least 'inter-subjectivity' which does not deny the notion of that which is 'pleasing' or *preyasa* but overcomes its pure subjectivity and its centrality when it begins to take precedence over the '*preyasa*' of others.

The *Śreyasa* or the *Nomos*, like the *Logos*, involves a distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality', a 'suspicion' or 'apprehension' that the immediately 'sensible', whether in terms of perception or feeling, may be deceptive in terms of its promised relationship to the whole of which it may form an element or the causal relationship it may have to that which one 'wants' and looks forward to in the future, or both. They both question the illusory self-sufficiency of the present and tend to see it in the context of an 'order' which it presupposes but which is not exactly known to man and is unknowable in its completeness as even if it is implied in everything we 'experience' or do, its apprehension and articulation is an indefinitely extended, 'unending' activity of innumerable generations in time.

But even though this seems correct at first sight, there is a deep gulf or even a contradiction between the two presupposed 'orders' and raises the question of the relation between the two as each nullifies the other. The former, i.e. *dharma* or *Nomos*, depends entirely on man, while the latter, i.e. *Logos*, is supposed to be independent of him, and totally unaffected by what man does or does not do. From the viewpoint of the latter, the former is an illusion, though an effective illusion misleading mankind through the ages. On the other hand, if the former has any truth about it, the latter cannot be the case as man's freedom and its exercise increasingly become an integral part of 'reality' and makes it dependent on what he does or does not do.

Logos and *Nomos* are, thus, at odds with each other, and man is a victim of the conflict between the two, neither of which he can give up as one is required for 'knowledge' and the other for 'action. The primacy given to the one or the other determines the direction which the attempts at a solution take place within a culture

or even in an individual who is self-reflective and becomes aware of the problem. The conflict ultimately is between the 'True' and the 'Good', and as both are values, which is treated as primary and which as secondary, or which as subservient and instrumental to the other, becomes the central question both for individuals and cultures alike.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that both arise within a human context and because of the fact that one has become self-conscious for some reason and thus is aware of these two opposite values which, though 'given' in a certain sense, have to be 'sought' and realized within the human situation as 'lived' by one and 'known' or 'discovered' through this seeking. There is no such thing as the Truth or the Good, given and found for once and all and, what is perhaps even worse is that even among the 'known' or the 'discovered' at any time or place, there always are many 'truths' and many 'goods' pertaining to diverse fields, and that there is a conflict of opinion about them or difference about the importance or the primacy one should accord them. This, though disheartening to those who want certainty and finality of 'faith' in these realms is, however, the basis of that continuous exploration and experimentation that lies at the heart of human enterprise, both in the field of knowledge and action.

Exploration and experimentation, however, require some 'base' to start from which itself has to be incomplete and inadequate to permit, or even require, an 'open-ended' challenge for its further construction, correction, emendation, addition along with the enthusiasm, the energy, the elan and the thirst for novelty that creates the dissatisfaction with what is there or has been achieved and the 'impulse' that urges man to seek something else, whatever it be. It is, in other words, the 'youth' versus the 'old', the eternal *Eros* against both the *Logos* and the *Nomos*, a revolt and a rebellion which still has to assume 'something' to 'rebel' against and 'something' to 'stand' upon. Both are there in the *Logos* and the *Nomos*, the Realms of Order discovered or built by those who were 'youths' earlier and who themselves had rebelled, or gone though the cycle once before.

What is presupposed by human action, thus, is a preexistent order which still needs through his effort, individual and collective, development in new directions which appear more desirable and

meaningful than the one that existed before. The 'knowledge' that such an action presupposes is of such a varied kind, both in its certainty and completeness, that most thinking about action at the human level seems too simplistic to those who are actually engaged in action. This is generally the result of an almost total misunderstanding about the nature of that which human action presupposes and the type of 'causality' that operates therein and the end or 'purposes' that the action is supposed to bring about, and the 'knowledge' regarding these that one generally has and which one wants to increase or augment further. What human action is concerned with is other human beings and what it presupposes is what other human beings have created, including oneself, whose 'being' and 'causality' is totally different from the 'being' and 'causality' encountered in all other realms, including that of the 'living beings', excluding man and the world they have created and go on creating.

The incredible indeterminacy of the 'being' of man and the world that he creates and the absence of what have been called 'necessary' and 'sufficient' conditions in the context of 'causality' that pertains to this world renders all thinking based on the usual understanding of those concepts developed during man's interaction with the 'natural' world in which he has lived and which his biological being presupposes and which thus is also relevant to the 'life' he lives as do all other 'living beings', is not only irrelevant but harmful as it leads action in the wrong direction. The model for action in the human realm becomes increasingly patterned on what man does with the 'natural realm', and which is known by the general name of 'engineering'. The 'successes' in this regard have blinded man to the essential 'failure' that surrounds him all around. The 'Great Failures' of the twentieth century embodied in 'Reason gone Mad' in the Soviet and the Nazi 'experiments' and the one enacted now at the beginning of the twenty-first century represented by Bush, Rumsfeid and Company in the US with their openly declared Doctrine of Unilateral Intervention exemplified in their war on Iraq in open defiance of the UN and the world opinion is as telling an evidence of this as anything can be.

The 'reason' that has to deal with the human reality and action in respect of it has, then, to be different from the one embodied in the notion of Logos as understood by the Greeks and as embod-

ied in the formal-deductive notion of pure logical reason as exemplified by Aristotle. The developments of non-Euclidean Geonetries and the recourse to statistical notion of truth, or the development of different kinds of logic do not significantly affect the 'engineering' notion of 'applied reason', as is evident in the whole spectrum of technologies that have come into being after the so-called liquidation of the classical model of Reason given to us by Aristotle and Euclid in their works. And, if one were to judge by the results these changes in the notion of 'Logical Reason' have brought about, then the actions of the most advanced world-center of all these, i.e. the US, may be taken as almost conclusive evidence in this regard.

Human reality, thus, cannot be 'understood' in the usual sense of understanding, as neither the Aristotelian nor the Kantian categories are applicable to this realm, without such radical modification as would 'destroy' the categorial nature of the categories altogether. Hegel comes nearer as he sees 'reality' in terms of a process in which 'negation' rules supreme, for if there is 'change', and change is inevitable and intrinsic to the notion of 'process', then there has to be 'negation' in it. But he does not know how to accommodate the 'reality' of 'freedom' which is at the heart of human reality, nor the 'positive' which man always seeks through 'freedom'. The idea of 'dialectics' does give some insight, but it is too mechanically formulated with the inevitability of 'progressive synthesis' in-built into it. Kant had talked of Freedom as the fundamental presupposition and foundation of human action which has to be 'moral' if it is to be 'human', an insight which most thinkers who have thought about 'freedom' have forgotten as they tend to conceive of it as 'value-neutral' or confined in what Sartre called 'l'acte gratuit'. But Kant's notion of morality is too individual-centred, even though he tries to bring in 'universality' through the three well-known maxims that he formulates. The empty formalism of the 'good will' and its 'disconnection' with the maxims as the latter do not form an integral part of it, or 'follow' from it by any 'transcendental deduction' which is such an important feature of Kant's thinking, is sought to be remedied by him in his *Science of Right* where, through the notion of 'right', that is something as 'mine', the idea of a community of 'free beings' is developed where 'thine' is as important as 'mine' with a reciprocal

'obligation' of respect and even facilitating the realization and actualization of the 'right' of each by all the others becomes the 'content' of the 'good will' that follows from the ontological reality of freedom presupposed by human actions.

This aspect of Kant's thought has not been paid sufficient attention, nor its relation to the work on *Perpetual Peace* which perhaps was his last work. But Kant's thinking in the *Science of Right* is too confined to the notion of a legal system, and even these he does not see it in a historical context, changing due to its failure to concretize the 'good will' as Hegel perhaps might have done. The failure of subsequent thinkers to build on the Kantian insight and retreat into an anarchic-existential-value-neutral notion of freedom as in existentialist and post-modernist thought whose linkages may be seen in Nietzche, or even earlier, shows a total unawareness of the fact that whatever the 'will' chooses always has to have a value-dimension attached, no matter whether this be positive or negative. The will that chooses 'evil' chooses it because it is evil and if, like Satan, it says 'Let evil be my good', then it sees it as good. The only alternative to this is to forget or forego the notion of 'choice' that is rooted in freedom and relapse into a state where unconscious 'habit' rules everything and which is as close to the 'animal world' as a human being can get.

There is, of course, another ideal similar to this, but in spirit it is just the opposite. It is the ideal of the saint or what Kant called the 'Holy Will', or what in some Indian traditions has been called the *Sahaja*, i.e. a consciousness that has transcended the distinction between 'good' and 'evil', but which naturally does what is 'right' and, in a deeper sense, radiates 'value' through its very 'being' or the fact that it is.

The human world, however, is in between, and it is there that *Logos* and *Nomos* reign supreme as it is built on their basis, though it is rooted in *Eros* whose nature no one 'knows', though it is there all the time and is the *Prime Mover*, or the Force that does not let anyone rest ever.

The 'order' that men build and call the 'world' and the idea of which they superimpose on the 'non-human' world that, to them, appears as 'given' and which they try to capture through their attempts to 'know' it and which, in turn, they transfer to the 'world'

built by them, is the 'circle' in which man 'lives', trying to negotiate between the two 'orders' which, in very different ways, are each built by him. The 'House of Knowledge' has to be built by man as any other 'house', and has to be built the same way, by continued maintenance, modification, correction, addition and attempt at an 'appearance' of a coherent, finished, integrated aesthetic 'whole', which it can never be, though man hopes that some day it shall be so and it is this 'hope' or 'faith' that ever spurs and lures him on.

Paradoxically, one does not believe this in respect of 'knowledge', though has little hesitation in acknowledging that in other realms it is not so. The dream of a 'utopia' is always there, but no one believes that it already exists, as one does in the case of knowledge. Perhaps, the illusion in the case of the latter arises because of the fact that it is taught, and has to be taught, while in most other cases it has to be 'lived', and one knows its insufficiency, inadequacy and imperfection in a more personal, existential and deeper manner than in the case of 'knowledge' which somehow seems more 'external' and 'objective' to oneself, even when one finds that it is not what it claims to be.

The continuous questioning of both *Logos* and *Nomos* by oneself and others in each succeeding generation, results in that ever-continuing attempt to find a more satisfactory solution which has given rise to what we call 'civilizations' that define the distinctive 'being' of man as different from all other beings in the world.

Behind and beneath the building and construction of civilizations, there lies the dissatisfaction and the frustration that man feels in respect of whatver 'is' as, for his consciousness, it could always be thought of or imagined as different from what it is, and thus challenging him to change it, many a time just for the sake of 'change' or 'variety' or 'novelty', but also in the hope that it would be better for oneself and others, and that the world he lives in would be a better place to 'live' in.

Eros is the name for this, and has to be understood in this way, and not the way it has been in almost all the traditions of the world up till now. It is not *kāma*, or the 'pleasure-seeking' polymorphous, anarchic perversity as Freud saw it, or even the *vasana* or *trasnā* as the *śramana* or the 'world-denying' traditions of India called it, but

pravṛtti or the ever-outward oriented, positive, valuational consciousness of man which is fascinated by the unending challenges posed to it by the incessant 'demand' and the resulting 'obligation' it feels for bringing the ideals vaguely apprehended into palpable 'living' reality and is prepared to endure with immense fortitude and patience the unbelievable effort that is involved in it.

This is the story of man and of the civilizations that he has built and, what is even stranger, is the fact that even those that have sought to deny it and argued for a different ideal, have been co-opted by the Eros underlying human reality and the ever-green and ever-revived creative impulse that it generates and cannot live without, as the myriad statutes of the Buddha loudly proclaim, visibly denying the so-called Truth that he proclaimed that 'Everything is suffering' or *Sabbam Dukkam*. The *Dharma* and the *Sangha* has to be created in this very world to give a lie, and to be the self-refutation of the Truth that Buddha is supposed to have proclaimed, just as the 'Living Body of the Church' was a refutation of the Christ on the Cross in Christianity.

Man cannot live 'with' or 'in', the 'denial' of the world, or of the desire to make it a little better, or to build anew, or make a fresh start, and to 'know' it a little more, to unravel its secret to the extent he can.

The source and the secret of this impulse in man which makes him accept 'suffering' as the price of this ceaseless endeavour is, however, conditional. The 'suffering' is acceptable only if it is 'necessary' for the realization of that which man accepts, and if it is not 'meaningless', and if it is not felt as a manifest injustice in the arrangement of men, and due to what man does to man and which seems so obviously 'avoidable' in the circumstances that obtain. Inequalities may be unavoidable, but not 'inhumanity'. Pain and suffering may have to be there, but not cruelty and disease and disability no one will be willing to accept, even if 'ageing' has to be accepted as a necessary part of life, and something to be 'lived' with.

The point is that there is nothing in 'suffering' that is to be glorified, nor is it the essence or 'truth' of life. That is the truth which the 'pleasure'-centred view of Eros contains, but it does not understand itself as it is only the half-truth of the world we live in,

and even there it is more concerned with the 'other', the concrete other rather than one-self.

The problem of the impersonal 'other' with which the idea of 'impersonal order' is concerned and which institutions embody in themselves, and which were collectively called *Nomos* in the Greek tradition and its relation to the concrete truth of 'interpersonally lived relationships', has been hardly paid any attention except perhaps in the thought of Confucius which, in any case, has hardly interested anybody as it lacks that transcendental dimension which seems so dear to man.

The secularization of the transcendental and the transformation of the 'sensuously given' into that miraculous something which is non-sensuous without losing its sensousness, and thus misleading the unwary observer into thinking that it is 'sensuous' still, is done through an infusion of 'values' and making it not only the symbol of something else, but also a halting step in a forward movement beyond itself because of the imperfection and incompleteness of both that was sought to be 'mirrored', and that which was sought to be realized.

This happens because the 'mirroring' and the 'realization' are mediated by an unending stream of consciousness in space and time, even though the individual 'self-consciousness' enclosed and imprisoned within itself thinks otherwise. The objective evidence makes no difference to the self-certitude of the 'I-centred' consciousness that suffers from the structural illusion that it always was, and will be what it is, forgetting the *Nomos* and the *Logos* which have formed and shaped it continually since it came into being in this world. A little self-reflection and an effort at imaginative identification with the underlying *Eros* of its own reality, in the sense in which we have used it, might help in mitigating or lessening the stranglehold of 'I-centricity' that seems to be the inevitable result of self-consciousness in man. It might also, hopefully, make men more aware of their 'indebtedness' to the past generations who had built what he has inherited and 'responsible' towards the future generations for whom he would leave the world just as others did before him, when he came into being.

Discussion and Comments

Comments on the Article Entitled 'Rasa—The Bane of Indian Aesthetics'

In the article 'Rasa—The Bane of Indian aesthetics' by Daya Krishna, it was as if the author put into words what I have been feeling about the subject all along.

I remember, way back perhaps in 1943 or 1944, I met a great musician and teacher, Ratnajankar. We were discussing emotion and music. Most emphatically, he said 'music has nothing to do with emotion. Emotion, any emotion, is a disturbed state of mind, and music begins with a quiet mind and ends with a still deeper tranquility of mind'. It took me many years to understand the significance of what he said. Music renders some sort of structure or form to silence. Silence has different forms, the silence of a deep well is diferent from the silence of a mountain top. Can one hear silence? Of course not—not with the physical senses with which you hear only sound. But one experiences silence. So is the case darkness, or even with light, for what one sees with physical eyes are only lit surface and not light. One experiences light and also darkness.

The bedrock of all experience is form and consciousness which supports the form. By 'form' one must not understand outline: the outline is only a *nām* or definition and at most a symbol. Though a symbol is much more than a form, as I will try to show later. A form is a filled in content shape in space, whether inner or outer. Thus, form changes with the content.

There are levels of knowledge. The most superficial one is what we learn in our schools, universities or through books. Deeper than that is understanding. Kant is right when he calls a person who bases his understanding on books immature. Deeper than understanding is experience. Deeper than experience is realization. And deeper than realization is, perhaps, Being. Then you do not only realize that knowledge but you ARE that knowledge. Buddha did not only realize peace, he was Peace himself. It is said of him that

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