

**Nyāya: Realist or Idealist?**

I have read your query entitled 'Nyāya Realist or Idealist' with profit. Here are my comments.

A Substances such as *ākāśa*, space, time, *mañās*, *ātmā*, atoms of earth, water, air, fire.

B *jātis* are all eternal

C *Samavāya* is eternal.

D *Viśeṣas* are all eternal.

E *Atyantābhāva* is eternal.

As they are all eternal, uncreated, they are not dependent on anything, least of all on their knowledge.

(2) Knowability, nameability, existence are common properties of all reals-*sādharaṇa dharmas Bhaṣaparichedaḥ* (verse 13)

As *dharma* they are dependent upon the reals, not the other way round.

As no human being is omniscient; all reals are *objects* of God's knowledge.

The point that Nyāya is making is that all reals are *objects* of knowledge, and have names.

This theory is in opposition to Śaṅkara's *advaitas* according to which the real. Brahman, is never an object of knowledge, and can have no name.

In liberation, according to Nyāya, there is no consciousness in the liberated self. This self is, even now, an object of inferential knowledge. For, at the stage of liberation, a self being devoid of consciousness does not know itself, In any case no knowledge can know itself according to Nyāya. It can only be an object, if one so desires, of another knowledge. In the case of one's own self, it is *anuvyavasaya*. In the case of perception, according to Nyāya, the object is a *cause of perceptual knowledge*, and hence must exist prior to the production of the knowledge.

**Nyāya is Realist par Excellence****(A supplementary note)**

On reading the short note under the above caption written by me, in reply to a query of Prof. Daya Krishna, an inquisitive reader asked me a pertinent question which seemed to be one whose proper answer would throw a great deal of light on the realistic character of Nyāya. Hence this attempt to write this supplement to the earlier note. The question asked is posed thus: As per my elucidation of the nature of knownness of everything, some or other cognition-of any kind-of each and everything is possible. This description covers even those things which remain totally unknown to any human being all through their existence. Such things remain unknown in their individual capacity but by a general cognition, like say of the form. Each and every object in the world is either non-eternal or eternal; even the totally unknown (individually) thing will be included as one of its objects. This being the case there is not and cannot be anything that is not known by some cognition (in some capacity or other). However, Nyāya would not go as far as the *Advaitin* does when he says that even an unknown thing is known as 'unknown'. this 'knownness' as unknown is obviously a peculiar kind of knownness-a kind of direct revelation- unmediated by any *vṛtti* to the *Sākṣin* or the witness-self. Nyāya does not admit the reality of the so-called witness-self or a property like 'unknownness' characterizing anything. The latter is just the hypostatization of sheer absence of a positive property. Now the question posed is that if everything is always known by some cognition or other (and under some aspect or other) according to Nyāya can't this school be dubbed as idealistic although this may appear to be a diluted and slightly peculiar version of idealistic? The answer to this question calls for some classification of the

distinction between different kinds of properties of things that Nyāya admits. Broadly speaking, there are five kinds of properties excluding qualities which are not usually treated as properties. The five kinds may be known as generic properties, specific properties, unique (specific) properties, accidental or ad hoc properties, and relational properties. To illustrate: substanceness is the generic property called *jāti* in Sanskrit-of all substances like earth, water, light, etc. Earthness, waterness, etc. are the specific (and also generic) properties of earth, water, etc. respectively. Likewise, potness, clothness, treeness, etc. are the respective specific properties of pot, cloth, tree, etc. More specific and individuating properties which differentiate a particular thing, say a certain specimen of pot from another such specimen are given the names 'This potness' (in Sanskrit *etadghatatva*) and 'That potness' (in Sanskrit *adghatatva*) respectively. Spaceness, timeness, etc. are instances of unique properties because they characterize singular entities like space, time, etc. Generic and specific properties characterize more than one entity. Accidental or ad hoc properties accrue to things when they enter into some temporary or non-essential relation with each other. For example, a book placed on a table acquires the conjunctive property of 'being located on the table' because of its conjunctive relation with the table. No sooner the book is displaced its conjunction with the table and the ad hoc property it has given rise to vanishes. Such 'properties may be described even as relational. But the more interesting and important relational properties are the properties of knownness, or knowability, spatiality, temporality, etc. The relations which are at the basis of these properties exist and do not cease to exist so long as both their relata exist. Only if one of the relata goes out of existence, the relations disappear. All the things which are spatial and temporal are related by special relations (called '*Daisika*' and '*Kalika*' respectively in Sanskrit to space and time. If the spatio-temporally located things cease to exist, space and time would not

cease to exist but the relation between the things and space and time would disappear. The relation of cognition to things is not ad hoc and it is bilateral unlike the spatio-temporal relation which, as described, is unilateral. There is no cognition without an object and no object without there being some or other cognition of it. Cognizedness or knownness is the property that accrues to an object because of its cognitive relation to a cognition. But despite the bilaterality and permanence of the cognitive relation the relational property of cognizedness cannot constitute the nature or being of any object. A pot, for example, is identified as a pot not because it is the object of this or that cognition but because it has a certain structure, certain qualities and serves certain purposes. The cognitive relation is irrelevant to what a thing is in itself. The being of the pot is constituted only by potness which therefore is regarded as the determinant of the structure, causality, etc. pertaining to the pot. It needs to be particularly noted in this connection that Nyāya has given a wide berth to what is called in western philosophy 'the internal relation'. No relation, even including inherence, is an internal relation for Nyāya. Such a relation swallows up the appropriate identity of at least one of its relations. To some inherence called *Samavāya* in Sanskrit may appear to be the prototype of the internal relation. But this is not true. Inherence-to use the words of Bradley in this context-joins the inherents by keeping them apart.

If the cognitive object were treated as the internal content of its cognition of Nyāya then it could not avoid the idealistic challenge. But Nyāya does not hold such a view of the cognitive object which according to it is neither the content nor the form of its cognition but is an entity wholly external and yet related cognition by a relation which even outlasts it, for, an object is cognizable both when it exists and also when it has ceased to exist. The idealist Buddhists (namely, the Yogācāras) however attach great importance to this (invariable) togetherness of cognition and its objects. As Dharmakīrti says:

the blue (an object) and its cognition are known to go always together and so they are non-different. It is only due to illusory cognition that they are viewed as different from each other as one moon is seen as two by pressing the eyeball. It is almost a tautology that no object is cognized apart from its cognition (where 'capart' means 'unassociated'). But mere invariable association cannot be regarded as the sign of identity. Moreover, it is not the case that an object is associated with the same cognition at all times. Cognitions may come and go but the object remains the same. So, much more intimacy than this is the cognitive relation that is needed to make the object internal to cognition.

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#### Nyāya Realism : Some Reflections

My aim in this essay is to examine, in some inevitable detail, Professor Daya Krishna's<sup>1</sup> objections to the general view which regards Nyāya as a 'realist' system in the sense that word is normally understood in the West, I also consider in this connection some of Professor Arindam Chakraborty's<sup>2</sup> response to Daya Krishna's paper, and for two reasons: one, that it does not head-on address certain issues focalized by Daya Krishna, and two, that in responding to the latter's queries, Chakraborty, even while upholding its basic realistic character, interprets Nyāya's position in a way that at certain points seems questionable.

<sup>1</sup> Daya Krishna, 'Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist?', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XII No. 1, September-December 1994, pp. 161-63. References within parentheses in the first part of the main body of the article are to Daya Krishna's note.

<sup>2</sup> Arindam Chakraborty, 'Is Nyāya Realist?' *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XII, No.2, January-April, 1995, pp. 1561-154. References within parentheses in the second part of the main body of the article are to Chakraborty's comment.

I

Daya Krishna rightly notes that Nyāya is supposed to maintain that all that is real is knowable and nameable. But then he goes on to attribute to Nyāya the contention that 'to be real' is 'to be knowable' and concludes that if so, the Nyaya standpoint 'seems suspiciously close to the idealist (that is, Berkeleyan) contention that 'esse is *percepti*' (p.161) (my emphasis). Further, in order to be in a position to question the common practice of calling Nyāya realist, Daya Krishna tries to bring Nyāya and Berkeley closer by suggesting, obviously implying that there is no harm in doing so, that Berkeley's position can be reformulated in terms of 'the perceivable' (or 'knowable').

I will make two comments on this. In the first place, the Nyāya thesis that whatever is real is knowable does not as such assert the *kind of* equivalence that Daya Krishna attributes to Nyāya. Nyāya does not say that the meaning of 'being real' consists in 'being knowable'; that is Nyāya does not seek to define 'reality' in terms of either 'knowability' (or 'nameability'). Śrīdhara, the author of *Nyāya-kandali*, when commenting upon Prāśastapāda's enumeration of three common characteristics of the six *padārtas* (categories of classes of reals) 'isness' (*astitva*), 'nameability' (*abhidheyatva*) and 'knowability' (*jñeyatva*)-explains 'isness' (or reality: *astitva*) as the distinctive character or individuality of a thing: *astitvam svarūpavatvam.. yasya vastuno yat svarūpam tad eva tasya stitvam*<sup>3</sup>. In other words, according to Śrīdhara the reality of a thing consists in its own distinctive 'isness', its self identity so to say which is in each case unique to it and so also (in a way) serves to differentiate it from what it is not. In fact, unless the reals have

<sup>3</sup> Śrīdhara, *Nyāya-kandali* as published with, *prāśastapādabhāṣya* (or *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*) of Prāśastapāda, edited by Durgadhara Jha, Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1977.p. 41.

their own-being or individuality they cannot partake of the universal 'existent-ness' (*sattā-sāmānya*)<sup>4</sup> which according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika inheres in the three categories of reals-substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), and motion (*karma*). (After all, for something to have a generic property-even if this property be *sattā-sāmānya*- it must first of all exist). What Nyāya therefore means (even if it does not always say in so many words) is that its property of knowability or nameability a real thing possesses as a *further* characteristic, and in virtue of the fact that it is real. Reality of a thing cannot therefore be made parasitic upon or relative to its knowability, though it is true that it (that is, reality) becomes one of the necessary conditions for that knowability or even knownness. To put it a little differently, 'to be real' and 'to be knowable' do not in Nyāya *mean* the same thing, though it is the same thing which can be real and knowable at the same time. This proposition, as we know, has quite a few important implications, one of which is that an 'unreal' thing-like, for example, sky flower or square circle-cannot (according to Nyāya) be an object of knowledge. Jayanta, for instance, puts it thus: *yas tu deśāntare' pyartho nā sti kālāntare' pi vā/na tasya grahaṇam dṛṣtam gaganendīvarādivat*.<sup>5</sup> (Roughly: a thing which exists at no time-past, present or future-and in no space has never been found to be known. The example that Jayanta gives of such an unreal thing is of a sky-lotus.) There is a school of thought, specially in the West, which credits even contradictory things (and of course, imaginary things) such as a square circle with some sort of being or existence

on the ground that they become objects of thought or philosophic discourse.<sup>6</sup> Nyāya would have nothing to do with such a view.

In this context someone may intervene and ask whether it is not true that we quite often talk and make judgement about the (so-called) unreal things and thus claim some knowledge about them even if some of these judgements assert nothing more than their unreality. Nyāya's reply would be that it all depends upon what your idea of knowledge is. If by knowledge we mean-and this is what Nyāya's own conception of knowledge, or better, awareness is-awareness of something *as* having certain characteristics, then it is inconceivable, according to Nyāya, that an unreal thing be said to be *known* and thus be (in the process) ascribed characteristics: for on that logic, Nyāya would say, we might as well find it reasonable to talk and discuss about the kind of fragrance which a sky lotus may be possessing. Mark, that to Nyāya-and, in my view, even otherwise-this doctrine is of cardinal importance. Indeed, its remarkable relevance (by which I do not necessarily mean its truth) can be gauged when we contrast it with, for example, the Kantian doctrine about what that philosopher calls noumena or things-in-themselves. If Kant is to be believed, it is things-in-themselves alone which are real: and yet it is these which he brackets and puts (perhaps for that very reason) beyond the pale of knowledge. The pretensions of our cognitive capacities do not extend beyond the world(if it be a world) of appearances (or phenomena). And yet (be it noted) Kant *knows* or at least implicitly claims to know that the things-in-themselves are indeed real. To be real, to be known *as* real (and atemporal), and yet to remain unknowable (and not simply unknown)-can there be a greater paradox? And yet Kant asserts all these things of his noumena. And when he further adds that though not knowable as such, they are

<sup>4</sup> 'Na py astīvam anarthakam niḥsvarūpe sattayāḥ samavāyābhāvāt', Śrīdhara, *Nyāya kandaī*, op. cit., p. 42

<sup>5</sup> Jayanta Bhaṭṭā, *Nyāya-mañjarī*, Part 1, ed. By Gaurinatha Shastri, Varanasi, 1982, *Ahnika 3*, p. 261.

<sup>6</sup> Among the moderns, Meinong and F.H. Bradley hold to this view, though the tradition can be traced as far back as Plato's *Theaetetus*.

thinkable as to their existence, does not this whole proposition amount to admitting, however unwittingly, that some knowledge about them is a possibility after all, just as just asserting and without knowing any thing about it beyond that, that God exists, is to know, and know in a definite and non-trivial sense, something about him. The same, however, cannot, according to Nyāya, apply to things which we think to be unreal. For to deny reality to something is, in Nyāya's view, to affirm nothing about it, let alone say or know something about its nature or character. (It is to be remembered that *astitva* according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika means being something with regard to which an affirmative awareness (*vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-viśayatva*) as for example Udayana calls it, is possible). That this view of Nyāya raises further problems in its wake is a different matter and beyond the muttons. (one of such problems is the one related to 'empty' terms—a problem which apart from being epistemological is also logical in nature).

Professor Daya Krishna then comes out with an alternative suggestion which he thinks undermines the allegedly realistic character of the Nyāya metaphysics. (Recalls that the first alternative of Daya Krishna's consisted in construing the Nyāya position—namely, that whatever is real, is knowable—in a certain way so as to bring it close to the Berkeleyan position). Thus he supposes that a reformulation of Berkeley's thesis, 'to be, is to be *perceived*' as 'To be, is to be *perceivable*' would bring Berkeley's notion 'closer to the Nyāya formulation' (p. 161) so that once again in his view the hitherto common practice of thinking Nyāya to be a realistic system becomes gravely questionable. And so far as I can see there is no doubt that if Professor Krishna's construal of the Nyāya thesis and reformulation of the Berkeleyan position were to be allowed he has half won the battle. But I do not think that Daya Krishna comes anywhere near succeeding. I have already tried to show above how Prof. Krishna's representation of the Nyāya view of knowledge is open to objections of a fundamental

kind. The same holds, I fear, for his reframing of the Berkeleyan view by substituting 'perceivable' for 'perceived'. Daya Krishna apparently feels that the difference between the two—the 'perceived' and 'the perceivable'—though quite obvious, is not so considerable as to be impermissible and that if allowed, affects whatever seems pronouncedly idealistic in Berkeley's doctrine, and so this time brings Berkeley quite close to Nyāya.

Now what is remarkable about Daya Krishna's way of thinking on this issue is that on both the alternatives suggested by him it is Nyāya realism which in his view gets the knocking. That it does on the first alternative (—namely, that 'to be real' means 'to be perceivable'—) assuming for the sake of hypothesis that it is perfectly in order, is clear. But that it should do so even on the second suggestion passes comprehension, for this (that is, the second) alternative (in replacing 'perceived' by 'perceivable') instead of bringing Nyāya near to idealism, gives a clear realistic twist to what is essentially idealistic in Berkeley. In other words it is Berkeley's idealism which here gets drastically compromised and not Nyāya's (so-called) realism, and consequently if Berkeley and Nyāya are to be thought to have been brought together on a common platform, this platform, I am afraid, is a realistic one rather than an idealistic one.

I have already shown that the first suggestion of Professor Krishna's cannot hold and have also given some reasons. As for his second suggestion referred to above, Daya Krishna apparently feels that while the difference between 'to be perceivable' and 'to be perceived' is only slight (for he does concede a little earlier that 'to be known' is different from 'to be knowable'), the consequence of it is quite considerable so as to bring Berkeley and Nyāya very close to each other. But this precisely is the crux of the matter; for while 'to be perceivable' in one clear sense represents a possible characteristic, 'to be perceived' represents a

characteristic (or say ideal) already attained. The difference between the two is, in other words, the difference between possibility and actuality. And that in my view is what makes the whole difference to the issue at hand.

That the difference between the Nyāya position and the Berkeleyan position gets further narrowed if perception is taken, as Daya Krishna suggests, to mean *knowledge* (for perception as sense-perception would necessarily involve, in case of God's knowledge too, his having sense-organs and a body) is a point whose relevance I am not immediately in a position to estimate in so far as the question of Nyāya's view and Berkeley's view of reality is concerned.

Prof. Daya Krishna again betrays less than full appreciation of the Nyāya position when he says that the Naiyāyikas did not quite see the problems posed by the distinction between 'knowing' and 'knowability' or that the issue of the 'independence' of the object of knowing from the 'act of knowing' was not 'focally raised' (p. 162) in the Nyāya (or perhaps the Indian) tradition just because there was no Locke around to bring to the fore the issue of 'secondary qualities'. My submission without sounding apologetic at all, on this part of Daya Krishna's contention is that both the things-(a) the distinction between 'knowing' and 'knowability' and (b) the issue of the independence of the object of knowing from the 'act of knowing'-were not only very well understood by the Nyāya thinkers but also given a central place in their ontology and their doctrine of cognition, and that Locke's view about secondary qualities which in Daya Krishna's opinion triggered the concerned twin issues in the British empiricist tradition is something wholly contingent. In Nyāya these issues, I may add, arose in its attempted response to the Vedāntic and some Buddhist schools, specially the idealistic one. In philosophy, as indeed elsewhere, similar issues can arise and similar answers be attempted even if the historical

contexts or the thought-traditions themselves happen to be different.

To continue with the question of reality and knowledge as they are conceived in Nyāya, one does not have to quote text after text to show that in Nyāya all that is real, apart from being regarded *for that reason* knowable and nameable, is considered not only as distinct from, but *also* as existing independently of the actual knowing and actual naming of it. Notice that we are here drawing, tentatively though, a distinction between 'being distinct' and 'being independent'. This is because while in Nyāya the reals-and this includes substances (or particulars or things), universals, relations, whether *samyōga* (contact) or *samavāya* (inherence), and a few other things besides-are both different from and independent of our knowledge (and verbalization) of them, in some schools, specially some of the Buddhistic ones, while an object (*viśaya*) of knowledge is considered (at whatever level) *distinct* from the concerned act (or state) of knowledge, it is not considered *independent* of that act of knowledge. In other words, according to these schools 'distinctness' need not necessarily imply independence too. ('Independent existence' of course implies distinctness too.) The word '*bāhya-artha*' used in Nyāya for real objects connotes both distinctness and independence. (That is why, the Naiyāyikas are called by their opponents, *bāhyārtha-vādins*.) The English word 'externality' seems to me to capture both these connotations of *bāhyārtha*. It is important to note that in some of Buddhist idealist tradition (Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda, for instance) while provision is made for an object's distinctness from the particular cognition of it, the object (*viśaya*) is not considered as capable of existing independently of that cognition and hence is conceived as a *form* or *mode* of it (awareness). (Hence the name *sākārajñāna-vāda* for the doctrine.) To the extent the Buddhists entertain the subject-object talk at all they postulate the splitting of consciousness (or cognition) into, firstly, the appearance of itself (as subject)

(*svabhāsa*) and secondly, the appearance of the object (*viśayābhāsa*). Dignāga. For example, attempts to argue for this very thesis in his chapter on *Pratyakṣa* (Perception) in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*<sup>7</sup>. And Dharmakīrti and others follow suit. Before them there is Vasubandhu. It is no wonder then that the waking world is often thought of by some of these Buddhist philosophers as being essentially like a dream world where too the objects though perceived as being distinct from their perceptions are not found to exist independently of those perceptions. Of course the reasons why the Buddhist idealists look upon objects of cognition as nothing more than modes or forms of these cognitions are different and call for separate comment. But it would be erroneous to deny that the objects cognized are thought of as distinct from the act of cognizing to the extent cognition is regarded as *sākāra* (form-*ed*).

I now turn to Daya Krishna's contention that the Nyāya thesis of 'knowability' of 'reality' implies that the structure of 'knowing' and the structure of 'reality' are isomorphic in the sense that the *satta* must be of the nature of *dravya* which is related to *guṇa* and *karma* by *samavaya*' (p.162). Frankly, I am not quite clear what Daya Krishna exactly means by isomorphism of structure here. (In fact, the words within quotes above seem completely dark.) I may however spell out one specific meaning of it which Nyāya seems to accept. This is that 'qualificative cognition' (*savikalpaka* or *viśiṣṭa jñāna*)-and this is the kind of cognition which for all practical purposes matters for Nyāya-consists of such constituent elements which all are, taken separately,- and in the case of true cognitions even in respect of their 'unity'-actual existents and therefore part of the real world. In other words, in Nyāya a cognition is thought capable of knowing an object in a variety of its aspects which are all considered independent existents. Be that as it may, Prof. Daya

Krishna makes of the alleged structural isomorphism of knowledge and reality in Nyāya the basis of a further conclusion which he states thus: 'The 'real', thus, has to be 'rational' and as Nyāya does not accept the notion of an unknowable thing-in-itself', there is no distinction between 'phenomena' and 'reality' or noumenon, as in Kant's case. If this is not out-and-out 'idealism', what else is it? (p.162). This passage embodies quite a couple of theses which I shall briefly state and take up one by one. They are:

1 To postulate (as and if Nyāya does) isomorphism of structure between reality and knowledge is to conceive the real as rational.

2 To subscribe to the notion of an unknowable thing-in-itself-as Kant avowedly does and as Nyāya in Daya Krishna's view does not- is to draw a distinction, which Kant draws and which Nyāya does not, between phenomena (or appearances) and reality (or noumena).

3 Nyāya implicitly subscribes, on a certain condition, to (1) explicitly rejects (2), and so ends up by being idealist.

To take up (1), I am not sure whether the isomorphism factor is sufficient in itself to prove the 'rational' nature of reality, as the two terms-'real' and 'rational'-are conceived at least in Hegel's system with whom is associated what is also differently expressed (by him) as the idea of 'being-thought' identity when the two realms are considered holistically. There is no doubt that the eminent Hegelian equation of rationality and reality (or actuality) does presuppose some definite isomorphism between the two, but it should not be forgotten, and I can here do no more than touch upon the topic very cursorily, that the Hegelian conception of rationality goes beyond mere 'cognition' as it is understood in Nyāya (and in some other Indian schools) and involves human reason as the principal arbiter of truth in its inevitable universal and absolute aspect. In Hegel we find the attempt most assiduously carried out-though the process already begins with Descartes so far as modern western philosophy is concerned-to-establish the closest

possible relation(-and an internal relation at that-) between thought (or logic) and reality so that reason does not remain mere empty form (which it does to an extent even in Kant according to Hegel) and reality does not end up being taken as mere atomic fact or surd, depending upon-whether you are on the side of logical analysis or existentialism. When Hegel conceives reality as 'rational' he finds in it an inalienable element of necessity-something which is best illustrated when we consider an apparently moral question. Hegel raises the very important question of whether the world is indeed as it ought to be, and comes to the above conclusion by treating this question as equivalent to the question: Is thought objectively actualized or embedded in the world? To a philosopher like Kant, as indeed to common sense, the two questions may seem to be about different things, the first about goodness, about whether human beings are morally good and happy in proportion to their desires and hopes, and the second about intelligibility, about the extent to which phenomena involve thoughts or categories, and about whether or not these thoughts or categories are applicable to things-in-themselves. And since he treats them both as one question, Hegel thinks their solution also to be one and the same. This equation as we come to learn is implicit in the famous Hegelian dictum 'What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational',<sup>8</sup> 'rationality' here meaning that the world as it is, in that it embodies or instantiates thought determinations, is rationally intelligible and (so) necessary, and secondly, that the world is reasonable in the sense of being more or less as it ought to be, and so not really to be questioned as regards its ultimate goodness. In the *Encyclopadia* the key-doctrine that thought is objectively realized in the actual world is construed as implying that it is none of our's or the philosopher's business to suggest that

<sup>8</sup> See *Dignāga, on Perception*, trans. and annotated by Masaaki Hattori, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1968, Section 1.

things ought to be different from what they are or to say how they ought to be, if this is viewed as different from the way they are. The point is that Hegel's whole endeavour in mapping the dialectic of reality taken in its widest sense is to establish the most intimate and most intrinsic connection between existence and thought, between content and form, between fact and value, and thereby transcend the bifurcated or sundered world which becomes our inevitable fate when reason goes on holiday so far as its other equally important function of synthesis is concerned. Whether a philosophy like Nyāya, in its conception of reality and knowledge, admits between the two some such relation as envisioned by Hegel is a question which requires a more detailed comment than is possible within the limits of this essay. I will therefore remain content by just pointing out, pertinently in my view, that there is a basic difference between (rational) 'intelligibility' in the sense noted above and 'knowability' as it is normally understood in a system like Nyāya such that even a closest possible correspondence of structure between reality and knowledge, assuming that it is postulated therein, does not really entitle us to regard Nyāya metaphysics as 'rationalist' or 'idealist'. (I am, however, far from suggesting that 'realism' and idealism' are necessarily mutually exclusive categories in themselves.

As for the thesis (2), it is extremely doubtful whether to draw a distinction between phenomena and reality is to subscribe to the doctrine of 'an unknowable thing-in-itself'. (That Kant does so is only a special feature of his philosophy.) Hegel or Advaita Vedānta or philosophers such as Bradley and McTaggart do draw a basic distinction between appearance and reality and yet do not hold (in fact Hegel's critique of the Kantian doctrine is well-known) that there are any such things as *unknowable* things-in-themselves. We find thus that Nyāya philosophy does not become idealistic either on (1) or on (2) or on a combination of them. I may here add, by way of a needed codicil, that though idealism too, like realism, has



known many varieties, what is common to them all as a matter of historical facts is that reality is there conceived as being essentially of the nature of spirit. It is in this sense that philosophers, otherwise in many respects as diverse as the Advaita Vedāntins, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hegel, Bradley and McTaggart, are idealists.

To turn to the phrase 'avyapadeśyam' in the *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.4) definition of perception (*pratyakṣa*), which prompts Prof. Daya Krishna to make a couple of pertinent (if anxious) queries, it needs to be noted that the adjective does not mean that (knowledge) which cannot be named or verbalized but only and significantly (as per the explanation given by none other than Vātsyāyana), *that* knowledge which does not owe its existence to any word or name which denotes (or happens to denote) it: *tas mādaśābdamarthajñānamindriyārthasannikarṣotpannam.* It is not that a name cannot produce knowledge of that for which it stands; only, the word naming the object plays *no* role in producing the *perceptual* knowledge of that object. A name only serves the purpose of communication: *tadevamarthajñānakāle sa na samākhyāśabdo vyāpriyate vyavahārakāle tu vyāpriyate.* In other words—as A. Chakraborty rightly points out by referring to Jayanta Bhaṭṭi's explication of the phrase 'avyapadeśyam'—perceptual knowledge is to be distinguished from the knowledge produced by verbal testimony. There is, therefore, no contradiction between the general thesis that everything real is verbalizable and the view expressed in the (above-mentioned *Nyāyasūtra*) that perceptual cognition is not word-generated (or linguistic) in origin. (In a way, Vātsyāyana's explication of this sūtra seems to put a big question mark on the propriety of postulating *nirvikalpaka* awareness as it came to be developed by the subsequent Nyāya philosophers from Vācashpati onwards.) Incidentally, this view of perception as 'non-verbal' has a different fall-out too, and it is that, on Nyāya's account, perceptual knowledge cannot be regarded as necessarily

*propositional* knowledge as is commonly supposed in the West, notwithstanding the fact that being *abhidheya*, it can *acquire* a propositional structure (so to say) and so become an objective and public entity when expressed sententially. This point is important, if only because it is often missed in discussions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Prof. Daya Krishna then seeks to draw attention to some of the implications of the Nyāya(-Vaiśeṣika) attempt to make certain concepts relative to our conception or view of them, which 'fact' in his opinion compromises Nyāya's alleged realism in respect of at least those concepts.

Since the situation so warrants, I would respond to this suggestion at the basic level and as follows. The relevant aphorism (1.2.3) in Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* where the word 'buddhyapekṣa' cited by Daya Krishna occurs is this: *sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam.* (Genericness and specificity are relative to (the nature of) the viewpoint.) Now the word *buddhyapekṣa*, if not carefully attended to and read along with the rest of the *sūtra*, can easily mislead one, as indeed it does Daya Krishna (if this is the *sūtra* which he has in mind) (and as indeed it has done some other writers), into believing that Kaṇāda here is propounding a conceptualist view of *sāmānya* (genericness) and thus reducing it to something that exists (or can exist) in thought alone and so cannot be credited with 'real' objective existence. This interpretation is, however, completely mistaken. What Kaṇāda actually seems to maintain here is that *jātis* or universals are eternal (*nitya*) entities which are (1) as much real as other realities, and so do not merely have (what is called) *logical* existence and which (2) serve *both* to produce as a generic character (*sāmānya*) a cognition of commonness among the members of the *same* class, and to distinguish, as a differentia (or specific character: *viśeṣa*), that class from *other* classes (or universals). Thus *dravyatva* (substancehood), for example, is a generic character or *sāmānya* when it is taken to unify all the existents which are substances, and is a specific

character or *viśeṣa* when it is thought to differentiate the whole class of substances (*dravyas*) in which it inheres from such classes (of entities) as qualities (*guṇas*) or actions (*karma*) which are *not* substances. Likewise, the universal 'potness' (*ghaṭatva-sāmānya*) can be conceived as a synthetic principle bringing under itself all individual pots, or as a differentiating principle which as belonging to pots alone distinguishes them from things which are not pots. Again, as serving the former purpose it ('substancehood' or 'potness' in our examples) is called *kevalasāmānya*, and as serving the latter purpose it is called *viśeṣātama-sāmānya*.<sup>9</sup> It is this *use* of a *jāti* or *sāmānya* which is dependent upon our viewpoint or understanding and not its *existence*. Our contention is supported by the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.2.5 (*dravyatvam guṇatvam karmatvam ca sāmānyāni viśeṣās ca*) where it is further made clear that the universals- such as substancehood (*dravyatva*), qualityness (*guṇatva*) and action-ness (*karmatva*)-are also used to differentiate the respective classes they denote from *other* classes and are therefore called *viśeṣās*. It is clear therefore that '*viśeṣā*' here stands for a class-character conceived or understood as a differentia (and so ought to be distinguished from, as would be evident from the remarks that follow, *antya-viśeṣā* which stands for the altogether different category called 'particularity'.) Not only this, Kaṇāda's intention on the score becomes patently evident from the fact that in the following sūtra (1.2.6) *anyatrāntebhyo viśeṣebhyaḥ*, he uses the expression *antya-viśeṣā* (mark the adjective *antya* added here) to denote the different category (*padārtha*) called *viśeṣās* in order that they are not confused with *sāmānyas* or *jātis* when these latter are viewed as differentia (*viśeṣās*). The *antya-viśeṣās* are meant to

<sup>9</sup> See Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, trans. with notes by T.M.Knox (1942: reprint Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1949), Preface (p.10); cf. also Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*, Introduction.

represent those *ultimate*, unique, *self-differentiated* and eternal features which belong to every eternal substance (*nitya dravya*) which could not otherwise-that is, in terms of *guṇa*, *karma* or *sāmānya*- be distinguished from other similar eternal substances. In other words, while everywhere else it is *sāmānya* or *jāti* which assimilates all the members of a certain class under one identical mode of being and *also* further serves, depending upon our intention, as a means to distinguish that class from other classes, in the case of eternal substances which on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view are *all alike* so far as their *guṇa*, *karma* and *sāmānya* (or *jāti*) are concerned, it is the self-differentiating feature called *viśeṣā* which, on account of its being unique to every such substance (*nitya dravya*), acts as a differentia for that individual substance.

That we are not telling a fairy-tale as regards the two-fold purpose of *sāmānya* we have sought to emphasize by quoting the relevant *Vaiśeṣika* sūtra, receives unambiguous support from Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.69- *sāmānya-prasavātmika jātiḥ*-which is concerned with defining *jāti*. Vātsyāyana glosses: 'The class-essence (*jāti*) is that which produces the knowledge of commonness in different objects, *that is*, that by the presence of which the different objects are not mutually differentiated, that is, the entity which is the cause of the continuation of the same knowledge in different objects. That which points to similarity (of something) with some individuals and *at the same time* (my emphasis) differentiates (it) from other individuals is also a class essence, though of a *special* (*viśeṣā*) type.'<sup>10</sup> (*yā sāmānam buddhim prasūte bhinneṣu adhikaraṇeṣu, yayā bahūni itaretarato na vyāvartante, yo 'rtho' nekatra pratyayānuvṛttinimittam tat sāmānyam yat ca keśāṃcid bhedaṃ*

<sup>10</sup> See for example, Desika-Tirumalai Tatacarya, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra-vṛtti*, Gāṅganātha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Allahabad; 1979, p 16 (on *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 1.2.3).

*kutaścīd bhedaṃ karoti tat sāmānyaviśeṣo jātirīti.*) Notice the last but one phrase *sāmānyā- viśeṣā* in the Sanskrit text) which is comparable to the phrase *sāmānyam- viśeṣā* of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 1.2.3 cited above. To conclude (then) this part of the discussion, there is no real in Nyaya (Vaiśeṣika) which does not exist independently of our knowledge or conception of it. So the Nyāya realism remains unaffected so far as this particular aspect is concerned.

## II

I turn now to some of the points contained in Prof. Arindam Chakraborty's response to Daya Krishna's Note.

(A) First, I do not understand the point Arindam wishes to make when, while rightly drawing our attention to Udayana's detailed refutation of the 'no-external world' theory of the Buddhist idealists, he emphasizes that the self in Nyāya is not only not 'essentially conscious', but also 'can exist independently of cognition' (p.152), so that both self and object (as objects of knowledge) turn out to be entities existing outside (and so without dependence upon) awareness (*bāhyārtha*). My own view is that even if the Nyāya self were essentially conscious or of the nature of awareness that would not by itself compromise its independent existence. Advaita Vedānta, for example, takes this view of the self and yet regards it as objectively and independently existent (*vastu-sat*). And so does for that matter a system like that of Rāmānuja. Second, it is to be noted that whenever the self in Nyāya is *known* as existent it is always as *cognizing* and therefore as *conscious* self (or subject). As those conversant with Nyāya know, the self not being regarded as self-luminous (*sva-prakāśa*) in that philosophy can be known only in a second-order cognition (*anuvyavasāya*, or introspective awareness) which makes the first-order or primary awareness (*vyavasāya*, which as such is always of one or another object) its intentional object, the seat or subject of which primary awareness is precisely the self. In other words, though the self can

exist without consciousness it cannot be *known as existent unless it possesses consciousness of some object* (which, for example, it does in a primary cognition). It is this peculiar character of the self which distinguishes it from other entities-which also otherwise exist as independent knowable reals-and which in a way makes Nyāya regard consciousness (or awareness) as a *special* attribute (*sva-dharma*) of the self belonging to it by the relation of inherence. (The only other real which possesses consciousness is God who is called *paramātman* or the universal Self.) It is true that, as Chakraborty says, both self and object 'remain outside awareness' and so are not really dependent, as far as their existence is concerned, upon consciousness. But his way of putting the whole proposition is a little awkward and misleading and fails to emphasize (what must be emphasized) that (in Nyāya) it is only a self which is inherently capable, given certain conditions of being conscious or a knower. Thus, there is a basic difference between the object(s) of knowledge being independent of consciousness and the self being independent of consciousness. Other reals are only knowable and so can never have consciousness while the self, besides being a knowable, is *also* a knower and so is always capable of possessing consciousness. And if the self exists without any consciousness or awareness in the liberated state, this is not because there is no special (even if contingent) relationship between consciousness and the self, but because in that state the self is devoid of any bodily form encased in which alone can it become capable of knowing the outside world via the mind and the senses. My point here is not that the self in Nyāya is not a real independent of cognition, but that even if it were to have consciousness as its intrinsic quality its ontological status would not be affected at all. The same consideration incidentally applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to 'consciousness' or 'cognition'. In Nyāya consciousness too, being a quality (*guna*), is considered (like *samyoga* etc.) among the objective reals and so independent of *its*

consciousness (which consequently is called *anuvyavasāya* or introspection); and yet, is it not seen (by Nyāya) as possessing the property of being consciousness? Being 'devoid' of or being 'not made of awareness cannot, therefore, by itself become a decisive criterion for affirming something's independent, reality, as Chakraborty seems to think. The one necessary condition for independent existence is that the thing concerned should not be *dependent upon* or *relative* to awareness of *itself*. And this perfectly holds true in case of consciousness in Nyāya, for every cognitive act is there considered as an entity or state numerically different from the act (called *anuvyavasāya*) which cognizes it.

(B) Second, in his anxiety to affirm, rightly of course, that the Nyāya world is a totality of things, Arindam tends to be unfair to facts just because of (a) what he thinks to be the predominantly Tractarian association of the word 'fact' and (b) because of the fear that any admission of independently existing 'facts' would necessarily commit one to upholding either a facts rather than of things-which latter include, as Chakraborty emphasizes, the (real) relation of 'inherence' or *being-in*. Such a fear, however, seems to me unfounded. It is my view that one does not necessarily have to be a fact-ontologist (leaving aside the further question whether the Wittgenstein of *Tractatus* is one or not) as distinct from a thing-ontologist to entertain the idea of facts. It is possible, I think, to say in the same breath that the world consists of things and that these things have *facts* holding about them. What is a fact, after all, (to confine ourselves to this elementary level), other than the possession by something of a property or the connection of something with something by a relation. (By 'something' we here mean both particulars and characteristics) A fact then would exist *depending* on whether or not the thing (s) about which it is a fact exists. The blackness of the crow would then be a fact as distinct from my *cognition* of or belief about it (as black), which (cognition or belief) is an occurrent (attribute) in my self as a knowing agent.

And such judgements can be commonly found in the Nyāya literature.<sup>11</sup> Besides, one does not have to be an upholder of the reality of propositions (which, for example, Wittgenstein is) to be an entertainer of facts. One can I think as legitimately talk of correspondence of structure between cognitions and objects (or facts) as between propositions and states of affairs (or facts).

(C) While endorsing the common scholarly opinion that Nyāya upholds metaphysical realism, Prof. Chakraborty cites two main reasons which in his view make the Nyāya system a realist one: first, that Nyāya subscribes to the doctrine of *Pramāṇa-saṃplava* (different means of knowledge grasping the same object) and, second, that Nyāya advocates the doctrine of *nirākāra-jñāna-vāda* (formlessness of awareness). Since Chakraborty leaves unclarified some of the meaning and implications of the two doctrines such that the possibility of misapprehension on this score always looms, I proceed to supplement what he has already said. To take up *nirākāra-jñāna-vāda* first, it must be remembered that this doctrine took the kind of shape (and, of course, the name) it did largely (though not exclusively) by way of a response to the *sākāra-jñāna-vāda* of some of the Buddhist schools, more especially the idealistic ones, who, since they totally denied the ontological reality of the external world (*bāhārtha*) and since they yet felt impelled, either in the nature of things or by the opponents' attack, to account for the undeniable subject-object distinction as characterizing every cognition (even if in the final analysis this so-called distinction was for them nothing more than an illusion.), took shelter in and formulated the notorious (?) doctrine that every awareness has a form (*sākāra*) which bifurcates itself into two appearances-subject-appearance (*svābhāsa* or *grāhakākāra*) and object-appearance

<sup>11</sup> Gotama's Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyana's commentary (*Bhāṣya*), trans. By M.K.Gangopadhyaya, *Indian Studies*, Calcutta, 1972, p. 168.

(Viṣayābhāsa or grāhyākāra)-the latter one having then been supposed to represent the objective constituent of an awareness.

As against the *sākāra-jñāna-vādin* Buddhists, the Nyāya realists (as indeed some other Hindu realists and Vaibhāṣika Buddhists) propounded the doctrine of *nirākāra-jñāna* (formless cognition or consciousness) according to which the 'objective' constituent (*viśaya* or *artha*) which serves and enables us to differentiate one state of awareness from another is not provided (as the Buddhist idealists 'mistakenly thought) by awareness *itself* from *within* but from *outside* this consciousness (which in itself is *nirākāra* or formless), that is, by the exterior world with which the conscious self comes into contact through the mind and the senses. It is always something belonging to the *real external* world which, in so far as it becomes an object of a cognition-episode, constitutes the objective component of a cognitive situation, cognition itself representing the subject-side (*viśayā*) of that situation. Thus while both Nyāya and the Buddhists in question apparently (if unwittingly) agree that it is the object (or 'object-appearance') which distinguishes one awareness from another, this component, while it is in the case of the Buddhists supplied by consciousness internally (or from within and so in fact ultimately reduces to nothing more than an appearance) and thus necessarily renders the latter form-ed (*sākāra*), comes in the case of Nyāya from the actual world outside that cognition and thus underlines the inherently form-less (*nirākāra*) character of consciousness. This doctrine was pithily summed up by Udayana thus: *artheniva viśeṣo hi nirākāratayā dhiyām*.<sup>12</sup> (A cognition is distinguished by its object (*artha*)) alone, for the cognitions themselves have no definite form by which to distinguish them from each other.) Now this particular

<sup>12</sup> I would not however be taken to mean that Nyāya does *explicitly* provide for 'facts' within its ontology. I am only suggesting that fact-talk would not strictly be an anathema to Nyāya.

formulation would seem to lead one to believe that in Nyāya's view consciousness is diaphanous. And in a significant sense it is. (One recalls here G.E. Moore's view of consciousness as enunciated in his essay 'Refutation of idealism'.<sup>13</sup> But though consciousness as thus conceived is diaphanous and formless, it is never contentless (*nirviśayaka*) if only because of the fact that it always is directed towards one or another (real external) object which it grasps in at least some of its features. And as something with a content, and so a structure-which incidentally is in Nyāya always in principle expressible in sentential form-it always lends itself to logical analysis. (Its structural content is however revealed only in an introspective or reflective act.)

But how can such an analysis become a possibility in the first instance unless we allow that a cognition must after all have a certain form and so be *sākāra*. Besides, whenever we need to distinguish one primary object-directed cognition from another such cognition we do it only in terms of the contents which have already become *internalized* and immanent (so to say) and so are accessible to introspective (or reflective) awareness whose *raison d'être* consists precisely in making the primary cognition (*saviśayaka vyavasāya*) its object of reflection. And it is common knowledge that Nyāya brings all such 'immanent' contents under the technical category called *Viśayatā* which is said to comprise three further sub-categories-*viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* and *samsargatā*-into which the constituent contents come to be arranged and their mutual connection analyzed. Indeed, to abstract a little, the sum and substance of the Buddhist idealist's contention is that if there is *no* such *immanent* content which characterizes every state of awareness, if awareness of blue and awareness of red, being

<sup>13</sup> Udayana, *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* with four commentaries, ed. With introduction by Mahāprabhūlal Goswami, Mithila Research Institute, Darbhanga, 1972, Chapter 4, verse 4.

therefore formless are wholly alike *internally*, their difference being constituted by the difference between their respective objects existing out there in the world, how can (i) the first awareness be distinguished from the latter (ii) there exist a one-to-one determinate relation between an awareness and its object? What I am trying to drive at is that the meaning and connotations which we normally assign to the term *sākāra* or *nirākāra* when interpreting or pronouncing on the relative merits of the doctrines concerned is certainly not the whole story and the issues involved are much deeper and greater. I am not at all suggesting that prof. Chakraborty's view of the doctrine of *nirākāra jñāna* as one of the pillars of Nyāya realism is without substance. (In fact, I am in agreement with him here.) My only aim in doing the above unavoidably digressive exercise has been to put across to the common reader that the one specific meaning which the term *nirākāra jñāna* carries in the context of Nyāya (-Vaiśeṣika) is that the (immanent) content which characterizes every primary cognition and therefore make it necessarily *sākāra* in the sense indicated above, derives its various determinations (in that system) *originally not from within* (hence the significance of the term *nirākāra*) but from the independently *existing* (object-complex in the) outside world. To put it all in one word, the (undeniable) internal content of a cognition is parasitic upon the real transcendent world and the nature or character of this transcendent world is established by *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇāyattā vastusthitiḥ Jayanta*).

(D) In the context of the knowability-talk (*jñeyatva*) in Nyāya Prof. Chakraborty relies exclusively or mainly on the version given by *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (in commentary on verse 13) and consequently interprets 'Everything that is, is knowable' as 'Everything that is, is actually known by God' (*jñeyatva* having been taken by *Muktāvalī* to mean: knowability is the property of being an object of knowledge: *jñānaviśayatā*), proposing, surely after

*Muktāvalī*, that this property of 'knowability' (*jñānaviśayata*) exists everywhere, for everything whatever is *actually* the object of God's (or a *yogi's*)<sup>14</sup> knowledge. Now this proposition and its acceptance as *the* correct view entails certain consequences. The most important consequence is that if *jñeyatva* is to be interpreted as 'actually' known by God (my emphasis) then the concept *jñeyatva* becomes altogether redundant as a common property of six/seven Vaiśeṣika categories, for the concept of God already implies in Nyāya his omniscience-which property cannot but include knowledge of all that is, and perhaps even that is not. And the same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the property of nameability which too is said to belong commonly to all the six/seven categories. Briefly, what I wish to say is that if *jñeyatva* and *abhidheyatva* only mean that all that exists is *already* the object of God's knowledge and his 'naming' of it, then it would be unnecessary for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to enumerate them as additional common properties of the existent. My point, in other words, is that their special mention makes sense only in the context of such thinking beings who, even while not actually possessing knowledge of all that *is*, are deemed inherently capable of acquiring such knowledge.

(E) Finally I turn to a special point made by Chakraborty in his response to some of Daya Krishna's queries. He writes, in obvious approval of a comment of Daya Krishna's: 'The canonical western characterization of realism as the thesis that objects exist mind-independently is *difficult* to apply to Nyāya (p. 154)(my emphasis).

<sup>14</sup> G.E. Moore, 'Refutation of Idealism', *Philosophical studies*, 1922; reprint, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958.

<sup>14</sup> Note that many translators of the text take 'adī' in '*isvarādijñānaviśayatāyaḥ kevalānvayitva*' to include (in addition to God) other knowing beings such as yogis.

The reason for this, according to Chakraborty, is that the notion of mind-independence involves the notion of *possibility*: 'An object of awareness is mind-independent if it *can* or *could* exist without awareness even if it actually is always the object of some awareness (for example, God's)' (p.154). And Nyāya metaphysics, according to Chakraborty 'cannot make sense of this empty 'can' or 'could' because nowhere in Nyāya do we find any trace of the idea of possible worlds' (p.154).

Now frankly I am not quite able to see how exactly is discussion of the question, if Nyāya can appropriately be called a realist philosophy, helped by Chakraborty's introduction of the notion of possibility? In fact, the puzzle only worsens because of Chakraborty's use of 'possibility' and 'possible worlds' as equivalents in the context concerned. What I mean is not that they can never be treated as equivalents, but only that care should be taken to indicate how exactly such equivalence is possible. It can surely not be accepted generally in the context of Nyāya. Thus (to illustrate), while (in Nyāya) it would make perfect sense to say that it may rain today, it is extremely doubtful whether Nyāya would entertain, without any qualification whatever, the notion of a possible *world* which for example, may be devoid of atoms (*paramāṇus*) as its constitutive cause. Again, in a different context, Nyāya would not hesitate to regard the illusorily perceived snake as a possible object precisely because both the 'snake' and its substrate, rope, are parts of the real world. And to come specifically to the context in which Chakraborty pointedly (if briefly) refers to the issue and goes on to dismiss summarily Nyāya's claim to the title 'realist', on the ground that it shuns any talk of 'possible worlds' which in his view realism as involving belief in mind-independent reality *necessarily* involves, I have only to submit that Chakraborty does nothing to show why 'possibility'-talk in the sense he cares to point out, is not permissible within

Nyāya's metaphysical framework. Isn't it plainly the case that to the extent Nyāya regards the entities (or classes of them) which it postulates *as* real, it thinks them as *capable* or existing independently of being known, whether by finite minds or God's mind, to which latter incidentally they are presumed to be known perennially. If I happen to see a tree and if my perception is valid, isn't this tree (on Nyāya's account of substances) something which, in fact, exists independently of my knowledge of it? And if it so exists now, should not such existence be taken to have been *possible*? Indeed, I would insist that when Nyāya calls an existent thing *jñeya*, it does not mean merely that it is possible to know that thing, but also, significantly, that it is a *potential* object of knowledge. And needless to say, this potentiality (as indeed also the possibility) the object derives from its mind-independent reality. Absence of 'possible worlds'-talk in *jñeyatva* does not one bit change this situation and is besides, as remarked above, an issue standing on a different footing altogether. I have no wish to deny that the history of philosophy bears witness to many versions of realism, but what is common to them all is the thesis that there is a *mind* independent real world. And I believe that this 'canonical' Western characterization of realism does apply to the *essential* Nyāya (-Vaiśeṣika) standpoint on the nature of reality and knowledge (including God's knowledge) In fact, Chakraborty himself seems to concede this when he says: 'Things, even if all of them are actually known, are not of the nature of knowledge. They are distinct' (p.154). However, his subsequent reduction of Nyāya realism to *just* the rejection of a certain Buddhist idealistic 'rule' (-*sahopalambhaniyamād abhedaḥ(nīla-taddhijyoḥ-*) appears to dilute, if not to undermine, not only what is independently and specially typical of Nyāya metaphysics but also its pronouncedly *realistic* character.

**Why Nyāya Remains Realist ? Second Round****Reply**

Let us assume that Navya Nyāya *cannot* make the distinction between sense and reference. Why should that entail (as Daya Krishna provocatively avers in the interrogative, vide May-August 1996 issue of *JICPR*) that it is idealistic *par excellence*?

Russell proudly failed to make that distinction, claiming in *On Denoting* that if you try to preserve the connection between sense and reference, as Frege would understand them, then you cannot stop them becoming the same. And this is not the voice of Russell during his idealistic adolescence. Indeed, it is pretty obvious that Russell thought that *drawing* the sense-reference distinction would go against that 'robust sense of reality' which he took to be the hallmark of a realist. If there are no senses of names like 'Pegasus' in zoology, then there are none such in reality, he would tell us.

So Daya Krishna's implicit premise: Whoever is a realist must draw the distinction between sense and reference is simply false. Where could he have got that from? A charitable attempt to speculate turns out to be very uncharitable on Daya Krishna. For, the following argument is a classic case of fallacious reasoning:

Frege was a realist.

Frege drew the sense-reference distinction.

Therefore, every realist must draw the sense-reference distinction.

And, of course, there is a sense in which Navya Nyāya does draw that distinction. What is known or understood when one hears the sentence 'Gadādhara is Saṅkhaṇi' is surely different from what you know when you hear 'Gadādhara is Gadādhara' because, for one thing, according to Navya Nyāya, you do not know anything when you hear the latter sentence. Yet it is clear that both the sentences speak of the same referent, namely Viṣṇu. Apart from the *vacya*, therefore, Navya Nyāya includes the reason for application or the limiter of designatumhood (*pravṛttinimitta* or

*vācyatāvaccchedaka*) within the content of the awareness generated by the use of a word in the context of a sentence.

Whether this notion of a limiter of referentness—that in virtue of which, on a particular occasion, an object is picked out as the intended referent—is quite the same as Frege's notion of *sinn* is a matter of deep and difficult debate. Mohanty's discussion of this point in pp. 65-66 of his *Reason and Tradition* (Oxford, 1992) is the best record of the current state of that debate, apart from the relevant pages of *Saṃvāda*.

Navya Nyāya and the Russell of 1910 to 1919 (including the famous *Problems of Philosophy*) are very similar in this regard. Both are realist about external objects and universals and both give an account of error or false belief which eschews the positing of false propositions/Fregean thoughts or unobtaining complexes like that-Desdemona-loves-Cassio or that (=rope)-which-is-a-snake. The sophisticated 'multiple relation theory of belief' or '*anyathākhyāti* theory of error' was precisely an answer to the question: How can you be a realist about what is referred to by a false belief or the constituents of an erroneous perceptual judgement without giving ontological status to Fregean senses. The urge to avoid Fregean senses comes actually from a deep commitment to hard realism which fears that once we allow the veil of objective, modes of presentation to come between our seeings or graspings from words and the objects and properties seen and grasped, we shall for ever be stuck in a rut of thought-contents. That, to succumb to an old pun, would be as sinful for a Naiyāyika as holding like a Buddhist that 'these words never touch real objects but only capture *vikalpas*.'

It is not clear at all what Daya Krishna is getting at when he links up the sense-reference distinction with accepting the idea that 'the same fact makes two different knowledges true.' If we mean by 'fact' what Frege explicitly meant by that word, that is, true thoughts, then 'Gadādhara saved me' and 'Sankhaṇi saved me' would express two different facts. Even Nyāya analysis of those two awarenesses would go *via* invoking different properties '*vācyopasthitiprakāra*'—the manner in which the referent was presented to the knower. And it is by showing sensitivity to



this difference between what is meant, in other words, by showing the meaning-non-equivalence of the two formulations, that Navya Nyāya shows that it can do justice to the phenomenon that Frege needed the sense-reference distinction for, without actually drawing that distinction. As to how to honour the realistic intuition that, after all, the same objective circumstance (Viṣṇu saving the speaker) makes both of them true, Nyāya does that by the apparently innocent but extremely farsighted doctrine that a *qualified entity is no distinct from that very entity in its unqualified state*, (*śuddha-padārtho viśiṣṭapadārthāt na atiricyate*: the man with the stick is no other than man). The real hallmarks of Nyāya realism are the following apparently distinct doctrines:

- (1) The relation of inherence is mind-independently real.
- (2) The object of very unlike kinds of knowing, for example, seeing and touching, perceiving and inferring, perceiving judgements and perceiving indeterminately, can be exactly the same object or object complex.
- (3) Awareness is not self-aware.
- (4) Universals are mind-independently real and can be directly and indeterminately perceived.
- (5) No awareness is self-certified to be true and false awarenesses do not require any non-existent or intentional entities in order to be accounted for.
- (6) Apart from a man with the stick, who is identical with the man, there is no fact or true thought that the man has a stick anywhere in any sector of reality.

How Frege could be a realist while dropping 2 and 6 is at most as interesting a question as how Prābhākara could be a realist while dropping 3 and 5. But just as you do not become an idealist if you believe that awarenesses are sometimes unwittingly false, you do not become an idealist if you do not draw the distinction between sense and reference in the way that Frege would.

**Nyāya: Realist or Idealist: Is the debate ended, the argument concluded?**

Nyāya, by common consent is regarded as a realist system *par excellence* by everybody. In fact, it is contended that if any philosophical system can be described as 'realist' at all, then Nyāya is one. The queries raised by me under the above heading in two parts in *JICPR* Volumes (i) Nyāya: Realist or Idealist?' (XII (I), pp. 161-3): (ii) 'Can Navya- Nyāya: make distinction between sense and reference?' (XII (3), p. 157) do not seem to have disturbed the self-evident, axiomatic belief in the characterization of Nyāya as mentioned above. Normally, when five such knowledgeable persons reject the very possibility of doubting such a characterization, one should accept that the grounds of one's doubting' had no foundation at all.

Yet, there seems to have been some slight shakings of the foundation of the belief in the responses of all these Naiyāyikas, though expressed in different ways. Professor Chakraborty, for example, concedes. 'The canonical western characterization of realism as the thesis that objects exist mind-independently is difficult to apply to Nyāya (*JICPR*, XII(2), p. 154). And, Professor N.S.Drauid explicitly admits that the question raised about the compatibility of the requirement of '*abhidheyatva*' with the definition of perception as *avyapadeśyam* given in N.S. 1.1.14. 'is an important one and deserves some serious thought'. Both these admissions are, surprisingly, questioned; the former by Dr. Ramesh Kr. Sharma and the latter by Arindam Chakraborty. But, though there seems to be a difference of opinion amongst the Naiyāyikas on the issue of the relevance, significance and importance of the questions raised, the 'difference' itself is indicative of the fact that it is not easy to determine what exactly is the Nyāya position in respect of the issue concerned.

The different and divergent points raised in the responses to the single question raised by me suggest that the House of Nyāya is divided in itself, and that the idea of a unique, unambiguous position of Nyāya is a myth, sustained only by the fact that scholars and students have unquestioningly accepted what is purveyed in the name of Nyāya in the textbooks on the subject. Nyāya is not, and cannot be, a monolith system as is suggested by all those who write on it, including the 'five experts' who have chose to respond to the questions raised by me. To give a few examples from the comments of these well-known, authorities' on Nyāya, Professor Mohanty is firmly of the view that Nyāya subscribes to the 'extensionality of the relation' that obtains between 'existence' and 'knowability' (*JICPR*, XIII (1), p.167). Professor Dravid, on the other hand, believes that at least as far as 'sat, prameya and abhidheya' are concerned, they are supposed to have identical denotations, though the connotations of these words differ from each other' (*JICPR*, XIII (1), p. 169).

These two positions seem, at least *prima facie*, to be opposed to each other. It is not clear whether Mohanty subscribes to the generalized position that Nyāya does not, and cannot, in principle accept 'intensional relations' in its system and that all relations have to be necessarily extensional. There is the related problem whether a system which admits only extensional relations can ever have any 'intensional relation' in it.

The problem, however, is not confined to relations alone. The deeper question relates to the issue whether Nyāya admits extensional definitions alone or it also admits definitions that are 'intensional' in nature. Professor Dravid in his discussion of the issue has explicitly brought in the concepts of 'connotation' and 'denotation' and suggested that while 'sat', 'prameya' and 'abhidheya' have different connotations, they have the same denotation. But once the idea of 'connotation' is accepted in any

system, it cannot have pure 'extensional' relations or definitions in it. And if the extensional relations and definitions are rejected in a system, it is difficult to see how it can be realist in character.

Nyāya, as is well known, is pre-eminently concerned with considerations of determining the exact *lakṣaṇa* of anything and if it is so then one cannot understand how it can be regarded as realist in the sense in which the postulation of extensional relations or definitions would entail it. All attempts at the correct establishment of the *lakṣaṇa* of anything suffer from either an *ativyāpti doṣa* or *avyāpti doṣa* and it is extremely difficult to avoid either of these and reach a 'definition' which will capture the true nature of the object concerned. Professor Mohanty has argued that there is a *vyāpti* 'between existence and knowability' and that this *vyāpti* is 'extensional' in character. Not only this, he has explicitly stated that, 'In the celebrated case of smoke and fire, the *vyāpti* is not to be understood intensionally as a necessary relation, but rather extensionally as a relation of mere co-presence' (p. 167). This, if correct, will raise serious problems regarding the long discussion about the exact definition of *vyāpti* in the Nyāya tradition. Mohanty knows, as well as everybody else, that successive definitions of *vyāpti* given before Gaṅgeśa were found to be inadequate and the issue regarding the formulation of the exact nature of the *vyāpti* was not close even after him. If *vyāpti* were merely co-presence, then it will be difficult to understand how these definitions of *vyāpti* were found to be inadequate, and that the dispute about the correct definition of *vyāpti* continued in the Nyāya tradition.

It may be said that the inadequacy of the definitions were primarily because of their inapplicability in those cases where the object concerned was either *Kevalānvayi* or *Kevalavyatirekī*, that is, where it was always present or always absent. But, these are exceptional situations and normally the relation of *vyāpti* is

established on the basis of what Mill calls 'the joint method of agreement and difference'.

Mohanty has suggested that there is an extensional *vyāpti* relation between knowability and existence. But how is this *vyāpti* established? By assertion only, or by an examination of the cases where *anvaya vyaitireka sambandha* is found among them. For the latter, one will have to have an independent *lakṣaṇa* or criterion of what existence is and a *separate* one for what knowability is. But, as far as I know, such a *Lakṣaṇa* has not been provided by the Nyāya thinkers and, even if it were to be provided, it will be difficult to see how one can find 'existence' and 'knowability' both present and absent in order to establish a *vyāpti* relation between them. Not only this, 'knowability' is a strange characteristic as it can only be defined in terms of a possibility, and not an actuality. If this is accepted, then it will be difficult to see how one could determine its absence anywhere. If something is 'known' then it certainly must have been 'knowable'. But if it is not known then one can only say that it is 'knowable' on grounds of faith alone.

It is, of course, known that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish *vyāpti* between objects or entities which are *Kevalānvayi* or *Kevalavyatirekī*. As both 'existence' and 'knowability' are *Kevalānvayi*, at least on the usual understanding of the Nyāya position in this context, only Mohanty will know how to establish *vyāpti* relation between them. The solution, of course, is easy. The relation between 'existence' and 'knowability' can be established by treating them as being analytically involved or implied by each other. This, however, will destroy the 'extensionality' of the relationship between them and make it 'intensional' or even 'definitional' which will not, probably, be acceptable to Naiyāyika, including Mohanty.

The term 'existence' itself is extremely ambiguous, especially in the context of the discussion about Nyāya. Does it mean *sattā*

and, if so, then it will be confined only to the first three *padārthas* in the Vaiśeṣika list, or does it mean *padārtha*? And, if so, it will apply to all the six *padārthas* originally mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras. However, even in this case, there will always be a problem whether it covers only the specific *dravyas*, *gunas*, *karmas* etc. which were mentioned by Kaṇāda in his Vaiśeṣika Sūtras or it can be taken to include even those which were added to the list later by subsequent thinkers. Praśastapāda's addition to the list of *gunas* is well-known, but there are others who have done the same in respect of other *padārthas*. *Sāmānya* for example, is supposed to give rise to *jāti* but, as everyone knows, Udayana feels the necessity of formulating criteria for deciding between genuine universals and pseudo-universals. There are, thus *sāmānyas* which do not, and cannot, give rise to *jāti* as they suffer from what he called *jātibādhaka* characteristics. The addition of *abhāva* as a *padārtha* presumably by Śivāditya around the 10<sup>th</sup> century adds problems of its own, as formerly, *padārthas* were supposed to be either *sattā-rūpa* or *bhāva-rūpa* only. But when *abhāva* was accepted as a *padārtha*, it could not be treated either as *sattā* or as a *bhāva*.

Besides these, the case of Raghunātha Śiromani is well-known. We need not elaborate the point. In case the term 'existence' refers to those *padārthas* which have *sattā* and *sattā* alone in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika framework then they alone shall be knowable. In case the term covers or refers to all the *padārthas* then the dispute about the *padārthas* will also be a dispute about that which is knowable. Once this is accepted, the so-called *vyāpti* relation postulated between existence and knowability will also become flexible and shifting in character. Not only this, as the number and types of *padārthas* will increase or decrease, that which was supposed to be knowable will cease to be 'knowable' or that which was not knowable, become 'knowable' by virtue of the very fact that it has now become a *padārtha* and hence accepted as existent

in the system. The term 'existence' is also generally contrasted with the term 'real' and it is not clear whether Mohanty accepts this distinction or not. For, in case he does, he will not probably accept the *vyāpti* between the real and knowable as all that is real does not exist in the usual sense in which the term 'existence' is generally understood.

The term 'knowable' is even stranger than 'existence' as it connotes, or rather denotes (to remain within the extensionalist framework of Mohanty's thought) something that is a possibility, or a 'dispositional' property, which may or may not be actualized. 'Possibilities or even 'dispositional properties', as Mohanty very well knows, are strange 'properties'. They are not like the usual properties such as 'red' or 'blue' and give rise to the paradoxes of counter-factual conditionals. In the present context, however, the problem is a different one and relates to the question as to how one may establish a *vyāpti* relation between something that is 'actual' and something else which is only 'possible', assuming that existence is something actual.

The establishment of a *vyāpti* relation between the 'actual' and the 'possible' may be left to the Naiyāyikas, who, I am sure, will be able to solve the problem with all the ingenuity which they have developed over the centuries. But, in the context of the question relating to the issue whether Nyāya is 'realist' or 'idealist', the distinction between 'known' and 'knowable' has assumed a central importance which is of different kind. Dr Ramesh Kumar Sharma, in one of the most clear presentations of the subject, has questioned the transition from the perceived to the perceivable in the classical Berkeleyan formulation and from the perceivable to knowable to bring it closer to Nyāya formulation. From 'to be is to be perceivable', to 'to be is to be perceived' and from that to 'to be is to be knowable' is the subtle, transpositional trick or deception that I am supposed to be guilty of. But, surprisingly, his

own conclusion is that this amalgamation of bringing together the position of Berkeley and Nyāya makes Berkeley a realist rather than Nyāya idealist'. He writes.. . if Berkeley and Nyāya are thought to have been brought together on a common platform, this platform, I am afraid, is a realistic one rather than an idealistic one' (*JICPR*, XIV (2), P.141). But, the main point is that both Berkeley and Nyāya can be brought together on a common platform by the inner logic of their positions and, I hope, Dr. Ramesh Kr. Sharma will admit that there is little point in giving any particular name to that position. If he wishes to call Berkeley a 'realist', I have no objection. But similarly, I hope, he will have no objection to my calling Nyāya 'idealist' in the sense in which Berkeley's position is designated as 'idealism' in the western philosophical tradition.

Unfortunately, the distinctions between the 'perceived' and 'perceivable' and the 'known' and 'knowable' which seem so crucial to Dr. Sharma disappear both in Berkeley and Nyāya when God appears on the scene. To God everything is 'known' and if we use Berkeley's phrase 'everything is perceived'. This has been roundly asserted by almost all those who have responded to my innocent query in the pages of the *JICPR*. But strangely, none of them appears to have seen that such an admission destroys the very foundation of the contention that Nyāya is, in essentials, out-and-out realist, unless the so-called 'knownness' by God is itself treated as completely contingent in character. The crucial problem for the Nyāya theorist as well as for Berkeley is whether for God also things may be knowable and perceivable respectively but not known or perceived. In Berkeley this move is impossible as he argues for the reality of God on the ground that if something 'is', it has to be the object of some consciousness or other. And, as it is not so in the case of many objects as far as finite minds are concerned, one has to postulate an infinite consciousness to which

they are eternally objects of its awareness. In Nyāya, on the other hand, God or *Īswara* is brought in on cosmological grounds, that is, in the context of understanding the creation of the world. As far as the question of 'knownness' of the world is concerned it is, at least prima facie, contingent on whether it is known by someone or not. The 'someone' may be the finite mind of the Naiyāyika or anybody else, or the infinite mind of the creator who is termed as *Īswara* in the Nyāya system. In Nyāya *Īswara*, of course, cannot have a 'mind' in the strict Nyāya sense of the term and, if it were to have it, then it will know only one thing at a time and hence will not be able to know simultaneously all the things that are there as they cannot be co-present to his consciousness at the same time. There is the added problem of things or objects or events that have not yet taken place and hence cannot be known in the same way as those that have occurred or are in the present.

The straight way to realism would be to accept that there are, or may be, things which are not known or which need not necessarily be known by any finite or infinite mind. But this simple way does not seem acceptable to Nyāya and it tries to wriggle out of the difficulty by maintaining that things may not be known but that they are certainly 'knowable' in principle. It not only fights shy of but actively rejects the possibility that something may be 'unknowable' in fact or in principle as it does not want to subscribe to this hard core contention of realism in the strictly epistemological sense of the term. For it 'to be existent' or 'real' is to be necessarily knowable in principle. But what exactly is meant by saying that something is 'knowable' is never explained clearly.

To be 'knowable' in the Nyāya framework is to be a *Prameya*, that is 'to be known by a *pramana*' or, in other words, it is to be an object either of *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (analogy) or *śabda* (testimony). But amongst all these, *pratyakṣa* or perception or being object of the five human senses is primary and foundational in the sense that neither

*anumāna*, nor *upamāna* nor *śabda* can even be conceived of without reference to it. There may be some dispute or doubt about the relationship of *śabda* to *pratyakṣa*, but there can be little doubt that *śabda* has, at least, to be heard or 'read' in order to be the means for the knowledge of that which it is supposed to convey authoritatively. There is, of course, the added problem if Gautama's definition of *śabda* is to be accepted that one has to independently know the character of the person whose *śabda* is to be authoritatively accepted. (आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः) And, if the gloss of Gautama on this *sūtra* is to be taken seriously then the very 'authoritativeness' of this *pramāna* will be compromised at least in the sense in which it has generally been understood in the context of the acceptance of the authority of the *Veda* in the Indian tradition. Gautama, as is well-known, gives the example of *Ayurveda* to illustrate the authoritativeness of the *śabda pramāna* subsumed under this special category. The authoritativeness of *Ayurveda*, however, is radically different from the way in which the *Vedas* or even the *Upanisads* have been regarded in the tradition. *Ayurveda* is essentially fallible and the knowledge of its contents continues to grow in time, the two characteristics which are completely absent from the authority of the *śruti* which is regarded as both infallible and complete by everyone who accepts it.

The 'knowability', then, in terms of *pratyakṣa* or perception basically depends on the assumption that all 'existent' or 'real' has such a structure that it is graspable by the five human senses. In other words, the limits of human sensibility is the limit of the 'existent' or the 'real' world. To put it differently, such a construal of Nyāya position implies that the existent or the real world is intrinsically and essentially of such a nature that it not only is, but has to be, graspable or apprehensible by the human senses. Its structure, therefore, has to be of such a nature as to correspond with the structure of the human senses in order that it may be graspable by it. One 'knows' that human senses apprehend colour

or sound *only* within a limited range and that beyond it they cannot perceive or apprehend whatever is, or may be, there.

These entities, which are intrinsically inapprehensible by the human senses, may be said to be the subject of inferential knowledge, but what then is the nature of this 'inferential knowledge' which gives us knowledge of entities or 'things' which are intrinsically ungraspable by the senses and therefore are incapable of being known by *pratyakṣa*. Such a knowledge may be said to be a 'knowledge' that can be known only by *anumāna* and never by *pratyakṣa* and though this may create some problems for Nyāya which believes in *pramāṇa saṁplava* on the one hand and the grounding of *vyāpti* on the basis of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in terms of sensuously apprehensible experience, it will have to grant some sort of isomorphism between the structure of reason, that is *anumāna*, and the structure of that which can be known only through inferential knowledge and hence is regarded as 'existent' or 'real' in nature.

Dr. Ramesh Kr. Sharma has questioned the postulation of this isomorphism by suggesting that Hegel's famous formulation, 'The real is rational and the rational is real' should be understood not only in terms of cognitive rationality but also in terms of what may be called 'the moral intelligibility of the universe'. In other words, according to him the term 'rational' in Hegel's formulation includes both the axiological and the epistemological aspects and the term 'Reason' has both these aspects simultaneously included or involved in it. But, there can hardly be any doubt that in the purely cognitive aspect, there has to be an isomorphism of structure between reason and that which is 'known', if the essential 'knowability' of the real in terms of reason is to be asserted. Dr. Sharma himself accepts this when he writes, 'There is no doubt that the eminent Hegelian equation of rationality and reality (or actuality) does presuppose some definite isomorphism between the

two' (JICPR, XIV (2), p. 144 ). But, according to him, Nyāya subscribes only to the half-contention of Hegel; it is silent about the other half, that is about the isomorphism of the valuation aspect of reason and the valuation aspect of reality. According to him, reason in the Hegelian sense involves both 'truth' and 'value' and Nyāya cannot, therefore, be said to subscribe to the Hegelian dictum 'Rational is real and Real is rational'. But this, according to him, will only be to deny the full blown characteristic of Hegelian idealism to Nyāya. It will still have to accept Nyāya as half-idealist in the Hegelian sense of the term and if we take the term 'Idealism' only in the epistemological sense of the term, Nyāya may have to be regarded as out-and-out Idealist on his own analysis.

But what is the 'structure' of *Buddhi* or reason in Nyāya which 'determines' the structure of that which is supposed to be 'knowable', as 'to be known' is, in Nyāya, to be known in the specific Nyāya way alone. Knowledge or *jñāna*, at least at the *savikalpaka* level, has to be linguistic in character. This according to some, is what is meant by the term *abhidheyatva* in Nyāya. Now the structure of linguistic knowledge in Nyāya is said to be constituted by *anuyogi*, *pratyogi* and the relation between them which is termed as *saṁsargatā*. The complex unit formed by these three together is said to have a characteristic called *viśayatā* which probably is an emergent property arising from the unique combination of these three elements. Strangely, the Nyāya has to postulate a *viśayitā* to which the visayata appears as an 'object' of cognition. But while *viśayitā* is an emergent characteristic of the three elements mentioned above, it is not clear to which substantive entity *viśayitā* belongs as a property, or whether it itself is a reflexively emergent property necessitated by the occurrence of *viśayitā* which makes the knowledge complex at the first level into an 'object' giving it epistemic objectivity.

The problems here are far more complex than those which have been usually considered by Nyāya theorists who have written on this issue. Some of these will become apparent the moment we consider the case of *anuvyavasāya* or introspective reflection where the first order knowledge-complex consisting of *viśayitā* and *viśayatā* becomes an object of cognition and thus, where the complex formed by *viśayitā* and *viśayatā* itself becomes an 'object' of cognition giving it a new *viśayatā* necessitating the postulation of another *viśayitā* to which it becomes the object of knowledge. Some of these problems we have dealt with in our comment entitled 'Have the neo-naiyāyikas been leading us up the garden-path' (XV (2), pp. 121-141). But in the present context, the more important question is as to how the postulation of these entities affects the contention that Nyāya is a realist system *par excellence*.

Professor Mohanty has roundly settled the issue by saying, 'There is no reason why a realistic ontology shall not admit entities that are either purely mental or 'hybrid' (JICPR, XIII (1), p. 167). This is an important declaration from the Nyāya camp and as Mohanty speaks with authority we may for a moment, accept what Nyāya says in this regard. But what is a 'mental entity' and what exactly is a 'hybrid entity', which presumably is a *mixture* with something 'mental' and 'non-mental' in it? Normally the term 'mental' is taken to mean something that is not independent of consciousness or the *act* of knowing which apprehends it. It is in this sense that Locke regarded the secondary qualities as 'dependent' on mind and hence as not there, independently of it, in the physical world. The very notion of a 'mental entity', thus, involves that it will not have been there if there had been no 'mind' in the universe. Realism, at least in the sense in which it has been used in the western philosophical tradition, refers to those entities which will be there even if there were no 'mind' in the universe. The contention was that certain kinds of entities come

into being just because of the fact that there was 'mind' in the universe and these were regarded as 'subjective' in character. The realist epistemology was in search of those objects of knowledge which were completely independent and objective in the sense that they would be there even if there were no mind and hence will have no admixture of anything 'subjective' in them. The term 'mind' in this context means the same as 'consciousness' and the latter term can be substitute for the former without making any difference to the contention.

The term 'mental', thus, is systematically ambiguous in this context. It may mean (and perhaps it Mohanty wishes it to mean in this sense) that there are 'entities' which cannot be characterized as 'physical' in character and yet, which are objects of consciousness and which have their own nature demanding to be known in the same sense as the so-called physical objects do. It may be, parenthetically, pointed out that the term 'mental', as used in the English language, cannot literally convey what is meant by '*manas*' in Nyāya. In fact, it will be interesting to find the exact corresponding term in the Nyāya system which conveys the same meaning as is conveyed by the term 'mind' in the English language.

But, assuming that the term 'mental' refers to what is usually conveyed in the English language, three distinct points arise in respect of the entities that are considered to be purely 'mental'. First, what is their 'ontological' status in the scheme of Nyāya metaphysics and is that status the same as the one that is accorded to objects which are considered to be 'non-mental' or physical in character. Second, what is the status of these objects when they are not objects of cognition? In other words, do they continue to have 'existence' in the same way as ordinary objects of sense-perception are supposed to have? Third, do they possess an intersubjectively 'objective' character or are they 'objects' to an

individual personal mind alone whose so-called 'existent' and objective character is not available to any other mind?

In case the mental entities are accorded a different ontological status than the ones given to non-mental objects, Nyāya would have to accept a radical dualism of the Cartesian type and face the well-known problem caused thereby. As for the second question, the mental entities cannot be regarded to have 'existence' in the same way as is accorded to physical objects and hence, in case they are considered to 'exist' even after they have ceased to be the objects of apprehension by some mind, they will have to be given a 'subsistent' status on the lines which Russell at one time argued for in the case of such entities. This, of course, would have Nyāya realism, but obviously do so in a Pickwickian manner. And, in case one grants them 'objectivity' only in relation to the individual personal mind which apprehends them, the situation will become even more hilariously Pickwickian as now it will be the individual mind which will be populated by these 'subsistent' entities which will not be accessible to anyone else unless one accepts telepathic cognition to save the situation. One will have to accept 'unfelt' pains and pleasure, hopes and fears as they are mental entities *par excellence*.

Professor Mohanty, however, has not only talked of mental entities but also epistemic ones which, according to him, enjoy the same 'realistic' status in Nyāya as any other entities. The mental is not and cannot be regarded as epistemic if 'psychologism' is to be avoided. And if so, the 'existence' or a unique class of entities which are neither mental nor physical will have to be admitted having ontological status of their own and an epistemological status different from the ones that are usually accorded to other existent entities such as those that are physical or mental in character. *Viśayatā* for example is one such characteristic and so also will be *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* *samsaragatā* and *viśayitā*. Nyāya abounds in

such epistemic entities and in fact, they have proliferated as Navy-Nyāya analysis developed over a period of time. These are entities created by Navya-Nyāya analysis itself and their postulation was necessitated by the mode of analysis adopted by Nyāya. The history of this proliferation is interesting in itself as it shows that however innocent the first step may be in philosophical thinking it leads with logical inevitability to consequences which are difficult to accept even by those who are involved in that exercise. To give a few examples of such epistemic objects which the Nyāya analysis has brought into being we may turn to Professor prahaladacar's article on the *Kroḍpatras* published in *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 3. Here are a few samples randomly selected which, I am sure, will test the understanding of even devoted Nalyāyikas unless they happen to be specialist students of the subject: *sva-samānādhikaraṇa*, *sva-āśrayatva*, *sva-tādātmya*, *sva-abhinnavatva*, *sva-nirūpitātva*, *sva-ṛtittitva*, *avacchelatattva*, *nirūpakatā avacchedakatva*, *sambandhitva sambandha*, *avacchedakatā ṛtittitva* etc.

The problem in respect of these epistemic objects which have gained 'existence' because of the Navy-Nyāya mode of analysis, has troubled the Naiyāyikas themselves. Shall they or shall they not be accorded the status of a *padārtha* in the usual sense of the term? The Nyāya 'realist' does not know how to deal with the situation. Professor V.N.Jha, for example, makes a radical distinction between the usual *padārthas* which are subsumed under the given categories of the Vaiśeṣika and others such as *pratiyogitā* etc. which according to him cannot be granted the same status of *padārtha*-hood as is accorded to *ghaṭa* etc. He writes, 'A *Ghaṭa* after it comes into existence remains *ghaṭa* throughout its existence and continues to be designated as *ghaṭa* throughout its existence, but a *ghaṭa* does not always possess *pratiyogitā*'. (p.XXIII, *Viśayatāvāda of Hartrāma Tarkālaṅkāra* translated by V.N.Jha, University of Poona, 19+87). He calls these 'acquired properties'



to distinguish them from those which he designates as 'inherent properties'. The phrase recalls the term used by Locke in connection with his discussion of secondary qualities such as colour, sound etc. which according to Professor Jha, would be regarded as inherent properties in the Navy- Nyāya mode of analysis. The important point is not how the property 'red' is designated in the Locke in and the Nyāya framework but that each, in its own way, feels the necessity of positing a distinction between properties which set them radically apart from each other. And, this distinction is based on 'dependence' on something because of which they do not belong to the object in the same inherent fashion as the other ones do. In a sense many relational properties have this character, though it is not clear if Nyāya has paid attention to them.

The so-called 'acquired' properties in Nyāya go on proliferating and the Naiyāyika does not find it easy to decide what to do with them. To give but one example, one may look into the discussion on *āpādyatā* in *Harirāma Tarkālakāra's Viṣayatāvāda*. *Āpādyatā* is a very strange relation and the discussion about it is so subtle and sophisticated as not to be clear even to good Naiyāyikas. It arises in the context of the postulation of the absence of a *pratibāṅdhaka* in respect of any knowledge whatsoever, and when, strangely, this is extended to the cognition of an imagined object where again one will have to posit the absence of *pratibāṅdhaka* in order that the 'imagined object' may be imagined. (For detailed discussion see page XXXIX, *Ibid.*)

The problem of the *acceptance* of such entities is well-known in the Nyāya tradition and many-a-time the dispute is sought to be settled by invoking the criteria of *gaurava* and *lāghava* in the situation and arguing that only that alternative should be chose which necessitates the postulation of the lesser number of such entities. This is *Occam's razor* without the awareness of the epistemological and ontological implications of its acceptance by

the philosopher concerned. One interesting example of such a discussion in Nyāya relates to the dispute between Gadādhara and Jagdīsa regarding the construal of the meaning of an expression in terms of *prakāratā* and *saṁsargatā*, Baccā Jhā in his well-known discussion of the subject is said to have concluded that Jagdīsa's position on the issue is preferable to that of Gadādhara as it requires the postulation of only 720 *pratibandhakātās* against Gadādhara's position which requires a far greater number of *pratibandhakātās* if *prakāratā*<sup>15</sup> view is accepted.

This is a strange way of solving the problem in case such entities are supposed to be existent in character, for who would decide about the population of animals in the forest on such a basis. The existence of 'Existent' entities is not, and cannot, be decided in such a manner. They enjoy an independence of all such considerations and if Nyāya is deemed to be a 'realist' then it cannot be allowed to indulge in arbitrary abolition of such 'existent' realities which are independent of both the Nyāya and the Naiyāyikas.

The issue, however, is not confined to those epistemic properties only which have been termed as acquired properties by V.N.Jha. It affects one of the basic *padārthas* in the Vaiśeṣika system which, according to everybody, has an independent existent character, entailed by a realist epistemology. This is the *padārtha* called *sāmānya* and, as everybody, knows, the Naiyāyikas are fond of establishing the reality of their 'realism' by pointing out to it. But, as every Naiyāyika knows, or should know, there was a problem with such an acceptance and that consisted in the question whether every *sāmānya* should be given an independent existent reality or some criterion or criteria formulated to distinguish between genuine *sāmānyas* and pseudo- *sāmānyas*. As pointed out

<sup>15</sup> See page 139 शास्त्र मूर्ति धर्म दत्त (बच्चा) झा: इन: वैदुष्य एवम व्यक्तित्व by kishore Nath Jha in Unmilan, July 1999

earlier, Udayana, formulated such criteria and called them *jāti-bādhaka* to focus attention upon the fact that in case any or all of these criteria did not apply to a *sāmānya*, it could not be treated as giving rise to a genuine class of existent objects. It may be said that we are ignoring the distinction between '*jāti*' and '*sāmānya*', but what could have been the necessity for making this distinction.

The *padārthas*, it may be said, have sub-classes of their own, and hence it should not cause any surprise if *sāmānya* also has sub-classes within it. But while this seems to be true of the first three *padārthas* which one are granted *sattā*, that is 'existence' within the Nyāya system, it is difficult to say whether the same is true of the other *padārthas*, particularly the next three which are given the status, not of *sattā* but of *bhāva* in the Nyāya frame work. *Sāmānya*, obviously, does not have subclasses within it and it is not clear whether *viśeṣa* can be said to have any such sub-classes, even though there is the notion of *antya-viśeṣa* or the ultimate particulars which is supposed to be a property only of the atoms in the system (it will be interesting to find in this connection whether the individual soul that is the *ātman* also has these characteristics). As for *abhāva* whose status as a *padārtha* was accepted much later in the Vaiśeṣika system. It is divided into *prāgbhāva*, *dhvansābhāva* and *atyantābhāva*, (*anyonyābhāva* is also supposed to be accepted by some as a separate *abhāva*, distinct from the three) but it is not clear if these should be accepted as sub-classes of *abhāva* in the same sense as one accepts those that are mentioned in the case of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma*. In any case, the case of *sāmānya* seems to be radically different as it is based on the ground of exemplification in existents and those which not only are not exemplified but cannot ever be exemplified because they are not *sāmānyas* at all and have been regarded as such as a result of misunderstanding on the part of the thinkers concerned.

The epistemic entities, or the *jñāniyapadārthas* will, thus, have to be divided into at least two major classes; the one consisting of

the three *padārthas*- *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *sāmāvaya* and the other consisting of all those which have arisen because of *navya-nyāya* mode of analysis and whose number is, in principle, unending as their 'manufacture' depends on the ingenuity of the Nyāya theoreticians. The status of *abhāva* in this context is ambiguous as one is not sure whether it can be classed as a *jñāniya padārtha* or not, Nor is the relation of these *padārthas* to those which are supposed to arise from *apekṣā buddhi* clear, even though the latter are specifically restricted to arithmetical numbers only. Professor Dravid has suggested that '...numbers other than unity are the products of the *enumerative cognition*' (p.172), forgetting that it is enumerative activity that may be said to give rise numbers and not enumerative cognition. The distinction between number 'one' and all other numbers will cease to have any meaning if Professor Dravid's explanation of the reality of numbers is accepted. For, while the '*enumerative cognition*' of numbers 2.3.4... is there, then it will only be the '*cognition*' of those numbers that will be there and when that cognition will cease, only the '*cognition*' of the numbers will cease and not the numbers themselves as they will still be there just as is the case with other objects such as trees etc.

The issue of Nyāya realism, thus, has to address itself to all different kinds of objects that Nyāya postulates because of very different reasons. These 'objects' are not of one type and the contention that this difference between the ontological typology of the objects concerned makes no difference to the epistemological issue of 'realism' in respect of their knowledge, will be strange indeed. The very fact that there is an 'undecidable' dispute about the number and nature of these *padārthas* should be a sufficient reason for doubting the 'objective', 'realistic' character of them. The case of Raghunātha Śiromani is well-known and so also the fact that inspite of his great reputation among Naiyāyikas, hardly anyone accepted his radical suggestions in this regard. It should be

remembered in this connection that he not only argued that *new padārthas* be accepted in the Naiyāyikas pantheon but also demolished and rejected the old ones and threw them out with scant regard for the tradition which had 'worshipped' them for so long without feeling any guilt whatsoever.

The two most telling objections against any possible doubt regarding Nyāya being a 'realist' system *par excellence* come from the fact that Nyāya accepts a large number of 'eternal', objects in its ontology and that, in Nyāya view the Self or the *Ātman* in its pure nature is devoid of consciousness. Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharyya opens his comment on the issue by enumerating these 'eternal' objects and suggests that, 'As they are all eternal, uncreated, they are not dependent on anything, least of all on their knowledge' (p.164). But he seems to forget that 'All reals are objects' of God's knowledge' (p. 164) and, if it is so then to be 'real' is either to be an object of human cognition or of God's cognition, a position that is squarely that of Bishop Berkeley in the western tradition. That 'No human being is omniscient' (p.164) is accepted by all idealists and no one, as far as I know, has maintained that to be 'real' is necessarily to be 'an object of some human cognition or other.'

As for the second objection that the *Ātman* or the self does not possess consciousness as its essential property, this does not make Nyāya any more realist than the acceptance of innumerable other such entities, if it is accepted that they are necessarily the 'object' of some cognition, whether it be that of God or of some other consciousness different from the *Ātman* concerned.

The question whether Nyāya is realist or not can only be answered if one is first able to decide what realism as a philosophical position necessarily involves. The crucial question in this context relates to the notion of 'independence' from consciousness. Thus any discussion of the issue involves a prior

acceptance of the notion of consciousness and that something can be dependent or independent of it in the context of cognition. There is the related question of what is meant by 'being an object of' or 'being an object to' consciousness.

There is also the question whether something can be regarded as 'known' if it is merely an object of awareness of some consciousness or other. The term 'known' may be used in the strict sense when to be 'known' is to be known in a judgemental form and even in a more strict form as entailing a cognitive claim which can be 'justified' if one is challenged to do so. Beyond this, 'knowledge' may be said strictly to refer only to those complex conceptual and theoretic structures which form a systematic unity of their own and are usually designated as 'Science' or 'Śāstra'. A cognitive assertion or denial is said to be a piece of 'knowledge' in this sense if it follows from the theories or laws or principles that form a basic part of that science or *śāstra*.

It is obvious that while in the first sense 'to be an object of awareness' involves a concrete, specific, experiential state of consciousness, in all the others the 'experiential' and the 'existential' character gets more and more diluted till, in the last stage, the idea that an 'object' of knowledge is an object of consciousness can be asserted only in the vaguest form. The related question of the independence of object of knowledge from the act of being known or as being the object of some awareness or other is, thus bound to be different in different cases. The notion of 'independence' is itself not clear and hence any formulation of the philosophical issue concerning the 'realism' or 'idealism' of a philosophical position will have to be analyzed and answered in a differentiated manner in order that it may be meaningful and significant.

'Independence' may mean independence in origination or independence in 'existence' or independence in assertibility in

respect of the nature and content of that which is asserted. Realism or Idealism thus, may also be of three types in respect of the contention that what is known is independent of the consciousness that 'knows' it. But as consciousness itself is the vaguest of all entities and it is difficult to specify the exact sense in which it may be said to be 'known', the question of something being 'dependent' or 'independent' of it is still more difficult to answer. Most objects of awareness are independent, in the third sense as their nature and content is distinct from the consciousness of which they are object. The only exception to this occurs in the case of consciousness when it itself becomes an object of *anuvyavasāya* or self-consciousness. In this situation where consciousness itself becomes an object of cognition, the former is not just consciousness but rather consciousness as 'knowing' or as being aware of something-else. The complex awareness formed by 'self-consciousness' thus presents a difficult case for the realistic contention as here what is an object of awareness does not differ radically in nature and content from that which is aware of it except in the sense that there is a content involved in the first level awareness which is not present in the same sense at the second level awareness. And, in case some new property, such as, say *viśayatā* is produced then its 'origination' will have to be ascribed to the act of self-consciousness which has given rise to it. It will be difficult to say that such a property will continue to obtain even when the act of self-consciousness which had give rise to it, ceases to exist. *Viśayatā*, for example, can hardly be said to characterize the judgemental cognition which occurs at the first level of conscious cognition at the human level, just as the whole complex of the judgemental cognition that is *savikalpaka jñāna*, can hardly be said to exist at the *nirvikalpaka* level or characterize it in any meaningful way, as any such characterization will destroy its *nirvikalpaka* character. Thus, the successive levels of *nirvikalpaka*, *savikalpaka* and *anuvyavasāya* cognition are characterized by

properties which arise because of acts of consciousness and which cannot be said to characterize them when that act of consciousness ceases to exist. Hence, at least in two senses of 'independence', that is in terms of 'origination' and 'existence' these properties cannot be regarded as 'independent' from the act of consciousness which has given rise to them. They may still be recognized as independent in the third sense, that is, in respect of their nature and content, though even in that case there is an element of commonality between the act of consciousness which had given rise to them and the way they themselves are constituted.

There is still a way out for the Nyāya realist to save his position in case he wants to do so at all costs in face of the above evidence to the contrary. He may maintain that what once occurred as an actuality, can always be regarded as existing as a possibility which can always be actualized whenever the appropriate conditions obtain. There is, of course, the problem whether what is possible but has not yet occurred can be regarded as 'real' or 'existent' in any relevant sense of the term. The issue has been debated in Arab philosophy but Nyāya, being an ultra realist, may not be deterred from giving them a respectable place in its 'realist' pantheon. There will still remain the problem of what are usually regarded as beings that are impossible such as *vandhya-putra* and Nyāya alone may, to preserve its realism, grant them some sort of independent reality as they are 'knowable' in some sense of the term. Some have argued that at least they are known as 'unknowable' and hence have to be treated as 'known' in a minimal sense, as otherwise they could not have been characterized even as unknowable or impossible.

This will, of course, introduce modal concepts into Nyāya but, as Professor Arindam Chakraborty asserts 'Nyāya metaphysics cannot make sense of this empty 'can' or 'could', because nowhere in Nyāya do we find any trace of the idea of possible worlds' (*JICPR*, XII (2), p. 154). Professor Arindam Chakraborty,

however, is not deterred by this and is not shaken in his belief that Nyāya continues to be 'resolutely realist' inspite of this. There could perhaps not be a greater example of 'faith' than this as he himself has just asserted. The notion of mind independence involves the notion of possibility' (p.154, *ibid*). For faith, there are no contradictions and all persons who have encountered men of deep religious faith know this, philosophy, however, is not a matter of faith but of reason and it normally does not countenance contradictions unless they are shown to be 'illusory' in nature. Nyāya, we hope, believes in reason and will not like to be saved on grounds which are non-rational or irrational or stupa-rational in character.

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Daya Krishna

#### 'Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist? Has the Debate Ended?' A Rejoinder

Professor Daya Krishna is back with certain insinuations and arguments against the different responses to his contention mooted in his earlier article that Nyāya could be viewed as an idealistic philosophy. A careful reading of his present article shows that he has exploited certain superficial differences appearing in the responses to reinforce his view that Nyāya cannot be treated as a realist school. In the course of his rather cavalier and rambling treatment of the issue, Daya Krishna has indulged in gross misinterpretations and even misrepresentations—perhaps unwittingly—of certain Nyāya views and doctrines. This has made it necessary to discuss passage by passage Daya Krishna's arguments in his article although they are not directly relevant to the main issue to which all the responses are addressed. I shall confine myself in this rejoinder of the second round to defending only my statements made in my previous rejoinder without making any attempt to show if they agree or do not agree with any statements of other respondents quoted by Daya Krishna. I think that despite there being certain differences in the approaches of the different

respondents to the resolution of the issue, their conclusion is identical. None has advocated the view that Nyāya is idealist in any commonly-accepted or acceptable sense of the word 'Idealist' and that the appellation 'Realist' in at least one of its important philosophical senses can be strictly applied to Nyāya. I shall first restate below—even at the cost of repeating in different words what I have stated earlier—why Nyāya has been and must be regarded as a realist philosophy.

First it must be conceded that according to Nyāya there is not and cannot be anything which is absolutely unknowable by any of the four well-known means of knowledge. If there could be such a thing then Nyāya's classification of reals would not be exhaustive which it is claimed to be. This does not imply that everything is known as it is in itself. A thing may be known individually or generically as characterized by a property common to it and other things which are known individually. These two kinds of knowledge of things may be broadly described as knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description respectively. Thus everything may be viewed as the object of some or other kind of knowledge and as such knowability may be regarded as a universal property likewise nameability also may be treated as a universal property (as everything that can be known can be named). If knowability is universal, cognizability can certainly be universal. Daya Krishna's main argument both in his previous and present articles in support of his contention is that, as everything is invariably knowable in the Nyāya view Nyāya cannot but be idealist. This argument ignores the fact—which was clearly stated in my earlier response—that the relation of knowledge and its object is quite unlike the converse of the relation. No knowledge can occur without an object forming an inseparable part of its being as every knowledge is knowledge of something by its very nature. The object of knowledge helps define the nature of its knowledge and so—one might say—is part and parcel of its being. Quite the reverse is the case with the relation of a

thing with its knowledge or knowledges. A thing may remain unknown throughout its existence and come to be known only after it has ceased to exist. Even when known, none of its knowledges can last for more than a couple of moments (as per the view of most Indian philosophical schools) while the thing may continue to exist longer. This fact however cannot affect its knowability as, one knowledge which has ceased to exist may be replaced by another. Even if no knowledge comes to replace the evanescent knowledge and the thing remains unknown throughout the rest of its existence, its knowability as defined above is not affected. Besides, in the absence of specific knowledge-as such and such a thing-general knowledge as a thing of a certain kind like substance or quality or-so on, of everything can always be had. Thus the invariability of the relation of things to their knowledge or knowledges is one sided, no particular knowledge being always related by the cognitive relation to a thing. Also a thing may remain unknown under one aspect throughout its existence while being known under many other aspects. The cognitive relation of knowledge to, the thing that is its object is like that of qualities to the substance in which they reside. The qualities cannot remain apart from the substance which is their natural substrate. But the qualities may change, one quality being replaced by another similar or dissimilar quality. This shows that the substance can exist without a particular quality whose occurrence therefore cannot be regarded as essential for the existence or being of the former. It is true that every knowledge clings to its object and as long as it exists its object cannot be dissociated from it. But it is also true (which knowledge itself testifies to the fact) that knowledge is 'of the object which means that the object though related to the knowledge is independent of it. 'Of' signifies the independent being of the known object. It is this cognitive independence of the known object which is emphatically denied by all varieties of idealism in whatever way they interpret the relation between the object and its

knowledge. God's knowledge is supposed to be cognitively related to every object throughout their existence. But despite this fact the independent existence and being of all objects is not denied by Nyāya. It is the very nature of divine knowledge to be all-knowing. Even a man endowed with yoga power may be all-knowing but these facts should not be taken to imply that things are by their nature known or knowable by means of any particular knowledge.

Having thus clearly restated the realistic standpoint of Nyāya, we may turn to Daya Krishna's counterarguments one by one. Daya Krishna quotes with approval a statement of Chakravarti to the effect that 'the thesis that objects exist mind-independently is difficult to apply to Nyāya'. What precisely Chakravarti means to say in this statement is not quite clear, But it must be emphatically asserted that taken in its literal sense the statement is totally inapplicable to Nyāya. Nyāya is perhaps the only Indian philosophical school which has maintained strict cognitive-independence- of objects. Many doctrines of Nyāya would be compromised if objects are regarded as dependent upon their cognition.

Referring to the universality of the property of nameability advocated by Nyāya. Daya Krishna next asks how perceptual cognition has been defined as unverbalizable (in Sanskrit 'Avyapadeśyam') if everything is supposed to be nameable. Since the perceptual object is unverbalizable or unnameable it must be treated as an exception to the universality of nameability. There is however no incompatibility here. Names are certainly associated with all things but they are not identical with them. So when things are perceived their names need not be perceptually cognized. Besides it is only perception which is defined as unverbalizable. Other types of cognition are not unverbalizable. So if the nonperceptual cognitions are taken into account, nameability can well be regarded as pervasive of the objects of these cognitions. In view of this fact it is rather surprising that Daya Krishna should say

without any ground that 'the house of Nyāya is divided in itself and that the idea of a unique, unambiguous position of Nyāya is a myth Nyāya is not and cannot be a monolith system as is suggested by all those who write on it..?' Curiously enough Daya Krishna quotes here a statement of Professor Mohanty contained in his response in support of the above sweeping characterization of Nyāya. The statement is to the effect that 'there is extensionality of relation between existence and knowability? What this statement seems to say is that all existents are knowable. This is precisely what is stated and explained above and is also the accredited view of Nyāya. The next quotation of Daya Krishna is a statement of mine stating that '*sat, prameya and abhidheya*.. are supposed to have identical denotation though the connotations of these words differ from each other.' Commenting on this and Professor Mohanty's above statement Daya Krishna remarks that, 'these two positions seem at least prima facie to be radically opposed to each other.' It is simply astounding that the identity of denotation of the words coupled with the diversity of their connotations should seem to be radically opposed to the extensional relation of existence and knowability to Daya Krishna. All existents are knowable and nameable although existence, knowability and nameability are coexistent but mutually different properties. What kind of radical opposition can there be between the denotative identity and the connotative diversity of the said words?

But a more astounding remark awaits the reader just two lines further Daya Krishna observes. 'It is not clear whether Mohanty subscribes to the generalized position that Nyāya does not and cannot in principle accept intensional relations in its system and all relations have to be necessarily extensional. There is the related problem whether a system which admits extensional relations can ever have any 'intensional relation' in it.' What is this strange creature called 'intensional relation' by Daya Krishna? No school

of Indian on western philosophy talks of extensional or intensional relation. Even Mohanty does not speak of any such relation in his above-quoted statement. What he seems to say is that the terms 'knowable' and 'existent' have identical extension.

From his gross misinterpretation of Mohanty's statement Daya Krishna turns to Nyāya's definitional enterprise as a whole. He says that, 'once the idea of a connotation is accepted in any system it cannot have pure extensional relations or definitions in it. And if the extensional relations and definitions are rejected in a system it is difficult to see how it can be realist in character? What is one to make of this most enigmatic passage? How can the simple admission of connotations of words be incompatible with the formulation of extensional definitions of concepts? There are what are called in Sanskrit, 'Svarūpalakṣaṇas' or extensional definitions and there are also what are called in Sanskrit, 'Tāsthalakṣaṇas' or intensional definitions and both are admitted by Nyāya and other schools. For example 'being an earthy substance' is the extensional definition of earth while the attribute of smell is its intensional definition. There is no incompatibility whatsoever between these two kinds of definition which may necessitate the rejection of either of them. Both are true to their identical definiendum.

Elaborating the above contention of his, Daya Krishna argues that if extensionality of definition implied realism then Nyāya cannot formulate the definition of any concept as 'the definition would be flawed by the fallacy of Avyāpti (too narrow definition) or Ativyāpti (too wide definition). 'This is confusion worse confounded. It has been explained above how both kinds of definition devoid of any fallacy are quite possible irrespective of whether one of them entails realism or not. In this connection Daya Krishna quotes a remark of Mohanty to the effect that 'the relation of the middle and major terms in inference is not to be taken intensionally and so it cannot be a necessary relation. It can be

only a relation of mere copresence.' If this is the exact reproduction of what Mohanty meant to say then we can only say that it is totally against the established view of Nyāya on the matter, Gangesa, the great Indian logician, formulated twenty different definitions of *Vyāpti* or invariable concomitance mainly to capture the essence of invariability or necessity characteristic of the relation holding between the middle and the major terms. This relation, namely the concomitance of the middle with the major, is determined by the generic character of the middle and therein consists the necessity of the relation.

Here Daya Krishna makes several totally wrong statements. First, it is quite incorrect to say that the question of the definition of *Vyāpti* remained unsettled even after Gangēśa. As a matter of fact Gangēśa himself formulated what he calls the 'Siddhāntalaksana' or the final correct definition of *Vyāpti* after rejecting twenty different definitions. The reason for rejecting the twenty definitions was not their inapplicability to middle, major or minor term as Daya Krishna suggests. It is the inapplicability of the definition to the relation of concomitance obtaining between a major term of universal extension like nameability and any other middle term in inferences like 'This is nameable because it is knowable. The term 'Kevalāvyatireki' which is the well-known technical term for inferences based on negative concomitance alone, has been grossly misused here by Daya Krishna to mean a term 'which is always absent'. Can there be a term which is always absent except that which is totally nonexistent?

Proceeding further Daya Krishna asks how the *Vyāpti* relation of existence and knowability can be ascertained when their negative association can nowhere be observed. He also asks how these properties can be defined. Both questions are easily answered. Even mere positive association of universal properties observed in loci other than the minor is competent enough to yield the knowledge of the *Vyāpti* of the properties. As to the definition of

these properties, the first, existence, is definable as temporal relationship for non-eternal entities and self-subsistence for eternal entities. The second property, knowability, can be defined as the property that determines the objecthood relating to any of the four different means of cognition. This definition takes care of the flimsy objection urged against knowability by Daya Krishna. An absurd remark made in this connection needs to be corrected. The remark is that 'Samanya gives rise to jati'. Sāmānya itself is Jāti and it is eternal. How can it give rise to itself?

Next Daya Krishna makes a puzzling reference to 'the case of Raghunātha Siromani' without even hinting what this case is. The reader is left to guess the case to be perhaps the great logician's denial of the independent reality of certain substances in his work. It may also be his disparaging reference to the view of certain logicians that *Visayatā*, *Prakāratā* etc.-the logical entities-that they are different from the basic categories as listed by the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school. But even if more than seven basic entities are admitted the extensional relation between existence and knowability will not be jeopardized. Existence would cover more entities than the seven basic ones if logical entities are regarded as independently real.

After this we come to the discussion of the nature of 'possibility' supposed to be involved in the notion of 'knowability'. The discussion has absolutely no relevance to Nyāya conception of knowability according to which 'to be knowable' is to be endowed actually with the property determining the knownness of actually-known entities'. For example a certain person not knowing what an electron is intrinsically may yet be supposed to know it if he knows it as a material particle. Other material particles being actually known by the person, the property 'material particleness' could well be taken as known to him and thus the electron may well be regarded as a knowable to him. Thus 'knowability' may be explained in terms of knownness (of a general type).



Daya Krishna's next intellectual misadventure is to suggest that Berkeley and Nyāya can be brought together on a common platform and be treated indifferently either as realist or idealist by a slight change of the Berkeleyan dictum, 'Esse est percipi'. The suggestion however is quite wrong. First, to be perceived as per Berkeley is quite different from 'to be cognized' as there are many types of nonperceptual cognition. Secondly, for Berkeley, as per the suggested interpretation, 'to be perceived' is existence itself of the object perceived whereas for Nyāya to be perceived or more precisely to be cognized is a property associated or copresent with the property of existence characterizing an object. Thirdly, no particular cognition is invariably associated with an object according to Nyāya while according to Berkeley each object is necessarily associated with a particular perception only (namely the perception that perceives it). When the perception is gone the perceived object is also gone. In the Nyāya view the object survives its cognition and also precedes it. Berkeley's view rides roughshod over commonsense in simply ignoring the objective causality in relation to perception of the thing being perceived. In order to be perceived a thing must pre-exist its perception at least by one moment. Otherwise, of the two simultaneous entities either may be taken to be the cause of the other.

In this connection Daya Krishna makes the suggestion that God's appearance on the scene would bring the Nyāya view closer to Idealism'. This suggestion has been discussed and refuted above. The necessity of the relation obtaining between God's knowledge and everything in the world is, like that of all other kinds of knowledge just one-sided. God's knowledge is proved to be eternal by the cosmological argument. So simply because of its eternity and universality God's knowledge is always cognitively related with everything but the ever-present relationship does not make things dependent upon the knowledge. It is this dependence of the very

being of things upon God's knowledge which Berkeley tried to justify by his view that everything is always perceived by God. If just because of their relation to God's knowledge they could be regarded as dependent upon it they could also be regarded as dependent upon God (for their existence too, not only for their origination).

There is at this point some discussion of *buddhi* and the nature of determinate cognition by Daya Krishna. He says that the structure of *buddhi* determines the structure of that which is knowable. This is precisely the opposite of what commonsense as also Nyāya opine. The nature or form of cognition is supposed to be objectively determined by the form of its object whether it is simple or complex. Further it is simply wrong to say as Daya Krishna does that *Jñāna* at the *savikalpaka* level has to be linguistic in character. Only verbal *savikalpaka* or determinate cognition is linguistic in the sense that it is generated by words, not in the sense that words are involved as terms in the cognition. The relation between the *Prakāra* and *Viśeṣya*-not *Pratīyogī Anuyogī* of this cognition is termed as 'Samsargata' not as Daya Krishna says. The complex of *Prakāra*, *Samsarga* and *Viśeṣya* in the cognition is endowed with *Viśayatā* in relation to which the cognition is endowed with *Viśayitā* or subjectivity which is certainly not 'a reflexively emergent property necessitated by the occurrence of *Viśayatā* which makes the knowledge complex at the first level into an object.' *Viśayitā* or subjectivity is just the converse of the relation of objectivity connected with the object whether it is simple or complex. It is simply absurd to say that *Viśayatā* makes the knowledge-complex into an object.' Equally absurd is it to say that, 'The complex formed by *Viśayitā* and *Viśayatā* itself becomes an object of cognition giving it new *Viśayatā* necessitating the postulation of a new *Viśayatā* to which it becomes the object of knowledge.' Neither does *Viśayatā* become the object of

knowledge (in the determinate cognition mentioned) nor does anything become the object of *Viśayatā*.

A long, confusing and rather irrelevant discussion of the status of 'mental' as distinguished from physical entities is inserted at this point by Daya Krishna. In regard to this it is enough to say that in Nyāya there is no hard and fast distinction between mental and nonmental as commonly understood. Mental entities like cognition, conation etc. are as much object of cognition as non-mental entities are. Desire, conation etc. are not themselves conscious as commonly thought. They are unconscious like common objects and like them too they become the objects of cognition. Such a view not only does not entail Cartesian dualism, it rather opposes it (as it does not admit a radical distinction between mental and nonmental entities in respect of objectivity).

In the course of the above discussion Daya Krishna refers to a statement of mine that numbers other than unity are the products of enumerative cognition of the cognizer and yet they are independent in their being of the cognition generating them. This view of Nyāya is objected to on the ground that as effects survive their causes the numbers should survive the enumerative cognition and persist even when they are not taken note of. This objection ignores the fact recognized by Nyāya that the effect can survive its efficient cause but not its material or nonmaterial cause. The enumerative cognition is the nonmaterial cause of numbers.

After this detour through a flirtation with peripheral issues, Daya Krishna comes back to the main issue of his article, namely the cognitive independence of cognized objects. One may concede to him the point that his independence is three-fold viz., in origination, in existence and in being asserted. What prevents the object of cognition from enjoying this three-fold independence from its cognition? Even a cognition can be supposed to enjoy such an independence from the reflective cognition apprehending it. There is no reason why the apprehended and the apprehending cognition

should not be radically different from each other. If such a stipulation is not made there will be no reflective or introspective cognition at all. Further it is totally wrong to think as Daya Krishna seems to, that a cognition transforms in some manner its object (by conferring its *Viśayatā* upon it) and that it is this cognition along with its *Viśayitā* that is cognized by the reflective cognition. The original cognition as qualified by the *Viśayatā* relating to its object is what is cognized by the reflective cognition. Thus the cognitive independence of non-cognitive objects as well as cognition itself when it is reflected upon, is defended by Nyāya.

Having thus answered all questions and objections raised by Daya Krishna we may now consider a very important question which Daya Krishna has not raised. It is the question, 'How do we know that what is not known so far by man is yet knowable?' It is not a question about possibility. It has been explained above how in Nyāya view possibility can be understood without invoking the idea of possible worlds. The question concerns the actuality of knowledge of that which is not known, that is, how the unknown can yet be treated as known? The answer to the question as explained above is that a thing which is not known individually may yet be known generically. But how do we know that an individually unknown thing is of a certain genus or type which is exemplified in certain known things? The answer to this question is this. If the unknown thing is absolutely unknown then no sensible question whatever can be asked about it. The so-far-unknown thing however must have some similarity to known things for any question about its knowledge to be possible to be raised. This knowledge of similarity is sufficient to treat the unknown as knowable. Besides, we know from the natures of the different instruments of knowledge, as to how many different types of things there could be. These types are already listed by Nyāya. So we already know that whatever is real must belong to the different types of reals known by means of the instruments of cognition. This should not

be taken to mean that the different types of reals correspond to the different instruments of cognition. All the reality-types are known by all the four instruments of cognition. The different reality-types are determined to be neither more nor less by means of perception reinforced by inference.

The sum and substance of all this discussion is that according to Nyāya cognizability is associated with existence but it does not constitute it or is identical with it or necessarily related to it. On this account Nyāya has to be reckoned as a realist school of philosophy.

Vol. XVIII, No.1

N.S.Drauid

#### Observations on Some of the Points Raised by Professor Daya Krishna While Discussing whether Nyāya is 'Realist' or Idealist'

The explanation for the terms 'Realist' and 'Idealist' given by the western philosophical tradition, is more or less acceptable to the Indian tradition also. Yet, the Indian tradition unanimously admits that only the Vijñānavāda school of the Buddhists, and the Advaita School of Śrī Śankara, are the idealists and all the other schools including the Nyāya school are realists. This view, in my opinion, is quite consistent, for only the *Vijñānavādins* and the Advaitins hold the view that all the objects are superimposed on the consciousness and hence they do not have separate existence apart from the existence of the cognition. This is explained by them with *Rajju-sarpa* illustration. The snake superimposed on the rope, does not have separate existence, apart from the existence of the rope. But, as per the Nyāya school, the objects are not superimposed on their cognition and hence, it is obvious that the school maintains that the objects do have an existence which is independent of the existence of knowledge. Hence, the Nyāya school is accepted by all, as Realist.

Now, the objection raised by Professor Daya Krishna seems to be this: *Jñeyatva* is held by the Nyāya school as a definition of all

the objects. In other words there is not a single object which exists without being known. This means that the existence of the objects is entirely dependent upon their means of knowledge. This is nothing but idealism.

The Nyāya school may react to this objection, as follows:

Objects are of two types, namely external and internal. Except the special qualities of Self, such as knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, merit, demerit and impression, all the other objects of this universe are considered as external objects. These external objects are always *Jñeya* in the sense they are objects of some knowledge, from the moment they come into existence. But, they also exist without being known by us. To explain further, when a jar comes into existence it may remain without being known by Caitra, but may be known by another person called Maitra. Even Maitra's knowledge will not be constantly apprehending the jar. After some moments, he may forget about it. His knowledge may grasp something else. But, even then the jar may continue to exist. Thus, the jar, according to Nyāya, is not a superimposed object like *Rajju-sarpa*. Another important point is that according to Idealists the object of my cognition, cannot be that of another person's cognition. In the case of the *Rajju-sarpa* for example, the object of my cognition, can never be the object of another person's cognition. I alone may have the illusory cognition of *Rajju-sarpa*, while the others are seeing it as just *Rajju*. But in the case of jar etc., external things, it is not so. Just as I can see it as a jar others also can see it as a jar. In other words had external things such as a jar not had their existence independent of knowledge, they might not have been cognized by other persons. But, according to Nyāya, they are cognized not only by me, but by others also. Hence, the Nyāya school has to be admitted as Realist.

The Point made above can be explained in a different manner also. As per the idealists, the object of a cognition, has existence

so long as the cognition has existence. The moment the cognition ceases to exist, the object also ceases to exist. The external things such as jar, according to Nyāya, are not so. They might be existing even before the origination of any person's knowledge and they may continue to exist even after the cessation of its knowledge. At the same time. It would also continue to be having *Jñeyatva* as it is the object of some other person's knowledge, at least, God's knowledge. Thus, from a human being's knowledge-point-of view, the existence of objects, is quite independent of those 'knowledges'. From the point of view of God's knowledge also, the Nyāya school can not be considered as idealist. For, as per the idealists, the existence of an object is co-extensive with the existence of the knowledge. The existence of *Rajju-sarpa* starts with the origination of its knowledge and comes to an end with the cessation of its knowledge. But, the existence of jar, for example, is not, according to Nyāya, co-existence with the existence of God's knowledge. For God's knowledge is infinite whereas jar etc., are finite. In other words, the existence of jar etc., is not co-extensive with the existence of God's knowledge. Therefore, even from the point of view of God's knowledge, the Nyāya school holds that the existence of objects are quite independent. It may be argued that the existence of eternal things such as space, time etc., is co-extensive with the existence of God's knowledge. But even the existence of eternal things, as per the Nyāya school, is quite separate and hence independent. In fact, to be considered as Realist, it is sufficient if some objects are admitted as having independent existence. When, as per the Nyāya, the non-eternal things are proved to be having independent existence, then it is obvious that it has to be considered as Realist.

Another point to be noticed is that as per the Vijñānavāda or the Advaitavāda, there may be a state in which pure consciousness without apprehending any object, can exist. But, as per the Nyāya, there cannot be a knowledge, whether that of God's or human

beings', without having an object. In other words just as *Jñeyatva* is a definition of all the objects, *saviśayakatva* or having a content, is a characteristic of knowledges. Therefore, if by simply admitting that all things are objects of some or other knowledge, they cease to have independent existence, then as no knowledge can exist without having a content, it will have to be admitted that the existence of knowledge, also is not independent, but absolutely dependent upon its contents. Therefore, just as a knowledge has independent existence, inspite of its being *saviśayaka*, objects also have independent existence though *Jñeyatva* is one of their main characteristics.

By the above discussion, it is clear that the external objects, as per the Nyāya school, have existence independent of knowledge. This is sufficient to show that Nyāya is Realist. Even among the internal objects such as the qualities of *ātman*, there are certain qualities like *dharma*, *adharma* and *saṃskāra*. They exist in *ātman* without being known by him. Of course, they are always objects of God's knowledge, but as already explained, their relation to God's knowledge is just *viśayatā* and not the peculiar relation of *adhyāsa* or superimposition as maintained by the Indian idealist. Regarding the other qualities of *ātman* such as *jñāna*, *sukha* etc., the Nyāya holds that they have a peculiar nature of being *Jñātaikasat*, i.e. they exist being known only. In other words, they cannot exist without being known by the self. However, the relation between these qualities and their knowledge, is not, according to Nyāya, the peculiar relation as maintained by the idealist.

I hope the above explanation is sufficient to bring out the difference between the idealists and the naiyāyikas. *Yogi Pratyakṣa* and *mānasa pratyakṣa* also are certain types of cognitions but not having the peculiar relation maintained by the idealists, with their objects. *Sāmānya lakṣana* and *jñāna-lakṣana* are, according to Nyāya, just contacts between the sense organs and the objects to explain certain cognitions which cannot be explained otherwise.

For example, on seeing a jar we come to know of all the similar jars. When we see a sandalwood piece at a distance we immediately have a cognition-'This is fragrant'. These cognitions cannot be explained with the sense-object contacts that give rise to perceptual cognitions, in the normal course. Any way, these *pratyāsattis* have nothing to do with idealism and the Nyāya school will remain realist, inspite of these peculiar contacts and cognitions.

D.Prahlada Char

### In What Sense is Nyāya Realist ? (Third Round):

#### Response to Professor Prahlada Char

In an earlier submission I had tried to dispel the worry expressed by Professor Daya Krishna that Nyāya may not be realist because it does not draw a sense-reference distinction (see 'Why Nyāya Remains Realist: Second Round', this journal). Now that Professor Prahlada Char has responded to Professor Daya Krishna's deeper worry that because of their universal knowability thesis Nyāya may not deserve to be called realist, I wish to make my position on this clearer.

The usual reponse: that Nyāya does not insist that all that exists be actually known but only that it be knowable, does not really cut any ice. Nyāya cannot draw such modal distinctions between actual and possible knowing with a straight face (many of us suspect, with no embarrassment, that Nyāya has no room for the concept of unactualized possibilities). There are at least two senses in which all things are indeed actually known in Nyāya. First, as Prahlada Char shows, everything is actually known to God.

Secondly, a certain undetailed generic knowledge of all things is possessed by all of us ordinary mortals through our grasp of the universal reality (*sattā jāti*) with which everything is somehow connected. When we perceive that universal, through it, via the non-normal perceptual link called 'connection through a universal feature' (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*) we are even perceptually

put in touch with all that is real. All reals are, thus, in one aspect, known to us. In this regard I would mildly protest (contra Professor Prahlada Char) that even the imperceptible qualities of the soul such as *dharma*, *adharma* and *saṅskāra* are not necessarily unknown to us though they are necessarily unperceived. When I infer from a successful recalling of a past event that in the intervening period I have had a memory-trace of it, or when because of my commitment to the *Karma* theory, I infer from any suffering that I must have had a demerit stored in my soul, I come to know the *Samskara* or the *adharma*, or at least that there exists some trace or demerit which has caused this memory or suffering, though I can never perceive them or be acquainted with them.

In any case, I need not admit that a quality of my soul has to remain unknown to me in order to prove that I am a realist about such qualities. All I have to admit is that its existence does not depend upon or consist in my knowing of it. Prahlada Char is aware of this since he goes on to say that such occurrent qualities as cognition and pleasure/pain of the self, even when introspectively known by the subject are not related to our knowledge of them as the idealist thinks they are. Unfortunately, while making this point in the eighth paragraph of his discussion-note, respected Prahlada Char commits what I take to be a slight error. He concedes that Nyāya regards awareness and pleasure etc. to be totally knowledge-dependent or '*Jñātaika-sat*', that they cannot exist unperceived.

This is not correct, Since Nyāya rejects the Prabhakara or Buddhist doctrine of the necessary self-aware character of awareness, in the very first moment of its origination both cognition and pleasure/pain do remain unknown. Indeed, as far as cognition is concerned, if one gets cognitively busy, distracted or otherwise pre-occupied one may never have the apperceptive *anuvyavasāya* after a particular perceptual cognition. One may simply fall asleep immediately after one has had a cognition. A

*nirvikalpaka* cognition, for instance, never gets introspectively known. So it is not simply true in Nyāya that cognitions cannot exist without being known. Pleasures and pains are very much attention-grabbing (*tivra-samvegi*) hence they routinely are registered as soon as they occur. But even for them it is logically possible that pleasure should occur without awareness of pleasure, at least for an initial moment and that one could fail to know the pain of the terminal moment of one's life because one did not live for the next moment to claim that pain cognitively: remember pain and knowledge of pain are distinct in Nyāya just as anything and knowledge of that thing are. Yet all those missed pieces of knowledge, pleasure, pain, traces, merits and demerits that are unknown to me are actually known to God.

How then, does Nyāya maintain its realism, its rejection of the idealist thesis that the existence of things depends upon or consists in our cognition of them? To explain that let me first set up an analogy. In a certain garden, each and every blossom may have a bee on top of it. It may, in fact, be impossible to find a blossom without a bee. But that would not incline us to suppose that the flowers in that garden are immanent to the bee, or bee dependent. Analogously, every object in this world may be known and knowable (by, literally, God knows who). Yet not all objects need to be knowledge-dependent. In order for a flower to be a flower there need not be a bee on it. In order for an object to be that object, it need not be recognized or known by anyone. This world may be created by God-in some peculiar non-Christian Nyāya sense, and God may keep constant track of every bit of this world, but the items of this world are not dreamt up by God or imagined by Him. If they are really made to exist then they are accessible to but independent of even God's knowledge.

At this point, perhaps another distinction would help. We could distinguish between two kinds of cognition-dependence: causal and recognitional. An event or object is causally knowledge-dependent

if it could not come into being without some knowledge-episode (not necessarily knowledge of that event or object) coming into existence first. True pleasure, for instance, is causally knowledge-dependent. I cannot be truly pleased by a perfume unless I first have perceptual knowledge of it. But notice that the knowledge upon which the pleasure depends for its existence is not knowledge of the pleasure.

A state or event or object is recognitionally knowledge-dependent if it could not exist unless it is recognized as existing by a piece of knowledge of that very state or event or object. A pleasure, according to Nyāya, is not recognitionally knowledge-dependent. *Anumiti* or inferential cognition, similarly is causally knowledge dependent but not recognitionally so. Unless we have knowledge of the pervasion and of the *sādhyapervaded hetu's* existence in the *pakṣa*, inference cannot happen. But in order for the inference to exist in a mind, that mind need not be aware of that inference. And the point is that even when introspectively one is aware that one is inferring or has inferred, the inference and one's meta-cognition of the inference remain distinct. Together, yet distinct. Or better, together, hence distinct. Nyāya has a similar view about numbers. Without a certain kind of counting cognition called '*apekṣābudhi*' numbers do not come into being, but my perception of the number is distinct from this *apekṣābudhi*. That is why I can be wrong in counting a hundred coins. If my cognition of number and the number were the same then whenever I would count hundred there would actually arise the number-hundred in the relevant collection. But that is not Nyāya's view. Numbers are *apekṣābudhi-janya* and therefore causally cognition-dependent but are not recognitionally so, and that's why one could miscount.

In terms of this distinction, now I can state the view that Nyāya takes of the relation between truth and knowledge also, since the concept of truth as *Prāmānya*-a property only of cognitions, has also confused people about Nyāya's claim to be realist.

Just as the sweetness of a candy cannot exist without the candy, truth of a particular cognition cannot exist without the existence of that cognition. Remember that truth, even as a property of cognitions, is *not* an eternal natural kind or 'jāti'.

Thus truth is causally knowledge-dependent. But a true awareness need not be known, let alone known to be true in order to be a true awareness. A distinct piece of inference from pragmatic success may certify the original awareness to have been true. But neither the original awareness nor its truth is dependent upon this separate recognition of truth. Thus truth is not recognitionally knowledge-dependent.

Udayana defines knowability, in *Atmatattvaviveka*, as: 'the property of being related to some knowledge by the relation of causal generatorship' X is knowable to the extent that X can or does causally generate knowledge of X. This precludes the possibility of X consisting of knowledge of X insofar as nothing can cause itself. The knowledge-independence of an object is most clearly appreciated when that object is known, because it is then that, in our utter externalist orientation, we manage to notice the object while not noticing our own knowledge of it. We do not need unknowability or finding a single unknown object in order to demonstrated knowledge-independence of objects.

Vol. XIX, No.1

Arindam Chakrabarti

**Comments on Professor Prahlada Char's Observations on the Question Whether Nyāya is Realist or Idealist\***

\*(I am grateful to the editor for inviting me to write these comments.)

Professor Prahlada Char's observations mainly concern the Nyāya concept of *jñeyatva* ('knowability') and the Vijñānavādin-Advaitin view of the external world, more specially the former. Since I have already dealt with the issue in some of its important aspects in my submission, 'Nyāya Realism: Some Reflections'

(JICPR, Vol. XIV, No.2, January-April 1997, pp. 138-55), I will here content myself with making just a couple of comments on Professor Prahlada Char's remarks.

1. It is not wholly clear what Professor Char wishes to be taken as meaning when, after referring to the Nyāya distinction between 'internal' and 'external' objects, he says: 'These external objects are always *jñeya* in the sense (that) they are objects of *some* knowledge by the moment by which they come (in) to existence.' (Emphasis mine). Does 'some knowledge' here mean knowledge by human beings or by all-(knowing) creatures whether human or non-human or such knowledge as God's? It is easy to see that as we ask this, the concept of 'knowability' (*jñeyatva*) acquires a complication not generally foreseen. If the concept of 'knowability' covers God's knowledge too, as might be held by some, then what sense can the phrase 'by the time by which they come(in) to existence' mean, since by definition God's eternal knowledge (*nitya buddhi*) is free from any vestige of temporality which the said phrase implies. Also, God, in terms of His omniscience, already knows which objects are to come into existence and which not. On the other hand, if non-human creaturely knowledge is also included in the concept, then we will have to assume that the objects, by the time they come into being are necessarily known by one creature or another. All this may embarrass the Naiyāyika. Not only this, the allied concept of 'nameability' (*abhidheyatva*) will pose its own problems when extended to God's knowledge or animal knowledge. Will God first know and then name the objects or do so simultaneously or not name them at all feeling there is no need to do so? Again, how will the concept of 'nameability' fare as regards the knowing animals? In view of these difficulties it seems plausible to hold that the notion of 'knowability' has its proper application only with respect to finite human beings. But if human beings can possess only finite knowledge (*anitya buddhi*), then the possibility that every time in

the entire universe an object comes into existence, there is a human being around to know it seems very remote indeed. The only alternative is not to insist that objects come to be known by one or another at the time of their existence but to regard them as 'capable of being known' at any time after their arrival: they are always possible objects of knowledge. This at once clinches the issue—something which is explicitly admitted by Prahlada Char also—namely, that objects can exist even without being known by anybody. God's knowledge is thus simply not in question in the context.

I may here add that on the Nyāya view God too is an object of (inferential) knowledge. And it cannot be anybody's case that God during His entire existence has to be known by one or the other finite human being: there may be times when there is no human around to know Him.

2. In his remarks on the Advaitin position, Professor Prahlada Char appears to make the mistake of conflating two points of view—that of the individual subject and that of (generally speaking) the whole race of thinking beings. In an individual's misperception of (e.g.) a rope for a snake, the snake-appearance is of course private to him, but not so the (snake) world in its condition of differentiation and separation as it appears to almost the whole of humanity. In the latter case the world-appearance has the status of an inter-subjectively confirmable 'phenomenal' reality and forms, unlike private illusions, a stable and orderly system of objects. And as an Advaitin would add, the world and its objects, to the extent they are known and felt to be external and independent of our knowing of them, are indeed external and independent. Any number of texts from Śaṅkara's own writings can be cited in support of the above contention, including not in the least his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras* 2.2.28-31. Of course, presentation of the world in its character of plurality and differentiation is, in *final* terms, an illusion having its source in a fundamental error. But it does not

affect its externality and independence *so long as* it is an experienced fact. In Yogācāra (Vijñānāvāda), on the other hand, this externality and independence itself is under question and is dismissed as a mere belief: a cognition does not point to anything outside itself. Of course, there is an apparent talk, in the latter school, of 'objects', but it is of 'object-form' (*viśayābhāsa*) which the cognition assumes and not of objects external to and independent of our cognitions, no difference having been recognized between cognitions and (broadly speaking) their contents.<sup>1</sup> But, I may add as a needed codicil, nothing can appear as if it were external if there was nothing really external somewhere. (This at least seems to be the teaching of common intuition.) And Śaṅkara duly provides for it in his scheme of things, being aware that externality as a felt fact needs to be accounted for. As he puts it in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* 2.2.28: *na hi viṣṇumitro vandhyāputravadvabhāsata iti kaścidācakṣīta*. All this is of course common knowledge. Still I felt there was perhaps no harm if things were briefly put in their perspective.

3. Professor Prahlada Char's remarks such as: 'As per the idealists, the object of a cognition has existence so long (as) the cognition has existence. The moment the cognition ceases to exist, the object also ceases to exist' are also, so far as at least the Advaitin is concerned, open to objection. The Advaitin not only holds that so long as there is an external world all knowledge of it is intentional or object-oriented, but also that the world or its objects do not cease to be with the cessation of our knowledge of it or them. The Advaitin position *here* coincides, I suspect, with the Nyāya standpoint. In Śaṅkara and Advaita in general, the objects of knowledge generally are, unlike in the Yogācāra school, transcendent. As Śaṅkara concludes part of the discussion under *Brahmasūtra* 2.2.28: *tasmādarthajñānāyor bhedaḥ*.



**Notes and Reference**

1. To exposit a little, the Yogācāra doctrine in the main holds that a cognition possesses (splits itself into) a two-fold appearance: the appearance of an object (*viśayābhāsa, grāhyākāra*) and that of itself as subject (*svābhāsa, grāhakākāra*) so that knowledge of an object is nothing else than the awareness of the cognition itself (*sva-samvitti*). Consequently, what is called an 'object' is really seen as immanent in the cognition and not transcendent, as if is in certain realistic schools.

Vol. XIX, No. I

Ramesh Kumar Sharma

**'Is Nyāya-Realist or Idealist?' Comments on Professor Prahlada Char's Observations on the Issue**

I am in broad agreement with Prahlada Char's observation on the above issue which has been discussed threadbare by many including myself. But I would have liked the professor to have been more circumspect in some of his remarks and more emphatic in some others. For example, I would strongly object to the characterization of Śaṅkara's Advaita as idealistic by Prahlada Char. In the *Tarkapāda* section of his *Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtras*, Śaṅkara almost pooh-poohs the idealistic doctrine of the Buddhist Vijñānevādins. In view of this it would be almost irrational to treat Śaṅkara's own philosophy as idealistic. No doubt it is true that the ultimate reality according to Śaṅkara is the unity of truth, bliss and consciousness but on this account it would be as inappropriate to regard Advaita as idealistic as to regard it as hedonistic or realistic. The only proper way to regard this doctrine is to treat it as what its very appellation means, viz 'non-dualistic'. Neither any dualism like that of the real and the ideal nor even a monism of the idealist type has place in Śaṅkara's Advaita.

Next, the one-sidedness of the necessity of the relation holding between cognition and its objects needs more emphatically to be brought out than is done in Prahalada Char's note. All cognition is

necessarily the cognition of its object. An object less cognition is a contradiction in terms but objects can very well remain uncognized throughout their existence or be cognized at one time and remain uncognized at another. This shows that the association between cognition and its object is necessary only for cognition because without its object cognition becomes formless. The object on the other hand is what it is on its own account, not because of its fleeting association with any cognition. If the object acquired its form from its cognition then, it would change from one cognition to another cognizing it, with the result that it would forfeit its very identity. Idealists maintain almost this very fact. According to them the form supposed to belong to the object is not its own. It is conferred on the object by cognition or perhaps the object with the form is nothing other than the cognition itself. As the Buddhist idealist Dharmakīrti says, the internally experienced entity which is cognition externalizes itself and appears as an object to itself.

About the property, 'Jñeyatva' what Prahalada Char says is not wrong but it is neither very enlightening nor sufficient, 'Jñeyatva', is a Sanskrit term usually taken in the sense of 'the property of being a known entity'. Nyāya regards this property as 'Kevalānvayi' which means 'universal' Everything is supposed to be endowed with this property because individually or generically every real thing can be regarded as known to somebody or other. The brontosaurus for example is not known individually to anybody, but as an animal of gigantic size it may be supposed to be known to those who have heard this description of it. Such unavoidable knownness of everything is trotted out by Daya Krishna as an argument in support of the view that Nyāya is idealist. This argument is not met squarely by Prahalada Char although what he says about the variability of the relation of an object to its cognition is quite true. The fact is that there is a catch in the word 'jñeya' which needs to be taken note of the word precisely means 'that which is knowable' (which may or may not

be known). The meaning 'that which is knowable' is however indiscriminately associated with this word. The universality of *Jñeyatva* is maintained by Nyāya mainly in the sense of 'everything being endowed by the property of knowability,' on the ground that all the different means of knowledge are definitely known. So whatever is real must be accessible to one or other means of knowledge that are known. Even if a thing may remain totally unknown throughout its existence and even thereafter, it can be treated as knowable if someone cared to use the right means of knowledge to know it. But simply because everything is accessible to the means of knowledge it cannot be treated as of idealistic character. Can everything be treated as of volitional or emotional character because it is desired or felt by somebody or other?

Knownness to God is another universal property that is regarded such because God is omniscient but God is omnipotent and omnivulent too. So 'being willed and wished by God' could also be treated as universal properties. The epistemic relation of everything to God's knowledge, will and wish may be regarded as necessary because these are viewed by Nyāya as the ultimate causes of everything. The western philosopher Berkeley advocated a direct and necessary epistemic relation between divine knowledge and the being of things. Such an extreme view of thing's nature cannot but lead to some kind of idealism. But Nyāya does not at all subscribe to such a view. It is true that unlike the relation of things to their common cognition their relation to God's knowledge is necessary. Despite this fact, things cannot be treated as ideal in nature. There are several reasons for this. First, if depending upon God's knowledge things become ideal in nature then it is omniscience that will have to be treated as the universal property of things. Second, things depend upon God's will and wish too so that they will have to have even volitional and emotional nature. Third, it may be maintained that only the existence of things

depends upon God's knowledge, not the being of things, because being is generic universal and it is regarded as eternal by Nyāya.

One final point, which was rather insufficiently dealt with in my own rejoinder published earlier, is this. There is an important difference not usually noticed between the relation of cognition to its object and the relation of the same object to the cognition. The former relation constitutes the very being of the cognition which is intrinsically 'the cognition of its object'. The relationship forms part and parcel of the nature of cognition. It is quite otherwise with the latter relation. The object remains related epistemically with its cognition so long as the cognition lasts. With the disappearance of the cognition the relation too disappears. The relation is only a relational property that the object temporarily acquires as a result of being apprehended by its cognition. This difference may best be illustrated by means of a simple example. A 'son' is always the progeny of his parents. So 'being born of his parents' can be regarded as an essential property of the son. But this relationship to his parents cannot be supposed to constitute the very being of the son because the son is not just a son. He is a human being endowed with a psychophysical nature. Relationship to his parents is only a property of him.

It may be noted in this connection that cognition and absence or *abhāva* are two entities among the different entities listed by Nyāya which are intrinsically relational. Like cognition absence too is relational. An absence is always the absence of something which helps define the nature of the absence just as the object of cognition helps define the nature of its cognition. 'Being born of certain parents' does certainly help define the nature of a son but as explained above the son is not just a son. His essential being consists in his psychophysical individuality.

**Nyaya-Realist or Idealist:****Response to the Reaction this Note Received**

As Professor Arindam Chakravarti explained, knownness in all that exists can be explained either taking recourse to God's knowledge or through the undetailed generic knowledge of all things that we possess. But, his view that *jñeyatva*, according to Nyāya, cannot be 'the possibility of being known' as it 'cannot draw such modal distinctions between actual and possible knowing with a straight face' does not seem to be acceptable. For, the school draws such distinctions between actual and possible in some other context. For instance,, it holds that causality is of two kinds namely, 'phalopadhāyakatvam,' i.e. actually causing the effect and 'phala-janana-yogyatā', i.e. the capacity which is associated with the possibility of causing the effect. Similarly, *jñeyatva* also can be of two types. One is actually being an object of knowledge' and the other is the 'possibility of being an object of a knowledge'. Thus, all the things may be considered as *jñeya* though some of them are not actually objects of knowledge of any human being.,

Regarding the *jnataika-satta* of pleasure etc. his view is absolutely correct. The Nyāya school holds that these qualities of ātman may exist without being known by him. I was under the influence of the Vedānta Schools when I stated like that and I regret the error.

Commenting on my statement 'these external object are always *jñeya* in the sense that they are objects of some knowledge by the moment by which they come into existence, Professor Ramesh Kumar Sharma raises some questions. He asks, 'does 'some knowledge' mean knowledge by human beings or be all creatures whether human or non-human or such knowledge as God's?' If the concept of knowability covers God's knowledge also, he thinks that the phrase 'by the time by which they come into existence 'would be meaningless. For, 'since God is omniscient, He already knows

which objects are to come into existence and which are not'. In short, God would be knowing even those objects which have no existence and thus *jñeyatva*, the definition of entities in general, would be applicable to a non-existent and hence a non-entity also. If non-human creaturely knowledge also is included in the concept, he remarks that 'we will have to assume that the objects, by the time they come into being, are necessarily known by one creature or the other and all this may embarrass the Naiyāyika', He further remarks that if the concept of *jñeyatva* is extended to God's knowledge or animal knowledge, 'the allied concept of 'nameability' will pose its own problems'. He questions, 'will God first know and then name the objects or do so simultaneously or not name them at all feeling there is no need to do so? Again, how will the concept of nameability fare as regards the knowing of animals?' He seems to suggest here that if God knows first and then names or does not name at all, then there will be the absurdity that there are objects which are *jñeya* but not *abhidheya* (nameable) at the same time. However, he is not clear about the problem, if we hold that God knows and names the object simultaneously. If the concept of *jñeyatva* also involves animals' knowledge, his criticism seems to be that animals can only know, but cannot name.

To this criticism I would like to react as follows:

The term 'jñeya' in Sanskrit, may mean either that which is actually an object of a knowledge or that which is capable of being known. In fact, the English term 'knowability' cannot be considered as an appropriate English synonym of the word 'jñeyatva' as it can only mean 'capability of being known'. When the Naiyāyika holds that *jñeyatva* is a definition of all the entities, both the meanings are acceptable to him. When he says that the objects are capable of being known, he does not mean that they may exist without being known. The knowledge which is a part of *jñeyatva*, need not, according to him, be restricted to human

beings' finite knowledge. It may be God's or animals' knowledge also. By admitting so he is never in any embarrassing position. Though God's knowledge is eternal and hence does not have even a vestige of temporality, nothing prevents it from grasping the temporal objects. Being omniscient He would know the objects as past if they are no more, as present if they have come into existence and as belonging to future if they have yet to come into existence. If God's knowledge because of its eternality cannot grasp the temporal objects, how can He be regarded as omniscient? Similarly, the objects are known only by those creatures, human or animal, if they are around when the object comes into existence. Anyway it does not mean that whenever an object comes into existence some creature will necessarily be there. Thus, what I mean by the term 'some knowledge' is any knowledge' either that of God or that of creatures-human or animal.

When thus in the concept of *jñeyatva*, we include the knowledge of God and animals, the apprehension that the concept of nameability also would pose some problems is baseless. By the term 'abhidheya' what the Naiyāyika means is that all the things in the world are the objects of the denotative function of a word. To be more clear, it only means that all the objects are capable of being denoted by a word. A denotative word need not be a proper noun as the English word 'name' would normally suggest. It may be a common noun or even a pronoun. Therefore, the questions such as 'will God first know the objects and then names' etc., and 'how can the animals name an object' etc. are quite irrelevant here. One thing that must be noted here, is that unlike the term 'jācyatva' the word 'abhidheyatva' would only mean the capability of being denoted by a word and not also 'being actually denoted by a word'. For, according to Naiyāyikas words come into existence only when they are uttered and we cannot imagine that whenever an object comes into existence there will be some human being uttering a word to denote it. God, in the Nyāya school, does not have a body

and therefore we cannot argue that He would utter a word to denote it.

Both Professors Sharma and Dravid strongly object to my characterization of Sankara's Advaita as idealistic. Both of them, in support of their objection, mention Sankara's *Bhāṣhya* on the *Brahma Sūtra* 2.2.28-31. I think I owe some explanation in this regard.

In his *Adhyāsa Bhāṣhya*, which is considered as the introduction to the entire *Brahma Mimāṃsā Śāstra*, Sankara, enunciating the cardinal doctrine of his school, states in unambiguous terms that the relation between *viśhaya* and *vishayin*, i.e. object and its knowledge which is nothing but consciousness is *ādhyāsika*-the relation in the form of super-imposition. Mainly basing on this view, the later Advaitins, in their attempt to establish the unreality of the world, employ the inference-'the world is unreal as it is an object of cognition, just as the silver superimposed on the conch-shell'. Here, by 'drśhyatva', i.e. 'being an object of cognition', what is actually meant is *dr̥g-adhyastatva* or 'being superimposed on the cognition'. The illustration of 'suktirupa' also confirms this explanation. It may be argued here that as per the Advaita school, the objects are superimposed only on the pure consciousness (*śuddha cit*) and not on the cognition of it and this makes the difference between the *sukti-rupya* and the world. But, the school holds that there is only one consciousness and the cognition of the world is not different from it. The same consciousness, when it becomes conditioned by the *virtti*, reveals the object. The point that is being made here is that the relation between the cognized and the cognition, as per the Advaita school, is none other than the relation of super-imposition and hence, in spite of his strong rejection of the Yogācāra school, Śankara is of the opinion that objects *do not have existence independent of that of the cognition*.

As a matter of fact, Madhusudana Saraswati upholding the 'dṛṣṭhisrṣṭhi vāda', i.e. 'the theory of creation in the form of cognition' explains it as.

द्रष्टृन्तरावेद्यत्वे सति ज्ञातैकसत्त्वम्

(*Advaitasiddhi*, p.533), i.e. 'being unknown to the other knowers and having existence only being known'. It is very clear here that according to the Advaita school, just as *sukti-rupya* is private to the viewer, the worldly objects are very much private to the knower. Madhusudana Saraswati is also very much aware that this position appears to be very much in contradiction to Sankara's rejection of the Buddhist view. He remarks:

ननु जीव ईशो विशुद्धा चिद् तथा जीवेशयोर्भिदा। अविद्या तच्चित्तोर्योगः षडस्माकमनादयः॥ इति प्राचां वचनेन, बौद्धं प्रति प्रत्यभिज्ञानादिना विश्वस्य स्थायित्वप्रतिपादनेन च सूत्रभाष्य विवरणादिग्रन्थेन विरोध इति चेन्न। अनाद्यतिरिक्तसृष्टिविषये एव दृष्टिसृष्टिस्वीकारात्। कारणात्मना स्थायित्वस्वीकाराच्च। तावतैव बौद्धाभिमतक्षणिकत्वनिराकरणोपपत्तेर्नाकर विरोधः। (Ibid)

He also foresees the accusation that this view might be of his own imagination and not acceptable to Sankara and earlier Advaitins. Perhaps, responding to such an accusation he further remarks:

प्रत्युत आकरेषु बहुशो दृष्टिसृष्टिरूपपादितैव (Ibid)

According to him, the view that objects have independent existence etc. is just for those of whom the eligibility is of a lower order.

मन्दाधिकारिविषयत्वात्। (Ibid)

I think the points made above are sufficient to show that the Advaita school considers itself as idealistic and I have not committed the mistake of conflating two points of view- that of the individual subject and that of the whole race of thinking beings.

### Is Udayana a *pracchanna advaitin*?

Udayana, by common consent, is usually regarded as the last of the Naiyāyikas of the old school before Gangeśa started what is called the Navya Nyāya or the new school of Nyāya which replaced older Nyāya completely. Yet, Udayana, in his *Ātmatatvaviveka*, gives six stages of realisation of the self in ascending order out of which the third and the fifth are described by him as advaitic positions and the fifth is considered only one step lower than that of the Nyāya which occupies the highest position in his system. As the difference between the two is only marginal, that is, whether the self when completely established in itself without any relation to any object whatsoever can still be regarded as conscious in any relevant sense of the term. Not only this, he closes the book with the recommendation to meditate on the self and suggests the gradual stages of realisation which would occur during the course of meditation. In the light of all this, would it not be more proper to treat him as almost an advaitin who is concerned with the realisation of the self and believes that it can only be so realised through the usual meditational practices associated with the advaita Vedāntins who deny the awareness of any object including the self in such a realisation? Where is the Naiyāyika in all this? And, should not we, therefore, call him almost an advaitin, a *pracchanna advaitin*?

### Reply

Daya Krishna has raised the question whether Udayana, the author of *Ātmatatvaviveka* and other works on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy is a disguised Advaitin. The grounds for raising such a question are, as stated by Daya Krishna, certain remarks made towards the end of *Ātmatatvaviveka* by Udayana. In these remarks Udayana seeks to highlight the distinction between the ultimate philosophical positions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita. Elsewhere in *Ātmatatvaviveka* and in *Nyāyakusumāñjali* as also in his commentaries Udayana has either criticised the Advaitic position or cast aspersions on it by making slightly disparaging remarks about it. In the aforementioned remarks, Udayana goes one step further in his denunciation of Advaita by maintaining that the

quintessence of Advaita is to be found only in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the absolute self and not in the doctrine of self-conscious Brahman as upheld by the so-called Advaita of Śāṅkara. The ātman or self as understood by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika becomes totally devoid of all its special qualities, even including knowledge in the state of release. The Advaita of Śāṅkara, despite its claim to Advaitism, does not subscribe to such a view of absoluteness of self or *Brahman* which is nothing but pure consciousness. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view the knowledge that leads to the release of self from bondage is dissipated of itself in the state of release leaving the self by itself. In the Advaita of Śāṅkara however the last *vṛtti jñāna* which brings about self's release is, of course, dissipated in release but with this dissipation the conscious being of the self stands revealed. There is, thus, no real absolutism in the Advaita of Śāṅkara. The real absolutism or Advaitism is that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika only in Udayana's considered view.

Vol. XIV, No.3

N.S.Drauid

#### *Pramā in Nyāya*

1. Can *pramā* of the Nyāya school be treated as 'justified true belief'?
2. Can *pramā* of the Nyāya school be treated a piece of knowledge which is 'justified, true and nondubious'?
3. Is there any substitute word in Samīskṛta of the word '*belief*' as it is used by the epistemologists in the West?

Vol. XV, No.1

D.K. Mohanty

#### Reply

1. *Pramā* as Nyāya understands it is 'justified true belief' if the word 'justified' is used to mean 'that for which justification is available or can be provided if asked for'. In this sense every true belief is a 'justified true belief' and therefore the qualification 'justified' used in the phrase is redundant. If however the word is taken in the sense of 'that whose justification is known to the holder of the belief' then not every true belief may be said to be justified. Even if a true belief is held on wrong grounds

it cannot be said to be justified in this sense of the word. But in both these senses the belief will not forfeit its intrinsic character of truth.

2. *Pramā* is certainly a piece of knowledge but it need not be 'justified' in the second possible sense of the word given above. As to 'nondubiety', it cannot be ensured for every true belief. In the Nyāya view nondubiety or veridicity of true beliefs needs to be inferentially established.

3. The word 'belief' is used both in the dispositional and the episodic sense in western epistemology. The technical Sanskrit equivalent of the word in the first sense is संस्कार and in the second sense it is ज्ञान .

Vol. XVII, No.1

N.S.Drauid

#### Navya Nyāya Terminology

What exactly is the difference between Navya-Nyāya use of the following terms and whether they refer to the same idea or there is some subtle difference between them?

- (1) (a) *Anuyogitā-pratīyogitā*
- (b) *Viśeṣyatā-prakāratā*
- (c) *Ādhāratā-Ādheyatā*
- (d) *Nirūpyatā-Nirūpakatā*
- (e) *Vṛtti*
- (f) *Vyāpya-Vyāpaka*.

Do these pair of terms convey the same distinction? If so, why do we use them simultaneously or even successively in analysis? If not, what is the difference? Also, what is the correlate term for *Vṛtti*?

- (2) *Tādātmya, tadātmatā*

*Abhinnatā*

*Svarūpa Sambandha*

*Sva-samānādhikaraṇatā*

*Sva-Vṛttitva*

*Sva-āśrayatva*.

- (3) What is the difference between *Samīyoga* and *Samīśarg*?

(4) Is there a radical difference between the relations mentioned above and the following relations?

(a) *Viṣayitā-Viṣayatā*.

(b) *Avacchedaka-Avacchinna*.

(5) Can there be such a thing as *Samavāyatva*?

(6) Does Nyāya make any radical distinction between the universals which are apprehended in natural objects which are perceived and those which arise because of the whole machinery of Navya-Nyāya analysis such as, say, *avacchedaka* and, if so, how does it account for the same? On the other hand, if it does not do so, does it hold that linguistic meanings are apprehended in the same way as non-linguistic objects are. Is *avacchedakatva*, for example, apprehended in the same way as *parvatatva*?

Vol. XIII, No.2

Daya Krishna

### Reply

#### Difference Between the Various Terms Which the Navya Nyaya Uses Frequently

##### *Anuyogitā-Pratīyogitā*

There is a lot of difference between these two terms. *Pratīyogitā* is counterpositiveness residing in the *pratīyogin*—the counterpositive. For instance, a jar is the counterpositive of the absence of it. The counterpositiveness resides in that jar. *Anuyogitā*, on the other hand, resides in the *anuyogin* which is not a counterpositive. *Anuyogin* is the correlate term of the term *pratīyogin*. Thus, when a jar is the *pratīyogin* of the absence, the absence itself is the *anuyogin*. So, in the instance of an absence of jar, the jar is the *pratīyogin* and has *pratīyogitā*, while the absence is the *anuyogin* having *anuyogitā*.

Sometimes, the locus of absence is also called *anuyogin*, for example, *bhūtalaṃ* is the *anuyogin* of *ghatābhāva*.

##### *Viśeṣyatā and Prakāratā*

Anything which is prominently comprehended by a cognition is *viśeṣya*. *Viśeṣyatā* is its property. For instance, the cognition 'The cow is black' comprehends 'The cow' prominently, which it comprehends 'black colour' as a qualifying attribute. Therefore, with reference to the above

cognition 'The cow' is the *viśeṣya* and the property *viśeṣyatā* resides in it. The English equivalent for '*viśeṣya*' is qualificandum. So, *viśeṣyatā* is qualificandumness.

'*Prakāratā*,' on the other hand, is a property residing in *prakāra*—the qualifier. In the above cognition, 'black colour' is the qualifier and it has *prakāratā*.

##### *Ādhāratā-Ādheyatā*

*Ādhāra* is locus and *ādharatā* is a property residing in it. For example, if there is a jar on the ground, the ground is *adhāra* and it has *ādharatā*.

The correlate term of *ādharatā* is *ādheyatā*. *Ādheya* is that which resides. The jar, which resides on the ground, is *ādheya*. *Ādheyatā* or 'being *ādheya*' is its property. The relation between *ādheyatā* and *ādharatā* is *nirūpya-nirūpakabhāva*, that is, the relation of determined and determinant.

##### *Nirūpyatā-Nirūpakatā*

*Nirūpya* is that which is determined *Nirūpyatā* is a property residing in *nirūpya*. Similarly, *nirūpaka* is determinant and *nirūpakatā*, that is, determinanthood is a property of *nirūpaka*. For example, *Ādhāratā* and *ādheyatā* are related by this relation. We may be seeing the jar, the *ādheya*. But the *ādheyatā* of it can be known only by knowing the *ādharatā* of the ground. Hence, the *ādheyatā* is *nirūpya* and the *ādharatā* is *nirūpaka*. Sometimes *ādharatā* is *nirūpya* and *ādheyatā* is *nirūpaka*. The relation is mutual.

##### *Vṛtti*

'*Vṛtti*' means that which exists. It is also called *ādheya*. *Vṛttitva* and *ādheyatā* are the same. *Ādhāra* can be said as a correlate term of *vṛtti*.

##### *Vyāpya-Vyāpaka*

*Vyāpya* is pervaded, whereas *vyāpaka* is pervader. For instance, fire is *vyāpaka*, that is, pervader, because it pervades all the instances of smoke. Smoke is pervaded. Generally a pervader occupies a large number of instances, whereas the pervaded occupies a lesser number of instances.

**Tādātmya-Abhinnatā**

*Tādātmya* and *abhinnatā* are the same. Gadādhara defines *tādātmya* as *svavṛtṭyasādhāraṇa dharmah*, that is, an uncommon property that resides in the self. For instance, in the proposition 'nīla ghaṭaḥ'—'The jar is black', the meaning of the term *nīla* is a thing that is qualified with *nīlatva* blackness. The term *ghaṭa* means a thing possessed of jariness, that is, jar. Here the relation of *nīla* in the *ghaṭa* is *abhēda* or *tādātmya*. In other words, the jar is related with *nīla* by the relation of *svavṛtṭyasādhāraṇa dharmah*. In all the relations 'sva' which means 'self' refers to that, the relation of which is under consideration. In the above example the relation of *nīla* in *ghaṭa* is under consideration. Hence, 'sva' refers to *nīla*. The *asādhāraṇa dharmah* residing in it, is *nīlatva*. Since this *nīlatva* is in the *ghaṭa* it is said as being related with *nīla* by the relation of *tādātmya*. *Tādātmyatā* is being *tādātmya*.

**Svarūpa Sambandha**

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School recognizes three relations as *Vṛtti-Niyāmakā*, that is, a relation by which a thing is cognized as residing in a particular locus. *Samyoga* (conjunction), *samavāya* (inherence) and *svarūpa* (self sameness)—these three are such relations. The term '*svarūpa sambandha*' which is generally translated into English as self-sameness is of two kinds—1. Spatial—*daiśikasvarūpasambandha*, and 2. Temporal—*kālikasvarūpasambandha*. The presence of an absence, in its locus, is by *daiśikasvarūpasambandha*. Similarly the presence of a thing in *kāla* is by the relation of *kālikasvarūpasambandha*. The *svarūpa* relation is also called as *viśeṣanatāsambandha*.

As per the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics the relation of conjunction holds good only among substances. The relation of *samavāya*, on the other hand, holds between a whole and its parts, a substance and its qualities and actions, an individual and the generic attributes residing in it, eternal substances and the particularities called *viśeṣa*, residing in them. Since, either *samyoga* or *samavāya* does not hold good in many cases such as an

absence its locus, *svarūpa sambandha* is envisaged as the relation, in such cases. The point to be noted here is that *svarūpa sambandha* is not a relation of identity as is understood by some.

**Sva-Sāmānādhikaraṇatva**

*Sāmānādhikaraṇatva* is co-existence. As stated earlier, *sva* refers to the thing, the relation of which is under consideration. For example, the colour of a mango fruit is related to the taste in the same fruit, by the relation of *sva-sāmānādhikaraṇatva*. Here, *sva* refers to the colour of the fruit. Since, the taste in the fruit co-exists with the colour, the taste is said to have been related with the colour by the relation of *sva-sāmānādhikaraṇatva*.

**Sva-Vṛttitva**

*Vṛtti* is that which resides or is located. So, *sva-vṛttitva* is being 'located in the *sva*'. For instance, a jar residing on the ground is the *vṛtti* and is related with the ground by the relation of *sva-vṛttitva*. Here *sva* refers to the ground.

**Sva-Āśrayatva**

*Āśraya* is locus. Thus *sva-āśrayatva* is 'being the locus of the thing, that is, *sva*'. Ground is related with the jar residing in it, by this relation. '*Sva*' here refers to the jar.

**Viśayatā-Viśayitā and Avacchedaka-Avacchinna**

There is a radical difference between the terms mentioned above. *Viśaya* is a content of a cognition and hence *viśayatā* is the property residing in the content. For example, the jar, which is a content of a cognition, has the property *viśayatā* and can also be related with the cognition by the relation *viśayatā*, that is, contentness.

On the other hand, *viśayin* is that which grasps a thing. Therefore, a cognition is *viśayin* and has *viśayitā*. Thus, the cognition of the jar, can be said as related with the content, that is, jar, with the relation of *viśayitā*.

The difference between *avacchedaka* and *avacchinna* is obvious. *Avacchedaka* is limiter, whereas *avacchinna* is limited. For example, when



a jar is considered as an effect, that is, *kārya*, *kāryatā* becomes a property of it. This *kārya* is limited by jarness. Therefore, the jarness is the limiter, whereas the *kāryatā* is limited.

Yes. There is a thing such as *samavāyatā*. It is a property of *samavāya*.

The last question is, indeed, interesting. It asks about the distinction between the universals such as *parvatatva* and the properties such as *avacchedakatva* which arise because of the machinery of Navya Nyāya analysis. My reply is that there is a radical distinction between *paratatva*, etc. universals and the *avacchedakatva*, etc. properties. *Parvatatva* being a universal is perceived the moment *parvata*, the locus, is perceived. As a rule, a universal is grasped by the same sense organ by which the individual is grasped. But, *avacchedakatva*, etc. properties are not universals. They come to be known through inference or a sentence. Thus, when we consider a jar as an effect, that is, *kārya*, then by analysing the thing, we also come to know of the limiter of the *kāryata* which is the limited. The limiter here is *parvatatva* which is already perceived. But, its limitorness, that is, *avacchedakatva* is grasped later. The point is that jarness, etc. universals are perceived when the jar is perceived. But, the *avacchedakatva* of jarness is known when the *kāryata*, etc. properties are known through inference.

Vol. XIV, No.2

D. Prahlada Char

#### What shall be the Navya Nyāya analysis of the following sentence?

This is the same bright, red rose whose sweet and subtle fragrance so deeply affected the beautiful princess when she came for an early morning stroll in the private royal garden a few days back that she still talks about it to her friends and says that she would remember the fragrance all her life.

This is a rather long sentence but the Navya Nyāya analysis, as Prof. Prahladachar's article on the *Kroḍapatrās* (JICPR, Vol. XIV, No.3) showed generally concentrates on such simple sentences as '*atra ghataḥ asti*', that I felt tempted to construct a complex sentence.

The sentence is deliberately constructed to test as to how a neo-Naiyāyika would analyse such a phrase as 'bright, red rose' or 'sweet and subtle fragrance' without questioning the generally accepted presuppositions of Navya Nyāya analysis. Also, the sentence challenges one to find what is the '*mukhya viśeṣyata*' which is so often talked about in Navya Nyāya analysis. Basically it is an invitation to *do* Nyāya rather than to talk about it, as most of our Naiyāyikas do.

Vol. XV, No. 1

Daya Krishna

#### Reply 1

The Sanskrit translation of the sentence is as given below. For identifying the '*mukhya viśeṣya*' in the sentence the complexity of the sentence does not offer much difficulty. 'The beautiful princess' is the *mukhya viśeṣya* as the term having this meaning is in the nominative case and its meaning does not act as the qualifier of any other meaning in the sentence. The phrases 'bright red rose' and 'sweet subtle fragrance' appear to denote qualities of qualities but they need not be so taken as redness and fragrance are qualities no doubt but brightness and subtlety may be regarded as certain *upādhis* or analysable properties. Sweetness is nothing but the property of causing pleasure.

Vol XVII, No.1

N.S. Dravid

#### Reply 2

महावाक्यम्: Comments on the Notes & Query Entitled 'What shall be the Navya Nyāya analysis of the sentence' published in JICPR vol. XV, No. 1

#### Introduction

1 तदेवेदं भासमानं रक्तपुष्पं वर्तते, 2 यस्य सूक्ष्ममधुरसुगन्धः तां सुन्दरीं राजपुत्री तथा गभीरतया प्रभावितवान्, 3 यथा सा रचकीयराजोद्याने प्राब्धनित्यभ्रमणा यद्यापि, तद्विषये स्वसरवीभिः सह अभिभाषते वदति च 'सुगन्धममुम् आजीवनं स्मरिष्यामि' इति। अत्र त्रीणि वाक्यानि सन्ति। यतच्छब्दयोगात् त्रीण्यपि मिलित्वा एकं महावाक्यमिति स्वीक्रियते। तत्र यथा सा इत्यादितृतीयवाक्ये तद्विषये इत्यत्र तच्छब्देन द्वितीयवाक्यस्य

सुगन्धस्य परामर्शोऽस्ति। द्वितीयवाक्ये यस्येति निर्दिष्टस्य प्रथमवाक्ये तच्छब्देन परामर्शोऽस्ति। अतः द्वितीयं तृतीयेन संगम्य ततः तृतीयं प्रथमेन संगम्य महावाक्यार्थो वर्णितः।

अथवा तृतीयवाक्यस्थायाशब्दार्थस्य द्वितीयवाक्ये तथाशब्देन परमर्शात् तृतीयं द्वितीयेन संगम्य द्वितीयं प्रथमेन संगम्यापि महावाक्यार्थो वर्णनीयः। पूर्वोत्तरभावेमात्रे विशेषः। अन्यत् सर्वं समानम् 'सुगन्धममुं स्मरिष्यामि' इति तु वाक्यपरम्, न तु वाक्यार्थपरम्।

1 'यस्य सूक्ष्मधुरसुगन्धः तां सुन्दरीं राजपुत्री तथा गभीरतया प्रभावितवान्' यस्येत्यत्र षष्ठ्याः संबन्धोऽर्थः। तस्य सुगन्धेऽन्वयः। सुगन्धशब्दस्य सुरभि-गन्धोऽर्थः। तत्र सूक्ष्मधुरपदार्थयोरभेदसंबन्धेनान्वयः। तच्छब्दार्थस्य सुन्दरीशब्दार्थस्य चाभेदेन राजपुत्र्यामन्वयः। तथा इत्यत्र याल्प्रत्ययस्य प्रकारोऽर्थः। तच्छब्दः यथेत्यत्र यच्छब्दनिर्दिष्टमर्थः परामर्शति। राजपुत्रीशब्दस्य राजसंबन्धिपुत्रीत्यर्थः। पुत्रीमिति द्वितीयायाः समवेतत्वम् (समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नमाधेयत्वमर्थः) तत्र निरूपितत्वेन राजपुत्र्याः अन्वयः। समवेतत्वेत्याश्रयतया प्रपूर्वकभाधात्वर्थेऽन्वयः। गभीरतया इतीत्यंभूतलक्षणे तृतीया। तस्याः विशिष्टत्वमर्थः। तस्य भाधात्वर्थेऽन्वयः प्रपूर्वकभाघातोः प्रकृष्टज्ञानमर्थः (आसक्तिजनकज्ञानमर्थः)। तदुत्तरणिचः अनुकूलव्यापारोऽर्थः। झवतप्रत्ययस्य आश्रयोऽर्थः। तस्याभेदसंबन्धेन सुगन्धेऽन्वयः। याल्प्रत्यायार्थप्रकारस्य णिजर्थे व्यापारेऽन्वयः तथा च 'यस्य सूक्ष्म .. इत्यादि .. प्रभावितवान्' इत्यन्तवाक्यान्। यत्संबन्धी सूक्ष्माभिन्नमधराभिन्नसुरभिगन्धः तदभिन्नसुन्दरीभिन्नराजसंब निपुत्रीसमवेततत्प्रकारविशिष्टगभीरत्वविशिष्टप्रकृष्टज्ञानानुकूलव्यापारवदिभिन्नः- इति शाब्दबोधो भवति।

'2 यथा सा स्वकीयराजोद्याने प्रारब्धित्यभ्रमणा अद्यपि तद्विषये स्वसवीभिः सह अभि भाषते, वदति च सुगन्धममुं आजीवनं स्मरिष्यामीति।'

यथा इत्यत्र यच्छब्दोत्तरयाल्प्रत्ययस्य प्रकारोऽर्थः। तस्यः आश्रयतासंबन्धेन अभिपूर्वकभाषधात्वर्थे अभिभाषणे वदधात्वर्थे कथने यान्वयः। स्वकीयशब्दार्थस्य स्वसंबन्धिनः राजोद्यानशब्दार्थे राजसंबन्ध्युद्याने अभेदसंबन्धेनान्वयः। सप्तम्याः अधिकरणत्वमर्थः। तत्र अधियतासंबन्धेन राजसंबन्ध्युद्यानस्यान्वयः। अधिकरणत्वस्य निरूपकतासंबन्धेन भ्रमणेऽन्वयः। प्रारब्धशब्दस्य प्रारम्भकर्मत्वर्थः। तस्याभेदसंबन्धेन नित्यभ्रमणशब्दार्थकदेशे भ्रमणेऽन्वयः। नित्यभ्रमणशब्दस्य सार्वकालिकभ्रमणवती अथवा प्रतिदिनभ्रमणवती इत्यर्थः तस्या अभेदसंबन्धेन तच्छब्दार्थं राजपुत्र्यामन्वयः। अद्यशब्दस्य इतिशब्दमर्थः। अपिशब्दस्य पूर्वदिनसमुच्योऽर्थः। तस्य आश्रयतासंबन्धेन इतिशब्देन न्वयः।

इतिशब्दस्य कालिकसंबन्धेन अभिभाषणोन्वयः। स चासौ विषयश्च तद्विषयः। तदभिन्नविषय इत्यर्थः। (तच्छब्दः सुगन्धपरामर्शकः) सप्तम्याः विषयत्वमर्थः। तत्र आधयतासंबन्धेन ताविषयस्याऽन्वयः। विषयत्वस्य निरूपकतासंबन्धेन अभिभाषणोऽन्वयः। स्वसरवीशब्दस्य स्वसंबन्धिसखी इत्यर्थः। तृतीयायाः कर्तृत्वमर्थः। तत्र आधयतासंबन्धेन स्वसखीशब्दार्थस्यान्वयः। तृतीयायार्थकर्तृत्वस्य निरूपकतासंबन्धेन सहशब्दार्थकदेशे अभिभाषणक्रियायामन्वयः। सहशब्दस्य साहित्यमर्थः। तच्च प्रकृते अभिभाषणसमानकालीनभिभाषणरूपम्। अभिभाषणं नाम ज्ञानजनकशब्दप्रयोगः। सहशब्दार्थान्तर्गतप्रथमाभिभाषणेन तृतीयार्थकर्तृत्वस्यान्वयः। द्वितीयाभिभाषणस्य कर्तृत्वसंबन्धेन तच्छब्दार्थराजपुत्र्यामन्वयः। अभिभाषते इत्यत्र आख्यातस्य कृतिरर्थः। तत्र धात्वर्थस्यानुकूलतासंबन्धेनान्वयः। कृते आश्रयतासंबन्धेन तच्छब्दार्थराजपुत्र्यामन्वयः। इतिशब्दस्य सुगन्धममुमाजीवनं स्मरिष्यामि वाक्यगतानुपूर्वीरूपप्रकारोऽर्थः। तस्य आश्रयतासंबन्धेन वदधात्वर्थे ज्ञानजनकशब्देऽन्वयः। वदतीत्यत्र आख्यातस्य कृतिः अर्थः। तत्र धात्वर्थस्यानुकूलतासंबन्धेनान्वयः। कृते आश्रयतासंबन्धेन तच्छब्दार्थं राजपुत्र्यामन्वयः। चशब्दस्य अभिभाषणसमुच्योऽर्थः। तस्याश्रयतासंबन्धेन वदनेऽन्वयः। तथा च यथा सा .. इत्यादि.. स्मरिष्यामीति इत्यन्तवाक्यात् 'स्वसंबन्ध्यभिन्न राजसंबन्ध्यभिन्नोद्याननिष्ठाधिकरणतानिरूपक-प्रारम्भकर्माभिन्न-सार्वकालिकभ्रमण-वदिभिन्न-राजपुत्री स्वसम्बन्धिसरवीनिषठकर्तृता-निरूपकाभिभाषणसमान-कालिका भियाषणकर्त्री पूर्वदिनसमुच्ययाश्र-यएतद्दिनकालिकतदभिन्नविषयविषयक यत्प्रकारक अभिभाषणानुकूलकृत्याश्रयः 'सुगन्धममुमाजीवनं स्मरिष्यामि' वाक्यनिष्ठानुपूर्वीविशिष्ट अभिभाषणसमुभ्रयाश्रयज्ञानजनकशब्दानुकूलकृत्याश्रयः (राजपुत्री) इति शब्दबोधः।

'3 तदेवेदं भासमानं रक्तपुष्पं वर्तते'

तच्छब्दः यस्येत्यत्र यच्छब्देन निर्दिष्टमर्थं परामर्शति। एवकारस्य अन्यभिन्नमित्यर्थः। तच्छब्दार्थस्य एव-शब्दार्थस्य च रक्तपुष्पेऽन्वयः। इदंशब्दस्य पुरोवर्तीत्यर्थः। तस्याभेदेन रक्तपुष्पेऽन्वयः। भासमानमित्यस्य प्रतीयमानमित्यर्थः (वर्तमानकालिकप्रतीतिविषयः)। तस्याभेदेन रक्तपुष्पेऽन्वयः। तक्तपुष्पं रक्ताभिन्नं पुष्पम्। वृत्तातोः सत्ता अर्थः। तेप्रत्ययस्य आश्रयत्वं वर्तमानकालिकत्वं चार्थः वर्तमानकालिकत्वस्य सत्तायाम् आश्रयत्वस्य रक्तपुष्पेऽन्वयः। तथा च-उक्तवाक्यात् तदभिन्नतदत्यभिन्नं पुरोवर्त्यभिन्नं वर्तमान कालिकप्रतीतिविषयाभिन्नरक्ताभिन्नपुष्पं वर्तमानकालिक सत्ताश्रयः इति बोधः। महावाक्यार्थबोधः।

तथा च वाक्यत्रयधटितात् महावाक्यात्

यत्संबन्धी सूक्ष्माभिन्नमधुराभिन्नसुरभिगन्धः

तदभिन्नसुन्दर्यभिन्नराजसंबन्धिपुत्रीसमवेततत्प्रकारविशिष्ट

गमीरत्वविशिष्टप्रकृष्टज्ञानानुकूलव्यापारवदभिन्नः,

स्वसंबन्ध्यभिन्नराजसंबन्ध्याभिन्नोद्धाननिष्ठाधिकरणतानिरूपक-

प्रारम्भकर्माभिन्नसार्वकालिकभ्रमणवदभिन्ना

स्वसंबन्धिसखीनिष्ठकर्तृतानिरूपकाभिभाषणसमानकालिकाभिभाषणकर्त्री

तादृशसुगन्धरूपविषयविषयक-

पूर्वदिनसमुच्चयाश्रयएतद्दिनकालिकत्वप्रकारकाभिभाषणानुकूलकृत्याश्रयः

'सुगन्धममुमाजीवनं स्मरिष्यामि' वाक्यनिष्ठानपूर्वी

विशिष्टाभिभाषणसमुच्चयाश्रयज्ञानजनकशब्दानुकूलकृत्याश्रयः राजपुत्री,

तदभिन्नतदन्यभिन्नपुरोवर्त्यभिन्नवर्तमानकालिक प्रतीतिविषयाभिन्नरक्ताभिन्नपुष्पं

वर्तमानकालिकसत्राश्रय इति शब्दबोधो भवति।

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N.S.R.Tatacharya

### Reply 3

Exercise on the 'Mahāvākya' for Śābdabodha Response to the comments on the Mahāvākya received from N.S.R.Tatacharya

The following is my comment on the Navya Nyāya analysis of the complex sentence (*makāvākya*) which is published in the *JICPR* Vol. XV, No. 1. It may be pointed out that my comment consists of four parts and they are about:

I: The sentence,

II: The translation (in Sanskrit),

III: The *śābdabodha* (as has been presented by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya), and

IV: The whole exercise.

#### 1. The Sentence

This is the same bright, red rose whose sweet and subtle fragrance so deeply affected the beautiful princess, when she came for an early morning stroll in the private royal garden a few days back that she still talks about it to her friends and says that she would remember the fragrance all her life.

Before I say anything, I think it is worth recording an interesting comment on the structure and syntax of this sentence by my computer<sup>16</sup>

Your sentences may be too long to be effective and may be hard to follow. For clarity and conciseness, consider rewording your sentence or splitting it into two sentences.

This, I think, is a very precise and accurate comment on this sentence. It is clear that this is not a sentence from any classical/Standard English literature but 'deliberately constructed' to test the Navya Nyāya analysis of long and complex sentence structure. The 'deliberateness' as has been suggested by the complier directed towards analyzing the phrases like *bright, red rose* or *sweet and subtle fragrance* without questioning the conventions of Navya Nyāya analysis. It refers to the analysis of the adjectival clauses, when there are two adjectives to one and the same noun. I do not think it is a big problem to handle for the *natyāyikas*. Then the question is why should one deliberately construct a sentence like this, whose grammatically is doubtful. Anyway this presents an interesting exercise for *śābdabodha*.

If the meaning aspect of the sentence is taken into account, it can be doubtlessly said that the sentence is ambiguous. I think the ambiguity arises out of the clause *'that she still talks about it'* The question is 'about what'? Is it about: 'The bright red rose'? The sweet and subtle fragrance'? or 'How deeply it affected the beautiful princess'? In other words, does it refer to the grammatical subject, or the grammatical object or the grammatical event'? In fact, there are two grammatical subjects in the given complex sentence: (i) the rose, and (ii) the fragrance. There are also two grammatical objects. They are: (i) the princess and (ii) her friends. There are several events; at least four may be considered for the sentential analysis point of view. And they are: (i) *deeply affecting the princess*, (ii) *her coming* for an early morning stroll to

<sup>16</sup> I am using *Microsoft word* for word processing job

the private royal garden, (iii) her *talking* about it to her friends, and (iv) *remembering the* fragrance all her life. Taking all these factors into account, the question certainly arises whether such complex construction in English itself is grammatically viable/desirable.<sup>17</sup> The syntax in English is the most difficult area of study and the *meaning analysis* of the complex sentential construction fully depends upon the structure of the sentence. Needless to say that unless we understand the sentence and its grammatical structure in its *source* language, it would certainly be difficult in translating it to the *target* language and analyze it in a different framework accordingly in the target language.

## II. The Translation (In Sanskrit)

The sentence in question is translated into Sanskrit as follow (I present it in Roman diacritic for writing conveniently with the help of my computer):

*Tad evedam bhāsamānam rakta-puṣpaṃ varttate yasya sūkṣma-madhūrasugandhaḥ tāṃ sundarīm rājaputrīm tathā gabhīratayā prabhāvitavān yathā sā svakīyārājodyāne prārabdha-nitya-bhramanā adyāpi tad-viṣaye sva-sakhibhiḥ saha abhibhāṣate vadati ca sugandham amum ājīvanam smarisyāmīti*

This is not a very good translation in Sanskrit. There are several English words/ phrases not properly translated into Sanskrit that can bear the near-most meaning to express the idea in its original construction. For instance.

(1) The word 'bright' is translated into Sanskrit 'bhāsamānam'. Though the verbal base (*dhātu*) *bhās*-means 'to sign', 'to bright', 'to appear', 'occur to the mind' etc., still, the word 'bhāsamāna' is mostly used in *śāstric* works to mean 'pratiyamānam= varttamāna-kālīka-pratīviṣayah' (complete understanding or clear apprehension) as has been explained by Professor N.S.R.

<sup>17</sup> A colleague of mine who is a professor in English says that the sentence in question is certainly grammatically wrong.

Tatacharya in his Navya Nyāya analysis. This explanation is not congruous with this construction. It is obviously wrong due to the inappropriate translation of the word 'bright' that leads to an inappropriate explanation in terms of Navya Nyāya analysis. Therefore, I think 'bhāsamāna' is not a good Sanskrit rendering of the English word 'bright'. It could have been translated as 'ruciram' or 'bhāsuram' which could have been compatible with the sentential meaning analysis.

(2) The word 'red rose' is translated as 'rakta-puṣpaṃ' (red flower). Perhaps, we do not have a word in Sanskrit for 'rose'. V.S.Apte's Dictionary is helpful to some extent when it defines 'japā/ javā puṣpaṃ' as synonym to 'rose'. I think there is no harm in accepting this name for 'rose'. How long we will be bereft of the name of a flower that is so dear to all of us these days!

(3) The English word 'subtle' is translated into Sanskrit as 'sūkṣma'. However, this translation does not describe the subtle charm of the sentence. Thus I think it could have been rendered as 'anirvacanīyam' (or *anyādrśam/asādhāraṇam*) because the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) defines the word 'subtle' as: 'difficult to perceive or describe because fine and delicate'.

(4) The word 'deeply' is an adverb in English but its translation in Sanskrit as 'gabhīratayā' is a noun in instrumental singular ending), which has created problem in the sentential analysis in the Navya Nyāya framework. (We shall discuss this later on.) It could have been translated only as 'gabhīram' in an adverbial form.

(5) The word 'affected' is translated as 'prabhāvitavān', which is derived from the verbal base *bhā*- with the pre-verb *pra*-<sup>18</sup>, that

<sup>18</sup> *prabhāvitavān* is also derived from the verbal base (*dhātu*) *pra-bhū* (where the *dhātu* is *bhū* with the pre-verb *pra*. Which means 'to come forth, spring up, arise or originate from appear, become visible, happen, occur, etc. However, Prof. Tatacharya has taken it to be derived from *pra-bhā* while explaining the sentential analysis.