

The sūtra 5.2.25 refers to fallacies which have been already pointed out and says that in case they occur in the argument, then one may also be considered to have been defeated in addition to all the situations that have been mentioned in 5.2.1.

Chapter 3

Some Further Reflections on the Sūtras after reading the Commentaries on it, particularly those of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana*

I

The sūtra I.I.I centres not only around the enumeration of the sixteen padārthas or topics but also about their relation to *tattvajñāna* and *niḥśreyasa*. The Nyāya Sūtra does not refer to these sixteen topics explicitly as *padārthas*. It is only later commentators starting from Vātsyāyana who used the term and appear to refer specifically to them.

The closing part of the sūtra says "... निग्रहस्थानानाम् तत्त्वज्ञानात् निःश्रेयसाधिगमः". The sūtra therefore, seems to say that by the knowledge of these sixteen topics one shall get *niḥśreyasa*. The discussion on the term *tattvajñāna* occurs in N.S. 4.2.1 where it seems to have been used as meaning true knowledge and not the knowledge of that which is ultimately real or true.

The term *tattvajñāna*, therefore, here means the true knowledge of the sixteen *padārthas* mentioned in the sūtra I.I.I and states that the true knowledge of each and all of them will lead to *niḥśreyasa*.

* The references to Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana are from the texts edited by Pt. Ananta Lal Thakur and published by Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1996, 1997.

The term *niḥśreyasa* does not seem to have been defined in the sūtra text itself, but it is extensively elaborated in the *Vārttika* of Uddyotakara which takes off from the way it is explicated by Vātsyāyana. Vātsyāyana has written "तदिदं तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसाधिगमश्च यथाविद्यं वेदितव्यम्" (Bhāṣya on sūtra I.I.I, p. 6 वात्स्यायन भाष्य). This means that each area of knowledge has its own *tattvajñāna* and this *tattvajñāna* leads to a *niḥśreyasa* which is specific to that knowledge and that knowledge alone. Elaborating on this, Uddyotakara has specifically referred to the following *vidyās* and their *niḥśreyasas*: The *niḥśreyasa* of *Agniḥotra* etc. is *swarga*, the *niḥśreyasa* of *vārtā* is 'भूम्यादिपरिज्ञानस्यफलम्', the *niḥśreyasa* of *dandanīti* is 'पृथ्वीविजयं', the *niḥśreyasa* of *adhyātmavidyā* is 'अपवर्गप्राप्ति' It is clear that at least according to Uddyotakara and even Vātsyāyana each *vidyā* has its own separate specific *niḥśreyasa* and that it is only *adhyātma* or *ātma* whose *niḥśreyasa* is *apavarga* or *mokṣa*. Thus the general idea that the end of every knowledge is *mokṣa*, does not seem to have been accepted by *Naiyāyika* thinkers till Uddyotakara's time. Not only Uddyotakara but Vācaspati Mīśra I also accepts this and writes "विद्यान्तराणि तावद् यत् तत्त्वज्ञानं कुर्वन्ति तत्स्वभावलोचनया हि तद्विद्यासाध्ये एव निःश्रेयसभेदे उपयुज्यन्ते नान्यत्र" (p. 59 टीका on sūtra 1.1.1).

This, however, raises the problem as to what is the *niḥśreyasa* of the Nyāya *Vidyā* itself which is also called *ānvīkṣikī* to distinguish it from other *vidyās*, including the *ātma vidyā*, whose *niḥśreyasa* is *mokṣa*. Vātsyāyana is clearly aware of this as he writes, "सेयमान्वीक्षिकी प्रमाणादिभिः पदार्थैर्विभज्यमानाप्रीतिः सर्वविद्यानाम् ...तदिदं तत्त्वज्ञानम् निःश्रेयसाधिगमोऽपवर्गप्राप्तिरिति" (p. 5-6 Bhāṣya on sūtra 1.1.1). It is clear that Vātsyāyana self consciously demarcates *ānvīkṣikī* from *adhyātma vidyā* and considers only the latter's *niḥśreyasa* as *apavarga*. But he does not seem to mention any specific *niḥśreyasa* of *ānvīkṣikī* itself except that it is "प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानाम् उपायः सर्वकर्माणाम्" This does not really state what

exactly is its own *niḥśreyasa* apart from 'serving' the cause of other *vidyās* in realizing their own *niḥśreyasa*. Incidentally, this would have also to be true of *adhyātma-vidyā* and, if accepted, shall entail that no *adhyātma vidyā* can realize its *niḥśreyasa*, that is, *apavarga*, without the 'services' of *ānvīkṣikī* and hence, will have to depend on it in a way which is not clearly recognised in the tradition.

There is, in fact, another problem as to what exactly is to be construed as a '*vidyā*'. Is a *vidyā* to have necessarily the form of a *śāstra* and, if so, what is the *lakṣaṇa* of a *śāstra*. This is important as there is a significant distinction between *prayoga śāstras* and others which are purely *saidhāntika* or theoretical in character. The former are primarily oriented to the acquiring of a skill such as is involved in dancing (*nṛtya*) or singing (*gāna*) or building (*vāstu*) or painting (*citrakalā*) etc. In all these areas theoretical-reflection and theory-building is secondary to the acquiring of the actual skill in their performance. *Adhyātma-vidyā* is usually considered to be similar in character as it involves *sādhanā* which is supposed to result in the transformation of one's 'being' in such a way that one 'becomes' what one 'ought-to-be', or one 'realizes' what one really 'is'.

The term *vidyā* seems to have been used in the tradition for both types of knowledge and though a distinction was made from the very beginning between the *Prayoga śāstras* and the other *śāstras*, both were called *vidyā* as is evident in Nārada's enumeration of the *vidyās* that he had learned and yet remained unfulfilled or dissatisfied. "ऋग्वेदं भगवतोऽध्येमि यजुर्वेदं सामवेदमथर्वणं चतुर्थमितिहासपुराणं पञ्चमं वेदानां वेदं पितृयराशिं दैवं निधिं वाकोवाक्यमेकायनं देवविद्यां ब्रह्मविद्यां भूतविद्यां क्षत्रविद्यां नक्षत्रविद्यां—सर्पदेवजनविद्यामेतद्रभगवोऽध्येमि"२ (छान्दोग्य उपनिषद्, सप्तम अध्याय, प्रथम खण्ड)

The distinction that is being made here is between *parā vidyā* which is the same as *adhyātma-vidyā* and all other *vidyās* which are called *aparā vidyā*. *Ānvīkṣikī*, thus, will have to be included

among *aparā vidyās*, but it will have to be an *aparā vidyā* of a strange kind as it will not only be foundational for all the other *vidyās* including the *parā vidyā*, if it wants to be a *vidyā*, but also determine whether they are to be counted as *vidyā* at all. It will, thus, have to be considered, in modern terminology, a second-level *vidyā* or that which is foundational for all, as without fulfilling its condition they cannot successfully perform their own function, that is, be a *pramā* or valid knowledge of the field it claims to be a knowledge about.

But, then, what shall be the *niḥśreyasa* of *ānvīkṣikī* itself? *Prima facie*, it can have no *niḥśreyasa* of its own as, its *niḥśreyasa* can consist only in being helpful or instrumental in getting the *niḥśreyasa* of all other *vidyās* fulfilled. The self-consciousness of 'rationality' could perhaps have been spelt in no better way. This is the crucial break in the Indian intellectual tradition as the *pramāṇa śāstra* proclaims itself to be "प्रदीपःसर्वविद्यानाम् उपायः सर्वकर्माणाम्" This, it should be noted, includes both theoretical and practical reason as it mentions both *vidyā* and *karma* separately and, thus, includes all those areas of human seeking which are primarily defined either in terms of knowledge or action. 'Action' would, or should, include both *dharma*, or what is called morality in the English language and art or realms where performance predominates, or where the 'world' of 'feeling', gets creatively embodied in an objective symbolization which makes it a permanent possibility for all human beings to recreate and, thus, re-live in it for themselves, if they so desire.

At a deeper level still, perhaps, *prayoga* is an essential element in all knowledge and the distinction between the 'theoretical' and the 'practical' is only a distinction in terms of that which is important and central to a particular discipline. Perhaps, the author of the N.S. wants to point this out by mentioning *vāda*, *jalpa* and *yitaṇḍā*, *chala*, *jāti* and *nighrasthāna* as integral parts of the *pramāṇa vidyā* itself as these may be considered as reason 'applied' in the act of 'reasoning' with others

and establishing one's own point of view effectively, at least at that time.

The distinction between the *niḥśreyasas* of different *vidyās* seems, however, to be a radical departure in the Nyāya and betokens not only the emergence of a powerful rational attitude in the field of knowledge but also the awareness of a radical distinction between the 'ends' or *prayojanas* or the desired fruits or *phala* for which the different *vidyās* are sought by man and whose correct knowledge is supposed to procure it for him. This should be seen in the light of the generally prevalent contention that the end of all *vidyās* is basically *mokṣa* or liberation. The segregation and isolation of *adhyātma vidyā* from all other *vidyās* is a step in this direction, a step which is already implicit in the statement of *Nārada* in the *Chāndogya upaniṣad* quoted above.

1.1.2

The second sūtra is also called a *prayojana* sūtra by Vācaspati Miśra I and is included along with the sūtra I.I.I in this category. Thus the Nyāya Sūtra, paradoxically, has not one single *prayojana* as a *śāstra*; instead, it has two which are spelt out in the first two sūtras and which are supposed respectively to consist of *niḥśreyasa* and *apavarga*. The first sūtra, as already mentioned above, is concerned with *pramāṇa vidyā* or as Vātsyāyana called it *ānvīkṣikī*, and its own *niḥśreyasa* is supposed to lie in enabling all other *vidyās* to attain their own *niḥśreyasa*. The problem of the *niḥśreyasa* of *ānvīkṣikī*, apart from the *niḥśreyasas* of all other *vidyās*, does not seem to have been a subject of discussion in the commentaries on the N.S., but one may think of it as the fulfillment of the function of rationality or *buddhi* in a human being. *Buddhi* is supposed to be a *guṇa* of the *ātman* and there is a discussion in the N.S. about its *nityatva*. Interestingly, at least according to Vātsyāyana, the following are supposed to be equivalent terms for *buddhi* and hence are said to be the *guṇas* of the *puruṣa* which stands for *ātman* for him. These terms are

jñāna, *darśana*, *upalabdhi*, *bodha*, *pratyaya* and *adhyavasāya* ("पुरुषधर्मः खल्वयं ज्ञानं दर्शनम् उपलब्धिर्बोधः प्रत्ययोऽध्यवसाय इति" p. 176 Vātsyāyana bhāṣya on sūtra 3.2.3) and are supposed to stand for the same thing ("चेतयते जानीते बुध्यते पश्यति उपलभत इत्येकोऽयमर्थः same p. 176 भाष्य on sūtra 3.2.3). *Pramāṇa vyāpāra*, thus, should be the *vyāvartaka lakṣaṇa* of *buddhi* as it alone can distinguish between what may be called *tattvajñāna* on the one hand and *mithyājñāna* on the other and, thus, be essential for the attainment of *apavarga* through the removal of *mithyājñāna* of the particular *prameyas* mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.9. However, Vātsyāyana in his *upodghāta* does not appear to confine the *pramāṇa vyāpāra* to man alone, but extends it to cover all living beings as they all not only show evidence of having knowledge, but also of engaging in determining 'what is true knowledge' on the basis of its *pravṛtti sāmānyā*. He writes "सोऽयं प्रमाणार्थोऽपरिसंख्येयः प्राणभृद्भेदस्यापरिसंख्येयत्वात् ।" (Introduction Bhāṣya, p.1). This would imply that *buddhi* is characteristic of all living beings and not that of man and man alone. But then one will have to give the *vyāvartaka lakṣaṇa* of human beings in this respect which would involve the contention that the attainment of *apavarga* can belong to man only and that this is radically different from the so-called attainment of pleasure and avoidance of pain which is a characteristic of all living beings.

The concept of *buddhi* and its relation to the *puruṣa* or *ātman*, on the whole, remains unclear in the sūtras just as the answer to the question whether it should be regarded as *nitya* or *anitya*. There seems, however, an interesting discussion where the relation of consciousness to knowledge is sought to be understood. It is perhaps suggested that the so-called *mtyatva* of knowledge arises from, or is a reflection of, the *nityatva* of consciousness, an argument which anticipates Śaṅkara's argument given later in this context, (see Vātsyāyana's discussion (bhāṣya) on sūtra 3.2.3, p. 177). The reference to *pratyabhijñā* along with the contention that all cognition is essentially 'recognition' implies that 'cognition'

presupposes or involves some underlying permanent entity to which consciousness belongs and which has 'knowledge'. But, as knowledge is supposed to be the result of an activity such as that of 'know-ing', and as all activity implies an agent and an immediate cause which is called *karana* in the Nyāya tradition, the question arises whether *buddhi* which may be regarded as the immediate cause of knowledge and hence itself involves recognition, is to be regarded also as *nitya* on the same ground as we consider consciousness to be *nitya* in this context. The complicated discussion on this issue in the *Vārttika* and the *Ṭikā* needs to be looked into as it provides interesting insights into the nature of the issues that engaged the minds of the philosophers of that time.

(The question whether the *tattvajñāna* which leads to *niḥśreyasa* is supposed to be that of *nigrahasthāna* alone or of all the other topics mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.1 is settled by Vātsyāyana in his remark "प्रमाणादीनां तत्त्वमिति शैषिकी षष्ठी" that all of them have to be taken into consideration and not just *nigrahasthāna*.)

1.1.4

The term *avyabhicārī* in the definition of the *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* is meant to exclude perceptual illusions but neither the author of the sūtra nor his commentators seem to have discussed the question as to how the 'illusoriness' of a perceptual experience is to be proved except through another perception along with the assumption that the two perceptions must not cohere, for opposed properties can not belong to the same object. Perception by itself can never provide the ground for the distinction between an 'illusory' and 'veridical' perceptual experience. The characteristic of 'avyabhicārī', thus, can only be non-perceptual in character and hence can not belong to perception-qua-perception.

The term *avyapadeśya* in the sūtra seems to refer to the fact that perceptual knowledge is primarily non-linguistic in character and that its linguistic designation is only secondary in character.

It does not mean that it can not be grasped in or through language, though there will always remain an element in it which language will never be able to get hold of as it is both non-linguistic and trans-linguistic in character. The perceptual experience of animals is an evidence of this.

There is, however, the problem which does not seem to have been discussed in this connection. At the human level perception is always of the form "This is this", or "This is that" where a distinctive predicate is asserted of something and hence both 'recognition' and 'naming' is involved. The problem of recognition has already been discussed in connection with knowledge and its relation to *buddhi*. Thus, there will arise the issue of the relation between perceptual knowledge and *buddhi*. In case *buddhi* is considered as an essential instrument then it can not be *avyapadeśya*. On the other hand, if it is really *avyapadeśya*, that is, totally *nirvikalpaka* in character then it can not function as a *pramāṇa* in the usual sense of the term. The author of the N.S. does not seem to be clear whether the definition that he is giving in sūtra 1.1.4 is that of *pratyakṣa* or of *pratyakṣa* as a *pramāṇa*, as *pratyakṣa*-qua-*pratyakṣa* can not distinguish between what is 'real' and what only 'appears' to be so. In the realm of the senses, 'appearance' is the reality. The distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality' at the perceptual level can occur only because of non-perceptual considerations.

There is another problem to which much attention has not been paid in the Nyāya literature. This is that the ascription of 'abhidheyatva' as a necessary characteristic of all reality is opposed to the *avyapadeśya* character ascribed to perception or perceptual reality. If reality is essentially 'nameable' or 'in other words, graspable by language, then perception can not be said to give us a knowledge of reality if it is essentially *avyapadeśya*, as is mentioned in the sūtra.

The characteristic mentioned as *vyavasāyātmaka* raises problems of another kind. First, as mentioned by Vācaspati Miśra I, it applies to *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* only while, according to

him, the characteristic of *avyapadeśya* applies to *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. Ultimately, the question is, whether the term perception is to be confined to that sense experience which clearly recognises that "This is this", or is treated as applicable to any sense-apprehension which is of the form "There is something". Perhaps, the latter can not be considered as a *pramāṇa* and hence the term *vyavasāyātmaka* is added in the definition. But, then, the term *avyapadeśya* will normally not be applicable to such a *vyavasāyātmaka* perception. This is the point that Vācaspati Miśra I is making in his discussion on the issue. The author of the N.S. does not seem to be clear in his mind nor, for that matter, are the commentators.

The complicated discussion on this subject raises other issues such as the relation of the senses to the mind and of the mind to the *buddhi* and of the *buddhi* to the *ātman* in the process of perceptual cognition. There is also the added problem of the relation between cognition, however determinate, to recognition, or between *vyavasāya* or *anuvyavasāya*, an issue already discussed in connection with the idea of *pratyabhijñā* and its role in cognition. The detailed discussion of the problem of perceptual knowledge in the Bhāṣya, the Vārttika, the Ṭikā and the *Parisuddhi* will be rewarding to any student of the subject who has been concerned with its philosophical importance in western philosophy.

1.1.6

The discussion on *upamāna* in Vācaspati Miśra's Ṭikā appears to draw attention to the term *prasiddha* and suggests that it should be the *vacana* of an *āpta* person in order that it may be regarded as *prasiddha*. But in case it is so, it will have to be subsumed under *śabda* unless a distinction is made between those statements of an *āpta puruṣa* which are *upadeśa* and those which are primarily informative in character. Also, the term *sādrśya*, is defined as "भिन्नप्रधानसामान्यवृत्ति" (p. 165 ṭikā on sūtra 1.1.6) meaning thereby that the term similarity can only be used in the

context of two different universals between which the apprehension of difference predominates. This is an interesting definition as it draws attention to the fact that the concept of similarity is based on 'the apprehension' of difference. Later, Udayana will go further and raise the question whether all *sāmānyas* give rise to a *jāti* and, if not, what are the criteria to distinguish between those *sāmānyas* which give rise to a *jāti* and those which do not. These criteria need a detailed discussion as the problem of distinguishing between universals and pseudo-universals has plagued philosophy since Plato focussed attention upon the reality of universals for understanding reality even at the perceptual level.

1.1.7-8

The sūtras dealing with *śabda pramāṇa* do not give any criteria to determine who is an *āpta puruṣa* and who is not. Vātsyāyana explicates these in the following "आप्तः खलु स्वाक्षात्कृतघर्मा यथादृष्टस्यार्थस्य चिख्यापयिषया प्रयुक्त उपदेष्टा।" (p. 14 भाष्य on sūtra 1.1.7). But it is Samantabhadra, the great Jain thinker, who in his *Āpta Mīmāṃsā* not only discusses the issue in detail, but also gives a different definition which states that the *āpta puruṣa* is one who is completely devoid of *rāga* and *dveṣa* and is a *sarvajña*.

In this context he discusses why none can be regarded as an *āpta puruṣa* except Mahāvira. Interestingly in this context, he discusses only two possible claimants for the title of being an *āpta puruṣa*; these are Kapila and Buddha and he discusses in detail why they can not be regarded as fully *āpta*.

It was perhaps Samantabhadra's discussion which resulted later in Vācaspati Mīśra's and Udayana's detailed discussion on the issue suggesting that the *āpta puruṣa* must not only be devoid of *rāga* and *dveṣa* and have relevant existential knowledge of what he is advising one to do, but also be filled with compassion and the desire for helpfulness towards those whom he is giving the *upadeśa*. The bringing in of the notion of *karuṇā* and of his being

parama kāruṇika is reminiscent of the Buddha. Udayana even brings in the issue of the creation of the Nyāya Śāstra for those who were not entitled to study the śruti or the Vedas according to the orthodox Indian tradition. It was, thus, the *sūdras* and the women for whom the Nyāya Śāstra may be said to have been created as they could attain the knowledge leading to the path of liberation through its study. It may be remembered in this connection that the same is said about the *purāṇas*, the *Gītā* and the other literature which makes available the truth of the *śruti* to those who are not entitled to it in the strict sense of the term. (It is not clear whether Udayana argues for this position or merely discusses it as one of the positions offered by others for the creation of the Nyāya Sūtras by Gautama when *Upaniṣads* were already available to attain *mokṣa* or *apavarga* which was agreed to by all to be the supreme end of human life.)

Alternatively, one may argue that the N.S. was created for those persons who were addicted to reason and obsessed by it in order that they may be freed from their 'doubts' and pursue the path to liberation without being troubled by the spurious or pseudo-arguments of the Buddhists and the Jains and the Sāṃkhyanas and all other heretic thinkers.

1.1.9

The enumeration of the *prameyas*, as already pointed out, raises many problems but perhaps what the author of the N.S. wants to suggest is that among the innumerable *prameyas* the most important for a human being is his own self and hence the first question that is to be settled is whether there is anything different from and beyond the body, the senses, the sense-objects, the mind and the intellect, for unless there is something beyond these, it will be difficult to accept that human life has any meaning whatsoever. The establishment of the reality of *ātman* or that which is beyond these is the first and the foremost task of any rational inquiry about the reality of man with which

182 ♦ The Nyāya Sūtras: A New Commentary ...

philosophy ought to be concerned. This is supported by the evidence that the number of sūtras devoted to the establishment of the reality of ātman amount to about 114 (4.1 & 4.2). Besides this, the most important *prameya* for man would be to determine whether there is any meaning in the life that he lives and whether there is any *puruṣārtha* whose attainment may be regarded as the complete fulfillment of one's being in an absolute sense as that alone will provide a foundational meaning to his life. The term *apavarga* refers to this *prameya* in the system. The *ātman* and the *apavarga* are, thus, the two *prameyas* which according to the author of the N.S., need to be established through the *pramāṇas* which the sūtra 1.1.1 has already described in detail and as these involve necessarily discussion and disputation amongst different and conflicting views about these, the author has included the art of disputation along with the strategies and deception involved in it, in his consideration. There seems little reason for the inclusion of *śarīra*, *indriya*, *artha*, *buddhi* and *manas*, in the *prameyas* as nobody entertains any doubt about them. As for the Cartesian doubt, the same does not seem to be accepted by Gautama as relevant in the human situation. The inclusion of *pravṛtti*, *doṣa*, *pretyābhāva* and *phala* seem to be heavily influenced by the wide-spread acceptance of the diagnostic analysis of the human situation in India which involves the ideas of *karma* and re-birth as essential parts of it. There is also the acceptance of the almost axiomatic belief that *pravṛtti* or involvement with the world is the fundamental cause of suffering and is almost analytically involved in it. It will be interesting to think if an alternative diagnostic of human situation can be given without the presuppositions involved in the usual Indian analysis. The Buddhists gave up the idea of *ātman* but could not give up other elements of the analysis. (It is perhaps time India gets liberated from the unconscious bondage of this analysis.)

1.1.10

The grounds mentioned for the belief in *ātman* include, as

pointed out earlier in our comment on the sūtra, *duhkha* which was mentioned as a *prameya* in sūtra 1.1.9. However, the term *pravṛtti* may be said to include or imply *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna* in it while the *phala* which is mentioned as a separate *prameya* may be said to include *sukha-duhkha* in it. Similarly the term *jñāna* may be treated as included in the *buddhi* or alternatively may be regarded as its *phala* or result.

The sūtra mentions these as the ground for the belief in the *ātman*, but it does not make clear in what sense they have to be regarded as 'grounds' for believing in it. Is it to be regarded as the cause of these and, if so, the inference will be from effect to cause. But, then, it will have to be argued that *manas* can not be the cause of these and, as has been argued recently by Pt. Badarī Nāth Sūkla in his lecture on *dehātmavāda* one need not postulate two different entities when the postulation of one will suffice for the purpose. The Nyāya will have to argue why the postulation of *manas* alone can not suffice for the purpose.

The postulation of *Īśvara* later in the system and the suggestion that it is included in the *ātman* as a *prameya* raises difficulties of its own as not only it can not be conceived of without the presence of the "creative power" within it in its ever-liberated state in contrast to the *ātman* which is not even supposed to have consciousness when it gets free from bondage and attains *apavarga* according to Nyāya, but will have to be granted consciousness as its intrinsic property which the *ātman* is not supposed to have.

1.1.12-14

The sūtras 1.1.12-14 deal with the senses and their objects. Two things have to be noted in this connection: One, the term *artha* or object is defined in terms of the basic five elements that is, earth, air, fire, sky, water and not the specific objects which are grasped by the senses. Two, Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* clearly

maintains that because of the intrinsic diversity of the sensed qualities, one can not postulate only one *prakṛti* but has to accept five different *prakṛtis*, each with its own individual nature. “नानाप्रकृतीनामेषां सतां विषयनियमः नैकप्रकृतीनाम्।” (Bhāṣya on sūtra 1.1.12, p. 17). This is in contrast to the Sāṃkhyan position which postulates only one *prakṛti* and makes qualitative distinctions in it which constitute it in their totality. The *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are ‘qualities’ pervading all levels of *prakṛti*, a possibility that the sūtras do not even seem to discuss. What is the relation of the *panca mahābutas* and their sensed qualities to mind etc. is not made clear. What are *manas* and *buddhi* constituted of? Does the notion of “subtle matter” exist in Nyāya? Are there independent qualities belonging to *manas* and *buddhi* and even the senses which can not be reduced to the qualities that belong to the five different material elements that are supposed to extensionally define them. An answer to these questions may help in understanding the differences between the Nyāya analysis on the one hand and Sāṃkhya analysis of perceptual experience on the other. (The position of the Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhists, the Jains and the different *āgamic* traditions in India needs to be investigated in this connection.)

1.1.15—It seems from the commentaries on the sūtra that what is being denied is the Sāṃkhya view that knowledge is the result of *buddhi* which, according to it, belongs to *prakṛti* which is unconscious. It is also being held by the commentators that the sūtra by identifying *buddhi* with *jñāna* also establishes the reality of *ātman* which alone is held to be conscious and hence to which alone knowledge can belong as it can belong only to something that is conscious. Such an interpretation will imply that there is no such separate faculty as *buddhi* in Nyāya and that the whole discussion about its being *nitya* or *anitya* is absurd. The situation can only be saved if the discussion about the eternity or non-eternity of *buddhi* is understood in terms of eternity or non-eternity of knowledge. But if it is remembered that according to Nyāya, knowledge is always to be ‘new’, then

the idea of the eternity of knowledge will be a contradiction-in-terms. On the other hand, if re-cognition is considered to be necessary for cognition to take place, then ‘knowledge’ can never be new. The Naiyāyikas do not seem to have realized the problems raised by the sūtra 1.1.15 which identifies *buddhi* with *upalabdhi* and *jñāna*.

There is another problem which does not seem to have been faced by the commentators. It relates to the conscious nature of the *ātman*. Nyāya, generally, is not supposed to accept consciousness as the intrinsic and eternal property of the *ātman* or even as its essential nature or *svarūpa* as the Vedānta does. Ultimately, for it, it is an ‘emergent’ property which arises by the conjunction of the senses, the objects and the mind. But this is the Cārvāka position. It may also be remembered that *manas* is given an independent position alongwith the body, the senses and the sense-objects.

There is, and can be, no such thing as *buddhi* in the Nyāya system if it is to be held identical with *jñāna* as is mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.15. It is a result or *phala* of a certain *vyāpāra* which is, for it, ultimately a conjunction of the *ātman*, *manas*, *śarīra*, *indriyas* and the *panca mahābhūtas*. If this is not acceptable to Naiyāyikas then they will have to accept a separate, independent status for *buddhi* as an ontological entity on the analogy of one that is accorded to *manas* in the system.

1.1.16—The contention that a number of ‘knowledges’ can not arise at the same time and hence the existence of mind has to be assumed in order to account for this is a strange argument indeed. For, firstly, it assumes that knowledge is a temporal event and that as time has necessarily a succession in it, “acts of knowledge” have also to be successive in character. Secondly, it is being assumed that but for the existence of mind, the *ātman* could have simultaneous knowledge of all things at once. Mind, on this view, will be the temporal organ *par excellence* as without it there will be no apprehension of succession of events and, presumably, the distinction of past, present and future will vanish.

Not only this, the *ātman* will lose all individuality as it will have to be considered omniscient and, thus, being identical with God or *Īśvara* in the system. The Naiyāyikas do not seem to have faced the dilemma which Gautama's definition of *manas* has raised. Nor do they have noticed that as mind does not seem to be the subject of *icchā*, *dveśa*, *sukha*, *duhkha prayatna* etc. and as there is no *buddhi*, the poor *ātman* is the only entity left which has to be saddled with these unless they are transferred to the body along with everything else in it. A reconsideration of the notion of *manas* is required if nyāya thinking is to be freed from this strange formulation of its founder in the Nyāya Sūtras.

1.1.17—The sūtra 1.1.17 tries to suggest that *pravṛtti* is caused by *śarīra*, *vāk* and *buddhi* which can only mean that human activity is a joint product of these three independent factors. Unfortunately the commentators from Vātsyāyana onwards confused the matter by suggesting that *buddhi* should be understood as *manas*, as if the *sūtrakāra* did not know the difference between the two and had not already established the difference in their meaning in the sūtras immediately preceding this sūtra (1.1.15-16) (See bhāṣya on sūtra 1.1.17, p. 19. "मनोऽत्र बुद्धिरित्यभिप्रेतम् ।"). Vācaspati Mīśra makes the situation even worse as, according to him, instead of *buddhi*, it is the term *vāk* which should be taken to mean *manas* along with such other things as the senses, "तेन मनसा इष्टदेवतादयनुचिन्तन चक्षुरादिभिश्च साध्वसाधुदर्शनादिसूचितं भवति ।" (Tīkā on Sūtra 1.1.17, p. 197). Udayana complicates the situation further by concentrating on the term *ārambha* and suggesting that *pravṛtti* effects a change both in the object and in the self simultaneously. Thus, it is both *kriyāhetu* and *jñānahetu* at the same time, "जन्महेतुः स्थिरात्मविशेषगुणजनकः प्रयत्न आरम्भः । सा च य द्विविधेति । ज्ञातुं ज्ञापयितुं वा प्रयत्नः उभयथापि ज्ञानहेतुः (परिशुद्धि on sūtra 1.1.17, p. 260) कर्तुं कारयितुं वा प्रयत्नः उभयथापि क्रियाहेतुः ।"

Interestingly *pravṛtti* itself has been supposed to be ten-fold in nature. Vātsyāyana had only said, "सोऽयमारम्भः शरीरेण वाचा

मनसा च पुण्यः पापश्च प्रत्येकं दशविधः" (p. 19) which perhaps means that *pravṛtti* may be either bodily or mental or because of speech, each of which is ten-fold in nature and as each of these can result in *pāpa* or *puṇya*, the same may also be assumed to be tenfold in nature. Thus if the phrase "प्रत्येकं दशविधः" is taken literally then we will have thirty kinds of *pravṛtti* resulting in thirty kinds of *pāpa* and *puṇya* respectively. Uddyotakara on the other hand seems to say in the Vārttika that the term "प्रत्येकं दशविधः" refers only to the *pāpa* and *puṇya* and gives a detailed specific description of it as follows: "पुण्या कायेन परित्राणं परिचरणं दानमिति । वाचा सत्यं हितं प्रियं स्वाध्यायश्चेति । मनसा दया असृहा श्रद्धा चैति । विपर्ययेण पापा दशविधैव ।" (p. 78). The term *manas* here obviously is performing a function different from the one mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.16 and it is clear that, from the beginning, the Nyāya is never able to decide the exact sense in which the term *manas* is to be used in the system. The same, to a certain extent, is also true of *buddhi* resulting from the fact that it is defined as *jñāna* or *upalabdhi* and not as reason or intellect. It will be interesting to ask the Naiyāyika that if *buddhi* is defined in such a way, then the whole *pramāṇa vyāpāra*, including *tarka*, belongs to which faculty in a human being.

1.1.18—The necessary linkage between *pravṛtti* and *doṣa* is sought to be established by the commentators through the postulate that *pravṛtti* can not occur without there being *rāga*, *dveśa* and *moha* and as these are essentially 'defects' they can not but give rise to *mithyājñāna* which has to result in *doṣa*. The commentators forget that they had themselves suggested that *pravṛtti* can lead both to *pāpa* and *puṇya* and that if the necessary linkage of *pravṛtti* with *doṣa* is accepted then the distinction between *pāpa* and *puṇya* will collapse.

It will be difficult to accept that all the virtues mentioned by Uddyotakara are the result of *mithyājñāna* which is caused by *rāga*, *dveśa* and *moha*. Not only this, *nivṛtti* will become impossible if this analysis is accepted, particularly if an individual

is considered 'unfree' or 'helpless' to reverse the situation. In this context Uddyotakara raises the interesting question that "का पुनरियं प्रवर्तना, यया अवशः प्रवर्तते ?" (p. 78) but does not proceed to answer it. Vācaspati Miśra only explicates the word "avaṣa" used in the question and explicates it as "asvatantraḥ" but does not pursue the problem further (p. 198).

1.1.20—The term *phala* is taken to mean pleasure and pain or *sukha* and *duhkha*. In Vātsyāyana's crisp definition "सुखदुःखसंवेदनं फलम् ।" (p. 21). Uddyotakara introduces the notions of *dharma* and *adharma* and suggests that *dharma* is the cause of *sukha* and *adharma* the cause of *duhkha*. Vācaspati suggests that *pravṛtti* may directly cause *phala* without necessarily producing *doṣa* but, in a poetic mood, he suggests immediately the reverse of what he said, "दोषसलिलावसिक्तायां खल्वात्मभूमौ धर्माधर्मबीजे सुखदुःखे जनयतः, नाऽन्यथा ।" (p. 199).

Interestingly, he also seems to suggest that *nirveda*, though opposed to *pravṛtti*, may still be said to arise from it or even be the result from it. "यद्यपि शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिसुखदुःखोपभोगातिरिक्तं गौणमुख्यफलं भिन्नं नास्ति ते च यथायोगं पूर्वं लक्षिताः, तेनापि च रूपेण ते निर्वेदोपयोगिनः, तथापि प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितत्वेनापि रूपेणामी निर्वेदोपयोगिन इति तेन रूपेण लक्ष्यन्ते ।" (p. 198-199).

1.1.26-31—Vātsyāyana defines the notion of *tantra* in terms of *śāstra* and says "तन्त्रमितरेतराभिसंबद्धस्यार्थसमूहस्योपदेशः शास्त्रम् ।" (p. 27). Vātsyāyana explicates the four types of *Siddhānta* as given in the sūtra. According to him, the term *siddhānta* is defined as *saṁsthitiḥ* meaning that wherein one rests or where reasoning reaches a conclusion. The process through which one reaches this state is twofold. One is through what is called *adhikaraṇa* and the other which is called *abhyupagana*. The first is again divided into two different types: one, where what is known to be true is also seen as implying something else which, therefore, is also believed to be true. The second is the reverse of this, that is, when something that is already known to be true on some ground is seen to imply what one is considering and hence the latter is

accepted as true on the ground of the former. The two when seen together, are both said to be *adhikaraṇa siddhānta*. In modern terminology, if p implies q and p is known to be true than q is also known to be true. Conversely, if q is known to be true and is seen as implied by p then p is also known to be true. The stronger example of this is strict implication where we say that p implies q and q implies p. Udayana gives the clearest formulation of this when he states, "तदत्र पक्षद्वयेऽपि फलतो न कश्चिद् विशेष इति मन्वानः श्लिष्टं भाष्यं व्याचष्टे साध्यस्य वा हेतोर्वैति ।" (p.282).

The *abhyupagama siddhānta* on the other hand does not start with anything known but with a supposition or hypothesis which 'demands' to be proved or justified or established. The process of proof or justification or establishment is detailed in the commentaries and when this is completed, what was regarded as a supposition or hypothesis becomes an established doctrine that is called *siddhānta*. The difference between *abhyupagama* and *abhyupagama siddhānta* is, that while the former is *aparīkṣita* the latter is *parīkṣita*. The discussion in the commentaries seems to go in strange direction, one of which seems to be concerned with acceptance or establishment of doctrines which are not mentioned in sūtras but are somehow implied in the system. There is also a discussion how one should treat somebody who is less intelligent than oneself. Uddyotakara clearly criticizes the view of Vātsyāyana in this regard. On the whole, the commentators do not seem to have understood the notion of *abhyupagama siddhānta* Vācaspati elaborates it thus, "सामान्योपक्रमस्य अभ्युपगमस्य प्रमाणतो विशेषपर्यन्ततापरिसमाप्तिः संस्थितिरित्यर्थः ।" (p. 221) but does not pursue the matter further.

The notions of *sarvatantra* and *pratitantra siddhānta* could have been elaborated further. The discussion in the commentaries does not seem to throw any light upon them as to how the conclusion or the *saṁsthiti* is reached in them. As already stated in the earlier comments neither the notion of 'sarva' nor the notion of 'prati' seem to be clearly defined. The discussion about *sarvatantra siddhānta* starts by giving concrete examples of such

siddhāntas. Vātsyāyana's examples (धाणादीनिन्द्रियाणि) are concrete and empirical while Uddyotakara's example (प्रमाणानि प्रमेय-साधनानि) appears to be analytic in nature, though he does not seem to be aware of the difference between the two. He seems to suggest in his discussion that commonly accepted empirical propositions based on perception can not be regarded as *sarvatantra siddhānta*. On the other hand, he seems to suggest that only that should be regarded as *sarvatantra siddhānta* which is; based on *anumāna* and *āgama*. He rejects the objection that these are ultimately based on *pratyakṣa*. The whole discussion is not very clear and should be analysed for the presuppositions involved in it.

The discussion in the commentaries on the sūtra defining what is meant by *pratitantra* concentrates on the term *samāna* and Vācaspati suggests that it should be taken to mean as one and one only (समान शब्द एक पर्यायः p.222), Udayana, agreeing with this writes, "तथापि अनेकसम्बन्धापेक्षया एकमपि समानशब्दवाच्यं भवति।" (p. 281). But this is to do violence to the sūtra text and 'super-impose one's own meaning on it which it ostensibly could not had have for the simple reason that the sūtrakāra could easily have avoided the use of the term *samāna* whose primary meaning is 'similar' and involves an intrinsic plurality in it. The term can, in an extended sense that is *gaṇa*, may also be used to denote one or *ekam*, as one is similar to oneself. Interestingly, the Bhāṣya gives Sāṃkhya and Yoga as examples of *paratantra* denoting thereby that these were the main counter systems to Nyāya in Vātsyāyana's time. Surprisingly, the absence of the mention of Buddhism as a 'para tantra' is perplexing as it was the main opponent of Nyāya in this period. The mention of Yoga as a separate philosophical system is both interesting and surprising as generally the Yoga system is not regarded as a separate independent system of philosophy by Indian thinkers.

1.1.32-39—The hard core of the Nyāya theory of *anumāna* is given in the sūtras dealing with *avayava* and are mainly

concerned with what may be called the joint method of agreement and difference to establish the relation between the ground and that which is inferred on its basis. This, later, will be known as *vyāpti* in the system and give rise to innumerable problems as the method of agreement and difference can not be applied in cases where something is universally present or universally absent which are known in the Nyāya tradition as *kevalānvayī* and *kevalavyatirekī*.

1.1.40—The discussion on *tarka* does not even raise the question as to why it should be discussed at all, particularly when the whole process of *anumāna* has been discussed starting from *saṃśaya* to *avayava*. It is to be clearly indicated why the discussion on *tarka* and *nirṇaya* has to be engaged in again and how does it add to our understanding of the *pramāṇa vyāpāra* with which the text is concerned with. It should be noted that *tarka* itself is defined in such a way as to involve *saṃśaya* as one of its essential elements and the process by which it is removed resulting in *nirṇaya*.

One of the interesting statements in this connection is that of Uddyotakara "एतस्मिन् अविज्ञाते सामान्यतोऽधिगते...यदि पुनः सामान्यमपि नाधिगतं स्यात्, न ब्रूयात् अविज्ञाततत्त्वे इति।" (p. 131) which means that in order to have *saṃśaya* one should have some kind of knowledge which needs determination in its specificity.

There is also a puzzling discussion in Uddyotakara of what could be meant by the phrase "अविज्ञाततत्त्वेऽर्थे" as it involves a *samāsa* which can be interpreted differently (p. 131). Similarly, Vātsyāyana seems to suggest that *jijñāsā* necessarily involves undecidability between two opposed positions in respect of the same object. In his own words, "योऽयं ज्ञाता ज्ञातव्यमर्थं जानीते, तं तत्त्वतो जानीयेति जिज्ञासा। स किमुत्पत्तिधर्मकोऽथानुपत्तिधर्मक इति विमर्शः।" (p. 36).

1.2

The second section of the first *adhyāya* is concerned with all

the topics mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.1 after the ones that have been discussed in the first section. The topics are concerned with the different ways in which persons try to win in an argument which is not supposed to be fair according to the rules of debate and discussion. One of the ways which is described as (1.2.13) *sāmānya chala* needs perhaps a more elaborate and intensive discussion. All argument necessarily involves a movement between universalization and instantiation, that is, seeing the particular as an instance of the universal and conversely testing the universal by the particular example in which it is supposed to be exemplified. This double movement is the essence of thinking as it simultaneously reveals the limitation of both the universalization and the power of the particular to establish a point in a rational discussion where it can not do so without being taken as an instance of a universal. Similarly, the discussion of the topic under *jāti* (1.2.17-18) is also not clear and needs to be explained further.

2.1

The second adhyāya begins with an examination of *samśaya* and tries to answer the objections which might possibly be raised against the definition given in the sūtra 1.1.23. The discussion seems to centre around the examples which may be confused with the characteristics given of doubt in the earlier definition. One may, for example, consider a discussion where conflicting positions are held by the disputants and think that it is an example of doubt as two opposed positions are being entertained by them. Similarly, one may think that the discussion of *pūrva pakṣa* in a sūtra is a sign of 'doubt' in it. But these can not obviously be considered cases of doubt as 'doubt' has to be entertained by the same person who is not sure or certain about either of the positions entertained.

The discussion on this in the commentaries is not clear and in fact, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Mīśra seem to question both the interpretation and contention of Vātsyāyana in this regard.

One of the issues raised is how the *parīkṣā* or examination of the topics given in the sūtra 1.1.1 starts with *samśaya* and not *pramāṇa*. The logic of the change in sequence is revealed in sūtra 2.1.8 which questions the very possibility of there being any *pramāṇa*, as all *pramāṇas* are themselves subject to essential doubt. This obviously refers to Nāgārjuna's powerful attack on the possibility of their being any *pramāṇa*, including *pratyakṣa*, for the establishment of anything as, according to him, the very notion of *pramāṇa* is self-contradictory, for it assumes that the ground of justification itself needs no justification. The process of justification is as unending as any other process and hence nothing can ever be really 'proved', as that on the basis of which something is proved itself needs a proof. The recourse to the idea of 'self-proved' or *svataḥ pramāṇa* can not help in the matter as if something is accepted as 'self-justified' then why should not everything else be considered to be so? One would have to grant this at least as a logical possibility and in case this is accepted the very necessity of engaging in *pramāṇa vyāpāra* will lose all rational justification. Prabhākara's is perhaps the only position which comes close to this, but it is more psychological than epistemological in nature.

After the discussion on the possibility of *pramāṇa* itself, the text turns to the specific examination of each *pramāṇa* from 2.1.21 onwards. The objection that in the definition of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* in 1.1.4 the contact of *ātman* and *mannas* has not been mentioned even though it is necessary for perceptual cognition to arise is answered by pointing out that, firstly, such a contact is required in all cognition and is not specific to perceptual cognition only and secondly, that if this were to be mentioned then the other eternal objects such as space, time etc. will have to be mentioned also. The discussion on sūtras 2.1.26-30 draws attention to certain phenomena which may be characterized as involuntary apprehension of sensory objects where the object forces itself on our attention even when there is no voluntary effort on our part, as in suddenly waking up on hearing some

loud sound. In such a case the contact of *ātman* and mind for the apprehension of the sensed object will only be 'postulational' in character and, in any case, will have to be given only a secondary or marginal importance. Attention, however, is also drawn to instances where even though *mdriyārtha sannikarṣa* exists, but if mind is absent then no perception takes place. (The discussion on the sūtra 2.1.26 is not quite clear and the commentaries need to be closely examined in this regard).

The discussion from sūtras 2.1.31 to 36 raises the question regarding the inevitable presence of inference in perceptual cognition as what we actually perceive is only a part and never the 'whole' that we are said to perceive. The discussion tries to answer the objections at two levels. One, that even if the point were to be conceded the conclusion will not follow as at least the 'part' will have to be perceived. The second point in respect of the objection tries to distinguish between 'wholes' whose parts themselves can be perceived if one wishes to do so and 'wholes' whose parts can not be perceived in principle, even if one tries to do so. The example of the second is supposal to be provided by such entities as ultimate atoms which are said to constitute all physical objects that we perceive. These atoms are supposed to be imperceptible, even though they constitute the 'wholes' that we perceive. The parts of the 'wholes' of former type are said to be such as those that constitute a forest or an army. The discussion in the commentaries does not seem to distinguish between 'wholes' that are perceptually apprehended and hence are essentially perceptual in nature and those which are built out of theoretically postulated entities and hence themselves have to be thought of as theoretical in character. There is an interesting discussion regarding the notion of identity and difference and it is contended that the concept of a 'perceptual whole' involves necessarily the notion of identity. The crucial discussion regarding the notions of *bheda* and *abheda* is carried on in the context of the debate between the advaitin and the non-advaitin, but it has not generally been noticed that the concepts have been discussed

earlier in the context of our perceptual knowledge of the parts and the whole. The discussion in the commentaries may be closely examined from this point of view. Uddyotakara, for example, writes, "अस्ति च भिन्ने उपलभ्यमाने भेदस्यादर्शनात् । and अनेकस्मिन्नुपलभ्यमानेपि भेदस्यादर्शनादभेदप्रत्ययो भवति" (p. 230 वार्तिक on 2.1.36). It may be noted that he already shows an awareness of the idea of ultimate atoms as constituting physical objects that are perceived by the senses, an idea which is generally ascribed to *Vaiśeṣika* as if it were their discovery.

The discussion of *anumāna* from sūtra 2.1.37 onwards is primarily based on the relation between cause and effect and not on what is called *upapatti* in the Indian logical tradition. Also, the objections raised are primarily empirical in character and are based on what is called plurality of causes and intermixture of effects in the western logical tradition. Furthermore, as the causal relation necessarily involves a temporal relation, the discussion of time is brought in and the usual problems in respect of the distinction between present, past and future is raised in connection with the problem of inference or *anumāna*. An interesting point is made that if 'causality' provides the basis for the inference either in respect of the past or of the future, then their reality has to be accepted. Not only this, the idea of action is brought in and it is argued that action necessarily involves the distinction between the present and the future and hence the reality of the distinction has to be accepted if action is to be regarded as real.

Besides this there is an interesting discussion of the phenomenon of 'falling' (2.1.39) which recalls to some extent the paradoxes of motion as articulated by Zeno in the Western tradition. The paradox is, however, formulated not in terms of the infinite divisibility of space or time, but rather of the impossibility of conceiving any state in the process of 'falling' as being 'present' which is essential to the concept of 'time' without which the phenomenon of 'falling' can not be understood at all. The paradox may be presented as follows; " 'Falling' necessarily involves the notion of time and the notion of time

necessarily involves the distinction between the present, past and the future. But in the state of 'falling' the 'present' can never be conceived to be present at all and hence 'falling' can not be regarded as being in time. But if it can not be so regarded, it can not be real."

The analysis of time and the problems relating to it need to be understood further as they are articulated in the discussion given later in the commentaries. (See the discussion in Vārttika on p. 239 and Ṭikā on p. 356.)

It appears that the problem regarding the phenomenon of "falling" was raised by Nāgārjuna and, if so, one will have to assume that the problem was being generally discussed at that time or alternatively, either Nāgārjuna or Gautama borrowed the example from the other.

The discussion on *upamāna* becomes more sophisticated and complex in the commentaries where its relation to *pratyakṣa* on the one hand and the *śabda* of an *āpta puruṣa* on the other is explored further and its distinction from them is articulated. However, one of the basic problem with respect to both *upamāna* and *śabda* does not seem to have been noticed and it is this that the notions of 'similarity' and 'reliability' or 'trustworthiness' are fundamental to all knowledge as it is inconceivable without them. Even in *pratyakṣa* there is said to be the essential element of *pratyabhijñā* which involves recognition and hence similarity of the present with the past. As for *śabda*, one has to accept reliability and trustworthiness of even one's own memory, let alone of that which is said by someone else. Knowledge is a collective enterprise and, in case it is so, *śabda pramāṇa* will have to be regarded as the most foundational in its acquisition. At a deeper level, language itself involves recognition and though *upamāna* can not be reduced completely to the recognition of similarity, still it has to have it as an essential element without which it can not even be conceived to be what it is.

In *Śabda viśeṣa parikṣā* Vācaspati Miśra introduces the notion of *Īśwara* in the context of *śabda pramāṇa* and in doing so

destroys the notion of the "*āpta puruṣa*" in terms of which the idea of *śabda pramāṇa* was defined by the author of the N.S. If *Īśwara* alone can be an *āpta puruṣa* then obviously there can be no other person or persons who can be given that appellation. The explicit denial of the characterization to both the Buddha and the Mahāvīra supports this, for if they can not be regarded as *āpta puruṣa*, who can be regarded as such? Udayana also accepts this introduction and calls him "*parameśwara*" but neither he nor Vācaspati Miśra see the problem created by the bringing in of the notion of *Īśwara* or *Parameśwara* to safeguard the authority of the Vedas. The sūtra 2.1.68 explicitly refers to *Āyurveda* as example to support the contention that there is such a thing as *śabda pramāṇa* but then *Āyurveda* will have to be regarded as the word of *Īśwara* and hence final in respect of what it deals with. This obviously will be difficult to maintain in face of the fact that the texts known as *Āyurveda* show unmistakable signs of additions and alterations even at the time when Vācaspati and Udayana were writing their commentaries.

There is another problem which does not seem to have been faced by either of the commentaries, that is, if *śabda* in order to be regarded as *prāmāṇika* has to be the *śabda* of *Īśwara*, then how can it be *anitya*, a doctrine that the author of the Nyāya sūtra vigorously supports as against the theory of *śabda nityatva* propounded by the *Mīmāṃsakas*.

It may also be noted that while both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara used the term "*puruṣa*", Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana used the terms *Īśwara* and *Parameśwara*, thus suggesting that the whole idea of *śabda pramāṇa* had undergone a sea-change since the times it was propounded by Gautama in his N.S. and when Vātsyāyana had said: "ऋष्यार्यम्लेछानाँ समानँ लक्षराँ (p.14)"

2.2

The discussion regarding *arthāpatti* raises two interesting issues which do not seem to have been distinguished in the

commentaries on the sūtra. The first relates to the question whether *arthāpatti* can be regarded as an instance of *anumāna* and hence need not be considered as an independent *pramāṇa* in itself, while the second concerns the question as to how can *arthāpatti* be regarded as a *pramāṇa* at all when it is essentially infected by *anekāntikatā*. In the former case, *arthāpatti* is regarded as a valid form of inference; what is questioned is only the acceptance of it as an independent *pramāṇa* which is irreducible to *anumāna*, or any of the other *pramāṇas* accepted by the Nyāya sūtra. The defect of *anekāntikatā*, however, is supposed to infect *anumāna* itself. Gautama's reply to this in the sūtra 2.1.6 is that in case the objection is correct, it will infect the argument given by the opponent and hence invalidate it also.

The various commentaries do not appear to have seen the problem raised by Gautama's rejoinder as no attempt is made to find the distinguishing character of that type of *anumāna* which is not infected by *anekāntikatā*. Uddyotakara has tried to define *anekāntikatā* as "स्वविषयतज्जातीयान्यवृत्तिः" (p. 265 वार्तिक on sūtra 2.2.6) but the lead given by him does not seem to have been followed further.

It is interesting to note that Vācaspati Miśra uses the term *avacchedaka*, perhaps for the first time in his *Tikā* on sūtra 2.2.6 when he writes "गृहावच्छिन्नाभावेन गृहसत्त्वं विरुद्धत्वात् प्रतिषिध्यते" (p. 392).

The discussion on *abhāva* seems to take a strange turn as the reason for denying *abhāva* as an independent *pramāṇa* is given in terms of the non-existence or *asiddha* character of that which it is supposed to establish. This, it should be noted, is the complete opposite of what shall happen when *abhāva* is accepted as an independent *padārtha* by the Vaiśeṣikas after Śivāditya's specific formulation of it in his *Saptapadārthi*.

The discussion takes an interesting turn from Vācaspati onwards when he brings in the notion of *prāgabhāva* into the picture and seems to suggest that *prāgabhāva* is something that is inferred from the perception of the object whose *bhāva* or

existence is known through it (It may be noted in this connection that Vācaspati uses the more appropriate term for what he wants to convey.) Udayana appears to go a step further and suggests that the object of *pratyakṣa* should be seen as a *pratiyogī* of its *prāgabhāva*. This is real introduction of *navya nyāya* terminology which later becomes standard in the description of *abhāva* in the *navya nyāya* tradition (p. 393). The extensive use of the term *pratiyogī* in connection with the discussion in *Pariśuddhi* on this topic may be specifically noted.

The inclusion of *aitihya* under *śabda* raises a problem which has not been seen either by the author of the N.S. or his commentators. In case *aitihya* is considered to be *paramparā*, then it will have to be regarded as beginningless in character and hence as *apauruṣeya*, thus, destroying the distinction between *pauruṣeya* and *apauruṣeya* as argued for by the mīmāṃsakas.

Śabda anityatva—One of the interesting issues in connection with the non-eternality of sound occurs in sūtra 2.2.31, 32 and 33 where the problem of identity and difference is raised. The discussion in Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra should be closely examined for the issues that they raised. Uddyotakara, for example, writes, "यदिदमन्यदिति मन्यसे इदमन्यस्माद् अन्यद् वा स्याद्, अनन्यद् वा । यद्यन्यत्, अन्यत् न भवति । यथा ब्राह्मणादन्यो न ब्राह्मरा इति । अथानन्यत्, तथाप्यन्यत् न भवति, अनन्यत्वात्" (p. 288) and Vācaspati Miśra writes, "तयोरन्यानन्योर्मध्येऽनन्यस्यापेक्षत्वसिद्धेरित्यर्थः" (p. 412). Perhaps the contention is that neither identity nor difference can be understood apart from each other and hence every assertion of identity or difference implies the assertion of the other in the context of which alone it makes sense.

The discussion from sūtras 2.2.39-57 deals with two different problems. The first relates to the question whether sound can be treated as a quality in the same sense as other qualities belonging to the different sense organs. The reason given for a radical difference between sound and other sense qualities is that it is

never the same and continuously varies in intensity which is not the case with other qualities which are apprehended by different sense organs. The other problem that is being raised depends firstly on the distinction between *dhvani* and *varṇa* and secondly on the fact that sound in the form of letters undergoes transformation when combined with each other. The discussion in the commentaries does not seem to see the importance of the issue raised in the sūtra (both Vācaspati and Udayana interpret the sūtras in the context of the *Sāṅkhyan* contention that the *prakṛti* is *nitya pariṇāmī* and do not see that the problem discussed is the generalized issue of change and permanence in the context of sound in the sūtra concerned. Interestingly, Udayana makes a contention that the change can occur only in *dravya* and not in the *guṇas* “प्रकृतिविकारभावस्यापि द्रव्यमात्रविषयत्वात्” (p. 410). Also, he distinguishes between Buddhist notion of change and the *Sāṅkhyan* notion of *pariṇāma* which have not generally been seen in this perspective, ‘विकासे हि नाम न बौद्धनयवत् पूर्वस्य निरन्वयनिवृतावुतरस्य प्रादुर्भावः सांख्यस्य विवक्षितः, किं त्ववस्थितस्यैव धर्मिणः पूर्वधर्मतिरोभावे धर्मान्तरस्याविर्भावः।’ (p. 410). Also, it is not clear that the term *varṇa* used in the sūtra should be translated as indicating the ultimate units of meaning or as letters, a term that does not clearly distinguish between what is denoted by the terms *svara* and *vyanjana* in the Sanskrit language.

The sūtras 2.2.57 onwards discuss the power of words to convey meaning and through that to determine action and feelings. In this connection Vātsyāyana propounds the ‘use theory of meaning’ which is associated with the name of Wittgenstein in the modern times. He writes, for example, ‘शब्दस्य प्रयोगसामर्थ्यात् पदार्थवधारणम्’ (p. 129 Bhāṣya on sūtra 2.2.59). Also, there is an extended discussion in Uddyotakara regarding the issue whether a word primarily indicates an individual, a form or a universal or all of these together. There is an interesting statement which states that if the universal is truly a universal it can have no ‘*bheda*’ or ‘difference’ within it. The exact statement is “एका

जातिः। तस्या विशेषणमनर्थकम्” (p. 300 Vārttika on sūtra 2.2.60). The problem is complex as in case the universal itself is to be differentiated from other universals, it is bound to have difference within it as it will have to be defined in terms of that from which it is different. In case it is truly universal in the sense that it is universal of universals, then it will have no difference within it as there will be no ‘other’ universal besides it. This is the problem of defining Being qua Being, that is, ‘being’ that is exemplified in everything. But, in that case one would have to deny completely the intelligibility of the notion of “non-being”, a problem which thought has not been able to solve for, if *abhāva*, or non-being, is treated as a *padārtha* then there will be the related problem of defining ‘being’ not in terms of that which ‘is’ but also that which it ‘is not’. This, however, would once again bring in difference within that which was supposed to have no difference within it.

3.1

The sūtras 3.1.1-3 seem to be concerned with the unity of the object that is perceived by different senses. The restriction to the sense of touch and sight in the sūtra 3.1.1 may perhaps more appropriately be seen as concerned not with the unity, but with the independent reality of the object as it is the sense of touch which ensures that something is ‘really’ there. The problem of the unification of different sensory objects into one complex whole is not adequately raised at all nor is its importance seen, particularly when one remembers the discussion on the subject in Kant where this becomes the central point in understanding what knowledge really involves.

The discussion from 3.1.4 onwards seems to be concerned with the question why *manas* can not be regarded as performing the function of the ‘knower’ and the answer seems to be that the *manas* itself performs the same function as that of the senses as it may be said to know pleasure and pain. There seems to be a systematic ambiguity in the use of the terms *manas* and *buddhi*

in the text as, on the one hand, they are supposed to be not instruments of cognition like the senses but as performing only a restrictive function ensuring that only one knowledge arises at one time (*manas*), while *buddhi* is supposed to be a synonym of knowledge itself. This is supposed to be the formal 'official' position of Nyāya, but the discussion continuously interchanges *manas* with *antaḥkaraṇa* which is supposed to be the organ of introspective cognition and not just of pleasure and pain, while *buddhi* is supposed to be the instrument of inferential cognition, that is, *anumāna*. The argument is that as these are instruments of cognition, like the senses, the knowledge that is produced by them can not belong to them and hence there is the need for the postulation of an entity separate from them which can be said to be the organiser or the knower to whom the knowledge may be said to belong. A simpler argument would have been that as these themselves are the objects of cognition, they can not be treated as that to which the cognition belongs.

There is another problem which has not been paid sufficient attention either by the author of the N.S. or by the other schools of Indian philosophy. This relates to the question regarding the relation between the objects known by the sense organs, the mind and the intellect and the relation that obtains between these instruments of cognition which are supposed to be different from one another. The body along with the senses, it should be remembered, dies and one may assume that the objects which are known through them cease to be known in case they are supposed to be exclusively known by the sense alone. One would then have to postulate that the mind and intellect which are supposed to be *independent* instruments of knowledge will survive the death of the body. In case one does not want to accept this, one will have to accept that these are also located in the body in the same sense as the senses are, or they are its functions as the so-called sensory functions are supposed to be.

The notion of *antaḥkaraṇa* is widely prevalent in Indian philosophy but it is seldom made clear what exactly does it

connote. Also, if it is regarded as *jaḍa* or unconscious as in advaita Vedānta on the analogy of *buddhi* in *sāṃkhya*, then how can it be said to 'know' and what will be the difference between it and the senses which so obviously belong to the body which certainly is not *jaḍa* or inert as it is alive. The Upaniṣadic upāsanā of *prāṇa* or the principle of life has not been sufficiently explored in Indian thought which, like its western counterpart, has been satisfied with the distinction between 'conscious' and 'unconscious', or between mind and matter, forgetting that the body is not material as it is living, full of life and zest.

Interestingly, the discussion on the sūtra is intrigued by the fact that while we have two eyes there is supposed to be only one act of 'seeing'. But there are other senses like ears and nose which are also dual in nature. As for touch it is spread all over the body and is co-extensive with it. Taste seems to be the only exception, though it is difficult to say whether tongue alone tastes, or the other parts of the mouth are also actively involved in it, as they are supposed to be in the production of speech or sound.

The sūtra 3.1.28 specifically cites the *śruti* for the first time in support of an argument. Vātsyāyana in his *bhāṣya* specifies the *śruti vākya* as belonging to the *Rgveda* 10.16.3. The *mantra* seems to say that the eyes belong to the sun while the body belongs to the earth as they arise from these. It is strange to find that the senses are supposed to be different from the body. Not only this, normally smell or *gandha* is supposed to be apprehended by the *ghrāṇendriya* which is supposed to be located in the nose just as the sight is located in the eyes. There seems little reason, therefore, to ascribe *gandha* to the *śarīra* or the body as the *bhāṣya* seems to say. The exact wording of the *mantra* is "सूर्यं ते चक्षुर्गच्छतात्...पृथिवी ते शरीरम्।" and the *bhāṣya* thereon reads as follows "सेयं कारणाद् विकारस्य स्प्रतिरभिधीयते इति।" (p. 153). This seems a purely *sāṃkhyān* position where the *kārya* is the *vikāra* of *kāraṇa*. Uddyotakara in his *Vārttika* seems to be aware of this and hence tries to modify the position by saying "प्रलयशब्देन च कार्यशून्यं कारणमभिधीयते, न पुनः कार्यस्य कारणे लयः प्रलयः।" (p.

351).

Vācaspati has nothing new to say on the subject except that the term *sprati* means *utapatti* (p. 478). Udayana tries to deal with the question whether all the five *mahābhūtas* of which the five senses are supposed to be subtle modifications are so, separately from each of them or from all of them together. As the Sāṃkhya position unifies them all ultimately in *prakṛti*, Udayana seems to try to distinguish the Nyāya position from that of Sāṃkhya on this issue. The discussion should be seen in detail in order to understand Udayana's position and his relation to the earlier commentaries on the sūtra (p. 447). All in all, the appeal to the *śruti* only seems to have confused matters instead of clarifying them. Not only this, the author of the N.S. as well as the commentators on it seem to have forgotten that if the *śruti* were to be treated as a *śabda pramāṇa*, then the mantra quoted will have to be treated as an *upadeśa* of an *āpta puruṣa* which it certainly is not as it deals with a factual matter.

The sūtra 3.1.36 seems to propound a general view that the perceptibility or non-perceptibility (अनुपलब्धि) of substances and qualities depends on the difference in their properties (धर्म). The discussion in the *Bhāṣya* brings in the knowledge of physics and optics of those times and suggests that the imperceptibility of the substances is because of the size of the molecules contained therein. Surprisingly, it suggests that it is the molecules of water in the air that are supposed to be responsible for cold while it is the molecules of light that are responsible for warm weather (p. 155). The discussion provides an important clue to the physics of those times and should be examined from this point of view. Unfortunately, Uddyotakara does not seem to be interested in this aspect of Vātsyāyana's discussion. Vācaspati does not carry the discussion forward; Udayana avoids the discussion altogether, showing that the philosophers had become far removed from the empirical knowledge of their times.

There is another point which needs to be paid some attention. This relates to the question whether the term 'dharma' in the sūtra

is to be applied to *dravya* only or to *guna* also. In case the latter is permitted, it will imply that qualities or *gunas* can have their own dharma, that is, properties. This will go against the accepted orthodox position of Nyāya that a property can not have a property of its own. This perhaps was a later development as the N.S. shows little evidence of having propounded such a position.

The sūtras 3.1.31-50 discuss in great detail the peculiar problem raised by the sense of sight and, surprisingly, give a picture of philosophical discussion which generally is neglected when people talk about Indian philosophy. The wealth of empirical detail mentioned in the sūtras and the critical attitude displayed in assessing them is worth noting.

The same thing is displayed in the discussion of the sūtras from 3.1.50 onwards where the discussion centres on the question whether one need postulate five different senses or they all may be regarded as modifications of one sense which may be identified with the sense of touch. This reminds one of the theory generally accepted in modern times that all the senses are differentiations from one primal sense which life displays at all levels and this is the sense of touch.

The argument in 3.1.58 not only suggests that there are categories of perception but also that each of these categories has a five-fold aspect into which it is necessarily differentiated. The term used is strange and once again raises the problem as to how the term '*buddhi*' is to be understood in the context of the N.S. in particular and the Nyāya tradition in general.

The sūtras 3.1.60 onwards discuss the puzzling problem of the relation between the senses and their objects and the qualities they apprehend in them. There is also the problem whether senses by themselves are capable of knowing the qualities along with their object or they need co-operation from some other faculties such as mind etc. for having the knowledge effectively. There is the, even stranger, problem of the uniqueness of the auditory faculty which is said to be radically different from all others. One reason that has been given for this problem is that sound is

supposed to be the quality of *ākāśa* which is not known on any other ground, or from any other source, whatsoever. One of the strange conclusions is supposed to be reached in the statement that the auditory organ itself may be regarded as identical with *ākāśa* which is sought to be justified by Uddyotakara in his statement “आकाशं परिशेषात् ।” (p. 375). Not only this, the Vārttika even raises the question regarding the identification of the auditory organ with space or time or *dik* and *kāla*. Vācaspati gives up the whole set of problems in desperation and argues that these are not empirical matters at all and may be left to purāṇas for decision about them. He writes “भूतसृष्टिप्रतिपादकेषु पुराणेषु नैतर्हीति । नेदानीमननुभवादित्यर्थः ।” (p. 492). Perhaps what Vācaspati means is that the question of origination and beginning can not be decided by empirical observation and arguments. But, then, the argument was not concerning either the origination or the beginning of the senses or the knowledge of their objects. Udayana, in his turn, ignores the issues altogether. There could be no greater evidence of the decline of the empiricist tradition in Indian philosophy than the one that occurs from Gautama to Udayana as evidenced and documented in the Bhāṣya, Vārttika and Pariśuddhi during the first millenium A.D.

The discussion in *adhyāya* 3.1 raises certain issues regarding visual and auditory perception which need to be paid attention as they raise some problems which need serious consideration even now. The following are some of the issues raised in the text: (1) Light not only reveals but also hides as in the case of sunlight which makes it impossible to see stars in the light. (2) Darkness does not necessarily entail that one can not see anything in it, for animals see in the darkness. (3) Eyes must have a natural light of their own as some of the animals' eyes shine brightly and are visible in the darkness. (4) Everything that intervenes between the eyes and the object does not necessarily obstruct the vision as is the case with transparent objects. (5) The ears have a cavity or an empty space within them which seems to be necessary for the appearance of sound therein. But sound is only produced

when two different things are struck together. What is it then which strikes the ear and how can an empty space be struck by anything at all? (6) Why should not all the senses be regarded as different examples of the universal sense?

3.2

The surprising mention of *karma* and *ākāśa* in the context of the question of eternity or non-eternity of *buddhi* is sought to be explained by the Bhāṣya on the ground that *buddhi* seems to share some properties with both of them and as *karma* is obviously *anitya* and *ākāśa* is *nitya*, the doubt regarding the eternity or non-eternity of *buddhi* arises. This, though plausible, is hardly credible as one can always find such instances to create artificial doubt in one's mind.

The meaning of the term *buddhi* is not clear in the context as, on the one hand, it is identified with knowledge or *jñāna* which itself is considered as something acquired or as something which is the 'result' of an activity, that is, *upalabdhi*. But, if it is understood in this sense then it obviously can not be *nitya*, a point that is clearly formulated by Vācaspati “अथ तु नित्यत्वसाधनानि प्रतिसन्धानादीनि न बुद्धिनित्यत्वस्येशते, ततो वृत्रय एव बुद्धयो न तु तदतिरिक्तं बुद्धितत्वं सिध्यतीती सिध्यति ।” (p. 496, sūtra 3.2.1).

The term '*buddhi*' may also be understood in the sense of a faculty or even as an instrument that results in knowledge and it is in this sense that the discussion occurs in Vācaspati and Udayana where it is articulated in the context of Sāṃkhya notion of *buddhi* and *mahat*. *Buddhi* in this discussion is seen as involving *kriyā*, *kartā* and *karana* and as *jñāna* is supposed to be *upalabdhi* of this *kriyā*, its *āśraya* can not be *buddhi* but has to be the self or *ātman*. In Vācaspati Miśra's own words “प्रधानक्रियाचेयभुपलब्धिः । अतो यदाधारा सा प्रतीयते स कर्ता न करणम् । तथा च प्रतत्यभिज्ञानाद्युपलब्ध्या तदाधारः कर्ता आत्मा सिध्यति नित्यो नान्तःकरणमित्यर्थः ।” (*Tīkā* on sūtra 3.2.3, p. 497). As for the notion

of *karāṇa* Vācaspati gives the following interesting definition of it; “प्रधानक्रियानाधारः करणम् ।” (p. 497)

The fact that knowledge persists even when the object of knowledge ceases to be there is given as an argument for the contention that knowledge therefore has to be accepted as a property of something else and this can only be the self or the *ātman*. Vātsyāyana in his explication of the sūtra adds that knowledge can only be the property of the self as when the self ‘ceases’, there can be no knowledge. The argument is strange as it presupposes both that the self is ‘independently’ known to exist and that it is something that can ‘cease’ to be. Normally, the Naiyāyika treats the self as *nitya* and proves its existence on the ground that knowledge has to belong to it as it can not belong to anything else. The exact statement of Vātsyāyana reads as follows “न च ज्ञातरि विनष्टे ज्ञानं भवितुमर्हतीति ।” (p. 185, sūtra 3.2.18).

Uddyotakara also seems to accept the possibility of the cessation of, or the non-existence of, the knower or the experiencer. Uddyotakara writes, “यथैव ज्ञातारमन्तरेण ज्ञानं न भवति, एवमनुभवितरि नष्टे अनुभवितारमन्तरेण स्मृतिरप्ययुक्तेति” (p. 395 on sūtra 3.2.18). Udayana makes another astounding statement which normally would not be acceptable to “orthodox” Naiyāyikas of modern times. He not only accepts the possibility of activity of the ‘self’ but also seems to argue for the position that ‘knowledge’ involves essentially an activity on the part of the *ātman* or the self. Besides this, he also makes the self the *āśraya* of the *saṃsakāra* and *anubhava*. In his own words, “तथापि परलोकिनमात्मानं साधयता बुद्धिं प्रति कर्तृत्ववत् शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तस्यैव स्मृतिसंस्कारनुभावाश्रयत्वमपि प्रसाधितम्...” (p. 478 on the same sūtra). Udayana, thus, seems to make a distinction between knowledge and experience or *jñāna* and *anubhava* on the one hand and *smṛti* and *saṃskāra* on the other. Uddyotakara had already mentioned *anubhava* in his Vārttika but had not mentioned *saṃskāra*. The distinctions, however, do not seem to have been developed further in the

Nyāya tradition. Nor, as far as we know, attention has been drawn to the use of the term *karṣṭva* in connection with the knowing activity of the self.

The discussion deals with the question as to how our knowledge is confined and limited both in space and time when the self is supposed to be omnipresent or *vibhu*. There is a lot of interesting discussion regarding the problems raised by memory in the understanding of knowledge and what is its relation to mind on the one hand and self on the other. There is also the problem as to whether mind or even self can be regarded as confined to the body alone or be considered as independent of it. In this connection some interesting notions such as those of *antaḥ śarīra vṛtti* and *karmāśaya* are brought in without however leading to any clearer understanding of the problems raised. Nor for that matter, is the *vibhu* character of the soul discussed, for how can there, be plurality of selves if each soul is regarded as *vibhu* in character. The discussion on these issues has to be closely looked into and critically evaluated for its philosophical relevance in the contemporary context of discussion.

The discussion seems to centre around two basic issues: (1) whether the apprehension of change necessarily involves an element of continuous changefulness in the ‘apprehension’ itself and, if this be accepted, how can any unitary knowledge be possible. (2) It relates to the question whether any relevant distinction can be made between phenomena that are considered as ‘living’ and the self or the *ātman* on the other. Two important distinctions are pointed out in the discussion; the one concerning freedom from causality and the second relating to the idea of moral responsibility. The former perhaps distinguishes, at least relatively, between the ‘living’ and the ‘non-living’, while the latter may be said to distinguish between man and all other living beings as the former alone seems endowed with moral responsibility whose essence is indicated in the Indian tradition by the theory of karma.

One interesting point which has been made in this connection

in the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika relates to the question whether the body, the senses and the mind can relevantly be ascribed the property of freedom and moral responsibility and as this can not be done, the soul alone is left to which these characteristics may be said to belong. But this is a Sāṃkhyan position which radically distinguishes between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and puts not only the gross and subtle elements on the side of *prakṛti* but also the senses, the mind and even the *buddhi* which it considers as a faculty separate from them. There is an interesting formulation in the Bhāṣya in this connection which reads as follows; "परतन्त्राणि भूतेन्द्रियमनांसि धारणप्रेरसाव्यूहनक्रियासु प्रयत्नवशात् प्रवर्तन्ते ।" (p. 196 on sūtra 3.2.38).

The bhāṣya in this connection makes another statement which seems to imply that only one soul which is distinguished by different bodies seems to constitute the world. The sentence reads as follows, "एकसत्त्वाधिष्ठानश्चानेकशरीरयोगः संसार उपपद्यते ।" (p. 197 on sūtra 3.2.39).

The sūtras 3.2.46-55 deal with the question whether *buddhi* can be considered a property of the body and comes to the conclusion that it can not be so attributed. Once again, it is not clear what does the term '*buddhi*' exactly mean? The *Nyāya Sūcī Nibandha* mentions the *prakaraṇa* discussed in the sūtra as "*buddhiśarīraguṇavyatireka prakaraṇa*" but the bhāṣya clearly uses the term *cetanā* in this context and the discussion also makes sense if it is construed in that context as many of the examples given such as those of hair and nails will not make sense otherwise. Uddyotakara in his Vārttika uses the same term again and even Vācaspati Miśra I uses the term in spite of the fact that in the title of the *prakaraṇa* he explicitly states that while earlier consciousness has been denied as a property of the five elements, the senses and the mind, now it is being explicitly denied of the whole body itself. He writes, "पूर्व हि भूतेन्द्रियमनसौ चैतन्यं साक्षात् निराकृतमुपेक्षात् शरीरस्य, संप्रति तु शरीरस्यैव साक्षात् चैतन्यं निरस्यत इति तात्पर्यभेदादपुनरुक्तम् ।" (p. 539, sūtra 3.2.47). (It is not clear

whether the term *bhūtendriya* means only the five senses or the five elements along with the five senses.)

The problem arising from the term '*buddhi*' in the *prakaraṇa* and *cetanā* in the bhāṣya may perhaps be resolved by seeing that for the author of the N.S. there is an equivalence between knowledge which is a synonym for *buddhi*, that is, *jñāna* and consciousness, that is, *cetanā*. And as knowledge is supposed to be a property of *ātman*, so also is consciousness and as the *buddhi* is supposed to be *anitya*, the *ātman* can not have consciousness as a permanent intrinsic property of itself.

The argument in the commentaries deals with the issue whether consciousness can be considered as a property of body, particularly as it is present when body is present and absent when body is absent. The counter-objection to this is made by pointing out that even if it is so, it does not prove what is sought to be proved as conjunction and disjunction or *saṃyoga* and *vibhāga* are present only when motion is present and absent when motion is absent and yet can not be ascribed as properties to motion. The *pūrva pakṣin* is then supposed to argue that after all a property is ascribed to the 'object' in which it is apprehended and consciousness is obviously apprehended as the property of the body. The objection against this given in the sūtra and elaborated in the commentaries is that even when a property is apprehended as belonging to an object, it may not intrinsically belong to it. The sūtra reads "द्रव्येस्वगुणपरगुणोपलब्धेः संशयः ।" (3.2.46). The Bhāṣya clarifies it further and says "चेतनायां संशयः किं शरीरगुणश्चेतना सति शरीरे गृह्यते, अथ द्रव्यान्तर गुण इति ।" (p. 203) and gives the example of warmth as property of water even when it does not essentially belong to it. But, while this would make consciousness an accidental property of the body, it will not deny its actual presence in it. The term "*dravyāntaram*" should be specially noted as it implies that a substance may come to possess a property which intrinsically belongs to some other substance. The body in the context of the discussion is supposed to be the substance or *dravya* to which the consciousness belongs even

though it is not its essential property which it can only be of the self or the *ātman*. Also, it will make it an essential property of the *ātman* and thus will go against the orthodox nyāya position which denies it absolutely. Not only this, if the identification of *buddhi* with *cetanā* or consciousness is accepted, then *buddhi* will have to be treated as *nitya* and not as *anitya* the way in which it is generally construed by Naiyāyikas.

The discussion on mind from sūtras 3.2.56-59 is puzzling in the extreme as it concentrates on a dubious fact that one knows only one thing at a time and that it has to be atomic in character because of this. Normally, the term mind or '*manas*' is postulated to account for the fact of introspection or the phenomena that it reveals such as wishing, desiring, willing, feeling etc. which are usually designated as "mental" processes. The sūtra text as well as the commentaries on it have earlier talked of *antaḥśarīravṛtti* and *antaḥkaraṇa* which normally should have been ascribed to *manas* but, strangely, the latter does not seem to have anything to do with them in the nyāya thinking on the subject. If it is remembered that the only other faculty after mind which the nyāya postulates is the *ātman*, then one will have to ascribe all the so-called mental processes revealed by introspection to it. The N.S. does talk of *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna*, *sukha*, *duhkha* etc. but nowhere clarifies how they are known except in behavioural terms. The basic problem seems to arise from the fact that the term '*buddhi*' does not mean anything except knowledge without explaining what the term would then mean in this context.

The long discussion on the sūtras 3.2.60-72 deals with the problem posed by the birth and death of the living body and the question whether one need postulate any radical distinction between this and the formation and dissolution of material objects which are essentially non-living in nature. The problem is not clearly articulated and suffers from the unconscious hypothesis that motion, even in material objects, can only come from a force outside them. This has given rise to the notion of a *nimitta kāraṇa* or an efficient cause without which no causality can ever operate,

an idea that ultimately leads to the postulation of God as the creator of the material universe. It took long for man to realize that the idea was not necessary for understanding the physical universe and that motion might be regarded as a natural property of objects, and that what required explanation was rest and not motion. In any case, the discussion does not seem either relevant or adequate. Also, if the problem of the birth of the body is supposed to create a problem, then so should the question of 'birth' or 'coming into being' of mind and *buddhi* or *jñāna* or knowledge.

4.1

The discussion in 4.1 starts with the consideration of *pravṛtti* and *doṣa* which are further specified in detail in the commentaries where particular definitions are given for each of them. The three *doṣas* which are mentioned in the sūtra 4.1.3 as *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* are further divided by Vātsyāyana into "काम, मत्सर, स्पृहा, तृष्णा, लोभ" which come under *ragā*; "क्रोध, ईर्ष्या, असूया, द्रोह, अमर्ष" come under *dveṣa* and "मिथ्याज्ञान, विचिकित्सा, मान, प्रमाद" come under *moha* (p. 220). Udayana adds *māyā* and *daṁbha* under *rāga*, *avamānānā* under *dveṣa* and *bhaya* and *śoka* under *moha*. The term *māyā* means परवचनेच्छा (p. 501). Interesting definitions of these are offered by the successive commentaries giving evidence of subtle phenomenological observation of mental states which are ascribed and designated by these terms. To give but a few examples, Uddyotakara gives the definition of *dveṣa* as "असहिष्णुता दुःखस्य दुःखसाधनानां चेति द्वेषः।" (p. 426 on sūtra 4.1.3). This is a strange definition of *dveṣa*. Vācaspati seems to be aware of this and though accepting it reluctantly, modifies it in an interesting way to suggest that the usually accepted definition of *dveṣa* is only a specific example of this general definition. He writes, "नन्वयं कृतापकारस्य या असहिष्णुता सोमर्ष इति द्वेषस्यैव विशेष इत्युक्तम्, कथं स एव द्वेषसामान्यमुच्यते इत्यत आह—असहिष्णुता दुःखस्य दुःखसाधनानां चेति।" (p. 552 on same sūtra).

Udayana gives an even stranger definition of *māyā* indicating that he was not aware of the way the concept was used in *advaita vedānta* or the *Gītā*. This definition reads as follows "तत्र माया परवचनेच्छा ।" (p. 501, 4.1.3). There is also an interesting definition of what has been called *ārya prajñā* given by Vācaspati which reads as follows, "आरात् तत्त्वाद् याता आर्या/आर्या चासौ प्रज्ञा चेति आर्यप्रज्ञा ।" (p. 552, 4.1.4).

The discussion of *rāga*, *dveśa* and *moha*, as is well known, occurs not only in the N.S. but is a general feature of the Indian tradition, Udayana shows an awareness of this and tries to suggest the specific difference in the Nyāya discussion of the subject from the one found in the *sāṃkhya-yoga* tradition. He writes in this context, "इन्द्रियादिदोषहेतुको हि मोहः, सुखानुशयी रागः, दुःखानुशयी द्वेष इति भावः" (p. 502, sūtra 4.1.6). Earlier he had mentioned five different views about *doṣas* amongst his contemporaries. These are, (i) *kāma*, *krodha* (ii) *śoka*, *moha* (iii) *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveśa* and *abhiniveśa* (iv) *avidyā* (v) *māna*, *matsara* etc. (p. 501, sūtra 4.1.3). Interestingly, most probably the *advaitins* thought that the basic cause of all *doṣas* is *avidyā* and *avidyā* alone as all the rest followed from it. The N.S. seems to suggest this when it says that as the *tattva jñāna* is the antithesis of all these three, that is, *rāga*, *dveśa* and *moha*, and hence they all may be considered as one. However, it counters this objection by saying that even when there may be one common quality which is opposed to a large number of qualities, they remain essentially different from one another. The example given is that of black which is opposed to all the other colours and thus shares the common quality of 'being different from them'; yet, they still remain different from one another. The detailed discussion on all these topics in the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārttika*, the *Ṭikā* and the *Parīśuddhi* is rich and deserves to be studied in detail to taste the phenomenological flavour of *nyāya* writing on this psychological-cum-spiritual topic.

The sūtras 4.1.10-13 argue that the idea of rebirth can only

be intelligible if the eternity of the soul is accepted. The argument, in fact, rests on the acceptance of the doctrine of *karma* and not that of re-birth as what is being argued is that in case the doctrine of *karma* is accepted and it has to be accepted if life is to be morally intelligible, then one has also to accept the identity of the agent who does the action and the one who suffers pleasure and pain because of the actions that one has done. Thus, the identity between the doer of the actions and the one who enjoys its consequences leads, it is argued, to the 'permanence' or *nityatva* of the self or the soul which is another name for that which is supposed to be the 'doer' and the 'enjoyer' at the same time. However, Nyāya does not believe that *kartṛtva* and *bhokṛtva* are essential properties of the self. There is also the anomaly that for exercising both these functions, the self has to depend essentially on the body and all the adjuncts that the exercise of these functions requires.

The sūtras 4.1.14-24 discuss the issue concerning that which may be regarded as the final or ultimate cause which is mentioned as *śūnya* or non-being which is usually ascribed to the school of Nāgārjuna, but it was mentioned as early as the *nāsadiya sūkta* in the Vedas. As for the hypothesis of God or *Īśvara*, the reason given for postulating it reminds one of Malebranche who had argued that the hypothesis of God alone can ensure the objectivity and stability of causal connection, without which moral actions would be come impossible. But none of these alternatives are exhaustively discussed in the sūtras and the commentaries thereon.

The author of the sūtras does not seem much interested in God or *Īśvara* and treats the hypothesis as an *upādāna kāraṇa* almost on the same level as that of *śūnya*, or that of non-being or chance and does not seem to accept it even as an *upādāna kāraṇa*. But, from Vātsyāyana onwards, the hypothesis of God assumes a different form and is taken seriously to account for the existence of all that is. The detailed discussion on this subject from Vātsyāyana to Udayana has to be examined closely to understand the development of philosophical thought about the

necessity for believing in the existence of God in order to understand the world. The usual idea that Nyāya becomes “theistic” only much later is, therefore, wrong and needs to be corrected accordingly.

The discussion on the sūtras 4.1.25-30 regarding the eternity or non-eternity of the world is divided into two parts, the first contending that everything is *anitya*, the second contending that everything is *nitya*. As the author seems to deny both the positions he may be taken to adopt the commonsensical position that some things are *nitya* while others are *anitya*. But there seems to be no discussion about what does it mean to say that something is ‘*nitya*’ or ‘*anitya*’. Vātsyāyana seems to give a criterion of what is to be regarded as *anitya*. He suggests that if something is born or comes into being and is destroyed or disappears then that may be said to be *anitya*. He writes, “यस्य उत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वमुपलभ्य—तेप्रमाणतस्तदनित्यम्। यस्य नोपलभ्यते तद्विपरीतम्।” (sūtra 4.1.28, p. 231). There can be little doubt that in case one does observe origination or destruction then the object or the phenomenon concerned is *anitya*, but in case it is not so observed, then it does not follow that the object is *nitya*, as there can be no guarantee that its cessation or destruction shall never be observed in future. This can be ensured only if the nature of the object itself is such that temporal predicates such as origination and destruction can not be applied to it in principle. But within the Nyāya framework such a criterion is difficult to apply as it does not seem to make any distinction between empirical and non-empirical objects or objects that are essentially spatio-temporal in nature and those to which spatial and temporal predicates can not be applied because they are radically different in nature. The nyāya list of eternal objects includes such things as *parama sūkaṣama bhūtas*, *ākāśa*, *kāla*, *dik*, *ātman*, *mauvas* and their qualities. No reason is given as to why these entities should be regarded as *nitya*. In fact, it is difficult, if not impossible, to give any reason or *hetu* for such a *sādhya* as the *lakṣaṇa* of the *sādhya* can not be given nor the *vyāpti* between the *hetu* and *sādhya* established. Strangely,

Nyāya does not seem to know any relationship except that of *vyāpti* on the basis of which it can establish a valid inference.

The discussion from sūtras 4.1.37-39 is concerned with the issue of difference and identity in objects and concludes that one has to accept both in order to understand phenomena as all that we know consists of *dravya* and *guna* on the one hand and *avayava* and *avayavī* on the other. In other words, everything that exists consists of substance and qualities and of whole and parts. Substances always give unity just as wholeness does, while qualities and parts always give a differentiating character to that which exists.

The *Bhāṣya* makes some interesting observations which, however, do not seem to have been elaborated. These concern the differentiating and unifying properties imposed by language on that which is regarded as ‘given’ or ‘real’. Also, there is an interesting formulation which may be translated as “to be” is to be “differentiated” “भावस्य लक्षणमभिधानम्, येन येन लक्ष्यते भावः स समाख्याशब्दः, तस्य प्रथग्विषयत्वात्।” (sūtra 4.1.34, p. 234). This, of course, is the *pūrva pakṣa* whose answer is given in the sūtra 4.1.35 “नानेकलक्षणैरेकभावनिषपत्तेः।”. Vātsyāyana’s own comment on this states, “गुणाव्यतिरिक्तं च द्रव्यम्” (p. 235).

The discussion on the sūtras 4.1.40-42 is interesting in more than one ways. Vātsyāyana seems to suggest that the answer to a question itself will generate a series of larger and larger number of distinctions intended by the person concerned. For example, in case one says that there is only one reality in the universe, he will make a distinction between the one that is *nitya* or, in other words, unchanging and eternal and all the rest which is *anitya*, that is, changing and impermanent. But in case he makes this distinction, he generates another distinction which consists of at least three entities in the universe. These will consist of the knower, the known and the knowledge, that is, *jñātā*, *jñeya* and *jñāna*. But in case one accepts the notion of *jñāna*, that is, something that is proved or established then one will have to

accept the existence of at least four entities, *pramātā*, *prameya*, *pramāṇa* and *pramiti*. The series can go on expanding and could perhaps have been developed in a different way. The sūtras themselves provide this other direction by suggesting that the contention that reality is one will have to be proved and a ground or a *hetu* provided for it. This itself will increase the number of entities in the universe as the *hetu* will have to be different from *sādhya*, an argument that will be given later by Samantabhadra to refute the advaitic position.

There is also another argument given in the sūtras which asks the question whether the so-called one reality is a whole or not and in case it is an *avayavī*, it is bound to have parts, and if it has parts the total number of entities can not be just one.

The discussion is important as it leads to the question of infinite divisibility on the one hand and indefinite proliferation of entities through the very process of proof of statements on the other. Russell's generation of an infinite number of classes because of the distinction between classes and classes of classes and their indefinite enlargement in this way resulting in the theory of types is well-known in modern times. So also is the distinction between a statement and a statement about the statement resulting in the distinction between object-language and meta-language and the resulting proliferation if one so wishes, is equally well known. It will be interesting to find if the paradoxes of self-reference were encountered in the Indian discussion of the subject. Strangely, later Nyāya discussion on the subject seems to have forgotten the 'objective' aspect of the discussion and centred more on the paradox of self-conscious cognition or *anuvyavasāya* resulting in the distinction between *viśayatā* and *viśayitā* and the indefinite proliferation that this might possibly generate.

The discussion on sūtras 44-51 centres around the problem of causality in human actions and its relation to moral predicates. It also concerns the relation between morality or *dharma* and happiness which has been a central concern of philosophical

thought all over the world. But it raises the question as to whom the moral predicates belong, specially as some of them necessarily involve a reference to the body. There is also a reference to the almost insoluble problem of the notion of 'potentiality' without which the very idea of human action can not be understood as it tries to conceive of causality in the context of its 'utilization' for bringing about an end or result which can be achieved through it. There is, of course; an attempt to distinguish between causality as it operates in the material realm and the way it operates in the human realm, but there seems no clear formulation of the issues which have been discussed in depth in philosophical traditions elsewhere.

Uddyotakara and Vācaspati discuss the issue in detail and at least Uddyotakara's discussion suggests that the very notion of human action entails the use of predicates which can not be understood or translated completely in empirical observable terms. He introduces the notion of *dharma* in this regard and suggests thereby that such a non-empirical property can only belong to something non-empirical in nature, that is, the *ātman* or self. In other words, the human self to the extent it has to be regarded as a moral agent can not be conceived of, in principle, in empirical terms. Uddyotakara seems to suggest further that such a non-empirical property, however, if it is real, must have consequences which themselves will have to be essentially non-empirical, even if they have an empirical dimension to them. Thus, the consequences of moral action have to have a non-empirical aspect even when they are treated as empirical in character.

The discussion is interesting in more ways than one, as it tries to bridge the obviously unbridgeable gap between the death of one body and the rebirth of the other. Strangely, the discussion brings in the notion of something which can neither be described as *sat*, *asat* or *sadasat*, concepts which are supposed to be used exclusively in the context of the description of the reality of the world in *advaita vedānta*.

The discussion on the sūtras 4.1.55-56 does not raise the fundamental question why *janma* or coming into being itself must be regarded as the cause of suffering. It is true that without it there can be neither suffering nor happiness, but it can not be regarded as the 'cause' of either. Nor has it been even thought that the thing that comes into being need not necessarily be conscious in nature and hence capable of feeling pleasure or pain. Material objects do come into being and also cease to exist, but no one will consider them as undergoing suffering. Not only this, no distinction seems to have been made between what may be called 'life' and 'consciousness'. Plants are considered to be 'living', but can they be regarded as possessing 'consciousness' or as feeling pleasure and pain, or 'suffering' because of the very fact that they have come into being.

Interestingly, Vātsyāyana makes a distinction between four grades of intensity of suffering and calls them *utkṛṣṭa*, *madhyama*, *hīna* and *hīnātara* and suggests that all beings including gods and those who are supposed to be *vītarāga* have to suffer. This, according to him, is because all of them possess bodies of some sort or other. According to him, "विविधा च बाधना हीना मध्यमा उत्कृष्टा चेति । उत्कृष्टा नारकिणाम्, तिरश्चां तु मध्यमा, मनुष्याणां हीना, देवानां हीनतरा वीतरागणाम च ।" (p. 245, sūtra 4.1.55). But, this is to forget that suffering can be mental also and even beyond that arises from causes that have nothing to do with either body or mind. Not only this, incurable dissatisfactions may arise because of the gap between the 'is' and the 'ought' or between what man 'is' and what he 'wants' to be or what he thinks he 'ought to be'. Still, one should see the discussion in the Bhāṣya as well as in the *Pariśuddhi* closely, particularly as the latter brings in consideration of *sāṃkhya* into the discussion.

The sūtras 4.1.59-68 discuss the objections that may be raised against the possibility of *apavarga* and should be taken seriously as they raise fundamental objections and also try to give possible replies to them within the tradition. One of the central issues relates to the question whether ignorance and suffering belong

to the very nature of the self or the self is essentially free of them. The example of sleep is invoked to show that one can and actually does get rid of suffering at least temporarily showing that it can not be the intrinsic nature of self. There is also a reference to the inherent conflict between the performance of dharma in the form of *agnihotra* etc. and the pursuit of *apavarga* which is supposed to involve the giving up of the obligation to perform these sacrifices. The reference to the householder's life wherein these sacrifices are supposed to be necessary, once again reveals the conflict between the householder's life and the pursuit of *apavarga* or *mokṣa*. There is also a reference to the renouncement of the fruits of action, but it is both uncertain and unclear.

There does not seem to be much discussion either in the *Bhāṣya* or *Vārttika* and the so-called reference to the *brāhmaṇa* texts is not clearly indicated. The discussion in the *Bhāṣya* seems to refer more to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* upaṇiṣad rather than to the *brāhmaṇa* texts where in case it had occurred, it would have gained an added 'significance'.

4.2

The discussion in 4.2 seems very strange, particularly as it occurs immediately after the discussion of *prētyabhāva* and *apavarga* in 4.1. The long discussion from 4.2.1 to 4.2.36 regarding the reality of whole and parts, atoms and *ākāśa* does not seem to make much sense in the context of the attainment of *apavarga* by the self after getting rid of all the *doṣas* which are said to be due to *pravṛtti* or *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* which constituted it. Perhaps, the discussion may be given some meaning if it is seen in the context of the *ātman* whose nature is to be determined. Is the *ātman* a whole consisting of parts or is it like an atom which can not have parts at all and to which the distinction of 'outside' and 'inside' can not be applied. If so, what is its relation to *ākāśa* or to other selves, for if it can have *samyoga* and *viyoga* or conjunction and disjunction, then one will

have to assume the reality of *ākāśa* in relation to it. In fact, the conjunction of the self with the body, the *indriyas* and the *manas* itself will have to be regarded as some sort of a conjunction whose disjunction results in what may be called *apavarga* and if so *rāga*, *dveśa* and *moha* will have to be regarded as the three different forms of relationships which connects the self to those. But the problem of the relation of self with other *ātman*s will still remain.

The problem has troubled thinkers in the western tradition also and Leibnitz's formulation of the concept of 'monad' as an immaterial atom or centre of conscious force and activity may be seen as a step in this direction.

In any case, the discussions in the commentaries do not seem to throw any light on these questions and as far as the author of the N.S. is concerned, he seems to be of the opinion that none of these questions can be answered in any definitive way. Still the relevance of the discussion and the level at which it occurs do not seem to make much sense. Perhaps the obsession with the Buddhists may explain to some extent the discussion as also the postulation of the notion of atom to understand the world around us.

The discussion from sūtras 4.2.27-37 is concerned with the nature of erroneous cognition or *mithyājñāna* which is the theme of the sūtra 1.1.2 as its removal alone leads to *tattvajñāna* which is supposed to lead to *apavarga*. The necessary relationship between *tattvajñāna* and *mokṣa* or *apavarga* on the one hand and *mithyājñāna* and bondage on the other, is the unquestioned assumption of Indian philosophical thought in general and Nyāya seems to be no exception to it. The Nyāya, however, is supposed to deny the necessary relationship between *apavarga* or *mokṣa* and bliss or *ānanda*, generally accepted by almost all schools of Indian philosophy, even though it accepts the necessary relationship between *mithyājñāna*, bondage and suffering. Ultimately, Indian thought seems so much afraid of 'suffering' in any form whatsoever that it has to postulate that in case one is suffering, it must be because of some 'falsity' in one's knowledge, even though the

general belief is that it is due to some wrong that was committed by one, either in the past life or this. The necessary relationships between truth, morality and happiness seem to be analytically postulated by Indian thinkers, even though there is no substantive evidence or argument in support of this contention. It is this postulate in its pristine purity which may be said to characterize Indian civilization and differentiates it from all the other major civilizations of the world.

The discussion from sūtras 4.2.38-52 is a statement of the standard Indian position on the subject and one is surprised to find it stated in the N.S., as it completely contradicts what has been said earlier in the text. Neither the process of yoga nor the practice of *samādhi* has anything to do with the *pramāṇa prameya vyāparā* with which the text had opened the discussion. Nor do the sixteen *padārthas* mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.1 have any relevance to the real enterprise of gaining the knowledge of 'reality' or *tattvajñāna* which is mentioned here. It is true that the sūtras from 4.2.47 onwards do bring in argumentation, even in the forms of *jalpa* and *vitandā*, back into the picture. But they hardly seem relevant after one has already been advised to go and meditate and find the knowledge of reality through it.

5.1

The fifth chapter deals with fallacies and the discussion, specially as elaborated in commentaries, throws light on the way in which the processes of thought in argumentation were understood in the Indian tradition. Vātsyāyana suggests that all argument is based on the apprehension of similarity or dissimilarity and the inference of other associated qualities on their ground. But similarity or dissimilarity can not only be of various kinds but also stretch along the lines of what Wittgenstein called 'family resemblance' and what in literary context, is known as simile and metaphor. But these can be misleading in character and lead to false conclusions. Vātsyāyana's pithy formulation summarizes

this in a preeminent way. He writes, “साधमर्भ्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्यानस्य विकल्पाज्जातिबहुत्वमिति संक्षेपेणोक्तम्” (p. 283, sūtra 5.1.1). The same is explained in detail as mentioned immediately after “तद्विस्तरेण विभज्यते”. The detailed explication classifies the types of false conclusions which are reached on the basis of similarities and dissimilarities and hence is interesting on its own account and needs to be examined independently.

The discussion is primarily in terms of the notion of ‘*jāti*’ as used in the sūtra 1.1.1 where it is mentioned along with *chala* as one of the *padārthas* and which in the context of a debate may lead to *nigrahsthāna*. But the issue is a far wider one and needs to be disengaged from the specific context in which it has been formulated in the Nyāya tradition. What needs to be explored is the forms which argumentation takes place and the natural mistakes which it makes when engaged in that process. Besides the argument based on similarities and differences, the other important basis for it is the relation between two entities or properties which are of such a nature that whenever one is present the other is present also. This has been called *vyāpti* in the Indian tradition and is generally based on the relation of causality. But it need not necessarily be so as the standard example of the relation between smoke and fire illustrates.

The ground provided by similarity or dissimilarity on the one hand and causality on the other, are both empirical, that is, based on sensory experience. But it need not necessarily be so and a history of self-reflection of thought on its own thinking process may be said to discover more and more of such bases which are either purely non-empirical or only half-empirical in character. The relation of material implication, for example, is an instance of this in modern logic. The same may be said about the relation of *āpādyatā* in the Indian tradition. In any case, the detailed discussion in chapter five needs to be looked into closely for the light it may throw on the notion of fallacy and its different types in the Indian tradition.

The sūtra 5.1.14 raises an interesting question, specially in the context of the Nyāya position that universals or *jāti* is perceptually apprehended as much as the particular or individual. And, hence, one apprehends simultaneously that which is *nitya*, that is *jāti* and that which is *anitya*, that is, particular or individual, at the same time. The problem is posed in respect of language which simultaneously apprehends or grasps both the universal and the particular through that which itself is particular in its aspect as ‘*occurrent*’ or ‘*event*’ and universal in its semantic function or aspect.

The sūtras 5.1.15-20 deal with a situation where doubt occurs either because of similarity or because of dissimilarity and considers the situation where the appeal to dissimilarity or similarity is not able to resolve the doubt for some reason or other. It also brings in complex cases where multiple examples of similarity or dissimilarity engender unresolvable doubt.

There seems to be an important distinction between the use of similarity or dissimilarity in thinking about anything and their giving rise to doubt which needs to be resolved in favour of one or other alternatives. The significance of the issues raised does not seem to have been grasped as neither the role of similarity or dissimilarity has been grasped in the context of thinking in general nor the part they play in engendering doubt in respect of that which we encounter in experience.

At a deeper level the question of the importance of similarity or dissimilarity does not seem to have been raised, nor has it been seen that the relevance of the question or its importance varies with the context in which we are considering the issue or the purpose for which we are trying to engage in the discussion.

The discussion in 5.1 seems to deal with dilemmas created by arguments based on similarity and dissimilarity on the one hand and the relation of cause and effect on the other. Perhaps, the discussion is triggered by Nāgārjuna’s dialectical presentation of the dilemmas through which he tried to disestablish the possibility of any *pramāna* establishing anything at all. The

argument, however, seems to be more general and seems to present a counter-dilemma to all those who manufacture such dilemmas and ask them as to how they can regard their own refutation as valid or establishing anything. At another level, it seems to suggest that all extreme positions are vitiated by the same defect and that perhaps the structure of reason itself is such that it pushes thought to logical extremes which, when reflected upon, seem equally untenable.

The whole section needs to be carefully examined from the view point of the structure of reason and the pure logic of argumentation, an approach later developed by Kant in the western tradition. The discussion also needs to be differentiated from the way dilemmas have been treated in the western logical tradition in order that a clearer picture may emerge of the way Gautama has treated the subject.

5.2

The discussion on nigrāhatāna in 5.2 seems to be the most puerile and useless discussion that one finds in the Nyāya sūtra. It also shows that the discussion and debate held during those times were not concerned with exploring the truth or finding answers to questions by engaging in a joint exploratory intellectual activity. Instead, the whole thing seems to have centred around 'winning' an argument which seems to have become the centre of intellectual life in those times. The inclusion of the topics from *vāda* onwards in the sūtra 1.1.1 explains this aspect, as otherwise the discussion about them will make no sense. The situation seems to have vitiated even the Upaniṣads as is found by what happened in the discussion at Janaka's court.

Chapter 4

A Short Note on Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña

Jayanta's *Nyāya Mañjarī* is a strange work in the Indian tradition. It is not a Bhāṣya or a Vārttika or even a Tīkā on the Nyāya Sūtras. And, though it calls itself a *Vṛtti*, it is nothing of that kind. It is an independent work, related only tangentially to the Nyāya Sūtras and, in fact, falls outside the interpretative tradition set up by Vātsyāyana and followed by Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana. In this, it reminds one of Bhāsarvajña whose work entitled "*Nyāya Bhūṣaṇa*" is also an independent work standing outside the main tradition formed by the four thinkers mentioned above.

There seems, however, a difference between Jayanta's work and the work of Bhāsarvajña, as there seems to have been no commentary on the former during the whole period of about 1200 years, if we believe Potter's data mentioned in his *Bibliography of Indian Philosophy*. Bhāsarvajña, on the other hand, seems to have found commentators on his work.

It is true that Jayanta seems to have mentioned Vācaspati Miśra I, though scholars differ regarding the identity of the exact person referred to by the name of Vācaspati in Jayanta's work. Udayana, on the other hand, seems to have referred to him as an 'old' Naiyāyika; the term used is "jaraja" and as contrast, he calls himself an *ādhunika*.

Jayanta's work discusses the 16 *padārthas* mentioned in the Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.1, ignoring details of the discussion in the Nyāya Sūtra, and though he refers to both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara,