

Chapter 2

Questions and Problems Pertaining to the Sūtras : A Dialogue with the text and development of a new methodology for understanding the Sūtras

Part I - Section I - (41 Sūtras)

Sūtra 1

Chapter 1 Sūtra 1.1.1

The Sūtra gives a list of the topics which are to be discussed in the whole text and has a sequence in which these topics have been given. It is also claimed that a correct knowledge of these topics that is their *tattva jñāna* will lead to Nihśreyasa which usually is regarded as connoting liberation or mokṣa in the Indian tradition.

The following are some of the questions which may be raised with respect to the sūtra:

1. The sūtra is concerned with *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *saṁśaya*, *prayojana*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *siddhānta*, *avayava*, *tarka*, *njñaya*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍa*, *hetvābhāsa*, *chala*, *jāti* and *nigraha sthāna*. These are the topics that have been mentioned in the first sūtra and it is promised that a correct or true knowledge of these will lead to liberation or Nihśreyasa.

It is not clear why the author of the sūtras did not stop with

mentioning the *pramāṇa-prameya vyāpāra* alone as the rest of the topics mentioned are an integral part of these two topics. Furthermore, what the text seems to be basically concerned with is only the theory of proof or inference or evidence on the basis of which we are justified in believing anything or claiming to have knowledge about it. Hence, fundamentally, *only pramāṇa* should have been mentioned as the notion *oi prameya* is relative to it. It is the *pramāṇatva* which establishes that some thing is a *prameya* or not. Rather, everything can become a *prameya* if a *pramāṇa* is given for it.

The first topic mentioned by the author of the sūtra after *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is *saṁśaya* or doubt. Perhaps what the author of *Nyāya sūtras* wants to say is that unless there is some doubt the activity of rational justification does not arise. But, if this is so, then *saṁśaya* should have been mentioned first as it is the doubt which makes one seek the *pramāṇa* and the whole issue of justification is only indulged in to resolve it. Strangely, the fourth topic mentioned is *prayojana* or purpose for which the whole activity of finding a *pramāṇa* is undertaken. But, if *saṁśaya* or doubt is the real ground for engaging in the *pramāṇa-vyāpāra*, there can be no other *prayojana* other than the removal of the doubt which had caused the undertaking of the justificatory activity. On the other hand, if the subject matter of the text is 'knowledge' itself then one could perhaps understand that knowledge itself is sought for some purpose and hence the term *prayojana* is used immediately after *saṁśaya*. But, then, does the author believe that the seeking for knowledge cannot be for its own sake and is always to be for the sake of something else? Whatever be the belief of the author in this connection, the term *prayojana* should have, in such a context, occurred earlier. The next term in the list of topics given in the sūtra is *dṛṣṭānta* or example. It is not clear what the idea of an example is doing in this context. The example to be given has to be of the purpose or of the doubt or of what? The insertion of the topic of example or *dṛṣṭānta* here does not seem to make any sense at all.

There term 'siddhānta' in the sūtra is in a sense irrelevant for, it cannot be different from 'prameya', that is, that which is to be established or proved or justified through the 'pramāṇa' which has to be given. The next term, that is, *avayava*, should refer to the structural elements of *pramāṇa* but surprisingly, it is confined to only one of the *pramāṇas* that is *anumāna* which is supposed to have five elements constituting it. Strangely, *dr̥ṣṭānta* which has been mentioned earlier in the sūtra, is itself a part of the so-called elements of the *anumāna*, which are collectively called by the name of *avayava*.

The term *tarka* only refers to a special kind of reasoning which is generally described as hypothetical in nature. But, if so, it should be treated as a type of *pramāṇa* even though it is not usually regarded as such. In fact, the relation of *tarka* and *anumāna* needs to be clarified in order that the process of reasoning as understood in the Nyāya tradition may be correctly grasped. The term *nirṇaya* seems to be again irrelevant as normally it should be taken to mean the same as *siddhānta* or *prameya*, that is, the one which has been proved or established or decided.

Vāda, *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* are forms of argumentation and they have nothing to do with the strict *pramāṇa-vyāpāra* as they have nothing to do with the argument. *Hetvābhāsa*s are, of courses, the enumeration of the possible types of fallacious reasoning. As for *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrah-sthāna*, these are terms that have nothing to do with the theory of *pramāṇa*, as they refer to debate or strategies employed by disputants to win an argument, the last specifically referring to winning or losing which can hardly be considered to be the *prayojana* of engaging in the *pramāṇa-vyāpāra* to attain certitude or knowledge.

The 'extensional' enumeration of the subject-matter of the Nyāya-sūtras, thus, is an amalgamation of two different discourses, the one relating to the forms of argumentation between different persons debating a point and winning or losing in the argument, and the other relating to the theory of proof or justification. The

mixing of these different discourses in the first sūtra is a sign of a basic confusion in the mind of Gautama, the supposed author of the Nyāya-sūtra.

The claim that a correct knowledge of all the elements mentioned in the sūtra will lead to *tattva-jñāna* is preposterous as, firstly, to win a debate certainly cannot be a sign of having knowledge of that which is ultimately real, assuming that the term *tattva* in the sūtra refers to that which is ultimately real, as it would only prove that one is more skillful in debate or argumentation than the other with whom one is debating. Moreover, the idea that from this one would get *Niḥśreyas*, that is, liberation or *Mokṣa*, is highly debatable, for it is difficult to see how a knowledge of valid argument can ever give rise to a state of being or consciousness, which is free from any kind of determination or bondage.

The second sūtra is strange in as much as it does not seem to follow from the first. It neither talks of *Niḥśreyas*, nor of *tattva-jñāna* or *oi pramāṇa*, which one would normally expect to be dealt with after the subject-matter of the Nyāya-sūtras had been laid down in the first sūtra. It may be said that the sūtra carries on the discussion of *Niḥśreyas* by spelling out what *Apavarga* is, which is merely another name for *Niḥśreyas*, and also links the discussion to the term *tattva-jñāna* by suggesting that it is the opposite of that which is *Mithyā-jñāna* which is the cause of the non-attainment of *apavarga* or *Niḥśreyas*. However, *tattva-jñāna* can not be the opposite of *mithyā-jñāna*, for the correction of an illusory perception, which is a fair example of a *Mithyā-jñāna*, will generally not be taken to be as *tattva-jñāna*. Also, the sequence given in the sūtra of *Mithyā-jñāna* leading to *doṣa* which itself leads to *pravṛtti* giving rise to *janma* and then to *duḥkha* does not seem to be correct. Illusory knowledge can give rise to happiness while the knowledge of truth can make one unhappy. Similarly, while falsity can be considered to be a *doṣa*, that is, something requiring to be corrected or removed, it need not give rise to *pravṛtti* or desire. The same is the case with the relationship

between desire, birth and suffering. The whole of the second sūtra seems to occupy a dubious place in the sequence of the sūtras in the Nyāya sūtra.

With the third sūtra, we revert back to an enumeration of extensional definitions of the term *pramāṇa*, which is not given an independent *lakṣaṇa* of its own. The mention of *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda* as the four *pramāṇas*, are merely enumerative and do not give a definition of what constitutes the *pramāṇatva* of a *pramāṇa*. The preference for extensional definitions in the sūtra literature is extensively found and it should be a matter of investigation as to when the notion of definition as giving a *vyāvartaka lakṣaṇa* arose.

The fourth sūtra gives the definition of *pratyakṣa*, which is very strange indeed for, it enumerates four characteristics of *pratyakṣa*, which are all equally necessary to make it a *pramāṇa*.

First, it should arise because of the contact of the senses with the object. However, besides this it should also be *avyabhicāri* and *vyavasāyātmaka*. It is obvious that the characteristic of *vyavasāyātmaka* and of being *avyabhicāri* cannot be given just by perception alone and would have to involve the process of inference or *anumāna*. Besides these, it is also supposed to be *avyapadeśya* which probably means incapable of being grasped by language. The definition therefore is faulty in the extreme for, it does not try to distinguish between *pratyakṣa* as a *pramāṇa* without the involvement of any element of *anumāna* in it. Perhaps the author wants to say that there is no *pramāṇa*, which does not involve the elements of both *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* in it or even all the four *pramāṇas* mentioned by him. But firstly, he has not said so and secondly, the whole discussion does not seem to imply it. The issue was later on discussed in the context, of the theory of *pramāṇa-saṃplava*. But, even there, the problem is not discussed exactly in this context, but rather whether that which is known by one *pramāṇa* can also be known by another. Also, it is not clear whether a *pratyakṣa* in order to be a *pramāṇa*, will require all the four characteristics mentioned in the sūtra or only

one of them. There is, in fact, another problem with the definition for, if it is accepted then there can be no such thing as *alaukika pratyakṣa*, an idea which the Nyāya accepts. There is nothing to indicate in the sūtra that it is talking about *laukika pratyakṣa* only. In *alaukika pratyakṣa*, the way the Nyāya understands it, there is no *indriyārtha-sannikarṣa* and, in fact, it cannot be so in principle for the universals are not the type of entities with which there can be any sense-contact.

The fifth sūtra mentions three types of *anumāna*, the *pūrvavata*, the *śeṣavata* and the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. Once again it does not give any definition of *anumāna*, but only tells us its varieties. Also, the distinctions between the three types of *anumāna* is not concerned with the nature of *anumāna*, but rather, with what is inferred, that is, the object of inference, which obviously is irrelevant unless it be argued that the object itself makes a difference to the type or types of argumentation by which it may be reached.

The sixth sūtra gives the definition of *upamāna*, which may be considered as argument by analogy. It is not clearly indicated as to why it should be considered as a separate *pramāṇa*. The ground for *upamāna* is given as *sādharmya*, that is, well known similarities of properties. But this is unsatisfactory for unless a distinction is made between essential and inessential properties, the argument cannot be valid. The sūtra does not attempt to do this even by implication. Perhaps the term *prasiddha* tries to do this. But the term normally means that which is well known or well established, but, even well-known or well-established similarities in properties cannot give a legitimate ground for inference or function as a *pramāṇa* unless the property or properties themselves are considered as essential.

The seventh sūtra gives the definition of *śabda* as a *pramāṇa* and suggests that it is the *upadeśa* of an *āpta puruṣa*. The definition is in a sense, circular because the term *āpta* means a reliable person. How a person becomes *āpta* and why and in what respects he or she should be considered as an *āpta* is not given.

Can a person be *āpta* in all respects? Moreover, if we take the term *upadeśa* seriously then every thing that an *āpta puruṣa* says cannot be a *pramāṇa* but only that which he says as an *upadeśa*, that is, as instruction. But the notion of instruction assumes somebody who is to be instructed and normally such a situation obtains only in the context of verbal communication but not so much where something is written and hence has not only to be interpreted but also where one cannot relevantly ask questions for further clarification of what is said.

The eighth sūtra classifies *śabda* into two kinds: one whose object is *drṣṭa* and the other which concerns objects which are essentially *adrṣṭa* in nature or unobservable in principle. The validity of a statement about objects that are either observed or at least observable in principle would ultimately depend on *pratyakṣa* and not on *śabda* while those which concern objects which are unobservable in principle can hardly be even known to be true or false. The assertion of *śabda* as a separate, independent *pramāṇa* therefore is either redundant or unverifiable in principle. In the latter case, therefore, it will only be a matter of faith and not a *pramāṇa* at all. Furthermore, it is not clear how the *pramāṇa* shall work if the two *upadeśas* of an *āpta puruṣa* are contradictory in nature or alternatively the *upadeśas* given by different *āpta puruṣas* are found to be opposed in nature. Will, in such cases, the *āpta puruṣa* be not regarded as an *āpta* at all? But unless some further ground is given to show that the so called opposed statements are not really so the issue cannot be settled. And, in case the two contradictory statements refer to *adrṣṭa*, that is, matters unobservable in principle, the issue between them cannot be settled in principle also.

The ninth sūtra gives the list of the *prameyas* which is strange indeed as the term *prameya* may not be regarded as independent of *pramāṇa*. Whatever can be established by a *pramāṇa* is a *prameya*. Perhaps the author wants to classify important objects which need to be established by *pramāṇa*, but this seems to be totally arbitrary. The list gives is *ātman*, *śarīra*, *indriyārtha*, the

object of the senses, *buddhi*, *mana*, *pravṛtti*, *doṣa*, *pratyābhāva*, *phala*, *duhkha* and *apavarga* as the *prameyas*. The inclusion of *duhkma* as a *prameya* seems strange for why should one need to have a *pramāṇa* for establishing the reality of *duhkha* for there can be no *saṁśaya* about it, when it occurs. Similarly, if *saṁśaya* is necessary for the *pramāṇa-prameya-vyāpāra* then *śarīra-indriya* and the objects of *indriyas* along with intellect (*buddhi*) and mind (*mana*) cannot be considered as *prameyas*. It may also be noted that *Īśvara* or *Brahman* are not included as *prameyas* in the sūtra.

The tenth sūtra tries to establish the *ātman* as a *prameya* on the basis of *icchā*, *dveśa*, *prayatna*, *duhkha*, *sukha* and *jñāna*. But firstly *duhkha* itself was given as an independent *prameya* in the ninth sūtra and has not yet been independently established as a *prameya* and hence its use to establish the reality of *ātman* is unjustified. The author of the sūtras has brought in *iccha*, *dveśa*, *prayatna*, *sukha* and *jñāna* as the basis for establishing the reality of *ātman*, but he has nowhere established them independently as *prameyas* nor has he shown as to why *ātman* has to be postulated for understanding these. Moreover, if all these are considered as providing the ground for the belief in *ātman*, then the *ātman* cannot be conceived as ever being without them. It is also not clear what *pramāṇa* has been used to establish the reality of *ātman*. It cannot be *pratyakṣa* and if it is an *anumāna*, which is supported by the use of the word *liṅga* then the *vyāpti* relation between the two will have to be established, which in this case is impossible in principle for the simple reason that the *ātman* itself is never directly known. In fact the author of the sūtras is using *icchā* and *dveśa* on the one hand and *sukha-duhkha* on the other as opposed to each other. But if two opposed qualities can both be the ground for the belief in *Ātman*, then the *ātman* would have to be treated as the *āśraya* of contradictory qualities, which would be very strange indeed, for normally one does not attribute contradictory qualities to an object. The sūtra can perhaps be interpreted to mean that it is the knowledge of *icchā*, *dveśa*, *prayatna*, *sukha*, *duhkha* which is the ground for the belief in the

ātman and not any or all of these properties themselves. But even in that case *jñāna* or knowledge would have to be treated as an intrinsic property of the *ātman* and not its accidental property as Nyāya is supposed to believe. Also, there will be no reason for confining the objects of knowledge only to those mentioned in the sūtra. There is another problem which arises if the term *ātman* is interpreted to include *Īśvara* or God, for it should be noted that God (*Īśvara*) is not mentioned as a separate *prameya* in the sūtra number nine, which gives an exhaustive list of the *prameyas*. In case it is supposed to be included as Nyāya is supposed to hold, it will have to have all the characteristics on the basis of which the reality of the *ātman* is sought to be established as it cannot have any other grounds to be believed in than those which have been given for the *ātman*.

The sūtra number eleven tries to give a *pramāṇa* for *śarīra* and says that it is the *āśraya* of *ceṣṭā*, that is, effort and the *indriyas* and their objects. Besides the general problem of what sort of a *pramāṇa* is this, a specific problem also arises as to how *ceṣṭā* is different from *prayatna*. Perhaps *ceṣṭā* is considered as bodily and physical while *prayatna* is supposed to be mental. But as mind has not yet been established as a *prameya*, such a distinction cannot be tenable. There is another problem with the sūtra as it does not merely infer *śarīra* as an *āśraya* of the *indriyas* but rather of the object of the *indriyas* for the term used is *indriyārtha*. But surely the body cannot be considered as the *āśraya* of the objects of the senses. It is also not clear what is the relation between the *ātman* and the *śarīra*. Is it being maintained that without the *ātman*, the *śarīra* can still do the *ceṣṭā*, but can not experience pleasure or pain?

The twelfth sūtra gives a list of the five senses: smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing. However, it is not quite clear what is meant by the term *bhūtebhyaḥ* as the term is again introduced in sūtra thirteen while enumerating the objects of the senses. The sūtra thirteen gives a list of the elements which are *prithvī*, *jala*, *agni*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa* (that is, earth, water, fire, air, sky) as the *bhūtas*,

but the technical term used for them in sūtra number nine which enumerates the list of *prameyas* was *indriyārtha* or the objects of the senses. The term *bhūta* was not mentioned there at all. Moreover, the sūtra does not give any grounds for believing in them. If they are to be considered as *prameyas*, their enumeration is no proof that they are real. Perhaps, it is being suggested that the senses and sense-objects are coordinate with each other and that if there is a sense organ then there must be an appropriate object for it to be known. But then this would involve that each object can only be known by the sense appropriate to it and that one object cannot be known by more than one sense. In any case, the logical and the epistemological issues involved do not seem to have been touched by the author.

The sūtra fourteen gives the qualities *gandha*, *rasa*, *rūpa*, *sparśa* and *śabda* as the qualities of the *bhūtas* mentioned in sūtra thirteen respectively and says that these are the objects of the senses mentioned in sūtra twelve. But then the *bhūtas* mentioned in sūtra thirteen will have to be taken as the *prameyas* on the ground of their being the *āśraya* of the *guṇas* mentioned in the sūtra fourteen, which themselves would have no independent grounds for being established as a *prameya*.

The sūtra fifteen does not establish *buddhi* as a *prameya* but only gives alternative names for it, such as *upalabdhi* and *jñāna* which have the same meaning as *buddhi*. *Buddhi*, of course, may be regarded as an instrument of getting *jñāna* or *upalabdhi*. But, firstly the sūtra does not seem to say this; and secondly, either *upalabdhi* and *jñāna* will have to be treated as identical with the *buddhi* or one would not know what is exactly meant by the latter.

The sūtra sixteen again gives a ground for establishing *manas* as a *prameya* and the ground given is that one cannot have two 'knowledges' or *jñāna* at the same time. It should be noted that the term *jñāna* has been considered as a synonym of *buddhi* in sūtra fifteen and a ground for believing in *ātman* as a *prameya* in sūtra ten, while here in sūtra sixteen the non-occurrence of two pieces of knowledge is taken as the ground for postulating the

reality of *manas* as a *prameya*. Now it is not quite clear what the author of the sūtra wants to say by maintaining that two instances of knowledge cannot occur together. What shall count as two instances of knowledge? If *jñāna* is treated as identical with *buddhi*, the question is meaningless. And if *jñāna* can have both *icchā* and *sukha* as its object or *duhkha* and *prayatna*, then obviously knowledge can have two different objects at the same time. In any case, the ground given for the postulation of mind as an entity is very weak indeed and it is surprising that the long Nyāya tradition should have accepted it on the ground given in the sūtra.

The sūtra seventeenth again gives no ground for the justification of admitting *pravṛtti* as an independent *prameya*. First, it is not clear why *icchā*, *prayatna* and *sukha* etc. cannot themselves be considered as a sufficient cause of *pravṛtti* or the relation between the senses and their objects together with *ceṣṭā* whose *āśraya* is supposed to be the body. The sūtra merely says that *pravṛtti*, *vāk* and *buddhi* provide the beginning of the *śarīra*. One does not know how *vāk* or speech has come into the picture. Nor does one understand how the question of the origins of the body has arisen and not of anything else which has been mentioned uptill now. Nor does one understand what *buddhi* has to do with the beginning of the body. Perhaps the sūtra means to say that *pravṛtti* is the cause of both the *buddhi* and the *śarīra* but that makes no sense either.

The sūtra eighteenth tries to define *doṣa* which, along with *duhkha*, *janma*, *pravṛtti*, and *mithyā jñāna* have been mentioned in the second sūtra. It is not quite clear how *pravṛtti*, that is, movement towards something or causing some thing to happen can be characterised as *doṣa*. If it is taken to mean that *pravṛtti* necessarily leads to *prayatna* and thus leads to *doṣa*, the whole thing is not clarified any better, for *doṣa* means a defect and there is certainly no defect in a change occurring because of *pravṛtti*, unless it be assumed that *pravṛtti* itself is a *doṣa* because it can arise only because of a sense of insufficiency or incompleteness

in consciousness. For, if one had the sense of self-sufficiency or completeness one would not have *pravṛtti* at all and thus not bring about change in one's condition either. But if this analysis be accepted, then there will be no place for either the concept of *lilā* or of *avatāra* to arise in any situation whatsoever. Similarly, the birth of a Buddha or a Mahāvīra or the *avatāra* of a Rāma or a Kṛṣṇa, would be because of a *pravṛtti* and hence full of *doṣa*. Perhaps these ideas and concepts had not gained currency when Gautama wrote the *Nyāya-sūtras* and hence he felt no necessity to accommodate them in his system.

Sūtra nineteen gives a definition of *pretyābhāva* which occurs for the first time in the text as being born again but as it has not yet been given any definition, it is difficult to understand why *punarutpatti* is being talked about. The fact of being born again is clearly found in the plants but nobody will apply the term *pretyābhāva* to them. A *kṣaṇa* gives rise to another every moment, but nobody would call it *pretyābhāva*. Thus the *lakṣaṇa* of *pretyābhāva* given by the *sūtrakāra* suffers from *atjvyāpti doṣa*.

Sūtra twenty gives the definition of *phala* as that which is born out of *pravṛtti* and *doṣa*. As according to Gautama *pravṛtti* necessarily leads to *doṣa*, it is not quite clear what is the difference between *phala* and *doṣa*. But even if it be accepted that there is a difference between the two and presumably *phala* can be both good and bad, one will have to accept that *doṣa* can give rise to good results also. It is also not clear how *phala* comes into the picture, as it is being introduced for the first time. Nor is it clear whether it is being used in a technical or non-technical sense here.

The sūtra twenty-one tries to define *duhkha* or suffering as obstruction or hinderance in one's way. But as the concepts of obstruction and hinderance presuppose *pravṛtti* it would follow that if *pravṛtti* does not meet with obstruction or hinderance it will give, not suffering, but pleasure or happiness. Thus *pravṛtti* will also give rise to *sukha* and unless *sukha* or happiness is also regarded as *doṣa*, *pravṛtti* will not always give rise to *doṣa* as

has been mentioned in the previous sūtras. Moreover, obstruction or hinderance does not always give rise to *duhkha* or suffering. There is a joy in overcoming obstacles and if there are no obstacles, there is no fun either. In many of the sports, one wants a strong opponent against whom one can test one's skill and strength. On the other hand, there are also situations where one suffers or has pain without there being any obstruction or hinderance.

The definition of suffering given in the sūtra is related too much to willing or activity, but this is not necessarily true of all cases of suffering.

The sūtra twenty-two defines *apavarga* as absolute release from suffering. But, firstly, this is a negative definition and does not positively indicate what *apavarga* is. Secondly, if *apavarga* is treated as an *abhāva*, whose *pratiyogi* is *duhkha*, then one would not only have to have first *duhkha*, then have its *abhāva* in order to get *apavarga* but even when there is the *abhāva*, one will have to be aware of its *pratiyogi*, *duhkha*, in order to know that it is the *abhāva* of *duhkha* and not of anything else. A *ghatābhāva* is not a *dukkhābhāva* and hence *apavarga* will involve not only an absence or knowledge of absence, but knowledge of absence of *duhkha*. Would *duhkha* then be remembered in the state of *apavarga* along with the consciousness that it is absent. But then, would not the memory of *duhkha* create some *duhkha* in consciousness. Furthermore, the concept of *atyantābhāva* which is being used in the concept of *apavarga* is not applicable in the Nyāya mode of analysis to the *abhāva* of *duhkha* in the state of *apavarga*, because *atyantābhāva* is applied in those cases where the *abhāva* is eternally present and has normally been seen as a characteristic of such objects as are self contradictory in character such as *vandhyāputra* or objects whose empirical existence cannot even be imagined such as *ākāśa kusuma* or *śaśāṅga*.

The twenty-third sūtra tries to describe the conditions under which doubt or *samśaya* arises or what it basically is. The

description emphasizes that when many opposite qualities, which are equally balanced, appear to characterize an object, doubt arises regarding what is there or what is not there. However, while the description is fairly accurate, it does not cover all cases of doubt. The Cartesian doubt, for example, will hardly be covered by the description given by the author of the Nyāyasūtras, for it operates even when there are no opposed qualities apprehended by consciousness.

Sūtra twenty-four defines *prayojana* as that because of which one engages in an action as the term used is *pravartate*. It may however, be interpreted in a wider sense than what is usually implied by the term action and may be regarded as co-terminus with what is termed as *pravṛtti* in the system.

The sūtra twenty-five defines *dr̥ṣṭānta* as an example in respect of which both the common people and the experts agree as having the same meaning. This is an interesting definition of 'example' as it provides the link between common sense and the critical intelligence. However, as one may assume common sense to remain constant and critical intelligence to go on changing with the changes in knowledge, that which is accepted as *dr̥ṣṭānta* at one time may not be so at another. On the other hand, the sūtra may be interpreted as the world of commonsense with respect to which there can be no difference between the experts and the common man as the expert is also a common man and hence shares all the commonality with the others.

The sūtras twenty-six to thirty-one try to explicate the notion of *siddhānta* or the different kinds of *siddhānta* that there can be. The definition of *siddhānta* in sūtra twenty-six leads to the notion of *tantra* or a system and *abhyupagama* or that which is assumed or presupposed. The sūtra twenty-eight suggests the notion of *sarvatantra siddhānta*, that is, a doctrine which is admitted by all systems. It is not clear what the term *all* means here. Does it mean only all the existing *tantras* or all the possible *tantras*. In other words, is it merely the statement of a contingent fact or does it refer to some sort of necessary preconditions of a *tantra* being

a *tantra*, so that there can be no *tantra* in principle which will not accept those conditions. It is not made quite clear, whether the notion of a *siddhānta* is necessarily related to a *tantra* or system or it can be independent of it at all. Furthermore, is *siddhānta* only a hypothesis which is justified or established by a relevant argument. In other words, is *abhyupagama* like a *pratijñā* and *siddhānta* like an *anumiti*, which is established by an *anumāna* or a *pramāṇa*?

The sūtra twenty-seven suggests that there are four kinds of *siddhānta* such as *sarvatantra siddhānta*, *pratitantra siddhānta*, *adhikaraṇa siddhānta* and *abhyupagama siddhānta*. But if *abhyupagama* itself can be treated as a kind of *siddhānta*, then how would there be a difference between what is to be established and what has been established. Similarly, the definition of *pratitantra siddhānta* is given as that which is accepted by similar systems and not accepted by opposed systems. But how can that which is not proved (*asiddha*) in another system be its *siddhānta*. The concept of an *adhikaraṇa siddhānta* which is sought to be explicated in sūtra thirty is not clear. Similarly, the idea of *abhyupagama siddhānta* explained in sūtra thirty-one is not quite clear as it seems to suggest that an *abhyupagama siddhānta* is the result of the critical examination of an *abhyupagama* which was not critically examined before. But the very definition of *siddhānta* is an *abhyupagama* which has been justified and validated. On the other hand, the notion of an *abhyupagama* or hypothesis is that it is only imagined or postulated to account for something.

The sūtra thirty-two enumerates the five elements of an argument which are known as *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*.

Sūtras thirty-three to thirty-nine try to give the definitions of these five elements of *anumāna* given in the sūtra thirty-two. *Pratijñā* is supposed to be that which is to be proved, *hetu* is supposed to be the reason which is offered as the ground for believing in its being true and this ground is supposed to be its

'similarities' with the *udāharaṇa* or the example where it actually obtains. But this is an absurd kind of definition, as, firstly, the concept of *udāharaṇa* has not yet been clarified and, two, if it is because of its similarity with the *udāharaṇa* that the *hetu* can prove the *sādhya* then why cannot the *udāharaṇa* do the job by itself.

The sūtra thirty-five talks of *vaidharmya* without clarifying how and why the notion of *vaidharmya* is being introduced.

Sūtra thirty-six gives a double notion of *udāharaṇa*, that is, it should be both positive and negative as having a common characteristic with that which is to be proved and also a different one where that which is to be proved is absent.

Sūtras thirty-seven, thirty-eight and thirty-nine try to explain something that is opposed and the notions of *upanaya* and *nigamana*. Similarly sūtras forty and forty-one try to say what exactly is meant by *tarka* and *nirṇaya* in the system.

General observations on the Nyāya-Sūtra (1.1)

The first section of the first chapter of the Sūtras thus tries to enumerate what is to be discussed in the text and the first section only discusses up to *nirṇaya* given in the first sūtra, thus implying that there is a radical difference between these and those which are discussed later in the second section of the first chapter. Thus we have two different types of topics which have been discussed and enumerated as *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *saṁśaya*, *prayojana*, *dr̥ṣṭānta siddhānta*, *avayava*, *tarka*, and *nirṇaya* on the one hand and *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahsthāna* on the other. The latter obviously relate to discussion and argument between persons while the former seem to be more internal to the nature of argument itself. The latter therefore have psychological elements intermixed with other things while the former seem to be more logical in character. However, even among the former there is a radical difference between the topics mentioned in sūtra one, and those mentioned in sūtra two.

Furthermore, there seems to be no logical distinction between the discussion of *abhyupagama* and *siddhānta* on the one hand and *pratijñā* and *nigamana* on the other. Similarly, one does not understand the need for a distinction between a *drṣṭānta* and *udāharaṇa* and why the former should be mentioned separately as an item to be dealt with in a formal discussion of what is to count as a *pramāṇa*. The concept of *tantra* or system remains unexamined and not discussed at all, though perhaps it is philosophically the most important for purposes of logic and epistemology. The distinction between *tarka* and *anumāna* is not quite clear. Similarly, one does not understand what is the relationship between the three types of *anumāna* and the whole discussion of the *avayava* in the sūtras.

Part I - Section 2 - (20 Sūtras)

Chapter (1.2)

In sūtra (1.2.1), the author tries to give what he considers to be the ideal type of discussion, which he calls *Vāda*. The conditions for any discussion being a *Vāda* are mentioned as consisting of *pramāṇa* and *tarka*, which are not against one's *siddhānta* and which consist of five elements which constitute an argument wherein the two sides, the *pakṣa* and the *pratipakṣa* engage in a discussion. However, it is not quite clear how there could be a real discussion if the condition of not being opposed to one's *siddhānta* is observed by both the parties to the discussion. In other words, how will a discussion be possible between persons who have different *siddhāntas* and, in case they do not have different *siddhāntas*, what is the point of discussion.

Sūtra (1.2.2) tries to define *jalpa* as using all means like *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* for establishing one's position. As the *Sūtrakāra* has not yet defined what is meant by *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*, he is not justified in using these terms for defining

jalpa. Furthermore, as at least *nigrahasthāna* is found in all kinds of argument it cannot be a distinctive feature of *jalpa*.

Sūtra (1.2.3) describes *vjtanḍā* as a discussion where the opponent does not have a position of his own to defend. But even if one does not have a position of one's own, one can reasonably point out a defect in someone else's argument or in the position that he holds.

The sūtra (1.2.4) tries to define the *hetvābhāsa* or that which is not a *hetu* but appears as one. Here again the *hetvābhāsa* is not defined but only its various types are mentioned. They are supposed to be five in number and are named as *svayabhicāri*, *viruddha*, *prakaraṇasama*, *sādhyasama* and *kālātīta*.

The sūtras (1.2.5), (1.2.6), (1.2.7), (1.2.8) and (1.2.9) try to define these *hetvābhāsas*. The sūtra (1.2.5) defines *svayabhicāri* as *anekāntika*.

The sūtra (1.2.6) defines *viruddha* as a *hetu* which proves the opposite of the *siddhānta* one wishes to establish. The sūtra (1.2.7) defines *prakaraṇasama* as trying to give that as a *hetu* which itself is to be proved.

The sūtra (1.2.8) defines *sādhyasama* as that which uses that which is to be proved to prove something other than itself. It is not quite clear what is the distinction between the *prakaraṇasama* and *sādhyasama*.

The sūtra (1.2.9) tries to explain the fallacy of *kālātīta* as a *hetu* that is given after the time for the argument is over. It is not clear how this can ever be a fallacy except in an argument where one is time-bound, that is, obliged to reply to one's opponent within a limited time. However, even in such a situation, it cannot be called a *hetvābhāsa* in any relevant sense of the term.

The sūtra (1.2.10) tries to define *chala* as an argument where one tries to interpret the meaning of a word used by an opponent in a sense different from the one that he intended. In other words, it is to take advantage of the ambiguity of the language and play

a verbal trick on one's opponent rather than refute the point he is making.

The sūtra (1.2.11) distinguishes between different kinds of *chala* and calls them *vāk chala*, *sāmānya chala* and *upacāra chala*. The sūtra (1.2.12) defines *vāk chala* as where one imagines or ascribes a meaning different from the one intended by the speaker because of the fact that the same was not specifically mentioned by him.

The sūtra (1.2.13) gives the meaning of *sāmānya chala* when, though the intended meaning is present in what the speaker has said, still, by an over generalization or universalization one imagines an unintended meaning.

The sūtra (1.2.14) defines *upacāra chala* as where there is an alternative to the qualities mentioned by the speaker, the opponent chooses the alternative which is opposed to the obvious one intended by the speaker.

The sūtra (1.2.15) tries to raise an objection saying that *vāk chala* is itself the same as *upacāra chala* as there is no distinction between them.

The sūtra (1.2.16) tries to reply to this objection by saying that it is not so as there is a difference of meaning in the two cases. The sūtra (1.2.17) seems to continue the discussion and tries to suggest that even if there is some similarity between the *vāk chala* and *upacāra chala* it is not so in all cases.

The sūtra (1.2.18) and the sūtra (1.2.19) define *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* respectively. The sūtra (1.2.20) says that both *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* are plural in number as they are of many kinds.

Part II - Section 1 - (69 Sūtras)

The sūtra (2.1.1) starts with describing what is doubt or *saṁśaya* and suggests that when a number of equal qualities opposed to each other are entertained at the same time, doubt arises. It is not clear why the discussion of *saṁśaya* is introduced once again when its *lakṣaṇa* was already given in the sūtra

(1.1.23). Also it is not clear what difference obtains between the *lakṣaṇa* of *saṁśaya* as given in the sūtra (1.1.23) and (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). The key words used are *aneka dharma*, *adhyavasāya*, *vipratipatti* and *vyavasthā*. Perhaps the sūtras (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) are trying to distinguish between cases which appear to be like *saṁśaya* but are not really so. This perhaps is the reason why the term 'na' is used in the sūtra (2.1.1).

The sūtra (2.1.3), (2.1.4), (2.1.5), (2.1.6) and (2.1.7) continue the discussion regarding *saṁśaya*. [The sūtra (2.1.8) seems to turn the discussion regarding *saṁśaya* to the possibility of there being no *pramāṇa* at all. The sūtra (2.1.9) tries to raise an objection to the definition of *pratyakṣa* when *pramāṇa* is supposed to exist before the perception of object while the sūtra (2.1.10) examines the question in case *pramāṇa* is given after the perception of object.

The treatment of doubt in the Nyāyasūtra from (2.1.1) to (2.1.7) is supposed to have been undertaken to clarify the general problem of doubt which may be raised with respect to any of the contentions made earlier. Doubt was already defined in Nyāya sūtra (1.1.23), the objections to the definition given in the Sūtra (1.1.23) are supposed to be raised in the sūtras (2.1.1) to (2.1.5) and Gautama's reply to these objections is given in the sūtras (2.1.6) onwards. But the discussion on doubt or *saṁśaya* given in the sūtras (2.1.1) to (2.1.7) is inadequate as the objections to the definition of doubt as given in (1.1.23) in the sūtras (2.1.1) to (2.1.5) do not seem to be very serious ones. Similarly, the reply given to the objections raised in these sūtras as given in (2.1.6) and (2.1.7) seems merely a repetition of the position without giving any fresh reasons for accepting the definition. It is not made quite clear whether doubt has been considered at the psychological level or at the epistemological level, nor is it made clear as to what is meant by the opposite of doubt, that is, certainty. Nor is any distinction made between dubitability and non-dubitability, nor is it made clear what role, if any, does doubt play in giving rise to knowledge. Both the objections raised and

the arguments given seem to be at a very elementary level and can hardly satisfy a modern student of the subject. It would be interesting to find the other discussions on doubt that have taken place in Indian philosophy after Gautama.

The author in sūtra (2.1.6) seems to suggest that one may not reasonably doubt that there can be such a thing as doubt. It is not made quite clear as to what the author means either by the first or by the second. That one may not doubt that there is such a thing as doubt or that there can be such a thing as doubt is not quite easy to understand. The first problem relates to the factuality of doubt, while the second relates to the possibility of doubt. Furthermore, there is the added problem whether I can not doubt that I am doubting or that I can possibly doubt if I want to do so, or that somebody else, may doubt whether I am 'really' doubting or that I could even possibly doubt, even if I wished to do so. Similarly, it is not quite clear what is meant by absolute doubt or *atyanta samśaya*. Does it mean that there are objects of knowledge about which doubting is impossible in principle or that there is no doubt which is not resolvable in principle? Does the denial of absolute doubt mean that every object of knowledge can be fully and finally established so that there cannot even be the possibility of future doubt arising with respect to that object? If, for example, it is accepted that one may argue that human experience regarding the existence of things is not always trustworthy or that if the frontiers of one's knowledge are not the limits of reality, then how can the possibility of doubt ever be denied and the removal of each particular doubt be considered only as a temporary removal and not as an absolute denial of its very possibility. Perhaps the word *atyanta samśaya* or absolute doubt refers only to the fact that every particular instance of a specific doubt is removable in principle even though the possibility of a doubt arising in future may always remain.

Sūtras (2.1.8) to (2.1.20) discuss the general concept of *pramāṇa*. The sūtras discuss the question regarding the concept of *pramāṇa* itself and not of any specific *pramāṇa* in particular.

The sūtra (2.1.8) tries to raise the objection that *pramāṇa* can never prove anything at all, for that which is to prove must exist either before the proof or after it. It seems reasonable to assume that what is to be regarded as a source of knowledge must precede that knowledge, as only that can be regarded as a source of knowledge which produces that knowledge, but what is actually a source will only be decided after it has resulted in knowledge.

The problem that is presented in the sūtras relates both to the notion of causation in general and the relation of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* in particular. What is a cause can only be known as 'cause' after the effect has been produced. Similarly, it is urged that what is a *pramāṇa* can only be known when the *prameya* is produced but though this seems obvious, it cannot always be true as in perception the object which is supposed to be known through perception, or for which *pratyakṣa* functions as a *pramāṇa* already exists, even according to the definition of perception given in the sūtra (1.1.4). On the other hand, if it is accepted that knowledge that succeeds the object is known on the basis of *pramāṇa* then it will also have to be accepted that it, that is, 'knowledge' already exists independently of it.

The sūtra (2.1.10) seems to thrive on an ambiguity between knowledge of an object as an object of knowledge and knowledge of an object independent of its being known. Sūtra (2.1.11) argues that if it be said that both the knowledge and the object of knowledge occur simultaneously, and neither is before or after the other in time, then the problem arises as to why we have knowledge of one thing at a time and not of all things all the time. The sūtra (2.1.12) suggests that if the opponent's objections were valid then he could not establish his position either, for the argument precludes the possibility of establishing any thing whatsoever. Sūtra (2.1.13) says this explicitly and argues that if all the *pramāṇas* are impossible in principle, then so will be their refutation. On the other hand, if the opponent thinks that what he is saying is established on the basis of some *pramāṇa*, then

it is obvious that all the *pramāṇas* are not being denied by the opponent. So the sūtra (2.1.14) argues that one can reasonably infer the knowledge of a *pramāṇa* just as one infers the existence of a drum on the basis of the sound that it has produced. Thus while the drum exists before the sound it has caused, it is inferred on the basis of the sound that it has produced. Hence while the drum exists before the sound it has caused, it is inferred on the basis of the sound, which now functions as the basis or the ground on which it is known. The sūtra (2.1.16) suggests that the *pramāṇa* and the *prameya* may be regarded as we regard a balance in which we determine the weight of some thing on the basis of some other standard measure of weight which itself has been established through other weights. Perhaps, what is being suggested is that what is a *prameya*, once it is established, can itself function as a *pramāṇa* later in some other context. On the other hand, the analogical example also may be taken to suggest that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are relative terms that may *simultaneously* be seen as both *pramāṇa* and *prameya* alternatively depending upon the view point adopted by the concerned observer.

The sūtra (2.1.17) and (2.1.18) again raise possible objections against the position whether anything can function as a means of knowledge. The sūtra (2.1.17) says that if something is required to establish anything as a piece of knowledge then that too would require another means of knowledge to know it, and so on indefinitely. Sūtra (2.1.18) argues that if, at any point, this unending chain is to be arbitrarily stopped, then it could easily have been stopped earlier. The sūtra (2.1.19) tries to suggest the untenability of this objection by pointing out the example of a lamp which is required for the illumination of objects, but which does not require any other light for being revealed itself.

The reply given in sūtra (2.1.19) reveals that the sūtrakāra does not seem to have understood the force of the objections given in the sūtras (2.1.17) and (2.1.18). The objection emanates from the idea of *infinite regress* in the establishment of knowledge in case it is supposed to require a *pramāṇa* for its establishment.

The idea of any self-justifying or self-establishing piece of knowledge would make it immune from the necessity of having any *pramāṇa* for its establishment. This would be something like the notion of an axiom in western thought. But if so, Gautama should have started with this notion and given instances of those pieces of knowledge which are self-justified and hence do not require any *pramāṇa* for their establishment, but which provide the basis for all knowledge other than themselves. They would function as *pramāṇas* without being *prameyas* themselves.

The sūtra (2.1.20) perhaps tries to suggest that perception functions in such a fundamental sense as it is like the light which illumines everything else without needing something to illumine itself.

The sūtra 2.1.20 seems to argue that the example of the lamp can not be uniformly applied to all cases of knowledge. In other words, while in some cases the ground that is given for the knowledge is self-justified, in other cases it may not be so. The discussion in the commentaries does not attempt to give the criterion on the basis of which one will be able to make a distinction between the two cases. Ultimately, the problem relates to the notion of “self-justification” or “self-proved”, which does not seem to have been discussed in the commentaries on the text. The problem has been extensively discussed in the western tradition and one of the strongest criterion that has been given is the one that is used in “indirect-proof”, that is, the one where the contradictory of what is sought to be proved involves a self-contradiction. Thus, if something is self-contradictory then it is bound to be false and hence the self-contradictory of the self-contradictory is bound to be necessarily true. This is not accepted by those who want always a direct proof as the intuitionists in mathematics. There is also the problem of what exactly is meant by self-contradiction and the contention that ultimately the opposite of self-contradiction is bound to be a tautology which is necessarily true because it does not say anything new. The problem of analytic and synthetic in western tradition is closely

related to this issue and it will be interesting to find the discussion in this regard in the Indian tradition.

The sūtra (2.1.21) argues that perception cannot function as a foundation for all knowledge without requiring any foundation for itself as the definition of perception given in the sūtra (1.1.4) is incomplete in that it does not enumerate all the objects which are to be in contact with the senses for perception to take place.

The sūtra (2.1.21) gives an example of this and suggests that unless there were to be a contact between the *ātman* and the *manas*, perception will not take place even if there were to occur a contact between the senses and the object, as is mentioned in the sūtra (1.1.14). The sūtra (2.1.22) seems to suggest that the same would be true also of space, place, *dik*, time and *ākāśas*. The exact relevance of this sūtra is not clear. Furthermore, the sūtra makes a distinction between *dik* and *deśa* which is not quite clear; perhaps what the sūtra wants to say is that perception requires not merely the contact between the *ātman* and the *manas* but also of *dik*, *deśa*, *kāla* and *ākāśa*, besides those of the *indryas* and the objects in order to take place. The sūtra (2.1.23) tries to suggest that the *ātman* has not been excluded as, in sūtra 1.1.10, it was clearly said that *jñāna* or knowledge is a sign of the presence of the self. The reply while correct is not satisfactory as it is not explicitly mentioned in (1.1.4) and has to be inferred as an implication of sūtra (1.1.10). The sūtra (2.1.24) again suggests that the conjunction of the mind with the senses has not been excluded as the sūtra (1.1.16) clearly mentions that one cannot have two simultaneous perceptions. The sūtra (2.1.25) clarifies why only the contact between the senses and objects is mentioned in the definition of perception. The reason given is that these are the only distinctive contacts in the case of perception as the contact of the mind and the soul is a constant feature of all knowledge, including those which are not perceptual in character. The sūtra (2.1.26) tries to give another reason why the contact of the senses with the object is decisive for perception as in the case of sleep and inattention, perception will take place

if there is a strong contact with the object. The example is unfortunate as it cuts both ways, for in cases of deep sleep, one is not aware of objects, even when they are in contact with the senses and many things remain unperceived, if one is not attentive to them. The sūtra (2.1.27) and (2.1.28) try to give other reasons why, in the case of perception, sense-object contact has been given primacy. One reason for this is that perceptual knowledge is distinguished on the basis of the sense with which it is obtained and not in any other way. We say, for example, that we see colours with our eyes and hear sound with our ears, even though the mind and the soul are equally in contact in both the cases. The sūtra (2.1.28) raises an unnecessary objection. It has already been discussed a number of times. It seems to argue that as mind and soul have not been mentioned in the definition of perception, they cannot be brought in as *hetu*. The answer given in the sūtra (2.1.29) is that not mentioning cannot be taken as a defect, since only the distinctive conditions are to be mentioned and not those which are constant for all kinds of knowledge. The sūtra (2.1.30) tries to suggest that *pratyakṣa* should be treated as a case of inference, for what we perceive is only a part of the object, and not the whole of it. The sūtra (2.1.31) tries to give a reply to this objection by saying that the objection itself presupposes at least a perception of the part of the object which itself is non-inferential in character. The sūtra (2.1.32) raises again the issue of the perception of the whole on the basis of the perception of the part. It argues that how can one be said to perceive the whole, when one has actually perceived only a part of it. The sūtra (2.1.33) further objects that as the whole is a matter only of inference one may doubt whether there is such a thing as a whole or not. The sūtra (2.1.34) tries to reply that in case wholes are not accepted, all things that are accepted by everybody will become unintelligible. The sūtra (2.1.35) further argues that if we did not know the whole, how would we be able to hold things or put them in different directions. In other words, how could we deal with them as wholes. The sūtra (2.1.36) tries to answer

the objection that the so-called whole may be like the army or the forest, that is, 'whole' only in name but no real whole at all, being only an aggregate of its parts. The reply to this given in the sūtra itself is that this could not be the case as unlike the trees and the individual soldiers, which constitute the forest and the army respectively, ultimate atoms which are the ultimate constituents of all wholes are not perceptible. But the problem of wholes was not being discussed in the context of ultimate atoms. The problem in the case of ultimate atoms would have to be phrased differently, for in their case the problem is how can something perceptible arise from parts or elements which themselves are imperceptible in principle. There is, of course, another problem which has not been discussed by any of the opponents and it is about the sort of contact between the senses and the object on the one hand and mind and the soul on the other. This cannot be either in terms of *samyoga* or *samavāya* or *svārūpa*, the three relations which are generally accepted in Nyāya. The sūtra (2.1.37) raises a possible objection regarding the acceptance of *anumāna* as a *pramāṇa* on the ground that the inference of an antecedent on the ground of what has happened or of a consequent on the basis of what has occurred, is liable to be false because of the fact that the cause of the effect may be other than the one on the basis of which the inference is being made. The usual examples given in this connection relate to the inference of rainfall because of the swelling of the river or to the occurrence of rainfall in the future because of the carrying of the eggs by the ants or of the inference from the crying of peacocks to the present phenomenon of the gathering of clouds. In each of these cases the objector suggests that the inference may be invalid because the supposed relationships may not obtain. The answer given in sūtra (2.1.38) tries to suggest that the similarity of the ground on the basis of which the inference is being made is only partial and hence it is because of the ignoring of the dissimilarity with the genuine cases that a false inference is being generated. It is interesting to note in this connection that the

concept of *vyāpti* is not being used in the sūtras nor is the problem being faced as to the exact nature of the circumstances in which the relation of inference would be supposed to obtain. The sūtras (2.1.39) to (2.1.43) discuss the concept of the present as contrasted with the past and the future. Presumably, the discussion arises because in the earlier two sūtras the inference was supposed to be from something in the present to something in the past or in the future or even in the present at a different point in space. The sūtra (2.1.39) tries to argue against the existence of the present as it suggests that in the case of something which is falling, it is reasonable to say that the distance that it has covered in the course of its falling was in the past and that the distance that it is going to cover is in the future, for it is continuously falling, and hence not static in any position whatsoever so that it could be said to be 'present'. Gautama's reply in sūtra (2.1.40) is that if the present is denied, the past and the future will also have to be denied, because they are relative to that which is present. The sūtra (2.1.41) tries to suggest that it would not be proper to think that the past and the future are relative to each other and not relative to the present as this will result in the charge of circularity. The sūtra (2.1.42) tries to argue further that if the present were not to be accepted, then there will be no such thing as perception and hence nothing will be known. The sūtra (2.1.43) further argues that as the distinction between action that has already been completed and that which is yet to be done is intrinsic to action and as action can only be done in the present, the distinction between the past and the future are necessarily implied in all action and thus have to be accepted as real. The discussion does not take into account a radical distinction between knowledge and action in this context. It is not clear whether the temporal distinctions of past, present and future are necessary for knowledge in the same way as they seem necessary for action.

The sūtras (2.1.44) to (2.1.48) are concerned with establishing the validity of accepting *upamāna* as a source of valid knowledge.

The sūtra (2.1.44) raises an objection against accepting *upamāna* or comparison as a separate valid source of knowledge as it is based on similarity of one or more characteristics and hence might be wrong. In other words, there is no necessity about it as two different objects may have certain characteristics in common and yet be different in other respects. The sūtra (2.1.45) tries to reply that this is not exactly a defect, since the comparison is generally on the basis of those characteristics which are important and hence associated with other characteristics also. The sūtra (2.1.46) tries to suggest that *upamāna* should be treated as a case of *anumāna* as it is on the basis of perception that something which is unperceived is known and hence it cannot be treated as a separate *pramāṇa*.

The sūtra (2.1.47) replies to this objection by saying that the term *gavaya* is applied to something which is perceived and hence the case of *upamāna* is totally different from that of *anumāna*, where the object that is inferred is totally absent. Does this mean that in the case of *anumāna* it is necessary that something which is not perceived is inferred on the basis of that which is perceived?

The sūtra (2.1.48) concludes the discussion and tries to suggest that *upamāna* is a distinct form of *pramāṇa* and cannot be reduced to *anumāna* or inference.

The sūtra (2.1.49) starts the discussion on *śabda pramāṇa*. The whole sequence of sūtras (2.1.49) to (2.1.56) treats the objections against *śabda* as a *svatantra pramāṇa* and answers the objections raised by the opponents. First, it is pointed out that there is a similarity between the object of *anumāna* and the object of *śabda pramāṇa* in that both are not present to perception. There is supposed to be a further similarity between *anumāna* and *śabda pramāṇa* as in both we start with the knowledge of something which is perceived. The sūtra (2.1.51) gives another reason pointing out the similarity between *anumāna* and *śabda pramāṇa* in that there is a known relationship between that which is perceived and that which is unperceived. In the case of *śabda pramāṇa*, it is the relationship between the words and that which

is meant by the words, which is the basis of the knowledge of that which is unperceived. The obvious reply to this which is given in the sūtra (2.1.52) is that it is not on the basis of the relationship between the words and the objects to which they apply that the *śabda pramāṇa* is based, but rather on the relation between the words and the speaker who speaks them, for it is the *śabda* of an *āpta puruṣa* which is a *pramāṇa* and not *śabda* spoken by anybody. But this only shifts the problem to the relation between the *śabda* and the reliability or the authority of the person who utters the words and is an *āpta puruṣa*. Moreover, the relation between words and objects is a necessary condition for knowledge to arise. Whether this knowledge is to be believed as true or not is, of course, another question but at least it should first be understood as without this, the question of believing or disbelieving cannot arise.

The sūtra (2.1.53) makes the point that it would be a mistake to think that *śabda pramāṇa* is about words in general on which the objection made earlier rests. The sūtra (2.1.54) concedes that even if the *śabda pramāṇa* does not relate to all words, it still depends on the relationship between words and objects. Gautama's reply to this is that the relationship between words and objects is conventional, while the relationship between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* is natural and hence one will have to distinguish between *anumāna* and *śabda pramāṇa*. The answer seems to be misconceived in two ways. One, it is not necessary that the relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* be always natural as firstly this condition has not been given as a *lakṣaṇa* of *anumāna* and secondly, it would not apply to those schools of thought which regard the relation between *śabda* and *artha* to be *nitya*. It should be noted in this connection that, at least for Gautama, the relationship between words and the objects which they denote is artificial or conventional. Nor is it clear whether a relevant distinction is being made between *artha* or meaning and reference or the objects denoted by the words.

The sūtra (2.1.54) tries to strengthen further the point by

saying that there is no direct or natural relationship between words and the objects they denote, as otherwise while uttering the words 'fire' or 'rice', one's mouth would burn or be filled with rice. The sūtra (2.1.55) raises the possible objection that the relation between the word and its meaning is due to a rule accepted by the linguistic community concerned.

The answer to this objection is given in the sūtras (2.1.56) and (2.1.57) where it is clarified that, firstly, the acceptance of the rule is itself conventional and that it also varies from one group or part of the linguistic community to another. The sūtras do not raise the central question regarding the reliability of the speaker on which the *pramāṇa* ultimately rests.

The sūtras (2.1.57) to (2.1.68) are concerned specifically with the authority of the Vedas. The sūtra (2.1.58) says that the Vedic sentences cannot be authoritative as they are full of inner contradictions, irrelevant repetitions and even straight falsehood. The sūtra (2.1.59) tries to answer the objection regarding the falsity of the Vedic sentences by suggesting that there might be a fault in the agent or/and the procedures adopted by him. The defence is strange, for it can be applied to explain away all cases of apparent falsity of injunctive statements on these grounds and not merely those of the Vedic sentences. Furthermore, the answer concedes that an injunctive statement can be true or false, while in reality questions of truth and falsity cannot be raised with respect to all imperative sentences. It is, of course, true that a hypothetical imperative may be understood in such a way particularly if it is of a causal nature, as it may be found to be true or false. But then it would mean that the Vedic injunctions are about actions of a causal variety and are hypothetical in nature. This would completely destroy the absolute and unconditional nature of the Vedic injunctions. The sūtra (2.1.60) tries to answer the charge of inconsistency. It suggests that the inconsistency is only apparent and that they should be understood either as alternatives to be adopted by the person concerned or seen as referring to different occasions or times when what is

being prescribed is to be done. As far as the charge of irrelevant repetition is concerned, the sūtra (2.1.61) suggests that the repetition serves a useful purpose which is not being grasped by the objector.

However, the three ways suggested to meet the three objections do not seem to be very successful as they can always be adopted whenever such objections are raised and hence suffer from the *ativyāpti doṣa*, that is they have nothing specific in respect of the Vedas, which are the subject of discussion. The sūtra (2.1.62) suggests that the meaning of the Vedic sentences should be grasped by arranging; them in different groups or classes.

The sūtra (2.1.63) suggests the groups into which these sentences are to be classified, that is, we should separate those sentences which are injunctive in character from those which have only *arthavāda* as their character. These two should be distinguished from those which are only repetitive in character. The sūtra (2.1.64) defines injunction as an authoritative imperative sentence which has to be followed. The sūtra (2.1.65) defines *arthavāda* sentences as praising or blaming. The terms *prakṛti* and *purākalpa* have been used in the context of the *arthavāda* sentences. These have been taken to mean that some persons have performed an action in a deviant way or followed the tradition and not the Vedic injunction. The meaning of *prakṛti* and *purākalpa* is to be determined, for if *purākalpa* means following the tradition and not the injunction of the Veda and if this is to condemn such action, then what happens to the role of the *yājñika* in the performance of the Vedic *yajña* and the authority he is supposed to enjoy therein. Sūtra (2.1.66) suggests that repetition of an injunctive statement is at another place or another context; in the sūtra (2.1.67) suggests that the definition given does not seem to be correct as there are repetitions of other kinds also. The sūtra (2.1.68) suggests that the repetition can be meaningful as sometime when we want a person to go faster, we say "go, go" again and again. The sūtra (2.1.69) strangely bases the *prāmāṇya* of the *mantra* or the Vedas on the

analogy of the authority of the *Āyurveda* whose authority itself is based on the authority and reliability of the persons who have composed them. This closes the first section of the second part of the Nyāya sūtras.

Part II - Section 2 - (69 Sūtras)

The first section of the second *adhyāya* of the Nyāya sūtras deals with the various *pramāṇas* and with the objections that may be raised against them. Thus it is primarily concerned with a detailed discussion of the first topic mentioned in the opening sūtra (I.I.I). The second section of the second chapter starts with raising the issue whether the number of *pramāṇas* are only four. The sūtra (2.2.1) raises the question as to why other *pramāṇas* such as *aitihya*, *arthāpatti*, *saṁbhava* and *abhāva* should not be regarded as *pramāṇas*. The point is that besides perception, inference, knowledge by comparison or *upamāna* and testimony, there are other sources of knowledge such as knowledge from tradition, knowledge by implication, knowledge by subsumption and knowledge by negation.

The sūtra (2.2.2) argues that while there are cases of knowledge based on these, they can easily be understood as instances of the four sources of knowledge already accepted by him. Knowledge from tradition, for example, could be treated as *śabda pramāṇa*, while the remaining three could easily be understood as based on *anumāna*.

The sūtra (2.2.3) raises an objection that there cannot exist knowledge by implication or *arthāpatti* as the generalization on which it is based is not a true generalization, for it is *anekāntic* in character, meaning thereby that the same effect could have been produced by many different causes and hence the inference to any one of them may not be correct.

In sūtra (2.2.4) Gautama's reply to the objection from *anekāntikatā* is that the instances chosen for establishing it are not genuine cases of inference or *anumāna* but the real issue is as to what is a genuine case of *anumāna* and how the theoretical

anekāntikatā of the relationship can be avoided. The sūtra uses a very strange word, *abhimāna*, to convey the inappropriateness of the examples. One should carefully examine the peculiar use of this word in the sūtra. The sūtra (2.2.5) again raises the objection from *anekāntikatā*, but neither the potential objector nor Gautama himself seem to be clear about the generalized nature of the objection and the real point of it. The sūtra (2.2.6) tries to suggest that if all inferences are vitiated because of *anekāntikatā* then the argument from *anekāntikatā* should also be so vitiated and hence be invalid. The general position of Gautama seems to be that even in order to object one has to accept at least some instances of inferential knowledge or rather some forms of argument as valid.

The sūtra (2.2.7) discusses knowledge by negation. The sūtra seems to argue that *abhāva* can not be regarded as a *pramāṇa* as what it is supposed to establish is itself non-existent. The sūtra (2.2.8) perhaps tries to explicate what exactly is meant by the sūtra (2.2.7). It suggests that if, in a situation, a number of things are identified as having a certain distinguishing property, then by virtue of that very fact they are also understood as different or distinguished from other similar things which lack that distinguishing property and hence absence or *abhāva* of a property can also be legitimately regarded as a property of objects. Perhaps the sūtra (2.2.7) objects that absence of something cannot be a property of objects. *Abhāva* cannot be accepted as a *pramāṇa* or *hetu* for proving anything. The sūtra (2.2.8) therefore is a reply to this objection suggesting that *abhāva* or absence can legitimately be regarded as a property of objects and hence as a ground of inferring something else. The sūtra (2.2.9) seems to raise the issue whether absence can properly be attributed to an object unless it earlier possessed the property which now is absent. In case it never possessed it, how can its absence be meaningfully attributed to it. Perhaps the question relates to the conditions under which absence of a property can be meaningfully predicated of an object and when it is just a vacuous assertion of absence.

Gautama seems to suggest a reply in the later part of the sūtra itself and says that the condition suggested for the meaningful predication of absence does not seem to be correct as it is not necessary that the absence predicated should be only of a property which was present earlier in that thing, as it might be present in something else and this should be no bar to the legitimacy of the statement that this property is present in this object and not in that object. The sūtra (2.2.10) seems to raise the objection that the very statement that something is non-existent implies its existence at some other place or some other time and thus leads to the simultaneous assertion of existence and non-existence together. But this presupposes that existence is always spatio-temporal in character and in case it is so it has to be specified. The reply of Gautama in (2.2.11) is something of the same sort as it says that the presence or absence of the property which is being asserted is relative to the object concerned and hence it is not in the same object that both presence and absence are being predicated. The sūtra (2.2.12) continues the argument and points out that the objector himself had admitted the absence of a property in an object after its having been present earlier. But this, in his opinion, did not lead to the simultaneous assertion of both presence and absence as time matters in such situations when difference of place does not. The larger question whether there are any radical differences with respect to the possession of contrary or even contradictory properties with respect to differences in space-time location has not been discussed either by Gautama or his *pratipakṣī*.

It would be interesting to see how the argument is developed from Vātsyāyana onwards.

The sūtra (2.2.13) which deals with *samśaya* is not regarded as a sūtra in the *Nyāya Sūci Nibandha*. The discussion onwards is concerned with establishing the non-eternality of sound, perhaps against the *mīmāṃsaka* position which is a pre-condition for their view that the Vedas are eternal. From the sūtras (2.2.13) to (2.2.21) Gautama gives his reasons why he regards sound as

non-eternal. The first argument given in sūtra (2.2.13) is that sound is non-eternal because it has a beginning, also because it is perceived with the help of an external sense-organ and because it is such that it is spoken of as a thing having properties and features that are only found in objects that have been created and hence are non-eternal. The sūtra (2.2.14) continues the discussion and suggests that none of these reasons is sufficient to establish the non-eternality of sound. For example, the *dhvaṅsābhāva* is generally regarded as eternal, even though it has a beginning and hence the fact that sound has a beginning does not prove that it is not eternal in the sense that once produced it is never destroyed. Similarly, the fact that something is perceived by an external sense-organ does not prove that it cannot be eternal for the *sāmānya* such as the *āhatatva* along with the object such as the pot by means of which it is produced and the external sense-organ such as the eye by which it is seen is still regarded by everyone as being eternal. Similarly the fact that some features are ascribed to sound, which are only found in non-eternal things would not necessarily make it non-eternal, for though parts are generally found only in non-eternal things, still we think of *ākāsa* as having parts or the self as having parts even though both of them are conceived as eternal. The sūtra (2.2.15) further argues that things may be eternal even when they are produced and when they are apprehended by the senses as in the case of *ghaṭābhāva* and the apprehensions of *sāmānya* or universal in perception. The sūtra (2.2.16) suggests that the analogy of perceiving a universal which is eternal along with the particular perceived by the visual sense-organ can not be held to be correct, as in the case of the ear, it does not reach out to the place where the sound is produced but rather the sound produced successively travels to the cavity of the ear, where it is apprehended as sound. Even otherwise, we will have to distinguish between the universal sound from the particular sound which will have to be admitted as non-eternal. It is thus not the particular sound which is heard which will be eternal, but the 'soundness', which will be perceived along with

it that will be regarded as eternal. The Nyāya analysis of the visual and the auditory perception seems to suggest that there is a radical distinction between them. However, it is not clear if the same analyses have been extended to other senses such as smell, taste and touch. The sūtra (2.2.17) again suggests that the use of the word 'part' in parts of *ākāśa* or of self are used incorrectly and hence can provide no ground for the belief that sound is eternal. The important point that Gautama seems to be considering is that if any thing is spatio-temporal and has parts or has a beginning then it can not strictly be considered as eternal. But the Indian analyst had suggested particularly in his analysis of *prāgbhāva* and *dhvaṅsābhāva* that something which is beginningless can still have an end and that something which has a beginning can be endless. There should, therefore, be three kinds of eternal objects, that is, those that have a beginning but have no end, those that have an end but no beginning and lastly those that have neither a beginning nor an end. Similarly, we should perhaps distinguish between objects which occupy space and thus are said to have parts in the sense that they are divisible and separable and those complex objects of thought which do not occupy space and yet have properties which are distinguishable by analysis. Perhaps, a further distinction should be made between properties which are only distinguishable and not separable and those which are both separable and distinguishable. The sūtra (2.2.18) offers some more arguments for the non-eternality of sound. The first argument is that sound is non-eternal because we do not hear it before it is uttered. In case it were already there and we were not hearing it, we would have to postulate some obstruction or countervailing factor because of which we did not hear it. However, our ordinary experience does not seem to support this. The sūtra (2.2.19) and (2.2.20) raise the interesting issue whether the fact that we are not aware of the exact nature of obstruction, because of which the sound is not perceived before it is actually heard, can be taken as a sufficient ground for the assertion that there is no obstruction or veil hindering our knowledge of the presence of the sound.

The argument is a general one and suggests that the absence of knowledge cannot be a ground for the rejection of something. But then there must be some independent grounds for the assertion that we have to postulate the existence of that thing and that without postulating it our experience will remain unintelligible. Also, if we postulate something like obstruction or a veil which is hindering our knowledge then it should be removable and there should be specifiable processes for its removal.

Otherwise, on the ground of *lāghava* or parsimony, there is no point in postulating such a thing. Gautama in the sūtra (2.2.21) does not see the general nature of the objection or the problem that it raises in the context of knowledge but argues that the absence, on the ground of which he has asserted the legitimacy of the inference of something, was a positive absence and not just absence as such. The point perhaps is that earlier Gautama had accepted the legitimacy of inferring something on the basis of its *abhāva*, even though he had not accepted *abhāva* as an independent *pramāṇa* and the opponent appears to have misconstrued what he was saying as arguing that we may postulate the existence of an obstruction on the basis of the fact that we do not hear the sound, even though it is eternal. The sūtras (2.2.22) to (2.2.39) give the positive arguments for the position that sound is eternal. The whole sequence of the sūtras is topsyturvy as normally one would have assumed that the arguments for the eternality of sound would be given first and then refuted. However, Gautama does just the opposite. He first gives the arguments for the non-eternality of sound and answers the possible objections against it and then gives the positive arguments for the opponents and then refutes them. The first argument that the opponent gives for the eternality of sound is that it is eternal because it lacks the quality of touch. This is a strange argument because it implies that whatever cannot be touched, is eternal. The argument is so weak that it is surprising that it should have been given and taken seriously. The sūtra (2.2.23) and (2.2.24) give two examples of something being non-eternal and yet

lacking in the quality of touch. The example given is that of *karma*. One cannot touch action and yet it is not eternal. The sūtra (2.2.24) gives the counter-example of something being eternal which also has the quality of touch, an atom, which is supposed to be both eternal and having the quality of touch. However, it is not quite clear how an atom is supposed to have the quality of touch, as one certainly cannot touch it. The sūtra (2.2.25) gives a very strange argument from the word *sampradāna* which is not normally used.

The sūtra (2.2.24) gives another interesting example of something which lacks the quality of touch and yet is non-eternal. The example given is that of action and it is very strange to have the issue whether an action can have tactile qualities, raised. In fact, an action cannot be said, meaningfully, not only to have the quality of touch but also those of smell and taste. As for the qualities of sight and sound, it is not quite clear how they can be ascribed to it, though actions certainly can be seen but they do not have colour. The whole question of the relevant predicates of action is interesting and needs to be explored further. There is, also, the related question as to how is an action known and what are the sources of the knowledge of action and how is such knowledge validated. There is also the distinction between *kriyā* and *karma* and, in case this is accepted, the problem will be regarding the difference that such a distinction makes in respect of the questions of knowledge and validity. The sūtra (2.2.25) gives a strange argument from the linguistic construction which allows one to say that one can 'give' a 'word' and argues that in case the construction is meaningful it implies that the word must have existed even before it was given as one cannot give a thing which was not existent before its being given. The argument is to establish the eternality of sound. But if its logic were to be accepted, then everything will become eternal for, if it can be given then it must have existed before and in case it is a thing, for only that which is a thing can be given, it must have existed before. In fact, there is another analogous argument

for the eternity of every thing as nothing can come into being if it was not already there, for nothing can come out of nothing and hence the illusion of something coming into being and passing away is only an appearance and not its 'real' reality. At a still deeper level it has been argued that the very notion of "appearing" and "disappearing" involves the reality of time with its distinctions of past, present and future which themselves are indefensible as they are continuously changing.

The sūtra (2.2.26) controverts the argument for the sound being eternal because of the fact that one can give one's word to somebody and one can give only what one has already got. The objection raised by Gautama is that there is always an interval between the giving and the receiving and normally the object continues to exist, but, in the case of sound, nothing is apprehended between the act of uttering and the act of hearing and hence it is improper to talk of "giving" in the case of sound as the opponent seems to do. The sūtra (2.2.27) gives a counter-argument that sound can be regarded as a thing that can be given, for a teacher does teach a student how to utter a word properly and he can do so only by first uttering the sounds himself and then listening to the same sounds being repeated by the student and correcting him if he has not uttered them in the same way. In sūtra (2.2.28) Gautama points out in reply that the argument from the teaching of sound in the case of words cannot establish that something is being given to somebody else, for the phenomenon of teaching can be understood in terms of the student imitating the teacher as he does, say, in the case of dance. A dance movement is not exactly given but is imitated by the student who watches the teacher's movement and tries to replicate it. The sūtra (2.2.29) tries to answer a possible objection that, after all, the sound is repeated and we say that it is the same sound that is being uttered again and again and hence it proves that the sound is eternal and its different utterances are so many instances of it. In a sense, this is the problem of the universal and the particular which is being discussed in the context of sound and neither the

eternity nor the non-eternity of sound can be established through this way of arguing. For, to take the Platonic line, it will be the universal which will be enduring and eternal, and not the particular which will be changing and ephemeral. In sūtra (2.2.30) Gautama points out that a repetition of the same does not argue for non-difference as the two cases are not numerically identical. It is certainly true that the same sound can be repeated but each instance of its repetition is different from the other and this is indicated by the fact that we say "it is the same as the other one was." It should be noted here that the sūtra uses the term *abhyāsa* in a very strange sense for though the term *abhyāsa* does mean repetition, it also implies improvement through repetition. The sūtra (2.2.31) raises the issue as to what exactly is meant by the words 'other than' for if something, say x, is held to be other than, say y, then it is obvious that x cannot be regarded as other than x and hence, as the concept of 'other than' cannot be applied to a thing itself, there is no point in treating sheer numerical difference as affecting the identity of the object concerned. The issue is whether numerical difference can be relevantly said to affect the identity of an object. (Those people who have said that Indian philosophy does not discuss the abstract law of identity as discussed by Aristotle have not paid attention to the discussion of it in the Nyāya sūtras as indicated here). In sūtra (2.2.32) Gautama points out that the idea of something not being other than itself cannot make sense if there was nothing which was not other than what a thing itself is supposed to be. While, there certainly is a play on the word 'other than' in the phrase 'a thing is not other than itself' there is a subtle philosophical point that is being made, that is, that the assertion of identity has no meaning except when an entity is being differentiated from all the other things which are not the same as itself. The usual formulation of the law of identity in the western philosophical tradition masks this basic fact which Gautama is trying to point out. However, the irony is that this is exactly the position that the Buddhists developed to the extreme in their doctrine of *apoha*

and the followers of the author of the Nyāya sūtras opposed them on this point.

The sūtra (2.2.33) imagines a new argument in favour of the eternity of sound and tries to refute it in (2.2.34). The argument imagined in (2.2.33) is that if sound was not regarded as eternal, then it would have to be considered as non-eternal, i.e. it would have to be regarded as something that is destroyed or ceases to be, but if so, there has to be some cause for the destruction or cessation of sound. But we do not know of any such cause and hence sound will have to be regarded as eternal. Gautama's reply to this in sūtra (2.2.34) is that in case this were to be true, then one will have to explain why one does not hear a sound constantly. Further, in sūtra (2.2.35), Gautama argues that though it is true that we do not perceive any cause for the cessation of sound, we certainly can infer it. For example, we may say that the members in a series of sounds are such that the next sound is produced by the earlier members which themselves perish after producing the next sound. Strangely, this is very much like the Buddhist position of *kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda* where reality is supposed to be momentary and this doctrine of the momentariness of reality itself is supposed to be a logical consequence of the criterion of reality given in their doctrine of *artha kriyā kārritva*. The Buddhists, of course, did not confine it merely to the realm of sound but extended it to all that was considered as real. The sūtra (2.2.36) tries to suggest that it is not a fact that we do not have any knowledge of the conditions causing the cessation of sound for if we put our hands on a bell then we can see the sound as ceasing. The sūtra (2.2.37) argues further that in case the sound was to be regarded as eternal then one would have to find the conditions for the fact that we do not hear it continuously and that we cease to hear it after a certain time. The sūtra (2.2.37), in fact, tries to answer the point that was made by the opponent in sūtra (2.2.33). The sūtra (2.2.38) discusses a different point and is concerned with the issue as to what is the substratum of sound or what is that in which sound inheres. The position of

the author of the Nyāya Sūtra is that sound inheres in *ākāśa* while the sūtra (2.2.38) tries to argue that the sound inheres not in *ākāśa* but in the physical substratum in which also inheres the contact with the striking instrument and the intensity or speed with which the object is struck. The sūtra (2.2.38) suggests that such a position cannot be maintained because the auditory sense organ is confined to the cavity of the ear and one would have to assume that the sound which travels from the object to the ear continuously ceases and gives rise to its successor till it reaches the ear. But between the object and the ear, in what substance will this sound inhere. Ultimately, therefore, the objection is untenable and one will have to assume that sound does not inhere in the object from which it is supposed to travel to the ear. The sūtra (2.2.39) makes another important point and suggests that sound, unlike other sense qualities, such as colour, taste, smell and touch, does not inhere in any object and hence one will have to assume some other non-objective substratum for it and this probably can only be *ākāśa*. However, even though the sound may not inhere in the object there can be little doubt that most objects have a sound of their own which they emit when struck by something. It is strange that Gautama did not anticipate this objection in sūtra (2.2.39).

The sūtras (2.2.40-57) are concerned with the issue of the transformation of sound. The sūtras (2.2.40) onwards consider an issue regarding sound which may seem very strange to one at first sight. The issue relates to the question whether sound is undifferentiated in itself and that if differentiations occur they are only due to accidental, external circumstances. On the other hand, sound may be essentially differentiated in terms of phonemes out of which all complex utterances are constituted. Perhaps an analogy with colour might help in understanding the nature of the discussion. Normally we do not think that there is anything like colour in itself but only determinate colours such as blue, green, purple etc. But if we treat white and black also as colours, then it will be clear that nothing can be colourless in principle.

On the other hand, if white is regarded as lack of colour then to be coloured would only mean that something is not white, but it will not determine as to what colour the object has. Similarly, sound may be considered to consist actually only of determinate sounds, but without there being anything like "white" in it, though perhaps a confused buzzing sound may be considered as akin to something like "white colour" in the realm of sound. In fact, the case of sound is very peculiar as phonemes are known only analytically and are normally postulated only in relation to language while in the context of music, the ultimate elements of sound are considered to be *swaras* (notes) or *śruti* (the ultimate distinguishable microtones that can be heard by the human ear and/or produced by the human voice). Strangely, while we know of sounds which are inaudible to the human ear but audible to other species of animals and we also correlate sounds with vibration frequencies of the air, we do not have any thing analogous in the realm of sound to infra-red and ultra-violet in the realm of colours. The colour spectrum and the sound spectrum seem to be very different in nature even though there seem to be seven notes just as we have seven colours.

It is also not quite clear as to what is the relation between what are usually called phonemes and notes or even *śrutis* and though both of them relate to sounds which are produced by human beings, they seem to have little relation to each other. Perhaps, in pure music or *alāpa* where no words are present, the sounds produced do not employ all the instrumentalities used in the production of words or their combinations. But then the question will arise as to what is produced by instrumental music and what exactly is the difference between words as they are produced on an instrument and those that are produced by the instrumentation of the vocal mechanism in human beings. The point is that for producing linguistic sounds, one needs the movement of the tongue touching different parts of the mouth. However, this does not take place in instruments, at least not ostensibly. There is also the problem that if words are produced

primarily by a mechanism which is different from that which produces only sound and if there is such a thing as pure *alāpa* in music where words do not play any role at all, then why does a person who is dumb in the sense that he cannot produce linguistic sounds cannot sing pure *alāpa* where words are not required. It would be equally interesting to find whether persons who are dumb can play instrumental music and if not, why not. We are, of course, assuming that a person who is dumb is not deaf but such a combination is supposed to be possible on pure physiological grounds. One may also explore the possibility as to why a dumb person cannot produce word music instrumentally. In any case, the Nyāya Sutra does not discuss all these issues but is interested in something else whose importance again does not seem to have been noticed by commentators. It is concerned with the phenomenon of *saṁdhi* and *saṁāsa* in language, particularly as it occurs in the Sanskrit language, where two separate words can be combined into one word but during the combination their last letters are combined in such a way as to change their *vibhakti*. Now the problem that is being discussed in the sūtras (2.2.40 to 2.2.57) leads to the issue of the nature of the transformation of two words when they undergo the process of being combined together in one word and the rules of combination that determine this conjoining of words that are separate into a new unity. The discussion recalls strangely the one that occurs in science dealing with the problem of chemical combination. In chemistry we are concerned with elements and their combinations to produce new compounds and what exactly happens during this combination. One of the problems relates to what is known as conservation of matter, later distinguished between conservation of mass and conservation of energy. The problem of combination of words through rules governing it, results in analogous problem as it is being argued that two words ending in the short “i” and the ones ending in the long “ī” get combined in the same way without distinguishing between the shortness or the longness of the “i” concerned and hence violate

what may be called the law of conservation of linguistic combination. The issue relates only tangentially to the basic problem which is being discussed in the sūtras, that is, the eternity or transience of sound. The problem perhaps is how to understand the transformation of vowels when two words combine with each other, for if the sound were to be eternal then the transformation and change in vowels could not have taken place. But, then, what is supposed to be eternal in sound; the undifferentiated sound or sound as differentiated? In case it is the latter, then alone can the problem arise; otherwise there is no difficulty as the sound is supposed to be transient and can certainly change. Persons who think of sound as eternal seem to suggest a way out of the difficulty posed by the transformation of vowels in the process of combination. They seem to suggest that the same sound which appeared earlier in one form now occurs in another form when the two are brought together. But this obviously seems to be an unsatisfactory explanation. It appears that two different issues are being confused here; the one relating to the problem of transformation in general, the other relating to lack of differential transformation even when there is a relevant difference in the vowels that have to be combined. Somehow, on a *prima facie* view, the two issues which are very different in nature and lead in different directions seem to have been confused in the discussion.

The sūtra (2.2.40) suggests that because of the variable rules of combination and transformation in grammar, it would not be proper to regard sound as consisting ultimately of phonemes for if it were so, one would not have this variability in the situation. The sūtra (2.2.41) suggests that perhaps the variability pointed out is not exactly correct as it is the change in the volume of the sound uttered which is the more fundamental factor and which remains constant. The sūtra (2.2.42) suggests an objection to this way of defending the position and states that there are other cases where the volume undergoes a variation and sometimes increases and sometimes decreases and sometimes remains constant. The

sūtra (2.2.43) tries to suggest that if the situation is so variable then nothing is proved either way. The sūtra (2.2.44) tries to say that the examples of variability were given to show negative instances which disprove or at least go counter to the thesis that the volume remains constant. The sūtra 2.2.44 further argues that it is not the case that the original material and its transformation share everything in common, for if it were so then they would have been identical.

As there is some identity and some difference in the transformation, we may say that some properties remain constant and some undergo a change. But what are the fundamental properties that do not vary in the transformation and what are those properties which change. Gautama's reply to this is that it is not the case that only some generic properties remain constant. The original material and the transformation share some specific and significant features in common and not such a general universal thing as sound which is being argued for by those who think that sound is something eternal and unchanging. The sūtra (2.2.45) suggests the counterargument from the opponent that it is being assumed that both the substance which is transformed and the substance into which it is transformed are substances and in case this is so it is only substances which can get transformed into other substances. And though Gautama does not ask this question it can be asked here whether sound can be regarded as a substance just as gold and clay, which are given as examples, are regarded as substances. However, the point made by the opponent is that just as substantiality remains a constant even though there is a variation in form and other properties, similarly the phonemes even after combination remain the same even if there is a change in other properties. The sūtra (2.2.46) argues that the objection would be valid only if in the conjunctive transformation some new properties would come into being. But if the same properties continue then where is the transformation? But in the conjunctive transformation what is there except phonemes which persist after the transformation. The sūtra

(2.2.47) raises the question that the linguistic combination is a very strange kind of combination as, though some sort of change occurs through the combination one can revert back to the old position by analytically decomposing what had been conjoined according to the rules. On the other hand, in nature if once a transformation has taken place one can hardly get back to the original situation which obtained before. For example, if milk gets transformed, into curd one cannot retransform it into milk again. In (2.2.48) the suggestion is made that this is not quite true as gold can be transformed into ornaments and the ornaments can be changed back into gold. Sūtra (2.2.49) points out that there is a radical difference between the two situations. Ornaments which are made of gold do not cease to be gold but phonemes do not retain their identity when they are transformed through conjunction and hence they are more akin to the example of milk and yogurt than gold and its ornaments. The sūtra (2.2.50) tries to suggest that the thesis of transformation of one phoneme into another is in any case untenable whether sound is considered to be eternal or transient, for if it were eternal then the phonemes' nature would never be transformed and if it is transient, there would be nothing to be transformed. The sūtra (2.2.51) gives a very interesting rejoinder to the point made by Gautama about eternal and non-eternal things. The opponent argues that it is not necessary for all eternal things to have the same properties as even according to the Naiyāyika, some eternal things like the universal have the property of perceptibility while others do not. Similarly, some eternal things may have the property of changeability while others may not have this quality. This, of course, is a tangential move in the argument as the opponent is not directly arguing that eternal things are changeable but only suggesting that it may be so. He is also not exploring the relationship between the concept of eternity and that of changeability and finding whether the two were compatible or not.

The sūtra (2.2.52) carries on the argument further and says that the incompatibility of transience with transformation which

was argued in (2.2.50) is not correct either, for in case sound is supposed to be transient then it is obvious that when one hears, the sound as an object in nature has ceased to exist and yet it has given rise to the sound that is heard. Similarly, a transient thing can always give rise to another, even though it is transient and thus result in something which may be similar to itself or even different from it. Thus both the sūtras 51 and 52 argue that the dilemma presented in sūtra 50 is not correct as in both the presuppositions of the eternity and transience of sound, the notion of transformation is tenable. The sūtra (2.2.53) returns back to the argument of (2.2.50) and suggests that the alternatives suggested in the sūtras 51 and 52 are untenable for, on the one hand, the concept of eternity and transformation are incompatible in principle while the concept of transience, if understood in its extreme logical Buddhist sense, will make the notion of transformation inapplicable. The problem in fact is a larger one and has plagued philosophers almost from the beginning. In the Greek tradition we had the Parmenidean contention that if the reality has to be a plenum there can be no change. On the other hand, if you have a Heraclitean universe, it becomes meaningless to say that something changes because there is “no” thing to change. We have the same problem in Indian philosophy between Sāṃkhya and Buddhists or between Advaitins and Buddhists. The compromise in the Greek tradition was to postulate a plurality of unchanging, permanent substances and to understand change in terms of their combination and separation. It is not quite easy to say that there were corresponding attempts at solution in the Indian tradition. Still, it is interesting to note that the discussion here in the context of sound is very similar to the one that took place in Greece on the same subject. In the sūtra (2.2.54), the argument is carried forward and it is said that to assert the transformation of anything is at least to assert that that thing would remain recognizably constant after the transformation so that we may say that the same thing has been transformed. But in the case of the phonemes such a situation does not obtain and

hence, to say that the rules of combination transform the one into the other is meaningless. The sūtra (2.2.55 and 56) relate to almost a verbal quibbling which however hides an important philosophical point, that is, whether a lack of necessity itself can be regarded as necessary. To put the point differently, when we say that in the empirical world there is no necessity, is this lack of necessity itself necessary. This may remind some of the distinction in modal logic between ‘necessarily necessary’ and ‘possibly necessary’. It is not quite clear whether modal logic developed alternative notions of ‘necessarily possible’ and ‘possibly possible’. The sūtra (2.2.57) concludes the discussion by suggesting that the concept of substitution will perhaps apply more relevantly to the situation than the concept of transformation. However, it is not clear what is gained by the change in terminology to describe what is happening and how does it resolve the theoretical difficulties with respect to the concepts of change and permanence which have been discussed here only in the context of sound but which have a wider relevance in all fields of knowledge.

From the sūtra 2.2.58 onwards, the discussion shifts from the problem of permanence or transience of sound to the problem of meaning of words or the performative power that language possesses. Interestingly, the discussion of the power of language leads to a discussion of meaning, as linguistic power is mediated through the meaning that it conveys. If the earlier discussion was centered on the ultimate units of sound in the context of language conceived as phonemes, the present discussion starts with the notion of roots or *dhātu* out of which the words are built by adding prefixes and suffixes. Gautama’s contention seems to be that only word has meaning and that roots by themselves have no meaning. However, it does not seem to have been discussed as to what is the distinction between a root and a phoneme, for both are supposed to be the ultimate constituents out of which language is built. The distinction obviously cannot lie in one being spoken and the other being written as all language is first spoken and then written. The other question to which Gautama addresses

himself is whether words refer to particulars or universals. In sūtra (2.2.60) he gives a number of examples which suggest that the meaning of the words can only refer to particulars and not universals. However in the earlier sūtra (2.2.59) Gautama had raised the issue as to what constitutes the word and in case word alone has meaning then what is it that constitutes the meaning. Gautama gives no answer to the first question. However, with respect to the second issue, he suggests that after all the meaning of the word can refer only to the individual entity to which it applies or to the universal properties embodied in that individual or it may refer to the peculiar form of the individual by virtue of which it is designated as that individual and which may also be correctly regarded as that individual. The idea of a visible form as the meaning of words and as perhaps constituting something midway between the individual and the universal is peculiar to Gautama. However, as far as I know, this issue has not been paid attention to, nor has it been seen that the form stands somewhere midway between the individual and the universal. The sūtra (2.2.60) tries to suggest by concrete examples that the meaning of the word is the individual to which it applies. However, the sūtra (2.2.61) refutes this view. The sūtra (2.2.61) suggests that while it is true that many of the examples given in 2.2.60 refer to individual, it argues that they do so only in the secondary sense for in the primary sense what is referred to is not this or that individual but rather the individual as belonging to a particular class and hence the meaning of the word is primarily the universal or the *jāti* and only secondarily, the specific individual to whom it is applied. The sūtra (2.2.62) gives a number of examples to substantiate that words can also be used in a secondary sense to denote specific individuals because of considerations of associations with place, functions, designs, measures etc. However, strangely, Gautama does not raise the question of proper names which are the heart of the matter. Nor does he raise the question whether the primary meaning of the word consists in designating objects, a function which is performed by nouns or to refer to activities

and processes, a function performed by verbs in a language. If it is remembered that this is the earliest controversy in the Indian tradition with respect to the problem of meaning, then its omission may be regarded as even more surprising. The sūtra (2.2.63) reverts back to the question that even if it is not the individual concerned which is primarily referred to by words, it is not the so-called universal either but rather the form or *ākṛti* which one sensuously apprehends as being embodied or exhibited by the individual concerned. However, the problem of the relation between the form and the universal is difficult to clarify and in any case the form also would have a universal of its own as it too is exhibited by diverse objects. There seems to be very little discussion of form as an independent claimant for the meaning of a word and Gautama seems to have too easily dismissed it. Nor does he seem to have raised the question as to how we refer to the individual if the meanings of words are always universal. The sūtra (2.2.64) further discusses the question of the form as the meaning of a word and suggests that even when the form is similar we do not treat it as the referent of the word but only as an apparent or virtual example of it. The problem that is being discussed is regarding the picture or an image in clay or stone of an object which also we call by the same name as it has the same form but which we do not regard as the real cow or horse or man as we do treat it in a way we will not do with the actual example of that object. However, Gautama does not discuss the whole problem of the status of an art object to which we react emotionally as if it were the real object. Nor does he discuss the issue as to why we call it by the same name or the same word if the meaning of the word has no relation to it at all. The sūtra (2.2.65) poses the problem that the universal alone cannot also be regarded as the meaning of a word as unless it were related to the form and the specific individual concerned we would not know what it referred to. The sūtra (2.2.66) suggests that perhaps a more complex theory has to be built and suggests that perhaps neither the universal, nor the individual nor the form can

constitute by themselves the meaning of a word. The sūtra (2.2.67) raises an even more interesting question and asks that after all, we have been using the words “individual”, “universal” and “form”, but what are the meanings of these words and how do we know them. The sūtra (2.2.68) tries to give some idea as to what form could possibly mean and suggests that the form is a half way house to the universal as it suggests that the object which is perceived falls under some class or other which has to be further determined and understood. However, it does not discuss the question whether there can be any object without form, a subject which has been discussed in Greek philosophy with respect to the relation between form and matter. The sūtra (2.2.69) closes the discussion and suggests that it is the universal which allows us both to know that a number of objects belong to the same class and the way they are different from objects in other classes.

Part III - Section 1 - (71 Sūtras)

The third chapter of the Nyāya sūtras is concerned with the *prameyas* or the objects that are established by reasoning. In a sense almost everything can be a *prameya* provided one wants to justify the belief in it and offers a ground for holding the belief. Thus *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are relative terms and while it seems meaningful to ask what are the legitimate grounds for believing in something, it is surprising that the author of the Nyāya sūtras should have thought it worthwhile to mention the possible objects of such belief. If one looks at the list of *prameyas* or things that are to be established by *pramāṇa*, one is surprised at many of the things mentioned therein. The list is given in sūtra 1.1.9 and contains *ātman*, that is the self, *śarīra* or the body, the senses and their objects, *buddhi*, that is the reasoning faculty, *manas*, that is mind, *pravṛtti doṣa*, that is the fault of desiring or being attracted towards the world or engaging with it in some sense or other, *pretyā bhāva*, that is, rebirth, *phala*, that is the result

of action, *duhkha*, that is, suffering, *apavarga* or release from suffering. The list is obviously fantastic and makes sense only in a framework where it is dogmatically assumed that the task of the whole enterprise of reasoning is to establish that *pravṛtti* is a *doṣa* whose *phala* is both suffering and rebirth from which release is required. Perhaps it is also implied that the *pravṛtti* is natural to man and consists in the body along with the senses being attracted towards the objects, and that it is the task of the reasoning faculty that is, *buddhi*, to understand this whole chain and try to get rid of it. The sūtra 1.1.9 relates perhaps to sūtra 1.1.2 which also had talked of *duhkha* and *janma*, *pravṛtti* and *doṣa* and had suggested that it all arises because of *mithyā jñāna* or false knowledge. The task of *buddhi* therefore is supposed to be to get rid of *mithyā jñāna*, that is, false knowledge.

However, though this seems to be a most plausible construction of the issue concerned, still it does not seem very intelligible as to how each of the elements mentioned can be regarded either separately or jointly as a *prameya*. The chapter 3 is supposed to deal exhaustively with each of these *prameyas*. The sūtra 3.1.1 starts by saying that we grasp the same object both by sight and touch and sūtra 3.1.2 tries to dispute this by suggesting that the identity of the object cannot be established by this supposed commonality between sight and touch. The chapter 3.1 seems concerned with establishing the *ātman* as a *prameya* and showing it as distinct from the sense organs, the body and mind. The problem therefore seems to be as to why postulate the existence of the *ātman* as separate from the body, the senses and the mind. This seems a legitimate enterprise for if the *ātman* has to be established as a separate entity, then grounds have to be given to show why it is necessary to postulate it and what are the grounds for such postulation. But then, as both the body and the senses and the mind are also supposed to be *prameyas*, they have to be established first, for to say that we have to believe in the reality of a soul which is different from the senses, the body and the mind implies that at least the reality of these has already been

established. The sequence of the sūtras in chapter 3, section 1 seems therefore to be wrong.

The sūtra 3.1.1 starts by giving the first argument for the necessity of the postulation of an entity which is different from the senses either individually or collectively. The argument is that we apprehend the same object both by sight and by touch. The argument should in fact have been formulated in a more general way, that is, we apprehend the same object through different senses, and there was no need to confine this situation to sight and touch alone. In fact, normally the difference between perception and sensation is given in terms of the fact that the object of the former is that which is, or can be, grasped by different senses while the latter can only be grasped by one sense alone. Gautama however seems to be saying that the apprehension of identity of an object which is apprehended through different senses can not be derived from the senses which apprehended it as they happen to be different in nature. It is not clear whether the argument hinges on the difference in the senses or on the identity of the object which is apprehended. For, in case it is the latter, then even in the case of an object apprehended by one sense alone the problem would occur as to how does one know whether the blue which one apprehended sometime ago was the same which one is apprehending now. On the other hand, if the argument is based on the fact that as the senses are different, their object can only be apprehended as different by them and therefore if they apprehend the object as one and the same, there must be some other entity besides the senses which apprehends the identity and that this entity can only apprehend identities and not differences. This would mean that the *ātman* in principle cannot know the difference between one object and another and the apprehension of difference is primarily due to the intervening instruments of cognition such as the senses. However, besides the sense objects, there are also abstract entities which are apprehended by the *buddhi* and hence *buddhi* again would have to be postulated as being essentially different on the analogy of the senses. But, then

nobody knows how many different kinds of *buddhi* there are. And, if one accepts the possibility of different spiritual realizations, then the same problem would recur therein also. The argument, if sufficiently pursued would result in the advaitic position where the *ātman* can only apprehend identities and all difference will be due to something else such as *māyā* or *avidyā*. But such a conclusion would hardly be acceptable to the author of the Nyāya sūtras.

The sūtra 3.1.2 raises the objection that the argument given in 3.1.1 is not correct as the apprehension of any object is through the senses alone and not through any other faculty. The point that is being made is that in the absence of the senses the object cannot be known and that each of the senses is restricted to the type of objects it apprehends. The objection is irrelevant as the issue raised in 3.1.1 did not relate to the fact that the senses apprehend objects or even that the senses alone reveal a restricted range of objects but that the same object is apprehended by different senses and hence something else has to be postulated for apprehending their identity besides the senses. What is surprising is that Gautama should have given this objection in sūtra 3.1.2 without seeing the irrelevance of the objection to the argument given by him in 3.1.1. It is obvious that the author is presenting the opponent's position in a weak fashion rather than making it more directly pertinent to the point he had raised in 3.1.1.

The sūtra 3.1.3 points out that it is because of the restriction of each sense to the apprehension of only one set of qualities that one needs to postulate something like the *ātman* which will see the object as a unified whole consisting of all the qualities. It has however not been made clear as to why such a unificatory function cannot be performed by the mind or *buddhi* and has to be performed by the *ātman*. However, if the function of the *ātman* is to unify the manifold of sensations into an apprehensible object, then it cannot be given any further qualities or functions unless they are necessarily implied or involved by this unifying function for which it is postulated.

The sūtras 3.1.4 to 3.1.6 argue that the soul is not merely distinct from the senses but also from the body. The sūtra 3.1.4 gives a very strange argument saying that if the soul were identical with the body there would be no sin from burning a living body. The sūtra seems to have been badly formulated as what is perhaps meant is that in case the soul is identified with the body, it cannot have such attributes as virtue and vice or sin and merit. The point of the argument seems to be that if the body were to be completely identified with the soul then, in case one harms someone else, one cannot be said to incur any sin. The sūtra 3.1.4 thus introduces a new reason for postulating the soul as the subject of moral predicates and not just that which performs the unificatory function in knowing the object. At a deeper level perhaps, the first three sūtras may be seen in terms of the necessity of postulating a soul for making intelligible the knowing function in man while the sūtra 3.1.4 sees it necessary for understanding human action which is necessarily characterized as good or bad or right or wrong.

The sūtra 3.1.5 suggests that the postulation of a soul will not exactly help matters for, on such a postulation, there will be no such thing as killing or harming another, as soul is supposed to be eternal and cannot be killed or harmed. The other part of the argument would be that if the soul is supposed to be eternal and unchanging then no new predicates could accrue to it and thus it could not incur sin or merit by any action that is performed. In fact, the deeper question should be whether such a soul could be thought of in these terms.

The sūtra 3.1.6 tries to suggest a distinction between the soul and the body in terms of the body being the necessary *āśraya* of action and hence its being killed or harmed in any way is as effective an action against another person as harming the soul itself. The problem basically pertains to the relation between the soul and the body and relates to the question whether the body is necessary for purposes of knowledge, feeling and action and if it is so then harming it is almost as bad as harming the soul

itself because it destroys its capacity to know, feel and act. However, it is not clear as to what is the use of postulating such an entity which can neither know, feel or act without depending on some thing else and secondly, the whole issue of moral predication or change of any kind in an entity which by definition is eternal and unchanging is not even raised by the author of the Nyāya Sūtra. In fact it is not even asked as to how the soul is affected by the knowledge, action and feelings for which the body is supposed to be the necessary instrument. Moreover, there is a continuous confusion between the problem of the ascription of a moral quality to the person who harms another person and the issue whether somebody can be really harmed by the fact that his body alone is harmed. The problem would recur in the *Gītā* and elsewhere without in any way getting seriously considered or resolved in any meaningful manner.

The sūtra 3.1.7 seems to give a very strange argument for the necessity of the postulation of the soul. The argument is that one recognizes that what one is seeing with the 'right eye is the same as what one sees with the left eye. In a sense, the argument is reminiscent of what was already said in sūtra 3.1.1 where the same object was apprehended by different senses. Here the same object is supposed to be apprehended by the same sense organ which consists of two eyes instead of one. In fact, there was no necessity of bringing in this unusual argument. The same purpose would have been served better by considering the case of memory or even of recognition which in fact is the term used in the sūtra. It may be interesting to note that the term *pratyabhijñā* was later used for powerful philosophical construction in Kashmir Śaivism by Abhinavagupta.

The sūtra 3.1.8 suggests that such an example is not correct because there are in fact not two eyes as the visual organ is only one and appears to be two because it is divided by the bridge of the nose.

The sūtra 3.1.9 suggests that the objection is mistaken and that the eyes are two and not one, for if one of the eyes is destroyed we continue to see with the other eye even then.

The sūtra 3.1.10 suggests that the argument given in 3.1.9 is not correct as it is well known that even when a part is destroyed, the whole of the remaining part still functions in many cases. The sūtra 3.1.11 argues that this is not exactly the case and that where the so-called whole still continues to function if a part of it was destroyed, the whole itself should not be considered as one, but as consisting of many relatively independent sub-wholes. The sūtra 3.1.12 points out that not only does one recognise that the object one knows by one sense is the same as that which is known by another sense but also the apprehension by one sense brings to memory the qualities associated with the other senses with respect to the same object and sometimes in fact actually produces sensations in them. For example, one sometimes has the actual sensation of taste on seeing an object even when one has not tasted it if one had tasted it earlier and the experience was either extraordinarily pleasant or unpleasant and hence got associated with it in an indissoluble manner. The point is that such an amalgamation of experience from different senses, even when the object is present only to one sense, necessitates the postulation of some entity other than the senses to account for the experience. However, as was the case with other examples, the argument does not prove the existence of the soul but only the need for postulating some entity other than the senses to account for the experience.

The sūtra 3.1.13 suggests that the problem is one of memory and has nothing directly to do with the soul, but then the issue is how to account for memory for, memory is that which is not directly present to perception or to any of the senses in the present.

The sūtra 3.1.14 suggests that though it is true that the question is primarily one of memory, still it is not the case that memory cannot be understood without postulating a soul.

The sūtra 3.1.15 raises the issue as to why all these properties cannot be attributed to mind and have to be attributed to an entity other than the mind, for what the arguments upto now have

established is only that some entity other than the senses and the body has to be postulated to account for such experiences.

The sūtra 3.1.16 says that ultimately the cognition can belong only to someone who cognizes and as mind also is the instrument of cognition, it cannot be regarded as the subject of cognition. It is not exactly clear what the sūtra says. At one point it seems that the sūtra is trying to suggest that the whole problem is a verbal one and whether you ascribe it to the mind or the soul the problem remains the same. The sūtra 3.1.17 perhaps tries to suggest that as there are objects of cognition which are different from those which are apprehended by the senses, we need to postulate an instrument for their cognition and mind must be regarded as such an instrument and hence cannot be identified with the soul on the basis of the very same arguments which have compelled us to postulate something apart from the senses to account for cognition. In case this interpretation of the sūtra is correct, it would give a non-sāṃkhyan reason for distinguishing between the self and the mind, for what is being argued is that there are objects of cognition which are not apprehended as one cognizes the sense qualities and hence require the postulation of an instrument distinct from the senses for their cognition. Pleasure and pain and all the other states that are apprehended through introspection may thus be said to require the postulation of mind through which they are cognised, but which itself cannot be identified with soul or self.

The sūtra 3.1.18 raises the issue regarding the nature of the soul, particularly whether it is eternal or not. The sūtra 3.1.19 (3.1.18 in Ganganath Jha) argues that the very fact that when a child is born he shows joy, sorrow, fear etc. shows that he must be remembering and recognizing experiences that he is having as otherwise there can be no reason for the discriminatory emotional responses that he makes to objects in this life, for he has not yet learnt about them. The postulation of a soul before it is born is thus a necessity to account for the behaviour exhibited by the new-born baby and we also find that though the body

continues to change and grow, the sense of 'I' does not change substantially over one's whole lifetime.

The sūtra 3.1.20 raises the objection that there is no reason for postulating such a continuity as one finds even non-human objects which show a similar behaviour on their part without our postulating any soul in them. A lotus flower, for example, opens and closes with the rising and setting of the sun and yet we do not postulate any soul for it. The sūtra 3.1.21 argues that the analogy is not correct as the changes in a flower such as lotus are due to variations in the elements of which it is made. Similarly, there certainly has to be postulated a cause due to which there are variations in the emotions of a new-born baby with respect to the objects that it encounters. But this cause cannot be in the elements as it consists of feelings and emotions and involves consciousness and a type of response which can only make sense in terms of the previous experience of the object concerned and hence has to be ascribed to memory and recognition which require the postulation of a soul which exists prior to the moment of birth.

The sūtra 3.1.22 argues that the soul cannot be regarded as something whose existence is caused and hence which can come into being and also can be destroyed by other causes. The argument given in support of this is very strange and has played an important role in Indian philosophical thought for believing in the eternity of the soul. The argument given is that the child from the moment of birth shows a desire for the mother's breast in order to feed itself and such a desire cannot be understood without postulating that the child in some sense knows that it is good for its living and such a knowledge could not have been attained except in a previous birth which itself would require the postulation of infinite births in the past and hence one has to accept eternity of the soul which undergoes such experiences. The sūtra 3.1.23 suggests that the argument in sūtra 3.1.22 cannot be taken seriously as the movement observed is analogous to the one which is found in the case of the iron and the magnet. However,

though the iron is naturally attracted to the magnet no one postulates a previous experience in the iron which attracts it in such a way.

The sūtra 3.1.24 argues that after all one will have to postulate some differentiating cause in the iron because of which it moves towards the magnet as no other object seems to show that kind of motion. Similarly, one will have to postulate some sort of differentiating cause for the child's motion and this can only be accounted for in the way that has already been argued in the previous sūtras. However, no substantive reason is given why no other postulations can account for the child's behaviour nor is any reason given why the same postulation cannot be made in the case of the iron and the magnet. It seems that the author of the Nyāya Sūtra is struggling to find a radical distinction between the inanimate world of matter and the world of plants on the one hand and the animal world and the world of man on the other. The example of the human child does not apply to the human world alone but is a common feature of all mammals and hence would prove the existence of a soul in all of them. It is surprising that this objection has not been raised or answered by the author of the Nyāya sūtras. Physics and metaphysics seem to be deeply interlinked here and this, as far as I know, has not been noticed in the discussion. The sūtra 3.1.25 gives another strange argument for the so-called eternity of the soul. The sūtra says that we may infer the eternity of the soul from the fact that persons who are free from desire and longing are never found to be born again. It is a very strange argument as no one seems to know or rather there is no means of establishing whether they are born again or not; nor is it clear what is meant by being free from desire.

The sūtra 3.1.26 reverts back to the earlier issue of the child's behaviour on being born and suggests that the behaviour could be understood on the same pattern as the production of qualities along with the production or coming into being of substances. The point seems to be that everything that comes into being shows a lot of properties that are natural and inherent in it, and

hence there seems no reason to postulate a previous birth in the case of a child as his behaviour can be seen as a quality or property belonging to it just as other objects possess other qualities when they come into being. The sūtra 3.1.27 tries to give a reply to this objection and says that desire and aversion can only be attributed to *sañkalpa*, that is, to consciousness or rather to will. The translation in Ganganath Jha of *sañkalpa* as anticipation is strange though it makes more sense. Perhaps what the author of the sūtra wants to say is that desire and aversion are examples of purposive behaviour and a purposive behaviour cannot be understood on the pattern of natural qualities which are found in objects. The whole issue concerns the understanding of instinctive behaviour and has nothing to do with the specificity of the example that has been given. All life shows purposive behaviour from the moment it is born and the point is whether it can be understood in terms of normal causation which is considered adequate in understanding the behaviour of inanimate objects. Also, as pointed out earlier, the hypothesis of a previous birth and the memory thereof only shifts the problem as either we will have to postulate an unending series of previous births or some original first birth and then have the problem once again. It is surprising that such an obvious objection has not been raised in the discussion by the author of the Nyāya sūtras. The discussion of the soul seems to close with this sūtra and is obviously very unsatisfactory. However, two important facts may be noted with respect to the discussion : first, that the reasons given for postulating the self in sūtra 1.1.10 (इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुख-दुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम्) are nowhere discussed or used in the arguments given here and second, none of these arguments, whether given in 1.1.10 or here, have anything to do with the establishment of God or Īswara as a *prameya*. The latter point is even more important than the former, for, whenever it is said that Īswara is not mentioned as one of the *prameyas* in the Nyāya sūtras it is said that he is included in the *ātman*.

The sūtras 3.1.27 to 3.1.29 deal with the body. The sūtra 3.1.28 states that the body is supposed to have the quality of the earth as it has the peculiar property associated with earth, that is, smell. The sūtra 3.1.29 suggests that even the *śruti* says this about the body.

The sūtras 3.1.30 to 3.1.50 are supposed to be concerned with the sense organs and their characteristics. The sūtra 3.1.30 is concerned with a peculiarity of the visual sense organ, the eye. This peculiarity is that the eye perceives the object even when the object has no direct contact with the eye or rather the pupil in the eye. It is equally true that if the pupil is damaged or destroyed, one cannot see at all and hence there arises the problem as to how to understand the sense of sight. Perhaps normally, in the case of other senses, the object is known or apprehended when it comes into contact with the senses. Touch and taste are the clearest examples of this, though in the case of sound and smell, one can also see the problem for we hear sounds which are far off just as we smell objects that are not ostensibly in contact with the sense organ. There is the other problem as to whether sense organs should be regarded as modifications of the five primal elements accepted in traditional physics, that is, earth, fire, water, *ākāśa* or sky and air, or to treat them as modifications of one fundamental primal matter as postulated by the Sāṃkhyan. However, it is not clear why the two characteristics of the visual organ should create any doubt about the problem. Perhaps, the doubt emanates from the fact that though the visual organ seems to be made of material substances, it still displays the property of seeing something which is not in contact with it, a property which *prima facie* cannot belong to a material substance. This perhaps is the problem of what in modern physics is called the problem of action at a distance, even though it has not been expressly formulated as such. The juxtaposition with the sāṃkhyan view however seems strange, for the Sāṃkhyan *prakṛti* is material and hence the problem cannot be posed with reference to it. Perhaps the author of the Nyāya sūtras has not understood the

Sāṃkhyan doctrine as, otherwise, he could not have contrasted the material elements of earth, fire, air etc. with the Sāṃkhyan prakṛti.

The sūtra 3.1.31 is supposed to raise the objection from the sāṃkhya point of view which says that the sense organs are composed not of elements but ultimately of prakṛti which is all pervading and the reason which is given for this is supposed to be the fact that because there is perception of large and small things. But it is not quite clear how the perception of large and small things entails the sāṃkhyan position nor is it clear why should the Sāṃkhya deny the five elements as they certainly accept the *panca mahābhūtas*. Nor is it clear why the term *anu* which is in the sūtra should be translated as small. Also, the general position is that one does not perceive *anus* if the term *anu* occurring in the sūtra is understood literally. It is also not clear whether one is discussing all the sense organs or just the eye alone. The sūtra 3.1.32 tries to suggest that the apprehension of large and small things is due to the peculiarity of the contact between the light rays emanating from the visual organ and the object perceived. It is interesting to note that the theory of vision in the Indian tradition postulates the notion of a light ray. However, the light ray is supposed to emanate from the eye and not from the object. It is not clear whether this is a generally accepted theory of the physics and optics of those times or is peculiar to the Nyāya school. Also, it is not clear why the emanation of a light ray from the eye to the object should provide a reason for the appearance of objects as large or small unless the time it takes to reach the object makes the difference. The sūtra 3.1.33 raises the objection that no one has seen these light rays and hence they cannot be given as an argument for accounting for the phenomenon concerned. The sūtra 3.1.34 suggests that if something is inferred, then the fact that it is not perceived cannot be held as an argument against it. It is strange to find Gautama taking recourse to this strategy for he has nowhere established by inference the existence of the light rays

in the sūtras and even if something is inferred, one can always demand its possible perception provided it is of such a nature that it can be perceived.

The sūtra 3.1.35 says that there is no uniform rule regarding the perceptibility or non-perceptibility of substances and their qualities and hence if something is not perceptible that cannot be a ground for denying its reality. The argument is interesting but it does not seem to make a distinction between actual non-perception and non-perceptibility in principle and, if so, then what should be the ground for our belief in the reality of the latter. There are important theoretical issues involved here and we should try to find whether the Bhāṣya, Vārttika or the *Parīśuddhi* discuss them. The sūtra 3.1.36 argues that the perceptibility of an object depends on many conditions and if those conditions do not obtain, then one does not perceive that object. It is perhaps being argued by implication that the non-perception of light rays may be due to this fact. However, the issue remains the same, that is whether the conditions are removable or irremovable in principle? In case they are the latter, what can be the possible ground for our believing in the reality of that object and in case they are removable, why do we not try to remove them and see if the object is there.

The sūtra 3.1.37 brings in consideration of a different kind and suggests that the sense organs are formed because of our past actions for achieving the purposes of the human being concerned. The sūtra uses the term *puruṣārtha tantra* which is interesting and important. However, though the sūtra seems to have been interpreted in a straightforward manner as meaning that the senses are only instrumental for achieving human purposes, a distinction is usually made between the *jñānendriyas* and *karmendriyas* and the problem of *puruṣārtha* raises the question of the relation between knowledge and action. All this however has little relation with the discussion at issue as to how the senses come into being. The sūtra 3.1.38 suggests that the non-perception of the light ray should not surprise us as there are other cases of non-perception

also. We do not, for example, see the light of the stars at midday, but there would have been no problem if we had sometimes seen the light rays which are the subject of discussion.

The sūtra 3.1.39 seems strange as it is supposed to be a reply to someone who makes a silly objection by saying that one could also argue that a stone has light but we cannot see it during the day because the light of the sun suppresses it, as it does the light of the stars. The answer is given in 3.1.39 by saying that the contention that there is light in the stone but it cannot be seen in the day because of the light of the sun cannot be accepted because the stones are not seen in the night. The sūtra 3.1.40 seems to argue that as the apprehension of objects seems to be due to the presence of external light, the non-apprehension of the light rays may be due to the absence of external light.

Perhaps the contention is that the external light both helps in the apprehension of objects and also the non-apprehension of some other objects like the stars at day and hence the fact that we do not perceive the light rays may be due to the presence or absence of some external light. However, firstly, unless something is perceived sometime under certain conditions we cannot know what are the obstructive conditions in the situation, and secondly, if light can come from the sun then it can certainly come from external objects and there is no necessity that in vision, it should always come from the eye alone. The sūtra 3.1.41 tries to argue that the light of the visual sense organ is such that it cannot be suppressed by any external light and the sūtra 3.1.42 elaborates this by saying that firstly, there are creatures who see in the dark such as cats, etc., and secondly, we see the light in their eyes even in the dark. These two things prove that there is natural light in the visual organ which is not suppressed by the light of the sun. The sūtra 3.1.43 tries to suggest that there are cases of perception or apprehension of objects without any direct contact with the object concerned. The examples given are of that of perception behind a glass or of rock crystal or even of vapour. The point perhaps is that in case the glass is transparent and there

is some object behind the glass we still perceive it even though the glass comes in between. Similar is the case with rock crystal and vapours. The point is that if perception can occur even when there is an intervening object which makes contact with the object impossible then we need not postulate the existence of light rays from the eyes which are supposed to go and meet the object in order to cause their visual apprehension. The sūtra 3.1.44 tries to raise an objection to this argument by pointing out that there are equally valid instances where one cannot see something if something obstructs the vision in between. For example, one cannot see what is behind the wall as the wall stands between our eyes and the object concerned. However, the objection seems irrelevant for even if there is one object which is visible when there is obstruction, the possibility of a counter-objection becomes legitimate and hence if Gautama had really to controvert the position he should have shown that the examples adduced by the opponent really require the postulation of a contact which is there but not apprehended because of certain circumstances.

The sūtra 3.1.45, in fact, does try to suggest that in the cases given by the opponent there is really no obstruction for the contact not to take place. But then it should have been clarified as to why the obstruction does not take place even when there is an intervening object in between. The sūtra 3.1.46 suggests other examples where even though there is an object in between there is no real obstruction. The example given are the sun's rays which can heat objects even though there is something in between and sometimes burn them even if there is a crystal in between.

The sūtra 3.1.47 raises the objection that basically the examples do not prove anything as there are examples of both kinds to be found in nature. The sūtra 3.1.48 suggests that just as in mirror and in water, even though there is an intervening medium, one can see, similarly, one can postulate substances which, though they are intervening, do not obstruct perception. The sūtra seems to be totally irrelevant and does not carry the discussion further as the issue had been raised earlier, nor does

it reply to the objection that no conclusion can be reached in the matter as both kinds of examples are available in common experience, (perhaps the sūtra 3.1.48 still continues the objection but even if it is so, it seems to be irrelevant as it only repeats what has already been said earlier.)

The sūtra 3.1.49 suggests that it is not right to question or deny things that are correctly perceived and inferred. The reply obviously is no reply at all as the objection relates not to what is perceived or inferred but to the explanation of what is perceived and inferred. The sūtras 3.1.50 to 3.1.59 are supposed to be concerned with the issue whether the sense organs are one or many. As far as the discussion of the visual sense organ was concerned, it is not only very unsatisfactory but it is not clear why the discussion occurs and why only the visual sense organ is being discussed. In fact the issue regarding the *prameyatva* of these senses is not even raised, for what is discussed is some particular issue about a specific sense organ and not the grounds on the basis of which the reality of the sense organs is to be established. Similarly, the issue whether there is only one sense organ or many presupposes the reality of sense organs which normally should have been established first. Also, logically, the discussion whether there is only one sense organ or many should have been raised first and then alone the discussion about any particular sense organ should have been raised

The sūtra 3.1.50 raises the issue of the singleness or multiplicity of sense organs on the ground that many objects which occupy many spaces are still regarded as one and hence, even though there appear to be many senses, they may possibly be regarded as only one sense occupying different spaces. The sūtra 3.1.51 argues that in reality there is only one sense, that is, the sense of touch, for it is the only sense which is never absent. The point perhaps is that the sense of touch pervades all the other senses and hence should be regarded as the one underlying sense from which all others are differentiated. The point is important as that is the one sense that may be considered as pervasive in all living

beings, at least in the animal world. The sūtra 3.1.52 tries to give a reason why the sense of touch cannot be regarded as the only sense. The reason given is that if it were so, that is, if there were only one sense organ, then all things would be perceived simultaneously. However, this is not so and hence there cannot be just one sense organ. The objection seems to be irrelevant as the problem of successive apprehension has nothing to do with there being one sense organ or many, for even with all the sense organs, whether one or many, we do not perceive everything at the same time. The problem of temporal differences or successive apprehension is different from the question whether there is only one sense or many. In fact, one can easily raise the question as to why there are only five senses and not more.

The sūtra 3.1.53 argues that the sense of touch cannot be the only sense organ, as this would lead to contradiction, for normally touch can only be had when there is a contact with the object concerned. But in the case of the perception of such things as colour or visual perception in general, there is no contact of the object with the body whatsoever. The sūtra 3.1.54 says that one will have to postulate in fact five senses in view of the fact that five different types of objects are perceptually apprehended. This obviously is an argument from commonsense and does not see the philosophical issues which have been raised, for even with the same sense organ we perceive multiplicity of qualities and we do not postulate a separate sense organ for the perception of each of the separate qualities. (The numbering of the sūtras here seems to be very erratic as the sūtra 3.1.54 is sūtra 3.1.58 in the text that I have.) The sūtra 3.1.55 objects that how can the senses be considered to be only five when the objects that are apprehended are many. The sūtra 3.1.56 argues that even though there may be a plurality which is apprehended, still there is a common universal quality shared by all of them as in the case, for example, of odour. This is of course a weak argument for on the basis of universality one can also argue that there is only one sense organ and it is also not clear what shall be common between all the

qualities that are perceived by a particular sense organ. The sense of sight perceives not only colour, but also shape and distance, but what could be common between these? The sūtra 3.1.57 makes the point that if things can be grouped under a commonality then it follows that all the sense organs should be regarded as one. The sūtra 3.1.58 objects that such a construction is not possible for there is a five fold character in the sense-object that are apprehended, that is, shape, location, process etc. It is not clear what exactly is the contention of the author.

The sūtra 3.1.58 seems to argue that each of the dimensions of a perceptible object being fivefold we have to infer that the sense organs themselves are five in number. The five dimensions of each perceptible object are given as *adhsthāna*, *gati*, *ākṛtti*, *jāti*. Each of these four has five aspects. Interestingly, these have been mentioned as *buddhi lakṣaṇa* or aspects of perceptible objects as apprehended by *buddhi*. The theory seems interesting but is not very clear. Also, as *buddhi* has not yet been established as a *prameya*, it is not correct to bring it into the discussion. Furthermore, it seems that the contention of the author of the Nyāya sūtras is that the sense organs themselves are a matter of inference from the diversity in the objects we perceive and the different aspects that a perceptible object reveals. The issue has to be explored further as there may be an interesting theory about categories of perception involved in it on the analogy of Kant's famous categories of understanding. The sūtra 3.1.59 argues that the different sense organs are supposed to be of a nature analogous to the five main substances as the latter are revealed by them. The point seems to be that there seems to be a correlation between the senses and their objects and that each sense is fitted to reveal the corresponding element in nature as it shares the same nature with it.

The sūtras from 3.1.60 to 3.1.71 discuss the nature of the objects of the sense organs. The discussion of the sense organs seems both incomplete and unsatisfactory and the sequence of the sūtras does not seem very logical as what should have been

discussed first and established is discussed later. Also, there seems to be too much emphasis on the visual sense organ and other sense organs seem to have been neglected. The sūtra 3.1.60 tries to establish a correlation between qualities of different sense objects and the fundamental material elements of the world. Thus it is said that odour, taste, colour and touch belong to earth or rather are correlated with the element denoted by the word "earth".

The sūtra 3.1.61 similarly correlates water, light and sky or space. The basic point of these two sūtras is to establish a correlation between the senses and their objects. The sūtra 3.1.62 raises the objection that such a correlation cannot be accepted as all the qualities which are found in the object concerned are not apprehended by the sense concerned. The sūtra 3.1.63 perhaps suggests that while all of the qualities are found in all the objects, they are not apprehended because one is dominant over others. The whole controversy does not seem very clear.

Is it being argued that each sense knows primarily the quality which is associated with one of the five fundamental elements of which nature is constituted? Or, is it being argued that all the qualities are found in all objects and that different senses select the quality which is prominent in them. In fact the whole discussion centres around the physics and optics of that time and one has to find from other sources as to what were the theories prevalent at that time in the context of which alone the Nyāya discussion makes sense. The sūtra 3.1.63 in fact tries to answer the question as to how is it that the elementary substances such as earth etc. are perceived to have not only the qualities specific to them but also other qualities which are supposed to belong to other substances which are different from them. The answer is because there is an admixture of the other elements in them. Does it mean that the notion of a pure element is a theoretical construct, for what we actually apprehend is always an admixture of elements. But if it is so then, are there only five basic qualities which are supposed to inhere and, are these basic qualities the

qualities specific to each of the senses? The point is whether the theory of five elements is a postulated construct from the fact that there are five senses and that each sense has only one specific property which it is supposed to apprehend. However, this would raise the issue that each of the properties which is apprehended by a sense is itself divided into a number of specific instances of its own. There is, for example, no such thing as a smell or odour which is supposed to be a property of an element called earth. There are only odours and hence one will have to postulate different kinds of earths corresponding to each of the smells that we apprehend. The same is the case with colours and sounds and almost every quality that is apprehended. It will be interesting to find whether these questions have been discussed in the literature concerned.

The sūtra 3.1.64 continues the same discussion. It is interesting to find that Vācaspati Miśra I commenting on this part of the discussion says that all this has to be learnt from the purāṇas as it cannot be directly known by us, for the matter is beyond the reach of our mind. This only shows that by the time of Vācaspati Miśra I, the whole controversy had become so distant and alien, that he could not even understand what the sūtras were discussing. This, in spite of the fact that he was commenting on Uddyotakara's Vārttika on the Nyāya sūtra. Those people who talk of the oral tradition should take note of this for in spite of the tradition Vācaspati Miśra failed to understand what really was the issue discussed in the sūtras. The sūtra 3.1.65 says that earth and water are actually perceived to have these properties. But, the argument from perception is meaningless as they are perceived to have other qualities also. In fact there seems to be a theory that the external substances like earth, water and light are endowed respectively with 4, 3 and 2 qualities while sound, or air perhaps is supposed to have only 1 quality. Similarly, the different senses have the capacity of apprehending more or less qualities according to their different capacities. The sūtra 3.1.66 bases itself on this and explains why the senses do not apprehend all the qualities

in the substances at the same time. The sūtra 3.1.67 seems to go back and argue that what is apprehended in a concrete object is the quality that is predominant. The sūtra 3.1.68 raises an interesting question that why do sense organs not apprehend their own qualities and answers that it is the nature of a sense organ to apprehend properties outside itself and not those of its own. The sūtra 3.1.69 further makes the point that a thing cannot be apprehended by itself, forgetting that if it were so, the self would never know itself. Perhaps that is the reason why Nyāya denies the property of consciousness to self, as otherwise it might become conscious of itself. There is a larger problem here and it has troubled almost all Indian schools of philosophy and there has been no satisfactory resolution of it. For, if what is to be known is necessarily other than that which knows, then the self qua subject, that is, qua 'knower' can never be known. However, the Nyāya sūtras do not seem to be aware of this aspect of the problem. The sūtra 3.1.70 raises the objection that, after all, this is not true in the case of sound as sound is the quality of ether or *ākāśa* and the auditory organ hears the sound. The whole discussion is embedded in the 'empirico-scientific' knowledge of those times which has to be clearly understood in order to make sense of the discussion in this *adhyāya* of the Nyāya sūtras.

It is not quite clear what is meant by the auditory organ being ether and as sound being a quality of ether, the auditory organ listens to itself. The sūtra 3.1.71 tries to give an answer to this objection by saying that both the quality and the substance, that is, sound and ether are peculiar and unlike other qualities and substances. This of course is no answer to the objection as it can be made with respect to any objection.

Part III - Section 2 - (72 Sūtras)

The section 3.2 starts with the examination of *buddhi* and the problem of knowledge in general. The first question which arises

in this connection is whether cognition is eternal or non-eternal. The reason given for raising this question is that as there is a similarity between knowledge on the one hand, and action and *ākāśa* on the other, doubt may naturally arise and the question be raised. The similarity postulated is very strange as, though there may be some similarity between action and knowing as both involve process, it is difficult to imagine what similarity could there be with *ākāśa* as is mentioned in the sūtra 3.2.1. Also, it is not clear how action could be regarded as eternal. The things which are non-eternal are supposed to be those which come into being and cease after they have come into being. This production and destruction of things is supposed to be the mark of their being non-eternal, but it is not quite clear why knowledge is supposed to lack these obvious characteristics, or how could action not have them. The sūtra 3.2.2 gives a strange reason for the possible eternity of knowledge and suggests that it is the element of recognition which is its integral part that makes it eternal. The condition seems to be that all knowledge necessarily involves an element in it of recognizing what one has known before and even the feeling that something is new could only arise in the context of a memory and a comparison with it, as otherwise there will be no justification for calling it either different or new. Plato had argued, almost at the very beginning of the western tradition, that all knowledge is recollection, but he had argued this primarily in the context of value apprehension which makes us feel or judge that things are not as they ought to have been, even though we may not be able to say how exactly things ought to be. It is strange to find Gautama raising this point in the context of knowledge, but in a way that seems, at least on a *prima facie* view, different from that of Plato. The sūtra 3.2.3 suggests that the argument from recognition cannot prove what is sought to be proved, for it would only prove, if it proves anything, the eternity of the conscious self to which knowledge belongs and not of the knowledge itself. The sūtra, it seems, tries to distinguish between the self and the act of knowing, but it does not appear to question

the inference of eternity or permanence from the fact of recognition.

The sūtra 3.2.4 presents an objection to the doctrine of eternity whether of *buddhi* or of self by pointing to the fact that all the objects are not cognized simultaneously, and if this is so, then obviously neither the intellect or reason nor the self could be regarded as eternal. The sūtra 3.2.5 raises the problem of the cessation of an act of knowing and the effect it will have on that which knows whether it be regarded as reason or self. The point seems to be that not only all the things are not known simultaneously but that one act of knowledge succeeds another and this can happen only if the former act of knowledge ceases to be. Yet, if this be accepted, then how will this cessation or destruction of the act of knowledge affect what is known or that which knows. Also, as the term *apratyabhijñā* is used in the sūtra which literally means non-recognition, it is not clear whether, besides the fact of cessation of the act of knowledge, the author wishes to refer to the fact that many a time we positively do not recognize an object that we had known before or that he wants to point to the fact that there are acts of knowledge in which no recognition is involved. In fact, if it be argued that all cognition is recognition then it would give rise to what can only be called an infinite regress as the first act of cognition will become impossible by definition.

The sūtra 3.2.6 reverts back to the problem of the non-simultaneity of apprehension of objects and suggests that the successive acts of knowledge occur in a sequence and hence, the simultaneous cognition of objects is not possible. The sūtra 3.2.7 tries to account for the non-recognition of objects mentioned in the sūtra 3.2.5 on account of the mind's being occupied with other things or because the attention is fixed somewhere else. The sūtra 3.2.8 suggests that for the acts of knowledge to be successive or for attention to be somewhere else, one would have to postulate the fact of change or movement in either mind or reason or consciousness which are not physical things and hence incapable

of motion. But strangely, according to Vātsyāyana the term *apratyabhijñā* here should be taken to mean not non-recognition but non-apprehension (p. 178.). The sūtra 3.2.9 tries to account for the plurality of cognitions and the unity of that which knows on the analogy of the crystal which though white appears to be possessed of different colours as it reflects them even though they do not belong to it nor affect its own pure crystalline nature. The sūtra 3.2.10 questions the example of the rock crystal given in the preceding sūtra to account for the problem as to how plurality can appear in a thing which is primarily unitary. The objection is given from the side of the Buddhists who argue that the ground of the example given in the earlier sūtra is mistaken as it too undergoes changes from moment to moment and there is nothing in it which may be said to last permanently there. The sūtra 3.2.11 counters this by saying that there is no reason for accepting the universal characterization of every thing as momentary and hence we have to go by our experience which distinguishes between things which are permanent and those which do not appear to be so. The hard core of the argument seems to be that a theoretical analysis which leads to the postulation of the doctrine of momentariness will make all things equally momentary and hence will not account for the apprehension of things as permanent or changing in our experience. The objection raises perhaps the deeper issue regarding the relation between the consequences reached by a purely theoretical analysis and actual experience and what is to be done in case there is a discrepancy between the two. The sūtra 3.2.12 carries the argument further by suggesting that in experience we find both the causes of the production of an object and also of its destruction and hence the postulation of a continuous production and destruction of entities leading to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness cannot be accepted, for no such causes either of production or of destruction are apprehended.

The sūtra 3.2.13 tries to suggest that there are cases where we see changes or destruction in objects even though we do not directly see the cause of such change or destruction. For example,

when milk turns into curd, we do not exactly see what is the cause of this change or destruction. The sūtra 3.2.14 counters this by saying that in the example which is given, the change is actually apprehended which is not the case in the rock crystal. The sūtra 3.2.15, suggests that, basically, there is no actual destruction in the case of the milk, but only a transformation or a manifestation of a new quality. This perhaps is an additional argument against the Buddhists who are postulating destruction of the previous entity in all cases of change even when they are only cases of transformation or appearance of a new quality. The point perhaps is that one must distinguish change and destruction on the one hand and permanence and change as actual objects of apprehension on the other.

The sūtra 3.2.16 tries to meet this objection and suggests that when we observe a new substance coming into being, we obviously infer that the earlier substance has been destroyed. Strangely, the argument shifts to the change in substance and not in quality which was being suggested in the earlier sūtras. The term used in the sūtra is *dravya* and not *guṇa*. The sūtra 3.2.17 returns back to the argument that it is only in certain cases that the cause of destruction is apprehended while in others, the cause of destruction is not apprehended and hence there is no justification for universalizing the notion of destruction even when there is no evidence for it. The sūtra appears to be redundant as the point had already been made. Perhaps the sūtra 3.2.17 is supposed to close the discussion and hence repeats the argument.

The sūtra 3.2.18 starts a discussion regarding some other faculty of man to which knowledge can be ascribed as a property. The reason for postulating this faculty arises from the fact that knowledge continues to exist even when the senses and the object of knowledge cease to exist. The sūtra 3.2.19 continues the discussion regarding whose quality knowledge should be considered to be and tries to suggest that it cannot be considered the quality of mind as its existence is inferred from the fact that the apprehension of things is not simultaneous and also because,

the case of simultaneous cognition on the part of the yogis, in case it occurs, cannot be attributed to mind. The point perhaps seems to be that, as mind has been postulated only to account for the fact that our cognition of objects is not simultaneous, cognition itself cannot belong to it. The bringing in of the simultaneous perception of the yogis should then perhaps imply that they lack the faculty of mind or that its functioning is inhibited for some reason. Furthermore, if yogic perception is admitted, then the eternity of knowledge will have to be accepted and the so-called non-eternality due to the arising and cessation of successive acts of apprehension be attributed only to the fact that mind is there.

The sūtra 3.2.20 does not seem clear as it uses the word *tulyam* with respect to knowledge being a quality of the self which does not make much sense. The sūtra 3.2.21 seems to raise the objection that in the event of their being no contact between the sense and the mind, knowledge does not arise and hence knowledge could not be the property of the same, for, in case it were so, even when the senses were not in contact with the mind, knowledge should have been there. The sūtra 3.2.23 suggests that the argument does not prove the conclusion, as the non-existence of knowledge in the self when the mind is not in contact with senses is only because all the conditions for the production of knowledge have not been fulfilled. The sūtra 3.2.24 raises the issue that as we do not know what exactly are the causes of the non-existence or cessation of knowledge we cannot determine its eternity or non-eternality. The sūtra 3.2.25 seems to argue that the transience of knowledge and its production and destruction seems to occur in the *buddhi* or intellect in the same way as the sound is produced and also destroyed. Perhaps, there is an interesting parallel in the discussion regarding the eternity or non-eternity of sound and the eternity or non-eternity of knowledge. There seem to be two independent discussions going on here: one regarding the eternity and non-eternity of knowledge and the other regarding knowledge being a property of the self

or that of the senses or the mind or the *buddhi*. Perhaps the two discussions are linked by the fact that if knowledge were to be a property of the self, then it should be eternal, for the self itself is supposed to be eternal. On the other hand, if knowledge is not eternal, then it should perhaps be a property either of the senses or of the mind or of the *buddhi*. On the other hand, if knowledge is regarded as non-eternal and yet considered as a property of the self, the problem will arise regarding the possession of a non-eternal quality on the part of something which itself is permanent or eternal. Will not a transient property make the self itself non-permanent or non-eternal in some sense or other? There is also another dimension to the discussion which is interrelated with these two issues and that seems to relate to the problem of the non-simultaneity of objects of cognition in the act of knowing. Here, perhaps, the problem relates to the non-simultaneous cognition of objects which themselves are simultaneously present and not of those objects, which themselves come successively into being. The problem is therefore twofold : one, there seems to be a temporality of successive acts of cognition with regard to objects which are simultaneously present as objects in the objective world. On the other hand, there is a temporal succession of objects in external time which has nothing to do with the temporality of acts of cognition and their successive apprehension is primarily due to their being themselves in the temporal series where one act of cognition succeeds another.

The sūtra 3.2.26 brings in the question of memory wherein there appears to be some sort of a simultaneous apprehension of both the present and the past which are fused together. Here again, perhaps one should distinguish between two types of memory, one in which something is recognized as the same as it was in the past. This should be distinguished from a pure act of memory where something in the past is remembered in the present and there is no question of anything in the present being recognized as the same. The sūtra 3.2.27 tries to bring in the notion of *antaḥ-sarīra-vṛtti*, i.e. an introspective act of attention which is supposed

to be a quality of the mind and is supposed, in some way, to account for the simultaneity of the past and the present cognitions in memory. The sūtras 3.2.28, 29, 30, 31 continue the discussion on memory and their detailed commentary has to be seen to exactly understand what the turn of the argument is. One of the problems which seems to be troubling the sūtrakāra arises from the fact that the soul is supposed to be all-pervading and if so, then obviously it should know everything all at once. The situation is saved by bringing in mind into the picture but the problem is why does the self need mind and the senses for knowledge if it is present everywhere. Another problem that seems to be discussed relates to the fact that if knowledge were to be a property of the self, then once it arises it can never be destroyed and hence how can we account for forgetfulness of knowledge. The answer to this interesting objection is that the destruction of knowledge occurs by another act of knowledge just as a sound is destroyed by another sound. The fact of memory however seems to controvert the hypothesis of the destruction of one knowledge by another as obviously, if the knowledge were to be completely destroyed, then it could not be remembered. Even here, the sūtrakāra seems to be concerned in sūtra 3.2.25 not with the issue raised regarding the destruction of knowledge by another knowledge but rather by the fact that there cannot be simultaneous acts of memory and if so, it must be due to the intervention of mind which does not allow simultaneity. The sūtra 3.2.26 raises the objection that the explanation given for the destruction of knowledge is not correct because the mind is an integral internal part of the body. Perhaps the term *antaḥa-śarīra* in the sūtra implies that. The problem seems to be created probably by the fact that the soul or the self is supposed to be all pervading while the limitation by the mind is confined only to the body.

The sūtra 3.2.27 questions the assumption and says that the limitation of the mind to the body has to be proved rather than assumed. The sūtra 3.2.28 counters this by saying that the

confinement of the mind to the body is proved by the fact that when one tries to remember something, one tries to concentrate one's mind through a mental effort after which alone the recollection usually occurs. It is not quite clear how this proves that mind is essentially related to the body unless the mental effort were to be confused with bodily effort. The sūtra 3.2.29 raises another objection deriving from the fact that the movement of the mind is very fast and hence it could not be tied to the body or, if it were so, its motion would also have to be constrained by the limits of bodily motion (It is not quite clear against which position the objection is being made, for obviously this would prove that mind is something independent of the body). The sūtra 3.2.30 tries to suggest that the argument from the speed of the motion of the mind does not seem to prove anything as there is no rule regarding the time to be taken by a recollection to fructify.

There seems to be at least a *prima facie* confusion between two or three different issues. The one concerns the relation between the mind and the self while the other concerns the relation between the mind and the body. These issues are only tangentially related to the issue whether knowledge is permanent or not and whether knowledge should be regarded as a property of the self or the *buddhi*, or the mind or even the senses. It would be interesting to disentangle the issues and see the arguments, or even develop them independently of the text. It may also be found as to how the tradition itself has developed them, in case it has done so. The sūtra 3.2.31 raises the issue regarding the direct contact between mind and the external world without the mediation of the body and suggests that such a thing cannot occur either by an effort of soul or by chance or by reason or intelligence. But, how will such a negative position explain the fact of telepathy which is normally accepted in the Indian tradition.

The sūtra 3.2.32 gives a strange example to suggest that perhaps the mind can be considered to be in contact with an