

# **Bhakti: A Contemporary Discussion**

(Philosophical Explorations In the Indian Bhakti Tradition)

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To the Memory of  
Professor R. C. Dwivedi  
A great sahrdaya intellectional and bhakta

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## INTRODUCTION

Chance or Divine Providence lies at the root of everything significant that occurs in human affairs. Both are in a sense the same, as they refer to that foundational ignorance which defines the basic structure of the human situation.

It was sometime in 1987 that Shrivatsa Goswami had dropped in one evening during his visit to Jaipur and during the course of the conversation told me about the attempt of Caitanya and his disciples, particularly Rūpa Gosvāmī, to recast all knowledge in the perspective of Bhakti so that it might breathe the spirit of the Divine and evoke his presence in the mind of the one who pursues it. Mathematics and grammar appeared to be the most resistant to any such attempt and so Rūpa Gosvāmī tried to see if this 'dry' subject could possibly be touched by the spark of divinity that lighted the world.

The information, so casually given, was a revelation. I had not known of the attempt. Nor do many others, even those who are interested in the tradition. But, on reflection, it seemed a part of that vast movement in the Indian tradition, which tried to 'sacralize' the 'secular' and whose main representatives were the various sects in the country. Caitanya and Vallabha seemed to have shared the same perspective as did Nānak later on in another sect.

But, at least prima facie, there seemed to be an essential difference. There was an emphasis on intellectuality that generally seems to be missing in the anti-intellectual

emotionalism that is so often associated with Bhakti. And hence it seemed worth exploring further to find whether there was really an intellectual dimension of the Bhakti tradition in India which had not been paid any attention to until now.

The idea of the seminar took shape and when Shri Shrivatsa showed enthusiasm for it and promised all his support, it seemed worth pursuing. Who could have even thought that there were 'intellectual' dimensions of the Bhakti tradition in India? Wasn't it a contradiction in terms? But here was the Goswami himself belonging to the tradition of the great Caitanya willing to let the show be explored in all freedom at his own institution in Vrindavan, the mythical embodiment of all that Bhakti symbolizes in this country.

The idea of a discussion on the intellectual aspects of the Bhakti tradition in India took shape. Prof. M.P. Rege had already shown the way, though Pt. Badrinath Shukla was no more with us to guide us on the path. We turned, therefore, to Prof. R.C. Dwivedi who had been associated with all the activities we had organized under the leadership of Pt. Badrinath Shukla and had also collaborated in the editing of *Samvāda*.

But to have a *samvāda* on Bhakti and that too on its philosophical dimensions at a place like Vrindavan which ostensibly rejects all intellectuality, seemed almost an impossible enterprise. Yet, the enthusiasm of Shrivatsa and his assurance that all freedom will be granted to the discussion at his ashram in Vrindavan and that he would provide full support of boarding and lodging to the participants and that we could discuss freely whatever we liked was most encouraging.

Thus, the spirit of Pune took another turn and the experiment that Rege had launched there, another direction. Issues were framed and sent to possible participants. The stage was set, and we met for a full three days to explore the philosophical dimensions of the Bhakti tradition in India in the heartland of bhakti itself. At times, it almost seemed blasphemous to say the things we said when the eternal flute of the Divine itself called to us every moment to give up the vain, empty, dry world of the intellect and the greeting of the 'Rādhe Rādhe' which reminded us of the ecstasy of divine love. But amidst these enticements and allurements what sustained us was the unbelievably long, hard-core tradition of the ever-seeking, ever-doubting *sāttvika* quest for the ultimate Truth by the *buddhi* in the Indian tradition, which has never been afraid of raising the most formidable *pūrvapakṣas* against one's own position and attempting to answer them. And we had the Kṛṣṇa of the Mahābhārata and the Bhagavadgītā with us in the new *saṁvāda* about which the Kṛṣṇa of the Śrīmadbhāgavata meant in the eternal quest of man for Truth, Reality and Bliss. After all, Kṛṣṇa had left Vrindavan much earlier to fight the battle of *dharma*, and if the Gopīs did not follow him, it was because they loved not Him, but their own emotions of loving Him. It was not Kṛṣṇa, they loved, but they were in love with the love they felt for him. And that is why they stayed on, leaving him to fight his battle of *dharma* alone. The reality of Kṛṣṇa does not seem to interest the Gopīs. But it does interest Arjuna, who at least appears to share some of his concerns. He is also supposed to be a Bhakta in the Indian tradition, the Bhakta of friendship. Yet, when he is shown the Viśvarūpa, the 'real' reality of Kṛṣṇa, he trembles in fear and requests Him to assume

his previous form so that he can love him and have a friendly, meaningful relationship with him. Does it mean then that one cannot love the real reality of God, and that it is only his illusory, friendly aspect that can be the subject of his devotion?

These aspects of the question were not raised in the seminar, though the idea of Asurī Bhakti was discussed. On the other hand, the problem implied by the love of the Gopīs was raised and discussed, though in another form. Was Bhakti the seeking of an ideal immanent in the life of feeling itself, which wanted to be 'free' of any object whatever in order to be completely independent of it? Was it, in other words, the seeking of *mokṣa* in the realm of feeling?

Many other issues were raised and explored in the wide-ranging discussion that lasted for three days, as the reader will discover in the pages of the book. Perhaps, never before has it been explored so freely in so many dimensions and directions. The free-play of reason, imagination and intellectual sensibility of such a large number of scholars revealed once more that we had underestimated the power of such a *bauddhika yajña* to actualize the hidden possibilities of the mind rather than the type of seminar in which everyone reads the paper written before-hand to which nobody listens. The dialogue on Bhakti, thus, confirmed once again what was demonstrated by the Rege experiment in *Samvāda*, referred to earlier.

The transcription from the tape took a long time and the editing of the transcript, even longer. It is always difficult to do these things, but this becomes even more difficult when a number of different languages are involved in the dialogue. Ila Dalmia of

the Vatsal Nidhi Foundation helped us with the first transcript and both Francine and Mukund have given freely of their precious time to do the second. To keep the informality and liveliness of the discussion along with the continuity and coherence of presentation is not easy, but I think they have succeeded to a remarkable degree.

Shrivatsa and his father, Maharajji, who is the head of the Caitanya Prema Sansthan where the dialogue was held, deserve special thanks not only for all they did in respect to the organizational aspect of the Dialogue at their ashram but also for the intellectual contribution they made towards its success.

The Indian Council of Philosophical Research had made a token financial contribution and sponsored the holding of the Dialogue under the joint auspices of itself and the Caitanya Prema Sansthan and it has also agreed to undertake the publication so that the intellectual *rasa* of the discussion may be tasted by a wider audience. Let the consciousness of Bhakti discover the intellectual element in it and enjoy the specific flavour it has.

The book is dedicated to the memory of Prof. R.C. Dwivedi, a rare scholar, genuinely dedicated to the cause of Sanskrit learning and to its critical evaluation and assessment as few Sanskrit scholars are in the country. And he combined all these with a personal charm and an 'openness' to ideas, which is not easily found amongst traditional scholars. Pandit Badrinath Shukla was, of course, the other great exception, and the passing away of these two has been an irreparable loss to the cause of the dialogue between the traditional and modern scholars in the field of philosophy' which Prof. Rege had so creatively

conceived and given effect to at Pune more than a decade ago.

The enterprise, however, has to go on and we hope that the publication of this Dialogue on the Philosophical dimensions of the Bhakti tradition in India will help in reviving the flagging spirit of those who have felt discouraged by the waning enthusiasm of many after the disappearance of these two personalities who had inspired us all in the endeavour of bridging the gap between the traditional and the modern in the field of philosophy in India and thus in making the tradition once more a living force in the philosophizing that is being done today in contemporary India.

□

## Session I

Chairperson: Prof. Daya Krishna.

The first thing I would like to talk about is the background of this dialogue. This is a dialogue between the traditions of India and our modern intellectual life. We have to understand this difference because unless we understand it, we will not be able to see the contemporary situation as it now prevails in this country. All of us who have been trained and educated in institutions of formal learning in this country have developed a whole western-centered way of looking at the world. To begin with, we have been trained in it from our childhood, from our school days, from our colleges, from our universities, which have bred deep in our psyche a feeling that the way of knowledge is the western way and that there is no other way. To realize that this has been deeply implanted in us through a foreign system of education imposed in this country for historical reasons, is to become aware that what we take for granted can be questioned. Similarly, to realize that India has had rich traditions of knowledge in various fields, rich intellectual traditions, traditions rooted in evidence and argument and reasoning, and traditions differentiated with respect to different fields of knowledge, and that these traditions have had at least more than two millennia of historical continuity and development, is to become aware that somehow we have ourselves been cut off from our own intellectual past. How this has happened is a matter of history. But how to



overcome it after one has become aware of it, is the challenge before all of us.

However, this is not the only divide we have in this country, a divide between the past and the present in terms of knowledge. We have also a divide between the life-style of the intellectual elite, which mostly lives in the metropolitan centers like Delhi or Bombay, and the masses, which live not very far from these places. One has just to drive a few miles out of one of these cities, and one comes into a different world, a different people, and a different way of life. Should not, then, one ask oneself: how can people who live in a totally different culture, with a different world-view, with a different style of living communicate meaningfully? This is a problem that we must articulate and face.

There is a double dichotomy, and each reinforces the other. One is the dichotomy of the total western training of our mind and sensibility which has been built over a long period of time from school to college and university. The other relates to the westernized style of living, which, as I said, makes it difficult for us to establish a living rapport with our own people in the country. The challenge then is to overcome this division. Our group has been concerned with this problem for the last five or six years. It has been engaged in an enterprise that treats the past of India in any field whatsoever as something living and not dead. It does not see the past as a matter of antiquity, that is, only of historical or archaeological interest. It does not want to write a history about it. This is because when

one treats something as living, one wants it to grow, to have a living relationship with it. But, what is a living relationship? Those who are dead, we only remember once a year and that too only ritualistically, and, sometimes not even that. The living we interact with, and in the interaction we all change. Till life is there, a possibility of change is always there. It is only with death, that suddenly all possibilities are closed. That which was a possibility has become a fact. Nothing more can be done. One can only remember it, though even remembrance fades away. One remembers less and less and remembers fewer and fewer things. True, when one is living, one also remembers infrequently, but the reason is different. It is because the present overcomes the past, and the present is always moving into the future. So, we have to develop a living relationship with India's past and to treat it as living, not as if it were dead. The first thing to realize, therefore, is that India's past in all fields is a living past, and that the relationship which we have to establish with it has to be a living relationship.

There is another aspect of a living relationship. When one is dead, everybody praises one. It is considered bad manners to talk ill of a dead person. But when a person is alive, people often speak ill of one. In fact, normally people talk more ill than well of others. The aspect of a living relationship, which I want to emphasize, then, is that when one treats the traditions as living, one criticizes them. One does not venerate them; one does not treat them as sacrosanct. If one finds something wonderful,

one should say it is wonderful, but if one finds something wrong, one should say it is wrong. If we have a living relationship, we will not be afraid of being critical. A living relationship, however, is not only critical or appreciative, we further ask ourselves: what can we do with it; how can we carry it forward? Hence, the second dimension of our enterprise with respect to all traditions of India's past is that it is alive and that our relations with them have to be critical, appreciative and creative.

Moreover, we have to realize that we are their heirs and that we have to carry it forward. We must not see it as a closed thing. No living thing is a closed thing. All the possibilities of our traditions have not been actualized. Our tradition does not end with the Vedas or with the Upaniṣads, or with the Sūtras. It does not end with the Śrīmad Bhāgavata or the Gīta, or the Mahābhārata or the Rāmāyaṇa. Nor does it end with the ācāryas. Think of Śaṅkara whose twelve hundredth anniversary we are going to celebrate very shortly; we all know that after him there was a long continuing tradition of Advaita Vedānta which lasted for at least five to six hundred years. There is also the whole tradition of Nyāya starting from Gautama and coming up to Baccā Jhā in the nineteenth century or even up to Badrinath Shukla who passed away recently. These traditions have not ceased at any point of time. A living tradition continuously grows. There is, for example, the tradition of Navya Nyāya which self-consciously calls itself 'navya' or new. It influenced almost all branches of learning in this country. Each one of us has to

establish a living relationship with the past traditions of this country and not only be critical towards them or try to interpret and understand them to the best of one's ability but also carry them forward according to their own capabilities. This, perhaps is a new way of looking at tradition.

But where are the carriers of the tradition? We are fortunate in that we have living repositories and practitioners of the traditions in this country. We need not go to a library or read a book about Gaṅgeśa or Gadādhara. We can meet living Naiyāyika and talk to him and ask him about our problems. A living tradition is that which can reply to one because there is a living repository of it. In a dead tradition one cannot do so. If one wants a reply, it comes only from a written text in a certain way. It is a reply of a radically different kind. We can enter into a dialogue with the living repositories of traditions in almost all fields.

But then, how does one locate these living carriers of the past traditions of this country? How do we look for them? How do we establish a dialogue with them? This is precisely what we have been trying to do: to discover the living carriers of the traditions in various fields of knowledge and to establish a dialogue with them. But this is not a dialogue of a guru with a śiṣya. It is not a dialogue where a person who does not know goes to a person who knows and asks him what the truth is. The dialogue is between two persons and two groups who are equal in the sense that none of them knows anything more than the other. Anybody who can ask a

question, a new question, is equal to or even more than equal to the person who knows.

I want to emphasize this point a little more. Who can be more ignorant than a child? And yet, when a child asks you a question, you are dumb-founded because you had never thought that such a question could be asked. You suddenly feel yourself to be utterly ignorant simply because a question has been asked for, which you have to think anew, afresh. Now this is the kind of dialogue that we try to have. It is not merely that we ask questions, but rather it is a mutual dialogue. In these seminars we usually do not have any written papers. We have all gone to hundreds of seminars and we know the situation, and yet we go on repeating the same syndrome of the seminar where papers are read, where the chair-person is looking at her or his watch and the paper reader is trying to hurry and finish reading the paper. If we are all concerned intellectuals desiring to understand each other, desiring to understand an issue, then, let us formulate the issues and have a dialogue about them.

We have discovered something else also. A dialogue with the tradition or with the bearers or carriers of the tradition cannot be carried on except in their own language. The language of knowledge in India is Sanskrit. It is the other language of traditional knowledge in contemporary India. Besides Sanskrit, there is one other language of traditional learning in India and that is Arabic. Any dialogue with the centres of the West Asian tradition of knowledge in India can only be carried on in Urdu with a heavy dose of Arabic in it. On the

other hand, if we want to have a dialogue with the Sanskrit tradition in India, we must talk in Sanskrit. Now I cannot speak in Sanskrit, but I understand it a little. So, how shall I have a dialogue? We must, then, have a bilingual talk with facilities for translation so that people who want to speak in Sanskrit may speak in Sanskrit, and we shall provide the facility for Sanskrit-English and English-Sanskrit translation. It is important to have bilingual or even trilingual facilities of translation for a real, living dialogue with the tradition.

Now I shall be brief because we must break for coffee in a little while, but I must make another point before I close. Until now most of the dialogues we have had have been on contemporary issues. The dialogue has to be around questions that agitate the contemporary mind. After all, knowledge is worldwide. This may seem to be contrary to what I said earlier when I argued that most of our knowledge these days is western knowledge. But whether western or Indian or Chinese or Arabic, knowledge claims universality. If knowledge claims universality, then, in each field there are contemporary issues engaging the best minds of the world today; so, if the tradition has real vitality, if the carriers of traditional knowledge have real knowledge, then they must be able to tackle contemporary intellectual issues in the perspective of their own traditions of knowledge. Therefore we formulate contemporary intellectual issues in Sanskrit or in Arabic, place them before classical scholars and ask them to respond to them. In turn, we critically respond to their responses, and so the dialogue goes on. We

have done this until now in the field of contemporary philosophical problems, and current issues in linguistics.

We have also tried to bring scholars in one area together, as, for example, in the field of Nyāya, where a hundred people from all over India gathered together at Sarnath, Varanasi for five days and discussed some new issues which had been formulated with respect to Nyāya. This has also been attempted with respect to Mīmāṃsā and Kashmir Śaivism. We have held meetings at traditional places like Wai, at the Prajñā Pāṭhaśālā of Pt. Laxman Shastri Joshi, one of the greatest scholars this country has produced, and the editor of *Dharmakośa*, twenty one volumes of which have already been published. Wai is on the banks of the Krishna river, in beautiful surroundings. Rather than meet in Delhi or Jaipur or Bombay or Calcutta, it is preferable to get together in a traditional place and to share the style of living, the ethos and to have a living contact with those who keep the tradition alive.

Friends, this dialogue on *bhakti* is part of the same enterprise. I have tried to give you some idea of the enterprise, the vision and the effort behind it. We have formulated some issues about *bhakti*. I will just make two more points, and close. Everything that any culture has explored in depth for a long time may be treated as culture specific, that is, only confined to that culture alone and not of universal relevance. Shall we then regard *bhakti* as culture-specific, that is, confined to the Indian culture alone? Or, is it universal in character? But if *bhakti* has

something universal in it, then, there must be something analogous to it in other cultures. If *bhakti* is a movement in the soul of man, then it must be found everywhere. If *bhakti* means the feeling that grasps the ultimate reality, then the human spirit in some form must have made this move in other cultures, other traditions, other civilizations, and we must try to find it if it is there.

Further, why is it that the form of *bhakti* in Bengal is so different from *bhakti* in Maharashtra and Gujarat? Why, for example does Bengal not sing :

*vaiṣṇava jana to tene kahiye  
je pira parāi jāṅe re.*

Today Maharashtra and Gujarat have developed a new notion of *bhakti* in the Svadhyaya movement, which is so different from the *bhakti* as we usually understand it. We should learn to take concepts out of the cultural context in which they have been embedded and extend them in new directions as the Svadhyaya movement has done. And, not only this, we should also enquire into the forms *bhakti* took in Śaiva Siddhānta or among the Śāktas.

I hope what I have said has provided you with some background for the discussion that will follow. As all the questions and the issues have already been circulated, I will request the participants to start the discussion on the first issue which is as follows: Is there such a thing as a philosophical tradition of *bhakti* in India and if so what is it? What are the *pūrvapakṣas* in the philosophical tradition of *bhakti*? What

are the arguments given for their refutation? Further, if bhakti is primarily a matter of feeling, then, what can be the place of philosophical argument in it? The question is, what exactly is the philosophical domain of any issue whatsoever? Philosophical discussion, we say, consists in reasoning, in argumentation and refutation.

एक बात मैं यहाँ उभारना चाहता हूँ। कई लोग समझते हैं कि परम्परा में मतैक्य ही दिखता है। यदि परम्परा में हमें ऐक्य का ही दर्शन होता है तो फिर जो खण्डन मण्डन की परम्परा है उसका क्या करें? ऐक्य की भावना के प्रति मेरी भी श्रद्धा है, उसमें गहराई है लेकिन फिर मत वैविध्य का क्या होगा? सिद्धान्त की स्थापना पूर्वपक्ष के खण्डन के बिना नहीं होती, यह भी परम्परा ही है। बहुत पुरानी परम्परा है। इसको हमें नकारना नहीं चाहिये। इसको अनदेखा करने का आदत अच्छी नहीं है। एक आचार्य दूसरे आचार्य से क्या कहता है, उधर भी ध्यान देना चाहिये।

I am suggesting that one of the foundational issues with respect to bhakti or thinking about bhakti is that bhakti is feeling-centered, emotion-oriented. It treats feelings and emotions as the basic instrument or means of grasping ultimate reality. If this is so, then what is the place of reason in it? Reason and a argument are the heart of philosophy, and this is so not just in the western tradition, but even in our own tradition, right from its very beginning. As far as bhakti is concerned, it is supposed to be just the opposite. Bhakti is a cultivation of the emotional life of man in relation to the transcendent; it is also the underplaying of doubt, *samśaya*. As they say, '*samśayātmā vinaśyati*'. But in *darśana* *samśayātmā* does not *vinaśyati*. Without *samśaya* or doubt one cannot make a movement in thought. First there is doubt; then the doubt is tentatively settled by an argument. And this goes on; doubt is the

eternal motive behind the movement of thought. If there is *darśana* in bhakti then we have two questions before us. One is: what is the textual evidence of this philosophical tradition and what are the arguments, and what is or could be the *pratipakṣa* of bhakti? This is the first issue. There is also a factual aspect to it. The other is that even supposing there is no literal evidence about the philosophical aspect of bhakti, can we not start a philosophical tradition of thinking now?

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: I would like to make a few preliminary remarks. As the discussion develops, I will introduce some more points.

So far as *darśana* is concerned, it is, no doubt, mainly based on reasoning. It takes the form of arguments, counter-arguments, introducing the *pūrvapakṣas*, putting forward the arguments of the *pūrvapakṣas*, and then the *siddhāntapakṣa*, answering each of the points raised by the *pūrvapakṣa*. This is the method. It has been followed in almost all the *darśanas*. But we have to remember here that each *darśana* has a doctrinal point to make. The play of reasoning alone is to be found mainly in the *Nyāya-śāstra*. In the *Vedānta* schools, reasoning is there only to the extent of introducing the *pūrvapakṣa*; it then gives the *siddhānta* and answers each of the points raised by the *pūrvapakṣa* where the opponent has a counter-doctrinal point. We cannot say that the *Vedānta-śāstra* is just a matter of dry logic or dry reasoning. It has also got something to do with feeling also because at the end of all argumentation, the question is

how to attain *mukti*. That is the end of the *śāstra*. Then finally the means is discussed. Bhakti is definitely one of the means. It is an inimitable means. So there is always an element of feeling associated with reasoning. In understanding doctrines we use reasoning, but for the attainment of *mukti*, it is bhakti that takes us forward. Therefore, while dealing with the Vedānta-śāstra with which we are very much concerned so far as bhakti is concerned, it is to be remembered that it is not merely dry logic. Of course, a Dvaitic thinker taking a different stand will have to take the Advaita stand as a pūrvaśakṣa and give an answer to it. But whether one is an Advaitin or a Dvaitin, one's way of life is inexorably wedded to bhakti, and it is through bhakti alone that one attains the higher spiritual possibilities of one's being.

Bhakti, according to the Śaiva school of philosophy, is not just a feeling; it is *śakti* itself. This *śakti* is introduced into mind for its own betterment, for its own spiritual uplift. For the purpose of creation, Śiva-*śakti* manifests itself in the form of the world. This is the *pravṛtti* of *śakti*. For the purpose of liberation *śakti* becomes bhakti in the mind of the devotee and the dawn of *śakti* in man is thus the dawn of bhakti in him. So, it is technically called by the Śaivites as *śakti-pāta*. It is through this *śakti-pāta* that a *sādhaka* begins his journey. He further picks up *sadācāra*. *Sadācāra*, as Swamiji put it, is exactly what is meant by bhakti. Through bhakti a devotee gains knowledge, and then through knowledge he attains *mukti*. So, this is the path. Therefore, so far as the Vedānta schools are concerned, we have to set aside

the idea of dry reasoning. It may be so in the case of logic, that is, in pure logic, in the Nyāya-śāstra, but it is not so in the case of the Vedānta-śāstra.

Prof. Sarnath Basu: The pointed question that Prof. Daya Krishna has raised is this: If bhakti is essentially feeling, why should there be any philosophical discussion on it? To this, my first answer is: We can have three different attitudes towards the ultimate reality, the cognitive, the affective and the conative. Now, can I ask why there should be a philosophy of knowledge? In fact, we cannot ask this question. Because we have these three fundamental mental attitudes, the affective, the conative and the cognitive, there can be three kinds of philosophies as well: the philosophy of cognition, the philosophy of affection and the philosophy of conation. Nowadays we hear a lot about the philosophy of action and its philosophical dimensions, or the drawing up of the logical geography of the different concepts relating to it. Even concepts relating to emotions are being analyzed today in philosophy. From this point of view we can enter into a meaningful discussion about the nature of bhakti.

I would also like to point out in regard to this tripartite division of the mental faculties, the cognitive, the affective and the conative, that this division itself has to be taken with a pinch of salt. This division is not really a clear-cut division. Though philosophically we speak of this tripartite division, but in philosophy itself, there is also a tradition of a bipartite division of mental states. When we turn to Nyāya, we find

several arguments that deny the division of mental states, into two or three. Nyāya says that *buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa* and *yatna* are to be taken separately. This cannot be done under the logic of a bipartite or a tripartite classification. Moreover, much analysis is needed with regard to the concept of feeling itself. Feeling is not devoid of awareness. We say 'cognition', then 'feeling', as if we separate feeling from cognition. But, as a matter of fact, feeling cannot really be separated from cognition. At this point we should see whether bhakti is an element in feeling or whether feeling is an element in bhakti and whether they are two sides of the same thing.

What I am trying to emphasize is that a logical analysis of the concept of bhakti itself is necessary. That is a philosophical issue, not merely an issue for a sādḥaka. As a matter of fact, the concept of bhakti has been analyzed elaborately so far as I know by Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya* and also in the different commentaries on the Gītā. In the Gītā, the problem arises whether *jñāna* or bhakti is more predominant. Lord Kṛṣṇa apparently shifts from the one to the other. Sometimes he says that there is nothing higher than bhakti, then he speaks of *yoga*, or of *dhyāna*. In the sixth adhyāya which is on dhyāna-yoga, he has emphasized meditation. But the last śloka of the sixth chapter itself is very significant, where he says:

योगिनामपि सर्वेषां मद्गतेनान्तरात्मना।

श्रद्धावान्भजत यो मां स मे युक्ततमो मतः॥

"Even amongst the yogīs, I consider him the highest whose inner self is concentrated on me"

Then he speaks of bhakti. At the end of the eleventh chapter one finds the śloka:

भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्य अहं एवविधोर्जुन।

ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन प्रवेष्टुं च परंतप॥

There he speaks about bhakti. This bhakti is not devoid of *brahma-jñāna*. Nor is it devoid of jñāna itself. At the end of the eighteenth chapter one finds the following śloka:

भक्त्या मामभिजानाति यावान्यश्चास्मि तत्त्वतः।

ततो मां तत्त्वतो ज्ञात्वा विशते तदनन्तरम्॥

"By means of devotion he will know what I really am. And then knowing me, will become one with me."

Here I would like to make another point. As a matter of fact, it is later in the tradition of philosophical discussion that Bhakti-śāstras have been composed. In the *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu* which has been written by Śrī Rūpa Gosvāmī, it can be seen how different philosophical concepts and different emotive concepts have been minutely analyzed. If aesthetics is a branch of philosophy, why cannot Bhakti-śāstra be a branch of philosophy too? In *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu* one can find different forms of bhakti: the *sādhana* bhakti, the *bhāva* bhakti and the *premā* bhakti. Bhakti needs a logical analysis, a minute analysis. The different faces of it have to be scrutinized and coordinated. Now, these three, *sādhana* bhakti, *bhāva* bhakti, and *premā* bhakti,

have been coordinated by Rūpa Gosvāmī in the *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu* itself.

Dr. Rukmini: I will address myself to the specific question raised by Prof. Daya Krishna. That is: do we have a philosophical text on bhakti available? When we look at the darśanas, whether it is Advaita or Yoga, or Nyāya, the pūrvapakṣa is very much concerned with refuting the theory of *anātma* of the Buddhists. Now, do we have anything like that in the bhakti tradition? I have not come across it. In such a perspective, that is, the perspective of pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta, we do not have such a debate in bhakti.

But, then, why do we not have such a tradition? This is perhaps not really true. There is a tradition of bhakti-experience right from the beginning, as one of our friends pointed out just now. The schools of philosophy, too, are already there. Jñāna, bhakti and karma are already there, the attempt has been to compose texts in order to justify what is already there. So, in that sense all the later literature, even the Gosvāmī literature which has been spoken of is to give reasons for, or justify, or evaluate an experience which is already there.

As for Rāmānuja, I think he is only debating against Advaita. He is trying to refute it, through his own commentary on the same text, the *Brahma-sūtra*, giving a different interpretation. He uses a different kind of argument to establish his position against the Advaitic position, but there is nothing philosophical per se in it. There is no demolition of the pūrvapakṣa and the establishment of siddhānta; it is just a way

of interpreting Upaniṣads. He says that it is more appropriate to understand them in terms of his Viśiṣṭādvaita.

So what we have is a school of thought that is already there. But it is primarily about bhakti as an *anubhava*. And, an entire school is built on that.

The *Īśa* Upaniṣad already has the concept of *niṣkāma karma*-

ईशावास्यमिदं सर्वं यत्किञ्चित् जगत्यां जगत्  
तेन त्यक्तेन भुञ्जीथा मा गृधः कस्यसिद्धनम्।

I think, everybody knows that the *Bhagavad Gītā* is a commentary on it. And the *Bhāgavata* is a commentary on the *Bhagavad Gītā*. Then, there is the concept of *ahaitukī* bhakti. I would like to interpret it as that bhakti where there is no *hetu*. But, what is *hetu*? *Phala-kāmanā* is *hetu*. The *Bhāgavata* talks about bhakti being an end in itself. Bhakti leads to bhakti. God himself is identified with bhakti. So, *ahaitukī* bhakti follows the tradition of the *Īśa* Upaniṣad, the tradition of *niṣkāma karma*. Even Śaṅkarācārya had to bow down to bhakti because there was a tradition and that is why *saguna* brahma had to be incorporated by him, though, of course, the final end is *nirguna* brahma. Bhakti had to have the concept of *ahaitukī* bhakti which is a totally new contribution by the *Bhāgavata*; it had not been spoken of earlier, so far as I know. This, I feel, is a totally different kind of bhakti, one that could be considered a philosophical innovation.

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: So far as the pūrvapakṣa of bhakti is concerned, what you said in general is quite right. But in the



third adhyāya which is known as the sādhanā adhyāya and discusses sādhanā for mokṣa; in respect to it Rāmānuja takes the Advaita position as the pūrvapakṣa position and discusses it in detail. Later the same thing is taken up by Madhvācārya and the other ācāryas of bhakti. They take the Advaita as the pūrvapakṣa and then reflect on the defects in the pūrvapakṣa position. Finally, they declare that without bhakti one cannot have the anugraha of the Paramātmā. Bhakti is for the sake of anugraha. Without anugraha there cannot be mukti. For receiving God's anugraha, and God's grace, there has to be bhakti.

Chairman: I think a very important point has been made. I would like to emphasize it. It has been associated with the name of Rāmānuja. He has argued against the Advaitin because the Advaitin could not have accepted his position. The Advaitin can accept bhakti only as a secondary thing. For him it is jñāna alone which matters. For him even karma cannot give mokṣa. Now, for the Advaitin, therefore, the hard-core Advaita position should be that jñāna alone is identical with mokṣa not bhakti. I would suggest, therefore, that there must have been a debate after Rāmānuja, with the great Advaitic writers, and after Madhva also. The Advaitins must have then given arguments against these arguments. So, one can build up what may be called a tradition of argument and counter-argument about the position of Rāmānuja.

Dr. K.V. Archak: So far as the first question is concerned, that is, what are the pūrvapakṣas in the philosophical tradition of bhakti, I will first present the pūrvapakṣas.

To begin with, I take the side of the opponent and raise the objection that bhakti is not necessary to attain mokṣa, because in the sacred texts like the Bhagvad Gītā, Lord Kṛṣṇa says that the performance of karma can lead us to liberation. So, why do we need bhakti, or even jñāna?

The other point is that the tradition of bhakti is a blind tradition. If we follow bhakti-siddhānta, we can say: *bhaktyā jñānam tato bhaktiḥ*. (भक्त्या ज्ञानं ततो भक्तिः) So, for knowledge bhakti is necessary, and when knowledge dawns, bhakti too gets deepened. There is, thus, a cyclic movement, each helping the other grow. And, thus bhakti helps us to attain liberation.

The charge that bhakti is a blind tradition is not true. Bhakti has a long history, since Vedic times. In the Vedas, and the Upaniṣads we have many references to, bhakti. For example in the Atharvaveda: *tasya te bhaktiḥ bhaktivān sahāsyam*, And in the Rgveda: *mahaste viṣṇo sumatiḥ bhajāmahe*. The Sāmaveda says, *upāsyatām śriyam avyaktasaudyām; bhaktyā mṛtyormucyate*. In the Kaṭhopaniṣad: *hiraṇmayena pātreṇa satyasyāpihitam mukham, tanme pūṣan apāvṛṇu*. It has also been said in the Īśāvāsya, *yamaṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ*.

Dr. Mukund Lath: I am willing to grant that bhakti is even older than the Vedas. Ever since the beginning of man bhakti was there. This is not the issue. Firstly, we must try, to define what bhakti is. There were the *lakṣaṇas: jñānena labdham; bhaktyā labdham*. But, why should I practice bhakti. What is it

that I am being asked to do, when I am asked to do bhakti?

Prof. Sarnath Basu: One minute please. I don't think it is necessary for everybody to give a definition of bhakti before making their remarks because it is understood what bhakti is from the exposition given already by others, and we need not go on giving our own definition of bhakti and then offering our remarks. Therefore, let us concentrate on the first two questions that have been raised by Prof. Daya Krishnaji.

Dr. Archak: I think, bhakti can be defined as the Bhāgavata says: This means that for bhakti, *mahātmya jñāna* is essential. Another point I want to make is that as Prof. Shivkumarji said, the dawn of bhakti is the dawn of śakti. What is this śakti? I want to know, whether śakti is spiritual or in the intellect or in the mind or if it has some other form. So far as I know, śakti is *mānasika śakti*, or *bauddhika śakti*. If there is a means of controlling one's mind and intellect, that itself is śakti and that śakti of mind and intellect helps us to concentrate on the Lord. So, that itself is bhakti. Therefore, the dawn of śakti means the capacity that is in the mind as well as in the intellect. Without that, we cannot have the dawn of bhakti.

Prof. Dwivedi: Bhakti, that is, the śakti that you mentioned, is not the intellectual power of the devotee. Originally śakti is divine grace itself. You remember Śaṅkara's statement: शिवः शक्त्या युक्तः यदि भवति शक्तः प्रभक्तितुम्. This *avinābhāva* is the inseparable relation between Śiva and Śakti, and when Śiva

desires creation, Śakti is transformed in the shape of the world. When Śiva wants to reabsorb the entire world back into himself, Śakti comes back and helps Śiva to drive the entire universe back into himself. This is how śakti as *pravṛtti* brings about the world, and as *nivṛtti* it takes back the world into Brahman.

But as to the *bhakta*, he is a world by himself, because according to the Śaivas, *jagat* is made up of thirty-six principles, and *this jagat* which is in the form of man, is also made up of thirty-six principles. So, in the very person of man, there is the dawn of Śiva's grace which initiates his march towards spirituality, reaching out to the Highest. Therefore, śakti is divine grace, and not the independent intellectual power of man. Of course, later on it converts itself into intellectual power. But originally it is divine grace.

वक्ता--मैं एक बात एक मिनट में कह देना चाहता हूँ। ज्यादा टाइम नहीं लूँगा। पहली बात तो मैं यह कहना चाहता हूँ कि इस डायलॉग को आर्गनाइज किया है इंडियन कौंसिल ऑफ फिलोसफिकल रिसर्च ने। इसका मतलब है कि जो हमारे भारतीय दर्शन में उसके दो पक्ष हैं--एक थ्योरिटिकल और दूसरा प्रेक्टीकल, उन पर विचार करें। पर, भक्ति एक फुल फ्लैज्ड फिलासफी भी नहीं है। वह तो एक मीन्स है, ईश्वर तक पहुँचने के लिए। अगर कोई और भारतीय दर्शन हो तो उसका एक सिस्टम होगा, उसकी एक एपिस्टिमोलोजी होगी। उसकी थ्योरिटिकल साइड हम अच्छी तरह से डिसकस कर सकते हैं। भक्ति तो केवल मीन्स है टु रीच गॉड। ईश्वर तक पहुँचने के लिए एक साधन के रूप में है। इसको, फिलोसफी को, अगर हम प्रेक्टीकल साइड से अलग करके डिसकस करें तो जितने प्वाइंट्स हैं उनको हम ज्यादा बारीकी से डिसकस कर सकते हैं। वाट इज द मेथड दैट शुड बी वैरी क्लीयर। इसमें जरा सी अगर चूक हो जाए तो हम इसका दूसरे पक्ष में चले जायेंगे। देखना यह है कि कौन सिद्धान्त क्या कह रहा है, यह नहीं देखना कोई क्या कर रहा है, यह नहीं देखना। भक्ति अपनी जगह पर है, मगर यहाँ पर हम लोग एक फिलोसफिकल काँग्रेस की तरफ से, इकट्ठे हुए हैं। मेरी सब वक्ताओं

से यह प्रार्थना है कि इस बात का हमेशा ख्याल रखे। उसकी फिलोसफिकल साइड को बड़ी बारीकी से प्रेक्टिकल साइड से अलग रखें, पहली बात। दूसरी बात एक छोटी सी बात है जो मैं अर्ज करना चाहूँगा कि शुद्ध भक्ति की ओर अहेतुकी भक्ति की जितनी बातें हुई हैं अप्रासंगिक हैं, मैं समझता हूँ दो ही मेन डिवीजन होता है। एक शुद्ध भक्ति और दूसरी अशुद्ध भक्ति। जहाँ पर आप इस समय हैं, इस नगरी में शुद्ध भक्ति ही एक मात्र भक्ति मानी जाती है जिसमें ज्ञान का अंश भीतर ही घुसा हुआ है, बाहर नहीं है। पर एक मात्र शुद्ध भक्ति जिसे अहेतुकी भक्ति भी कह सकते हैं, इन इंसेंस, गोपिका भक्ति, ऐसा प्रेम हमारी आपकी प्रेक्टिस के लिए कहाँ तक ठीक है यह तो आप ही बता सकते हैं जो स्वयं पार्टीसिपेट कर रहे हैं। डर लग सकता है। इससे समाज में दुराचार आदि की जितनी बातें की गई हैं, जैसे बंगाल में इस प्रेक्टिस के नतीजे, नेडा-नेड़ी जिसको कहते हैं, इसकी भरमार भरे विचार में फैल जाती है। शुद्ध भक्ति का इतना ज्यादा डिग्रेडेशन हुआ है कि हर एक आदमी निन्दा करता है। मैं दूसरी बात यह कहना चाहता हूँ कि हम ख्याल रखें कि गोपी प्रेम को कम डिसकस करें और भक्ति के दूसरे रूपों को ज्यादा डिसकस करें।

प्रो. दयाकृष्ण—आई वान्ट टु क्लोज नाऊ फार लंच, बट बिफोर वी क्लोज, एन इशु वाज रेज्ड : वी शुड थिक एबाउट इशूज इंटेलेक्चुअली। किसी भी पूर्वपक्ष की स्थापना के लिए, उसके खंडन के लिए, पहली बात जो मुकुन्द जी ने उठायी थी, भक्ति का व्यावर्तक लक्षण क्या है इस पर चर्चा होनी चाहिये। जैसा अभी किसी वक्ता ने कहा, रामानुज ने जब यह कहा कि ज्ञान से मोक्ष नहीं मिल सकता है, और इसके लिए तर्क दिया, तो ज्ञान और भक्ति में उन्होंने भेद किया। भेद का लक्षण क्या था? बहुत लोगों ने कहा है कि भक्ति के अनेक स्वरूप होते हैं। चार प्रकार की भक्ति होती है। कुछ लोगों ने कहा भक्ति का फल भक्ति ही होता है भगवान नहीं होता। अगर भगवान नहीं है तो भक्ति का क्या अर्थ होता है? इन प्रश्नों की चर्चा होनी चाहिए।

भक्ति का फल अगर भक्ति ही है तो कर्म का फल क्या है? कर्म? कर्मसु कौशलम्? कर्म के बारे में भी यह बात कही गयी है कि कुशल कर्मी कर्म के लिए कर्म करते हैं। आप लोग विचार को आगे बढ़ाइये या विचार के संदर्भ में प्रश्न कीजिये। अभी ईशोपनिषद् की बात हुई। मैं भी कभी-कभी ईशोपनिषद् पढ़ता हूँ। मेरे मन में तो 20 सवाल पैदा होते हैं, आप को क्या नहीं होते?

*ईशावास्यमिद् सर्वं यत्किंचित् जगत्यां जगत्।*

पहली लाइन देखिये कितनी उदात्त है। दूसरी कैसे फोलो करती है, बताइये? मुझे तो तर्क नहीं दीखता—तेन त्यक्तेन भुंजीथा। यह यह कैसे फोलो

करता है? यदि सारा विश्व ईश्वरमय है तो मैं भी ईश्वरमय हूँ। सब कुछ ईश्वरमय है तो यह क्यों कि 'तेन त्यक्तेन भुंजीथा?' में किस को छोड़ूँ?

आगे कहते हैं : मा गृधः कस्यशिवद् धनम्।

यह हम कहाँ आ गये? यानी हमने इतनी ऊँची उड़ान भरी थी और कहाँ गिर पड़े : मा गृधः कस्यशिवद् धनम्, ये तो छोटी बात है। आप देखिये मेरे सामने तो बीसियों प्रश्न उपस्थित हैं। अभी किसी ने गीता की चर्चा की, गीता में है : कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन। इस सेन्टेंस में, इस वाक्य में सेल्फ कंट्राडिक्शन है। अगर आप कर्म के सिद्धान्त को मानते हैं तो यह वाक्य कह नहीं सकते। 'कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते, मा फलेषु कदाचन। यह कैसे हो सकता है। कर्म में जिसका अधिकार है उसको फल तो मिलेगा ही, वह चाहे या न चाहे। अगर कौज पर आपकी पकड़ है तो इफेक्ट तो मिलेगा ही। कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते जो व्यक्ति यह कहता है वह कर्म के सिद्धान्त को फिर नहीं मानता। इतनी बड़ी बात है तो कुछ प्रश्न उठने चाहिए, उन प्रश्नों का निराकरण होना चाहिए।

## SESSION II

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: The first thing I would like to say is this. We have to see if it were the later Advaita Vedāntins who replied to Rāmānuja, and what the counter-arguments were from the other side. How did the debate between the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Advaita thinkers move? If we can document this debate and translate it in terms of the arguments, I think, this dialogue or seminar would have already succeeded.

Secondly, many interesting things were said in the morning. In fact, a point was made which has not been given sufficient attention. It relates to the concept of bhakti itself. It is not only a variegated concept but there are also different dimensions to it. Also, that bhakti itself may be called śakti. This gives our discussion a new turn and a different direction.

जब शक्ति मनुष्य में एक भिन्न दिशा लेती है तब वह भक्ति कहलाने लगती है। हमारे यहाँ तो प्रवृत्ति और निवृत्ति की बात की जाती है। उसी सन्दर्भ में इस बात को लीजिये कि सब शक्ति का ही रूप है। वही शक्ति जब बाहर की ओर प्रवृत्त होती है तब कर्म का रूप लेती है और जब मनुष्य की मुक्ति का साधन बनती है तब वह भक्ति का रूप लेती है। ऐसा कहने की चेष्टा की गयी है। मुझे बहुत अच्छा लगा। इसी सन्दर्भ में मुकुन्द ने एक प्रश्न उठाया था जो मैं समझता हूँ, महत्त्व का प्रश्न है। भक्ति पर किसी भी विचार के लिए एक व्यावर्तक लक्षण बताना चाहिए कि भक्ति है क्या? भक्ति का पूर्व पक्ष ज्ञान है, कर्म है, परम्परा में ऐसा माना गया है।

A very interesting point was also made that after all a philosophic reflection can be either on knowledge or on action and that philosophical problems can also arise from the context of feelings or emotions. A philosophy of feelings is therefore as much justified as epistemology or ethics. This is an interesting point. If aesthetics can be a philosophical discipline, why not a philosophy of bhakti, that is, a philosophy which investigates the cognitive function of feelings and emotions. Or, in other words, what is their epistemological, ontological and axiological status in the life of man?

अब इस प्रश्न पर चर्चा होगी। मैं समझता हूँ इस सत्र में हम लोग इस बात पर थोड़ा विचार करने की चेष्टा करें कि भक्ति का लक्षण क्या है? भक्ति हम किस को कहेंगे? पुरातन ग्रंथों में क्या कहा गया है? वो महत्त्व की बात है उसे जानना चाहिए। परन्तु अपनी बुद्धि का प्रयोग करें यह जानने के लिए कि क्या ठीक लक्षण बन सकता है। पहले कोई कामचलाऊ लक्षण बनाइये। दोष बाद में निकालेंगे। मुकुन्द जी ने बात शुरू की थी। उन्हीं से पूछते हैं, कोई लक्षण बतायें।

पुरुषोत्तम गोस्वामी--मेरा निवेदन यह था कि भक्ति के पूर्वपक्ष की बात होनी चाहिए। जैसा अभी दया जी ने कहा पूर्वपक्ष यहाँ ज्ञान है, कर्म है, योग है। यदि कोई ऐसा कहे कि योगी, ज्ञानी, कर्मी को भक्ति के विषय में बोलने का कोई अधिकार नहीं है तो बात को ऐसा समझा जाए कि भक्ति का सम्बन्ध भक्तों से है। ज्ञान का सम्बन्ध ज्ञानियों से है और ज्ञानी ब्रह्म का उपासक होता है। मोक्ष उसकी साधना और साध्य है। जबकि भक्त कहता है कि भक्ति में मोक्ष सबसे बड़ा कपट धर्म है। "मोक्ष वांछा कैतव प्रधान। जाहा हइते कृष्णभक्ति होंय अन्तर्धान।" गोस्वामीपाद ने कहा है--मोक्ष वांछा सबसे बड़ा कपट धर्म है जिससे कि कृष्ण भक्ति अन्तर्धान हो जाती है। श्रीमद्भागवतस्य प्रौढ टीकाकारः श्रीधर स्वामिपादाः एवं वदन्ति श्रीमद्भागवतस्य द्वितीयश्लोकयारख्याने।

धर्मः प्रोज्झितकैतवोऽत्र परमो निर्मत्सराणां सतां  
वेद्यं वास्तवमत्र वस्तु शिवदं तापत्रयोन्मूलनम्।—इति भागवतस्य प्रतिज्ञा।  
तद्विचार पूर्वकम् स्वामिपादैः भावार्थदीपिकायां एवं भणितमस्ति,  
यत् 'प्र' शब्देन मोक्षस्याऽपि शङ्क निरस्ता।

अर्थात् श्रीधर स्वामी यहाँ 'प्रोज्जित', इस शब्द में प्रयुक्त 'प्र' की व्याख्या करते हुए कहते हैं कि मोक्ष पर्यन्त जो अभिलाषा है इसको जब तक नहीं त्यागोगे तब तक भागवत का भक्ति-प्रसाद तुम को प्राप्त नहीं होगा, प्रेम-पुरुषार्थ की प्राप्ति नहीं होगी। तो सच यह है कि ज्ञान तो भक्ति में सबसे बड़ी बाधा है। पर एक बात और ध्यान रखने की है कि सामान्य भक्ति अलग वस्तु है और जहाँ हम परमार्थ के संदर्भ को लेकर योग ज्ञान, कर्म, भक्ति की मीमांसा करते हैं वहाँ भक्ति दूसरे अर्थ में ग्रहण की जाती है।

सामान्य व्यावहारिक जगत में, मनुष्य के सामान्य जीवन में भक्ति और ज्ञान को कोई अलग नहीं कर सकता। जहाँ भक्ति है वहाँ ज्ञान है, जहाँ ज्ञान है वहाँ भक्ति है। यह भक्ति शब्द का सामान्य प्रयोग है। लेकिन जहाँ हम साधना की बात करते हैं वहाँ भक्ति का तात्पर्य केवल उस विशुद्ध भक्ति से होता है जिसमें योगी के योग का या ज्ञानी के ज्ञान का और कर्मी के कर्म का पूर्ण बहिष्कार है। उसका कोई स्थान नहीं है। इसलिए भक्ति को परम स्वतंत्र माना गया है। भक्ति की परिभाषा में ही ऐसा कहा गया है। कुछ वैष्णवाचार्य कहते हैं कि भक्ति नाम प्रीति का है। भक्ति प्रीति को कहते हैं। प्रायः ऐसा कहा गया है कि ईश्वर प्राप्ति के चार साधन हैं। योग, ज्ञान, कर्म और भक्ति। इनमें भक्ति का प्रयोग ईश्वर की प्राप्ति के लिए ही किया जाता है और सभी सम्प्रदायों में भक्ति शब्द का इसी रूप में प्रयोग है। आज भी हमारे देश में भक्ति करने का तात्पर्य है ईश्वर प्राप्ति की साधना। एक वैधी भक्ति भी होती है जो शास्त्र के भय से की जाती है। नरकादि की निवृत्ति के लिए की जाती है, लेकिन उस भक्ति का कोई आदर नहीं है। केवल प्रेमा भक्ति भक्ति है, विशुद्ध प्रीति का नाम है भक्ति। वह सुख-वांछा रहित होती है, प्रीति वहाँ अपने किसी सुख की वांछा नहीं करती। वहाँ वांछा यही होती है : "कृष्णोन्द्रिय प्रीति इच्छा तार नाम प्रेम आत्मेन्द्रिय प्रीति इच्छा तार नाम काम।" सामान्य कोई साधक है उसको कुछ धन मिल जाए यह स्व-सुख वासना है। कोई चाहता है सन्तान मिल जाए, कोई चाहता है नरक से निवृत्ति हो जाए, कोई चाहता है स्वर्ग मिल जाए कोई चाहता है ब्रह्म पद मिल जाए कोई चाहता है, 'पुनरपि जननं, पुनरपि मरणं इति मे न स्यात्' यह भी स्व-सुख वांछा ही है, इसीलिए इसको सबसे बड़ा कपट धर्म माना गया है। इससे बड़ा कपट धर्म कोई नहीं है 'मोक्ष वांछा कैतव प्रधान।' क्योंकि यह अपने स्वार्थ की ही बात है, भगवान् मेरा जन्म नहीं हो मृत्यु नहीं हो बार-बार माँ के पेट में जन्म की यातना मुझे सहन न करनी पड़े, इसलिए मुझे मोक्ष की प्राप्ति हो जाए। मैं समझता हूँ जहाँ भक्ति की बात है और जो प्रौढ भक्ति है वहाँ भक्ति का अधिकारी ही भक्ति के विषय में बोलेगा, क्योंकि वही भक्ति को इष्ट और शुभ पदार्थ मानता है। पर जो भक्ति को शुभ पदार्थ मानता ही नहीं है मोक्ष को अपना शुभ पदार्थ मानता है उसका भक्ति से क्या सम्बन्ध है? योगी ज्ञानी कर्मी का भक्ति से सम्बन्ध ही नहीं है। विशुद्ध सम्बन्ध

यदि है तो केवल भक्त का ही सम्बन्ध है भक्ति से, और उसकी परिभाषा के लिए हम गीता को अगर लें, तो वहाँ भक्ति पोजिटिव कम्परेटिव और सुपरलेटिव है। 18वें अध्याय के 63वें श्लोकपर्यन्त गीता ने कम्परेटिव और पोजिटिव भक्ति का उपदेश दिया है। कृष्ण ने वहाँ 'इति ते ज्ञानमाख्यातं गुह्याद् गुह्यतरं मया' कहा है। 'इति' का अर्थ समाप्ति है। ते, तव प्रति ज्ञानं मया कथितं। आख्यातं? कीदृशं ज्ञानं आख्यातं। गुह्याद् गुह्यतरं। न तु गुह्यतमं। इति विचारणीयमस्तु। इति तु मूलश्लोके वर्तते, नास्माकं कविकल्पना इति। ते, तव प्रति मया ज्ञानम् कथितं, कीदृशं? गुह्याद् गुह्यतरं न तु गुह्यतमम्। विमृश्यैतदशेषेण यदिच्छसि तथा कुरु। तो अर्जुन एकदम निःसंज्ञ हो गये मृत्यु जैसी वेदना हुई। मूर्छा खा कर गिर पड़े। अर्जुन बार-बार कहते हैं : 'व्यामिश्रेणेव वाक्येन बुद्धिं मोहयसीव मे। तदेकं वद निश्चित्य येन श्रेयोऽहमाप्नुयाम्'। पर भगवान् ने कहा नहीं। 'एकं वद निश्चित्य' अर्जुन की प्रार्थना थी पर भगवान् ने एक निश्चित बात नहीं कही। यही कहा है, 'यथेच्छसि तथा कुरु' तुम्हें जो अच्छा लगे सो करो। भगवान् ने आज्ञा नहीं दी कि तुम ऐसा ही करो। एकमात्र ये ही करो। फिर अर्जुन की दुर्दशा जब देखी तो बोले, भूयः श्रणु, और फिर कहा—

सर्वगुह्यतमं भूयः श्रणु मे परमं वचः।

अब मैं तुम से सुपरलेटिव गीता कहता हूँ। गुह्याद् गुह्यतरं मया कथितं, इदानीं तु गुह्यतमं, सर्वगुह्यतमं श्रणु। कहते हैं, 'भूयः'। 'भूयः' का क्या अर्थ है? जैसे चिट्ठी में लिखते हैं : 'पुनश्च', कुछ कहना रह गया तो 'पुनश्च'। यों ही 'भूयः'। और फिर किस गीता को उठाया कृष्ण ने? सुपरलेटिव गीता को उठाया।

सर्वगुह्यतमं भूयः श्रणु मे परमं वचः।

सुपरलेटिव गीता केवल दो श्लोकों में है। 'मन्मना भव मद्भक्तो सत्यं ते प्रतिजाने प्रियोऽसि मे'। और फिर अंत में कह दिया—'सर्वधर्मान्परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं ब्रज'।

इति तु भक्तिः। वैशिष्ट्यं वर्तते अत्र। न तु ज्ञानस्य न तु कर्मस्य न तु योगस्य अत्र वार्ता, इति तु विवेचनम्।

प्रसंग आया : 'तदेकं वद निश्चित्य' तो 'मामेकं शरणं ब्रज' अंत में कह दिया। अतः भक्ति पदार्थ तो सुपरलेटिव है, इसके आगे कुछ नहीं है। सारे पूर्वपक्ष इसने बंद कर दिये। यह सिद्धान्त है।

भक्ति साधन भी है साध्य भी है क्योंकि जितने भक्तों को भगवत्-प्राप्ति हुई, जैसा हमें भक्तों के चरित्र या देव-चरित्र में मिलता है, उनमें से किसी ने भगवान् को नहीं माँगा : 'मम जन्मनि जन्मनि भवताद् भक्तिरहेतुकी त्वयि। न जनं न धनं न सुन्दरी कविता वा जगदीश कामये।'

इसलिए ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि केवल भक्त ही ऐसा है जिसे जब विशुद्ध भक्ति का आश्रय मिलता है, अपने प्रति भी इच्छा नहीं रहती। योग, ज्ञान, कर्म ये जो पूर्वपक्ष हैं इन सबमें पुरुषार्थ स्वसुख वांछा है। केवल भक्ति ही पदार्थ ऐसा है जिसमें स्व-सुख-वांछा नहीं होती अपितु तत्सुखे सुखित्वं होता है। 'आत्मार सुख दुःख गोपी ना करे विचार। कृष्ण सुख हेतु करे सकल व्यवहार। कृष्ण सुख हेतु मात्र कृष्णोर संग।'

भक्ति हेतु-रहिता, निर्गुणा है। हेतु-रहिता जब होती है, परमार्थ की प्राप्ति में सबसे उज्ज्वलतम वस्तु है। मैं ऐसा समझता हूँ कि सामान्य रूप से जो भक्ति शब्द का अर्थ है, उसमें ज्ञान भी है, योग भी है, कर्म भी है। भक्ति में ज्ञान नहीं होता है क्या? सब कुछ होता है। लेकिन जहाँ पर विद्वज्जन इन चार साधनों को लेकर उनके सन्दर्भ में भक्ति शब्द का प्रयोग करें, वहाँ तो भक्ति के उस वैशिष्ट्य को देखना होगा, जो औरों से भिन्न है। यह भी देखना होगा कि भक्ति को भक्तों ने क्या माना। उसे स्वसुख वांछा नहीं माना है तत्सुख वांछा, तत्सुखे सुखित्वं माना है। जहाँ न आत्म-प्रीति की इच्छा है न आत्म-सुख है न मोक्षाभिलाषा है, और न निवृत्ति है, जहाँ सम्पूर्ण समर्पण है। यही उज्ज्वल स्वरूप है भक्ति का।

प्रो. दयाकृष्ण—भारतीय परम्परा में जो प्रमाण-प्रमेय व्यापार है वह वास्तव में अज्ञान की ही अवस्था में होता है, ऐसा माना गया है। स्वयं योग-सूत्र में प्रमाण-प्रमेय व्यापार को चित्त की और वृत्तियों में एक वृत्ति कहा है और जब वृत्ति का निरोध हो जाता है तो प्रमाण-प्रमेय व्यापार हो ही नहीं सकता। ज्ञानी के लिए भी नहीं होता। यह सारा व्यापार बीच का व्यापार है; ज्ञान से पहले का व्यापार। लेकिन जो विचार की प्रक्रिया है और जिसमें हम सब लगे हैं उसके लिए प्रत्येक चीज नापने-तोलने की चीज़ होती है। यह समझने की बात है। कोई कुछ कहता है, ठीक कहता है। हम सुनते हैं। गुह्यं, गुहतरं गुह्यतमम् ऐसा गोस्वामी जी ने कहा, बहुत अच्छी बात कही। पर पिछले दो श्लोकों में गीता कुछ और ही कहती है, इसको कैसे समझें? कोई भी व्यक्ति ऐसे प्रश्न उठाने की जिम्मेदारी छोड़ नहीं सकता है। ईमानदारी के साथ वह इसके बारे में अपनी बुद्धि से, अपने अनुभव से, अपनी राय से विचार करेगा जहाँ तक कि ईमानदारी बरत सकता है। फिर उसके बाद कहेगा कि उसकी समझ में बात क्या है। हम विचार को टाल नहीं सकते।

Daya Krishna : The Lord himself has given us all these attitudes. Unfortunately, we have to accept the situation. The Lord himself has given us this mind, this intellect, this experience, these desires, everything which makes me question. This is the limitation which we face, namely, that the

Lord has given us a past and a future and the desire for the timeless.

अज्ञान की अवस्था में होते प्रमाण-प्रमेय-व्यापार के सन्दर्भ में ही हम समझना चाहते हैं कि भक्ति का पर्यावर्तक लक्षण क्या है? क्या होना चाहिए? देखिये, -यहाँ एक डैमिनेन्ट और एक सब्सिडियरी इशु मानना पड़ेगा। डैमिनेन्ट क्या है, और सब्सिडियरी क्या है? हम अगर यह मानें कि जहाँ भी स्वसुख नहीं है स्व-सुख आकांक्षा नहीं है वहाँ भक्ति है तब तो कोई भी ऐसा कर्म जो परहित के लिए किया जाता है, या पर-दुख हटाने के लिए किया जाता है या दूसरे के सुख के लिए किया जाता है वह भक्ति कहलायेगी। क्या यह ठीक है? अगर भक्ति की परिभाषा यह है कि जहाँ हम अपने सुख की आकांक्षा से प्रभावित नहीं हैं या वह प्रकृति का हेतु नहीं है, वहाँ भक्ति है, तो फिर यह विचार उपस्थित होगा कि अगर ऐसी परिभाषा मानी जाये तब स्व पर का भेद भी मानना होगा। मुझ में और कृष्ण में भेद रहेगा। एक बात और है। यों हम तीन चीज़ें पाते हैं : स्व, पर और कृष्ण। इनमें भेद क्या है? ट्रिपल डिस्टिक्शन इज़ देयर। ट्रिपल डिस्टिक्शन बिट्विन मी एंड द अदर एण्ड कृष्ण। और मी एंड अदर्स। बहुवचन में। ट्वाट डज द डिस्टिक्शन इम्प्लाई? दिस इज़ अज्ञान। जहाँ यह भेद आपके मन पर छाया रहता है। जब तक यह भेद मेरे मन में रहता है, मैं अज्ञान की अवस्था में हूँ, क्योंकि स्व और पर भेद का होना ठीक नहीं है। मेरे कहने का आशय यह है कि हमारा प्रश्न तो प्रमाण-प्रमेय-व्यापार का प्रश्न है और उसका उत्तर देने की चेष्टा भी की जायेगी, लेकिन यह भी है कि उत्तर की शृंखला अनादि है। हम उसमें जकड़े हुए हैं। जो भी हो, लक्षण ढूँढने की कोशिश तो करनी ही चाहिए।

मुकुन्द लाट—बात ऐसी है कि कोई भी शास्त्र हो, हमारे यहाँ यह प्रथा है कि जिसकी चर्चा हो रही है उसका एक अलग लक्षण किया जाता है। हो सकता है उसके बारे में अलग अलग विचार हों। पर कहीं से कुछ प्रारम्भ तो होना चाहिए कि चर्चा हम किस बात को कर रहे हैं। हो सकता है कोई यह कहे कि भक्ति का लक्षण हो ही नहीं सकता। पर अगर लक्षण हो ही नहीं सकता तो फिर हम उसकी चर्चा कैसे करेंगे?

प्रो. दयाकृष्ण—एक प्रश्न यों रखता हूँ कि यदि तत्त्वज्ञान न हो और ईश्वर के प्रति अगाध प्रेम हो तो हम उसको भक्ति कहेंगे या नहीं कहेंगे? दूसरा प्रश्न यह है कि क्या यह मानना अनिवार्य है कि भक्ति से मोक्ष होता ही है? क्योंकि यदि इसे स्वीकार किया जाये तो मोक्ष को स्वतंत्र पुरुषार्थ मानना पड़ेगा। भक्ति तो साधन रह जायेगा। तीसरा प्रश्न यह है कि ईश्वर को माना जाय या नहीं? यह मैं महत्त्व का प्रश्न उठाना चाहता हूँ। कैन आई नोट बी ए भक्त एंड एन एथीइस्ट? यानी भक्ति जो भी है उसे मानने के लिए क्या यह अनिवार्य शर्त है कि मैं ईश्वर

को भी स्वीकार करूँ? ईश्वर इन द सेंस आफ पर्सनल गौड। एक चरम सत्य है, कोई सत्य है, उसके प्रति मेरा जो इमोशनल रिलेशनशिप है, क्या वही भक्ति नहीं है?

Would we call that bhakti where an emotional relationship is cultivated towards whatever is regarded as "real", whether that "reality" is considered as personal god or not?

Rukmini: Can we call that bhakti which does not lead to the realization of God?

Another Speaker: For bhakti tattva-jñāna is necessary. But that need not be connected with the actual attainment of mukti. It can be connected directly only with bhakti..

Prof. Daya Krishna: I think there are two points. One, whether tattva-jñāna has to be necessarily added to bhakti. If I have understood the discussion correctly up to this point, there are two issues which are being raised. One, whether in the definition of bhakti, tattva-jñāna is a necessary karaṇa for the love of God. That is, if there were to be a very intense, developed, deep love of God, which has no conscious or rather self-conscious awareness of tattva-jñāna would it be called bhakti? In other words, with respect to the deep emotional relationship that I can develop towards whatever is ultimately real, have I necessarily to assume that this real must have a personal form. It may be so in some traditions, but it is not exactly necessary.

गोस्वामी जी—“भगति, भक्त, भगवंत, गुरु, चतुरनाम, वपु एक।” ऐसी मान्यता है। आपने अभी कहा कि ईश्वर को अगर हम नहीं मानते तो क्या भक्ति से हमारा कोई सम्बन्ध हो सकता है या नहीं? हम भक्त हो सकते हैं या नहीं? अवश्य

हो सकते हैं, परन्तु इस अर्थ में भक्ति एक व्यापक परिभाषा में आ जायेगी। जीव के प्रति भक्ति होती है, कर्म के प्रति भक्ति होती है, अपने कर्तव्य के प्रति भक्ति होती है, मानव की मानव के प्रति भक्ति होती है। पर यह तो एक विषयांतर हो जायेगा। अगर हम इस रूप से आगे चलेंगे तो इतना बड़ा क्षेत्र हो जायेगा कि हम किसी निर्णय पर नहीं आ सकेंगे।

अद्वैत दर्शन भक्ति से मोक्ष नहीं मानता। उनके लिये भक्ति से मोक्ष होता ही नहीं है। यह सिद्धान्त-विरुद्ध बात है। अद्वैत-दृष्टि में भक्ति से मोक्ष की प्राप्ति हो ही नहीं सकती। जितने भक्ति ग्रंथ हैं प्रायः वे भी यही कहते हैं। आपने कहा कि हमें लकीर का फकीर होकर नहीं चलना चाहिए। लेकिन फिर भी हम देखते हैं कि बिना किसी को कोट किये कोई बोलता ही नहीं है। बम्बई की एक घटना है। किसी ने कहा देखिये आप व्यक्ति को अंधानुकरण न करने दीजिये, उसे स्वतंत्रता दीजिए। उसके पास अपनी बुद्धि है, उसको अपनी बुद्धि से चलने दीजिए। हमने कहा ठीक है। आप भी जरा देखिये, गीता है, भागवत है, उपनिषद् है, वेद, वेदांत हैं, झट से प्रमाण दिया और अपनी बात का समर्थन कर दिया। पर यह अपनी बात नहीं है। दूसरे की बात है। आपके पास अपनी स्वतंत्र प्रज्ञा है, उसका प्रयोग आपने नहीं किया। अब उत्तर देखिये वे क्या देते हैं। उन्होंने झट एक कैसेट चला दिया। भगवान रजनीश का कैसेट। कैसेट में रजनीश कहते हैं, कि एक ऊंट का व्यापारी ऊंट लेकर जा रहा था। जब संध्या होने लगी तो गले का खूटा खोल दिया और खटखट करने लगा। किसी ने पूछा क्या कर रहे हो। उसने कहा झूठमूठ रस्सी को लेकर खाली खटखट करो, ऊंट समझेगा वह बंध गया। ऐसा ही हुआ, ऊंट ने समझा कि वह बंध गया। ऐसे ही आप लोग हैं। प्रमाण देकर खूटा गाड़ते हैं। कैसेट सुनकर हमने कहा हमें तो आपकी बात बड़ी प्यारी लगी थी और निश्चय किया था कि आज से हम किसी और के प्रमाण को अपने मुख से नहीं बोलेंगे। अपनी स्वतंत्र प्रज्ञा का प्रयोग करेंगे। लेकिन आप तो स्वयं मेरे सम्प्रदाय में आ गये हैं। आपने भगवान रजनीश को कोट कैसे कर दिया? यह क्या माजरा हुआ? सारा गुड़ गोबर कर दिया। अपनी कथनी पर पानी फेर दिया। लेकिन प्रायः यही देखा जाता है। अब अर्जुन को जिज्ञासा हुई तो श्री कृष्ण ने कहा—

तस्मात् शास्त्रं प्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ।

इतना ही नहीं कहा, उसको और गाढ़ा करने के लिए कहा—

यः शास्त्रविधिमुत्सृज्य वर्तते कामकारतः।

न स सिद्धिमवाप्नोति, न सुखं, न परां गतिम्॥

पराकाष्ठा कर दी। अस्तु, फिर भी हम यहाँ तक भी सहमति व्यक्त करते हैं कि यह सब ठीक है। शास्त्र को हम सब उद्धृत करते हैं। सब शास्त्रों को लेकर

चलते हैं। प्रयोग अपनी बुद्धि का करना चाहिए। हमारा एक निवेदन है कि हम अपनी बुद्धि का प्रयोग तो करें, लेकिन 'भक्ति' शब्द की शोभा ही क्या रहेगी यदि ईश्वर को माइनस कर दिया गया। भक्ति के जो लाक्षणिक ग्रंथ हैं, जैसे नारद भक्ति सूत्र, शांडिल्य भक्ति सूत्र या भागवतादि की टीकार्यें उन सबमें विस्तृत रूप से दार्शनिक दृष्टिकोण से भक्ति पर लिखा गया है। उसे केवल श्रद्धा और विश्वास का विषय नहीं माना गया है। बड़ा गूढ़तम विवेचन किया गया है। सिद्धान्त मार्तण्ड में यहाँ तक कह दिया गया है कि : 'मोक्षप्रवृत्तिषु यः भावचित्स्मन् दृश्यते, तत् सर्वं भावबिम्ब एव, न तु भावः' --मोक्ष की प्रवृत्ति में जो भावना का चिह्न देखा जा सकता है, वह भाव नहीं है, भाव की छाया मात्र है।

योगी, ज्ञानी, कर्मी यदि भक्ति की वार्ता करता है, तो सावधान। विश्वनाथचक्रवर्तीपाद अपने भक्ति रसामृत सिंधु बिंदु में लिखते हैं कि सावधान-- "भावबिम्ब एव, न तु भावः" ये भाव बिम्ब मात्र है।

मान लीजिए कि हम केवल अपनी ही प्रज्ञा का प्रयोग करें तो मेरी एक जिज्ञासा है। मान लीजिए हम भक्ति से थोड़ी देर के लिए ईश्वर को हटा देते हैं तो फिर भक्ति की क्या परिभाषा होगी? 'भज' सेवायाम् धातु से भक्ति शब्द बनता है। भक्ति शब्द का अर्थ है सेवा। इससे अधिक इसकी परिभाषा हो नहीं सकती। सेवा का जहाँ तक प्रश्न है, सेवा बिना भक्ति के नहीं हो सकती। आप वृंदावन आये हैं। वृंदावन की रूखी सूखी रोटी भी तो आपको स्वाद से स्वीकार लेनी चाहिए, माल-मसाला तो आप खाते ही रहते हैं। आप ज्ञान की उत्कृष्टतम बातों को सुनने के अधिकारी हैं और इसके महा-महा योग्यतम पात्र हैं, लेकिन यहाँ की सूखी-रूखी रोटी का भी आपको स्वाद लेना पड़ेगा। यहाँ के लोगों के दिमाग में क्या बसा हुआ है? अगर आपको यह देखने को नहीं मिलेगा तो आप यहाँ से खाली हाथ ही लौट जायेंगे। आप देखें कि भक्ति सेवा है और द्वैत बिना नहीं बनती। कभी नहीं बन सकती। हम समझते हैं कि मानव का सबसे बड़ा उद्योग-स्वरूप यदि कुछ है तो वह यही है, सेवा-भाव। इसके बिना मानवता जीवित नहीं रह सकती। सेवा है तो द्वैत भी है। वहाँ अद्वैत का कोई प्रवेश नहीं। यदि वैष्णव रीति से अद्वैत की व्याख्या की जाए तो गोपिकाओं में जितना गहरा अद्वैत है उतना गहरा अद्वैत उस महायोगी ज्ञानी ऊधव को कहीं देखने को ही नहीं मिला। इसीलिए उसने सरेंडर किया कि मैं तो अद्वैत की बात ही बात कर रहा था केवल, लेकिन यहाँ मैंने क्रिया रूप में इसके दर्शन किये। इस रूप में दर्शन किये, 'योग कहाँ रखें यहाँ रोम-रोम श्याम है'। दूसरी कोई चीज़ हो तो बतायें। केवल श्याम ही श्याम है; यही तो अद्वैत है। तुलसी से प्रश्न किया गया--यह सब क्या है, यह सब कौन है? तो तुलसी ने उत्तर दिया था : 'सियाराम मय सब जग जानी' फिर दूसरा प्रश्न किया गया कि क्या यह सब तुम्हारे इष्ट हैं यह सब तुम्हारे सियाराम हैं तो फिर तुम कौन हो?

उत्तर हो सकता था कि मैं भी सियाराम हूँ। यह अद्वैतवाद का उत्तर है। वैष्णव का उत्तर था कि मुझे छोड़कर सब इष्ट हैं। 'करहुँ प्रणाम जोरि जुग पानी'।

The difference between jñāna and bhakti is the difference between pride and humility. Jñāna is pride. Bhakti is humility. And the solid foundation of all virtues is humility. The first test of a truly great man is humility. It was pride that turned angels into devils. It is humility that makes man an angel.

केदारनाथ मिश्र-श्रीमंतः अध्यक्षवर्यः बुधजनसुहृदः श्रीदयाकृष्णवर्यः आचार्याः भक्तिनिष्ठाः हरिचरणरजोपूतचित्ताः, विदुष्यः साधवोऽन्ये सभ्याः प्राची-प्रतीची प्रचुर प्ररिचिताः ज्ञानविज्ञाननिष्ठाः। हिन्दुत्वभारधुर्यस्मर्यः नगरी विश्वाविद्यालयी या मिश्रः केदारनाथो सहृदयहृदयो, अध्यापको दर्शनानां, कर्तुं सद्भक्तिचर्चा विहितपरिकरान् चिन्तकान् भक्तिपूर्व आयातः काशिकातः प्रणमति विनतः सावरं भक्तिभक्तान्। मान्याः।

अनुवादस्यापेक्षा स्यात् किं?

तर्हि सर्वजनभोग्यया राष्ट्रगिरा आंग्लगिरा वा किंचिद् वक्तुं उत्सहेमः।

I switch over to English so that I may not have to repeat certain things. Since morning we have been discussing one problem. I think, as a student of philosophy, I have found that it has been said that the problem is whether there is any pūrvapakṣa of bhakti? Sometimes it has been said that it is jñāna, sometimes karma, and sometimes that it is lokāyata, or even that there is no pūrvapakṣa at all. I want to draw your attention to some presuppositions of what we are thinking about here. These presuppositions, I have found, are of three types. For instance, there is the presupposition about the unchanging character of the tradition. There has been a tradition of bhakti, but we forget that the concept of bhakti has undergone changes from the earliest



times and in different parts of the country. Unfortunately, we have not undertaken a history of Indian religion or a history of Indian philosophy where we delineate the development of concepts over time. When we think of the lakṣaṇa of bhakti or we say that there is this lakṣaṇa, we forget that there is more than one definition of bhakti. It is immaterial whether the definition is taken from the Bhāgavata or from Madhvācārya or it is taken from some earlier text. For example:

महात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वस्तु सादृढः सर्वतोऽधिकः।

स्नेहो भक्तिरिति प्रोक्तः, तथा मुक्तिर्न चान्यथा॥

It is not a question of whether it is quoted from this book or that book; that makes little difference. From the philosophical point of view, we must analyze the concepts.

In our tradition we presume that the Bhagvad Gītā is a commentary on the Upaniṣad, that the Bhāgavata is a commentary on the Bhagvad Gīta, and that the *Brahmasūtra* and the Upaniṣads teach the same thing as the Bhagvad Gīta. So, we follow a tradition, where there are the Upaniṣads, the *Brahmasūtra*, the Bhagvad Gīta and the Śrīmad Bhāgavata with many *prasthānas*. The Madhva *sampradāya* has six *prasthānas* and we think that bhakti was present in the earliest text, the Ṛgveda. It is in bhakti sense that we interpret the texts and quote from them. But the basic point is that it is not the words that are significant, but it is the concept that is significant. True, the words are found in the *Samhitās* and in other texts also, but what is that concept which is being conveyed by the words? Has that concept undergone a change over a period of

time in subsequent texts? The concept of bhakti that we are discussing, I presume, follows the way, which thinks that there was no bhakti in India and it is with Rāmānuja that it began and so on. But that is not the case. There is a *pūrvapakṣa* to bhakti; but within bhakti there are many *pūrvapakṣas* also. In the Vedas, or in the *Samhitās* to be precise, we find many variations of thought, and from that variety of thought we pick up only one tradition, which has come to us through the Upaniṣads. The authors of the Upaniṣads were well aware of the fact and they have reminded us of this. They have reminded us that in the Vedas there are various traditions, and there is the tradition that everything comes out of *asat*: *devānām pūrve yuge asataḥ sadajāyatah*.

The *Chāndogya* refers to this: *tad ha eke āhuḥ asadeva idam agra āsita tato vai sadajāyata*. But it also refutes it: *katham nu somya evaṁ syāt, kathamasataḥ sat jāyeteṭi. Sadeva somya idamagra āsita ekamevādvitīyam*. So, this tradition of the Upaniṣads continues, and we identify ourselves with it.

This country had the great honour of giving the world three religions without any god, the first being the Mīmāṃsakas themselves. About the Mīmāṃsakas I used to say : यजमान का घी पी पी कर मीमांसकों ने ईश्वर का खण्डन करने में जितना परिश्रम किया, जैनों और बौद्धों ने भी नहीं किया।

But we fought this development, and we have the later Mīmāṃsakas, who accommodated mokṣa, who accommodated everything else. And, we are now doing, this in our own way. We forget the fact that there was a religion without a god even in the Vedic tradition.

There was also a religion without a god outside the Vedic tradition, namely, Buddhism. And the same is true of Jainism. But it is very difficult to say that there was no concept of bhakti in these religions. I, on the other hand, contend that there is a concept of bhakti in these religions also and it was precisely against *this* concept of bhakti that the Vaiṣṇava religion emerged. This is the pūrvapakṣa, and against this pūrvapakṣa, the concept of Vaiṣṇava bhakti really takes up cudgels. The basic thing is that while the word remains the same, the concept changes. This can be appreciated only if we understand that we are living in a composite culture and that we have inherited not only the thought of the Upaniṣads, but also the thought of Buddha and Mahāvīra as well as those of the Mīmāṃsakas who said: अहिच्छन्ने ब्राह्मण्यः बहुलं सुरां पिबन्ति. If we look from this point of view, then we will find that Kṛṣṇa, in his philosophy or in his preaching is giving a new religion, that of bhakti. We think that there is only one tradition, and we identify ourselves with that tradition of bhakti where there is a god, where bhakta tries to visualize God, to live in His company. This is the line of thought with which many of us identify ourselves and neglect other aspects of it. But when we are engaged in philosophical thought, we should look at other views also.

The second point is in respect to the works, the texts that we are quoting. It was very ably pointed out by Mahārājjī that when we are talking about these matters, our view is that we should not quote from texts. Yet, we do so all the time. But I think one of the

greatest confusions arises when we quote, because sometimes we are only using their authority for our own purposes. But how do we view these texts? Is the Bhagvad Gīta a commentary on the Upaniṣads? We have forgotten altogether that the Bhagvad Gīta is a part of the Mahābhārata and if it has to be understood properly, if its philosophy has to be appreciated, it has to be understood in the light of the total Mahābhārata, just as if we want to understand the Bhāgavata, one chapter alone will not suffice. Furthermore, it has to be understood not in the light of the Brahmasūtras but in the light of the Śrīmad Bhāgavata itself. Similarly the Bhagvad Gīta has to be understood in the light of the philosophy of the Mahābhārata; the philosophy of Kṛṣṇa has nothing to do with the Brahmasūtras.

Our approach to texts begins with Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who says about Śaṅkarācārya, who himself in the earlier stage of his thought was diffident about his work as is evident from his saying, 'When there are the expositions of Kapila etc. who will care for my expositions?'

न नौमि तं व्यासं अशेषमर्थं सम्यक् न सूत्रैरपि यैर्बन्ध

विनापि तैः संग्रथिताखिलार्थं तं शंकरं नौमि सुरेश्वरं च॥

We should, therefore, be aware of the spirit of the texts, but we should also remember that every word that is written in Sanskrit is not the last word. Then there is the problem as to what is the status of the person for whom the text was written. Who is its real *adhikārī*? Frauwallner has written that the Bhagvad Gīta does not correspond to

the worth and the prestige that it has got in India. He, of course, does not mean to minimize the significance of the Bhagvad Gīta. He merely means that in the Mahābhārata there is not only the Bhagvad Gīta but many other places where you find as exalted a thought as you find in the Bhagvad Gīta. But the overemphasis on the Bhagvad Gīta has made us forget about those portions of the Mahābhārata. This has influenced later religious tradition, where there are two theories of religion. One theory of religion is that man has to have peace of mind, to have a good ideal life in this world, and this is why he has a spiritual life, a religious life and a religion. Man has invented it for himself and he tries to evolve himself in his invention. Buddha might have thought on those lines, and so also Mahāvīra and the Mīmāṃsakas. However, for the first time, Buddha seems to have institutionalized religion. Later on what happened is that we thought that religion was given by God to us. When we think that religion is given to us by God, it results in a different theory. So, my point is, that if we think about what has been said in our texts, presuming that it is a text that has been given to us by God, whether it is the Bhagvad Gīta or the Rāmāyaṇa or any other text like that, we should remember that it was not the view of the 14th or the 15th century scholars.

Says Madhavācārya :

शेषः साधुभिरेव तु सयत्नेन शब्दयितुं अर्थार्थिभिः।

वाल्मीकिः कविराजेष वितथैरर्थैः मुहुः कल्पितैः॥....

There is another presupposition in all our discussion that there is only one tradition of bhakti. These days the Vaiṣṇavas claim to be the direct carriers of the Vedic tradition of bhakti, but if we read the ācāryas, we find that it started with the Ālvārs. It was here that Vaiṣṇavism was born. Real bhakti was born in Mathura, on the banks of the river Yamuna, and Kṛṣṇa is really the father of this religion. This journey led to the south in the second stage. The second phase of bhakti is in the Ālvārs. The third phase is in the Maharashtra and the Karnatak. The fourth phase is in Gujarat, in Kathiawad with Vallabhācārya. Thus there are these different phases. With Rāmānuja bhakti began to be associated with the Vedic tradition. We find that up to Vallabhācārya, the ācāryas are not only aware, but they are careful to point out that in their philosophical position so much is from the Upaniṣads and so much is from the bhakti tradition, or the Vaiṣṇava tradition. They also utilized the Nārada, the Pāñcarātra and other systems, for their own purposes.

Therefore, I contend that the real pūrvapakṣa is the Vaidika dharma. It is the pūrvapakṣa of the bhakti dharma, even though the Vaidika dharma also has a concept of bhakti of its own. But that concept of bhakti is not from the Bhāgavata. There is a tradition in Sanskrit of trying to understand the meaning of a word from its etymology, but it serves only one purpose. That purpose is that where a certain new concept has been developed, that we want to derive that concept from a single word. And that is the beauty, I understand, of the Sanskrit language, that we

can derive a whole concept from one word. But etymology or derivation shows only this much that the author who is giving the etymology has a certain idea and that he derives that concept or idea from a certain word. So, this etymology helps us in understanding the concept and in associating it with the word. But it does not say anything about the origin of the word. The word 'bhakti', for example, can be etymologically explained in two ways, and these explain very well the difference between the Vedic concept of bhakti and the Vaiṣṇava concept of bhakti.

The first, namely, the Vedic concept of bhakti is from *bhaja vibhajate*. Understood thus we have the word 'bhakti' in the sense of 'dividing', parallel to words such as '*vibhaja*', '*vibhajati*'. A derivation in terms of '*bhajane*' gives us the concept of bhakti.

When it is a case of sacrificial religion, it is the religion epitomized in Mīmāṃsā which is before both Buddha and Kṛṣṇa who revolted against this religion in their own way. The Mīmāṃsaka position is that we have to share what we have with the gods. In the Bhagvad Gīta this is reflected in the line--

इष्टान् भोगान् हि वो देवा दास्यन्ते यज्ञभाविताः।

तैर्दत्तानप्रदायैभ्यो यो भुङ्क्ते स्तेन एव सः॥

In the Vedic *yajña*, however, what is to be offered to the gods is already determined or decided. We have no choice. And then what the god may give in return is also decided. That is, he cannot bestow completely his grace or us. He can give it in parts only. And what he can grant us, is also predetermined. We

offer him something, and he has his glory, and he shares in return his glory with us.

वयमपि विभजामः असावपि विभजते।

किन्तु तत्र देवतायाः शक्ति अत्यन्तसीमिता वर्तते।

The gods can give us only very limited things and these are only either worldly things, or perhaps also heavenly things. No emotion is involved in this bhakti. The *mantra* is to be recited by the priest. The devotee may not even know the meaning of the *mantra*. So, his heart, his emotion is not involved in it. It is the words and the form that is important, not the heart, nor the emotion that is important in this type of bhakti. Bhakti here is a means to propitiate a god with a small 'g', and from this god we want many things. So, this is the first stage of bhakti. This is the *pūrvapakṣa*'s bhakti. In bhakti, god expects from us, but he is not going to give us anything unless we propitiate him by offering whatever he demands. The story of the second bhakti culminates here in Mathura where the worship of Indra is stopped forever. So with this *Indra-yāga-bhaṅga* all this begins and Kṛṣṇa establishes a new order of bhakti. Prof. Daya Krishna has very aptly pointed out a contradiction in the Bhagvad Gīta. But it is solved if one sees that in the Mīmāṃsā, karma reigns supreme, and the gods are subservient to it.

Devatā is *aṅga* there, *yajña* is *aṅgī*. Devatā is *aṅgabhūta*. If we proceed further the Mīmāṃsaka will say '*mantramayā devatā*'. There is no god at all with a capital 'G' in Mīmāṃsā. The whole Mīmāṃsā tradition, in fact, refutes God.

It is with the Bhagvad Gīta, that the real bhakti tradition starts. Karma is replaced by a theistic god, a personal god. Karma is no longer supreme. We are told it is not the sacrifice that will take care of your future or your wellbeing. It is I (that is, Kṛṣṇa who will take care of your well being. So in the Mīmāṃsā tradition if one wants to beget a child, one must perform a sacrifice or if the crops are getting dry one performs a *kāryeṣṭi yajña*. Everything was being taken care of by sacrifice. In the Gītā tradition, on the other hand, it is Kṛṣṇa who is responsible for *yogakṣema*. So, karma is replaced by a god. Thus formal, heartless, verbal bhakti is replaced by an emotional bhakti where god does not accept anything from us nor does he expect anything from us. We need nor give any offering to him. It is not what is offered that is important, but it is the emotion with which it is offered that is important. Hence, there are no more mantras prescribed for offering gifts to the God. It is the language of the heart and emotion that is important in bhakti and not the language of the Vedas or the language of the scriptures. So, there is a total change in the concept. Now, this bhakti is from Bhāgavata:

वस्तुतस्तु भज धातोस्तु सेवार्थः। प्रेमभक्तिरिति प्रत्ययस्य चार्थः। स्नेहेन भगवत् सेवा भक्तिरित्युच्यते बुधैः।

This is from the *Garuḍa Purāṇa*. There are many such definitions. And this etymology has been drawn upon by most ācāryas. भक्तिपदस्य शक्तिः स्नेह एव।

So, I conclude my statement with the contention that there is a concept of bhakti and there is a development in this concept of

bhakti. Just as when Gaṅgā starts from the Himalayas, Yamunā is accompanying it and so we have a different Gaṅgā, more enriched perhaps. So also, in this development, the idea of bhakti has also become enriched. Of course, there is a large contribution of the Vaiṣṇavācāryas in this field, and mostly from the 10th to 15th century onwards. But I submit that each one has something specific to say. Each of these ācāryas had something, which he thought was being said by himself alone. We should try to appreciate the contribution of each ācārya.

Chairman: Thank you very much for your address. You have given a lot of historical-textual material. We must now break for tea.

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: Prof. Mishra has traced the history of bhakti from the Vedic time onwards. I think that there was a break and that the entire Vedic tradition has to be kept as the pūrvapakṣa. But I wonder if the later stages of bhakti which he traced, were so simple, as he made them out to be.

Another point is in regard to the Bhagvad Gītā. He said that it has nothing to do with the Upaniṣads; that we have to see the Bhagvad Gītā in the context of the Mahābhārata. But in the entire Bhagvad Gītā, in its different adhyāyas one finds reflections which resemble the reflections in the Upaniṣads themselves. Many, śloka are common in the *Kaṭha* Upaniṣad, and the Bhagvad Gītā. That is why it is said '*sarvopaniso gāvah*', and this traditional statement should not be taken so lightly.

Similarly, in building up the history of the bhakti cult, the bhakti, which we find in the Veda is not different from the later bhakti. Of course, later on in the *Brāhmaṇas* it is connected with sacrifice. But if we take the *Ṛgveda Samhitā* proper, mantras are addressed to different gods like Agni, Varuṇa, etc. and we find devotion pouring out of the minds of the Ṛṣis there also. While I fully agree that there was a development of bhakti, but it was not so different from what it was in the past in the Vedic times. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* is another important evidence to be looked into in this connection.

In the Advaita tradition we understand that jñāna alone is the sādhanā for mukti: '*jñānanaiva mukti*'. Earlier in the morning discussion someone had, said that Rāmānuja had treated this Advaitic position as the pūrvapakṣa. But now jñāna and karma are not kept as pūrvapakṣas. The view that jñāna alone is the means to liberation is the pūrvapakṣa and not that the concept of karma or that of jñāna is the pūrvapakṣa of bhakti. Earlier in the Advaita tradition, though Śaṅkara said that jñāna alone is the means for attainment of liberation, there was another great scholar, Maṇḍana Miśra, whom we cannot forget, and he expressed a different opinion.

According to the Advaitins up to his time once we knew the Upaniṣadic *mahāvākyas* such as '*tat tvamasi*', we attained mokṣa or liberation. But Maṇḍana differed from this view. According to him, knowledge of the *mahāvākyas* was not enough. It has to be followed by *upāsana*, *abhyāsa* and even the observance facilitates the *grahaṇa* of *vidyā*.

So, karma is not to be completely left out. This is another deviation from Śaṅkara in the Advaita tradition itself.

एक बात शुरु करूंगा। दर्शन में और परंपरागत शास्त्रों में बात का जो वर्णन है उसकी चर्चा करूंगा। मनुष्य को जब अपने होने का पता लगता है तो तीन बातें सामने आती हैं, जानने की, मानने की और करने की। कभी लगता है कि तीनों साथ मिलकर रहती हैं, पर कभी लगता है कि एक का दूसरे से कोई सम्बन्ध नहीं।

बुद्धि और विचार की प्रधानता हो तो ज्ञान कहलाता है। भाव और अनुभूति प्रधान हों तो आस्था-विश्वास। इन्द्रियाँ प्रधान हो तो कर्म। हमें देखना है कि भक्ति का स्थान क्या है? भक्ति में किसकी प्रधानता है। ज्ञान की या भाव की या कर्म की? तीनों का सम्बन्ध है तो कैसा और कितना? तीनों कितने साथ हैं, कितने अलग? भक्ति में इनके सम्बन्ध की विलक्षणता क्या है?

जहाँ तक मैं समझता हूँ भक्ति का स्थान ज्ञान और आस्था के बीच में है। इन्द्रिय से इसका ज्ञान की दृष्टि से सम्बन्ध नहीं है। पर कर्म की दृष्टि से है। सत्य का ज्ञान भक्ति नहीं है, सत्य को अनुभव में, जीवन में जीना भक्ति है। यों इसमें ज्ञान, आस्था और कर्म तीनों का सहयोग है। जीने की जो बात है उसमें आस्था प्रधान है, पर ज्ञान और क्रिया का भी स्थान है। यह भक्ति का मौलिक तत्त्व है जो वृन्दावन में मिलता है। वृन्दावन में भाव, ज्ञान और कर्म से एक विशेष रूप में आ जुड़ता है।

गीता में चार तरह के भक्त गिनाये गये हैं : जिज्ञासु, अर्थार्थी, आर्त या दुखी और ज्ञानी। इनमें क्या भेद है और वृन्दावन की भक्ति की अपनी पकड़ क्या है, यह प्रश्न होगा। पकड़ है ज्ञान के साथ रहन-सहन का मेल। इसीलिये वृन्दावन में आर्त-भाव नहीं होता, क्योंकि इसका सत्य से सम्बन्ध नहीं हो सकता। यहाँ क्रीड़ा-भाव होता है। साधना के रूप में भक्ति दास भाव की या किसी भी भाव की उपासना हो सकती है। या हम अर्थार्थी या आर्त हों तो भक्ति का कोई और प्रयोजन भी हो सकता है। लेकिन भक्ति का जो मौलिक रूप है वह ज्ञान और भाव का रहन-सहन है। तुलसीदास जी ने इसे स्वतन्त्र शक्ति कहा है। यह अंधविश्वास नहीं है, मनुष्य के अन्दर एक स्वतन्त्र प्रेरणा है। जब ज्ञान और कर्म दोनों अपना काम पूरा कर लेते हैं उसके बाद जिस प्रक्रिया का आरम्भ होता है, वह भक्ति है।

ज्ञान आस्था और कर्म तीनों का यहाँ भक्ति में विलक्षण रूप हो जाता है। ज्ञान में जो हम जानते हैं, और भक्ति में जो हम पकड़ते हैं, दोनों अलग चीजें हैं। भक्ति का ज्ञान साधारण ज्ञान नहीं है। उसमें जो हम जानते हैं वह ज्ञान का विषय नहीं है। कैसे नहीं है? क्योंकि न दुनिया जानी जा सकती है न भगवान्, भगवान्

तो माने ही जा सकते हैं। इसलिए भक्ति में आस्था का ऊँचा स्थान है। आत्मा ही ज्ञान का विषय हो सकता है। पर वह कर्म का विषय नहीं हो सकता। कुछ करना हो तो जगत की सेवा करनी चाहिए। यह भी आस्था का विषय है। आस्था एक स्वतन्त्र चीज है। स्वतन्त्र शक्ति है, ज्ञान कर्म के अधीन नहीं है। वह सरसता प्रदान करती है, उसी से भक्ति का विकास हुआ है। देखना है इसका नास्तिक दर्शन में, जैनों बौद्धों में कैसा विकास हुआ है, वहाँ भक्ति है या नहीं है, है तो कैसी? और जीवन के दूसरे मूल्यों से भक्ति का क्या सम्बन्ध है?

Prof. Pande: One question that has been raised in this seminar is whether bhakti is possible without the need for a personal god. Another question that was raised is that if bhakti is a matter of feeling, how can there be any philosophy of it, or about it. In regard to this, I would like to point out that thought in Indian philosophy has followed two courses in its development. One has been the tradition of saints, and the other the tradition of ācāryas. The ācāryas had been the interpreters, commentators, scholars, indeed, great erudite scholars. They developed the conceptual framework of thought in which bhakti or god could find a place. The other tradition has been the tradition of saints. They had nothing to do with logical argument. Nor did they worry whether they were consistute or not. Even today in contemporary India the way in which Indian philosophy has been revived is mainly and predominantly through the saint tradition and not through the ācārya tradition. If I am permitted to quote the thoughts of Ramatirtha, Raman Maharishi, Ramakrishna, Shri Aurobindo etc., it will be difficult to fit them in the way bhakti has been propounded by the great ācāryas who have talked of *navadhā* bhakti or grades of bhakti, kinds of bhakti or whether there is any qualitative difference or

quantitative difference in the different stages.

Now, I would like to argue regarding the question whether bhakti is possible without a personal god or not; Religion is possible without belief in a personal god. There may be a religion without belief in a personal god, but it cannot be called atheism. It is also theism; it is religion. But bhakti without faith, without belief in a personal god is not possible. Bhakti is something too intimate, too personal. A saint can be and in fact is a bhakta, but he is not called upon to give a ractional explanation, of the object of his devotion.

What, then, is bhakti? Two things are required. Firstly, a belief in a personal god, and secondly, a belief that god has something to do very intimately, with oneself in particular. It is not universal, it is not social. It is a personal, intimate something. If one believes in a transcendental supreme power, superior power who is infinite, love, who is *sarvajña*, *sarvaśaktimāna*, *kṛpānidhāna*, *karmanidhāna*, then alone one is entitled to be called a bhakta. It is not, thus, the duty of one who is devoted to such a god, to argue out, to work out what that god is, or what is its nature; that is the duty of the ācārya, the commentator or the philosopher.

Chairman: Would anyone like to react to this?

Prof. Mishra: Yes. I would like to react to what Prof. Shiv Kumar said about my presentation. Firstly, I would like to say that when we are thinking here we are not

praying to make others argue with us. One may disagree with what we have said. Also, we try to say what we think is the case, but we need not necessarily give an argument for it.

आग्रही यत्र निवेशति युक्ति तत्र मतिरप्यस्य।

पक्षपातरहितस्य तु युक्तिर्यत्र तत्र मतिरेति निवेशम्।

I am not saying that there is not a tradition. There is a tradition that regards that this tradition is the Vedic tradition. But there are thinkers who have been saying from times, immemorial, that there is a large variety of thought in the Indian tradition. We may choose for our own life any one of these thoughts and develop it in our own way. When I said that bhakti was born here, it did not mean that the idea was not present earlier. Then also very sublime thoughts and very ordinary thoughts went hand in hand together. In fact, we find both sorts of ideas present in the same text.

As for Bhagvad Gītā, we are of course, accustomed to read that इति श्रीमद्भगवद्गीतासु उपनिषत्सु ब्रह्मविद्यायां योगशास्त्रे । The tradition thinks सर्वोपनिषदो गावो दोग्धा गोपालनन्दनः ।

But the point is how old this tradition is. Have we ever bothered to see that if one reads the Bhagvad Gītā *parva*, one finds that it has 42 chapters, one of which only the last eighteen are called the Bhagvat Gītā. The Bhagvad Gītā, as everybody knows, is a part of the Bhīṣmaparva which ends with it, then in the following *parva*, the verses in the beginning give the number of the chapters of the Bhagvad Gītā, which does not tally with the number of the present chapters in the Bhagvad Gītā. The Mahābhārata itself says that

Arjun recited so many ślokas and one finds that he did say that many ślokas. In the statement of the great Śaṅkara: Vyāsa summarised the words of Kṛṣṇa in 700 ślokas. There are people in this country who are searching for the original Bhagvad Gītā. There may be Upaniṣadic elements in it, but non-Upaniṣadic elements are also there. Also, the bhakti in the *Saṁhitās* is totally different from the bhakti we find in the Bhagvad Gītā. Here you may, of course, disagree with me on this matter, but this is what I think.

Chairman: Thank you very much. I think it is going to be 6 O'clock, and it is time chose the session.

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## SESSION III

Prof. Daya Krishna: I would like to make a very few general remarks, which will bear on what has been discussed and said both in the second session and the first session. Firstly we may ask, how similar is similar and how different is different? This problem always arises in the context of any culture or civilization, which has a continuity of thought and practice over a long period of time. Surely there must be continuity, otherwise, we cannot call it the same civilization. Surely there must also have been differences. Otherwise, there will be no development, merely dull, plain repetition. In the morning I raised the question as to what living is. The characteristic of living is that it shows both continuity and change. However, I would also like to make a point which I think is important because in the Indian tradition, by and large, people have tried to emphasize continuity and underplay the change or novelty except in some fields of arts. That is the problem why the tradition of presenting a new thought is through the medium of a *bhāṣya* or *vārtika* or the *vṛtti*. I mean, this is the tradition. Therefore, in the Indian context where novelty is underplayed, the task of the historian is as Mukund once said to show that it is a facade to say something new, though, ostensibly claiming that it is only an interpretation. On the contrary, what happens in the west is that because novelty is valued very much, so, every new thing is claimed as novel. So, what the

historians do there is to tell us that it is not really so new and they find the seeds of it or the sources of it in the past. In the Indian context therefore we should try to find out where the difference is occurring or where the change is occurring. Indians seem to be afraid of a radical difference. Somehow we want to say that there is no real difference, that there is really only identity. But if it is so, the raising of *pūrvapakṣa* or *pratipakṣa* will not really be a debate as we will be afraid of accepting a radical division and difference.

Secondly, I had made an observation in the morning, and I would like to repeat it for your consideration. That is, our relationship to this present exercise is a living relationship. We are not exactly interested in what somebody said at some time regarding what *bhakti* was. We are interested in how we, as persons living in 1988, can make sense of this tradition in our life, in our times, in our own society, in our own history. That is how we can establish a living relationship with this tradition. But when we ask ourselves this question, I think, many of the points made in the course of the discussion seem to become irrelevant. *Bhakti* is ultimately the development of a significant, fulfilling, rich life, centered in feeling and emotion, which is sought to be made permanent. The life of emotion is a fluctuating life. An emotional mood never lasts more than a second, more than a moment. Now I want to build on make it stay, make it permanent, but it is like building on water. How, then, to build a life of emotion with a constant tone, with a constant direction? I think, *bhakti* should be seen as a

tremendous attempt of a culture to build what may be called a life of permanent and beautiful feeling.

Thirdly, when I was asking whether bhakti could be conceived of without a personal god, I was only suggesting that we start with the emotion, and not with the god. We do not know whether there is a God or not. But we do know that we have an emotional life. And if we want to know how to build meaning and significance in it and on it, we have to start with it. One needs an infinite *ālambana*, an *ālambana* with an infinite being, then why not have nature or why not anything else? Is it a relation of a finite being with something infinite? I am not myself clear about this.

Also, are we honest with ourselves in underplaying large parts of our tradition? I think, one of the very good scholars here referred to the *Brāhmaṇas*, and said that, though bhakti is in the *Samhitās* it is not so prominent in the *Brāhmaṇas*. But, then, should we forget the *Brāhmaṇas*? But how can we do that? There is the *Śabarabhāṣya* and the *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras*. People should read to realize what the Vedic tradition of sacrifice was. It did play an important part in our tradition. One can reject it but to reject it is an act of courage and honesty and conviction which, few Indians are prepared to do. Kṛṣṇa could criticize the Vedas. But can we? Do we dare do the same? And, people refer to the Upaniṣads without even knowing what they are. The Upaniṣads are a part of something else; they are not an independent work. They are selections out of *Āraṇyakas*, out of *Samhitās*. *Īśa* Upaniṣad is not a separate text; it is an

integral part of the *Yajurveda Samhitā*. Why, then, do we call it an Upaniṣad? Who made the selection? What were the criteria of the selection? Anyone who speaks of Upaniṣads as separate text independent from *Āraṇyakas*, *Brāhmaṇas* and *Samhitās* is doing an injustice. There are some Upaniṣads, which are independent, such as the *Śvetāśvatara*. In fact, the Upaniṣads continued to be written till almost the 13th century. But, if this is true, how can this be regarded as *śruti*. For, it something, is a *śruti*, or if something is regarded as *śruti*, we cannot add to it. The whole idea of what is *śruti*, what is accepted an authority, is a vexed question.

Our scholars have gone on repeating things which can be shown to be factually false. So, please don't underplay the *Brāhmaṇas*, and please don't forget that most of the *moto* Upaniṣads, are an integral part of the *Āraṇyakas*, etc. which someone has selected out of them. In this connection, I cannot resist the temptation of repeating something which some of my friends have heard me say below. I would request the scholars assembled around the table to take the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* and the *Aitareya* Upaniṣad and compare the selection which has been made out of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*. They will be shocked, or rather they should be shocked. I want to ask why during the last 2,500 or 3,000 years of history of this country, nobody has raised this question as to why a portion of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* which specifically proclaims itself to be an Upaniṣad, has not been included in the *Aitareya* Upaniṣad as a part of that Upaniṣad. I repeat: why has the person who was selecting out of the *Aitareya*

*Āraṇyaka*, that portion which he was to call the *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, not selected a portion which proclaims in a self-conscious manner that though everything is an Upaniṣad, this is a special Upaniṣad. It is called the *Vāk Upaniṣad*. It has not been included. What was the criterion of selection? Why did the person reject a portion which called itself the Upaniṣad? I wonder why has no scholar raised this question.

I can go on and on. My own feeling is that we are blind. We read the texts blindly. We do not ask questions. One of my friends here is a great scholar. Let me ask him a question. He said, the theory of *yajña* is based on the theory of *karma*. But the theory of *yajña* is completely contradictory to the theory of *karma* because there is the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtvika*. The *ṛtvika* performs the *yajña*, the *yajamāna* gets the *phala* because he gives him the *dakṣiṇā*. Now, in the theory of *karma* the person who does the action must reap the fruit of his action. You cannot do an action on my behalf. Just because I pay you to do something, will I get the fruit of your action? This is not the theory of *karma*. But the theory of *yajña* is different. The theory of *yajña* is against the theory of *karma*. There is an inherent contradiction in it. In *Mīmāṃsā* the theory of *karma* is presented as a *pūrvapakṣa*, which is rejected because the *pūrvapakṣa* raises the question as to how the *phala* can go to the *yajamāna* when it is the *ṛtvika* who does the *yajña*? And he treats this as a *pūrvapakṣa* whose opposite is the *siddhānta* for the *Mīmāṃsaka*.

We must adjourn till tomorrow.

## SESSION IV

Chairman: We have explored the *lakṣaṇa* of *bhakti* and what are its possible *pūrvapakṣas*. We have also explored the issue as to whether *bhakti* is primarily a matter of feelings and emotions, and what logical ratiocinative discussion we can have in regard to it. I think, the conclusions, if there can be any conclusions in such a discussion, were that philosophical reflection can be done with respect to anything whatsoever. So, when you are in the *bhakti* experience you are not philosophising or being philosophical about it. But otherwise we can think rationally, critically about it, both about its relationship to, and implications for, other domains.

To begin today's discussion, I will like to make two or three observations. Firstly, the problem of *lakṣaṇa* or the *pūrvapakṣa* that we raised yesterday is not so difficult to handle as it appeared to be. This is sustained by traditional evidence also. If we make a *lakṣaṇa* or a series of *lakṣaṇas*, it does not matter. A *lakṣaṇa* is merely a starting point for thought, for discussion. After all, we have to take hold of something in thought. And how to do this except by giving it some characteristic in order to be able to say that it is this and not that? If one is dissatisfied with the *lakṣaṇa*, which is given, one can make a different one. The process of thinking ultimately lies in the 'if, then'

process. We have to see if the implications follow. So, we need not, for our discussion, take hold of only one lakṣaṇa, but we may explore as possible lakṣaṇas as we can reasonably imagine.

Similarly, regarding the pūrvapakṣa. Even if there is no pūrvapakṣa in the tradition, we can create a pūrvapakṣa ourselves... This has been done in the past. In fact, those of you who have read the Mīmāṃsā text carefully, would be surprised that there is not only one pūrvapakṣa but rather there are a number of pūrvapakṣas to many positions. But supposing there were many pūrvapakṣas then there will have to be a reply to each of them. It has been pointed out that a pūrvapakṣa was generated by Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya*, but the point I am making is that for purposes of thinking, for purposes of discussion, for purposes of carrying the intellectual debate forward, it is not necessary to find it someone gave a lakṣaṇa or propounded a pūrvapakṣa, for it is the nature of the mind or the nature of the thought process that it provisionally creates a lakṣaṇa, finds defects in it and rectifies them.

Before we start the discussion on the issues already circulated and which are in continuation of our discussion yesterday, I will ask Francine to make a point because, I think, it is important and it is related to the discussion we are having.

Dr. Francine E. Krishna: I obviously know very little about this area. But some of yesterday's comments and discussion set me thinking. When we closed the discussion, some of the comments made me feel that the chairman

was himself opening out a new approach, new ways of getting into the subject, new ways of understanding it. But it is not easy for me to travel through the Indian experience as an outsider. I do try to search and find something in my own experience, in my own tradition that may help me understand this and come a little closer to understanding it here. I think about the rise of the bhakti tradition, how it comes into being and what is in the western history, which might be comparable to it. Of course, there are so many moments and turnings in the history of religion, but some of these turns may perhaps be more intelligible if they are seen as arising out of dissatisfaction with our life of feelings and emotions and a desire to change them. The cognitive changes are a consequence of there rather than the other way round as is usually thought.

For example, take the rise of Protestantism, which took place in central and northern Europe as a response to Roman Catholicism. It has been argued that Protestantism was a protest against the corruption of the Roman Church, as a reaction to the elaborate ritual, to the idea of the Pope as an intermediary between God and man, and so forth, But aside from these ostensible reasons, it is also possible that it was more austere, self-contained cold individual of the colder northern north that found the warm, spontaneous, emotional Latinism uncongenial. So that the northern response to the southern religion was not just a rational or theological difference, but a question of emotional style.

Similarly, the later bhakti or Vaiṣṇava turn might have been a response to the older and more austere Śaivite tradition. Individual feelings and emotions were brought more into play by bhakti. Historically, it was the reverse of what happened in Europe. But the point is that a religion also fulfills an emotional need; it corresponds to a style of life. Rather than emotions or an emotive style being a result of a theology, it can also be that a theology or a dogma arises from an emotional style or need.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: I think the point perhaps is that we see the structures of knowledge primarily in terms of their very logic or their search for truth or their contact with reality. If I have understood her point right, what she is suggesting is that the structures that we create may also be seen and sometimes correctly as attempts to provide a supporting box for our life of feelings. I mean they arise because we are dissatisfied with our emotional life because of a vague apprehension of certain emotional norms, and we want to seek a new kind of emotional life for which we build the cognitive structures as a support for this new kind of emotional life. That emotion or the life of feeling is the central point, which leaves us dissatisfied or makes seek for a new emotional response. But as for bhakti, it cannot be defined in any one particular way. Many definitions are possible.

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: Life of bhakti, in fact, as the search for a new life depends on the cultivation of feelings and emotions, has been divided into six stages called six *sthalas*, and at each stage bhakti is called by

a different name. I wanted to mention this because it adds to the definition of the scope of the word 'bhakti'. The first stage is known as the *bhaktasthala*, the bhakta stage. Here the name of the bhakti is *śraddhā* bhakti; later on, when experience grows, the bhakta enters the next stage known as the *māheśvara* stage, called the *māheśvara sthala*, and the bhakti at this stage is known as *niṣṭhā* bhakti. In *niṣṭhā* bhakti he concentrates and remembers god in his devotion and decides I am not going to worship any other god, other than the one I have chosen to worship. That kind of *niṣṭhā* is developed in him.

Then after this *niṣṭhā* is attained, one comes to the next stage which is known as the *prasāda sthala*. The *prasāda sthala* is one in which the bhakta begins to feel that everything that he attains in life, everything that he enjoys is given through the grace of god, the *prasāda* of god. Bhakti at this stage, is known as *avadhāna* bhakti, because here one is always vigilant. The human mind constantly builds new cognitive structures to suit our emotions. I think, this is a radically different way of looking at the cognitive history of mankind, that the cognitive history of mankind is not determined only by a search for truth or for the search for what should be called success in practical life or action because knowledge has been seen either in relation to action or in relation to what may be called truth. But there can be another dimension to it. Knowledge may be seen as related to the emotions. The emotional life is not a static thing but dynamically developing

and evolving. If cognitive structures are viewed along with the centrality of feelings and emotions and a search for new forms of feelings and emotions, then, the bhakti movement in India can be seen perhaps in a new light. This seems an interesting direction.

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: In Śaivism, Vīra Śaivism in particular, as I mentioned yesterday the śakti-pāta is mostly a starting point for a devotee to start on a spiritual pilgrimage. Here, It is when he begins to feel disgusted or less drawn towards the worldly things, worldly pleasures and he wants to seek higher pleasure or higher achievements.

The next stage is known as the *prāṇalīṅga* stage, where the devotee begins to worship something in any form whatsoever. It is worshipped through a *bhāva-padārtha*. This is a remarkable stage of bhakti called *anubhava* where there is an element of mysticism. This is attained through yogic practice and is known as *anubhava bhakti*.

Then the devotee enters into a stage known as the *śaraṇa* stage wherein there is a relationship between the god and the devotee in the form of husband and wife. *Satī-pati-bhāva* is present there and there is complete surrender to God. This particular stage is marked by *ānanda* bhakti and is the *prasāda* stage.

Then we have the last stage, which is known as the *aikya* stage. Here according to the Advaita position the entire world is seen in the form of the divine one worships. This stage of bhakti is known as *samarasa* bhakti where one leaves behind all ideas of

difference and merges with the supreme consciousness.

Thus the term 'bhakti' has certain variations of meaning, and at each stage of spiritual development one has to reinterpret it and understand bhakti in a new light.

Dr. Rukmini: I want to draw your attention to a different dimension altogether. While it is possible to look at bhakti in a new way and perhaps to get away from the parameters, which have already been laid down, in order to look at bhakti, some of us feel, at least I feel, that in a śāstra there are already laid down certain parameters under which we can look at the system. For instance, when we talk about Vedānta, what kind of a system one is talking about. In this context, we have the notion of *sādhana catuṣṭaya* and *adhikāri-bheda*. I am more concerned with the *prayojana*. The *prayojana* is already defined as *mokṣa-prāpti*. But if we stick to the dimensions of a particular system, we really do not have the freedom to think of bhakti as something other than not connected with the *prayojana* which is *mokṣa-prāpti*.

If we look at the various definitions, we find that this is what they are aiming at. Take for instance the *Devī Bhāgavata*. We have so many texts, which talk about bhakti, but if we look at it from this point of view, we find all of them telling us what we should aim at. The aim should be to forget oneself and to become *tanmaya* with whoever is the *ālambana*. It can be in the form of a personal god; it can be any kind of *ālambana*.

But what troubled me as a student when I read the Bhāgavatā Purāṇa was when Yudhiṣṭhira asks Nārada in one context: 'How is it that people like Śiśupāla, Kāmsa, Jarāsandha, who are known haters of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, all got mokṣa, and that too quite quickly?' And Nārada has no answer. His answer cannot satisfy anyone of us, I think. He says that the Lord is only concerned with the constant thought of him and not with the context in which the thought occurs.

Of course, one tries to explain this to one's own satisfaction. We have Duryodhana quarreling with Kṛṣṇa and telling him: 'It is because of you that all this happened in the Mahābhārata.' Of course, he asks Vyāsa, why he wrote or presented a picture of Kṛṣṇa which is not in keeping with his dignity. Vyāsa says that all this had already happened. So now Vyāsa may only write a new book if he wants to deify Kṛṣṇa, and, naturally, he finds a way to do it.

How much freedom do we have, then, in this exercise here? Do we really have the freedom to get away from this whole tradition and to define bhakti to our own satisfaction, because if one is already within the system, within the tradition, does one have the freedom to define bhakti in a different way? And as far as aesthetics is concerned, I think, it is the Gosvāmīs who have developed it in a preeminent manner. They have developed thinking about all the *rasas* and trick to integrate them in the idea of bhakti. So, how do we get out of the prayojana and then give a satisfactory definition, which will satisfy a

modern mind? This has been the dilemma, which has been exercising my mind.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: I think, two questions have been raised. If one is doing a textual study or a historical study, then, one is bound by the text and can only try to be as honest to it as possible. But there are many texts. There are also texts claiming to interpret another text and we have a history of such interpretations. But history raises problems, which are even more complex than the interpretation of a book or a series of books.

But, as I said earlier, when one is establishing a living relationship with a tradition, then one is free in a different sense. The problem of such a freedom is not a trouble for some. This is one reason why it did not trouble the past ācāryas. It troubles only the modern ones. I would like each one of you to be to like the old ācāryas. There is no difference between those ācāryas and you. It is only that you have forgotten your own mission. You were being told today in the morning what Caitanya Mahāprabhu did in his own times. I tell you it was a revelation. One thinks of Caitanya as a great bhakta. But to bear that this great bhakta who was immersed in bhakti was also trying to tackle the problems of war and peace between fighting kings who were Muslims and Hindus. Who would imagine that a bhakta devoting his whole life to living in emotional relationship with the Lord was simultaneously aware of the socio-political situation and concerned with it. I think we have a wrong picture of Caitanya's life. This must be rectified.

But I would go further. There is a wrong picture of the whole intellectual and spiritual tradition of this country, of ācāryas. Yesterday a distinction was made between ācāryas and saints. This is correct to some extent. Take a man like Tulasī. Everybody knows that Tulasī was also not merely a saint but also a learned person, and he was trying to do something through the Rāmāyaṇa, which was not merely an act of bhakti but something more. What I am trying to suggest is that we should become a part of this living tradition of India which has been flowing for 3,000 or 4,000 years. We have to take part in it actively. So, we should feel free. If one doesn't feel free, it is because one has not understood the tradition correctly.

The second point is that this exercise is not a textual or historical exercise. The issues that were formulated for discussion at the seminar were not historical or textual in nature, except for the first. Today what we are to discuss should open new avenues for thinking, not merely for us but for others, other cultures and civilizations which have as much right to our cultural heritage as ourselves. We talk of ego. But what is ego in the Indian tradition? Is it not ego when I identify myself only as an Indian? The shedding of ego is not easy. One will engage a rational pursuit ones when one has identified one say with universality. In other words, I am a rational animal only to the extent I become universal. I shed my ego to the extent I participate in this universal reason in the game of knowledge. In the game of knowledge when we enter into a dialogue, I do not remain Daya Krishna, you are not just Kriplani and he

is not just this particular, specific human individual. But we get out of our individual prejudices, biases and try to reach an objective universality, which can be mutually corrected and jointly explored. It is continuous with the whole of humanity, past and present, which man has built over time. Now the question we are asking today is whether there is an analogous universality of feeling. And, if there is universality of feeling, does bhakti try to take hold of this truth in the sense that it sees that feeling has both a universal element in it like reason and also because feeling grasps the real, the ultimately real in a sense which reason can never do. This is the issue, which we have to discuss.

Third, does bhakti postulate some basic emotion in all human beings towards what is ultimately real and which, because of this emotion, cannot but be conceived in personal terms? Yesterday we said there is theistic bhakti. The issue that we are posing now is whether this feeling is universal. Is it potential in all human beings, everywhere, at all times and does it grasp reality in a way which reason never does. But because reality is claimed to be grasped by this feeling, is it necessarily apprehended as a person? When reason grasps reality, it grasps it as a law, as a universal principle because it is the nature of reason to apprehended things that way. But when feeling tries to grasp the same reality, it grasps it as ālambana or as a support for itself. Ālambana may be a person or anything else.



The next question, which we will also discuss today is, I think, very important. If bhakti is primarily a cultivation of feelings, then are its forms determined by the universal *a priori* forms of feeling on the one hand and by the socio-culturally determined patterns of feelings, on the other? Those of you who are students of philosophy will know that when you talk of universal reason, then, this reason has universality transcending different cultures, different individuals and different historical epochs. Why? Because it has a certain universal form.

Similarly, are there *a priori* forms of feeling and, if so what are they? If bhakti is this universal feeling, if ultimate reality is grasped through this feeling, and if there are *a priori* forms of feeling, then there must be corresponding forms of bhakti in other civilizations, traditions and cultures. They will be different; just as reason though universal has different socio-cultural forms because of the empirical conditions in which it arises.

This is the issue for discussion. I am sure many of you will throw light on it. But the exercise, we should remember, is exploratory because as far as I know these two issues have not been framed by thinkers either in our culture, or in other civilizations and cultures, because they are primarily reason-centered and reason-oriented.

Dr. Mukund Lath: Dayaji has said that there is universality to reason. What about feeling? It is difficult to understand why Śiśupāla also achieved God though he hated him. So, hatred and *anurāga*, or love one might

say, are clear opposites. Supposing one can achieve *tattva* as ultimate reality through feeling, would it be the same *tattva* at all if we achieve it through hatred rather than love or some another feeling? In fact, various feelings can take one there. So, did Śiśupāla get the same *tattva*, which Rādhā got? This is the question that I would like to pose.

Prof. Sastry: Referring to the case of Śiśupāla, as we have seen in the Bhāgavata, the first question arises as to whether *virodha bhakti* is possible because it is generally seen that wherever there is hatred, there cannot be love.

Not only is it true of Śiśupāla, but also of Duryodhana and others, Hiranyakaśyapa, also had *virodha bhakti*. So, they also should have achieved liberation. So, what exactly is that which helped them to attain liberation? Madhvācārya in his *Gītā Bhāṣya* makes the remark that in Śiśupāla's case the hatred was a personal choice because of intense love, and hence hatred in this case is a form of love. What brought liberation to Śiśupāla was subverted love. It was therefore not hatred, which helped him to achieve the necessary concentration, but love. Such passages should be treated as *arthavāda*. So, the acceptance of *dveṣa bhakti*, that is the hatred of God as a possible means of salvation, is quite inconsistent. That is why Madhva strongly disapproves of *dveṣa bhakti*.

Mr. David Haberman: I just want to add to the notion that perhaps bhakti is concerned with a certain kind of emotion. The question of universality might be a difficult one in the situation. One often hears that bhakti is

an easy path. I think the assumption behind this is that since we are having an emotional life, it must be an easy path. But, I think the group is talking about a particular kind of emotional feeling here. May be the potential for that feeling explains the idea of its universal presence or that everyone has the universal potential to attain the emotion. But people who have had that emotional experience have had an extremely varied experience. It is done either through Kṛṣṇa or through sādhanā. I think, the question is what do we mean by the word 'emotion', that is, whether we are talking about some very particular emotional experience, a very rare, a very special kind of experience. In that sense, bhakti is not really an easy path and becomes a difficult task. People define bhakti as something, which is difficult to achieve. I think bhakti is of different kinds. I think the Upaniṣadic bhakti is very different. So is the whole question of universality unnecessary?

Chairman Daya Krishna: I think a fundamental objection has been raised to the assumption that there is perhaps a universal feeling found in all human beings at all times which can grasp the ultimate reality. Is that the presupposition of bhakti? It is being said that this is not so, that bhakti is a very rare thing. I would say that even if the tradition has held such a view, I would like to reject it for two reasons. Firstly there are no favourites of God. I want to give this as a general postulate, that there is something wrong with any theory, which puts any particular people or place or time in a privileged position with respect to the

ultimate. Therefore, every human being must have the potentiality of directly relating to whatever is ultimately real in the same way as everyone else. We must distinguish between the potentiality and the actuality. Every single human being has been created by God. If one doesn't like the word 'God', we may use some other word for whatever is ultimately real, and call it, say 'X'. Everyone in the past and everyone in the future, whether he lives in a village or in a city or in a metropolitan town or a capital, has the capacity to relate to that ultimate reality. It would be a non-bhakti or even an anti-bhakti view of the universe, which treats some people as more privileged and most people as less privileged. It is the same thing with reason. After all, everybody is not an Einstein, a Plato, or an Aristotle. But we believe that every human being, by virtue of being a human being, is capable of participating in this universal life of reason. So, we must distinguish between potentiality and actuality in bhakti. Nobody says that the path of bhakti is difficult or the path of reason is easy or vice versa. All of these are difficult.

Secondly, before I request Dr. Rukmini to speak we must be clear as to whether bhakti is a *sādhana* or a *sādhya*. If bhakti is a *sādhana* for mokṣa, then bhakti is only a *sādhana* among other *sādhanas*. If we are saying that bhakti is not a *sādhana* but a *sādhya*, then many of the things that have been said perhaps cannot be said.

This question also leads me to think that all feelings and emotions may either be positive or negative or indifferent, as the

case may be. A negative state can arise with respect to an actual person or a situation, but can it arise in respect to an ideal?

Dr. Rukmini: I would try to look a little deeper. I would repeat that it is not only said that Jarāsandha and Śiśupāla attained mokṣa but also that one can attain mokṣa quicker if one hates the Lord. But why should this be so? Perhaps it is like *sambhoga śṛṅgāra* and *viraha śṛṅgāra*. Even that comparison is not really correct. Then there is another point. If we really want to define universal bhakti we have to remove the *prayojana*. But the only way we can do this is through *sādhana* and *sādhya* which again the Bhāgvata has already laid down. Even, when one is doing some intellectual work, one can transcend oneself. So, in that sense bhakti is possible. Then bhakti can be defined in different ways and if it is through a *sādhana* and a *sādhya* it is possible to look at it differently.

Shri Shrivatsa: I want with the freedom of *līlā* to say a few things and to mix up the issues a little bit, especially regarding the question of the universality of human thought process and experience. Bhakti, like any other experience or phenomenon, can be best summarized or understood through a phrase which happened to be a part of my own religious background. When we speak of bhakti on the experiential side of it, we call it the *rahasyānubhava*. That is the way it has been referred to throughout. It is said that the knowing of *rahasyānubhava* is also *rahasya*, so that to know the *rahasyānubhava* one has to go back to *rahasyānubhava*. There is no shortcut.

But there is another possibility, and that possibility, as Prof. Daya Krishna and other scholars have suggested, is that we can reflect on *rahasyānubhava* with the means of reason and intellect. And the clue, I think, is given in the word 'darśana' itself, *darśana*, *mukti-darśana*. And if we look at the Indian philosophical process and go back a little we can see the whole process of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. Then, this two-way approach to *darśana* becomes quite interesting. In the word 'darśana' itself, is it not revealed as to how we come to apprehend reality? How do we 'know' reality? Can we 'know' the feeling or do we just feel the feeling or is there a difference between the two? The basic promise of *Ṣaṭ-sandarbha*, the well-known six-volume work on bhakti is one line: "*vedānte yat tadvidas tattvaṃ yajjñānaṃ tadadvayam*." Neither the name of God is there, nor is bhakti mentioned. It is an amalgamation of Śaṅkara and Arjuna, a terminology which betrays the whole legacy of Buddhist logic. It is not even Advaitism. It is a very interesting, careful choice of the term, 'advaita', because 'advaita' is a metaphysically loaded term. And another word is 'jñāna'. So, we are concerned with *advaita-jñāna-tattva* and with exploring the details and unknown depths of the *advaita-jñāna-tattva*. So, that process, as the Upanishad says, '*sadeva satyaṃ agrāhiṣi*'. Thus it is given to us. In the western jargon we call it 'religious consciousness'. We have to just go and dig deeper into it. But if it is given to us, then, it is, of course, given to us conditioned by a historical framework, cultural conditions and limitations of

expression. But we cannot get out of it if it is in that mould, and we have to accept it as it has come to us.

There is, however, another possibility towards which Jīva Gosvāmī points, and I think I will argue on his lines even today. He says that there is no need to accept the given and the revealed. There is no need to go to a śāstra although in the very beginning of his great work Jīva Gosvāmī says as Mukundbhai said yesterday, *anye tu śapathāpitā*, that others are under pledge. Those who are not totally devoted to Śrī Kṛṣṇa, should not even look at this text.

Prof. Daya Krishna: What exactly does this phrase mean?

Shri Shrivatsa: He says that suppose there is nothing available to us, no data, no śāstra, and we do not know even the terms, 'God' or Īśvara or Bhagavāna or Brahman, then what is one to do? What else, but śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana.

Dr. Ashok Vohra: I am happy that the controversy about means and ends of bhakti has ended, and we are now agreed that bhakti is an end in itself because if that were not so, then there would be a lot of problems. But we have been told just now that bhakti is an experience, which cannot be explained, and yet people write volume after volume explaining what bhakti is. So, what I want to know is: what kind of an emotion is bhakti?

Certainly there are two ways of understanding bhakti as of anything else. Firstly we must be conceptually clear about what bhakti is, what does it lead to, what its

purpose is. The tradition says: "Till I have the grace, I cannot be a bhakta." This means that bhakti is not something for which I should strive for which I should make an attempt, because till there is the grace of God one cannot take this path. Then, why should I strive for it? We are told, that it is something to be experienced, and that it cannot be experienced until there is the grace of God. Now, an atheist like me finds himself in a great dilemma. Moreover, the bhakta is not interested at all in what I, as a philosopher, am trying to understand about it; he is only interested in his goal. But there is a larger world around him. There are historians here who are trying to talk about the history of the bhakti movement. Then there are methodologists who talk about how bhakti should be done. Then there are philosophers like us who are trying to theorize about bhakti, who are trying to ask questions about bhakti. The questions that we ask about bhakti would essentially be questions, which are in regard to the concept.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Two issues have been raised; one by Shrivatsaji and the other by Vohra. Shrivatsaji has raised a question as to whether the knowledge about feeling is the same or on a par with the feeling itself. That is: can I know about a feeling except by feeling it? While knowledge about knowledge is on the same level, rather on a par, as talk about reason is still rational or still in the same domain, but talk about feeling or knowledge about feeling without having the feeling is nonsense. This is, I think, a fundamental question that Shrivatsaji has raised, and I think, it is an

important issue, which we must think about because there is a change in the level itself. The related question, though different, but I think still related, has been raised by Ashok Vohra. He says that there is a history of religion or a history of what may be called the tradition of bhakti. And there is, what he called the question of the methodology. Then there is the philosophical approach which tries to conceptualize it, which asks for a lakṣaṇa. What, then, is the relationship between the philosophical enquiry and bhakti? Do the two mutually influence each other in any way? I don't think this question is a generalized question about philosophy's relevance to everything else. Seekers generally think that philosophers are irrelevant and philosophers think that others are irrelevant.

Prof. Mishra: Two or three questions have been raised, and I find them interconnected. Is there a universal feeling just as there is universal concept of knowledge? I find that the basic problem in philosophy as well as in religion and especially in bhakti is that of relations. In Indian philosophy, somebody might say, the soul is the main problem or mokṣa is the main problem. But if one looks at the history of philosophy, one finds the one problem that is being faced by all the philosophers is the problem of relation. Is Brahman related to the world? The issue emerges in Advaita and in other systems also. Here we are presuming that in the case of bhakti there is a god and that bhakti consists in having one's emotions directed towards this god. We need not accept these assumptions. But, given these

assumptions, bhakti is also a sort of relationship. And this is the traditional answer to the question whether dveṣa can be a means to bhakti. Not only dveṣa, other means are also there.

स्नेहात् द्वेषात् भयात्, क्रोधात्, कामात् ...।

कामाद् गोप्यः, भयात् कंसः, द्वेषात् चेद्यादयो नृपाः।

It is not only dveṣa, as in the case of Śiśupāla. There is also *kāma* as in the Gopīs and *bhaya* as in the case of Kāmsa. Whether it be *dāsyā* or *vātsalya* or *mādhurya*, that is not important. What is important, is that there is a *relationship* to the Lord. The question, therefore, is related not only to the problem of Śiśupāla and Kāmsa, but also to the case of Gopīs and all the others. Generally we identify bhakti with *rāga*. But if it is *rāga*, it is *kāma* also. But this is what has been urged against the Vaiṣṇavas by the great thinkers that they worship gods who have fallen prey to such emotions.

क्रोधमाश्रित्य कामं दहन् शङ्करः, काममाश्रित्य कृष्णश्च धर्मं द्विषन्।

यत्र पूज्यौ स्मृतौ चिन्तकैरीश्वरैः ईशजन्मावनीतां भजे भारतम्।

नव्यधर्मव्यपेक्षं भजे भारतम्॥

The bhakti thinkers have tackled the objection in two ways. One is that, whether one accepts it or not, there is a deterministic view right from the *Ṛgveda*, the *Brāhmaṇas* and the Upaniṣads, which we agree with:

‘रुद्रिप्रहारी पुरुषः सहेत् कथं त्वदीयां विषमावस्थाम्।’

However, in the present age some are not prepared to accept it, Prof. Daya Krishna argued, that there is a god on that this god

does not view all persons as equal, that he favours some and does not favour others. This idea of discrimination on the part of God, most of us do not want to accept. But if we are propounding a philosophy that accepts this theory, then it is a different matter. Yet, will we accept what the tradition says in this regard? The tradition, of course accepts and demands acceptance. The whole bhakti movement is like that. Kṛṣṇa says for example 'क्षिपाम्यजस्रशुभाशुभानासुरीष्वेव योनिषु'. God discriminates between bhaktas and non-bhaktas, not between different kinds of bhakti-s.

It is also said very clearly in the *Kauṣītakī Brāhmaṇa*; यमधो निमीषति तमसाधु कर्म कारयति, यमुन्मीषति तं साधु कर्म कारयति. The view is reflected in the Bhagvad Gītā also: स मे प्रियतमो मतः and स मे प्रियः. Not only this, there is dveṣa also: यमधो निमीषति तमसाधु कर्म कारयति, यमुन्मीषति तं साधु कर्म कारयति. So, the difference is that where in philosophical thinking we are universalizing our feelings, our affection, the bhakta tries to minimize it, and to personalize it. Bhāī Dayānanda put it very clearly when he said:

तमारो तो हरि सर्वे रे। अमारो तो हरि एकज स्थले।

तम रीझो चाँदनी थी रे। अमो रीझिये चन्द्र थी रे।

That is, it is the *candrikā* or the moonlight that gives you *āhlāda* or joy. It is the *candra* or the moon itself, which gives joy to us. Bhakti is this process because in bhakti, emotion and love are directed towards a definite object, and therein the bhakta is trying to minimize the universal element in it. So, in that process what bhaktas have done is to see that we follow a method which suits us. Dr. Ashok Vohra raised a very pertinent

question. Am I really free to be a bhakta? The answer is, no. If one is asking whether one is really free to be a bhakta or not, this is also determined. Here Vallabhācārya says, 'नमः भगवते तस्मै कृष्णाय अद्भुतकर्मणे।' So, it is the *adbhuta-karma* of that *acintya-tattva*. This *adbhuta karma* consists in *asāadhanam sādhanīkaroti*. That which is not normally a *sādhana* of something, is turned into a *sādhana* by God. *Dveṣa* is not a *sādhana* of *moksa*, but it is tuened into one by God. *Rāga* is not a *sādhana* either, and yet it can be used in bhakti. That is why Kṛṣṇa is said to be *Kāma*, In *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, *Rajasekhara* quotes a śloka and says that the *Vaiṣṇavas* worship *Kāma* in the form of Kṛṣṇa, and he asks Kṛṣṇa to reveal himself in the form of *Kāma*:

चापं पुष्पमयं गृहाण, मयूरः केतुः समुच्छ्रीयतां

चेतो लक्ष्यभिदश्च पञ्चविशिखाः पाणौ सन्तु ते।

दग्धा कापि कलाकृतेः प्रतिकृतिः कामोसि किं गृहसे।

चिन्तां सन्त्यज नात्र शङ्करमयं सर्वे वयं वैष्णवाः॥

So, *Kāma* need have no fear of *Śiva*. *Śiva* will not destroy Kṛṣṇa. And in this sense we are all *Vaiṣṇavas*: we all rever *kāma*. This is how some people have perceived it. And, yet, it is not only *krodha*, but also *kāma* which is said to stand in the way of *sādhana*. Some say that there is a God, and that this God has determined everything, including whether he will accept us through the *mārga* of *karma* or through the *mārga* of *jñāna* or through the *mārga* of *bhakti* or through *prapatti*; it has all been pre-determined by Him. That is the traditional answer. But we cannot accept it only partly we have to accept it *in toto*. We can view it from two points: whether God has

decided that I will go to a bhakta through dāsya bhakti or through vātsalya bhakti. If bhakti is *tatsukhasukhitva*, He has to decide where and how He will relate to us. So, the mode of bhakti, whether it is dāsya or vātsalya has to be decided by God. Now when it comes to us, and to which form we should choose, then Madhva and other thinkers say that we can only decide to an extent प्रयत्नपर्यन्त जीवकृत्यमग्रे प्रभुकृत्यम्. So, if we try to decide ourselves, we will have to take into consideration our own life, the world around us, our own *maryādā* and *ādarśa*.

Chairman: I think that God has decided that a new chapter on bhakti will be written. He decided that the seminar will be held, and on this occasion the Lord has ordered that a purely new kind of thinking about bhakti will emerge.

Prof. Basu: We must try now to understand what is the geography of feeling charted by the Indian thinker. Is he trying to say that if there is a feeling, it shall be either kāma or krodha or bhaya or jugupsā etc.? That is, feeling is something like colour. We cannot just have colour. We will have either blue or yellow or green, etc. Then there are primary colours and there are combinations of colours. There are certain primary feelings and there are combinations of feelings. So, the issue is: Is feeling something like colour, which has necessary modalities? Will it be contended that through each of the modalities, we can apprehend the ultimate reality? Is it being said that I can approach whatever is ultimately real either through bhaya or through kāma or through

krodha or whatever? What will be the meaning of apprehending the ultimate reality through, say, krodha? In krodha my impulse will be to destroy it. If krodha or kāma relate to action, so does bhaya. But bhaya means running away from what I relate to. Then, shall I get Reality by running away from it? I think, Prof. Vohra did try to draw our attention to this problem. He did not do it directly. There has been a lot of analysis in the philosophy of feeling these days and if we are really trying to think about the nature of bhakti, we cannot ignore the analysis that has been done in contemporary times. We have to bring it to bear on our discussion, and we have to open our discussion to a wider horizon.

Dr. Krishna Sharma: I have heard the discussion scheduled for today. I will, in the first instance confine myself to stating my views on the issues raised for what they are worth.

One comment is that whatever tradition of bhakti was given or text cited it was directly drawn from the texts of the Chaitanya tradition and Gosvāmīs and their works. There are various definitions of bhakti by various thinkers. When we talk of bhakti in the manner that we are now talking about, we are then talking of bhakti as defined by the Vaiṣṇava ācāryas of the sixteenth century.

A number of things have been said about bhakti as feeling and how that is related to a higher goal. My contention is that these explanations once came from Caitanyites, and the Gosvāmīs, the Vrindavan Gosvāmīs who were responsible for this. That was the first time that bhakti was defined in terms of technique.

The Vrindavan Gosvāmīs did it in accordance with the *rasa-siddhānta*. The Sanskrit scholars here would bear with me that *rasa-siddhānta* is as old as the *Nāṭya-śāstra*. For long, *bhakti* was not accepted as a *rasa* by the *rasa-siddhāntīs*. It was only at a much later stage that it was accepted as a *rasa*. But the *rasa* theory is based on the assumption that certain feelings are universal. Yet in earlier thought *bhakti* was never accepted as a *rasa*.

Finally I would refer to what has been discussed in the last half an hour. My contention is that the Vaiṣṇava *bhaktas* are trying to counter the challenge of Śaṅkara in various ways at a philosophical level. The Vaiṣṇavas were first and foremost worshippers of Viṣṇu and of *avatāras* or incarnations of Viṣṇu. Now if Advaita Vedānta or Śaṅkara were to be taken literally and accepted totally, then there would be no scope for the worship of an *avatāra*. The concept of a personal deity would not have been there. Although Śaṅkara did not say it openly, he had to make compromises. He only said, your Viṣṇu is also *ātmā*, your Rāma is also *ātmā*. But it is obvious that this did not help matters. The path of the Vaiṣṇava tradition of the worship of personal deity was bound to be affected adversely in some way or other. The Vaiṣṇavas prefer individuality while the Advaita Vedānta prefers universality. In Advaita there is a tendency to natural unity. And, hence it preached a different kind of *bhakti*. Ācārya (Vallabha) said that Śuddha Advaita cannot accommodate the concept of *māyā*. He speaks of the *maryādā mārga* and the *puṣṭi mārga*, saying that the Ultimate is found in the *maryādā mārga*, and that of course is Kṛṣṇa.

But, there is not only Kṛṣṇa *bhakti*, there is also Rāma-*bhakti*. There can, in fact, be many kinds of *bhakti*. *Bhakti* does not presuppose any doctrine, any theology. The confusion arises because we have accepted this in our discussion. As far as I have studied, I do not find any definition of *bhakti* in the Bhāgavata or in the Bhagvad Gītā.

Further, people often say that Śaṅkara also shows elements of *bhakti*, that he is also a *bhakta*. But for him, basically *bhakti* is *jñāna-niṣṭha*. There is no need to seek or search for *sūtras* in the *śāstra* that speak of a personal deity to prove this. A *bhakta* is a *jñānī* among other things as Kṛṣṇa has said in the Bhagvad Gītā. It is perhaps a matter of emphasis. But we should remember that Caitanya was against Advaita and against any talk of *jñāna*. He said that he only wanted Kṛṣṇa and that Kṛṣṇa was all.

When the Vaiṣṇavas of Bengal say that their religion can be summed up in one word, 'bhakti', it is the first time that *bhakti* is seen as a religion. Before that there was, of course, *deva-bhakti* and other such *bhakti-s*. But the end result of the Caitanya movement was that *bhakti* got identified with Kṛṣṇa *bhakti*. The first Indian to propound this theory was R.G. Bhandarkar. He was a contemporary of Swami Vivekānanda. It was said that there was some influence of Christianity on Kṛṣṇa *bhakti*. Bhandarkar tried to answer this by saying that *bhakti* was more Asian than western. But he did not realize that it was not real *bhakti*, that *bhakti* is not Kṛṣṇa *bhakti*. I, for example, could not find any reference to the three *mārgas*, the *jñāna*



mārga, the bhakti mārga and the karma mārga. So I looked it up in Monier Williams' Dictionary. And, he did seem to corroborate what I thought. In fact, to my surprise, I found that he refers to all the occurrences of bhakti. But no Indian scholar ever questioned the writings of the western orientalist in the nineteenth century or their identification of bhakti with Kṛṣṇa bhakti or their identification of bhakti as a religion by the Vaiṣṇavas of Bengal. Bhandarkar, in his works, did not touch on this.

Prof. R.C. Dwivedi: I would like to add a few points to the ones that have been made.

The point that in the early history of the *Alaṅkāra śāstra*, bhakti is not accepted as a rasa is quite acceptable. In the first work which deals with rasa, that is, Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra*, there is mention of eight *sthāyī* bhāvas and eight rasas. It is said that these eight rasas are evoked through drama or *nāṭya*. Later, the *śānta* rasa was added. The first writer who spoke of *śānta* rasa was Udbhaṭa, who also identified *nirveda* as its *sthāyī* bhāva. It was only after Ānandavardhana, and later in Abhiavagupta, that *śānta* rasa came to be established as one of the rasas not only in drama, but also in *kāvya* and *mahākāvya*. Bharata did not think of it in poetry. It had to wait until a great scholar like Ānandavardhana came and established it.

Similarly, the *sthāyī*-bhāva of bhakti rasa had to wait until the Gosvāmīs. In the field of religion. Śaivism had a bhakti cult; Vaiṣṇavism had a bhakti cult. There is a long history of the development of the bhakti tradition. But bhakti was not earlier

established as a rasa because nobody attempted to think on those lines until the Gosvāmīs and others arrived on the scene. So, earlier there was a bhakti movement, a bhakti sampradāya, but one had not thought of seeing bhakti as a rasa.

Now there are two ways of looking at bhakti. One is: it can be looked upon as *devādi-viṣayaka-rati* and *devādi-viṣayaka-rati* is accepted as a bhāva in the *Alaṅkāra-śāstra*. Mammata, for instance, says: "*ratirdevādiviṣayā tathāñjitaḥ bhāvaḥ vyabhicāri*", and thus he defines bhakti as a bhāva. *Rati* itself is one of the established *sthāyī* bhāvas. But when it comes to be associated with *deva*, *pitṛ*, *mātr*, etc., it becomes a *vyabhcārī* bhāva and is not the *sthāyī*-bhāva forming the basis of *śṅgāra* rasa. It remains just a bhāva.

Another suggestion was that bhakti be included under *śānta* rasa. That was another way of thinking about bhakti in the *Alaṅkāra-śāstra*, because bhakti involves *vairāgya* and other such attitudes, which are also connected with the *śānta* rasa.

But instead of accommodating it either under bhāva or under *śānta* rasa, can we not see it as a universal feeling?

However, Śaṅkara's Advaita was something which captured the minds of philosophers right from very early times. When the western scholars took to the study of Sanskrit and Indian philosophy, for instance, Deussen and others, they came in touch with Advaita philosophy. Perhaps you have seen Thibaut's Introduction to the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja. He

suggests that a theistic approach to the study of the *Vedānta Sūtras* is a much more congenial approach than that of Advaita. Śankara was also a bhakta if we accept the fact that the *stotra* works, ascribed to him, are really his. *Viveka-cūdāmaṇi*, for example, seems certainly to be one of his works. Therefore, he was also a bhakta. However, at the philosophical level he is not thinking of bhakti and the life of feeling. But at the *vyāvahārika* level, he too accepted bhakti, a personal God and upāsana and such traditional modes of the religious life.

Dr. Ashok Vohra: Daya Krishnaji has raised a very important philosophical issue, and I shall try to concentrate on that particular point. The issue is, whether there can be any *a priori* forms of feeling just as there are *a priori* forms of knowledge. Perhaps he has raised this question in order to raise the further issue of the universality of feelings so that if the answer is in the affirmative then the feeling or bhakti cannot be restricted only to a particular kind of culture or a particular kind of nationality, but it will be seen as universal.

But even if we do not admit any *a priori* in the strict sense, universality can perhaps be achieved in other ways. May I remind you of the sorts of difficulties, which Kant had to face in order to make the universal categories of place and time the universal forms of sensibility, and the other well-known categories as the universal forms of understanding? There were already in western philosophy discussions about the nature of space and time, and there were so many

differet views, each opposing and contradicting the other. Perhaps, every view was itself self-contradictory. Such was also the case with questions about substances, spatial substances and so on. To remove all these difference, Kant had to postulate some universal form of understanding; which he elaborated in his famous doctrine of the categories. But so far as I know, there has been no such discussion with respect to feeling. It does not matter, of course, whether there has been or there has not been such a discussion, as we ourselves can make a beginning as Daya Krishna has just suggested. I have, however, an objection to the word '*a priori*'. We can use the word 'universal' instead of '*a priori*'. Of course, if one identifies the forms, the *a priori* forms, with universals, then, that is a different matter. In this context, I shall request you to consider this point that just as we speak of the forms of our understanding or forms of reason, we can also speak of the forms of reality or the forms of being. Reality expresses itself in different forms, and that is why they are reducible to different categories or characterisable in terms of them. Otherwise could we not perhaps speak of different categories in the way in which the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika thinkers have done.

Prof. Basu: It is from this point of view that the question in respect of bhakti may be raised, a question which Mukundji has also raised. That is, what are the factors that determine the relationship between the bhakta and the object of his or her love? Are these determining factors *a priori* or not? This question has actually been answered by the

commentator Mukunda Dāsa, while commenting on *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu*. He categorically said that it is because of our disposition (*svābhāviki, svabhāvajā*). 'Svābhāviki' refers to temperamental disposition. Every person has his or her own disposition. So, according to one's disposition one may approach the Lord through any one of the relations, which are said to be of five kinds.

Dr. Pande: Only five?

Prof. Basu: Yes, only five, just as we do when we are classifying, for example, the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *padārthas*, or the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika doctrine of qualities, there is always a specific, definite number. So also in this case. But we need not assume any *a priori* character for them. We may, of course, admit universals embedded in those different kinds of substances or embedded in these different kinds of qualities. So also, perhaps, the Bhakti-śāstra has emphasized these five kinds. These are the five varieties of bhakti. Taking anyone of them we can approach the Lord according to our temperament. Similarly, we have śānta rasa. Philosophers have never discarded the śānta rasa. But if this rasa is properly analyzed, then, it will be nothing other than what the Gītā speaks of as *brāhmī-sthiti* or what we speak of as *nirvikalpaka-samādhi*.

Yes, an objection may be raised. We have an idea that nirvikalpaka is the highest stage, that beyond it there is nothing. That is the ordinary view, I think. But there could also be a theory, or if there is no theory, we may make one ourselves, that there are stages beyond it also. In fact, Shri Aurobindo in his

book, *Essays on the Gīta*, spoke of Brahman, as both *kṣara* and *akṣara*, and said that beyond them there is the *puruṣottama*. How to reach this Puruṣottama, which is neither *akṣara* nor *kṣara*, but which transcends the *akṣara* itself? Bhakti-śāstra really attempts to go beyond śānta rasa or beyond *akṣara* Brahman and seeks to adore Puruṣottama in any of the five 'forms' or ways.

Now the interesting question is this: why only these five ways, and not any other way? That question may be raised, and I think, I can name four of the ways immediately. One is *prīti*. Within *prīti* there is *dāsyā*, among others. The second is *sakhya* and the third *vātsalya*. The final one is *mādhurya*. These are the four ways, apart from the śānta, which might be called the fifth way.

This whole path lies beyond the realm of the *triguṇa*. Gītā in the fourteenth chapter emphasizes this; as also do the Bhakti-śāstras, specially the *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu*, and also the *Nārada-bhakti-sūtras*. In this way, bhakti can be viewed both from the empirical point of view and from the transcendental point of view. When the Vaiṣṇavas or the authors of the Bhakti-śāstra speak of different kinds of bhakti-rasas, they speak from the transcendental and not the empirical point of view. But the interesting point is this: the terms or the terminology in which they describe them are derived from our social relationships. The question was raised as to whether it is in looking at bhakti as *vaiyaktika* relation that we find the socio-cultural level. What is happening is that the terms are taken from the socio-cultural level

while what it is describing is transcendental bhakti. But, the question can be raised: why confine bhakti to these four kinds only? I cannot give an answer. Perhaps, there are only these four kinds of relationship that we can have with the ultimate reality.

Yes, any question you want to ask.

Dr. Rukmini: You earlier named five, but now limit yourself to four only. What makes you do so?

Prof. Basu: Five? Yes I was for the time being equating śānta with the nirvikalpaka stage.

Dr. Rukmini: Do you want to say that the other four ways of bhakti are in the triṅṅa stage?

Prof. Basu: No, no, they are not in the triṅṅa stage.

Dr. Rukmini: Are they not also universal?

Prof. Basu: They are universal in the sense that any person having that temperament, or having that disposition can approach the highest, ultimate reality in either of these four ways. For example, in Roman Catholicism you also see that there is love for the mother, the son Jesus, and many others. I mean, it is universal in the sense that we can approach Him, we can love Him in any of these four ways.

Dr. Pande: But what will happen to the four ways in the ultimate stage? Will they remain different or become the same?

Prof. Basu: What will happen in the ultimate stage cannot be described. *Anirvacanīya svarūpam*. That has been said. But so long as we are philosophizing, our duty is to describe as far as we can. That is what the Bhakti-śāstras are actually attempting. Through the different stages of sādhanā they have also described a sādhanā mārga common to the four ways. We cannot have any quarrels with these, because they are more or less common with all other systems: vairāgya, non-attachment, withdrawal and so on.

After going through various stages, we can have that quiet state of mind where we attain the śānta rasa or the nirvikalpaka. That has been declared as the Ultimate according to some. But others say we should even try to pierce through that and try to reach Puruṣottama, who is beyond.

Dr. Rukmini: When you speak of nirvikalpaka, would you identify it with nirṅṅa, because it is beyond the three ṅṅas? My question is: why in the Bhakti-śāstra is there reference to this but not to nirṅṅa? In the Bhāgvata, however, there is actually mention of nirṅṅa bhakti.

Prof. Basu: Yes, a definite reference is there.

Dr. Rukmini: In the later śāstras is there any definite reference to it? This is my question.

Prof. Basu: A very interesting question. Whether there is a definite reference or not, I cannot say.

Dr. Rukmini: Why is the term avoided?

Prof. Basu: It is simply that there is no 'nirguṇa' there. Bhakti is above the guṇas, which happen to be of three kinds.

Dr. Rukmini: I need your assistance in this. Why is this not called 'nirguṇa', a more direct way of describing it? Why nirvikalpaka? Then you say that beyond the nirvikalpaka is Puruṣottama. Vallabhācārya also refers to the Puruṣottama. He says that the end of the puṣṭi-mārga is Puruṣottama. In the philosophy of the Caitanya school, one inevitably ends up in such a position because nobody is able to avoid the identification of brahma with Kṛṣṇa. When one attains brahma, all is Kṛṣṇa. So, everyone is really Kṛṣṇa, everything below Kṛṣṇa is māyā.

Chairman: Thank you.

Dr. Rukmini: I think the previous speaker was trying to search for some universal form arising out of the basic question: what is it that makes bhakti *nīstraiguṇya*? Or, perhaps, we can say, when is it *nīrahaṅkāra*? However, in every tradition it is necessary to look beyond the written text. Perhaps there is in bhakti a little tradition and a great tradition as there is, for example, in the performing arts. We have totally ignored the practicing bhaktas.

But before coming to that, I would also like to say, that from what I have understood of Vallabha's maryādā and puṣṭi, there is a distinction between the paths but not the end that they pursue. If one follows the path as 'given', *vidhi*, it is called 'maryādā'. But if one achieves the grace of God, and need not follow the given path, that is puṣṭi. But the

end is the same: the same *vaikuṇṭha* where you become a Gopī.

But it is not enough if we look only at the written text. After all, how does the text evolve? The text also evolves by anubhava, as our friend Shrivatsaji said. That is one aspect. Then there are those who are capable of interpreting the anubhava. As far as the bhakti mārgas are concerned, Monier Williams or anybody else who wrote in the nineteenth century, was not aware of the profusion of the bhakti texts which are available in the regional languages. If some western scholars studied texts, they studied only those, which were in Sanskrit. But there is a rich tradition of bhakti literature in the regional languages. What is the common factor between them? Whether it is Mīrā in Rajasthan, or Tukārāma in Maharashtra, or the Āḷvars or the Nayanmārs in the south, everywhere what is it that we find? We find a seeking for the complete effacement of the self or the ego. Now, if one calls that 'rising above the *triguṇāvasthā*', then, perhaps, it is possible to put it down as a qualifying lakṣaṇa of bhakti. We may also say that there is, a *viśiṣṭa* jñāna involved in it. Perhaps, it is possible to say so. Then there is the question of *vikalpa* and *nirvikalpa*. I would agree that there is a stage beyond *nirvikalpa samādhi*. Vācaspati and Vijñāna Bhikṣu refer to a stage which is beyond and they call this higher stage '*nirbīja*'; *nirvikalpa samādhi* is regarded as lower than this as the possibility of return is still their.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: May I say that in the afternoon session we will continue

this discussion. It is now going to be 1 O'clock. I would like Dr. Rukmini to reply to the comments, which have been made. After some observations I will close the session.

Dr. Krishna Sharma: It was said that bhakti cannot be taken as a rasa. I did not raise the question why it should not be taken as a rasa. I only said that it was not accepted as a rasa.

Secondly, I think, when we discuss we should be able to get to some kind of a point of clarity. Clarity gets diffused in a discussion; perhaps we cannot do better. My reference to rasa was only for one purpose. I said that the Vaiṣṇavas first carried out the exercise of evolving a Vaiṣṇava theology with the help of Vedānta and in the language of the Vedānta from Rāmānuja onwards. This had not happened before Rāmānuja. Earlier, Vaiṣṇavas were working with a Vaiṣṇava theology in the language of the Vedas. The process ends with Vallabhācārya. Later, one finds the Vrindavan Gosvāmīs who tried to use the rasa-siddhānta to evolve a Vaiṣṇava theology, and they evolved it in such a manner that this Vaiṣṇava theology was identified and became almost synonymous with bhakti so much so that whenever any thing is being said in specific terms about bhakti, it is generally in the sense in which it was said by the Vrindavan Gosvāmīs. My contention is that bhakti itself is general or universal. The common man knows what is meant by bhakti. He will see bhakti in a devout Christian. He will see bhakti in a devout Muslim: It is only amongst the academia that the thing has assumed a certain definition with regard to certain conceptual

frameworks. But there was always bhakti. Bhakti is as old as religion itself. To say that there are bhakti texts means that we have in our minds a definite idea of bhakti. Generally bhakti is identified with Vaiṣṇavism, also sometimes with Śaivism. But even in the case of Vaiṣṇavism the identification was generally more with Kṛṣṇa than with Rāma. A reference was made to Rāmānuja or rather to Thibaut's remarks on Rāmānuja in his Introduction to the *Śrībhāṣya*. Why does Thibaut make the remarks? Because he says it is theism. It is a western Judeo-Christian approach to Hinduism. So, that is how this whole thing evolved. According to them what Śaṅkara and others say is philosophy and what Rāmānuja and others say is religion.

Dr. Pande: Was there any Christian influence on Rāmānuja also?

Dr. Krishna Sharma: No, I do not think so. What I am saying is just the opposite. You will find that whenever there has been a challenge to the Hindu tradition, it is the nirguṇa tradition, the Advaita tradition which has borne the most severe assault and yet survived. For us, theism and atheism do not have the same connotation as the two terms have in the western tradition. What they mean by theism and what they mean by atheism concerns a belief in a personal god, the Biblical concept of God, and for the western tradition there is a division between religion and philosophy which is a seventeenth century phenomenon. They see the rise of philosophy as an assault on religion. So, the western division of theism and atheism is different. Our theism and atheism should be equated with

what we call *āstika* and *nāstika*. The distinction is not exactly defined. But we take *theism* as a belief in a personal god. However, that is a western definition of theism. What we need is our own definition of theism and also of monotheism. But for us philosophy and religion have always been so interlinked that we have to have our own definition of monotheism and theism and not go by the definitions which themselves were evolved after the rise of modern European philosophy. This did not happen in the time of Aquinas, it did not happen in the time of St. Augustine. It happened after Descartes and the rise of reason as the means of determining what is real.

Dr. Mukund Lath: We have not gone into the tradition at all.

Dr. Krishna Sharma: Mukundji, you have accepted a certain definition of bhakti, and that has determined your entire thinking. *Bhakti paramparā kā dārśanika pakṣa* is not that the title of our seminar and does not all that I am saying relevant to it?

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: I think, we should be thankful to Dr. Krishna Sharma for having highlighted the fact that much of our thinking about bhakti, as about everything else, is taken from the formulations given by western scholars in their study of Indian history, religion, culture, philosophy etc. I think that is a fact. I had tried marginally to point this out, but she says that in our own formulations we ourselves have been influenced by the way they have looked at our tradition. Or, in other words, the formulation of the issues itself has been done in terms of

the western concepts. This is an important point and we should take note of it. I will make only two comments both for her consideration and for a consideration of the general, larger epistemological issue. When an incorrect understanding or a biased understanding is accepted by a large section of intellectuals and lay thinkers alike, it begins to determine what may be called our perceptions of reality. It becomes a fact, and thus part of history. This is one aspect. In all the social sciences it is so. For example, there might have been no class in actual reality. But Marx talked of class, and class comes into being. There are two aspects of the matter: one, a phenomenon might have existed and not been named, or not been highlighted. And a thinker comes along and classifies it in a new way and a reality then begins to be perceived. Another is that a culture sees another culture in a particular way, and then it comes to be accepted. After all, our view of the west or the western view of us or our view of China or our view of the past, all these determine people's perception of the same to some extent.

Secondly, I would like to say that bhakti must have had some *pratipakṣa*. However universal the content of bhakti may be and it may be that bhakti was not opposed to *jñāna* and *karma*, but what was it opposed to? After all, there must have been something like non-bhakti. You cannot have in any culture or tradition a form, which is not opposed, which does not exclude. Bhakti is not like *brahma*. So, what does it exclude? Yesterday I raised the question as to what is the *pratipakṣa* of bhakti, what is the opposite, what is its

*vyāvartaka* lakṣaṇa? Forget what the westerners have written and even what the Indians have written. Let us try to give our own lakṣaṇa. This is the challenge.

The other point I would like to make before closing is this: what are the universal forms of relatedness in terms of feeling to its object? Let us reformulate it. I mean, not only what may be called the forms of feeling, but also the forms of the relation of feeling to its object. Does the object or the type of object make a radical difference to the forms of relatedness of feeling to it? Also, it seems that bhakti tends to delimit radically the object to which the feelings are to be related?

Now the forms of this relatedness of feelings to diverse types of objects, excludes certain types of objects because of their very nature or the way they are constituted. For example, if, supposing, one takes the concept of *Puruṣottama* and one begins to have a sustained, deep, cultivated relationship to that ultimate reality in one's own personality. How would it spill over? How will it affect the forms of relatedness in terms of feeling to other objects? Because as an embodied being, I will have to continue to engage in *vyavahāra* in the world. So, unless that relatedness percolates into other forms of relatedness or influences them to some extent, it will make no difference in the empirical life of a human being. What, then, is the relation between the form of relatedness which one has in relation to one object to those which one has to other objects?

These can be some of the issues that we may discuss.

Now we must close and have a lunch break. We meet again at 3 pm. (After the Lunch-Break)

□



## SESSION V

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: There was an important point made in the morning session that the very manner of our formulation of the issues is resulting in a misunderstanding of the tradition of bhakti in this country. Now, even if I grant that it results in a misunderstanding, I will suggest that the characterization of the Indian tradition is not an easy task because the moment we try to categorize it and understand it and classify it, this activity itself creates divisions, classifications, distortions and emphases, which the tradition itself might not have had. When something becomes an object of study, it undergoes a transformation. Whenever some knowledge assumes the form of a śāstra, the realm of which it is a śāstra undergoes a transformation, and transformation is primarily in the interest of knowledge and understanding. But the transformation is also influenced by an interest in the transformation of life.

दोनों पक्षों को ध्यान में रखना चाहिए कि जब हम किसी शास्त्र की रचना करते हैं तो यही नहीं होता कि शास्त्र की रचना पहले होती है। साथ ही पहले तो जिस विषय के बारे में शास्त्र की रचना होती है वह विषय एक नया रूप लेता है, वैसा ही नहीं रहता जैसा कि वह प्रकृति में है। दूसरे, यह जो ट्रांसफरमेशन है, इस बात से निर्धारित होता है कि अब दृष्टि ज्ञान की हो जाती है, हम समझना चाहते हैं। तीसरे यह कि जीवन में कुछ परिवर्तन लाना चाहते हैं।

So, it is in the interest of what may be called transformation of life both in its active and emotive aspects. This aspect is

usually underplayed because it is usually hidden under the surface. It is what the thinker does not want to bring into the open. Hence, when we are trying, now in the year 1988, to understand our tradition, we will necessarily have to transform that tradition in the interest of cognition, or the interest of understanding on the one hand and also in the interest of the transformation of life, both in its active and emotive aspects.

हम भक्ति पर चिन्तन कर रहे हैं। इस विषय में एक प्रश्न यह है कि भारत की जो परम्पराएँ हैं, उन्हें समझें। यह एक पक्ष है, दूसरा पक्ष उतना ही इम्पोर्टेंट है कि जो हमारी परम्परा की धारा है उसको हम किसी दिशा में ले जाना चाहते हैं। उससे अपने जीवन में किस प्रकार परिवर्तन करना चाहते हैं, अपने कर्म को, अपनी भावनाओं को, अपने विचारों को कैसे बदलना चाहते हैं?

Those people who were not here yesterday and have come only today must understand that this seminar or this dialogue is a part of a series of dialogues where we are attempting to do something totally different. We want not only to understand what someone else has said or what the tradition has said, we are trying to understand the intellectual process behind what was said.

इन्टरस्टिंग बात यह है कि रूप गोस्वामी ने या जीव गोस्वामी ने जो लिखा है या चैतन्य महाप्रभु ने जो कुछ किया है, उनके बाद भी बहुत सारे लोगों ने, कई आचार्यों ने कुछ कहा और किया है। वे लोग भी हमारी तरह देश की सामाजिक, आर्थिक, राजनीतिक वैचारिक परिस्थिति में स्थित थे।

In fact, a statement has been made in the book and in the presentation of Dr. Krishna Sharma that the non-Advaitic ācāryas were not exactly against Advaita, but that they wanted to adapt Advaita to the Vaiṣṇava tradition. But how can one make the Advaita thought of Śaṅkara compatible with the Vaiṣṇava tradition?

Mr. Rajamani: You referred to the statement of Dr. Krishna Sharma that all ācāryas, Rāmānuja and others, have tried to meet the demand for a change in the Advaita system. I must record my protest. It is not such a simple thing. The major opposition of the Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda is to the *jagat-mithyātva* of Śaṅkara. Basically Śaṅkara started with *adhyāsa*, and the refutation of *adhyāsa* was the first priority of all the theistic schools. Therefore, the first task of Rāmānujācārya was to refute *adhyāsa* before establishing the *guṇas* as *tattvas*. Only, after this refutation did he start the interpretation of the *Vedānta-sūtras* according to his doctrines. To say that Advaita was adopted to suit the needs of these people is a simplification and it shows the ignorance of the facts on the part of the scholar who has said this.

Prof. Daya Krishna: Agreed.

Dr. Lath: Will someone else like to say anything on this or any other related matter? I would like to carry forward the thought put forward by Prof. Basu in the morning about feelings, and I would like to suggest an alternative formulation to the one he has made. He has said that there are four basic universal feelings. On the basis of these four feelings, we can understand or try to comprehend the whole *vyāpāra* of feeling, and one might ask how these feelings are directed towards God. Here also I would like to say that if they are directed towards God, then there are two stages in this movement of feeling itself. There is the first stage when it is a *laukika* or natural kind of a feeling,

even though it is turned to God. But at a later stage, it becomes an *alaukika* kind of feeling, and it becomes *alaukika* or transcendental due to some process. I am not interested in that part of it. But I would like to make an alternative formulation regarding feeling itself. I think, there is a flaw in the very manner of categorizing feeling, which Prof. Basu has adopted. The flaw in my opinion is that he takes particular kinds of objects as the defining paradigms of feelings. For example, how one is related to one's father or to one's son and so on. The feeling here is categorized on the basis of certain objects of feelings. Now in the tradition itself there is another way of categorization of feeling, that is, where the feeling is characterized in the way that it flows and not on the basis of the object of feeling.

Most of us here who have any knowledge of the *Alaṅkāra-sāstra*, are aware of the classification of feelings in terms of *bhāvas* or *sthāyī bhāvas*. From these *bhāvas* we derive the *rasa* theory. The *bhāvas* are transformed in certain ways according to Bharata's *rasa-sūtra*, into *rasas*. The connection between a *bhāva* and a *laukika* situation is quite obvious. To anyone who has read the *Nāṭya-sāstra* or seen the descriptions in the text, the connections are very obvious.

But there is another theory: the *guṇa* theory of characterizing emotions. What the *guṇa* theory does is to classify the nine *rasas* into three distinct categories in one of which are *śṛṅgāra*, *hāsyā* and *karuṇā*. The basis of this is a shared *guṇa* called, I forget the

name, mādhyurya or something. Now, if I characterize mādhyurya as a guṇa, and if we think of it in terms of a flow of feeling which three rasas share, then what shall be the ground of difference between them? Will it not be in terms of a shared 'flow', for now we are not characterising them in terms of objects or situations which give rise to them. The advantage of characterizing them in the guṇa or 'flow' way is that we are not now limited by objects. We are interested only in how feelings flow independently, not in what causes them.

The feelings are thus not limited by human relations in the course of which they generally arise. The way I am related to God is not in the same way that I am related to human beings. It would be easier to understand that if we make our move from the very nature of feelings and not be limited by the laukika objects through which we usually characterize feelings. The guṇa way of proceeding may be more fruitful in this connection.

In mādhyurya, for example, the feelings have a flow in the sense that they are characterized by certain inherent qualities, qualities they keep whatever they flow towards, 'comprehending' or 'catching' their object in a particular way whatever the object may be.

Prof. Dwivedi: In the sthāyī bhāva way of looking at feelings, there is not one continuous flow. One cannot have a sthāyī bhāva which is not associated with sañcārīs. That is impossible to think of. Sthāyī is stable, but its stability depends on the fact that it is a more complex bhāva which is built

up from others. In fact, the others come and make it stronger. But without the others it would not be there. That is the way of looking at feelings in a śṛṅgāra, hāsya, or karuṇa mode. The guṇa mode of understanding feelings was not carried forward very much after the seventeenth century. It became a kind of a very minor tradition. Thinkers just used it in some limited contexts, but did not take it very seriously, particularly because they tried to connect it with the rasa theory. When the rasa theory became dominant, the guṇa theory almost disappeared. But I suppose one can think of reviving it, though I do not know exactly how one can do it.

In the *Nāṭya-sāstra* there is another way of dividing all the feelings into two major flows or two major categories. One is the *sukumāra*, and the other is the *uddhata*. That is, all feelings, which have a kind of delicacy about them are *sukumāra* and anything that has strength or vigour is *uddhata*. This is how Bharata has divided a lot of works of art. But the mādhyurya way of doing it is richer because it has more possibilities. One can perhaps have many guṇas. One is *mādhurī*, which means delicacy; another is *oja* where there is some kind of vigour. There is also a quality called *drava*, that is where feelings become liquefied.

Shri Shrivatsa: Actually mādhyurya becomes *ārḍra*. It melts.

Dr. Lath: There is a melting quality of feelings, a vigorous quality, a harsh quality, and so forth. These are qualities of feelings and they may relate to any object. But in the other categorization the feelings themselves

are categorized through the objects. In the *guṇa* way of categorizing feelings, feelings are *not* characterized in relation to objects, but in respect of their own intrinsic qualities. I suggest that this may be a better way of talking about feelings than the *rasa* characterization.

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: May I say something about what has been said? Just now the speaker has raised a very fine point. But there is some difficulty in synthesizing the two things and understanding the two things separately. One is the conception of *rasa* from the point of view of the objects, and the other is the conception of *rasa* through *guṇa*. Actually speaking, Ānandavardhana and others have treated *guṇas* as *rasa-dharmas*: रसस्योत्कर्षधर्माः कुणाः। रसव्यञ्जकत्वं शब्दे शब्दार्थयोः शब्दार्थनिष्ठः रसव्यञ्जकधर्मः स एव गुणः। So, the appeal of *rasa* is enhanced by certain *guṇas*. And what are those *guṇas*? Where do they reside, is the question. Obviously they reside in *śabda* and *artha*. *Rasas* evolve in the communicative process, and *guṇas* help in the relish of *rasa*. So, they enhance the appeal of *rasa*, and that is why they are called the *dharmas* of *rasa*. In the case of the analysis or *śṛṅgāra*, *hāsyā* and *karuṇā*, *mādhuryā* is, no doubt, accepted as the common *guṇa*. But we also have *śabda* and *artha*. Therefore, the question would be: what is it that we get through *śabda* and *artha*? Again there are the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārī bhāvas*. Through *śabda* and *artha* we get the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*. These evoke the *sañcārī bhāvas*, which is another name for the *vyabhicārī bhāvas*. Through this process, once we experience *rasa*, the appeal of that *rasa* is enhanced by an appropriate *śabda-*

*vinyāsa* and *artha-vinyāsa*. It is very difficult to look at *rasa* from any other point of view. Even from the *guṇa* point of view, it is the *rasa*, which is said to be *madhura*: "śṛṅgāra eva madhuraḥ paraprahlādāttu rasaḥ". It is from this point of view that Professor Lath was arguing, looking at *rasa* from this point of view. But actually speaking, *madhura* cannot be an emotion. Only *śṛṅgāra* etc., can be emotions.

Dr. Mukund Lath: What I was trying to say was that if one wants to characterize emotions, and say that emotions can only be characterized in a certain way, that is through something out there, then obviously, *śṛṅgāra* cannot be characterised unless I think of man and woman. But one has emotions even without such kinds of objects. They are not tied down that way. For example, in music too one has feelings. But there is no *vibhāva* presented through *śabda* and *artha* or in any other way at all. The whole characterization of emotions through the objects limits them. What I was suggesting was that there is another way of understanding available in the tradition itself. Now, *mādhuryā*, for example, is a *guṇa*, which is common to three *sthāyī bhāvas*, associated with three distinct *rasas*. Other *guṇas* can be seen as common to many *sthāyī-bhāvas* and *rasas* even though the *sthāyī bhāvas* are associated with very different objects.

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: Of course, they are different.

Dr. Lath: And yet behind the three, there is a feeling, which is the same.

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: Can you call that mādhyurya? That is the problem I have. If one accepts the śāstra one will not be able to call it a feeling. Do you mean it is something common to all the three sthāyī bhāvas?

Dr. Lath: Yes.

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: But can something, which is common to these three, be a feeling? Can one say that? That is the point.

Dr. Mukund Lath: O.K. fine. Suppose I call it a feeling common to these three sthāyī bhāvas.

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: But you cannot do that.

Dr. Mukund Lath: Why not?

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: Because mādhyurya is not a bhāva. It is a guṇa. It is a power that makes feelings appeal in a certain way.

Dr. Mukund Lath: Let us get rid of all this...

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: Then, I have nothing to say. You get rid of these things and then speak.

Dr. Mukund Lath: No, no. I am taking my clue from you. But I think, the later rasa theories just do not know what to do with the guṇas. If you want to characterize rasas through guṇas, then take a guṇa, say, oja, then one may have three different rasas, which may have that one guṇa. Now the later rasa theory, it would seem, could see that this characterization of rasas through guṇas does

not lead anywhere because one does not have śṛṅgāra, hāsya or karuṇa through a set of syllables with a certain structure and sound in spite of the fact that these syllables may be characterized as madhura. But one can think of a piece of music that can be so characterized. The guṇa theory was found to clash with the rasa theory, and guṇa was accepted only as a dharma of śabda and artha? It was said that it is rasa, which really relates to emotions. Guṇa itself does not relate to emotions. It may be there, but it need not be there. It is only a minor dharma. It is something subsidiary. But I don't want to keep it subsidiary. I want to bring it out as something important in its own right.

There may be a major rasa theory, I agree. But that is not the point. What I am trying to suggest is an alternative way for understanding feelings from the point of view of feelings themselves, and not from the point of view of how certain objects presented in certain modes evoke them. After all, we have feelings not only in literature; we have feelings also with respect to nature. We have feelings in music where the kind of vibhāvas which are found in literature don't exist at all.

The issue may be put thus: how do I characterize those feelings, which do not arise in the context of human situations? The rasa-śāstra is of no help to me if I want to characterize feelings which do not have the kinds of ālambana vibhāvas necessary for rasa. After all, God can also be an ālambana vibhāva, but not of the same kind of which Bharata is speaking. And yet the bhaktas are

trying to force some kind of a rasa theory in the situation, reducing God to a man or a woman or a child or whatever. But why should one do that? After all, we have feelings where the vibhāvas are not limited to human situations. In guṇa, we have in the śāstra itself a way of looking at such feelings. I myself have no full-fledged guṇa theory as such, but I want to suggest that there are other ways of looking at and understanding feelings besides the way imposed on us by rasa. And, that is all that I want to say. If you think that another way of looking at feelings cannot be carried forward, that is another matter.

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: It was not with the intention of rejecting what you were saying that I intervened. I only wanted to make it clear that it is very difficult to look at rasa from two opposite angles because the different approaches to rasa are meshed together. In the śāstra, it is difficult to separate the guṇa-view from rasa and make it into an independent entity and speak of guṇas in the form in which you have done.

Dr. Lath: I know.

Prof. Sastry: What you seem to be suggesting is that we look at rasa as such, without relating it to the object or translating it in human terms. In other words we should treat God, only as God without making him play the role of the child, or woman or anything else. Would you like to put it that way? Or, you don't want even that? That is the point, which I was about to raise.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: I would like more people to take part in this discussion because in a certain sense it touches the heart of the problem. The problem, as I see it from the dialogue that has just taken place, is two-fold: one, that the usual characterization of emotions in terms of the objective human situations which normally give rise to them, suffers from a basic limitation. One limitation is that as the cultural patterns of behaviour with respect to these human relations vary over what may be called societies, cultures and historical times, the emotion may not be the same in all of them. After all, the relations between men and women have varied in different cultures all through history. Or perhaps it was being suggested that they did not? This perhaps is the first limitation. That is, we are taking some cultural variant in the human relationships and making it an essential feature of the characterization of emotion.

The second limitation perhaps is that by confining emotions to human situations and their characterization by reference to human relationships, inter-personal human situations, one is rendering oneself incapable of characterizing emotions which do not arise in the context of other human beings. The example of music is a classical example. A little note, a little tune certainly makes our mood change. When one hears, for example, a *dhrupada*, what feelings arise in one? But, these emotions or feelings cannot be characterized if the characterisation has to be done in terms of human situations alone. How will one characterize them? They do not arise out of what is a human situation.

Similarly, all forms, what are called significant forms, and with respect to which we have aesthetic emotions, which arise not from the contemplation of a human situation, are transformed in literature or drama. But where one has pure pattern as in the plastic arts, or where we are moved by pure architectural forms how will one characterize the emotions aroused in such contexts? But Mukund seems to be suggesting that we should not even characterize these emotions by reference to the 'art' situations in which they usually arise as it will not make them *nirviṣaya*. But whether it is music or painting or architecture or any other art form, where we are not concerned with human situations, there is still a *viṣaya*, and without that *viṣaya* the feeling will not arise. I can only listen to music from a great musician; a bad musician gives me a headache. So, I have to see beautiful forms outside myself in order to have that feeling. I mean, a great building has to be created for me to have the necessary form. So, my situation is still not *mukta* in the realisation of feeling in me. It is still dependent on something. Perhaps the seeking of bhakti is to get what may be called *mokṣa* in the realm of feeling, to become independent of all objects, human or non-human. How will you like this characterization of the ideal of bhakti? I would like somebody to really carry the thought forward. One of the ideas of this dialogue is not to find who is right or who is wrong, but to carry thought forward. If you add something, take it in a new direction, if you see a new possibility, please explore it freely.

Yes, would anybody like to say something.

Shri Shrivatsa: I think some interesting dimensions have been thrown up at this point. I will put a counterquestion. You say that in the realm of feelings we may take a clue from a non-human situation. I think, it is a very interesting point and very thought provoking. But is there anything for us as human beings which is non-human? Caitanya took incarnation in this world as he wanted to make the world dance in four *bhāvas*, *dāsyā* to *mādhuryā*. That is one dimension of the human situation. But whenever we cite the example of, say, music, architecture, plastic arts or anything like that, is it not also very much a part of the human situation? Can we meaningfully take away the human ingredients of that situation from where we are trying to derive meaning? I think it would not be possible because who is going to make that situation possible? The human agent. Even that very non-human situation is born out of the human interaction with that object. If there is an instrument, the instrument is okay. Even a great music synthesizer of the fourth generation made by Yamaha or Casio is a dead object. It will not give out any feeling unless somebody fiddles with it, makes out a few notes, melodious or bizarre or jarring notes. Without the human interaction the human ingredient, I think, the situation is meaningless for us. In that way I would try to understand that somehow we are in a *Catch 22* situation. We try to get out of the human context, but we really cannot. Somebody has said, "*na hi manuṣyāt śreṣṭhataram kiñcidasti.*" But there is also this human urge to break out of our limitations, of our

experience. I will try to categorize it or verbalize if I can. The fact is that there is a kind of tension and a dialectical awareness in the human psyche and human intellect and thought, which needs to break out of the existing norms and categories and structures of thinking. I think that is the whole thing, which has given the impetus to human intellectual history.

I cite one example again from history. Yet, when Mukundji was talking, I never thought about it in this fashion, and he is giving me an idea. Unfortunately, it is in the human context. Look at the concept of *parakiyābhāva*. When the Gosvāmīs in Vrindavan became great votaries of this bhāva and its aesthetic theory, what were they doing? Sociologically we can say that they were putting the whole world upside down, they were creating chaos. But in one way, when Patañjali says, "*dr̥ṣṭasya anvākyānam bhavati*", although that quotation is from a different context, that is, whether language is first or grammar is first. But there also the whole question is of experience versus reflection. Can we reflect on something that has no experiential content?

Prof. Daya Krishna: What is Patañjali's sūtra?

Shri Shrivatsa: "*Dr̥ṣṭasya anvākyānam bhavati*." This is in the *Mahābhāṣya*, of course. But, what is this *parakiyābhāva*? Some historians have argued that the Gosvāmīs were having a high time in Vrindavan with their *parakiyā nāyikās*, and to justify that they had to float a theory. There are a couple of books written with the

contention that Rūpa Gosvāmī had some washerwoman as his girl friend in Vrindavan, and that Gopālā Bhaṭṭa, who was a celibate, and a *bāla brahmacārī* also had some woman who was living with him and so on and so forth. So, to justify their life style they had to come out with a new theory of *nāyaka-nāyikā* relations. But in itself if you see and if you go back into the history of the whole thing and of this relationship, the model presented to us is the model of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, it is a totally unorthodox model. Rādhā is *parakiyā*, *prauḍhā* and *paraḍhā* at the same time. Not only *prauḍhā*, but also *paraḍhā*, not *anūḍhā*. So, from the conventional point of view we have a very strange *nāyikā*, and it is stranger still for a Rāsa-rāja like Kṛṣṇa to be involved in such a situation.

So, the main thing which I was trying to suggest regarding the *parakiyā-bhāva*, about which Mukundji provided me the clue, is that here is a feeling which may not fit into the conventional aesthetic categories established by the rasa theorists of the great Indian aesthetic tradition or even the Dharma-śāstra or the Mokṣa-śāstra traditions. But the question is of a feeling, a very authentic, very rich and very life-giving feeling. And that is the way I see the whole bhakti movement and also bhakti philosophy. Bhakti philosophy has a phenomenology of feeling. It was not that they were structuring something beforehand and then imposing it on our experience. Rather, it is a phenomenology in the true sense of the term. The phenomenon was given to these people through poetry and experience and other things, and then as philosophers they tried to analyze it in a



meaningfully communicative, philosophical language. That is how bhakti darśana got its substance.

Chairman: Firstly the idea of a phenomenology of feeling is very interesting and in fact ought to be pursued further. How far is bhakti an articulation of a phenomenology of feeling and how much an exploration and articulation and then theorizing of that.

I would like to return to the issue that Mukund raised and which I had formulated earlier. But before I do that, I would like to place before you an idea that arises out of Shrivatsa's presentation. Interestingly, all the examples that he has given belong to the aesthetic domain which man has created.

But what about nature? One responds to it certainly as a human being. But the 'other' in this case is not a creation of man, whether it be lightning and thunder in the sky, or the rainy season, or any other great example one may choose from one's experience of nature. In fact, recently I had been to a hill station where we used to walk on a road along which there was a forest of pine and deodar on both sides. As one walked one's mood changed and one's feelings changed suddenly. But as one came into the open expanse, one's feelings changed dramatically. Here, the object in relation to which the feelings arise is neither made by man, nor is it a purely formal aesthetic object. Yet, when I was listening to what Shrivatsa was saying, it occurred to me that even in responding to nature I do feel an impulse to share my feeling with others. I call somebody; I say, 'look, see, how peaceful

it is'. My feeling is enhanced if someone is sharing that feeling with me. I do not know how we would analyse this phenomenologically. On the other hand, particularly in an aesthetic situation, supposing I am enjoying music and I say, 'Mukund, listen to this', and he says, 'it is not very good', my own feelings would be dampened. I cannot then continue to enjoy it in the same way as I previously was. How will we theoretically articulate this situation?

Dr. Lath: Take the situation in respect to nature? So far as my response to nature is concerned, there is no doubt that the feeling that I get is only a human feeling. Yet it cannot be rasa.

Secondly, you might be understood to suggest that if one shares it with someone else, then it becomes some sort of rasa. For example, if one describes the scene to another person and says, 'I saw such terrible lightning that I was full of fear'. But if one is conveying one's feeling to somebody else, one is like an artist presenting it to the critic, and if the critic sympathizes is it rasa? There has to be some limitation to what may be regarded as rasa. Everything one sees and responds to is not rasa.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: That is true.

Dr. Rukmini: When one talks of music or painting or literature in this context one does not see that there is a basic difference between these and bhakti. Bhakti is possible for every human being; this is the premise. There is a certain feeling, which transforms

itself into good poetry, but that state is not common to every individual. We must make a distinction. Is bhakti possible for every individual? It is not that every one of us can produce good music. Creating good music and listening to and enjoying good music are two different things. So, creating good literature and enjoying that literature are two different things. In other words, what I am trying to ask is this: Is bhakti possible for every individual? If that is so, then, I am afraid, the things we have been talking about may not belong to that realm. Or, is it that a special kind of bhakti is reserved for a few, and another available to all?

I would also like to bring in some physics here, the uncertainty that Shrivatsaji had referred to. It is difficult to classify and all classifications leave objects that cannot be put in a clear-cut manner in one class or another. The human 'classifier' is always present and one cannot really call anything, any situation in which a human being is involved as 'non-human'. Even at the level of observation, what one observes is deeply related to the one who is observing whatever is being observed.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: I think, we must distinguish at least for the sake of clarification between the response that is being aroused in a human being in a human situation and the response that is being aroused in a human being by a non-human situation. I will take mathematics as an example. It is perhaps the most impersonal of all pursuits. But when I see a mathematical proof and its elegance, I feel a delight. Many

people say that this delight is purely aesthetic in character but you may say it has an aesthetic *element* in it. But the delight that one gets consists of a state of feeling and emotion which is not aroused by any human situation in the ordinary sense of the word. But it is human-centered. Obviously, it has to be. Feeling has to have a location. But its *ālambana* is not necessarily a human situation or anything remotely resembling it. But the search in bhakti is to become free of any *ālambana* whatsoever. First, to become free of the human situation because it binds us too much, then to get rid of all objects whatsoever. Can I have a feeling, which is not determined by any object at all? This is perhaps the ultimate ideal of bhakti. Ultimately there should be no God even in bhakti because the ideal of bhakti should be self-enclosed, self-justified, self-immersed in feeling.

I think we have to break for tea. Then, we will meet again and then we should close by 5-00 or 5-15 so that you can all go and see a temple.

In between I request you to please reflect on what has been said. I think some very important points have been made. Please come back after tea refreshed and give a response that may take the thought further.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna (continuing): In bhakti we are searching for absolute freedom in the realm of feeling. The feeling that my *sukha-duḥkha*, my *ānanda* etc., are not dependent on me, they are dependent on something outside myself, seems to give rise to a desire to get rid of this dependence, and

makes one seek what may be called deepening levels of freedom. That is, one continually seeks freedom from every limitation. But normally after getting rid of one limitation, one finds that one has moved to a limitation at another level. But take the idea of *niṣkāma* karma. The idea is that karma should not bind me. Karma generally binds one, so, one must either give up action or minimise it as far as possible or find a method of action in which though one performs action, it does not bind one. Similarly, we can think of bhakti as a seeking of absolute non-dependence or freedom from all objects whatsoever in the realm of feeling.

Prof. Mishra: That is not possible. We may think about it; but it is absolutely not possible.

Dr. Vohra: Bhakti is also a kind of feeling. If one accepts your model of feelings, firstly there is a feeling, which one gets when one goes in the forest, or to nature. Or, a feeling may be communicated to me by another person. In one case I have a direct apprehension. In the other case I have an indirect apprehension. But both are human situations and can be described as such. Whenever we talk of feelings, we have necessarily to talk of human beings. Thus, if it is conceptually impossible for us to think of emotions or feelings devoid of all reference to human beings, then how can we think of bhakti in any other way? I would think that it is conceptually impossible.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Let me show that it is possible. I have a feeling. But this feeling itself can arouse a feeling

because I am a self-conscious being. Thus a feeling itself may give rise to a feeling in me. This may be called a second order feeling. Now bhakti, to my mind, is a seeking of a whole world of second order feelings different from primary feelings. Even if I grant that the primary feelings are to some extent object dependent, then, firstly, I can make these primary objects as imaginary as possible. That is, they shall be in my control or they will be aesthetic objects. That is, I devise my whole life in such a way that as far as possible I can cushion myself from those objects which will disturb my first level feeling. Then, my contemplation is on these first level feelings, which are being aroused by an external situation of my own design. The second-order feelings arise, I think, out of the first order feelings. In the second-order of feelings I am trying to achieve complete independence. I surround myself by a whole planned situation where only certain types of first-order feelings arise.

However, the relation between the first order feelings and the external situation is not a determinate one. They may arise, they may not arise. But what I can try to do is to limit their range and variability. Of course, I cannot completely control this. So, what can I control? This in India, has been called *sādhana* from the very beginning, that is, to control the second level. In the bhakti *sādhana* what I am doing is to control the second level feelings which are more in my control than the first level feelings.

Dr. Rukmini: But that is only a change of vocabulary. You have only changed the

vocabulary. In the tradition it was called laukika and alaukika.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: It may be a change in vocabulary. But a change in vocabulary is a change in the way of feeling also.

उसी चीज को परकीया भक्ति कह दें तो आमन्द ही आनन्द है। कुछ और कह दें तो कुछ नहीं।

Dr. Pande: The kind of autonomy you are suggesting is perhaps not possible in bhakti: absolute independence of anything, human or non-human. This is impossible. It is not only not possible, but hardly expressible. So long as we think in terms of organic relations in a wider context with man on the one hand and nature on the other and something beyond both, this kind of relationship can be described as an organic relationship. In the context of bhakti, there may be a stage when the absolute can be reached as some philosophers have said. But that autonomous state does not stay. Even if such a state is possible, what will happen to that kind of bhakti which is so much eulogized, that bondage in bhakti, bondage in love is better, more beautiful than mokṣa?

Chairman: That is an interesting point.

Dr. Pande: Let us go to the second level, which is given primacy or supremacy over bhakti, as it is commonly understood. But that level is neither considered good, nor expressible in intelligible terms. It may be better than bhakti. But bhakti must be left to remain what it is. Otherwise it will lose its characteristic form, its identifying marks, and it will be something else than what it has been, and is, and should be.

Shri Shrivatsa: I think I am more on the side of Mr. Pande on this issue than with Prof. Daya Krishna.

Yet I really appreciate your putting the things in the first order, the second order and that kind of thing. We may ask: "Is there anything called 'absolute feeling', 'feeling by itself', 'feeling in itself', 'feeling par excellence', 'basic feeling' or any kind of such things?" I think, they exist, but with the qualification that they are not expressible. That is what is called *rahasyānubhava*. Even in the human situation we need to give an example to understand something. Unless we have an example of something, however great it might be, I do not think it becomes meaningful for us. When people engaged in the intellectual process are trying to verbalize or give an example of *rasa* as a kind of inexpressible feeling they talk about an experience which is called *brahmānanda sahodara*. Actually, linguistic verbalization will always be short of that experience. It is definitely a *rahasyānubhava*. But to talk of that *anubhava*, we must speak of a process and the process cannot be spoken without the duality of subject and object.

Then, of course, we have *jñāna* and *karma* or *jñāna* and *yoga*. So, the models are there. But we have to liberate ourselves a little from the clutches of the two other modes. That is why there is a lot of confusion when, suppose, I say '*acintyabhedābheda*'. Of course, it is a contradiction in terms. But, in fact, if one is talking about feeling as such, then, the other two modes of thinking, that is, *bheda* and *abheda*, both of them are absent. We

have become slaves to a two-valued logic. But in the case of rasa, thanks to Whitehead or the process-theologians today, such as Hartshorn etc., we have come to realize that it is very important on our part to think that Aristotle was only an initiator or pioneer of thinking about logic and not its culmination. Of course, we have the Jain tradition and hence need not go to the west. But since we are using the English language and we are using its concepts, the problem is not to make ourselves slaves to a particular discipline and a tradition of thinking. So, when we are talking about object as given to the subject, or object in the subjective mode, there should be little surprise if we have the tremendous urge to free the subject from objectivity altogether. Similarly in the objective mode, that is when I see jñāna as *vastu-tantra* jñāna, we strive really hard, conceptually, philosophically, logically, epistemologically and even spiritually to get rid of the subject. If we are not doing that, we are not being objective. We are not faithful to the jñāna mārga. But if we are playing, if we are in līlā, in the feeling mode, we may ask, is such līlā possible? I think it is possible. It may not need even a second person. I agree fully with Prof. Daya Krishna, we do not even need a vision of a mountain or a beautiful flowing river or anything for a feeling to be aroused. As the Gosvāmīs said, just a memory can do it. But then this is begging the question again. So, the first order and second order question remains. That is, does the second order feeling give rise to the first order feeling or does the first order feeling give rise to the second order feeling, in the

reflective mode? So, when we are talking about feeling, we have to think about this basic relationship between the subject and object. But ultimately, when we have the feeling itself, the absolute feeling, then that metaphysical situation of object-subject duality also merges and melts in a single rasa. So, that way, it is a completely different type of thinking process than the subject-object process.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Thank you. I think, we have only five minutes for tea.

I would make three points. One, the notion of impossibility is with respect to all ideal pursuits, whether it is world peace or it is what may be called advaita jñāna, or any other ideal. When we posit any ideal, the unrealizability of it is almost written there. But the approximation to it is not. In fact, the controversy in the Indian tradition with respect to the concept of *jīvana*-mukti is of that nature, whether living in this life before one dies one can achieve complete mokṣa is one formulation of this issue. For, as long as one is alive, one is within the casual nexus. After all, one has to live, one has to breathe, one has to eat, to get up, to sleep, and if one gets ill, one has to go to a hospital, and to consult doctors. One is enmeshed in this situation. Even when one seeks any absolute or some ideal one is bound to this medium. It may be karma or causality, natural causality or moral causality. So, when someone says that the ideal that I am posing or the way I am interpreting bhakti is an impossible ideal, that is not a criticism.

That is, in fact, an acceptance that it is an ideal.

I would like to add two things here. One, that our discussion is leading us in a direction where, I think, it might be helpful if Dr. K.L. Sharma presents K.C. Bhattacharya's outstanding thought on the subject tomorrow. He is one of the greatest thinkers that India has produced in this century, and it is almost a shame that few people know about him. He has written on the absolutes involved in feeling, knowing and willing and he has related them to traditional Indian thought and practice in these directions. Dr. K.L. Sharma is a scholar in the field, and if he can present it, it will be wonderful.

Just now Shrivatsa made a distinction which caught my attention. He said that while feeling is real in itself, it was also a mode of knowing reality. Feeling shares this double characteristic. This is a very strange characteristic. That is, whenever I am in a state of feeling, it impresses me by its palpable reality. It is perhaps the most real thing in which I live all the time. The world it creates around itself is a magical world, though it is real. So, feeling functions in two ways, that is, it is itself real and the world that is projected through that feeling is also a reality of a different order. I think perhaps we have a clue to bhakti here and also to the concept of māyā, which becomes līlā in bhakti. The projection of a feeling or the objective situation projected by the feeling has a reality of a different kind than what cognition grasps in the normal game of

knowledge, because feeling simultaneously create it and apprehends it. Let us put it like this: that here there is simultaneously an act of creation and apprehension. This aspect of feeling has not been explored.

I think, we must now close for tea.

□

## SESSION VI

Shri Shrivatsa: At the end of the fifteenth century Rūpa Gosvāmī had been serving as the Chief Minister of the most powerful ruler, Husain Shah, of Bengal was picked up by Caitanya and instructed to go to Braj and take up his project of resurrection. That project was launched in 1515 AD in the month of monsoon. It was almost as important as Columbus reaching America.

It was a beautiful place where Śrī Kṛṣṇa had played. But there is a big gap in the history of the physical Vrindavan and no one knows about it. So, when the Indian Columbus comes in search of Vrindavan, he is stuck in Mathura, as the real Columbus was stuck in the West Indies. And this Columbus was, of course, Caitanya. He came and entered in these woodlands which were completely uninhabited, and he recreated the sacred geography of Kṛṣṇa līlā. He identified a few ghāṭs, the Pīra Ghāṭ, the Brāhman Ghāṭ, the Kāliyāmardan Ghāṭ, the Rāsaślīla spot and so on. He spent nearly seven to eight months in the area, and then went on to Allahabad and Varanasi and onwards back to Jagannath Purī. But from there, he launched his project and started sending a very select group of persons to Vrindavan. When we say, '*bhakti dakṣiṇa ūpajī*' or '*utpannā draviḍe cāham*', it really has a historical sense, because later on the passage adds: *vṛndāvanam punaḥ prāpya navīnavasvarūpiṇī.*

But here too, they had to take help from South India. So he selected persons from the ruling family of Karnataka, Rūpa, Sanātana and their nephew, Jīva, they were from the family of the ex-ruler of Karnataka, who had to flee because of some intrigue and conspiracies at home and take a job with Husāin Shah just to save their lives. They were sent to Braj. Another South Indian, a Tamil Brahmin scholar, a man of stature from Varanasi, whose name was Raghunātha Bhaṭṭa, played a very crucial role in Vaiṣṇava religious history. He spent four months at the Srirangam temple and when he was leaving after his *cāturmāsya*, a family tried to offer him something. But he said, "I am a *sanyāsī*, I do not even keep a set of clothes to change; I have even given up my begging bowl, so, I practically do not need anything." But they insisted and said, "unless you take some offering from us, it would appear that you are not pleased with us." At this he said, "all right, if you want to give me something you may give me your son." This was the son of the chief priest of Srirangam, the highest seat for a Vaiṣṇava. He happens to be the founder of our family tradition. He was Gopāla Bhaṭṭa, the writer, the actual writer of *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā* and also the writer of *Haribhaktivilāsa*, key texts for the Vaiṣṇavites.

These Gosvāmīs very carefully selected six other Gosvāmīs. Of them, these are five: Gopāla Bhaṭṭa from Srirangam, Raghunātha Bhaṭṭa, a Tamil Brahmin from Varanasi and then the three Karnataka Brahmins, Rūpa, Sanātana and Jīva. There was also one Bengali who was Raghunātha Dāsa, a *kāyastha* from North Bengal, a very rich man. Anyway, this selected band

was sent one by one to settle and literally recreate Kṛṣṇa and his lilās in all dimensions. So, they claim to be the first settlers landing here. Once when Rūpa Gosvāmī was doing a certain *parikramā*, he saw a cow milking herself at one place. Then he got a dream. A voice said, "I have not seen an idiot like you. I gave pointers; you are not helping me out. I lie buried here. Take me out." That was the story of digging Kṛṣṇa out from under the ground. So, the first image in Vrindavan was dug out from that spot. This was significant. After the Mahābhārata War, Kṛṣṇa's great grandson, who became the ruler of Braj, commissioned images of Kṛṣṇa to be made with the help of Uddhava because he was the only survivor who had seen Kṛṣṇa in person. That was the image of Govindadeva. Rūpa rediscovered it. Letters were sent, couriers were sent to Jagannatha Puri, and a big celebration took place in Jagannatha Puri for Kṛṣṇa had appeared in Braj. This was in Caitanya's own lifetime. Caitanya left this world in 1532 in the month of July.

Prof. Daya Krishna: The discovery was in 1510.

Shri Shrivatsa: 1515 was the year of Chaitanya's rediscovery of Vrindavan. The image was found sometime in the 1520's, after the Gosvāmīs had begun to settle here. Where we stand is the *axis mundi*, not only the physical centre of Vrindavan but of the whole world.

But this is also a natural elevation in the centre of the town, for, otherwise, there are no natural elevations in Vrindavan. It is entirely flat. But as you could see, Prof.

Daya Krishna found it difficult to climb here. That suggests a good height. Then at this place they decided to build the temple. It was Caitanya's design. I call it 'design' with a purpose; as you were saying in the morning, he was a great designer. He took the design of this temple from Jagannath Puri. It was Caitanya's design. This answers partially the question as to what is the architectural style of the temple.

But in one sentence, why I really brought you to this temple is that I love to call this temple:

One, dialogue in stone;

Two, history in stone;

Three, ritual in stone;

And four, power politics in stone.

But the dialogue part is most important for me. This is a dialogue in stone because, as for me, personally, I really believe that dialogue is a useless exercise. Also it is a very dangerous exercise. If we are engaging in a dialogue from an imperialistic point of view, then, a dialogue is impossible. If one thinks one is powerful, there will be no need for a dialogue. If one is weak, only then will one need a dialogue. So, the only premise for a dialogue is Prof. Daya Krishna's premise. Yes, it is a dialogue. But still there is a danger, and the basic premise of that for me is in the ambivalence of one's own position. But unless you have some ambivalence and some sort of *saṁśaya*, dialogue will never take off.

In this temple, if you see, architecturally speaking, there is a very



interesting plan. The dialogue, you will see, historically, religiously and structurally. Everywhere there is a dialogue happening in this temple. Number one, This temple is only half of the original temple. Imagine the magnitude. Heightwise, this temple has only three stories left of the original seven. Try to visualize it, try to imagine the magnitude, the grandeur of it all. The size of this monument puts it in a class by itself. That is, the size is so big that even Fatehpur Sikri, which was built at the same time, has no building of this size. In the whole of North India from the sixteenth century onwards, if I am not very wrong, no edifice of this size was built and that too at a time when the Hindu psyche was at its lowest, when Hindu power was at its lowest in this area. When I see the design of Caitanya, as I call it, I see it as a Hindu political move. When all the external symbols of power has gone and slipped out of one's hands, the course one follows is around some kind of inverted reality. And such was the move. It was a kind of resurrection of the Hindu psyche, what probably Patel was trying to do after Independence through the symbol of Somnath if one is allowed to read history into these kind of events.

Later, the whole process of seeking the royal permission started. Yes, all the Gosvāmīs said that we shall not compromise on the size; we shall not compromise on the structure or on the material which was totally banned for any building other than the royal buildings because Fatehpur Sikri was under construction. There was a royal *farmān* and it was a public *farmān*. It forbade the mining of

this particular quarry because it had red sandstone. Usually, red sandstone is very prone to peeling off, but this particular quarry had a hardness and durability, which was not found elsewhere. It was for the reason that Akbar had forbidden it for any use but at Sikri.

So, the dialogue part now comes in. Raghunātha Bhaṭṭa was a sort of guru to Man Singh. Because of Raghunātha Bhaṭṭa, Māna Mandir had come up in Varanasi. It was Raghunātha Bhaṭṭa Gosvāmī who influenced Man Singh to build the Māna Mandir. He had been carefully picked up by Caitanya, who saw the power in him. He had sent this Tamil Brahmin to Vrindavan. This man then influenced Man Singh. It is not Rūpa Gosvāmī's influence. It is Raghunātha Bhaṭṭa's influence which makes Man Singh take a pledge. He pledged, "when I become the Commander-in-Chief of the Mughal Army, I shall dedicate a huge temple to Kṛṣṇa in Vrindavan." When he became that, this is the fulfillment of the promise. But Man Singh did not have the courage to ask his master to lift the ban on mining. So, Todar Mal comes in between and mediates. He says, "This is Man Singh's wish, but out of modesty and respect to you he is not able to say it to you." So, Akbar issues another *farmān*, which not only gives permission for building the temple of Govinda Rai (he never used the term 'Govindadeva', he used the term 'Govinda Rai'), at Vrindavan but also adds that the cost of all the material used in the temple will be given from the royal exchequer. What a great man!

This is all historically attested as Akbar also decreed that the labour cost would be borne by Man Singh. So, it is done. In 1590 when Akbar was camping in Lahore, this temple was dedicated with full glory. It had seven storeys with a full *śikhara* and all the four parts, Jaga-maṇḍapa, Nātha-maṇḍapa, Jaga-mohana and Ravindra. When all the four parts were complete, it was dedicated. And a theologian of the stature of Jiva Gosvāmī (Rūpa Gosvāmī had died, Gopāla Bhaṭṭa had died and only Raghunātha Dāsa and Jiva Gosvāmī were alive) made a dedicational inscription at the time of the inauguration of the Temple. First he writes, "*śivādideva-vandite vṛndāvane.*" (In Vrindavan, even gods like Śiva worship Kṛṣṇa), Adding, "at the Yogapīṭha *sthala* this Govinda Mandira is being constructed." Then look at the next words. The honour is not given to Man Singh. The honour is given to whom? To "*Śrimān naravaraḥ.*" Only later does the poor benefactor of the Temple Man Singh appear.

That is what I mean by a dialogue of politics. In history there is always give and take. Here is Caitanya, who is willing to give up everything, and then he is making this move. At the same time, when this give and take of the dialogue is going on, he very aptly observed that this kind of ground plan in a miniature form is available in Hubli or some such place. It has a particular architectural characteristic, where there is profuse ornamentation on the outside. But so that the sensitivity of a benefactor, that is, Akbar, may not be hurt, the Gosvāmīs deliberately chose not to have a single picture or sculpture outside.

Another thing is: this whole politics is the politics of embrace. When you embrace the other, the other comes close to you. That is the greatest political move and political device ever created. Look at this facade. You see something very interesting right there. What do you see? I give you ten seconds to guess. It is clear.

Audience: मेहराबें बनी हुई हैं।

Shri Shrivatsa: Almost everybody noticed it. If you, have seen the work of the Mathura school you will notice that this offsetting is typically traditional. It is found at other places also.

A Speaker: कमल भी बने हुए हैं।

Shri Shrivatsa: But they are very much like those in Fatehpur Sikri. But this Mughal thing, if you see, where is it positioned? How are the arches typical of Persian art used? Look very carefully. They are in the middle. They cannot be placed at the base, the ādhāra, nor at the top, so they are in the middle.

Dr. Rukmini: Yes, they are in between.

Shri Shrivatsa: Before the light goes out, we will just go around quickly. You can spend hours in this Temple. Every stone speaks of history, politics and intrigues. Inside is something much more, you know. We shall go inside. Here you see the statues. It just looks like the Halebid Temple. Or if you go to Belur, you will find such a temple. Actually in shape it is the same. I have written an article on this, 'Govindadeva Temple, History and Polity in Stone'. I will give it you later.

Dr. Rukmini: In Karnataka, in Belur, we have the same thing.

Shri Shrivatsa: Belur in Karnataka was a revelation to me.

Dr. Pande: Somnathpur is also more or less like this.

Shri Shrivatsa: When Purāṇa is being recited, silence is required. So, it is a question of sensitivity and sensibility. We have seen the first part of the sensibility in dialogue. We have here two words for Akbar: 'Arkavara' and 'Akbar'. 'Akbar' on this part and 'Arkavara' on the part of Hindus. So, the Hinduization of the other and the Islamization of the Hindu.

Then comes the time of the grandson of Akbar, the turning point in India's religious history, Aurangzeb. The sanctum sanctorum is completely razed to the ground. Where we were sitting, the sanctum sanctorum used to extend this way. As I told you, it was seven storeys high and with a śikhara on top of that. You can imagine the glory. When Shivaji escaped from Agra, he escaped through Vrindavan, Mathura and Banaras and onwards.

What does Aurangzeb do? Till that year he had built a temple, he was renewing all the grants given by his predecessors. But why in 1667 does he damage these three cities? Why only these three cities? In 1662 he had given the land, he had given the money for building a Rāma temple in Chatarpur. But in 1667 what makes him destroy these particular temples, in particular these three cities? Why does he not go back to Chatarpur and destroy his own creation? Why does he not stop the grants

given to the temple in Gazipur? Of course, it was political frustration and punishment to the Jaipur family because Ram Singh was involved in this game of Shivaji's escape. Varanasi was another place of the Jaipur royal family. Mathura was known as the home of the Jaipur family. So, as a kind of punishment of retaliation to his own commander-in-chief, that is, to Ram Singh, he comes and destroys these temples.

Anyway, then comes the year 1865. A Britisher, a young officer was posted for the first time from the BCS, British Civil Service as the District Magistrate of Mathura. He comes to this place where some houses had been built by the local people around the destroyed structure. It was all in chaos. The lintels were broken up to one storey. Vrindavan was under the debris, which was left by Aurangzeb in 1667. For one hundred to two hundred years nobody took pains even to remove the rubble. That shows the character of the Hindu tradition. No body bothered about throwing the rubble out. That was the first task, which this District Magistrate faced. He was amazed. Even on the walkway houses had been built on the left. He acquired the houses and demolished them overnight because, as he said, there was no space from where one could even have a look at the building. Houses were built almost up to that point. Thanks to Ghouse, we have that slope. He spent in those days over Rs. 165,000 in restoring this temple. But then, slightly before that there was another man, and his sensibility we will have to appreciate. Raja Nand Kumar Basu from Bengal comes. He sees all these major Hindu temples in Braj completely demolished or half

demolished. What does he do? He leaves them. He does not touch them. He comes before Ghouse. But adjacent to all these ruins he creates equally bigger temples. He built the New Govindadeva Temple in the beginning of the eighteenth century. So, this is the whole concept. But when Ghouse comes, he does a very interesting thing. This canopy was earlier in the garden. The boundary of this temple was there, a beautiful, large boundary where all this encroachment has taken place. This canopy was in the garden. He writes in his memoir that the holy spot where probably the images stood one/day, should not be left unprotected. So he dismantles this beautiful piece from the garden and puts it here.

Dr. Rukmini: It is out of place there.

Shri Shrivatsa: It is definitely out of place. But that is what Ghouse does. But he has to pay the price for all this. The Governor of U.P., of course a gentleman, writes about another gentleman in his progress report, that Ghouse who was sent to rule over Indians, turns out to be in some collusion with the natives. And so when he was mid-way in the resurrection of the temple, he was transferred. But in seven years he did wonders in Mathura. He was the founder of the Mathura Museum. He translated Tulasī Dāsa's *Rāmacaritamānasa* in his seven years stay in Mathura, into English, a beautiful translation. Ghouse actually not only did something for Vrindavan and this temple but he did the same thing for all the temples. He wrote a beautiful two volume work on the history of Mathura art which nobody knows, nobody reads. But it is a wonderful work. I

have only a part of it. It is available in the Mathura Museum. After writing about this temple, he broke his pen. He said, "this is the last word in the architectural world." Although he never became a Hindu, he died at the age of thirty-nine out of frustration and tuberculosis because then the Britishers started transferring him almost every month. They could not get rid of him, so they started transferring him. Then he resigned his job and went back to England, where within one year he died of tuberculosis and frustration. I put him in the category of the Seventh Gosvāmī of Braj, and he deserves that title.

This wall was not built by Ghouse. He was not so insensitive. This was done by the Archaeological Survey of India. Of course this is absurd. You can imagine what Ghouse did with this stone and what the Archaeological Survey did at that time. Some of these facts are published in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society*.

But historically, from the religious and historical point of view this temple is also interesting. Not only that this image was dug out, but the whole phenomenon of things coming out of the ground. This temple is in fact three temples in one temple. This temple was carefully chosen to be built on a place which was also earlier a place where Śakti was worshipped. It was a śakti-pīṭha. Some historians say that this whole Kṛṣṇa cult came from Bengal, and that this was the spot where there was a Yogamāyā Temple and that it is still there today : it is underground. There might have been a previous temple here. The image of Yogamāyā you can see here in this

side chapel. There is a side chapel on the other side also. That is the Yogamāyā chapel where the deity still is the original one. This was the chapel dedicated to Vṛndā Devī. And Vṛndā is, the presiding deity and power of Kṛṣṇa's līlā. Kṛṣṇa's līlās are all under her supervision. She is the stage manager for the Kṛṣṇa līlā. As you know, the Kṛṣṇa līlā is nothing but a līlā of ecology, an environmental concern. Religiously speaking, Kṛṣṇa never went to a temple in his whole life, and the only ritual, religious ritual, he did was the worship of nature, even in the religious sense. So, that place of honour is given to Vṛndā Devī.

But when Aurangzeb invaded the place, Ram Singh collected all the images from Vrindavan, literally, took all of them, except one or two. He took them hidden in straw carts and smuggled them out, first to Kama and from Kama to other places, to Govind Pura, and from Govind Pura to Jal Mahal, to Purāṇā Govind Dev. When you come down from Amer it is on the left hand. Then Jai Singh came to the throne and he was told in a dream, "you are living in my place, and you have put me in a pond here. What kind of a fair distribution is this?" So, then he went to Jaipur and Amer, and commissioned a whole new city through Vidyādhara. You can actually see it if you stand in Jaigarh or from the palace above. In the city palace complex you have the Jal Mahal and the Chandar Mahal. The physical centre of that royal complex is the Govindadeva temple. That too is so positioned that from the royal chamber the deity is visible. So, it was a one to one relation from Jai Singh to Govindadeva. He offered his whole kingdom and everything,

and he used to recite, "*Shri Govind carāṇa Savāī Jai Singh śarāṇa.*" When he was sitting here in Vrindavan as a diwan, Jai Singh said that. Then he institutionalized the whole thing in Jaipur and Karauli. Madan Mohanji travelled to Karōli, which had been given as a gift to the brother-in-law of the royal family. But, there you know, Nand Kumar Basu, did something else. He said, when he reached, "how could Krishna be out of Vrindavan when it is written in the Bhāgavata and other places?"

So, how is it possible? Now he is already sitting in Jaipur. So, what does he do? He establishes the *pratibhū vighrahas*. The *bhoga* is offered there but the *pratibhū* is here. Then he builds all these temples. In the temple here is the *pratibhū*. The original deity, the original Vrindavan is in Jaipur.

Not only that. In Jaipur I was wonderstruck when a local paṇḍita took me around Jaipur and the surrounding areas. They have Govardhana there, and the Rādhā Kuñja. They have recreated the whole sacred geography of Braj in Jaipur. Not only that, the deity was taken away, the whole Vrindavan was taken away to Jaipur.

What we see here inside the temple is again a commingling of cultures. This was a Hindu design on the Moghul. What did they do? Fatehpur Sikri and this temple were being built at the same time, precisely the same time. They took the cue from the brothers there. The other partners of the dialogue built that whole thing here and left it for posterity to say that this vagueness is part of the Hindu ethos. There is nothing Moghul in it. What is Moghul about Fatehpur Sikri? There

is nothing Moghul about it. What is done is, if you look at this chamber, it is a typical Halebid Belur chamber. On this side is a typical Halebid Belur chamber. Inside is typical Halebid Belur also. In the middle this is squeezed in. It is an architectural feat. It is all one piece.

Dr. K.L. Sharma: This is Hindu.

Shri Shrivatsa: In sand-stone the inverted hanging is a lotus in one piece of that size. It is interesting, unique. It is a unique piece.

Prof. Basu: Art has given us a new view of the whole thing.

Shri Shrivatsa: That is really why I brought you here. The best part of the temple I am going to tell you about now. But I will tell you only if you give me my *dakṣiṇā*. In 1990 is the 400th anniversary of this temple. I really feel that we as intellectuals, as inheritors of the Indian tradition, should come on that occasion to celebrate this as an event in the great Indian tradition of history, religious history, political history. There is no comparable monument to this. We talk of *sulah kul*, we talk of the Gosvāmīs, we talk of bhakti, we talk of many things, but there can be nothing compared to this because this was the temple which compelled Akbar also to do something. It was a very remarkable thing that he did.

He sent offerings to the temple.

Dr. K.L. Sharma: In 1590?

Shri Shrivatsa: Not only that. When he was camping in Lahore, when this temple was

built, the news was given to him in his camp at Lahore.

Dr. Lath: Who was sent for making an offering in this Temple?

Shri Shrivatsa: Abul Fazal, no lesser officer. So, when Abul Fazal reports on this temple to Akbar he says, 'go back'. He sends him back to Braj with another four officers, very high officers from the Moghul Court, and he asks him to make a survey of Hindu religious institutions and individual pandits of this area. Then he makes a thousand *bīghās* of land grant to each of the temples and individual paṇḍitas. The *farmān* is available and is preserved in the National Archives and has been printed and published. What I say is that if the experiment of Akbar had continued, but for his grandson or other misfortunes or historical events, the whole course would have been different. I think, in 1990 we should all try to celebrate it because when we were talking about the feeling of feelings, I also said that this is a ritual in stone, and a totally different kind of ritual in stone, a ritual which is beyond all ritual, a feeling which is beyond all feeling. The next full moon is *kārtika pūrṇimā*, Guru Nanak's birthday. *Kārtika pūrṇimā*, is also the *rāsa pūrṇimā*. People connected with Bengal know it very well. On that day, the moon rises in the middle of this doorway, and the first ray falls on the sanctum sanctorum.

Prof. Daya Krishna: Wonderful!

Shri Shrivatsa: This was a new ritual developed by the Gosvāmīs for Vrindavan to suit its sacred geography. Aṣṭama or eighth

līlā is the rāsa. Vrindavan is the place of rāsa līla. Govardhana is the place of *gocāraṇa*. Rādhā Kuñja is the place of mid-day union and so on and so forth. In Vrindavan everyday, everynight, Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa and Gopīs are having their *nitya* rāsa, and after the *nitya* rāsa they come and take rest at the Yogapīṭha. That is the technical meaning of Yogapīṭha. They come and rest in this place. You will ask, "why so many riches? No Hindu temple has so many riches."

It was built to a ritual design. This is the ritual of *rāgānugā* bhakti, not Vedic bhakti. Forget about Vedic bhakti. I call it the ritual of rituals when the Gopīs are attending on the divine couple who are resting after the peak of dance, these are their stations, carefully designed and assigned to them. This is the place of music and dance. So, in 1990 we have to have a grand musical celebration, a great dance celebration. We will remove obnoxious tubelights, flushlights, torches and so on. No amplification is required here. The best musicians and dancers should assemble in this place in 1990. This is also the place of *Vicāra-sūtra*. When *Caitanya-caritāmṛta* is commissioned, the great theologian says, in the very beginning, "I am not writing the biography. I am giving the *amṛta* of a biography." That means that the biography is a theological work. So, when he comes here, a big *vidvatsabhā* is held. He gathers all the paṇḍitas of the Braj area, and he seeks permission from each paṇḍit and scholar: "shall I write the biography of Caitanya or not and in what fashion should I write it?" This is all given in the *Caitanya-caritāmṛta* and the *Bhakti-ratnākara* also

documents this same event, and *Govindadeva* had the place of honour as the *vidvatsabhā* centre. But intellectual, aesthetic and religious processes always stand on the two columns of money and power. We cannot get away from these two pillars of reality. And this temple is a symbol of that. If Caitanya had not played a power game, this temple would have never come up. So, we should not let this year go by without celebration. That is why I brought you here.

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## SESSION VII

Chairman: Friends, I think, we can now start this morning's session. Yesterday we had explored the idea, the feeling that underlies the seeking of bhakti. What sort of feeling is it? How can it be understood? Is it trans-cultural or it is culture-bound? And, we had explored the possibility that feelings, though characterized in terms of the objects or the situations in the context of which they arise, may also be characterized in terms of their own intrinsic properties and qualities. We had also explored the possibility of understanding bhakti as the seeking of freedom, absolute freedom, in the realm of feeling from its dependence on any object whatsoever. Normally we say that feelings are dependent on situations or on aesthetic objects or even on nature.

Now, before we start a discussion on issues 5 and 8 today, which are listed, I would like to say that issue number 5 takes up the question as to what place any thought which considers bhakti as central, gives to knowledge or action on the one hand and to pure reason on the other. Issue number 8 is how the notion of impersonal obligation to institutions, ideas, norms and values is accommodated in bhakti thought. Any thought about bhakti has to take into account these two problems. That is, if you are a bhakta, you may not worry about it. But, if you think of bhakti as an ideal which ought to be pursued by human beings, then you have to

pursued by human beings, then you have to relate it to the demands of reason on the one hand and of action on the other, and not merely to the demands that are made by reason and action, but also of the norms or the impersonal ideals which are involved in reason and action. The norms in action are in the form of morality and norms in the field of reason are the cognitive demands for objectivity, universality, verifiability, etc. Now, for any comprehensive thinking about human life and situation which places bhakti as the central *puruṣārtha*, we will have to take into account its relation to these, and if we cannot relate it to these, then there will be a basic deficiency in it. The bhakta may not care, but any *thinking* about bhakti which treats it to be the *parama* puruṣārtha has to take these into account.

Before inviting you to discuss these issues, there are two preliminaries. Firstly, I call upon Dr. Mukund Lath to explicate a possibility, which is there in the bhakti tradition of defining feelings not in terms of objects but in terms of their own qualities. I also request Dr. K.L. Sharma to give you a brief indication of Prof. K.C. Bhattacharya's thought on the ideal which is involved in self-consciousness about the life of feelings which is related to the ideal of bhakti in his thought.

Dr. Mukund Lath: In the Alankāra-śāstra there is a conception which might suggest an understanding of feeling not related to objects. There is a very interesting view in Kavikarṇapūra where the old śāstra has been formulated into a kind of generative formula



so that if it is used in different ways it will give rise to different effects. I think, I will go to the board and try and explain as briefly as possible what he is trying to do. Though what he is trying to do is not really new, still the articulation is new. I do not know if someone else has articulated it this way. But Kavikarṇapūra has certainly articulated it in a manner which seems to be new. But I am sure many of you will be able to point out if it is really new or not.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Give the name of the text also.

Dr. Mukund Lath: I cannot refer to the verse exactly. But there is a place where Kavikarṇapūra played around with the idea of feelings organised in different ways. He suggests various ways of putting them together so as to give rise to different effects and wholes. In fact, he made formulae for mixing them, which are very interesting. He says that basically feelings have three *avasthās*. That is, there is a *avasthā* of *udaya*. Feelings arise, and there is an *avastha* of *paraśama*. They subside. We all feel it. Feelings rise and fall. There is an *avasthā* in which they come together. Kavikarṇapūra thinks of it not only as *sandhi*, where they fuse, but also as *śabala*, where they don't, although, I think, the difference between *sandhi* and *śabala* is not important. Kavikarṇapūra constructs sixteen formulae for the manner they may be combined. So, you can have sixteen positions. They are put into four sets depending upon which comes at the end *udaya*, *praśama*, *sandhi* or *śabala*. Kavikarṇapūra composes short verses where he shows how this can be done. Within

*śabala* or *sandhi*, he says, there can be two ways in which different feelings are associated, and that is, that the feelings are not related to each other or there may be another position where the feelings seem to be related, that is, where one is felt as arising out of the other or they go with each other. In some positions you can also have feelings that do not go with each other. Then he gives us verses. Most of us are familiar with the themes he chooses. I do not remember all of them. There is, for example, a situation, which is so common in Sanskrit poetry. *Rādhā* is waiting at night for *Kṛṣṇa*, and he has not come. It is too late. So, she says, "I am sure he is not going to come now." This is the *praśama*, he says, of one emotion. There was *samśaya* in her mind whether he will come or not. That *samśaya* is now over. Now *krodha* arises, and she says, "he must be spending the night somewhere else." This is said out of *krodha*, and the *krodha* becomes more intense because she says: "Not a single night of his goes to waste (he spends them with someone or another)." Suddenly, she sees him coming and then she is confused. A number of emotions arise together. There is a *sandhi* or a *śabala*. She is happy, but at the same time she has another *samśaya*, "*usne sun to nahīn liyā*", because he had come quite near. Then he comes and embraces her, and she swoons. So, at the end there is again *praśama*. This is how Kavikarṇapūra proceeds; he has formulae, which are combinations of his four *avasthās* for putting feelings together in order to give rise to different moods, one might say. The interesting thing is that this is a part of bhakti poetry. *Kṛṣṇa* is taken to be the *nāyaka*

and Rādhā the nāyikā. This is a very interesting way of doing things, and it is a part of the tradition. The point is that such things can be done within the tradition. What Karṇapūra does is to give a list of fixed bhāvas. But the list can be increased. He says that it is with these bhāvas that you can play around.

I was wondering, though, how all this is related to bhakti because when I was reading it, I thought Kṛṣṇa is nāyaka and Rādhā is nāyikā, but they are no more than nāyaka-nāyikā. I don't think Karṇapūra has pointed out how his formulae are to be related to bhakti. Dr. Basu was saying yesterday that there is a stage where you can kind of change gears and move in from an ordinary kind of emotional organisation into bhakti. I was wondering how this can be done with Karṇapūra's combinations of feelings.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: This was just to make us aware of the work in the light of which the problem may be tackled. But as far as I can see, it does not really get away from the objective situations in the context of the arousal of feelings. So, it does not help us in going in the direction where we want to go. Perhaps no one has done it. So, we have to do it ourselves, and the job is for all of you to do it when you go home.

Prof. Dwivedi: About what he has said, I would like to say that the whole framework is already old. You know the eight kinds of rasa, *rasābhasa*, *bhāvābhāsa*, *śānti* or *praśama*, etc. are of eight kinds from which this framework is taken. Actually in śabala itself we have a combination of all these things. So, with each

bhāva there is a rising of another bhāva, and it is supported by another one. There is the rise and fall or the rise and disappearance of one feeling giving rise to another. That is the very characteristic of bhāva itself. But, of course, the application of this to bhakti is new.

Dr. Pande: I wonder if he has really been able to do that.

Shri Shrivatsa: Yes, it is new. But one has to transfer from this laukika level to the *pāralaukika* level. Bhakti belongs to the *pāralaukika* level, not to the laukika level. Though bhakti is considered a feeling, that feeling is not like other feelings, other mundane feelings. It is not mundane. It is a *pāramāthika* feeling, an attachment to the Paramātma itself. That is the highest goal, we can say. Therefore, when we have to talk on another plane, it cannot be on the laukika plane.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Thank you very much. Dr. Vohra, you want to say something.

Dr. Vohra: I just wanted to say that we all agree that when we talk about bhakti, we are not talking about any of the laukika feelings. But when we come to describe those feelings, then, we will have to speak in terms of something, which we all know. And the purpose of Mukundji's making this distinction was that we have now a framework, in which there can be sixteen types of feelings. Can we describe bhakti as any one of these kinds? Which one of these will come close to it? I think that was the point.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: I would like to make only one suggestion. The terms 'laukika' and 'alaukika' are used both in the tradition and in our own language commonly. But what exactly is the distinction? I think, we use the words without being quite clear about the distinction. What is alaukika? Can anything that we are talking about be alaukika? Anything that has been written about, anything that has got a tradition? Surely to say that it is alaukika is merely to make a distinction between two forms of laukika. Anything, which is alaukika cannot be talked about or discussed, not even be known. Therefore, the distinction between laukika and alaukika falls within what may be called the broad framework of laukika itself.

Secondly, if laukika means that which is spatio-temporal, then anything where the spatial or temporal or sensuous or sensible characteristics do not apply, will necessarily be alaukika, But that many other things will become alaukika besides the spiritual experience. Take, for example, mathematics or reason, which is not sensuous or take the ideal forms, which are also not sensuous.

The point I am making is that when we are thinking, there are compulsions of thought. And one compulsion of thought is to be critical or self-critical about the dichotomies that have been made in the tradition itself. And I will say that the distinction between laukika and alaukika which is usually made, is a defence mechanism against a cognitive difficulty. Whenever a cognitive difficulty is pointed out, a refuge is taken in that. One says this is alaukika,

but the person who says this argues against his opponent and makes use of laukika language all the time. So far as laukika and alaukika are concerned, they are clear whether we write in Sanskrit or in Hindi or any other language. But when we translate them into English or any other language, it carries us away from the concept. That is what I feel.

Dr. Lath: Alaukika is an experience, which you cannot perhaps infuse into others, where you cannot make another person have the same kind of experience.

Prof. Daya Krishna: This is true of all experiences.

Dr. Lath: It is true perhaps about experience as such. Can I put it this way? There are two ways in which the term laukika is used. I think, what we are doing here is to confuse two levels, the level of experience and the level of description. As long as you are trying to explain the pāramārthika level in terms of vyāvahārika language, it is laukika in a certain sense. But to the persons who have experienced it, the reality is at the experiential level; it is alaukika. He will not be able to give it the same dimension once he comes down to the laukika level because he has to use a laukika language.

Dr. Pande: Would it not make all experiences that I have alaukika experiences?

Dr. Rukmini: No, not at all. Our attempt is to see if there is a level of feeling, which is not laukika. Laukika means the way we normally feel, the man-woman relationship, for example. Now in bhakti, if it is possible to have a feeling, which can transcend that, even

though we can only give examples of it from this world, it is alaukika in character. One may, of course, say that that is also a laukika level, but no one is going to believe you. This has to be an alaukika level of experience. But on the other hand, even if we are willing to conceive that these experiences are slightly different from what you and I have, how do you establish that they are really alaukika in character? You can't. The very fact that you are in a laukika state shows that you can only talk in a laukika way.

Prof. Sastry: The point is philosophical, and it needs serious thought. What is alaukika? Even alaukika is being talked in anti-alaukika terms? That is a fundamental philosophical question. Shrivatsa Gosvāmī explained the difference between laukika and alaukika from the traditional point of view. That does not minimize the fundamental philosophical question that was raised. Even if we go by the tradition, alaukika is felt by laukika persons. So, to what extent is it alaukika? This difference between the laukika and alaukika cannot be insisted upon too rigidly.

May I draw to your attention the way in which the Liṅgāyatas have made the distinction between the laukika and the alaukika? They equate them with *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. An expert has a better view of things without going through the processes which an ordinary man has to go through. He has a quicker, more refined, subtle perception than ordinary people. Similar is the case with a *siddha*. Between the *sādhaka* and the *siddha*, there is also this distinction and it corresponds to

laukika and alaukika. The former is already given to many while the latter is given to only a few. It has been very clearly brought out by the Liṅgāyatas that the difference is between ordinary and extraordinary. That is with regard to the process. The process in the context of bhakti will thus be an extraordinary rather than ordinary process.

However from the view-point of Alaukāra-śāstra, the difference will only be in the viśaya of feeling. The laukika tattva and the alaukika tattva are different only in the sense that the feeling is directed towards the divine or even towards the guru. That is from the point of view of the Alaukāra-śāstra. What is not commonly shared, must be talked of as being something different from the ordinary. So, it is the direction of the feeling toward God or towards other objects. But in Alaukāra, the process and that towards which the feeling is directed are considered to be alaukika not because they are pāramārthika. There is a difference between the pāramārthika and the vyāvahārika. One is real, and the other is unreal. The condition of bhakti is not about which one may make a distinction between the real and unreal. This difference is not allowed because this tradition is like that of the Tantra. It is not the Advaita Vedānta of Śāṅkara; it is something different, something more.

In Alaukāra-śāstra, they saw that the feelings of a human being are ordinarily directed towards other human beings.

If they are directed towards God or divinity, then they are different. That is why we can explain in the Bhāgavata context: *prīti*,

bhaya, kāma, krodha, or any other feeling can be bhakti. There is no difference in feelings; these are actual, separate feelings, but directed towards the higher self. But then the *santa* traditions will also have to be explained, not merely those of bhakti, but of guru-bhakti. Guru-bhakti is the most important part of the whole saintly and bhakti tradition. So, it is not merely God alone, but first the actual God in human form in guru-bhakti. I would say that there is no distinction between laukika and alaukika, vyāvahārika or pāramārthika in the context of bhakti which is delineated in the Bhāgavata. But there is uniqueness about it. If one having a common headache, the common headache, it is not an alaukika headache. What is alaukika? An experience, which is ordinarily never there. It comes as a flash on its own. If the feeling called headache, for examples, is uncommon, it will be called alaukika. Tāntrics give different names to different stages. All these may be hallucinations, but they are unique. So, this distinction, I think, in a real distinction in the broader bhakti culture. The difference is a more refined, subtle feeling which can give you real perception. If this is so, all the perceptions beyond the ordinary perception may be regarded as alaukika.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Thank you. I think, there are three different senses of the terms, 'laukika, alaukika'. One is ordinary, the other, extraordinary. Another is that which is directed to ordinary objects of human experience and that which is directed towards what may be transcendental Īśvara, God, or a transcendent being. The third is a

distinction between the unreal and the real, between vyāvahārika and the pāramārthika in the sense of reality, that which is really real and that which is apparently real. These are three different senses. Each of them is legitimate in some context.

Another very important thing is whether there is a continuum between the laukika and the alaukika or there is a radical break, that is, whether we move, from an ordinary, usual experience of ours to a more, higher or deeper level of experience. Is there continuity in it? If there is radical break, then no comparison is possible.

Prof. Dwivedi: There is another distinction, which is very common in the tradition, which has not been pointed out, and it is called 'lokottara', and that is in the rasa tradition. It is a common term in that tradition. It is not called 'alaukika' as such but called, 'lokottara'. You can call it 'alaukika' where the same feelings are separated from their laukika context because the context becomes a drama or poetry or *sāhitya*. There is a kind of distancing. Feelings are not felt to be one's own feelings. This is called 'lokottara'. But this is not the lokottara of bhakti though they use this term. What is the 'lokottara' of bhakti? That is the question. If it is not rasa, if it is not ordinary, is it the extraordinary connected with the ordinary? What is meant by it? Usually one thinks of a break. But what kind of a break is it? That is the question.

Prof. Daya Krishna: I think, the other part of the question will be: What is the difference, if any, between the lokottara

where the object of feeling is not an ordinary thing? Virtually, an art object creates it and the feelings generated by it develop around it. But how are the feelings whose object is the ultimate reality or impersonal God or Īśvara, different from the feelings aroused by the imaginative creation of man? What is the distinction between the lokottara and alaukika? Is the distinction being drawn in terms of the objects from which the feeling arises or in the context in which it arises?

Prof. Dwivedi: Rasa experience is lokottara. It is also called alaukika by the Alaukikas. They use it in the same sense. What they mean is that the elements that give rise to these situations presented in poetry or drama are alaukika in the sense that they are removed from individual associations.

So, this kind of feeling is the result of generalization, which is not present at the ordinary laukika level. There is a process of generalization which operates in the field of poetry and drama, and though generalized there is a suggestion or the rousing of the bhāva and that experience is known as rasa and it is lokottara in that sense. The distinction may be drawn in terms of the comparison that is made between *brahmāsvāda* and *rasāsvāda*. *Rasāsvāda* is not considered to be *brahmāsvāda*: "*brahmāsvāda sadṛśāntu brahmāsvāda eva*." That being the case, what is the difference between *rasāsvāda* and *brahmāsvāda*?

Dr. U.C. Sharma: What about Kṛṣṇāsvāda?

Dr. Krishna Sharma: Is there difference between *rasāsvāda* and *bhaktirasāsvāda*?

Prof. Dwivedi: Maybe. Whatever it be, '*brahmāsvāda sahodara*' is the phrase used by Abhinava Gupta and others for *rasa*. Now, what is *brahmāsvāda*? The main difference between *brahmāsvāda* and *rasāsvāda* is, as pointed out by Abhinava-pādācārya himself, that the *āsvāda* or relish of *rasa* continues as long as a work of art is experienced. When that disappears, then the *āsvāda* also disappears. But *brahmāsvāda* is not of this kind. *Brahmāsvāda* is something which is permanent. Once you get it, you can always come down from that level and then think of this world and go back again to it, revert back to that level. Whatever it is, it is permanent and not something, which one can achieve one day and lose the next.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Thank you. I think, it is an interesting discussion. Therefore, I will like it to continue for a little more time.

Just now a question arose in my mind that if we see the distinction between *laukika jñāna* and *alaukika jñāna* or knowledge of the empirical and rational on the one side and knowledge of the transcendental on the other, then one distinction usually pointed out is that there are relevant criteria for determining what is true and false or what is correct or incorrect in the realm both of the empirical and the rational. But in the realm of the transcendental or the transcendent, no relevant criteria are there. That is, we do not know how to determine whether one view about the transcendent is really correct or incorrect, true or false.

Now, similarly, would it be correct to say that while in the realm of the *laukika*

feelings, there are criteria related to society or whatever to determine that these are desirable, undesirable, correct or incorrect, in other words, should they be there or should they not be there? In the realm of the arts, there are some criteria for determining whether one's response to the object is adequate or not. One may be admiring something and considering it to be very beautiful, but someone can say the thing has not been seen correctly, or that the response is inadequate or incorrect or not fitting to the object? In the case of a transcendent object of feeling, can there be any criterion of adequacy or inadequacy, correctness or incorrectness? Is there a parallel with the transcendent as an object of knowledge and the transcendent as an object of feeling? In other words, do we have any criteria for determining and deciding the adequacy or inadequacy of the response to the transcendent in terms of feeling. If anyone would like to carry this discussion further, I shall be very happy.

Prof. Mishra: Prahlāda precisely and significantly makes a distinction between lokottara bhakti and alaukika bhakti. He says:

या प्रीतिः लौकिकविषये वर्तते सा प्रीतिः लौकिकप्रीतिः, सा एव प्रीतिः  
यदि कृष्णपरमात्मने वर्तते तदा सा प्रीतिः अलौकिकभक्तिः। विषयभेदेन लौकिक-  
अलौकिकयोः भेदः।

Prof. Pande: I wish to make a few points. Picking up from Daya Krishnaji's last remark, I was just wondering if we can also try to free ourselves a little from the categories and the structures provided by cognitive concepts and try to move towards the realm of feeling a little more. I think, one kind of structure provided by the bhakti mārga

will be helpful, and that is, when we talk about bhakti, we have many levels: the basic, the lowest level is bhakti itself and the discipline of bhakti, both included.

Why bhakti? Bhakti is important for a seeker in the early stage. But, then, there is a bhakti in itself itself. The feeling becomes the discipline as well as the feeling itself. Ācāryas called it 'rāgānugā'. That gives us loosely two realms, the empirical and the transcendent.

But then we are stuck with the main problem: Is there a link between the two? That is what we are trying to tackle this morning. I think, the clue is very much there in the discipline of rāgānugā. Here is a novice; he is somebody who is in the vyāvahārika realm, trying to devote himself to the ideal which is transcendent. How does he do it? Is it possible? So, I think, that is the rāgānugā, the rāga, the feeling in itself becomes his by the ideal, the model. There is a kind of jump from the mundane or the laukika to the lokottara. In between these is the realm, which is very important and crucial. I do not know whether we can translate it in cognitive terms, but for the experiential domain of feeling, the realm is very important. It is like the concept of Īśvara in Śaṅkarācārya. We have the jagat, which is vyāvahārika. Then we have the pāramārthika brahma and the link between them is provided by the guru or Īśvara or whatever. So, in the realm of bhakti, two poles, vaidhī bhakti and rāgātmikā bhakti and rāgānugā is the connecting link.

Prof. Daya Krishna: What is the distinction between rāgānugā and rāgātmikā?

Prof. Pande: Rāgātmika actually pertains to archetypes, the goals, the prīti or the rasa or the bhāva in itself, the absolute end or rasa-rāja in mahābhāva, which a seeker cannot have. But he can always try to follow them as patterns.

Dr. Vohra: Is it a paradigm?

Prof. Pande: Yes, it is a paradigm. Rāgātmikā is the paradigm, and rāgānugā is the seeker's way of approaching it.

Dr. Lath: What about mahābhāva?

Prof. Pande: The mahābhāva and also the rasa-rāja. Mahābhāva, of course, is Rādhā. The rasa-rāja is Kṛṣṇa. These are the paradigms, and the relation, and the feeling generated out of that. There will be a kind of *anurāgopāsanā* if you try to be in the rāgātmika. Only the ideal, the model, the players can do that. Only *naiṣṭhikī siddhi parikaras* can do that. But we are all seekers and intellectual seekers at that. So, in that reflective mode, I think, the rāgānugā is the crucial thing even for a philosophical enquiry.

Shri Shrivatsa: Now I shall try to throw some light on the distinction between laukika and alaukika. I totally agree with Prof. Daya Krishna that just from one point of view the distinction itself is a distinction within laukika itself. But, I think, there are some other considerations. To make a distinction, I shall not use the words 'laukika' and 'alaukika' but I may use the words, 'para' and 'apara'. However, what is above *prakṛti*?

So, here, I think, the distinction is between the realm of *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* consists

of these three guṇas, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. If you do not admit this metathesis, then, of course, it is a different thing. But if you accept it, then the realm of *pratīti* consists of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* and whatever we do, whatever *śāstra* we compose, even the Vedānta-*śāstra* will have to partake of these guṇas. Vivekānanda once said that at one stage the Vedas themselves are also set aside. Now, these are all works within the realm of *prakṛti*. But there is a realm above the *prakṛti*. That appears in the heart of the bhakta.

Now, the fundamental thing that we should note here, I think, is this. Prof. Gaurav was asking me, 'is my love for you empirical or not; is it laukika or alaukika?' This thought of love, the bhāva or the rati or the *prema*, whichever word I may use, is altogether a different sort of thing. That we have to note first. The bhakti which Śrī Caitanya used to speak of is altogether a different sort of thing. The first characteristic so far as I think, I do not know whether I am correct or not, is that the ego is totally dissolved. Unless we break the ego first, we can never imagine what bhakti is. The laukika bhakti we can very well understand. But the ego is to be first dissolved. When it is dissolved, then, it is not 'my' love towards something. There is no 'me'. There is no 'I'. That is the most important point. The love, which the Vaiṣṇavas speak of, is the *āhlādinī śakti* of Śrī Kṛṣṇa himself. I have no capacity to love him unless he bestows his grace on me. He appears to me in the form of love. A śloka is to be found in the *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu* that once one has



transcended this realm of what I call prakṛti, Mahāśakti appears. The prema is of the nature of *vilāsa*, play. Play of whom? Of the Mahāśakti, the great omnipotent being herself. That love, that prema appears in the heart of the bhakta in different forms.

I do not know whether I have been able to clarify anything or not. But I have tried to say that first, the human is not there, the ego is dissolved, the love is the play of the Lord himself. *Mahāśakti vilāsakāmā*. It is the *vilāsa* of Mahāśakti.

In this context there is just one point more, and I shall end after that. That is, even this *nāma*, this *Hare Kṛṣṇa, Hare Kṛṣṇa, Kṛṣṇa, Kṛṣṇa, Hare Hare*, etc., the bhakta, the true Vaiṣṇava, would say that this *nāma* is of the nature of this empirical realm itself; even this *nāma*, not to speak of the mahābhāva, which is of the nature of the *vilāsa* of the Mahāśakti, the *āhlādinī śakti* of Sadāśiva himself. It is said at one place in the *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu* that it just appears. So long as we have the agency, the ego is there and I may utter certain words, but that is not *nāma*. The *nāma* really appears in the heart of the bhakta, and that name, they say, is the real, '*nāma nāmino abhinnaḥ*', *nāma* and the *nāmī*, the Lord himself, *puruṣottama* or *Kṛṣṇa*, by whatever name you may call it. That *nāma nāmino abhinna* if we take it literally, will to be something transcendent, as it is not due to human agency.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Would somebody else like to say something on this issue? Just as we were trying to understand the distinction between the *laukika* and the

*alaukika* and the *lokottara*, now we are attempting to make a distinction in terms of the existence or lack of it in term self agency and egoity. But what is this notion of giving up egoity or the notion of agency? Take, for example, if somebody says that agency or freedom is an illusion, (*guṇā guṇeṣu vartante iti matvā na sajjate*). There is an obvious contradiction here: *guṇa guṇeṣu vartante*. Then I do not do anything. Scientists say the same thing. The scientists or the deterministic scientists say that I am determined, that it is an illusion to say 'I am free', 'I am choosing'. Suppose I take the scientific viewpoint and internalize it, realize it, actualize it, and somebody tells me, 'you have done it', and I reply, 'you are a fool. I have not done it; nobody has done it'. This in fact, links up with the issues we have been discussing. How in the thought, which denies agency, which denies responsibility, which denies that one is responsible for what one has done, that one has to take the punishment or the praise for what one has done. If I say, I have not done it, I am not responsible, then who can punish me? What is the reality of agency or its *sattā*? How can we have the *karma-siddhānta* if there is no agency. If the *sattā* of *karma* does not exist, then how can we have the notions of 'responsibilities' or 'liabilities'. If the denial of the notions of agency, egoity and responsibility is the basis of the distinction between the *laukika* and the *alaukika*, then it obviously needs to be explored further.

Dr. Rukmini: Mr. Chairman, I have just one thing to say. We have heard what A, B and C have said. Mainly it is an experience. It is

brahmāsvāda, bhāva or rahasyānubhava. I want to take it to another culture. For instance, I am talking about Prince Kakral. People have talked about alaukika or lokottara or brahmāsvāda or bhāva and then, of course, compared it to the laukika. In other cultures also this has happened. Kakral talks about it also. It is a feeling. He says that he was sitting on the seashore, and suddenly he got this overwhelming feeling. Again he is not able to describe it. When you read the *Tao of Physics*, I am sure most of us round the table have read it, you find that here is a person from a totally different culture who is talking in a similar language, even though you may know very little above physics.

So, I just wanted to suggest that there is a stage when it is a leap, like Shrivatsaji said, from one stage to the other. We should be able to experience that leap.

Dr. Vohra: I would only like to add a little to what has already been said. On the one hand we say that it is *acintya*, and yet at the sometime we are giving definitions also. But how do I know that there is really a feeling like that? I know that I am, in fact, rooted in life in space, and that there is a principle, called the identity of indiscernibles. Is it the case that in that stage where one says there is no dualism that the law of identity of indiscernibles does not apply there? But I know that I remain then. We are not saying, "I do not remain any more. I do not exist." Yet at the same time it is being said that 'I am not there'. Shall I, following Rukminiji, say, 'if you cannot speak, you must keep silent'. Whether we just

keep silent or just say that this is something which I cannot talk about, But then, as I said yesterday, why do they want to communicate these things to us? They should just say, 'look, this is something you have to experience yourself'. That is all. But they write; they try to convince us that this is a feeling, which is absolutely different from what anyone has had, and that once one has had this feeling, one will be a different person. But if it is so, then 'I' and 'that feeling' will always be there. At no stage there is the loss of 'egoity' or 'merger' because I remain.

Shri Shrivatsa: Yes, of course, in the Bhakti-śāstra the distinction between the self and the Lord is always to be maintained. In the fifteenth chapter of the Gītā that point has been emphasized. 'ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः।'

And yet, who is that *jīva*? What has become *jīva*? A part of Myself has become *jīva* in the *jīva-loka*. And, all of us know the different kinds of *muktis*: *sālokya*, *sāyujya*, *sahasthiti*, etc. The bhakta does not want any of these kinds of *mukti*. There is a distinction between *mamākāṅkṣā* and *ākāṅkṣā*. Also in the same chapter you will see in the Gītā that there is a distinction within the *acintya*. There is sort of distinction, which we cannot really explain, between the Lord and the *jīva*. They are the same and yet they are distinct.

The second point is this. Why then do we communicate if it is unthinkable? As I have already said, the śāstras are mundane affairs. But why is there this communication? One answer I can suggest is that at least there is the continuity of the self. The self that

enjoys that bhāva at the transcendental level, does not always stay there. It comes down, so to say. And so, we can say, it is because of this continuity of the same self at the two levels, that there is *prapatti*. What is higher than *prapatti*? It is said, this self continues, and that is why when it comes down there is an urge to communicate with others what one has realized in the higher state. But, unfortunately, one fails, and therein lies the tragedy. We try, we attempt to describe it. We can't really define. Logic and all such things are inapplicable in the realm of the *acintya*. But when one returns to the everyday level one again becomes bound by this logic and everything else. So, we create a *śāstra*. We try to make some approach to communicate with others.

Prof. Basu: Then it is not non-egoistic.

Shri Shrivatsa: No. A clear-cut distinction is to be made between the ego and the self. The corresponding notion of ego is *ahankāra*. *Kartāhamiti manyate*, that is *ahankāra*. The self is a part of the Lord. '*Mamaivāṁśaḥ*' as the Lord said. We have to make a distinction between ego on the one hand and the human self on the other and also make a distinction between the human self on the one hand and the ultimate on the other. That is the way in which we should approach this *śāstra*.

Prof. Dwivedi: The distinction between *laukika* and *alaukika*, which we were discussing a few minutes earlier, has a reference to the distinction between bondage and liberation. If you do not keep in view that distinction, probably the meaning of these two terms,

*laukika* and *alaukika*, will not be understood. There are thinkers, there are philosophers who do not believe in liberation at all. Therefore they do not believe in the *alaukika*. The things, which are in some way helpful in making us understand whether we should be in the stage of bondage or are required to get out of it and get liberation are in some way understandable because that topic has been discussed much more than the distinction between *laukika* and *alaukika*. I think the things which help in getting liberation, liberation of any kind proposed by Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja or any other theistic system, those that help in releasing us from our bondage and getting rid of it are *alaukika* and those which take us away from that direction are known as *laukika*. In fact, this subtle demarcating line does not exist. An object can be binding for one but liberating for another. The same object, the same situation can generate a *laukika* feeling in one but an *alaukika* feeling in another. A long discussion has already taken place without really separating the meaning of the two. But so long as we keep in mind some idea of the difference between bondage and liberation, the distinction between *laukika* and *alaukika* is understandable. Otherwise, we may say that what is more understandable or more describable is *laukika*, and *alaukika* is that which is not so well understandable or describable. It transcends our understanding.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Thank you. I think, this is a very good point. That is that the distinction between the *laukika* and the *alaukika* is also to be related to liberation and bondage.

Prof. Pande: We were discussing the distinction between laukika and alaukika in the context of feelings. Perhaps all of us would accept that alaukika is an extraordinary feeling. Something was also said regarding the fact that one cannot always remain at this extraordinary level of feeling. We say that a person becomes liberated to the extent and during the span that he gets the feeling. I think the two are related. But that is also true of other feelings. We feel different as long as the feeling lasts.

One speaks so much of bhakti in historical terms as well as in expository terms. But when it comes to feelings, one always refuses to talk, and generally refers to something, which cannot be described, which cannot be explained. So, in one word, it is like a *svāda* or *rasa*. We can look at the problem from different angles. If we are looking at it from the *svāda* angle, there is a very clear reply which was given by Kabir. He says that it is like a taste tasted by a dumb person. The person cannot describe it, so he refuses to describe it.

Shri Shrivatsa: But what about Bhakti-śāstra? I would like to repeat what I said yesterday. When Bengalis talk of the Bhakti-śāstra, they are talking of the Bhakti-śāstra in their tradition. Although the Bhakti-śāstra has emerged out of the Vaiṣṇava tradition in general. Bhakti, taken in totality, has many components.

Dr. F.E. Krishna: This was also in my mind. But the fact is that there are so many people who have had the experience. Whether they cannot describe it or they do not want to

describe it, I do not know. But are there are limits to language itself? Are there certain areas of our experience which language cannot express? There are scholars who have been working on biographies of saints. In Bangalore earlier this year I met Professor Pandurangi who was kind enough to take us to his personal library. I asked him if he had any texts on this subject. He told me, yes, he had. There are texts in which scholars have given their own religious experiences. It is very very interesting to know how far they are able to express this experience. Anyway, the question is: Are there limits to language?

Dr. Mukund Lath: I think it is a very interesting point, which she has raised, whether there are limits to language. But even if there are, can we know them? Can bhakti not express itself in other forms. Or, are there not only the limits of language but limits of expression itself.

One of the points that was raised was about *nirahaṅkāra*. I would like to add something to what has been said about *rasa*, because *rasa* seems even in the śāstras to be closest, as they say, to what can be described as bhakti. One of the things that is said about *rasa*, as to why it is not Brahman and is only the *sahodara*, is that the former is *nirviṣaya*. Is there, then, always a *viṣaya* in *rasa*? But is it true of bhakti, too? That is the problem. One can imagine Brahman as *nirviṣaya*. *Rasa*, on the other hand, is always *saviṣaya*. That is why when the *viṣaya* is not there, you do not have *rasa*. *Brahmajñāna* is *nirviṣaya*. That is one definition given. There

may be others. But this is certainly one of the definitions given.

Supposing we explore it this way, supposing we say that bhakti is a feeling which is *nirālamba*, *nirviṣaya*. Where would it lead us? Of course, bhaktas do not say that. It does not matter what they say. I am not concerned with that. If we can do that with *jñāna*, we can think of consciousness as being limited by *viṣaya* in such a way as not to be itself. After all when we are conscious, we are always conscious of a *viṣaya*, yet we can think of those *viṣayas* as limiting our consciousness. Logically, this leads to the concept of consciousness in itself, a *nirviṣaya* consciousness. Now the same can be done with feeling. Feeling always has an object. So, I could think of the object of feeling as limiting my feeling and think of a *nirālamba* feeling, or *nirviṣaya* feeling, you might say.

Shri Shrivatsa: Actually I do not want to prevent what Dr. K.L.Sharma has been waiting to give us this morning, but just to pick up on what Francine led us to, this whole question of the limits language (Mukundji also referred to it) I think, we are again limiting ourselves to the cognitive domain of expressions. When we are reflecting upon the realm of feeling, then, we have to see the possibilities, of non-cognitive language, or what is the medium or the media possibilities of non-cognitive communication. The whole aesthetic discipline is there and the body language, the language of music, dance, painting or anything. That is also expression. That is why poetry and music is always taken

as the language of communication in the realm of feeling. That is what the basic core of bhakti philosophy actually is. That is my conviction. Although it is a little bit unconventional, I am bound to fill in the gap so that there is a communication possible between the philosophers of feeling, the philosophers of, say, the objective realm and the philosophers of the subjective realm. So, that was a very crucial move the philosophers of bhakti made. They are trying to communicate also. They did not try to reflect just on what feeling is but they also try to use a language and adopt a methodology and symbolism and thought categories where they could also be meaningfully understood by, say Naiyāyikas or the Vedāntins, I mean the Advaita Vedāntins or even the Buddhists. It is thus a very important and a courageous move on the part of the bhakti philosophers to engage in that kind of exercise. So, it is again a realm of *bhedābheda*. They are trying to do something, which is almost impossible, because it seems a contradiction in terms in the context of cognitive discourse. They use a language, a structure, which is essentially non-feeling if not anti-feeling. But still they do venture in that direction drawing from the realm of, say, *kīrtana*, poetry and *bhāva* and *bhakti* and *rāga* and *bhoga* and *pūjā*. All are expressions of that feeling. That, I think, is language. *Smaranam kīrtanam viṣṇoḥ*. It is not only discipline, but if you see it in the reverse order, it is a mode of communicating that feeling. So that we have to see and try to keep that in mind and then we will come to K.C. Bhattacharya's propositions and where we have scholars who have enlarged the theme of

K.C. Bhattacharya like Kalidas Bhattacharya or T.R.V. Murti and so on. Then we have to see these other different possibilities and try to envisage feeling as a realm, which both includes and transcends all these. That is what I think. As an alternate path they are O.K. But when one sees feeling as something which is inclusive and still transcendent, the possibilities of just the pure objective or just the pure subjective is not very meaningful because when we are talking of Śrī Rādhā as āhlādinī śakti, the parāśakti, the supreme, the prema in itself, *premā śakti*, which is also the *premā bhakti*. But what is *premā bhakti*? The essential definition of *premā bhakti* is that this āhlādinī śakti includes and transcends the *samvit* and the *sandhunī*. The existential domain and what you call the domain of consciousness is a partial manifestation of āhlādinī śakti. Āhlādinī is simply not possible if the *sandhunī* and the *samvit* are not there. That is from the context of understanding it. But from the ontological point of view, it is āhlādinī in which the *sandhunī* and the *samvit* are grounded.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: It is 11-30. Now it is for you to decide whether we should have coffee break and then continue the discussion. If there is a brief intervention, it can be made. Otherwise, we should break for coffee. I would only remark that we have discussed the limits of communication in all thought, not merely language, which is continuously overcome by artists and by others. But we should reflect also on the need to communicate and the presuppositions of this need to communicate. Realized persons also want śiṣyas, they search for them. When one

sees the life of Ramakrishna, one continuously finds that seekers want a person, that there is a need to communicate. What does it presuppose and what happens to egoity? Certainly there is a distinction between self and egoity. The distinction perhaps is more of a moral distinction than an epistemological distinction, I mean an ontological distinction. When I use the word 'ego', I want to communicate a negative sense. When I say 'self', it is a more neutral thing. So, we should not bring moral connotations of egoism into the discussion, if the discussion is primarily ontological or epistemological in nature.

But we must have a coffee break now.

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## SESSION VIII

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: A number of friends have suggested that they would like to visit the Oriental Research Institute and the libraries, etc. here. So, it has been decided that we will close this session at 12-45. Lunch will be served then and by 1-30 at the latest, those who want to visit may please gather in the lounge, in the hall or at the gate. Arrangement shall be made for transportation there. But we must return by 3-00 O'clock for the afternoon session.

Well, friends, we have been discussing bhakti and the nature of feelings and the philosophy around it for the last two days. I think one of the most creative thinkers of India did pay some attention to this and more people should know about it. It is unfortunately true that even in Bengal people have not really paid attention to the work of Prof. K.C. Bhattacharya, let alone develop it further.

I started this seminar on the first day by saying that we have to develop a living relationship with the past tradition of this country, and I have tried to articulate what a living relationship means. But I must further add that we have to make a living relationship with the contemporary present or the recent past also. If we do not pay attention to our thinkers, if we do not take seriously what they say, if we do not develop it further, if we do not criticize it or modify it, how can

we build any tradition? The utter neglect in this country of not only our traditional thinkers but of our recent thinkers is appalling. I cannot really find a word to express my indignation, anger and surprise at the fact that even the works that have been done in India since the 19th century onwards have not been paid attention to by subsequent thinkers. Everyone seems to be writing in a vacuum. I do not need to go into details, but I can document it if somebody wants me to. We have not built on the works that have been written. Somehow, everyone goes on writing about Śāṅkara; everybody goes on translating the bhāṣyas and the vārtikas and the ṭīkās; everybody goes on doing it as if nobody has done it before. You have to build on what other people have done and carry it forward. This is the only way a tradition is made.

I am now requesting Dr. K.L. Sharma to give a brief presentation of K.C. Bhattacharya's thought on bhakti. It is difficult to characterize it, as he is a very difficult thinker.

Dr. K.L.Sharma: First of all some questions. They are not directly related to K.C. Bhattacharya's views. I am raising some different questions, and then I shall begin my presentation.

Suppose some behavioural psychologist were present here, and tells us that bhakti is emotion; he would then explain emotion purely in terms of the stimulus-response pattern. He would say that there is a stimulus, and then a response and change in the voice and the facial expressions and so on and so forth. However, some other emotion theorist might say

that there is stimulus, response and there is also feeling. For example, when one is angry or in love, one is also aware that one is angry or in love. But the behaviourist will not accept this. In bhakti we are not concerned with stimulus and response. We are thinking about feeling, what type of feeling it is, what kind of expression. Just now something was said about *nāmajapa*. How would one distinguish between real *nāmajapa* and just conditioning as habit pattern? For the behaviourist, it is a kind of a defence mechanism. We will, therefore, have to distinguish *nāmajapa*, and find how it is different from conditioning or from a habit pattern.

We have already discussed the difference between *laukika* and *alaukika*. Dr. Daya Krishna just asked if there is a dichotomy between *laukika* and *alaukika*, or whether there is a continuum between them. K.C. Bhattacharya suggests that there is a continuum between the *laukika* and the *alaukika*. He suggests a technique through which these two can be linked together. Pandeji gave an interesting interpretation of *baddha* and *mukta*. K.C. Bhattacharya does not exactly say this, but he is also talking in similar terms. According to K.C. Bhattacharya, it is the freedom of the subject to relate itself to the object. This is one basic assumption of K.C. Bhattacharya.

At three places K.C. Bhattacharya discusses the nature of feeling. In his book, *The Subject as Freedom*, he discusses worldly subjectivity, psychic subjectivity and spiritual subjectivity. Feeling has been discussed there under spiritual subjectivity.

But, there is another discussion, where he talks about feeling. That discussion occurs in his paper on 'The concept of Rasa'. There is also the concept of the absolute and its alternative forms. I would like to say a few things about his article, 'The Concept of Rasa' and then discuss his views on the concept of absolute and its alternative forms.

According to him, if there is no dichotomy then the problem is how to proceed from our direct feelings or primary feelings to the concept of *rasa*. For him, *rasa* is the essence of feeling, and this essence should not be understood as a category of intellect. But, according to him, it is an eternal feeling or an eternal value that is felt. This is how he talks about *rasa*, that it is feeling par excellence and that it stands on a different level from other feelings.

He suggests three types or three levels of feeling: The first is direct feeling, the second level is sympathetic feeling, and the third is the sympathetic feeling aroused by the second level sympathetic feeling itself. Or one may use another terminology: contemplative feeling, sympathetic feeling and primary feeling. Now, how does he distinguish between these three types? According to K.C. Bhattacharya, a direct feeling is, for example, like enjoying an object. Here one may say that both the contributing subject and object are blurred; that in direct feeling, the subject-object relation is a blurred kind of relationship. If the object has some enjoyable qualities the subject will be attracted towards it. Sympathetic joy or feeling is a feeling about somebody else's



feeling. Or, we may say, the object is another's joy or another's feeling. Now, what is happening is that the person who has sympathetic feelings does not lose the sense of distinction between his feeling and the feeling that he is sympathizing with. So, the content of the sympathetic feeling and the feeling of the person are not being confused. He knows that there is a distinction here.

In the third level feeling where the feeling is aroused by the sympathetic feeling at the second level, he refers to the two different levels: of enjoying the direct feeling and the sympathetic feeling which is the object of this direct feeling. Rasa arises at this level. In terms of the object, the gross object is there at the first level of feeling. At the other level, we get distanced from the gross object. There are thus degrees of the object. It gets finer and finer, subtler and subtler. This is the context in which he discusses the concept of rasa.

In another article, 'The Concept of the Absolute and Its Alternative Forms', K.C. Bhattacharya defines the absolute as what is free from implicational dualism. I am using his terminology. It has its own meaning. It will be difficult to discuss all his concepts now. What he says is that when I reflect, reflection gives me the awareness of the relation between the content and consciousness. Mishraji rightly pointed out the other day that the concept of relation is quite important in Indian philosophy. Bhattacharya too has discussed the concept of relation. Consciousness, to begin with, is always a consciousness of some content, and we

are reflectively aware of the content as distinguished from consciousness. Reflection gives us the awareness that the content is different from consciousness. But consciousness has three aspects: knowing, willing and feeling. Even in knowing, according to him, there is a peculiar relationship between the content and consciousness. In willing this relationship differs from what it is in knowing. So also is the case of feeling. For example, in knowing the content is different from consciousness, or rather the content is free from its reference to consciousness. When this content which is related with the consciousness, is completely freed, then, we get the absolute as truth. And absolute is what is free from implicational dualism. And implicational dualism means the relationship between content and consciousness. When it is free, the truth is absolute.

The content in willing, on the other hand, has a very peculiar nature. It is constructed by the will itself. It sets a limit to the will in the sense that the 'will' determines in a sense what is the 'will'. There is another important concept in K.C. Bhattacharya's philosophy. Perhaps, we can understand it in this way. Take for example, the distinction between laukika and alaukika. The question arises: Why should I go from laukika to alaukika? What is the demand? Or what is the process? These are two different questions. In the light of these two questions, if you see K.C. Bhattacharya's thought, you will find that at each level, whether it be the level of knowing or feeling or willing, he talks about a 'demand' at all

these levels. When the content and consciousness are related in 'knowing', then, what is the demand? Why do I want to free the content from the consciousness? Or say, for example, why in 'willing' I want to free the consciousness from the willed object or the known object? As I just said, in 'willing' the content puts a limit on the consciousness, and this limit demands that I must be free from it.

In the same way, we may take the example of feeling. K.C. Bhattacharya says that in feeling, the relationship between content and consciousness is a kind of a unique relationship. But there is a demand here also because consciousness is to be freed from the content. And when the content is freed from consciousness in feeling, that gives, according to him, a new kind of alternate absolute which is different from those which arise in the realms of 'knowing' and 'willing'. So, truth is an alternative absolute for 'knowing', and freedom is the absolute for 'willing', and 'value' is the absolute for feeling.

The problem is: how this implicational relation of content and consciousness 'demands' to be resolved? This is the basic question. For example, I see a beautiful object. Now suppose I want to explain this in terms of whole and part. The whole is felt to be beautiful, but the parts are felt to be indifferent. What is happening is in the realm of feeling I am talking of the content, the content of feeling. The whole is felt to be as beautiful, but the parts are felt to be indifferent, or you may say, they are only

'known' and not felt as beautiful. Such a feeling of their knownness is a part and is necessary for the appreciation of the beauty of the whole. There is knowledge of the parts, and this knowledge is necessary for the feeling of the beauty of the whole. Now, K.C. Bhattacharya speaks of the relation of feeling to contents at one time. This is the feeling of the unity of this content and consciousness. What happens is that the content and consciousness are here fused in the unity of feeling and there is unity between the content and consciousness. So, in the realm of feeling he talks of the unity of the content and consciousness. He must have borrowed the idea in the realm of 'willing' from Hegel and in 'feeling' from Buddhist nihilism and in 'knowing' from Advaita Vedānta.

But the problem is: how to put these things together? He brings in the notion of sādhanā because there is a tension to begin with, and there is the demand before the consciousness to unrelate itself from the content, and the whole process of fulfilling this 'demand' is a process of sādhanā. Unfortunately, I do not remember exactly, but Kalidas Bhattacharya, in his book, *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, has discussed bhakti in detail in the realm of feeling.

Prof. Daya Krishna: I am sure that most of you have got a vague inkling of the complexity of K.C. Bhattacharya's thought and its relevance to the discussion that we are having. Let me give a brief supplement to what Dr. K.L. Sharma has already said.

K.C. Bhattacharya starts with what may be called the problematic of self-consciousness. This is what defines the situation, the human situation. It is not consciousness alone that defines it, but self-consciousness. The moment one becomes aware of being conscious, one is aware of the relation of consciousness to an object. K.C. Bhattacharya calls it 'content', as Dr. K.L. Sharma has said. So, what is one aware of? Self-consciousness is an awareness of the relation of consciousness to an object, that is, to its own content in some form or other.

K.C. Bhattacharya goes on to say that because one is self-conscious, therefore, one is also conscious of the relation between consciousness and its object. It is not the existence of the relation but rather the consciousness of the relation that presents one with three dilemmas or problems demanding to be resolved. One arises in the context of knowledge. When one *knows* an object, one knows simultaneously that as far as the object is concerned, it is not necessary for it to be known. The very notion of knowledge involves this. When one knows something, that which is known need not have been known. There is no necessity for it to enter into the 'knowledge-relationship', and yet it has entered into this relationship, which is clearly contingent for it. So, the object, one might say, really wants to be known as completely dissociated from this relationship.

In the relation of willing or action the situation is just the opposite, because in all action, in all willing, one wants to bring something into being by one's effort, by one's

agency, by one's action. The concept of agency does not exist in the context of knowledge; it is only present in the context of action. And if we have to think about the relation of bhakti to action, the problem will be how to get rid of agency as it seems essential in the context of action. Can agency be really given up in such a context? Here, therefore, the situation seems totally different. In willing, one seeks an omnipotent will, which will create the object completely. And yet the notion of action involves also a resistance, without which there can be no accomplishment. So, in the realm of action, the relation of consciousness to its content is of a totally different kind, than it is in the realm of knowledge.

Now, what about the realm of feeling? In the realms of knowledge and of action, either the subject predominates or the object predominates. In the realm of knowledge the object is all in all. The demand is that the subject should not count at all. We can think of consciousness here as just like a mirror. But a mirror can also distort. So, what shall it be? It should be like nothing. In the realm of action the subject is predominant. The object is subservient. But in the realm of feeling there is an equivalence. The subject and the object are in an equal inter-relationship, an indistinguishable identity, what is called, *bhedābhedā* or *samarasa*.

Therefore, in these three situations, self-consciousness, when it reflects on them, is faced with a problematic situation; it feels three different demands on itself. In the field of knowledge it feels the demand of

complete liberation of the subject from the object. In the realm of willing, the demand is of a complete overcoming of the objecthood of the object. In the realm of feeling it feels the demand for a completely balanced relationship in which consciousness and content are indistinguishable, though the elements should yet be distinguished. It is very interesting here that the demand is for the *relationship* to be indistinguishable but the elements to be distinguishable. What is meant by the relationship being completely balanced between the subject and the object? The relationship should be, he says, indistinguishable, but the relationship should be such that while the elements related should remain clear the relationship should not be so. He is suggesting that human endeavour can be seen as the attempt to realize these three different ideals arising from the very structure of the self-consciousness of man.

I am not quite sure if I have clarified the issue.

Dr. Pande: What you spoke about the knowledge part was not clear.

Prof. Daya Krishna: What I was saying about knowledge is more clear to me than about feeling. That is, in knowledge the object claims independence in the sense that the object is itself and by itself. For it to be known is a purely accidental phenomenon. Being known does not affect it at all. It does not need to be known. This is the presupposition of knowledge, while the presupposition of action is that the object is to be brought into being by one's agency, by one's activity. It depends on us. In knowledge it is

completely independent of the subject which knows it. This is the point.

In any case, I suggest at this point that we have to think about the problem. In the realm of knowledge or action we completely ignore feeling. In knowledge we just want to bring about a state of being which is desirable in the context of knowledge, where we are merely concerned with truth and falsehood. Those who seek knowledge ignore the realm of feelings. What matters to you and me ultimately are feelings. This we all know. There is no doubt about it.

Bhakti is an attempt to build a whole world-view based on the life of feelings, making it central. I suggest, therefore, that it is our task and the task of those who take bhakti seriously to see how it is relevantly related both to the claims of knowledge and the claims of a just society or a moral order. Action means this.

But before asking you to think about and share in thinking about this problem, it just came to my mind that we have been ignoring an aspect of bhakti completely in our discussion. I am surprised that a person like Shrivatsa Gosvāmi should have forgotten this, and it has been left for me to point it out. We were just talking about the problems of communication and the need of communication even in spiritual life. But in bhakti there is a collective community of bhaktas. Bhakti is not an isolated individual thing. Particularly in the Caitanya sampradāya it is not an isolated seeking of the self in relation to the divine alone. Even Kṛṣṇa had to be surrounded by gopīs in the plural. Take *saṅkīrtana*, for

example. I have called our seminars 'bauddhika saṅkīrtana'. I have not propounded the idea yet, but the idea is to see life itself as a bauddhika saṅkīrtana. Saṅkīrtana is where there is a community of bhaktas, the feeling relationship to the Lord is its essential part. This notion of a collectivity, which inter-communicates feelings amongst its members, and by doing so intensifies the feelings of each in relation to the divine principle or order, is what is to be emphasized. What I meant to say was that this community aspect, this collectivity in bhakti is to be emphasized.

So, now the discussion is open.

Prof. Basu: In the context of K.C. Bhattacharya, from the point of view of the content and of consciousness what exactly is possible? The three moves that he has suggested are to know the truth, to strive for freedom and to seek pleasure. That is what we are doing. Suppose there is an aspirant, an individual who wants to know the truth, or to feel pleasure or joy or ānanda or to get liberated or be free. The first problem is how will he know which path would be the most suitable for him or which of the three forms of sādhanā is the most suitable for him?

The next thing is this: Is this dualism between content and consciousness presupposed or is it imaginary? Is it there as a fact? I do not know what forms of sādhanā he prescribes? Is it meant only for intellectuals? For only they can distinguish between content and consciousness. Normally, they make a definite distinction between the object and the subject of feeling or enjoying.

But let me ask, what is the criterion for distinguishing between laukika and alaukika in Bhattacharya's system? What is the criterion for distinguishing between knowing, feeling and willing on the one hand and truth, reason and joy on the other? Are they found in every person or in some very self-conscious persons who are philosophically inclined?

Dr. K.L.Sharma: The answer to the first question is, it is your temperament. K.C. Bhattacharya is not giving a procedure or sādhanā. He is a philosopher in the strict sense of the term. What he is saying is that philosophy starts with reflective consciousness. When I reflect, I find that something is given to me, that I know, or I will, or I feel. Now the issue is that consciousness is involved in these processes. They are all reflective processes also. K.C. Bhattacharya talks about the different reflective stages of these processes. As the degree of subjectivity increases, the degree of objectivity decreases. Suppose I know something. K.C. Bhattacharya would say, 'knowing the content of the known or the object known'. What is the position of the object as it is known in this reflective situation? Suppose I reflect, and find that the object is there, and it is self-sustained. Whether I know it or I do not know it, it makes no difference to it. But all that while my 'knowing situation' is there. The problem is how to overcome this situation by a gradual process? What is the process exactly? Suppose you use a phenomenological analysis. You would proceed from the experience of object and then bracket what is unnecessary and then gradually reach the last extreme step. K.C. Bhattacharya

goes beyond this. In the same way in the realm of feeling, he also talks about the feeling where the object and subject are in balance. Both are necessary. As far as feeling is concerned, it is equally sustained by both. He is simply providing an analysis of experience.

Regarding *sādhana*, you can see he is reflecting on the *sādhana* process. I don't think he is a *sādhaka*. He is not concerned about what some *sādhaka* is doing, but rather with the process of *sādhana* itself. I think, he is reflecting on what the process of *sādhana* implies.

Prof. Daya Krishna: More about content and consciousness. The two are distinguished, though they are known to be related. It was also mentioned that perhaps this idea of content and consciousness, the difference between them and the relation between them, might have been borrowed from Hegel or somebody else. That is what was mentioned during the course of your remarks. But I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in the Indian tradition itself this distinction as well as its relation has been discussed.

But we must remember that the content of knowledge is one thing, and the truth of that knowledge is another thing. Let us take the example of *ghaṭa*. We have to make a distinction between the content *ghaṭa* and a *saṁvit* like *ghaṭajñānavānaḥam*. This distinction and relation is already pictured in the Indian tradition. According to the Naiyāyika tradition this is *prakāratā*. According to the Mīmāṃsaka it is a *saṁvit*.

But, whatever it is, consciousness is what is meant by both.

Further, there is also another idea you mentioned: the parts and the whole. *Lāvanya* is no doubt derived from parts, that is, from limbs. But it has to be accepted as something different from the collection of the limbs. So, that idea is there also in the Indian tradition. Perhaps, K.C. Bhattacharya might have been influenced by these things also. I am not suggesting that he was not influenced by Hegel or somebody else. He might have been influenced by many other things also and these might be another source of his thinking.

Finally, he comes to the three types you referred to: to know, to feel and to will. That is, of course, related rightly to *jñāna*, *bhakti* and *karma*. *Jñāna* is *mukti* from the Advaita point of view. That is, *brahma tattva jñāna*. What is that *brahma tattva* apart from describing Brahman as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*? What else is Brahman there? Therefore, ultimately speaking, the Advaitin will have to accept feeling also. And, if *cit* is to be distinguished from *sat* then, it will have to have an element of *śakti* or willing in it. Therefore, though the three seem to be different, they are the same. Similarly in *sādhana*, *karma*, *jñāna* and *bhakti* seems to be different, but they are all related.

Dr. K.L. Sharma: Actually, for K.C. Bhattacharya, the question whether they are three or one does not arise. For him they are alternative points of view. He will not say that they are three or one.

Prof. Dwivedi: That alternative itself is to be questioned. In the Advaita tradition this question was never raised earlier, whether they are one or they are constituents or attributes of the central main thing. It was just accepted without questioning. The point, however, is why are there only three points of view and not others? Are they components or constituents?

Dr. K.L. Sharma: They are not components.

Prof. Dwivedi: There is a common feeling that *saccidānanda* brahma is the Advaitin's technical expression. Such an expression never occurs in the Upaniṣads. There is no sentence like *saccidānanda brahma*, though we have sentences where we have the word *satyāni*: *satyāni jñānam anantāni*, and so forth.

Prof. Mishra: Yes, but in the Advaitic tradition *saccidānanda* does not occur. Brahman in Advaitic tradition is *anirvacanīya*. Since it is *anirvacanīya*, it cannot be defined. If we are trying to define it, the first and perhaps the best definition may be to try to define it through silence. So, *mauna* is the best possible definition. So, this is the first possible definition, and naturally one is not satisfied with it. So, the second possible definition is through negation: *neti, neti*. But *neti neti* also does not satisfy us; we want something positive. So, then Brahman is described as *sat, cit and ānanda*. But this is with the understanding that this *sat, cit and ānanda* is an expression in the positive way of the negative definition. That is, *sat* ultimately culminates in this, that it is not *asat*, *cit* culminates in this that it is not

*acit* and *ānanda* culminates in this that it is not *duḥkha*. When one is not satisfied even with this, then there is the *taṭastha lakṣaṇa*: *janmādyasya yataḥ*. That is, it is that from which the world has arisen. There, too, '*janmādyasya*' is not to be taken in the sense in which it is taken in Nyāya. It is not by inference that we are trying to prove Brahman, that there is a world and therefore there is the creator of the world and he is the Brahman. It is an expression of the Vedic experience that Brahman is the source of creation. But in what sense is it the source? It is only in the sense of being the ground of the lokas. *Adhiṣṭhāna mātṛeṇā kartṛtvam*. So, that is why *sat, cit and ānanda* are not three qualities, *guṇas*, that have Brahman for their *āśraya*. There is no *āśraya-āśrayī-bhāva*. They are not even its constituents as the three *guṇas* are in *prakṛti*. Rather, they are words with the help of which we try to have some understanding of Brahman, that it is not *duḥkha* or *asat* or something like that.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: I think, we shall close at this point because it is already 12-50 and time for lunch.

□

## SESSION IX

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: This session shall be devoted to the discussion of those issues, which have not been discussed in the morning session. What is the social, political and intellectual ideal projected by the protagonists of bhakti? I think, this is a very important issue because any ideal which is put before man, particularly as an ultimate ideal, must show itself to be better in all directions of human endeavour and if it does not do so, then, it is partial. This is something fundamental and essential.

If everybody is a potential bhakta or an actual bhakta or one who ought to be a bhakta, then, there is a relation between actual and potential bhaktas. If you assume a plurality of bhaktas, then, what shall be the relation between the bhaktas themselves? I think, this is an important issue. What shall be the ideal relation between the actual bhaktas and the potential bhaktas, particularly persons who are non-bhaktas, and what shall be the relation of this ideal to the other ideals of man?

Somebody said in the morning that the notion of an alternative absolute is absurd because after all, knowledge, action and feeling go together. Supposing they do go together, then, I can ask: what is the knowledge that is commensurate and coordinate

with the ideal of bhakti? How shall science with the spirit of bhakti be different from the actual science that we have? We have to answer this question, and if we do not answer it, we are escaping our responsibility as thinkers. What shall be the action, what shall be the nature of the state, and what shall be the nature of society and polity?

If Vrindavan is to be a *Vṛndāvana-sthalī*, could it mean this Vrindavan where there are open drains, where people are begging? Will you have this kind of Vrindavan as the ideal Vrindavan? Is Kṛṣṇa really satisfied with it? Are the gopīs satisfied with it? What sort of gopīs are those who are only in the *viraha* of Kṛṣṇa and are not in the *viraha* of hundreds of persons who are dying of lack of love? There is something wrong with those gopīs. What I am saying is: What is the sort of ideal that exists where untouchables are not allowed in the temple of the Lord. What is this ideal? So, the issue that we have not discussed in the morning should be discussed now. My suggestion is that these issues must take precedence in any agenda of our thought about bhakti.

Prof. Dwivedi: Bhakti is defined in the *Śāṅḍilya Bhakti-sūtra* as: *sā parānuraktirīśvare. Īśvara me parama prema bhakti hai*. Two meanings of the sūtra are accepted. One is: a great *anurakti* in God is bhakti. In the other meaning, 'parama' is taken with *Īśvara*. So, the second meaning is love towards that which is the highest, which is *Īśvara*. The two meanings together are: great love or lofty love for God who is the loftiest. But a third meaning is possible.



'Parānurakti' can also mean, love for the *para*, the other. Thus we have, 'bhakti is anurakti, love, for the other in the presence of God'.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Dwivediji has suggested a third meaning of 'para', in the famous sūtra. And what he is suggesting is that this should be taken as anurakti for the other because 'para' also means the other. So, anurakti for the other is bhakti. Now in the third meaning what could be objected to is that if you take it in this sense, then you cannot connect this meaning with Īśvara.

Prof. Dwivedi: I shall answer that. This objection actually can relate to one the other meanings also. How can 'para' be construed with 'Īśvara', since it is part of a compound as qualifying 'anurakti' and not 'Īśvara'? Now, the question for the third meaning is, how shall we construe the sentence in order to derive it? How can one relate Īśvara to the intended meaning? Only in the first meaning is there a direct relation, but in the other two cases it cannot be direct. We can say that what is being propounded in the sūtra is this: '*Īśvara sambandhini visaye*'. Īśvara is the basic ground, the basic *prakaraṇa*, the context, in which the sūtra is being uttered. That will make all the three meanings possible. These are the three possible meanings. What is being said is that your love should be of the highest order of excellence. This is understood. Forget the sūtra for the time being or how the sūtra meaning will be derived, whether directly or indirectly. Instances are prolific in our śāstras where the *prakaraṇa*, the basic *prakaraṇa*, is

indicated as God. Otherwise, the definition and the defined, that is, will be the same. There will be other difficulties as well.

Prof. Mishra: Suppose we forget about Īśvara and have only a 'para' *vyakti*. Then all the three meanings are quite possible.

Prof. Dwivedi: All right. If you accept that, my point is taken. When we derive the three meanings through 'para' *vyakti*, we have love par excellence, love for God and love for the other being. The word Īśvara will be kept separate and will signify the context, the ground, the basic ground of everything. So that if one does not believe in that ultimate being one cannot have real love for another fellow being also.

Dr. Rukmini: Why not?

Prof. Dwivedi: One has to assume the context of spirituality. In a mundane materialistic world there is no question of real fellow feeling. If you take away Īśvara, then materialism will deny that there can be a true fellow feeling or universal brotherhood, because an inner relationship between *ātmāns*, the individual selves cannot be derived unless there is a sense of spirituality amongst them. In any case, Indian thought has believed that the overarching truth, which provides the ground for the possibility of a meaningful relationship is spirituality. It is only within the great dimension of spirituality that one thinks of not only of oneself, one also thinks of others. Otherwise, others may not matter for one at all. It will only result in self-centeredness. So, the word 'Īśvara' is necessary in order to bring in the domain of

spirituality. I am trying to give a proper understanding of the issue and not just a syntactical one.

I conclude my remarks. But, I think, others might like to discuss the question in relation to individual ācāryas and sampradāyas and their notions of relationship with the other sampradāyas and the para vyakti understood in the sense of the third meaning which I gave you. I would also request friends sitting around the table that they pose problems in the field of morality and try to answer them from the point of view of bhakti, not the issues that have been raised by Daya or by me or anybody else, but the issue that arises in their own mind regarding the relation of spirituality to social service, etc.

सर्वेषु भक्तिसम्प्रदायेषु सामाजिकी प्रज्ञा वर्तते सर्वथा।  
 रामानुजीये सम्प्रदाये ज्ञायते यत् रामानुजाचार्यैः  
 चाण्डालानामपि स्पर्शादिकं कृत्वा तेषामादरं कृतम्  
 एवं अनेकाः कथाः श्रूयन्ते।  
 तत्र यदि स्वधर्मीयाः केचन ब्राह्मणाः  
 विरोधं प्रकटयन्ति तदा ते यदि सामर्थ्यवन्तः  
 तान् भक्तिं प्रति प्रेरयन्ति रामानुजीयाः।  
 एषा प्रज्ञा रामानुजीये सम्प्रदाये वर्तते।

Prof. Shiv Kumar Sastry: The uplift of the down-trodden is the issue that has been taken up in Southern Śaivism. The Vaiṣṇava sampradāyas and others have done it also. But with all that what has happened is that the conservative attitude has always gained the upper hand. I remember Rabindra Nath Tagore's statement in this connection, who said that all these religions are sectarian movements. They start as liberating agencies, but later

on end up as a vast prison house. Similarly, bhakti, which was started as a liberating agency, got reversed as a result of this conservative tendency. But when we read our scriptures, the ideals are still there, but when it comes to actual practice, they are lost. But, taking the ideal situation into consideration, there is a social possibility in all bhakti movements, as there has always been a social consciousness shown by them, particularly in Karnataka by the Basava movement in the 12th century A.D., and also in Tamil Nadu by Rāmānuja ācārya in the 11th century A.D. In fact, he had to leave that place and go to Karnatāka and settle down there for some years: there was some kind of tussle between the Śaivas and the Vaiṣṇavas. In short, the ideas have been always there. But when one brings them into practice, actual practice, then, there is a difficulty. Social ideals have always existed in the bhakti movements. But whether these bhakti movements have been able to carry out all these ideals, is a different question.

Prof. Daya Krishna: According to Prof. Shiv Kumar every religious reform started as a matter of protest against certain social evils, but ultimately they were bogged down in some kind of ritualistic practice alone. I wonder if all of you agree with him.

Dr. Rukmini: The point has been made that the ideal of all bhakti movements is the same, that there is no difference. But we must remember that they were pioneers who started the movements. For instance, saṅkīrtana which is a spiritual practice, was started by Caitanya. But what is the counterpart of that

practice in society? One certainly finds that there is no difference when it comes to saṅkīrtana whether those who are taking part it are brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, or anything else. Saṅkīrtana has become common to the bhakti schools, irrespective of whether they are Vaiṣṇava, Śākta, Śaiva, or whatever.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: I think, Dr. Rukmini is pointing out that various forms of bhakti gave a social dimension to spirituality, and what was to be individual sādhanā in the earlier tradition, began to have social content through various forms. But looking back, is it not true of yajña also or of the various Tāntric practices, which have preceded the bhakti movement? Take for example, going outside this field, the sārva-varṇika concept in the Nāṭya-śāstra. Take also the description of the Nāṭya-śāstra or the Mahābhārata as the fifth Veda. The original Vedas were actually for the three varṇas alone. But this was challenged by the tradition of the Mahābhārata being regarded as the fifth Veda, or the Nāṭya-śāstra, for that matter, being the pañcama Veda, and all these are meant to be sārva-varṇika, which will translate in our cultural context by the word 'secular'.

Dr. Rukmini: But in the nāṭya form, the thing is being just played or recited. One can thus only hear or see them from a distance. In saṅkīrtana one actually participates in it. One is practising as much as the priest.

Prof. Daya Krishna: No doubt what you are saying is correct. But I was only pointing out to the fact that there were historical precedents also. Only three elitist varṇas,

brāhmaṇa, kṣatriya and vaiśya could participate in the Vedic sacrifice. But in the sārva-varṇika concept of the Nāṭya-śāstra, there was the possibility of all groups of society coming together. Before the bhakti movement came into existence in India, there were many other movements which made dharma sārva-varṇika and not merely a preserve for the three higher varṇas. This sārva-varṇika concept is very important, in that it is for all the varṇas. I do agree that various forms of the bhakti movements evolved which were participatory, and thus they became socially cohesive in a new sense. They did not divide the various groups of society. Of course, adhikārīs were defined. But they at least did not argue that because one was a sūdra one could not participate in it, either in a drama or in a recitation of Rāma-kathā or anything else. You see it in Ramanagar; all the people there actually participate in the enactment of the Rāmāyaṇa. It is a very important development of Rāma-kathā that they all participate in it and become very much a part of it. So, various attempts had preceded the bhakti movement. This was not a result of some counter-culture forcing it to adopt a certain form, but rather an internal evolution. At one level, that is how I see the problem. Many historians think otherwise. According to them, it was as the result of a counter-cultural movement that these forms were evolved by the Hindus for their defence.

डॉ. के. एन. मिश्रा—वैष्णव धर्म का प्रादुर्भाव और व्यावर्तक लक्षण ही समाज चिंता है और अन्य व्यक्तियों की चिंता है। इसके पहले जो वैदिक धर्म की परम्परा है उस वैदिक धर्म की परम्परा में अगर हम संहिताओं से प्रारम्भ करें और धर्मशास्त्रों के उस युग तक आये जब वैदिक धर्म का सूर्य प्रखर प्रकाश में चमक

रहा था तो जिसको आज हम मातृभूमि कहते हैं उसका 90 परसेंट अंश म्लेच्छ भूमि मानी जाती थी और मनुस्मृति तक में अगर आ जायें तो देखेंगे कि कितना हम आज मिसकोट करते हैं—

एतद्देशप्रसूतस्य सकाशादग्रजन्मना।

स्वं स्वं चरित्रं शिक्षेरन् पृथिव्यां सर्वं मानवाः॥

हर आदमी फैशन में बोलता है, समझता है कि यह भारतवर्ष के लिए कहा गया है जबकि मनुस्मृति में साफ कहा है—

कुरुक्षेत्रं च मत्स्याश्च पंचालः शूरसेनकाः।

एष ब्रह्मर्षिदेशो वै ब्रह्मावर्तानन्तरः किंचिदूनः॥

देश के केवल इतने छोटे से हिस्से के लिए कहा गया है कि—

एतद्देश प्रसूतस्य सकाशादग्रजन्मनः।

और बाकी देश की यह हालत थी कि वेद ही—

एतान्द्रिजातयो देशान् संश्रयेरन् प्रयत्नतः।

शूद्रस्तु यत्र कुत्रापि निवशेत् वृत्तिकर्षितः।

ब्राह्मण केवल इसी देश में रहे; शूद्र जीविका की तलाश में जहाँ चाहे वहाँ भटक सकता है। बाकी साफ है। आधे से अधिक देश के बारे में यह धारणा थी मनुस्मृति की, जहाँ दूसरे प्रकार के चिंतन उपज रहे थे, जहाँ बुद्ध सोच रहे थे, जहाँ बुद्ध के पहले के चिंतक सोच रहे थे, जहाँ महावीर सोच रहे थे। वहाँ के बारे में कह दिया कि—

अंगबंगकलिगांश्च सौराष्ट्रमगंधांस्तथा।

तीर्थयात्रां बिना गत्वा पुनः संस्कारमर्हति॥

फिर से जनेऊ करना पड़ेगा आपको नहीं तो जातिच्युत हो जायेंगे।

पद्भ्यां तु स कुरुते पापं यः कलिङ्गान् गमिष्यति।

पैरों से पाप करता है जो कलिग देश को जाता है। देश के अधिक से अधिक हिस्से के प्रति हमारी जो धारणा थी वह यह थी कि यह अपवित्र भूमि है। देश के लोगों के प्रति जो धारणा थी वह तो आप जानते ही हैं। निम्न वर्गों में जो लोग उत्पन्न होते थे उनके प्रति जो धारणा थी, सब जानते हैं। जिन स्त्रियों के मुँह से 'असतो सद्गमय, तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय, मृत्योर्मा अमृतर्गमय' की तरह के मंत्र निकले थे उनको हमने 'स्त्री शूद्रौ नाऽधीयतां'— कहकर पढ़ने लिखने से मना कर दिया। अध्ययन की परम्परा वहाँ समाप्त हो गयी। आज हम कहते हैं कि लोग लड़कियों को जलाते हैं, लड़कों को बेचते हैं। ऋषियों के चरित्र पढ़िये। ऐतरेय ब्राह्मण उठाकर देखिये, अजीगर्त का प्रसंग आता है। हरिश्चन्द्र के लिए उसे बेचना

पड़ता है अपने पुत्र को। यज्ञ में बलि के लिए। फिर राजा कहता है अब इसको मारे कौन? अजीगर्त कहता है 100 गायें और दीजिए तो मार दूंगा। जिन पुत्रों के बारे में आज हम कहते हैं कि दहेज के लिए बेचे जाते हैं, वैदिक धर्म में उनकी यह स्थिति थी। भीष्म को देखिये, जिनकी प्रतिज्ञा की इतनी बात होती है। काशी नरेश की तीन लड़कियों को बलात् उठा लाये। नाकाश लड़कों के लिए पकड़ लाये। लड़कियों की सगाई हो चुकी थी। वृद्धावस्था में अगर उन्होंने इतना संयम बरता कि वह पुत्रवधू का भी अविचलित भाव से चीरहरण देख सके तो उनके बारे में अब क्या कहें। असहाय और आर्त, स्वयं हरिश्चन्द्र की कहानी देख लीजिए। जिस राजा को इसलिए राजा बनाया गया, वह सारी प्रजा की रक्षा करे, वह राजा अपनी पत्नी और पुत्र को बेचता है एक चंडाल के हाथ। पुत्र और पत्नी की रक्षा करने की आवश्यकता भी नहीं समझता। एक सपने में दिये हुए वचन की रक्षा की ज्यादा जरूरत समझता है। धर्मपुरी काशी में धार्मिकों की यह हालत थी कि पुरुषार्थी हरिश्चन्द्र को कोई काम नहीं मिला, सिवाय पत्नी बेचने के। मैंने संस्कृत में इस पर लिखा है। पद्यबद्ध रूप में सारी कथा बांधी है। शैव्या को देखिये :

एकमेवाद्वितीयं पुराणं श्रुतेः ब्रह्मवद् चारु आयासतो विभ्रती।

स्वात्मजं सर्पदेशान्मृतं रोहितं संवहन्ती रुदन्ती च शैव्या सती।

यत्र दृष्टाप्यदृष्टेव श्रद्धा धनैर्धर्मपुर्याख्यकाशीपुरीवासिभिः।

निष्कृतैः निष्कृपैः निष्क्रियैर्धार्मिकैः, स्वार्धवन्त्रेण संवेष्टुम् नाऽशकत्॥

आज कुत्ता मर जाता है तो म्युनिसिपैलिटी को कहने के बजाय लोग चार-चार रुपये चंदा इकट्ठा करके उसको फिकवा देते हैं, और बिल्लियाँ मरती हैं तो उनका गाजे-बाजे के साथ जुलूस निकालते हैं। यहाँ काशी में बच्चा मर गया है उसकी मां आंचल से आधा कपड़ा फाड़ कर किसी तरह उसे ढक कर ले जा रही है। दूसरा निस्साहय देख रहा है, कुछ नहीं करता। हमारी चेतना ही विकृत है।

निरसहायार्त सादृश्यदीक्षाविधौ दृश्यते हेतु एतादृशी चेतना।

निःस्पृहो दास्यमालभ्यतां सर्वदा नव्य धर्म व्यपेक्षं भजे भारतम्॥

तो, यह जो वैदिक धर्म की दृष्टि थी, उसमें सहानुभूति किसी के भी प्रति नहीं दिखती, और अगर कोई सहानुभूति का कार्य करे तो बस कुआँ खुदवा दे, बावली बनवा दे, पेड़ लगवा दे "इष्टापूर्तं मन्यमाना वरिष्ठं, नान्यच्छ्रेयो वेदयन्ते प्रमूढाः"— वह प्रमूढ है, महामूर्ख है, नासमझ है कि जो इष्टापूर्त को ही वरिष्ठ समझता है और किसी श्रेय की कल्पना नहीं कर सकता। परोपकार का इस तरह से कंडमेशन होता था। पहले ही दिन मैंने इस बात की ओर ध्यान आकृष्ट किया था कि वैदिक धर्म में परार्थ-भाव के लिए या भाव के लिए भी कोई स्थान नहीं था। व्यक्ति को अपने लिए मोक्ष चाहिए, अपने लिए संतान चाहिए, अपनी गाय खंदक में न गिरे इसके लिए वरुण से प्रार्थना, पूजा की जाती थी। ऐसे धर्म की जगह पर

कृष्ण ने जिस धर्म की प्रतिष्ठा की उस धर्म का पहला तत्त्व यह था कि वह भाव पर आधारित था, फार्मैल्टीज़ पर नहीं।

दूसरी विशेषता यह थी कि वह साधारणजनों के प्रति सहानुभूति पर आधारित था। कृष्ण ने अपने चरित्र में इसको करके दिखाया है। रुक्मिणी का पत्र पहुंचता है तो रुक्मिणी को छुड़ा कर लाते हैं। पुत्रवधू का पत्र मिलता है तो पुत्रवधू को भी उसी तरह छुड़ा लाये और पौत्र की वधू को भी वैसे ही लाये। युद्ध करके लाये। गोपियों के साथ उनके जो सम्बन्ध हैं, उसे धार्मिक दृष्टि से देखना चाहिये। अगर सामाजिक दृष्टि से आप देखते हैं तो कृष्ण का सम्बन्ध उन लोगों के साथ है जिनको आभीर कहते थे। कृष्ण यादव थे। पर नन्द नहीं थे। नन्द आभीर थे। नन्द के परिवार और वंश का वर्णन करना तो भागवतकार का काम नहीं था, क्योंकि पुराण का लक्षण पंडितों ने बना दिया था कि राजवंश का ही वर्णन होना चाहिए। उससे कुछ लाभ मिलेगा। आभीर वंश के वर्णन से क्या मिलेगा? इसलिए राजवंश वर्णन ही आपको मिलेगा पुराण में। कृष्ण के वंश का वर्णन मिलेगा, लेकिन नन्द के माता-पिता का नाम भी मालूम नहीं क्या था? तो यह जो आभीर थे, एक जाति मानी जाती थी। वह जाति उस समय बहुत हीन स्थिति में मानी जाती थी, लेकिन कृष्ण ने उस जाति के लोगों के साथ सम्बन्ध स्थापित किया और उनके कल्याण की चिंता की। यह बात केवल कृष्ण तक ही सीमित नहीं है। आज जितने धर्म चल रहे हैं वह सब गैर-ब्राह्मणों के चलाये चल रहे हैं। ये राजाओं के चलाये धर्म हैं या क्षत्रियों के चलाये धर्म हैं—चाहे वह कृष्ण हों, राम हों, बुद्ध हों, या महावीर हों। इन धर्मों में दूसरों के प्रति सहानुभूति की भावना है। राजा की प्रजा होती थी, उसकी चिंता करना, रक्षा करना उसका दायित्व होता था। इसलिए ऐसे धर्म चलाये। आज कोई अपने को मीमांसक कहने को तैयार नहीं है। जो मीमांसक यजमान का घी पी-पीकर ईश्वर का खंडन करता था, वह आज सत्यनारायण की कथा बाँचने जाता है। जो आज का अच्छे से अच्छा कसाई है वह जितना जानता है अपने काम के बारे में उससे कई गुणा ज्यादा मीमांसक जानता था। पशु का एक एक हिस्सा अलग-अलग काट कर कहता था : अथ हृदयस्याग्रे वर्धति। अथ जिह्वयाम्। अथ वक्षसः। जिस अंग की बलि देनी होती आंख मूँदकर, हाथ डालकर खींच लेता था।

यह जो परंपरा थी इस परंपरा के विरुद्ध क्षत्रिय प्रधान धर्मों का उदय हुआ। बुद्ध की दृष्टि विशुद्ध आध्यात्मिक दृष्टि तो है लेकिन बुद्ध इससे सुपरिचित हैं कि इस दृष्टि का समाज से समन्वय किये बिना कोई अर्थ नहीं है। एक प्रसंग पालि में आता है जहां राजा के परिवार के एक आदमी को बुद्ध दीक्षित करते हैं। लोग कहते हैं यह मूर्ख है, नासमझ है, संज्ञाशून्य है, नौकरी-चाकरी करने लायक है इसको साधु बनाकर क्या होगा? बुद्ध कहते हैं यह कैसा है, बाद में पता चलेगा। कुछ दिन बाद राजा पूछते हैं, आप कह रहे थे कि बाद में पता चलेगा बताइये उसने कितना पढ़ लिया, कितना धार्मिक ज्ञान हो गया उसको? कहाँ है वह? वह

आया तो नरेश ने प्रणाम किया उसको। बुद्ध ने कहा, इसको पहला लाभ तो यह हुआ कि जब यह आपके पास रहता था तो समझता था केवल आपके जूते उताने लायक है। आज उसको यह बोध तो हुआ कि आप भी उसको प्रणाम कर रहे हैं। उसका आत्मविश्वास जागृत हुआ है, वह मनुष्य है, यह उसको ध्यान हुआ है। यह तो पहला लाभ हुआ है। इसके बाद लाभ होने का द्वार खुल गया है। वैष्णव आळवार संतों में आप देखेंगे कि अन्य लोगों की सहायता पर बहुत अधिक बल है। श्रीमद् भागवत में ही देखिये : नातिप्रसीदति तथोपचितोपचारैः

आराधितः सुरगणैरपि बद्धकामैः

यत् सर्वभूतदययाऽसदलभ्ययैको

नानाजनेष्ववहितस्सुहृदंतरात्मा॥

देवता भी अगर खूब सारा संभार कर सामग्री इकट्ठा करके लायें और पूजा करें तो भी भगवान उतने प्रसन्न नहीं होते हैं जितना सब प्राणियों पर दया करने वाले पर प्रसन्न होते हैं। यह दया असद् अलभ्या है। असद् आदमी को सरलता से नहीं मिलती है।

हर आन्दोलन जब प्रारंभ होता है तो उसके पीछे कुछ तेजस्वी व्यक्ति होते हैं। बाद में अवसान शुरु हो जाता है। विष्णु पुराण तक आते-आते वैष्णव धर्म की दुर्दशा हो गयी। दूसरे जीवन्त रिलीजन भी थे विष्णु पुराण के समय में, बौद्ध, जैन। ये एकदम जीवन्त धर्म थे। इनमें तेजस्वी ग्रंथ लिखे जा रहे थे। और वैष्णव लोगों ने सेल्फ डिफेंस की एक अजीब मैकेनिज्म अपनाई। मैं पाँच साल का था तो मुझे पढ़ाया जाता था :

न वदेत् यावर्नी भाषां न गच्छेज्जैनमन्दिरम्।

पण्डेन पीड्यमानोऽपि प्राणैः कंठगतैरपि॥

इसका लाभ मुझे यह हुआ कि बी.ए. में जब मैं पहुँचा तो प्राकृत पढ़ी और जैनज्म पढ़ा कि आखिर है क्या। जब पहला मौका मिला तो ग्रीक पढ़ी कि यावनी भाषा में ऐसी कौन सी बुरी बात है जो कि पढ़नी नहीं चाहिए। मैं यह कहना चाहता हूँ कि इसका परिणाम यह हुआ कि जिस वैष्णव धर्म का प्रारंभ हुआ था जनसाधारण के उद्धार के लिए, उस वैष्णव धर्म ने विष्णु पुराण तक आते आते अंधापन अपना लिया। विष्णु पुराण पढ़ें तो सिर झुक जायेगा कि ऐसे हमारे इतिहास लेखक हैं। आख्यान कहते हैं कि जब सब लोग धर्मनिष्ठ हो गये, वैदिक मार्ग पर चलने लगे तो देवताओं को बड़ी परेशानी हुई कि अब हमारा क्या होगा। देवता विष्णु के पास पहुँचे और कहने लगे कुछ उपाय कीजिए अनर्थ हो गया है। विष्णु ने दो बाल निकाले और मायामोह पैदा हो गये। ये आपका काम करेंगे। मायामोह पहुँचते हैं बौद्धों और जैनों के पास। जो तपस्या कर रहे थे। वहाँ जो वर्णन किया गया है पहले बौद्धों का वर्णन किया है। कषाय पहने हैं। इस तरह से रक्त-

पटाह है। रक्त-पटाह शब्द है, समास है, बहुव्रीहि है या कर्मधारय है। रक्त-पटाह नाम वहाँ भी आता है जहाँ शंकराचार्य खंडन करते हैं बौद्धों का। वे समझते हैं रक्त-पटाह कोई आइडिया है। उनके लिए शब्द बहुव्रीहि समास है। बौद्धों के लिए प्रयुक्त है। रक्त-पटाह वाले जो भी हो, कहानी पर आता हूँ। मायामोह ने रक्त-पटाहों से जाकर पूछा, तुम क्यों तपस्या कर रहे हो। उन्होंने कहा हम आत्मोद्धार के लिए तपस्या कर रहे हैं। मायामोह ने फिर पूछा, मोक्ष चाहिए, स्वर्ग चाहिए, भोग चाहिए, क्या चाहिए? रक्तपटाहों ने कहा, हम तपस्या कर रहे हैं आत्मोद्धार के लिए। मायामोह ने कहा, ठीक है तो फिर ऐसा समझो, ऐसा समझो : "इति बुध्यध्वम्" 'बुध्यध्वम्' कहा तो सब बौद्ध हो गये। मायामोह फिर दूसरे गुप के पास पहुंचते हैं और पूछते हैं कि तुम क्यों तपस्या कर रहे हो? ये जैन थे। उनसे जब पूछा तुम तपस्या क्यों कर रहे हो, तो उन्होंने कहा हम तो आत्मोद्धार के लिए तपस्या कर रहे हैं। मायामोह ने कहा ठीक है "ईर्यमर्हताहंत"—तुम इसके योग्य बनो। और सब अर्हंत हो गये, जैन हो गये। विष्णु पुराण के समय को अगर चौथी सदी मान लें तो उस समय नागार्जुन, असंग, वसुबंधु के ग्रंथ लिखे जा रहे थे। इस पहाड़ को सामने देखकर भी आंखें मूंद लेना 'पश्यन्नपि न पश्यति' वालों का ही काम था। आगे बढ़ें तो रामानुज आते हैं। रामानुज जैसे जितने भक्ति संप्रदाय के आचार्य हुए सब एक बड़ी विपत्ति में फंसे थे। इस विपत्ति में कि उत्तर में भगवान पैदा हुए और दक्षिण में उनके लैफ्टीनेंट आचार्य पैदा हुए। भगवान जनरल हैं, जहां बहुत ज्यादा उपद्रव होता है वहां भगवान खुद जाते हैं, पर जहां कम उपद्रव होते हैं वहां लैफ्टीनेंट से काम चल जाता है। दक्षिण वैदिक धर्म को बहुत मजबूती से पकड़ कर बैठा हुआ था। मुसलमानों के आक्रमण उत्तर में पहले हुए। जन्म के 100 वर्ष के अन्दर, आधे संसार को कब्जे में कर लिया मुसलमानों ने। यहां आये तो उत्तर में पहले आये। पर दक्षिण जो मजबूती से बैठा हुआ था, वहां हर ब्राह्मण आचार्य की मुसीबत यह थी कि वह स्वयं ब्राह्मण था और बुरी तरह ब्राह्मण था। वैदिक परंपरा से पिंड नहीं छुड़ा सकता था। और ब्रह्मसूत्र के खूटे से अपने गले को बांध लिया था। रामानुज जब ब्रह्मसूत्र पर भाष्य लिखने बैठता है तो भूल जाता है कि वैष्णव है। अपशूद्र अधिकरण की बात लीजिए। रामानुज शंकराचार्य से दस कदम आगे चले जाते हैं। शूद्रों के खिलाफ कहते हैं कि अगर ज्ञान से मोक्ष माना जाये तो बड़ी मुश्किल होगी, स्त्रियों और शूद्रों का भी मोक्ष हो जायेगा। भक्ति से मोक्ष मानना ही ठीक है—तब स्त्री, शूद्र पंगत में नहीं आ सकेंगे। रामानुज वैदिक परंपरा के हिसाब से भक्ति करने का उपदेश देता है। तो आप पहले ब्रह्म का स्वरूप जानिये, फिर पूजा करने की विधि जानिए। तब जाकर भक्ति कर सकेंगे। जब तक आपको मंत्र बोलने का अधिकार नहीं आप भक्ति नहीं कर सकते। स्त्री शूद्र अनधिकारी है। जितने अद्वैत वेदांती हैं, अंग्रेजी में लिखने पढ़ने वाले, शंकराचार्य के अनुसार इनमें से एक को भी पढ़ने का अधिकार नहीं है, न समझने का अधिकार है। रामानुजाचार्य

शंकराचार्य से दो कदम आगे जाते हैं और कहते हैं कि, जब श्रुति ही नहीं अधिकार क्या होगा। मनु भी कहता है:

निषेकादिश्मशानान्तो मन्त्रैर्यस्योदितो विधिः।

तस्य शास्त्रेऽधिकारोऽस्मिन् ज्ञेयो नान्यस्य कस्यचित्।।

मनुस्मृति को न मनु ने लिखा न भृगु ने लिखा है। किसी पंडित ने लिखा है, बहुत बाद में। कहता है पुंसवन संस्कार से लेकर देहान्त संस्कार तक जिसके संस्कार वैदिक मन्त्रों से होते हैं, वही इस शास्त्र को पढ़ने का अधिकारी है, दूसरा नहीं। इस प्रकार की परंपरा में, रामानुज कहते हैं कि आप ब्रह्म को समझें कि क्या है तब ही धर्म का बोध होगा। ब्रह्म उपनिषद् प्रतिपाद्य है, पर उपनिषद् पढ़ने का आपको अधिकार नहीं है, तो फिर ब्रह्म की उपासना में अधिकार कहाँ से होगा? यों भक्ति में सबका अधिकार नहीं हो सकता।

वैष्णव मूवमेंट की यह दुर्दशा हुई लेकिन तब भी इन सब आचार्यों के हृदय में वैष्णव बैठा था, क्योंकि उन्होंने उसे लोक-धर्म से ग्रहण किया था। आळ्वार संतों की परंपरा थी उनके जड़ में। हम रीजनल लैंग्वेज का लिटरेचर नहीं पढ़ते उसमें बहुत उत्तम कोटि का साहित्य है। वैष्णव धर्म जब संतों के हाथ पड़ता है, महाराष्ट्र में या उत्तर भारत में तब उसका पुनः उद्धार होता है। चैतन्य महाप्रभु ने भाष्य नहीं लिखा ब्रह्मसूत्र पर और किसी पर नहीं लिखा। रामानुज से उनके गुरु ने कहा कि यह मंत्र किसी स्त्री या शूद्र के कान में पड़ जायेगा तो मंत्र देने वाला नरक में जायेगा। उन्होंने कहा ठीक है लेकिन सुनने वाला कहाँ जायेगा? उन्होंने कहा उसका मोक्ष हो जायेगा, तो रामानुज गोपुर के ऊपर खड़े होकर चिल्लाकर मंत्र पढ़ने लगे। बोले अकेले मैं जाता हूँ नरक, तो क्या नुकसान है, इतने लोग तो मोक्ष को जा पायेंगे। दिस इज द स्पिरिट और इस स्पिरिट को आचार्यों ने पकड़ा है, चैतन्य ने पकड़ा है, वल्लभाचार्य ने पकड़ा है, सब आचार्यों ने इसको पकड़ा है। मैं समझता हूँ, इस दृष्टि से बहुत रिच लिटरेचर पाया जाता है। यहां इस ब्रज में विट्ठलनाथ कथा कहते थे भागवत की। पर जब तक अली खान पठान आकर बैठ नहीं जाते थे कथा प्रारंभ नहीं होती थी। एक दिन एक वैष्णव को बड़ा बुरा लगा। उसने पूछा यह आप क्या कर रहे हैं, तो विट्ठलनाथ ने कहा, ठीक है उसको आने दो दिखाता हूँ। वे आये तो विट्ठल ने कहा बताओ भई कल हमने क्या कहा था? पठान बोले, पिछले पारायण में आपने यह यह बताया था। इस बार आपने यह और जोड़ा है। विट्ठल बोले, देखो इसलिए मैं इसे सामने बिठाता हूँ। वेश्याएँ, स्त्रियाँ, लुटेरे, बटमार, कोई भी ऐसा नहीं जिनको इन लोगों ने अपना नहीं लिया हो। मैं समझता हूँ एक विशेष अर्थ में इस देश को बचा लिया है वैष्णव धर्म ने। नाश के जो चार मूल उपादान होते हैं उनको एक ही श्लोक में कहा है :

यौवनं धन-संपत्तिः प्रभुत्वं अविवेकता।

एकैकमप्यनर्थाय किमु यत्र चतुष्टयम्॥

प्रायः यह चारों होते हैं वैश्य युवकों के पास। आचार्यों ने उनकी शराब बंद करा दी। उनमें जितना वैष्णव वर्ग था उसे वैष्णव धर्म ने प्रभावित किया। उसके बाद कोई धर्म प्रभावशाली हुआ है तो जैन धर्म। आज भी अगर आप परिचय में आर्येंगे तो जो वैष्णव परिवार हैं उनमें से अनेक परिवारों में बहुत से ब्राह्मणों की अपेक्षा अच्छा आचार पायेंगे। जिनके पास पतन के सारे साधन मौजूद थे, उन्हें वैष्णव धर्म ने पतन से रोका। जो नितांत पतित थे उनका उद्धार किया। आज जो आचार्यों और गोस्वामियों को भगवान माना जाता है उसका कारण इस देश का सामाजिक इतिहास है। इन लोगों ने जिन लोगों का उद्धार किया, समाज में उनकी जितनी साधारण स्थिति थी उससे वह उन्नत होकर आज अच्छी स्थिति में है। मैं कम से कम ऐसे सौ लोगों से व्यक्तिगत रूप से परिचित हूँ जो बहुत ही दयनीय स्थिति में थे और आज करोड़ों के आदमी हैं। उन लोगों को यह लगता है कि इन आचार्यों ने हम को बचाया है। उनकी आगे की पीढ़ियाँ मानती हैं कि हमारे लिए ये भगवान हैं।

आज मैं एक दूसरा अनुभव आपको बताता हूँ। क्रिश्चन मिशनरी को देखते हैं तो गाँव वाले कहते हैं हमारे तो भगवान आ रहे हैं, क्योंकि उन्होंने उनका उद्धार किया है, उनके लिए काम किया है। तो इन आचार्यों ने अपनी जगह पर यह जरूर काम किया लेकिन कालांतर में जो स्थिति आयी है उसमें गड़बड़ी है। इस गड़बड़ी को सम्भालें। धर्म के अंदर ऐसी आंतरिक शक्ति है जिस शक्ति का उपयोग समाजोद्धार में किया जा सकता है। समाज के उपयोग के लिए इसमें से एक विचार परंपरा का प्रवर्तन किया जा सकता है। आज जो पतनोन्मुख स्थिति हो गयी है उससे निकला जा सकता है। बुद्ध ने इंस्टीट्यूशनलाइज कर दिया था रिलीजन को। इसकी जरूरत है, केवल सत्य में निष्ठा काफी नहीं है : संघ शरणं गच्छामि, बुद्धं शरणं गच्छामि। वह भी जरूरी है। क्योंकि हम चाहते हैं कि जो हम कह रहे हैं वही सत्य सिद्ध हो जाए। ईमानदारी से सच की ओर जाने की हममें प्रवृत्ति नहीं है। बुद्ध के समय में सच की ओर दौड़कर जाने की प्रवृत्ति थी लोगों में। शंकराचार्य ने हिन्दू के लिए यही किया। चार गदियाँ बनाईं। उसके बाद वल्लभाचार्य आते हैं, विठ्ठलनाथ आते हैं। विठ्ठलनाथ ने पहली बार औरस सम्बन्ध से महन्त होने की व्यवस्था की। इस पुत्र-परंपरा से सब तरह के लोग आचार्य होने लगे। पुत्र-परंपरा से जब होने लगे तो सारी सुविधाएँ यों ही उपलब्ध थीं। विकास के लिए कुछ करने की जरूरत नहीं रही। राजा के 5 साल के बच्चे को हाथी पर बैठा देख कर कालिदास कहते हैं, "महती देवता ह्येषा नर रूपेण तिष्ठति।" राजा अगर भगवान है तो उसका 5 साल का बच्चा भी भगवान ही है।

देखिये आज के संदर्भ में विचार करने की आवश्यकता है। तीन-चार मिनट है टी ब्रेक में। ठीक है, इतिहास का ज्ञान हम को होना चाहिए, परन्तु सीधी

बात यह है क्या आप भक्ति का समाजशास्त्र, भक्ति का अर्थशास्त्र भक्ति का राज्यशास्त्र आदि बना सकते हैं या नहीं? अगर नहीं बना सकते तो आज का युग जिन विशिष्ट शास्त्रों का युग है उनमें आप कुछ नहीं कह सकते। आप क्या नई दृष्टि देना चाहते हैं? आज नयी दृष्टि देने में आपको क्या बाधा है? आप ब्रह्मसूत्र पर भाष्य नहीं लिख रहे हैं। आपकी बाधा वैचारिक है, सामाजिक है, सांस्कृतिक है, राजनीतिक है—इनका सामना करने की आवश्यकता है।

I think we are about to have a tea break.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: To begin with, how can a new vision permeate our society, our economy, our polity, and in a systematic manner both institutionally and in structures of thought, what should be the prime consideration of any thought about bhakti or any other ideal, which has been propounded in this culture and civilization? The real vitality of bhakti will be tested in these fields. Otherwise, it will be just a group of sectarian, self-enclosed, small islands where some individuals or groups of individuals may realize certain values, but which will remain irrelevant for contemporary civilization, even in India.

Secondly, our own institutions must show at least some desire to implement our vision. And if this is not done, I think, Shrivatsa will have to explain to us why other centres of the Gaudīya sampradāya have not condemned what has happened. If supposing this centre or certain other centres, or even non-Gaudīya centres say that this is wrong and against what Caitanya stood for, then that would be something. We will feel that the movement is alive. Even if others do not agree it does not matter. But, one least, we will hear a voice of protest. The other ācāryas should condemn

what the Śaṅkarācārya of Puri or some other ācārya says.

Well, now we will have the tea break.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna (continuing after the break): That is the state of affairs in our contemporary society, amongst the Vaiṣṇavas in particular and in all religious centres in general. As a matter of fact this whole issue relates to them, their social commitment, their interaction with society at various levels. The relation between the different sampradāyas, both in the north and in the south, has been very important in our history.

Now, the best person amongst us, of course, is Shrivatsa to throw further light on the subject.

Shri Shrivatsa: From what Prof. Dwivedi said, I would probably, be considered the 'worst man'. The intellectual challenge of this tradition, what we call the bhakti tradition, is essentially for the people who have been playing the role of the catalyst in shaping and maintaining and also carrying the load of this tradition. In the Vedic perspective, the word 'gosvāmī' will definitely mean something very different but which, in the spiritual dimension was not only eulogized but got respectability to such an extent that even the Bhaṭṭas or the Dubes thought it great to have the appendage, 'Gosvāmī' to their names. The word means, one who can control the senses. But I have no pretensions of giving myself the connotation of that respectable dimension of the meaning of 'Gosvāmī'. Rather I will take it more in

the other sense of 'Gosvāmī', the Lord or the cows, the bull who is destined to carry the burden of the tradition.

I would like to reflect on a few things, which have been said earlier by my elders, particularly about open-endedness, which Prof. Mishra beautifully brought out along with Daya Krishnaji and others in reflecting on the history of my tradition. The six Gosvāmīs, the builders of a system, who provided a complete śāstra for the tradition in all its aspects, gave a new Smṛti; they gave a code of conduct. They even went a little further. They gave *saṁskāra* vidhis as well. They were able to challenge and provide an alternative system, a counter-culture. This challenge was carried on. As a student of religious history or the history of ideas, it is fascinating for me to see that the six Gosvāmīs covered such a vast canvas of human creativity. It is not only that what they were doing was only in the intellectual realm. But as I was talking with friends here the other day, these people were also involved in the game of power and politics, 'real' politics, and they played it very successfully. In North India, if Hindu history took a different course after the 15th century, the credit should go to two sets of Gosvāmīs the Vallabhaites and the Caitanyaites who were very good at philosophy and literature, but even better in the game of politics. This pushed us through those dark periods. But interestingly enough, they were consciously thinking and doing every thing with a purpose. Even the writing of the biography of Caitanya there was a organized towards it. They saw to what should be carefully presented in it. In the more than



sixty volumes composed by these Gosvāmīs, not even once did they use the name of the sampradāya, or why the whole thing was being done, except for just a single reference. Imagine, just one reference in the sixty volumes! One of the things I have tried to find out the name these Gosvāmīs had given to themselves and the movement they were trying to launch. Nothing, except for one reference in a very remote, unknown place in the *Sarvasāmvādinī* on *Parmātmāsandarbhā* where the author says: "*svamate tu acintyabhedābheda eva.*" That is the only reference. But there is no reference to itself as a movement, as a social movement, and as a historical phenomenon, as a structure. They did not even say *svamate svasampradāye* or even *sampradāye*. This is a very late nomenclature, very late, indeed. Of course, we all know that Vallabhadeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa is the first man who spoke of the *prasthānatrayī*.

So, that shows somehow the vitality of what we are trying to struggle for and the whole *raison detre* of the exercise we are engaged in for the last couple of days. When one acts with a sense of commitment to a living phenomenon, perhaps the very naming of the thing makes it a little restricted. And that had been the greatness or an element of greatness in the Indian tradition. Of course, this whole rigmarole of naming is also our weakness.

Secondly, Derrida, who these days is a very fashionable philosopher after Gadamer, talks of inter-textuality. But what is the inter-textuality in our own tradition? I mean, 'textuality' with quotation marks, the texts,

the paramparā. We are trying to ignore the inter-textuality of the bhakti tradition, as Dr. Mishra has pointed out. With my own background, I think that I can find some clue in the central philosophy of Buddhism. Perhaps, bhakti as a concept, as a philosophic concept, was a contribution of the Buddhist thinkers.

If one looks at the history of Caitanyanism, it would be a fruitless exercise to see it in isolation from Buddhism. If one takes out the Buddhist element, probably Chaitanyaism would collapse intellectually, spiritually and perhaps even physically because in the fifteenth century in Bengal, thanks to the Islamic sword, people were left without any intellectual leadership. Consequently, there was degeneration amongst those large numbers of people who were the leftover followers of Buddhism. It was the role of Caitanya to literally redeem and accept these people *en masse* back into the main Hindu stream. It is a fascinating story, where the nāstika and the āstika extremes fuse once more.

Another thing, which has been talked about here is sankīrtana. If you see the whole literature, as Prof. Sukumar Sen says, you can even see the origin and development of Bengali literature in Caitanyaism. What else is the originator of the *padāvalī sāhitya*? That is, if you discount the *padas* of the Buddhist Siddhas and the *Dūhākośa*. Of course, I am not denying that it is not a Vedic tradition. That is undeniable. But in that particular historical moment, how else was *maṇḍala upāsanā* and the *kīrtana-praṇālī* in Bengal

possible? The Buddhist tradition was beautifully incorporated into their own work by the Caitanayites. But that was also a kind of politics which was being played by this movement.

Anyway, apart from this, I come to another point, which I raised earlier. As a living tradition we have to have two things: while we have to see who we are and what our rights are, we also have to be self-critical for a healthy growth. And self-criticism is present in my particular tradition, though I cannot speak for others. Obviously I cannot speak for the whole Hindu tradition because I do not know what that is. But at least for the Caitanyaitees today in Bengal, in Vrindavan, in Assam, in Manipur, in Orissa and in some recent developments in South India. But foreign historians have been saying that for the debacle of the Indian culture, one of the major factors has been the impotency given or infused by the Caitanyaite movement into the Hindu psyche. That is strange.

Simultaneously, there is another allegation, which can be very well substantiated that there is a strong *sahajiyā* element in the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava movement. The popular image in Bengal is that it is a very Puritan movement, that when a Gosvāmī is walking back from his morning bath from the Ganges he has in the right hand his chanting beads and in the left hand he has two very large fishes. "*Haribol, Haribol, Mācher jhol, Mācher jhol.*" That is the image in the contemporary mind about a Vaiṣṇava in Bengal. This is the impression that I get. But for a movement, which lives through the paradigm of

Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, trying to rationalize the socio-ethical or the moral situation is a kind of escapism. It is not an endeavour to encounter the situation, but a way of escaping into the world of aesthetics. So, I will try to take up the issue specifically in a way that I may be able to handle it. I can understand the metaphysical necessity of *parakīyāvāda*. It is a must. I don't question that. From the aesthetic point of view, it is a must. There is also a śāstra about it. From the point of the religious quest, even a spiritual quest, *parakīyāvāda* is like the concept of alienation. If there is no element of alienation between the seeker and the sought, then, there is no occasion for religiosity, that is, human religiosity. *Parakīyāvāda* is a phenomenology of *rasa*. But it is also an escape. The phenomenology of *rasa* and *premā* and *prīti-rasa*, *Īśvara-prīti*, *premā-bhakti*, call it by any name, you like, but even the propounder, the most uncompromising propounder of that theory writes in the same chapter: "I am talking of the true paradigm; but it is not for the mortals to follow."

So, the question is, can there be a more suitable paradigm, especially in the realm of religion and philosophy? At the same time, from the Indian perspective, can a paradigm for religion be a prohibition also? Can we get another angle on *parakīyāvāda*? From the socio-political point of view, it is slightly damaging. But I will come back to that later. It is an answer, but also a question. So, I shall keep it open. The quest of the Hindu psyche for that human harmony which is found in love. In that context if we define and

redefine our socio-ethical philosophy and scriptures and śāstra, then parakīyāvāda may be given a very interesting dimension, in that it gives the right of expression or rather the right of having an emotion to a person in his or her own right, not predetermining it as a dogma with some particular set of norms. Such a set of norms may be useful in keeping up given structures. But if the ultimate goal of the exercise is the human being, then parakīyāvāda provide a kind of confidence and śakti to a person as a person.

Dr. Vohra: Shri Shrivatsa has given us some ideas from Caitanya. Whenever followers have added something, then they have given a new dimension to it. This is similar to the field of science. Yet most people just imitate what others have done. So, the same type of issue may be raised in bhakti as in the field of scientific enquiry.

Prof. Pandey: I would like to confine myself to the question of feeling, which was referred to by Prof. Daya Krishna while starting this evening session. He referred to bhaktas and he emphasized the relevance of bhakti or the bhakti movement for restructuring or regenerating society. Immense good to society can be done, and has been done, even by those who are neither bhaktas nor have anything to do with any religious movement. Good to society can be done and has been done without defining, without understanding what good is going to accrue. Persons like Karl Marx have criticized and opposed and neglected things done in the name of religion. But he was also trying to do good. Society is not something static. It is

always in a state of flux. Religious movements or bhakti movements at some particular time served their purpose to some extent. But this does not mean that they are relevant all the time.

So, we should be very clear about what bhakti is, what society is, what factors are responsible for shaping things. In fact, in a country like India there are certain things, which belong to the social structure itself. They have a long history. There is also an intellectual legacy. We have to consider all those factors. All the practices related to bhakti cannot be justified. They do not stand the test of time. We want to be scientific. We want to be one united family, to be one house, but the given norms stand in our way. To what extent can bhakti help us in bringing society together? To what extent are we able to translate theory into practice? Adhering to a theory is relatively easier than practising it. Can you *prescribe* honesty? At the level of a mass movement, the economic background has got to be considered. Bhakti in itself is a vital force; it has a very great spiritual potency. One wants to worship something, one may change the object, one may change the deity, but by his very constitution, by his very nature, man wants to depend on something. That dependence, that surrender is bhakti. One cannot do everything himself. There is need to depend on God. What the bhakta can do is to pray to God, to invite God and to ask God for help.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Dr. Pandey, what problem do you pose?

Dr. Pandey: The problem is that the House should suggest some means, some mārga as to how one should be able to practise what one may preach. May I come back to what was said in the morning. We were given three kinds of interpretation of bhakti. The third interpretation that was given was other-relatedness. If we can define bhakti or if we can describe bhakti as other-relatedness, then it should logically lead to tolerance. But if one goes back to the 15th century, one finds that the history of bhakti is full of inter as well as intra-sampradāyavāda; there was even violence. So, there is not always tolerance. In fact, I would say that bhakti essentially is self-centered, selfish in a way, because I want to achieve nirvāṇa or mokṣa for myself. Therefore, there is no consideration for others. Each one is for oneself. That is one reason why there is no social dimension. People may be living in miserable conditions, but no one is really concerned about it. Perhaps those who are living in those conditions are also not concerned about it; they have accepted it as their fate or, if they are bhaktas in the true sense, they have no concern about external things. But is that not a kind of escapism? Should we really approve of a doctrine, which leads us necessarily, logically, to ego-centrism, to escapism from problems of actual existence? Therefore, I would personally have liked Shrivatsaji in his discussion to say how this kind of indifference to misery, to the human situation has been going hand in hand with bhakti or the bhakti movements.

Shri Shrivatsa: I think there is a large potential in bhakti for reviving the good of

society. Bhakti believes that there is one God and that there are many jīvas who are all equal to the extent they are jīvas. It also believes that one bhakta can help another in becoming a better bhakta. But this leaves that problem of the non-bhakta. However, one can always take a non-bhakta to be a potential bhakta. Therefore, all are bhaktas in that sense.

But there is one problem in all human thinking regarding certain matters. That is the problem of *adhikāra-bheda* and *avasthā-bheda*. If *adhikāra-bheda* and *avasthā-bheda* are taken to be *upādhis*, which they generally are, as they are not really a part of the jīva, then perhaps there may be a way out. Their importance will only be at a certain level and in certain contexts. But, unfortunately, what India does, or at least what Indian social thought does is that it interprets *adhikāra-bheda* and *avasthā-bheda* in terms of *jātivāda*. Or, what is called *pūrvajanma*. So, *adhikāra-bheda* and *avasthā-bheda* are crystallized into *jātis*. So, a *brāhmaṇa* is supposed to be different from other *jātis*. By being born in a certain *jāti* one becomes a better *adhikārī* or one has a better *avasthā-bheda*, and not by one's own endeavour. So, the *adhikāra* becomes a part of your birth. And that is the real problem. One has to solve that problem. I am sure that it cannot be tolerated in any social thought. It is all right to think of *jīva*. And it is perfectly all right to think of *adhikāra-bheda*, which has to be there in some form or other. But, after all, everyone is equal in certain aspects. But when *adhikāra-bheda* is crystallised as *jāti-bheda*, it becomes a great

block in any social thought. Bhaktas should be able to get rid of it. But they have not been able to do so. Those who have been able to do so are the nirguṇas, and nirguṇas have not really been intellectually strong except in some ways. They have not gone into the śāstras as they could have done. And, when they did, many of the later nirguṇas became like any other sampradāya, accepting all the adhikāra-bheda and *janmavāda* and everything else with it. This is what has happened with many of the nirguṇas. We need adhikāra-bheda, but we do not need it in terms of birth. How to get rid of that?

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: May I request the ladies to respond to this?

Ms. Vinita Sharma: There are any number of *sākhīs* in Kabir which show a deep concern for fellow beings. But in Kabir you have them more at the level of God. He is more a poet than a thinker. But Kabir-bhaktas then started worshipping Kabir. Sankīrtana is there in Kabir also. Bhaktas get together, they sing together. There is a sense of collectivity.

But the most important person who really turned everything into action was Nānaka, who taught us that we must treat everyone alike. He does not just stop at that. He threw a challenge that if one believes in it, one has to do something about it. Nānaka says that caste has to be rejected. He does not stop like Kabira at worship or thought or feeling. He says, those who follow me come and eat together. If you are a disciple of Nānaka and if you are a Brahmin, you must sit with a śūdra and eat with him. Just saying and believing is not enough. Do it. You must get

together for prayer, just as Caitanya did for kīrtana. No caste distinction is to be maintained. Nānaka's views on women were also more liberal. At the operational level, Nānaka is an activist. Caitanya had a Muslim disciple. He ate with Muslims. He was a holy man different from other bhaktas like Tulsī Dās. Tulsī Dās is the opposite not only of Kabir and Nānaka but also of Catanya. They were leading two kinds of movements, but they were all infused with the common spirit of bhakti. According to the contemporary social and economic situation at that time there were different responses from them.

Prof. Daya Krishna: Thank you. May I remind the participants that they may assume that most of the persons in the seminar know the history of the subject. In a dialogue we have to make a point leading out of what somebody has said; if you differ from someone, you can make your point.

We have to close now, because in this very hall there is going to be another function this evening at 7 O'clock. All of you are invited.

Those persons who have not been able to contribute to the discussion up till now, will have an opportunity tomorrow at 10-00 a.m., when we will continue the discussion. But let me pose a question for tomorrow. Just a simple question: Is punarjanmavāda necessary for bhakti?

## SESSION X

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Friends, we can now begin the morning session on the last day of the seminar. Yesterday we raised a question as to how bhakti is centered in feeling. If one gets interested in feeling, then one is not interested in the object of the feeling. But, how can the whole cultivation of consciousness or sādhanā be centered in something so personal? It cannot even be called personal, but rather a state where both the subject, which has it, and the object with which it is connected, are only marginal and tangential. This is the whole issue.

Swamiji had said at the beginning: "*bhaktyā tuṣyati kevalam na ca guṇaih; bhaktipriyo mādhaveḥ.*"

We may forget Mādhava for the moment. *Bhaktyā tuṣyati kevalam.* In other words, it is the state of my consciousness or being or feeling which alone tuṣyati. It fulfils me, it fulfils my innermost need and being. If this is so, then it does not matter with respect to what object it is being aroused, because the specificity is irrelevant to the consciousness, which is centered in the feeling itself. If you go into the adequacy of the object with respect to which the feeling is being aroused, then consciousness will be concerned with the adequacy of the response of the feeling to the object and an independent investigation of the nature of the object with

respect to which one has feeling. On the other hand, if one moves to the guṇas of the subject, then the question is whether one is worthy of having such as feeling or not. All these moves are generally regarded as closed in any discussion on bhakti and perhaps logically they ought to be closed. But if this is the situation, then the question arises: how can something like a feeling-centered consciousness and an ideal which is basically built in terms of feeling, move towards a correct understanding of the object with guṇas, which are appropriate to that ideal and the quality of the subject, which is having the feeling. One must be a worthy person and have a worthy object so that the ideal with respect to which the whole movement of bhakti is directed may satisfy the rational, the moral and the aesthetic needs of man. If I am apprehending the object in the movement of knowledge. I ask myself whether I apprehend the object as it is, or not. The movement of moral consciousness on the other hand, asks whether I am what I ought to be. Both of these movements are absolutely essential for a full human development and the development of society and polity. A man or a society which lacks an essentially directional movement towards the knowledge of the object as it is will certainly ultimately ruin itself. Or, a consciousness (and here you can have both 'or' and 'and') that is not concerned at all with the worthiness of oneself in the sense that whether I am what I ought to be, will also take both the individual and the society in a direction, which we will normally consider undesirable. Cultures and movements which have been primarily feeling-centric and have

neglected the other two dimensions have ultimately led to decadence. Many of you might not have read or heard about the novel *A Rebours*. I am merely referring to it, and it was associated with a movement. This is a novel by Huysman, a French writer, centered on the pursuit of feeling for its own sake. There was a whole movement around it in France in the late nineteenth century. It is instructive, even though its atmosphere is far, far distant from bhakti. The philosophical point that I want to make in this connection is this: any ideal or thinking about an ideal which is basically centred in the life of feelings and, therefore, in the development and deepening of ourself in relation to this ideal, is to be conceived or thought about in relation to both the object and the subject of feeling. There was an interesting move made yesterday which was not noted. In K.C. Bhattacharya's thought, in the concept of sympathy, he suggests how a feeling arises in connection with the feeling of another person. This is very interesting. Here the object of feeling is the feeling of somebody else. I have talked of a second-order feeling. But that was a feeling about one's own feeling. The whole notion of *karuṇā*, of *dayā*, that is, the whole notion of sympathy and compassion, arise in response to another person's feeling.

What might be a community of feelers? I mean, feeling beings. In this connection, I think, Dr. Dwivedi raised a very interesting issue, which has not really been pursued, and I would like to bring it to your attention. He had said that bhakti should be understood as a feeling that is aroused with reference to the

other, any other. He also argued that equality between the others could only be ensured in a spiritual context. *Īśvara sandarbha*. This means that we should believe in the equality of all persons in the context of God. But in all other contexts, persons are unequal. If a feeling relationship is to be generated with respect to the other, the 'other' can be not as on unequal other. The reality of the 'other' has an equal claim on my feelings. And this can be done only in a spiritual perspective of the universe. This is perhaps the direction of thought, if I have understood Prof. Dwivedi correctly, he was arguing that the whole western concept of equality arising from a secular framework is intrinsically untenable. The whole thing can only be done in a spiritual framework where each person is seen as a potential ātman or a potential puruṣa or a potential bhakta. This is a fruitful line of thinking and may be pursued further.

Mr. S. Rajmani: In the 12th century A.D. there was a great thinker in Karnataka known as Bāsaveśvara. This Bāsaveśvara was born as a Brāhmaṇa. He joined Vaiṣṇavism, Vīra Saivism and incorporated many revolutionary ideas into religion and society. He called his own movement the Liṅgāyata religion. What he said was that each one of us should become a temple. "People who are rich can build temples. What can I do? I am a poor man. The body I have is the temple. The head is the pinnacle. And you, God, are living in my heart, and that is your *sanctum sanctorum*, the *garbhagṛha*, the *devasthānam*." He says: "I take all, who enter into this faith. I take them. I treat them as equals." Women were also

initiated, and they participated in all religious activities as much as men did. They were equal participants. Thus Bāsaveśvara paved the way for the equality of the professions in society. He said: "Whether you are a Brahmin teaching śāstras, or a kṣatriya fighting in the battlefield, whatever you are, whatever profession you practice, if you do that profession with meditation for God, that itself is a great thing. Professions of cobbler, carpenter, etc., are all equal." So, Śaivism and Vīra Śaivism in Karnataka in particular, had called for the upliftment of everyone in the society and the equality of everybody. In that kind of *cintana*, exchange of ideas, exchange of anubhava, discussion about society, were all done at that time. Everyday they used to have discussion. Later, it culminated in a very great revolutionary incident in the life of Bāsaveśvara.

He decided to have a marriage celebrated between the daughter of a Brahmin who had become a Śaiva,

Līngāyata, with the son of a *harijana* who had also joined the faith; so, a marriage between a harijan boy and a Brahmin girl was arranged. When the marriage was celebrated in Karnataka, there was a great revolution which, I think, Bāsaveśvara could not control. The Vīra Śaivas were at the forefront of that revolution, even though it was not successful.

Prof. Daya Krishna: Thank you. Do you know or some documents containing reports of the *anubhava maṇḍapa* and *vicāra pariṣad* proceedings?

Mr. S. Rajamani: There are some.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Have they been published?

Mr. S. Rajamani: Yes, they are published, and also in English.

Prof. Daya Krishna: Could you give a list? From where can we get them?

Mr. S. Rajamani: I will send a copy of the commemoration volume of the centenary celebrations of Bāsaveśvara. That will give you an idea of the entire movement. All the historical data is there.

Prof. Daya Krishna: Prof. Dwivedi, may I ask you to briefly say in Sanskrit what I have said?

प्रो. दयाकृष्ण— जो मैंने इशू उठाया था उसी पर थोड़ा संस्कृत में कहिये।

प्रो. द्विवेदी— क्या उठाया था?

प्रो. दयाकृष्ण— फीलिंग की बात।

प्रो. द्विवेदी— आप इसको हिन्दी में कहिये।

प्रो. दयाकृष्ण— आप कहिये, आप सुन रहे थे। संस्कृत में संक्षेप में बोलिए।

There was an Indologist, I do not remember at the moment whether he was Max Mueller or Deussen, who made the following statement: earlier when I was told, 'you should love your neighbour', I could not understand it. Why should I? But when I was told that all is Brahman, all is ātman, then, I could very well understand it. For, if all is Brahman, all is ātmān, then, all is the samr. And so, I should love every ātmān. This is all.



डॉ. के. एन. मिश्रा— सात्विक लोगों को संस्कृत नहीं आती। जैसी द्विवेदी जी करते हैं। द्विवेदी जी ने गुण और गुणातीत की बात कही थी। आप सुन रहे हैं न?

प्रो. द्विवेदी— हम सुन रहे हैं। लेकिन मैं सोचता हूँ— थोड़ा पेशेस होना चाहिए। यह जो प्वाइंट है गुण के बगैर गुणातीत उसे समझने के लिए।

Actually I will not simply translate but interpret and interconnect both these ideas. The real problem in all these discourses in whether bhakti is more important or Bhagavāna the bhaktas more important. In the final analysis, what is important is the bhakta. If the qualifications and the qualities of a bhakta are important, then, there is no need for any further discussion. If Bhagavāna is important, as philosophers thought, then intellectual awareness of Bhagavāna is sufficient. In that case, we can do away with the bhaktas because the intellectuals will take over the issue. So, it is in this context that we may say that it is neither Bhagavāna nor bhakta, but the bridge which connects the two, that is bhakti, which is important. And, bhakti has two well-known forms: the *sādhakānvika* bhakti and the *sādhyānvika* bhakti. The former is sādhana-centered, while the latter is sādhyā-centered. But in both of them intellectual awareness or action-oriented awareness is not important. It is service, which is important in the ultimate analysis. It is not the viṣaya or the viṣayī that is important. *Bhaktipriyo Mādhavaḥ*. Thus, the guṇas refer to the intellectual, to the non-bhakti sphere only. This contradiction occurs only when we refer to other realms. What are these other realms? The realm of karma or jñāna. So, what is ultimately important is bhakti, not guṇas. The guṇas in the context

are bound to represent intellectual apprehension and action-orientation.

But I will like to raise one more issue. Prof. Daya has rightly said,

तत्र मया यत् प्रपादितं संक्षेपेण ब्रवीमि। वस्तुतः यत् भक्तेः प्राधान्यं, भक्तिः प्रधानभूता साध्या, इत्येवाभिप्रायः। ज्ञानस्य प्राधान्यं नास्ति। कर्मणामपि प्राधान्यं नास्ति, इत्यपि अभिप्रायः। एतौ हि प्रकृतौ। प्रकृतेश्च परमुदेति भक्तितत्त्वम्। बहुषु शास्त्रेषु प्रतिपादितम् इदम्। गुणानां किं क्षेत्रं? प्राकृतं हि गुणानां क्षेत्रम्। भक्तेः क्षेत्रम् अतिप्राकृतं, लोकोत्तरम्, अलौकिकं वा, कथञ्चिदपि स्यात्। गुणानां क्षेत्रे नास्त्ययं भावनामयः संसारः, अतएव भावनायाः प्राधान्ये सति गुणात्मकं यज्जगत् तद्भवतौ न राजते। यदि अहम् प्राधान्यं स्यात् विषयस्य वा प्राधान्यं स्यात्, विषयिनो वा प्राधान्यं स्यात् तर्हि यथा आचार्यशंकरपादैरपि उक्तं, 'विषय-विषयिनोः तमः-प्रकाशवत् विरुद्धस्वभावयोः' तत्र नानात्वमापतति। भक्तेः प्रधान्यं नायाति। अतः यथा मयते ऊह्यते उल्लेख्यते यदहम् उत्पश्यामि अयमेवाभिप्रायः पुरुषोत्तमाचार्याणां प्रतिभाति। साध्यरूपायां भक्तौ भक्तिरेव ज्यायसी, सा एव गरीयसी, सा एव भगवन्तं साधकं भक्तं च सृजति, अवति संहरति। भक्तिं विना भगवानपि नास्ति। भक्तिं विना भक्तोपि नास्ति। योयं भक्तिभावः या वा भक्तसत्ता या वा भगवती सत्ता, सा किमूला? भक्तिमूला एव। भक्तौ तु ज्ञानमार्गश्च प्रतिपादितः तथा च योयं कर्ममार्गः आस्थितः, तं ज्ञानमार्गं कर्ममार्गं च अतिसृज्य, अतिरिच्य वर्तते कश्चन एष नवीनपंथा भावनायाः। भावनामये अस्मिन् भक्तिसंसारे भावना एव कुलदेवीति कृत्वा तदनु कर्मणां प्रसक्तिः, तदनु च ज्ञानस्यापि प्रसक्तिः।

I do expect that spiritual equality was accepted in our tradition, in our holy tradition, not merely by the bhakti tradition but also by the knowledge tradition, and the karma tradition. In all the traditions, spiritually, speaking, this equality of man was accepted. But socially it was never confirmed; politically it was never thought of. Who is responsible for this? The philosophers do have to explain why this happened. Equality was believed in by all the traditions including the bhakti tradition and the Tāntric tradition. Why were they not socially or politically concerned about it? This is my problem, and this is the problem,

which Dr. Lath had actually raised yesterday also. Once the bhakti movement and the Tāntric movement starts, one can see the tension, the tension they have with the karma doctrine, the tension with the varṇa doctrine. Such tension exists in all the texts of these movements. That is the difficulty. They are ambivalent in the matter. They feel that if they have sanctity, they must be able to establish some relationship of equality in the social realm. Yet they are not quite willing to do it. This tension is visible. In the Bhāgavata it shows in the very first few pages. The first thing that a sensitive person encounters is this tension. How to keep the varṇāśrama vyavasthā despite moves to the contrary? And, let us not forget, it is Brahmins who have written such texts. How to keep it closed and yet, how to make it open to all the varṇas? How to challenge the old system, yet retain it, is the problem. This tension is still not resolved and continuous to exist in our minds. Ultimately, the tension concerns reconciliation with the Vedic past which, after all, is nothing but our racial identity in terms of the knowledge tradition.

Mahātmā Gandhi proclaimed the equality of man with his *ahimsā* doctrine. That was a great experiment through spiritual doctrine of *ahimsā* in the field of both society and polity. There should be other experiments of this kind at the social and the political level. There are so many texts in which the spirituality of all is proclaimed. But what has been the real effect on this in society?

Dr. Rukmini: Even Rāmānuja tries to establish that in the ultimate analysis.

Jñāna, bhakti and karma are the same. But what was the prayojana of them all? The prayojana was individual salvation. So, once they have established that, then everything depends on oneself to follow a particular path for one's own individual solvation. So much so that when the bhakti movement started, there was also a dependence on God for individual solvation. At least in jñāna and karma the individual was more important because whatever karma or jñāna we do, it is an endeavour. But after Rāmānuja, I would say, there was a decline of this trend to the extent that even *bhaktaka nyāya* was totally lost sight of, and *mādhava nyāya* came into prominence. Whatever may have been the historical reasons for this, for us the task is different. The political conditions have changed and even social and intellectual thought has changed. We have, therefore, started thinking in terms of society.

I want to return to the idea of feeling per se which is possible because in the Bhāgavata itself it is treated as a rasa, and rasa is a feeling. But can we translate that feeling into social terms? There are examples of bhaktas like Ramakrishna. In the Ramakrishna Ashram there are people who are engaged in social work. There is something in the bhakti path which allows you to work for fellow beings which unfortunately is not the case with people who are following the jñāna-mārga. So I would at least give this credit to bhakti. Of course, ideas change. I think, now society is also ripe and bhakti can be used to improve the lot of our fellow beings more than before.

Prof. Dwivedi: There is no gainsaying that in our tradition we have neglected the social aspect and that the personal aspect of religion has been over emphasized. On the other hand, right from the times of Buddha there is an emphasis on how to behave with others. From his death bed Buddha asked his disciples, if they had any question. So, Anand asked him, 'how should one behave with women'? Buddha said, 'don't look at them'. Ānanda said, 'if I were to meet one, what shall I do'? "Ananda, don't talk to them." Then, Ānanda asks, 'if I have to talk to them, then, how to do so'? Buddha said, 'keep before you the smṛti'.

The individual was always emphasized; how to think, how to behave with other individuals. But so far as the concept of society was concerned, it does not seem to occur in our thought. How should we behave with our neighbour if he does not belong to our culture or to the religious denomination to which we belong? No Dharma-śāstra has ever given thought to this. How to behave with the neighbour in case he is not a man who belongs to our own religion? Unfortunately, it so happened that we had neighbours who did not belong to the religion to which we belonged. People belonging to other traditions came here, and we were taken aback. We tried to get into our own shell of self-defence: 'don't talk to them'. Hence such rules: 'don't talk to a Jain; don't talk to a Buddhist'. So, not to speak of foreigners, even amongst Indians this developed. The ancients tried to explain or rather explain away this problem by saying that there are two levels. In a spiritual sense there is equality. Śaṅkarācārya, for

example, gave us the panacea of vyavahāra-satya and paramārtha-satya. If you ask anyone who is giving a *pravacana* on the Bhagavad Gītā, then he might say, *paṇḍitāḥ samadarśinaḥ*. But mind it, it is *paṇḍitāḥ sama-darśinaḥ*, vyavahāra is not to be *sama*; *sama* is only meant for darśana. So, they will say that in spirituality it is all right, but in practice it cannot be implemented. Spiritually, unity is there; but in practice there has to be discrimination.

Chairman Prof. Daya Krishna: Thank you.

Shri Shrivatsa: I will speak in English. Dr. Dwivedi had raised an issue to which, I think, the answer has been given. If he reads the newspaper any morning, he will get the answer to it. It has been broadcast from the Boat Club meeting that behind all our problems there is a foreign hand. *Videśī hāth hai*. As intellectuals the onus of responsibility is more on us, because the process about which I would like to tell you a little bit later, is actually, as he said, something which is first felt, or experienced, and then it is articulated, or translated into actions, deeds, events and different kinds of social, political, legal processes. So, when I use the expression, 'bhakti is something which includes and transcends', it is not an exclusive transcendence but an inclusive transcendence in the socio-political realm as well. Because even if you see the great ācāryas, you will find them also to be great social reformers. If we take the example of Śaṅkara himself, when he took up the role of a reformer, an organizer, a rebel, a missionary, whatever you might call him, was he being

exclusively a jñānī? We cannot imagine, we cannot really imagine Śaṅkara being exclusively a jñānī and yet doing what he did. He is not only engaged in karma, he is also a bhakta, and he is doing it with love, love towards his ideals.

But when I talk about the videśī hāth, I mean that it has systematically inspired us to compartmentalize our experience. The great champion who led us into this compartmentalisation was born in Greece. Thanks to Aristotle, and his whole approach of compartmentalization, we are now trying to make it into a fine art and applying it even to our day-to-day life. I was therefore quite surprised, to find that in 1976 when I went to the Harvard Medical School for some examination, the doctors were talking about holistic medicine. But after returning to Delhi, I found that this talk was completely missing from the Indian medical scene. We do not even seem to realize that our own medical system, *Āyurveda*, is a holistic system. If you are an *Āyurvedācārya*, you have to know Kabir, you have to know philosophy, astrology, and the economic and social life of the patients you are handling. You cannot be a true doctor unless you are trained in all these things.

So, at least we are not going to form a party, even though this is the month for forming parties in the country. But if we have to do something, we have to form a party, a new party. We can form a new party and start a political movement. We can start a fight. We can do something meaningfully through intellectual exercise. But we have to intellectually convince ourselves first, and

then communicate that conviction to others, so that it can be translated into action. But we have to stop for a while and look back. What are we actually doing? The man who had the last laugh at India, at the Indian tradition must have been Warren Hastings. We should be really grateful to him for providing us systems, which we see in India today, the great political system, the legal system, the economic system and, above all, the educational system. He made laws to do away with our tradition, our heritage. He said, If I try to handle India from the political angle, I will fail. I will fail like the Mughals and all the others who have tried to do so. I have to hit at the root. I have to change the system. He had the last laugh, as all the new formal systems in every field in our country have cut us away from the roots, which sustained our civilization for such a long time.

The only person who really challenged all this was Gandhi, who said, "I am proud to be a religious person. Dharma is my commitment. My politics is *Rāma-rāja*. I will not be doing politics meaningfully if I keep away from religion, which is the major commitment of any human being." Then, with this kind of *samagra* approach or 'bhakti approach', all his political meetings were *prārthanā sabhās*. Probably, even in the modern sense of the term, he was the first and the last secular leader born in this century in India.

So, we return to the issue. Let us take our clue from Vaiṣṇava and bhakti history, whether Basava or Caitanya and the Gosvāmīs:

feeling is the core. But the articulation and the intellectual exercise is a *must* as it holds everything together. This is something, which cannot be ignored at any point.

What has happened at this moment in our history is that we have intellectually mortgaged ourselves to the west. We have accepted that ideas should come to us from a high seat of learning in the west, from Harvard or Columbia or X, Y, Z university, and then we rehash it in our language, in our jargon or in Indian English. That is a major concern and that is why this whole *sāmvāda* has come up.

But, what did the Gosvāmīs do? They experienced. They were literary *bhūparikaras*, they wrote *mañjarīs*. But they did not stop there. If you see their life work, they were the most articulate *jñānīs* and philosophers and scholars. In fact, they concerned themselves with their discipline a little too much. Imagine the Vrindavana where their writing was done covering over six volumes. Imagine Gopāla Bhaṭṭa's plight. He was collecting this *Smṛti*, trying to give a complete system or life style. That was the thing, which was done, the model, discarding even the *prasthānatrayī*. Why should he have been concerned about it? Yet, he wrote a book, which is in 600 pages, where he quotes from almost 300, or to be precise, 273, texts. No library was there at the end of the 15th century in Vrindavana where one could get the *Smṛtis*, he quotes from. Where to get even the hand-made paper and ink in Vrindavana where nobody was living? So, what kind of hardship did they undergo, and they created this system

which has lasted for 500 years. At the same time they had understanding and sensibility, for after writing these six volumes on *bhakti-rasa* or *prīti-rasa*, Jīva Gosvāmī writes these last words:

*kṣamasva me kṣamāśīlaḥ ayi gopālanandanaḥ*

I forget the third part of the śloka. The *Rasa*, which/who is so *sāndraghana*, why he should forgot me? "*Yadi kvacit taralayatu mām.*" I might have diluted it, the *rasa*, in this *jñāna* and the *jñāna*-process. But, nonetheless, what was done was important. When he is writing this, he mentions *Rādhā*. He says, without the *dhārā* of *Rādhā* your *saṅga-raṅga* would not have been available to anyone, and without the *dhārā* you would have been unknown and meaningless and useless for us. So, the whole process of *manana* and *jñāna* is important.

But, the Gosvāmīs were directly involved, not only in this, but in many other things, for the upliftment of their movement, their history, their society, their culture, their heritage. Look at the trouble they had with royalty, not only of our own tradition, but with the Mughal power which was basically hostile to this activity. I know, as I am involved in this small structural thing, how much effort it takes! Look at what they created in Braj; Govindadeva is only one thing that they built. They were probably spending their total time with masons, architects and their organization and raising funds. From where did they get the time to write the books, forget about the *sādhanā* and their *aṣṭakālīna* *cintana* and their *nāmajapa* and

everything else. But, it is because of that commitment that they were called ācāryas.

My question, then, as the bottom line of this Seminar to Dwivediji and to everyone is that we should individually take up the task, which the Gosvāmīs initiated. We should individually take up the task and should not mortgage ourselves to higher realities and bigger processes. We are all individuals and it is very easy to preach. But unless there is the ācārya kind of thing, unless we commit ourselves to a kind of liberation theology of bhakti at the threshold of 21st century, things are not going to be easy.

Chairman: I think, it is 11-30. It is time for coffee. After coffee we will all assemble here.

प्रो. दया कृष्ण--यह बात है इस पर सोचना चाहिए। अभी आप लोग जो यहाँ मन्दिरों में जाते हैं या संस्थान में आते हैं या विभिन्न संस्थाओं में जाते हैं वहाँ आप को एक नये प्रकार का अनुभव होता है कि भारतीय परम्परा जीवित है, जागृत है इतनी मृत नहीं है जितना आपने सोचा है। उससे आप को कोई जीवन्त सम्बन्ध स्थापित करना है तो आप उन लोगों से मिलिए, बात करिये जो उस परम्परा के जीवन्त प्रतीक हैं और उन संस्थानों में जाइये जहाँ वह जीवित है। किस प्रकार वार्तालाप करके एक नयी प्राणवंत धारा प्रवाहित हो सकती है? कैसे होगी, किस में होगी, कब होगी यह तो कोई निर्णय दे नहीं सकता, सोच ही नहीं सकता। भविष्य हमेशा अनिश्चित रहता है यह बात ठीक है मगर अपनी ही शक्ति के अनुसार वह शक्ति बौद्धिक हो या अन्य प्रकार की हो उसके अनुसार साधना करनी चाहिए और इसी दिशा में जो विशेष बात कही गयी है यह है जो प्राचीन आचार्यों के चाहे भक्ति के हों चाहे अन्य प्रकार के हों उन्होंने भी इसी प्रकार की चेष्टा की थी जिस प्रकार की चेष्टा करने की हम सोचते हैं। वह हम से किसी प्रकार भिन्न नहीं थे। मैं बाद में उस पर बात करना चाहूँगा। ऐसा लगता है कि जब हम भूतकाल की ओर देखते हैं तो हमें एक विफलता दिखाई देती है। ऐसा जरूर लगता है कि दृष्टि है, कर्म है, मगर यह भी महसूस होता है कि आखिर यह कर्म विफल क्यों है? उतना सफल क्यों नहीं हुआ, जितना होना चाहिए। पर वास्तव में ऐसा नहीं है। इतना आप को निराशा होने की जरूरत नहीं है क्योंकि अगर अन्य संस्कृतियों पर ध्यान दें तो

वहाँ भी ऐसा ही नजर आता है। आज जरा रूस और चीन के बारे में सोचिए जहाँ इतनी जबरदस्त क्रांति हुई थी और जहाँ समाज में बराबरी स्थापित करने की, अर्थ वैषम्य को हटाने की चेष्टा की गई थी। वहाँ आज इतने साल बाद क्या अवस्था है? गाँधी जैसे पुरुष दुर्लभ होते हैं लेकिन वह इस देश में हुए। उनकी जैसी विफलता शायद ही कहीं मिले। हाँ, महाभारत में जरूर मिलता है, हालांकि वहाँ तो स्वयं भगवान् कृष्ण उपस्थित थे। ज्ञान और कर्म दोनों की विफलता संसार में मिलती है, इसका अर्थ यह नहीं है हमको कर्म नहीं करना चाहिए। करना तो चाहिए ही, लेकिन निराशा होने की कोई बात नहीं है। संसार का स्वरूप ही यह है। हमारे शास्त्रों में हमेशा निर्वेद की चर्चा होती है, पर यह भी कहा जाता है कि शांत रस की उत्पत्ति भी उससे होती है। इस संदर्भ में कुछ भी कहना कठिन है, लेकिन कुछ तो कहना ही पड़ता है। मुझे बार-बार यह अनुभव होता है कि हमारी परम्पराओं में बहुत सारा ऐसा कुछ है जिससे अगर हम सम्बन्ध स्थापित करें जिसके बारे में स्वयं सोचें, अपने अनुभव के आधार पर, अपनी बुद्धि के आधार पर, तो हम बहुत कुछ कर सकते हैं, कह सकते हैं। ऐसा भी है कि वास्तव में हमारे चिंतन में जो समस्याएँ हम अपने सामने रखते हैं वह उस पश्चिम के विचार के इतिहास से प्रभावित हैं जो उसकी अपनी परम्परा में उत्पन्न हुई हैं। कभी-कभी मैं सोचता हूँ कि इस स्थिति में ही कोई मूलभूत गलती तो नहीं है।

Are we not committing a fundamental mistake in projecting the very terms of the debate in categories, problems and questions that have been given to us by a whole western tradition and thought with respect to things which are familiar to us and in which we have been trained?

अगर ऐसा मान भी लिया जाय, तो भी यह समस्या तो रहती ही है कि क्या हम अपनी परम्परा के बारे में नए प्रश्न नहीं उठा सकते? परम्परा तभी अवरुद्ध होती है जब नए प्रश्न नहीं उठाए जाते और केवल पुरानी बातें दोहराई जाती हैं। इसलिए जब तक आप स्वयं अपने परम्परागत विषयों पर नये प्रश्न नहीं उठाएँगे, चिन्तन नहीं करेंगे, उन लोगों से नहीं मिलेंगे, जो परम्परा के प्राणवान वाहक हैं, उन संस्थाओं में नहीं जायेंगे जहाँ परम्परागत विचार अब भी पलता है और उनसे बातचीत नहीं करेंगे उनको अपनी बात नहीं कहेंगे उनकी बात नहीं सुनेंगे तब तक परम्परा आगे नहीं बढ़ेगी। सुनने सुनाने से ही परिवर्तन आता है, आप में भी और दूसरे में भी, क्योंकि वार्तालाप की यही सफलता होती है। यह परिवर्तन बुद्धि के स्तर पर भी होता है, और दृष्टि के स्तर पर भी। जब तक बुद्धि, दृष्टि और शक्ति तीनों ही सक्षम नहीं होंगे और उनमें किसी हद तक सामंजस्य स्थापित नहीं होगा,

तब तक बात आगे नहीं बढ़ेगी। कैसे बढ़ेगी, कहना कठिन है लेकिन यहां जो प्रयास हम कर रहे हैं, वह इसी तरह का प्रयास है। मैं गोस्वामी जी से कहूंगा जो वास्तव में अधिकारी आदमी हैं, वह इस विषय पर कुछ कहें। लेकिन वह जो कुछ भी कहें अपने अनुभव और चिंतन के आधार पर ही कहें, उसके आधार पर नहीं जो लिखा गया है।

श्री गोस्वामी--प्रश्न उठेगा कि किसी भी व्यक्ति के जो विचार हैं उसको मिले कहाँ से? वह किसी देश, काल और परिस्थिति में पला और कोई विशेष वातावरण उसको मिला, संग मिला। इनके अनुसार ही उसके विचार उसके अपने बनते हैं। वृंदावन में किसी का जन्म हुआ, विशुद्ध अनुरागमयी भक्ति ही उसे जन्म से देखने को मिली, वैसी ही साधना करने का सौभाग्य मिला, तो ऐसे व्यक्ति के 'अपने' विचार कुछ अलग होंगे। पर वह व्यक्ति जिस को ऐसा वातावरण न मिला हो, जिसने धार्मिक ग्रन्थों का अवलोकन न किया हो, सत्संग न मिला हो, उसके विचार कुछ अपने तरीके के होंगे यह स्वाभाविक बात है।

कोई भी वक्ता सब को संतुष्ट कभी नहीं कर सकता। इसलिए कि सब के भीतर जो विचार हैं अपनी-अपनी निष्ठा के अनुसार हैं। और निष्ठा परिपक्व होती है संग से, शिक्षा से, वातावरण से, घर से, परिवार से, और इसके भी आगे एक और बात है पूर्वजन्म का जो कर्म है उसके अनुसार भी हर मनुष्य को बुद्धि की प्राप्ति होती है। यह भी मान्यता है।

भक्ति का विषय इतना व्यापक है कि उपायम् अपि चिंतयेत्, अपायम् अपि चिंतयेत्, उपाय पर भी विचार हो और अपाय पर भी विचार हो। हानि कहाँ होती है? वहाँ जहाँ हम मनसि एकम्, वचसि एकम्, कार्ये एकम् नहीं हैं। वहाँ हानि हो जाती है। मैं देखता हूँ कि विशुद्ध व्यक्तिगत विचार किसी के भी नहीं हैं। हर विचार के भीतर उस धर्म का भी प्रभाव होता है जिस धर्म का वह अनुयायी है, उसके परिवार वालों का प्रभाव होता है तो उसके सम्प्रदायों वालों का भी प्रभाव होता है। अध्ययन का भी प्रभाव होता है। पिछले जन्म के कर्म भी उसके पीछे रहते हैं। इसलिए व्यक्तिगत विचार किस को कहा जाये? जो विचार मन में हों, चाहे ग्रंथों के आधार पर चाहे गुरुजन या सत्संग प्रभाव से या शिक्षा से मिले हों, वही वैयक्तिक विचार हैं। ऐसा व्यक्ति देखने को नहीं मिलता है जिसने शुरु से किसी को न पढ़ा हो और अध्यापक जिसके पीछे चलता हो। डॉ. कृष्णमूर्ति की इच्छा थी कि अध्यापकों को विद्यार्थी पढ़ाये लेकिन ऐसा व्यवहार में सम्भव नहीं दीखता। विद्यार्थी तो सीखने के लिए आता है। गुरु उसको विद्या दान देता है, नहीं तो विद्यार्थी सीखेगा कहाँ से? गुरु उसको सिखाता है तो वह सीख जाता है नहीं तो वह अपने आप कैसे सीख सकता है? अगर अपने आप सीखने की चेष्टा करेगा तो मैं समझता हूँ वही प्राचीन काल आ जायेगा जिस काल में हम बन्दरों की संतान

थे। हमारा धीरे-धीरे विकास हुआ है लेकिन शिक्षा के बिना हम फिर उतने ही पीछे चले जायेंगे, अनुभव से लाभ उठाया जाता है। सभी लोग लोग उठाते हैं।

मैंने पहले दिन निवेदन किया था--

भक्त्या तुष्यति केवलं न च गुणैः। भक्तिप्रियो माधवः

हम कोई भी हों, कुछ भी हों और कितने भी योग्यतम हों, यदि हमारे भीतर भक्ति का सद्गुण नहीं है तो हम अधूरे हैं। हाथ में लेकर माला जपने को मैं इंगित नहीं कर रहा हूँ, लेकिन कल्पना कीजिये कि दो जनें हैं और दोनों में बहुत काबिलियत है लेकिन व्यावहारिक पक्ष में न मुझे आपके प्रति श्रद्धा है न आप को मेरे प्रति श्रद्धा है तो मैं और आप फिर कौन हूँ? क्या हम मनुष्य कहलाने के भी अधिकारी हैं? ऐसा आज देखने को मिलता है। बड़ी विडम्बना है कि चाहे राजनीतिक दल हों या धार्मिक सम्प्रदाय हों, यदि आप मेरे सम्प्रदाय में नहीं हैं, मेरे दल में नहीं हैं तो मैं आप को मनुष्य ही मानने को तैयार नहीं हूँ। आप मेरे परम शत्रु हैं। मैं आप से इतना भी सद्व्यवहार करने को तैयार नहीं हूँ जैसा एक मानव को दूसरे सम्य मानव से करना चाहिए। अगर मैंने सुन लिया कि आप बीजेपी के हैं तो आप कुछ नहीं हैं। मैं सी आई का हूँ तो मैं सब कुछ हूँ। मैंने सुना कि तुम भी सी आई के हो तो आओ बैठो मेरे पास। तुम मेरे हो पर किसी दूसरे दल या सम्प्रदाय के हो तो मेरे नहीं। यह कैसा आचरण है यह समझने में नहीं आता। यह क्या है? क्या भक्ति यही शिक्षा देती है? अगर यही शिक्षा देती है, तो इति गणना लघुचेतसाम्, यह निम्न कोटि की बात है। पर बात ऐसी नहीं है। व्याधस्याचरणं ध्रुवस्य च वयो विद्या गजेन्द्रस्य का, वंशः को विदुरस्य यादवपते? विदुर का क्या वंश था? तभी जब उन्होंने कहा "भक्त्या तुष्यति केवलम्" तो पहले उदाहरण गिना दिया, स्पष्टीकरण पहले दे दिया। व्याध ने एक बाण मारा, भगवान श्री कृष्ण के चरणों में लग गया। मृग मान कर जब पास आकर देखा तो चतुर्भुजी मूर्ति बैठी हुई थी

चतुर्भुजं तं पुरुषं दृष्ट्वा स कृतकित्त्विषः।

भीतः पतति शिरसा पादयोः

अजानता कृतमिदं पापं मधुसूदन। क्षन्तुमर्हसि . . . ।

हे मधुसूदन मुझ से अज्ञान हो गया, आप दंड दीजिए, जितना भी आप दे सकते हैं। भगवान ने उसे स्व-धाम की प्राप्ति करा दी। "याहि त्वं मदनुज्ञातः स्वर्गं सुकृतिनां पदम्॥"

आजकल एक बड़ा फैशन चला है। महात्मा अपनी आयु बहुत बड़ी बताते हैं। बड़ी आयु बताने से क्या होगा? जनता विश्वास कर लेगी कि इसको ईश्वर प्राप्ति हो गयी। अधिक आयु रूपी गुण से ईश्वर की प्राप्ति हो जाती है यह भी

मान्यता है। इसलिए महात्मा की 100 वर्ष की आयु बहुत मामूली बात है। अब तो 400-500 वर्ष की भी घोषणा होने लगी है। हमारे यहाँ एक संत हैं जिनकी आयु करीब 400 वर्ष की है। उनके गाँव का एक दल आया। उनका नाम लेकर गाँव के बूढ़ों से हम ने पूछा। एक बूढ़े ने कहा, कहां है वह? हमने कहा तुम इतने बड़े महात्मा को ऐसा छोटा शब्द बोलते हो? 400 वर्ष की आयु है। बूढ़े ने कहा, हमारा भांजा बाटे। कौन कहता है 400 वर्ष की आयु है। मेरा भानजा है। आयु रूपी जो गुण है उससे ईश्वर प्राप्ति नहीं हो सकती। उदाहरण देकर गिना कर दिखाते हैं : ध्रुवस्य च वयो ध्रुव की 5 वर्ष की आयु थी। पर उसको भगवान प्राप्त हो गये। विद्या गजेन्द्रस्य का? गजेन्द्र के पास क्या विद्या थी? आज के विद्वान पांडित्य प्रदर्शन करके यह जताना चाहते हैं — धार्मिक विद्वानों की बात कर रहे हैं — यह जताना चाहते हैं कि मुझ को ईश्वर की प्राप्ति हो गयी है, क्योंकि मेरे पास विद्या है। गजेन्द्र के पास क्या विद्या थी? पर उसको ईश्वर की प्राप्ति हो गयी; तो विद्या रूपी गुण से प्राप्ति का कोई सम्बन्ध नहीं है।

*व्याधस्याचरणं, ध्रुवस्य च वयो, विद्या गजेन्द्रस्य का? वंशः को विदुरस्य, यादवपते!*

विदुर का क्या वंश था? वह तो ऐसा निर्वंश था कि उसका अपमान कर दिया गया। विदुराइन के घर छोकल खाये, मेवा तजि दुर्योधन को, विदुराइन के घर छोकल खाये। वहाँ जाकर छिलका खा लिया। राजा का मेवा त्याग दिया। उग्रसेन तो कारागार में बंदी थे उन पर भी कृपा कर दी। राजा के ऊपर कृपा नहीं की। एक बंदी के ऊपर कृपा कर दी। यह भक्ति की शक्ति है :

कुब्जा के रूप नहीं था उस पर कृपा हो गयी। रूप गुण के ऊपर ईश्वर प्रसन्न नहीं होता। सुदामा के पास धन नहीं था। आज का धनी तो जब किसी प्रसिद्ध मंदिर में जाता है तो पंडित जी से कह देता है पाँच हजार की अर्चना करा दो। सब से आगे हम खड़े होंगे यह ध्यान रखना। तो पाँच हजार में भगवान को खरीद लेता है। उसको यह विश्वास है कि 5 हजार में भगवान खरीदा जा सकता है। पर सुदामा के पास तो एक कौड़ी भी नहीं थी। सुदामा के ऊपर कृपा कर दी। अंत में कहा :

*प्राप्तो माम् अस्य दास्यामि सम्पदो अमर्त्यदुर्लभाः*

भक्ति एक ऐसा आन्दोलन है एक ऐसी सेवा है, जिस सेवा के बिना मनुष्य मनुष्य हो ही नहीं सकता। भक्ति का इतना व्यापक महत्त्व है कि :

*विप्राद्विषड्गुणयुताद् पादारविन्दविमुखात् श्वपचं वरिष्ठं मन्ये तदर्पितमनोवचने हितार्थप्राणः पुनाति स कुलं न तु भूरिमानः।*

प्रह्लाद नृसिंह स्तुति में कहते हैं कि द्वादश विद्यायुक्त ब्रह्मण से वह चांडाल श्रेष्ठ है जिसके भीतर और बाहर वचन एक है। और ईश्वर भक्ति पारायण उससे भी कहीं श्रेष्ठ है। श्री चैतन्य की लीला-परम्परा में बहुत से ऐसे उदाहरण देखने को मिलते हैं। धनी और मानी व्यक्ति के भीतर बहुत दुर्गुण देखने को मिलते हैं। लेकिन जो अकिंचन है और जिसका हृदय कपट-रहित है वहाँ ईश्वर का निवास हो जाता है। कोई उच्चवंश का दावा करता है या धनिक दावा करता है या विद्वान दावा करता है कि मेरा सम्बन्ध ईश्वर से है। पर ऐसी बात नहीं है। निर्मलमन जन सोहि है पावा, मोहि कपट छल छिद्र न भावा। भक्ति का जो सबसे बड़ा वैरदान है वह यह है कि वह हृदय को कपट रहित करती है, निर्मल बना देती है। वचस एकम्, मनस् एकम्, कार्य एकम् कर देती है। भक्ति का सबसे बड़ा यही प्रभाव है। भक्ति ने कहीं किसी दुर्गुण को अपने में रखा ही नहीं है। अपितु दोषों से मुक्त है। स्वयं और पर का भेद दूर कर देती है। ऐसा कहीं भी सनातन धर्म में कुछ नहीं मिलता है। पर भक्ति के भीतर लोक का हित स्वाभाविक और निहित है। कहा गया है।

*अहेतुकी अव्यवहिता या भक्तिः पुरुषोत्तमे।*

भगवान के चरणाविद में यदि भक्ति नहीं हो तो आप धार्मिक नहीं हो सकते। यह इस एक सूत्र में कह दिया। पर होनी चाहिये, अहेतुकी अव्यवहिता। यह भूलने वाली बात नहीं है। जहाँ किसी प्रकार का स्वार्थ नहीं है वह सच्ची भक्ति है। कोई दिवा रात्रि भक्ति की साधना करने वाला हो पर उसके भीतर यदि किंचित् भी स्वार्थ हो तो वैष्णव ग्रंथों में उसको अपराध मानते हैं। यह भक्ति के चरणों में अपराध है।

ईश्वर कहता है कि मुझसे आप प्रीति कर रहे हैं, मेरा पूजन कर रहे हैं, मेरा मनन कर रहे हैं, चिंतन कर रहे हैं, जाप कर रहे हैं, कीर्तन कर रहे हैं तीर्थ व्रत नेम कर रहे हैं परन्तु यदि दूसरे से आप द्वेष कर रहे हैं, तो भस्म में आहुति डाल रहे हैं। उस आहुति का कोई महत्त्व नहीं है। साथ-साथ एक दूसरा भी पक्ष है। हमारे देश में बहुत संत हुए हैं, अखंड भक्ति का अनुष्ठान जिन्होंने किया है और जो हर प्रांत में विद्यमान हैं। सर्वत्र भारतवर्ष के कोने-कोने में उनका सुयश फैला हुआ है। आज भी जनमानस उनकी ओर खिंचा चला जाता है। उनकी वाणी के प्रसाद से अपने जीवन की आराधना को आगे बढ़ाता है।

एक पक्ष और भी है। आज तो एक फैशन भी हो गया है कि मानव की सेवा ही ईश्वर सेवा है, इससे पृथक् ईश्वर क्या होता है? यह विचारणीय है। मानव से ऊपर सत्य न हो तो फिर मानव भी क्या रह जायेगा? पहले हम सत्य को नकारते हैं, फिर कहते हैं हम सत्य के उपासक हैं। यह धूलि प्रक्षेप नहीं है तो क्या है? गीता कहती है : प्रथम आप शरणागत हो जाइये, समस्त अहंकार को त्याग



दीजिए। मनुष्य क्या है? नाम, गाँव, जाति, पेशा यह सब कहकर मनुष्य अपना परिचय देता है। यह सब कुछ नहीं है। यह तो निवास स्थान है। उसका शरीर। उसके भीतर जीव बैठा हुआ है जब जीव निकल जाता है सब कहते हैं आदमी तो गया शरीर पड़ा है। कौन चला गया? आत्मा चली गयी। आप कौन थे? आत्मा थे। किस के अंश थे : ममैवांशो—उस पूर्ण के अंश थे। यह भावना अद्वैतवाद की ही नहीं है। भक्तों ने सर्वत्र यह ज्ञान दिया है : सियाराम मय सब जग जानी। सर्वमय कृष्णमय जगत्, जित देखो तित श्याम मयी है। ऐसा कहने का आधार क्या है? आधार यह है कि ईश्वर का अंश भी वैसा ही पूजनीय है जैसा ईश्वर। द्वितीय का चन्द्र भी वैसा ही पूजनीय है जैसा पूर्णिमा का चन्द्र। चन्द्र तो चन्द्र है।

विचार की बात कीजिये। आपने तो यह कार्य बहुत पीछे प्रारंभ किया। हमारे यहाँ तो इसका पहले से प्रचलन था। इसको हम लोग शास्त्र-विचार कहते थे। हमारे यहाँ ब्रह्म उत्सव प्रतिवर्ष होता है, 15 दिन होता है रंग मंदिर में। अब तो कम विद्वान आते हैं। पहले सारे भारतवर्ष के विद्वान आते थे। दो पंक्ति में बैठ जाते थे। ऐसे ही विषय पर विचार होता था जो आज यहाँ हो रहा है। लेकिन उसकी एक मर्यादा थी। क्या मर्यादा थी? शास्त्रसम्मत वाणी होगी तभी प्रमाण मानी जायेगी। यदि शास्त्रसम्मत वाणी नहीं हो तो अप्रमाणित होगी। आज यह नहीं है। आज हम सबके ऊपर आदेश है कि आप अपनी व्यक्तिगत बात करिये। कोट करके बात मत करिये। शैली बदल गयी है। मैंने निवेदन किया था कि किसी की अपनी कोई शैली नहीं होती है। संग का, अध्ययन का प्रभाव होगा ही। एकदम से व्यक्तिगत कोई कहां से पैदा कर लायेगा? अस्तु।

हमारे यहाँ जो शास्त्र-विचार होता था उसमें विचारक एक दूसरे के समीप आते थे। किसी प्रकार की कोई हठधर्मिता का प्रश्न नहीं था। क्योंकि शास्त्रों ने तो मानव-मात्र का हित चिंतन किया है। शास्त्रों में कहीं कोई दोष देखने को नहीं मिलता। मानव, शास्त्र की मूर्ति बन जाता है।

ईश्वर की बात पर फिर आता हूँ। भक्ति शब्द के भीतर ईश्वर के प्रति पूर्ण शरणागत होकर ईश्वर-प्राप्ति और आत्मशांति की बात छिपी हुई है जो भक्ति का मूल है। आज हम केवल यही पूछते हैं कि भक्ति से समाज की हम क्या सेवा कर सकते हैं? देश की क्या सेवा कर सकते हैं? भक्ति को राजनीति से, इकोनॉमि से कैसे जोड़ सकते हैं? हर बुद्धिजीवी यही पूछता है। लेकिन अनुभवात्मक जो ज्ञान होता है ईश्वर का भजन देता है। काशी में डॉ. भगवानदास जी थे, वह हमारे परिवार से सम्बन्धित थे। पीढ़ियों से। मेरे पास संवाद आया कि उनका स्वास्थ्य बहुत दुर्बल हो गया है। मैंने कुछ विचित्रता देखी। उनके हाथ में एक माला थी। वह माला सरका रहे थे और सारा जीवन उन्होंने माला का विरोध किया था। मैंने जब उनके हाथ में माला सरकते हुए देखी तो मैंने कहा डाक्टर साहब यह क्या है। आज ऐसी

बड़ी भूल? बोले नहीं भूल तो नहीं पर मैं अपने को रिक्त अनुभव कर रहा हूँ। विचार तो मैंने बहुत किया, नये-नये सृजन किये और देश ने मुझको सम्मान भी बहुत दिया। भारत रत्न की उपाधि से विभूषित किये गये थे डाक्टर साहब। सब कुछ हुआ लेकिन मैं अपने को एकदम खाली देखता हूँ। एकदम जी जैसे घबराता है। पता नहीं कैसे मेरी आत्मा में यह प्रेरणा हुई कि तुम राम-राम करो नहीं तो शांति नहीं मिलेगी। तो हाथ में माला है और राम-राम कर रहे हैं। किसी बुद्धिजीवी का भी देहांत होता है तो कहते हैं कि कुछ कीर्तन कर लो, भजन कर लो। क्यों भई बुद्धिजीवीपन की बात क्यों नहीं कर लो? एक कॉन्फ्रेंस क्यों नहीं बुला लो। उससे शांति मिल जायेगी। नहीं मिलती, किसी को नहीं मिलती। यह भक्ति का एक बहुत बड़ा सौष्टव है जिसको हम तिरस्कृत नहीं कर सकते। यदि भक्ति में जानकारी ही सब कुछ है और उसके सारे पहलुओं की जानकारी सारी हमने कर ली और जानकारी से ही हम संतुष्ट हो गये तो करना-धरना कुछ नहीं, लेकिन फिर भक्ति से हमको मिला क्या? या आप यह मानने को तैयार हैं कि नहीं ईश्वर को बिल्कुल माइनस कर दिया जाये और ईश्वर के प्रति जो आराधना और साधना की परम्परा रही है उसको बिल्कुल माइनस कर दिया जाए तो हमको लाभ हो जायेगा, हमारी आत्मशक्ति बढ़ जायेगी, हम सेवा में श्रद्धा से विमुक्त हो जायेंगे, पर क्या यह बात सफल होती दिखती है?

मान लीजिए ईश्वर नहीं है। मान लीजिये ईश्वर नहीं है जैसे भूत नहीं है। मान लीजिए ईश्वर एक भूत है। ईश्वर को कुछ भी मानिए, लेकिन ईश्वर में तीन गुण होते हैं जो भूत में नहीं है : ईश्वर सर्वत्र है, ईश्वर भीतर और बाहर का साक्षी है, ईश्वर किए हुए कर्म का फल दिये बिना नहीं मानता। यह तीन ईश्वरी गुण हैं जो वैष्णव आचार्यों ने माने हैं। पिता चोरी करने गया। अपनी 12 वर्ष की बालिका को साथ ले गया। उस दिन उसके साथी चोर नहीं थे। उसको पता लगा सेठ जी बाहर गये हैं, घर में कोई नहीं है। लड़की को बाहर खड़ा कर गया कि कोई आये और देखे तो मुझको बता देना। वह भीतर चोरी कर ही रहा था, इतने में उस लड़की को अपनी माँ की बात याद आ गयी। वह चिल्ला पड़ी, पिताजी, पिताजी, वह देख रहा है। वह आपको पकड़वा देगा। आप दौड़िये। पिता घबराया। सारा सामान छोड़कर बालिका को लेकर भागा और घर आ गया। पूछ, बैठा कौन आ गया था? किसने देखा? बालिका बोली, पिताजी माँ कहती थी कि वह जो भगवान जी हैं न, वह सूने घर में रहता है, वह सब स्थान में रहता है। वह सब को देख लेता है। वह ईश्वर आपको देख रहा था। आपको दंड दे देता। यह कितना बड़ा लाभ है। ईश्वर को स्मरण करने से लाभ ही लाभ है। कारण गाँधी जी ने भी पकड़ा था। बहुत ही चतुर शिरोमणि थे, ऐसा पकड़ लेते थे कि जीवन में उतार लेते थे। ऐसा ही सबको चतुर होना चाहिए। उन्होंने एक भजन बनाया था : सबको सन्मति दे भगवान, क्या बात पकड़ी थी। दो प्रकार की प्रज्ञा है। एक तो हमारे पूर्वजन्म के

कर्मा की प्रज्ञा है और एक जब हम ईश्वर को स्मरण करते हैं, तब ईश्वर-प्रदत्त प्रज्ञा हमको प्राप्त होती है। गांधी जी को गीता से प्रज्ञा मिली।

ईश्वर की भक्ति, बालक पूछ बैठे क्यों करना? उस बालक को कहिये, ईश्वर एक अनमोल वस्तु देता है बेटा। क्या देता है? सद्बुद्धि। ईश्वर जिससे प्रसन्न होता है उसको सद्बुद्धि योग प्रदान करता है। सद्बुद्धि ही मनुष्य के जीवन की रक्षा का सबसे बड़ा उपाय है। अगर सद्बुद्धि नहीं है फिर आपके पास कितनी भी बड़ी विद्या हो, ज्ञान हो, तो भी आपका अनर्थ होगा। एक सद्बुद्धि ही रक्षा करती है। आपके पास सब कुछ का अभाव है पर सद्बुद्धि है तो आपके जीवन को कोई दुखी नहीं बना सकता।

मान लीजिये आपकी चार संतान हैं पर उनमें जो आपको अधिक प्यार करती है, प्यार से आपकी सेवा करती है आप उसको कलेजे से लगा देते हैं और कभी-कभी तो आप उसके नाम विल भी कर जाते हैं। और किसी को नहीं मिलेगा उसी को मिलेगा।

**एक वक्ता :** गलती करते हैं।

**श्री गोस्वामी :** गलती नहीं करते हैं। यह तो ह्युमन साइक्लॉजी है।

हम देखते हैं कि आपकी जहाँ प्रीति है उसका नाम आप बार-बार लेते हैं, सबका नहीं लेते हैं। हम प्रीतिपूर्वक, निष्कपट भाव से जिसके पास आयेंगे उसको खरीद लेंगे। उसके हो जायेंगे। अतः :

नोत्पादयेत यदि रति स वृथैव हि केवलं

वह सारा जितना भी हमारा उद्योग है वह सारा निष्फल हो जायेगा, यदि हम ईश्वर की कृपा से युक्त नहीं है। क्योंकि ईश्वर की कृपा जिन संतों पर होती है उनके जीवन की सबसे बड़ी विशेषता यह है वह प्राणी मात्र को भी दुख देने का कभी विचार स्वप्न में भी नहीं कर सकते। यह उनका जीवन हमको दीखता है। लेकिन जहाँ इसका अभाव हो गया वहाँ हम देखते हैं कि सदाचार का भी नाश हो गया। आज देखिये, ईश्वर भजन कम हो गये। आज से 40, 50, 60 साल पहले जो बात थी वह नहीं है। आज यही परंपरा चली है कि खोली-खाती बातें करिए। बातों से सार निकल आयेगा। अरे, बातों से तो रोटी भी नहीं मिल सकती। क्रिया तो करनी पड़ेगी, तभी रोटी बनेगी। अब आप देखिये महामना ने पावन भागीरथी के तट पर कितना बड़ा एक मंदिर बनवाया। कितना पावन पवित्र मंदिर बनवाया। उनकी आकांक्षा थी, कि मैं यहाँ सद्बुद्धिार्थियों को ऐसी सद्बुद्धि दूँ कि जो सारे विश्व में प्रकाश कर दें। सद्बुद्धि का प्रकाश पर अब कहां क्या हो रहा है? अरे, भगवान न करे ऐसी यूनिवर्सिटी का कोई स्नातक कहलाये जो वहां जाकर अपना अपमान कराये। मैं आपसे प्रश्न करता हूँ। आज सारा राज्य बुद्धिजीवियों के हाथ में

है, चिंतन बुद्धिजीवियों के हाथ में है, वतन भी बुद्धिजीवियों के हाथ में है, अब धार्मिक कोई नहीं है। तो देखिये, क्या हो गया? सदाचार को आग लग गयी है। गुरु और शिष्य का सदाचार भी नष्ट हो गया है। इसका उत्तर कहाँ है? कौन देगा इसका उत्तर? इसका उत्तरदायित्व किसके पास है? दिन-प्रतिदिन अशिक्षा बढ़ती जा रही है :

अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति येऽविद्याम् उपासते—

तुलसीदास ने इसी आशय को लेकर कहा था : सोई महि मंडित पंडित दाता, जो छल छौंड भजहि रघुनाथा। पंडित वह है, ज्ञानी वह है, जिसका हृदय निर्मल है। सत्यं विशुद्धं वसुदेव शब्दितं, विशुद्ध अंतःकरण का नाम वासुदेव। विशुद्ध अंतःकरण में वासुदेव का निवास होता है। मेरा यह निवेदन है कि भक्ति के किसी पहलू को भी हम नकार नहीं सकते, भक्ति बहुत व्यापक है। भक्ति एक ऐसा पूर्ण दान है, मनुष्य को मानवीय सद्गुणों से अलंकृत कर देता है। किसी प्रकार का द्वेष, राग या पर को दुख देने की भावना, किसी का अहित करने की भावना भक्त के हृदय में कभी उपस्थित नहीं हो सकती, चाहे इस देश का हो या दूसरे देश का हो, इस धर्म का हो दूसरे धर्म का हो, कहीं का भी हो। भक्त सदाचार का उत्लंघन कभी नहीं कर सकता। सदाचार ही भक्त कहलाता है। भक्त को जीवन में सदाचार की हानि सहन नहीं होती। इसलिए समस्त पहलुओं का समान आदर करते हुए, समान विचार करते हुए हम को भक्ति की स्थापना की आवश्यकता है और यह जो ईश्वर की प्राप्ति को लेकर और ईश्वर की अनुरागमयी भक्ति को लेकर ब्रज में आकर्षण है, आप उस अनुरागमयी भक्ति को माइनस कर दीजिये तब यहाँ कौन आने वाला है? कौन वृंदावन का यश गायेगा? सारा उद्धव संवाद अतीत में कहीं लोप हो जायेगा। कितनी बड़ी क्षति हम को पहुंचेगी—

कानन दूसरो नाम सुनो नहीं। एक हि रंग रंगो यह डोरो,

धोखेहु दुसरी बात कहै, रसना मुख बाँध हलाहल बोरो।

ठाकुर चित्त की वृत्ति यहै, यह कैसेहु टेक तजै नहीं भोरो,

बावरी वे अंखियाँ जरि जाहिं, जो श्यामहि छोड़ निहारहिं औरो॥

इस निष्ठा की निंदा कैसे कर सकते हैं? यदि इसकी अपेक्षा करते हैं और इसकी आलोचना करते हैं तो ईश्वर को जो 'रसी वै सः' कहा है, हम रस की ही अपेक्षा करते हैं। लेकिन ऐसी भक्ति करने वाला व्यक्ति क्या समाज सेवा या राष्ट्र सेवा या जन सेवा या परोपकार का तिरस्कार कर रहा है? वह तिरस्कार नहीं कर रहा है।

धन्यं वृन्दावनं तेन, भक्तिर्नृत्यति यत्र च।

आप उस वृन्दावन में आये हैं जहाँ भक्ति उन्मुक्त होकर नृत्य कर रही है। हम भक्ति के चरणों में प्रार्थना करते हैं कि आप वैसे ही यहाँ से जाइये। कैसे जाइये—

अद्वैतवीथीपथिकैरुपास्याः आराध्यसिंहासनलब्धदीक्षा,  
शठेन केनापि वयं हठेन, दासीकृता गोपवधूविटेन॥

मैं तो अद्वैत साम्राज्य का लब्ध प्रतिष्ठित चक्रवर्ती सम्राट था। इतनी बड़ी प्रतिष्ठा थी। सोहं, अहं ब्रह्मास्मि का ढोल और नगाड़ा पीट-पीट कर मैं आया सारी दिग्विजय करके। लेकिन भूल हो गयी कि मैं इस गोकुल की गली में आकर फंस गया—शठेन केनाऽपि वयं हठेन दासकृताः। इतना प्यार कौन कर सकता है उस प्रभु को और ऐसे शब्द कौन दूँड कर ला सकता है, मैं गोकुल की गलियों में जैसे ही गुजरा वहाँ कोई शठ शिरोमिणि था। उसको शठ कह कर पुकारा—केनापि शठेन गोपवधूविटेन, जो स्वयं गोपियों का दास है उसने सोऽहम् से दासोऽहम् कर दिया। मेरा स्वरूप ही बदल गया। यह उनका प्रभाव है। भगवान करे आपका स्वरूप भी ऐसा ही हो।

प्रो. दयाकृष्ण—वृन्दावन में आकर सोऽहम् दासोऽहम् हो जाता है। लेकिन शृंगेरी जाइये, अलग स्थान है। वहाँ की बात भी अलग है। भारत की पुण्य भूमि में जहाँ-जहाँ आप घूमेंगे वहाँ अनेक स्थान आपको मिलेंगे, हर जगह आप को नये अनुभव होंगे।

श्रीगोस्वामी—क्षमा चाहता हूँ। उपस्थित परित्याज्य अनुपस्थितस्य का परिकल्पना? इस समय मैं वृन्दावन में बैठा हूँ। मेरी भूमि यही है।

प्रो. दयाकृष्ण—यह समस्या हमेशा उपस्थित होती है। असल में यह बात पहले ही उठायी गयी थी कि क्या भावना के बारे में कोई विचार किया जा सकता है? भावना का भी सत्य है, अनुभव का सत्य है, उस अनुभव पर विचार हो सकता है या नहीं हो सकता है? विचार पर विचार होता है। यह कोटि की बात है। भावना पर विचार हो यह भिन्न कोटि की बात है। कोटि भेद होता है, स्तर भेद होता है। इसी प्रकार से कर्म पर जो विचार होता है, उसकी सत्यता अलग है। विचार का धर्म, कर्ममूलक है। तो हमारे यहाँ कर्मस्वतंत्रता की बात की गयी है। लेकिन जब कर्मस्वतंत्रता की बात होती है, धर्म की बात होती है, तो धर्म और अधर्म में भेद भी आवश्यक होता है। धर्म और अधर्म के भेद के लिए चिंतन की आवश्यकता है। परम्परा में विचार है। श्रुति है, स्मृति है, सदाचार है, आत्मतुष्टि है। परम्परा में प्रश्न भी हैं: कौन पहले कौन बाद में? श्रुति क्या है? स्मृति क्या है? सदाचार क्या है? आत्मतुष्टि क्या होती है? अगर इनमें विरोध हो तो तब क्या किया जाए? महाभारत की बात हुई, वहाँ धर्मसंकट की बात है। मुकुन्द ने कहा कि धर्म की चर्चा धर्मसंकट की चर्चा है। धर्म में सदा धर्मसंकट होता है। तब कैसे निर्णय करें, क्या

धर्म है, क्या अधर्म? महाभारत इसका कोई उत्तर नहीं दे पाया। यह भी परम्परा की बात है। कृष्ण महाभारत के भी हैं, योगेश्वर कृष्ण, वृन्दावन के कृष्ण नहीं। योगेश्वर कृष्ण कर्मशील हैं। महाभारत के प्रधान पात्र हैं। वे युद्ध करते हैं। युद्ध के पहले संधि का प्रस्ताव लाते हैं। यह सारी कथा है। महाभारत की कथा को श्रीमद्भागवत में पूर्वपक्ष के रूप में प्रस्तुत किया गया है। वहाँ व्यास कहते हैं कि महाभारत की रचना से उनको शांति प्राप्त नहीं हुई। मैं आपसे प्रश्न पूछना चाहता हूँ कि यह शांति की तलाश क्या है? 'स शांतिमाप्नोति न कामकामी'। गीता में कहा है। पर यह शांति की तलाश है क्या? अगर अशांति हो तो क्या गड़बड़ है, परेशानी क्यों है? मैं क्यों चाहता हूँ कि मेरा चित्त शांत हो, आनन्दमय हो, अपने चित्त की अवस्था पर जो विचार केन्द्रित है उसमें एक दोष मालूम होता है। कम से कम अपरिपूर्णता जरूर मालूम होती है। यह क्या बात हुई कि सदेव 24 घंटे इसी बात का चिंतन रहे कि मेरी चित्त की अवस्था क्या है? चित्त की अवस्था एक प्रकार की होनी चाहिए इसमें कोई दो मत नहीं है। लेकिन यही केन्द्र हो जीवन का, यह भी मुझे कुछ ठीक नहीं लगता। मैं समझता हूँ आप सब लोग अपने-अपने अनुभव पर सोचें, विचार पर सोचें। एक ग्रंथ विशेष पर मत सोचिए, सारी भारतीय परम्परा पर सोचिए, जिसके आप उत्तराधिकारी हैं। सोचिये, श्रीमद्भागवत में महाभारत को क्यों पूर्वपक्ष बनाया गया? नारद से क्यों कहलवाया गया है कि हे व्यास तुमने गलती की, धर्म की चर्चा की, रस की और भक्ति की चर्चा करनी चाहिये थी—यहाँ तक कह दिया श्रीमद्भागवत ने। गीता के आखिरी दो श्लोकों का आपने विवेचन किया—“यथेच्छसि तथा कुरु” के बाद जो आये हैं। मुझे बहुत अच्छा लगा। मैंने ठीक इसी प्रकार से नहीं देखा था। भारतीय परम्परा में कर्म के बारे में जो मीमांसा का चिन्तन था कि कर्म से बंधन होता ही है, कर्म से फल मिलता ही है। कृष्ण ने या जिस किरसी ने कही हो, उसने इस समस्या का समाधान खोजने की कोशिश की। कर्म इस रूप में किया जा सकता है कि वह बंधन का कारण न हो। ऐसे कर्म को निष्काम कर्म भी कहा गया है। इस पर भी विचार करना चाहिए कि श्रीमद्भागवत में कहा जाता है कि नहीं निष्काम कर्म भी व्यथा है, यदि वह भक्ति के साथ न हो। मैं समझता हूँ भारतीय परम्परा में अध्यात्म पर जो चिंतन हुआ उस चिंतन को भक्ति ने क्या दिशा दी, क्या नया मोड़ दिया, और वह कहां तक हम को एक नयी दृष्टि दे सका है इस पर और विचार होना चाहिये। मैं आपके सामने एक मामूली बात कहता हूँ। आप कुछ भी सोचें, हर एक व्यक्ति को अपने अनुभव से, अपनी बुद्धि से बात करनी चाहिए। हम में से प्रत्येक व्यक्ति कहता है कि यह विचार मेरा है, बड़ी अजीब सी बात लगती है। मेरा क्या है? कुछ मैंने पढ़ा लिखा है, गुरुजन हैं, सतसंग है, पुस्तकें हैं, कुछ अनुभव भी है, कुछ पूर्वजन्म का भी कर्म होगा। सब कुछ है लेकिन तब भी मेरा कुछ होता है। थोड़ा मैं अंग्रेजी में कहूंगा फिर हिन्दी में भी कहूंगा।

Each faculty of man has an eminent ideal which needs to be pursued by man. This was said by K.C. Bhattacharya. But while each faculty of man has a liberating aspect, it has an inhibiting aspect as well.

यानि बुद्धि से बड़ा आपको स्वतंत्रता देने वाला कौन हो सकता है। आप हर चीज पर संशय कर सकते हैं, हर चीज का प्रमाण मांग सकते हैं और प्रमाण-प्रमेय व्यापार के शास्त्र की भी रचना कर सकते हैं। बंधन नहीं है। लेकिन बुद्धि से बड़ा रसविहीन कौन हो सकता है? बुद्धि से बड़ा, लौजिक से बड़ा बंधन का कारण भी कौन हो सकता है?

रीजन से बड़ा लिबरेटर रीजन से बड़ा बाँडेज देने वाला कौन हो सकता है? जो बहुत ही रेशनल होने लगता है, हम को लगता है कुछ अजीब बात है। लेकिन इमेजिनेशन को देखिये, इमेजिनेशन से बड़ा कौन फ्रीडम देता है। या पागलपन को देखिये, किसी पागलखाने में जाइये, आपको पता लगता है इनको क्या हो गया? इमेजिनेशन से बड़ा कोई फील करने वाला नहीं है। लेकिन इमेजिनेशन की बाँडेज रीजन से भी गई बीती है। ऐक्शन देखिए। जो व्यक्ति सदा कर्म में ही रत है चाहे वह समाजसेवा में रत हो, हमें लगता है यह आदमी ठीक नहीं है। कहने का अर्थ यह है—

Everything, every faculty of man, whether it is reason or will or imagination or feelings, every faculty of man is both a liberating faculty and a binding faculty.

मुझे तो यह लगता है कि वास्तव में हरेक फ्रैकल्टी का लिबरेशन दूसरी फ्रैकल्टी में है। अगर आप को फीजिंग से बाँडेज लगे तो रीजन में जाइये, रीजन से बाँडेज लगे तो फीलिंग में जाइये। इन दोनों से तंग आये तो कर्म करिये। कहने का अर्थ यह है कि वास्तव में अगर हम को कोई समन्वयात्मक दृष्टि उत्पन्न करनी है तो इसमें लौकिक अलौकिक का सामंजस्य करना पड़ेगा। भावना, कर्म और ज्ञान में सामंजस्य करना पड़ेगा—ज्ञान भी उस प्रकार का जो कर्मकाण्ड का ज्ञान नहीं है, मीमांसक का ज्ञान नहीं है, शुद्ध अद्वैत का ज्ञान नहीं है बल्कि वह ज्ञान जो लौकिक है। काल और कालातीत में सामंजस्य करना होगा, त्रिगुण और त्रिगुणातीत में करना होगा और जब तक हम ऐसा करने की चेष्टा नहीं करेंगे तब तक हम एक पक्ष को ही प्राधान्य देते रहेंगे। परन्तु समस्या वही रहती है कि क्या हम चिंतन से पीछा छुड़ा सकते हैं? यों तो बड़ा आसान है। सोचना बंद कर दीजिए, कौन मना करता है। कुछ सोचना भी बंधन है, आप मत करिये। लेकिन इज इट डिजायरबल?

एक दस होने वाले हैं। सेमिनार खत्म होने को आया है। यदि किसी को कुछ कहना हो तो वह कह सकता है। इस सेमिनार की जो बेसिक थीम है उसी पर कुछ कहना हो तो एनीबाडी हू लाइक्स टु से समथिंग कैन स्पीक। हाँ, द्विवेदी जी।

श्रीद्विवेदी—मुझे एक विचित्र महासूक्ति की अनुभूति होती है जब कभी भी वृंदावन जैसे स्थान में विचार करने के लिए आमंत्रण मिलता है। एक नितान्त भिन्न अनुभव होता है। शहर में किये जाने वाले किसी संवाद से पढ़ा-लिखा जो कुछ है वह तो है ही प्रभावी, किन्तु सबसे बड़ा जो प्रभावी है वह है स्थान का महत्त्व। ऐसा क्यों है कि वृंदावन ही आकर दयाजी को लगा कि बंधन और मुक्ति, भोग और मोक्ष साथ ही साथ हैं। कंट्राडिक्शन नहीं है। अभी तक जैसा कि श्रीवत्स जी ने प्रारम्भ में कहा था हम कम्पार्टमेंटलाइज्ड थिंकिंग की ग्रीक विचारधारा से प्रभावित होने के कारण आदी हो गये हैं। यह वैदेशिक खात है। वैदेशिक और देशिक में फर्क होता है। देशिक के माने हैं गुरु, वैदेशिक वह जो देशिक के विपरीत हो। जब अर्चना ज्ञान का रूप धारण कर लेती है, एक विग्रह जिसको अखंड कहते हैं, दृष्टि में स्वयं उद्भूत होता है, खंड दृष्टि समाप्त होकर अखंड दृष्टि उद्भूत होती है। जैसा डॉ. दयाजी ने कहा रीजन से फीलिंग के क्षेत्र में फीलिंग से कर्म में। इन तीनों को गीता ने योग शब्द से कहा है। कर्म योग कहा, ज्ञान योग कहा, भक्ति योग कहा, अभिप्राय यही था एक के बाद दूसरे का प्रस्फुटीकरण आवश्यक है। भारतीय चिंतन में एक विशाल स्वतंत्रता है आप संतों के सान्निध्य में बैठकर उस उन्मुक्तता का अनुभव करें। हम बाहर से बंधी हुई दृष्टि वाले दीखते हैं। उनके सामने चिंतन की स्वतंत्रता का प्रजातंत्र मानो खुल गया हो, ऐसा प्रतीत होता है। यही है भारतीय चिंतन परम्परा की सबसे बड़ी विशेषता। सबकी दृष्टि में एक संग्राहक भाव है, अपने-अपने युग और अपनी-अपनी अवस्था के अनुरूप समन्वय की दृष्टि है। यह मुक्तिबोध हमें वृंदावन में प्राप्त हुआ और इस मुक्तिबोध को हम बाँकेबिहारी जी के यहाँ जाकर महाभाव में परिणत होता देख सकें तो बात ही क्या।

Ms. Rukmini : I want to take this opportunity, on behalf of everyone to thank Swamiji, Shrivatsaji and the organisers who have made all these arrangements. Personally I feel it was a new experience, a new anubhava. So, on behalf of everybody and on my own behalf, I thank all those, and of course, Prof. Dayaji, who made it possible.

Chairman (Prof. Daya) : May I say a few words? We must thank all the participants who have come here. It is not possible for a seminar to be successful without a free and sustained discussion.

प्रो. दयाकृष्ण—(हिन्दी में क्रमागत) मैंने इसको बौद्धिक संकीर्तन का नाम दिया है। इस प्रकार के वार्तालाप को बौद्धिक यज्ञ भी कह सकते हैं। मुकुन्द ने इसको सत्र कहा है, जहाँ सभी याजक भी होते हैं, यजमान भी। लेकिन इसमें एक नयी दिशा जरूर है कि हम जब सब एक साथ कुछ सोचने की चेष्टा करते हैं तो सबके विचार में थोड़ा परिवर्तन आता है। अंत में मैं केवल यह कहूँगा कि आप सब लोग जहाँ भी जाएँ वहाँ अपने स्थान पर ऐसी ही प्रक्रिया को जारी रखें।

हम जहाँ हैं, ऐसे स्थानों पर ठहरना यहाँ की जीवनचर्या में, दिनचर्या में थोड़ा भी भाग लेना एक नया आयाम देता है हमारे अनुभव को। उसके लिए हम यहाँ के संस्थापकों को जो हमारे दायें और बायें हैं, उनको शतशत प्रणाम जताते हैं।

डॉ. के. एन. मिश्रा--

संवाद एष इह पूर्तिमगादमन्दं, विद्युन्मनःसु परमं मुदमादधानः।

एनं जनोऽयमतुलादरतो सोल्लासमर्चति प्रसूनैः। दध्मो हार्दिकधन्यवादान्।

भक्ति का दान है। भक्ति महारानी की कोई सेवा करता है तो भक्ति उसको अपना प्रसाद देती है। वह प्रसाद क्या है—तृण से भी अधिक अपने को छोटा मानना, वृक्ष से अधिक सहनशील होना।

सम्मान की इच्छा को त्याग देना, सब को सतत् सन्मान देना। इससे चित्त शुद्ध होता है, अन्तःकरण पवित्र होता है ईश्वर स्मरण की योग्यता आ जाती है।

सरस्वत्याः स्रोतः प्रकटमिह वृन्दावनभुवि

प्लवन्तो दृश्यन्ते कतिचत् तु तच्चिचतनजले

विधिज्ञो यस्यान्तः प्रविशति बुधः कोऽपि सुकृतिः॥

मया तु दृष्टं भवतः समस्तं

विलक्षणं व्याकरणैर्विरुद्धं॥

नानाविधानि मुहुरस्म मिष्ठान्नपानरुचिरासनभोजनानि,

नानाविधानि मुहुरस्मदभीप्सितानि,

संप्रापितानि रुचिराण्यथ कारितानि

प्राचीननव्यबहुमंदिरदर्शनानि॥

भावास्तु संति सविधेः न परंतु भाषा  
भक्तिपरास्ति न च तत्कथनस्य शक्तिः।  
सत्यं ब्रवीमि मनसोऽभिमत्तं न जाने  
प्राकाशमेति कथमत्र कृतज्ञता मे॥  
दग्धा न या यावनकोपवहनौ  
तथा न नष्टा ब्रिटिशेन्द्र काले,  
देशे स्वतंत्रे सति संस्कृतिः सा  
संवर्धनीया न कथं सयत्नम्॥  
चिरं महामोहतमो विदारि  
सर्वोदयारम्भविधिप्रचारि,  
शास्त्रं यदापि भुवनोपकारी,  
कथं तदेवाद्य न जाड्यहारी॥  
यदेव शास्त्रं निकषं विधाय  
वदन्ति विद्याः सदसद्विचारं,  
तस्यैव शास्त्रस्य नवप्रमाणैः  
आदेयतां साधय सर्वमान्याम्॥  
शब्दार्थमात्रमतिरेव न वैदुषी स्यात्  
सोपाधिकेषु सुलभाद्य न याति साऽपि  
काप्यद्य पद्धतिरुदेति मुदेतिगानां  
तत्कार्यमेव नवचितनमद्य यत्नात्।  
समानमानप्रणयी स्वशित्यैः  
ब्रह्माण्डभाण्डस्य रहस्यभेदी,  
रुद्धिप्रहारी पुरुषो न शक्तः  
सोढुं पुराणीं विषमां व्यवस्थां।  
विदार्य पृष्ठान्यहितावहाने  
कृत्वाग्निसात् क्रूरतमाः व्यवस्थाः,  
यावद् विधातुं न निजां व्यवस्थां  
स्वयं समाजः विवशी कृतः स्यात्।  
तावदस्माभिः किं कार्यं  
अस्पृश्यता दोष विधानकारी  
स्त्रिशूद्रवेदाध्ययनावरोधी,

मनुष्यमानापहधर्मशास्त्रं

कार्यमेवाद्य नवीन दृष्ट्या॥

सर्वो यदा कीर्तिमुदञ्चितुं त्याम्

सर्वात्मना यत्नशतं करोति,

नैवोचिता भारतचित्तकानां

अधोमुखी स्पन्दनशून्यतेयं॥

विश्वप्रभूतनवचितनवारिपूर्णं

विज्ञाननिष्ठजनतर्कमहासमुद्रे

सेयं निमज्जति न भारतशास्त्रनौका

मान्या सुधाः भवतु संप्रति कर्णधारः।

तेजस्तु दिग्धं निजपूर्वजानां

जगन्महामंगलकार्यहारी,

कथं पुनः भारतपंडितानां

अतर्निगूढे पुनराविस्तु॥

स्मारं स्मारं भुवनवितं गौरवं पूर्वजानाम्।

ध्यायं ध्यायं मननकुशलै आयति संततीनाम्।

विद्मः सर्वैः अमलमतिभिः साप्रतं सद् विधेयं,

मन्दाक्रान्ता न भवति यथा भारतोर्मी पवित्राम्।

इत्येव दन्ते सुतृणं निधाय

याये समस्तान् भवतः प्रणम्य, मान्याः पुनः चिन्तनशाह्वलेषु

मनः कुरुक्षान् विजयोजयध्वम्।

मनः कुरुक्षान् विजयोजयध्वम्॥

मेरे ख्याल में मूल समस्या यह रही है कि जो भी हमारे यहाँ प्रवृत्ति रही है, चाहे भक्ति हो, चाहे अध्यात्म हो, दयाजी ने जैसा कहा, द्विवेदी जी ने भी कहा, व्यवहार और व्यवहार से अतीत के बीच में कोई जोड़ नहीं रहता। व्यवहार को केवल धर्मशास्त्र पर छोड़ दिया। चिंतन का एक धर्म बनता है कि हम ने जो भी सत्य प्रतिपादित किया, उसके आधार पर केवल प्रकृति के अतीत ही की चिंता न करें प्रकृति की भी चिंता करें। व्यवहार तो करना ही पड़ेगा और उसके लिए लीपापोती काफी नहीं है। यह चिंतन के धर्म को मानने से हटना है। जहाँ हटा नहीं है आदमी, वहाँ सोचा है, अहिंसा परमो धर्मः। वह कहते हैं कि यह व्यवहार में नहीं लाया जा सकता। ठीक है मान लिया, व्यवहार में नहीं लाया जा सकता पर अगर व्यवहार में लाना चाहें तो इसका एक रूप व्यवहार में आ सकता है। इसके साथ ही

एक धर्म चलता रहता है और जो राज्य करने वाले कर्म करने वाले हैं, वे अहिंसा परमो धर्मः नहीं कहते हैं, वे कहते हैं आनृशस्यं परो धर्मः। इससे यह बनता है कि हम दूसरे के प्रति करुणा रखें। इस पर कहानी आयी है। राजा की कहानी आयी है। इसके आधार पर धर्म की दो धारणाएँ उभरती हैं राजधर्म में। एक तो विशुद्ध नीतिशास्त्र, जिसको राजधर्म कहा जाता है। नीतिशास्त्र धर्म को ध्यान में ही नहीं रखता, वह इस बात को ध्यान में रखता है कि किस तरह से शक्ति मिल जाए। पर राजधर्म में एक धर्म की भावना भी होती है, जिसमें पर प्रधान होता है। यही आनृशस्य है। हमारे यहां ऐसे भी मार्ग रहे हैं। किसी भी कल्पर में ऐसा हो नहीं सकता कि इस तरह की बात न आये, दूसरे के प्रति सम्येदना न हो, दूसरे के लिए आदर न हो, यह सम्भव ही नहीं है। पर ये जितने बड़े-बड़े लोग हैं इनको चाहिए कि जब धर्मशास्त्र लिखने बैठते हैं, चाहे नेता हो या कोई चेतन्य भी हों तो इनको चाहिए धर्मशास्त्र वही मानकर न चले जो पुराना है। उनका जो चिंतन है उसके साथ जिस धर्मशास्त्र को वे मान रहे हैं उसमें मेल बैठना चाहिये। पर इस बात पर चर्चा नहीं होती है, भिन्न धाराओं को जबर्दस्ती मिलाने की चेष्टा होती है। भक्ति के स्वरूप की कल द्विवेदी जी ने बहुत अच्छी व्याख्या की उसकी थोड़ी और चर्चा होनी चाहिए थी : पर के प्रति अनुराग। यह भक्ति का लक्षण है अगर ईश्वर को नहीं मानें तो पर के प्रति अनुराग नहीं बनता क्योंकि दूसरों को हम अपने बराबर मानना चाहते हैं। बराबरी कौन देगा, ईश्वर ही देता है। मान लीजिए यह सत्य है तो फिर उससे व्यवहार क्या बनता है, राजनीति क्या बनती है, वार्ता या इकोनोमिक्स क्या बनती है, विधान क्या बनता है, लीगल सिस्टम, कानून क्या बनता है, इस पर चिंता होनी चाहिए। इस पर चिंता बिल्कुल नहीं हो रही है। किसी एक सेक्टर को मान कर, किसी एक विशेष सिद्धान्त को मान कर उससे कई रास्ते निकलते हैं और वे रास्ते केवल ब्रह्म को ही नहीं जाते हैं, ईश्वर को ही नहीं जाते हैं व्यवहार की तरफ भी आते हैं। उन रास्तों पर हमें चलना चाहिए और हम चल सकते हैं। यही मैं कहना चाहता हूँ।

8. How is the notion of impersonal obligation to institutions, ideals, norms and values accommodated in Bhakti thought?
9. How does Bhakti relate to the realization of other ideals-personal or social such as justice, freedom and equality. How does the personality-ideal of the bhakti relate to other personality-ideals such as that of the heroic dharm-centered personalities like Rama and Krishan on the one hand or Moksa or Nirvana-centered personalities like Shankara or Buddha or any other personality-ideal centered in some other value and giving rise to personalities like Gandhi or Einstein?

□

## Appendix I

## SOME ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION AT THE DIALOGUE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE BHAKTI TRADITION IN INDIA

1. What are the *purva Pakshas* in the philosophical tradition of Bhakti? What are the arguments given for their refutation?
2. If Bhakti is primarily a matter of feeling, then what is the place of philosophical argument in it?
3. Does Bhakti postulate a basic emotion in all human beings towards what is ultimately real, and which, because of this very emotion, cannot but be conceived in personal terms?
4. If Bhakti is primarily a cultivation of feeling, then are its forms determined by the universal a priori forms of feeling on the one hand and by the socio-culturally determined pattern of feeling, on the other?
5. How does any thought which considers *Bhakti* as central, view knowledge or action on the one hand and Pure Reason, on the other?
6. Does the philosophic tradition relating to *Bhakti* believe that feelings or emotions are more appropriate means of apprehending what is real than reason or will? What arguments do the *Bhakti* philosopher give for justifying this position.
7. Is Advaita in the strict sense compatible with *Bhakti*?

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