

means 'begin to become light, shine, gleam, to appear, seem, to look like, to illuminate enlighten' etc. These meanings do not come closer to the meaning of 'affect'. 'have an influence or impression on, act on' (OED). It is because of this inappropriate translation, Professor Tatacharya goes on explaining it as '*pra-pūrvaka-bhā-dhātoḥ prakṛṣṭa-jñānam arthaḥ (āsakti-janaka-jñānam arthaḥ)*', which neither suits the context nor the sentential analysis. This term could have been translated with the verbal base *abhi-bhū (abhibhūtavān)* which would have given a meaning that is closer to the meaning of the original construction.

(6) The phrase '*prārabdha-nitya-bhṛāṇā*' which, anybody will agree, certainly is not the translation of the English clause '*when she came for an early morning stroll*'. It is because of this wrong translation, the whole episode in the semantic exposition in the Navya Nyāya analysis is misleading. Moreover, the word '*stroll*' is translated '*bhṛāṇā*' which is not a very good rendering in Sanskrit. The Sanskrit word '*vihārah*' would have been a better term in this context.

(7) The phrase '*a few days back*' in the original sentence has not been translated into Sanskrit.

(8) The clause '*she.. says that she would remember the fragrance all her life*' is an indirect statement, whereas '*vadati ca sugandham amum ājīvanam smariṣyāmīti*' is a direct statement. Though it is desirable to translate an indirect statement into direct statement sometime, it is not desirable here, because it effects the semantic analysis. Therefore, Professor Tatacharya opines that '*sugandham amum smariṣyāmīti*' refers to the phrase itself but not to the meaning of the phrase. Thus he does not explain the phrase (*atas tasya pṛthag vākyaṛtho na varṇitaḥ*). The question arises that is it desirable to leave the meaning analysis of an indirect statement in the Navya Nyāya framework or not. I, however, do agree with Professor Tatacharya that the direct statement need not be

explained and he is perfectly right in this case. It is not the translation that makes a difference.

### III. The Śābdabodha

(as has been presented by Professor N.S.R.Tatacharya)

The *śābdabodha*, as has been presented by Professor N.S.R.Tatacharya, certainly proves the living tradition of the Navya Nyāya analysis with its astounding glory. This is not a simple task but this exercise has made it clear that present-day's scholarship is in no way diminished from that of the works of the great Gaṅgeśa to Raghunātha, from *Tattvacintāmaṇi* to *Didhiti*. Of course, it is true that there are very few outstanding scholars like Professor Tatacharya these days who have command over the Navya Nyāya exposition in sentential analysis. I am however not very happy with the sentential analysis or the representation of *śābdabodha* as has been given here. It is solely because of the inappropriate translation of the English sentence. Professor Tatacharya however has done a commendable job.

The sentence in question has a complex structure. Its semantic representation is expected to be obviously more complex than the sentence structure. Professor Tatacharya has analyzed the given translation of the original English sentence with a great acumen of the Navya Nyāya conceptual framework of the *śābdabodha*. *Śābdabodha* usually considers representing the cognitive structure of the *expression* as has been received by the listener. It of course takes the cognitive mechanism into account and then relates the micro-sentential representations to construe the macrosentential representation (*mahāvākyaṛtha*). Before proceeding to represent the *śābdabodha* of a complex sentential structure like this one has to identify the embedded clauses of the main structure.

Professor Tatacharya identifies three such embedded clauses of the sentence in question in the following manner and says due to use of '*yat*' and '*tat*' they all form a '*mahāvākya*' (a complex/ long sentence).

- (1) *tad evedaṃ bhūsamānam rakta-puṣpaṃ varttate,*  
 (2) *yasya sūkṣma-madhūra-sugandhaḥ tām suandarīm rājaputrīm*  
*thatā gabhīratayā prabhāvitavān,*  
 (3) *yathā sā Svakīya-rājodyāne-prārabdha-nitya-bhramaṇā adyāpi*  
*tadviśaye sva-sakhībhiḥ saha abhibhāṣate vadati ca sugandham*  
*amum ājīvanam smariṣyāmīti.*

According to Professor Tatacharya, the clause (1) is the main clause of this sentence and therefore the so called 'rakta-puṣpaṃ' is the chief qualificand (*mukhya-viśeṣya*) in the cognitive representation of the sentence being the subject. The clause (2) is about the 'fragrance' (*sugandhaḥ*) which again is the subject in the second clause. The clause (3) is about the 'princess' (*rāja-putrī*). It may be pointed out here that the subjects in all these three clauses are in nominative singular endings (*prathamānta*) and all of them are suited to the conventional theory of the chief qualificand (*mukhya-viśeṣya*) in the cognitive representation in the system of Navya Nyāya analysis. Therefore, Professor Tatacharya has very accurately analysed the clause (2) first and then the clause (3) and thereafter he related the whole cognitive representation to the cognitive representation of the clause (1) upholding 'the rose' as the chief qualificand of the *mahāvākya*. Professor Tatacharya of course has proposed a second way out of the cognitive representation, of the *mahāvākya*. According to his second alternative, the clause (3) may be taken first for the sentential analysis and then the clause (2) and thereafter the whole sum of these two clauses may be added to the cognitive representation of (1) for giving the final shape to the cognitive representation of the *mahāvākya*. He however, takes the first option and goes on to explain the *śābdabodha* of the sentence.

The *śābdabodha* consists of the *padārthas* (the word meanings) and their mutual 'relations' (*samsargas*) represented through the conventional process technically called '*samsarga-maryādā*'. Literally it may be translated as 'the boundary or limit of

relation'.<sup>19</sup> However, this literal translation seems to be incongruous with the conceptual framework of *śābdabodha*. According to the commentators, the term *samsargamaryādā* is *rūḍha* (has a conventional meaning' as opposed to 'etymological meaning') in the sense '*ākāṅkṣa* (syntactico-semantic expectancy).<sup>20</sup> Therefore, we may translate the term *samsargamaryādā* as 'the governing principle of syntactico-semantic expectancy'. While representing the *śābdabodha* of a sentence like this, one has to pay special attention to the meaning of the case ending or the affixes/ suffixes (*vibhakti/pratyaya*) first, and thereafter to the nouns or verbs. Because the meanings of the nouns and the verbs are almost fixed in the lexicons (i.e., *koṣa/dhātupāṭha*), whereas that is not the case with the case endings. Therefore it is a common phenomena seen in almost all *śābdabodha* works that the *śāstra-kāras* always try to define (or redefine) the meanings of the case endings first and then try to relate it with the meaning of the substantives or the verbal bases as the case may be. The next crucial thing about the *śābdabodha* is to identify the 'relation' (*samsarga*), between two so-called *padārthas* (word meanings strictly represented by *vṛtti*), which functions as connective of the word meanings. Though the 'relation' is to be identified strictly according to the principle of *samsarga-maryādā*' (the boundary or limit of relation) still, I am always confronted with the question: does this so-called relational limitation limitless? Is it flexible enough to give scope to imagine any relation that appears

<sup>19</sup> *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies-The Philosophy of Grammarians* (1990) translates *samsarga-maryādā* as 'association of word meanings' (p. 10, 98) or 'the power of association' (p.96) Matilal, B.K. (1968, p. 152) translates it as 'relational seam'.

<sup>20</sup> '*samsarga-maryādā-śabda ākāṅkṣāyām rūḍhaḥ*'. See *Tippaṇi* on VV-S, p. 10.

to be appropriate/ suitable to the cognitive engineer? In other words, is it to some extent subjective? There is indeed an aspect of thinking on relations to be due to *ātma-niṣṭha-pratyāsatti* (the relation based on self-contact) in contrast to that of *viṣayaniṣṭha-pratyāsatti* (the relation based on object-contact) In other words if the relation is subjective then how scientific is the cognitive structure and the cognitive event? If it is objective what is the role of *samsargamaryādā* which is often interpreted as 'ākāṅkṣā' (desire), a quality of the self? These aspects are yet to be seriously investigated upon. I am interested in raising this question in this connection because this is a plain case of doing a serious exercise on Navya Nyāya. Though I have no serious objections to *what* and *how* Professor Tatacharya has explained the *śābdabodha* here, still there are places where doubt regarding the relations may be raised as to 'why this relation, why not that'. For instance, let us take the *śābdabodha* into consideration of the clause (1) of the sentence, namely '*tad evedam bhāsamānam rakta-puṣpam varttate*' as has been presented by Professor Tatacharya.

The *śābdabodha* is given as '*tad-abhinna-tad-anya-bhinna-Purovartty abhinna-varttamanakalika-purovartty-abhinna-varttamānakālika-pratītiṣayābhina-raktābhinna-puṣpam varttamāna-kālika-sattāśrayaḥ*'.

Let us relate the sentence/clause (1) to the *śābdabodha*. For that we have to check the words and their respective meanings first and then the relations between the word meanings subsequently. For the sake of clarity, let us do it like this:

- a) *tad*= this is a relative pronoun and refers to the same meaning which is referred to by the counter relative pronoun *yat* (in the clause(2)).
- b) *eva*= this is an indeclinable (*avyaya*) and means (in this context) 'other than something, different from itself' (*anya-bhinna ity arthaḥ*). This is how Professor Tatacharya has explained in the most simple manner possible. A traditional scholar would have

explained the same in a more sophisticated manner as '*eva-kārasayaitaravyavacchedo rthaḥ*', which almost means the same as above.

c) *idam*= 'this'. This refers to 'the thing which is present before someone (that he can indicate pointing out to it by his finger/indicator)' It is explained in Sanskrit as '*purovartti ity arthaḥ*'.

d) *bhāsamānam*= *vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-ṣaya* (see Section 1 no.1).

e) *raktapuṣpam*=(e<sub>1</sub>)*rakta*+(e<sub>2</sub>) *puṣpa**raktābhinnam puṣpam* (see Section 1 no.2).

f) *vartate* = (f<sub>1</sub>) *vṛt*-+(f<sub>2</sub>)-*te* = *vṛt*- means '*sattā*' (existence) and-*te* means '*āśrayatvam*' and '*vartamānakālikatvam*' ('substratum' and belonging to present time).

The relation between the meanings of the words have been presented by Professor Tatacharya in the following manner:

- (i) The relation between the meanings of (a) and (b) is *abheda* (identity);
- (ii) The relation between the meanings (c) and (e) is also *abheda* ;
- (iii) The same between the meanings of (d) and (e) is also *abheda* ;
- (iv) The relation between the meanings of (e<sub>1</sub>) and (e<sub>2</sub>) is also *abheda* ;
- (v) The relation between the meanings of (f<sub>1</sub>) and (f<sub>2</sub>) is *janakatā* represented by the primary suffix *ka*.

The relation between the meanings of (d) (*viz. vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-ṣaya*) and (e) (*viz. raktābhinnam puṣpam*) has been given *abheda* (see iii). This is of course true. But I think there is possibility of contemplating different relations in the following manner if we consider the *śābdabodha* of this sub-clause as :

(a) '*vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-ṣayatā-nirūpaka-raktābhinnam puṣpam*' or

(b) 'vartamāna-kalika-pratīti-viśaya-niṣṭha-viśyatā-nirūpakaraktābhinnam puṣpam' or simply

(c) 'vartamāna-kālīka-pratīti-viśyaka-raktābhinnam puṣpam'.

Well, what I am doing is trying to expand the simple cognitive structure into more complex cognitive structure. This further can be expanded and this is called *pariṣkāra-prakriyā*. The purpose behind this is to make the cognitive event more explicit, clearer, and more unambiguous. However in essence they do not differ from one another. But the point to be noted is that this expansion is technically possible due to the concept of '*samsargamaryādā*' which seems to be flexible in nature, of course within the limit of its conceptual framework. The question, as has already been pointed out, is 'how flexible is it'? To what extent does *samsargamaryādā* limit/restrict the application of a relation? For instance, we can say '*pratīti-viśayābhinna-raktapuṣpam*' represents the same cognitive structure as that of the '*pratīti-viśyatā-nirūpaka-raktapuṣpam*'. However, can we say '*abheda*' is the same relation which is represented by the primary suffix *ka* to the substantive '*viśaya*'? The reply will certainly be in the negative. Because, the suffix *ka* (*nirūpaka*) is a *bheda* relation whereas the other is an *abheda* relation and in that case can it be said that the *abheda* relation is convertible with a *bheda* relation? It is of course evident in the *śāstric* works that they are inter-convertibles, since the term *abheda* is explained as : (a) *bhedatvāvacchinnābhāvaḥ*, (b) *bhedapratīyogikābhāvaḥ* (c) *bheda* and *abhāva* (being related appropriately). The inter-convertibility of *bheda* and *abheda* leads to the question of their ontological reality and logical compatibility. There are a lot of issues that can be raised in this connection and that invite serious attention.

#### IV. The Whole Exercise

Now may we think on the merit and demerit of the whole exercise? To my mind even though this is a very interesting exercise, still how useful is it if we just do Navya Nyāya without

thinking about the questions and issues as has been pointed out above. Moreover, I do not think it is necessary to 'deliberately' construct a complex sentence in English and then try to translate the same into Sanskrit ( which often loses its original flavour) and then try to exercise its *śābdabodha*. If this is the aim, then why go for a roundabout way of thinking/ constructing a sentence in English and then translating it into Sanskrit and then exercising to give the cognitive structure of the same in Navya Nyāya framework? We can do the same picking up any *śloka/vākya* from the vast and marvelous literature in Sanskrit. We should think ourselves fortunate to have a very rich literature both in prose and poetry in Sanskrit. For the sake of *śābdabodha*, can't we find an appropriate (and if required, complex) sentence from it? Have we forgotten the great *Mahākāvya*s like *Kādambarī* or *Daśakumāracaritam*? Well, if we would like to concentrate only on a sentence where a *prathamānta* (nominative singular) is present as the chief qualificand then we have an innumerable number of sentences in our literature. Therefore, I do not think this type of exercise shows a very healthy intellectual trend. We should instead seriously concentrate upon deliberating on different issues and concepts and their applicability to the modern linguistic and logical concepts. We should also try to reinvestigate the historical development of the conceptual framework for emphasizing the rich tradition of Navya Nyāya and we should go for constructing a comparative logic and epistemology.

XVII, No.3

Achyutananda Dash

#### Reply 4

The Navya Nyāya Analysis of the *Mahāvākya*:

Some comments. Response to the comments on the *Mahāvākya* received from N.S.R. Tatacharya

I

The intention of this paper is to give some comments on the Navya Nyāya analysis of *Mahāvākya* (the sentence and its Sanskrit

translation appeared in *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1) given by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya

## II

In connection with determining the meaning of the large sentence (*Mahāvākyārtha*) Professor Tatacharya has divided the sentence into three parts, viz, (a) This is the same bright red rose (b) whose sweet and subtle fragrance deeply affected the beautiful princess (c) At the time of her early morning stroll in the private royal garden a few days back, she still talks about it to her friends and says that she would remember the fragrance all her life.

Professor Tatacharya has first explained the second part of the sentence-*Yasya sūkṣmamadhurasugandhaḥ tām sundarīm rajaputrīm thatā gabhīratayā prabhāvitavān.*' The meaning of the genitive case in *yasya* is the relation which is connected with fragrance. In this context the identical relation prevails in two objects-subtle and sweet. The meaning of the term 'tat' found in 'tām' is connected with the princess who is identical with the meaning of the term 'beautiful'. The suffix 'thāl' in the term 'tathā' gives rise to principal adjective (*prakāra*). The term 'tat' (in *tām*) refers to the meanings expressed through the term 'yat' found in 'yathā'. The meaning of the term 'rājaputrī' (princess) is 'the daughter of the king' (*rājasambandhī*). The second case-ending attached to *putrīm* refers to the superstratumness (*ādheyatvam*) limited by the relation of inherence (*samavāyasambandhāvachinna*), which is again related to *rājaputrī* through the relation of being determined (*nirūpatatva*). The term 'prabhāvitavān' is derived from root *bhā* preceded by the prefix *pra*, which means best cognition (*prakṛṣṭajñānam*) or cognition generating desire (*āsaktijanaka-jñānamarhaḥ*). The suffix *ñij* attached to this means favourable action (*anukūlavāyāpārah*). The suffix *ktavatu* gives rise to the meaning-the substratum (*āśraya*). It is connected with sweet fragrance through the relation of identity.

If all the terms are combined, it will have the following comprehensive meaning:

The fragrance which is identical with sweetness and subtleness is related to that which is endowed with action favourable to best cognition qualified with depth which is again qualified by the chief qualifier of that inhered in the daughter related to royal race and endowed with full beauty. ('*yat sambandhī sūkṣmābhinnamadhurābhinnasurabhigandhaḥ tadabhinnasundaryabhinna-rājasambandhiputrīsamaveta-tatprakāravisiṣṭagabhiratva-viśiṣṭa-prakṛṣṭa-jñānānūkūlavāyāpāravadabhinnah*').

## III

The third part of the sentence runs as follows: '*yathā sāsvakīyārājodyāneprārabdhanitya-bhramaṇā adyāpi tadviśaye svasakhibhiḥ saha abhibhāṣate, vadati ca sugandhamamuṁ ājivanam smariṣyāmīti*'.

In this part of the sentences the term *yathā* means chief-qualifier (*prakāra*) signified by the suffix 'thāl' adduced to the term *yat*. It is construed with the phenomenon of saying and addressing (*abhibhāṣaṇa*) coming from the meaning of the roots-*vada* and *bhāṣa* prefixed by *abhi* through the relation of substratumness (*āśrayatāsambandha*). The meaning of the term *svakīya* is the royal garden in relation to self (own) and which is identical with garden in relation to king (*rājasambandhyudāna*). The meaning of the locative case-ending is the substratumness (*adhikarāṇatva*). In this context the royal garden is related to the locative case through the relation of superstratumness (*ādheyatāsambandha*) and the substratumness (*adjolarāṇatva*) is related to strolling (*bhramaṇa*) through the relation of determinatoriness (*nirūpakatāsambandha*). The term 'prārabdha' means *prārabdhakarma* (action) which is connected with 'a part of regular strolling (*nityabhramaṇaikaśa*) through the relation of identity. The term 'nityabhramaṇa' is either 'woman strolling at all times' (*sārvakālikabhramaṇavati*) or woman strolling everyday (*pratidinabhramaṇavati*). This adjective is

construed with the princess, the meaning of the term 'tat', through relation of identity. The term 'adya' (today) means 'this particular day' (*etaddinam*). The term 'api' has got a different import which is 'the assemblage of earlier days, (*pūrvadinasamuccayah*), which is connected with 'this day' through the relation of substratumness (*āsrayatāsambndhena*). The relation between 'this day' and 'addressing' is through the temporal relation (*kālikasmbandha*). The term 'tadviṣayaḥ' means the identity between 'thā' in *tat* and object (*viṣaya*). In this context the term 'tat' is used as a pointer to 'the cognition of sweet smell' (*sugandhaparāmarśaka*). The locative case-ending refers to the 'contentness which is connected with that object' (*tadviṣaya*) through the relation of superstratumness (*ādheyatāsambandha*). The contentness is connected with the phenomenon of addressing (*abhibhāṣana*) through the relation of determinatoriness (*nirūpakatā*). The term 'svasakhī' means 'friends in relation to her own' (*svasambandhisakhī*). The 'third-case-ending' has got the meaning of agentness (*kartṛtva*) which is connected with 'own friend' (*svasakhī*) through the relation of superstratumness (*ādhyatāsambandha*). The 'agentness' (referred to by third case-ending) is construed with the activity of addressing, a portion of the meaning of the term 'saha' i.e., 'togetherness' (*sāhityam*). The definition of addressing (*abhibhāṣana*) is the usage of words for generating cognition' (*jñānajanakaśabdaprayogaḥ*). The first addressing or saying which is included under the meaning of the term 'saha' is connected with the 'agentness', the meaning of the third case-ending. The second addressing or saying is construed with the princess, the meaning of the term 'tat' through the relation of agentness. The verbal suffix in *abhibhāṣate* means 'effort' (*kṛti*). Here the meaning of the verb is connected with this (*kṛti*) through the relation of favourability (*anukūlatāsambandha*). The 'effort' is connected with 'the princess' through the relation of substratumness. The term 'iti' refers to the meaning of the a sub-

section of the section. 'I shall remember this fragrance during the whole life' (*sugandhamamumājivanam smarisyāmi*). This is again connected with 'the usage of the words generating cognition', the meaning of the root-'voda' through the relation of substratumness. The meaning of the verb-'vadati' is volition (*kṛti*) which is connected with the meaning of the root through the relation of favourability (*anukūlatāsambandha*). The 'volition' (*kṛti*) is related to princess through the relation of substratumness. The term 'ca' (and) means 'collection of *abhibhāṣana*' (*abhibhāṣanasamuccayah*), which is connected with the phenomenon of saying (*kathana*) through relation of substratumness.

This is the analysis of the second part of the *Mahāvākya*.

## IV

The analysis of the first part-'*tadevam bhāsamānam raktapuspaṁ vartate*' is as follows. The term 'tat'- here refers to the particular meaning expressed by the term 'yat' existing in 'yasya'. The term *eva* is used to give an emphasis on this particular meaning different from other (*anyabhinna*). The meaning of the term 'tat' and 'eva' have got connection with red flower (*raktapuspa*). The term *idam* is used to refer to an object existing in front, (*purovartī*) which is identical with red-flower. The word '*bhāsamāna*' means appearance (*pratīyamāna*) of something known in the present tense, which is identical with red-flower. The 'red-flower', a flower identical with this property-'red' (*raktābhinna*). The root 'vṛ' means 'to exist' (*sattā*). The suffix 'te' (*in vartate*) indicates substratumness (*āsrayatva*) and 'being in present tense' (*vartamānakālikatva*). The former is construed with the red-flower while the latter with the state of being (*sattā*).

The whole meaning of this part is ascertained as follows. The knowledge of the substratum of being in the present tense of the flower identical with redness which is identical with the object known in the present tense and identical with an object existing in front, which is again identical with that which is referred earlier

(*Tadabhinna-tadanyabhinnapurovartyabhinna-vartamāna-kālīka*  
*pratīti-ṣṣayābhinnaraktābhinnapuspaṁ vartatamānakālīka-*  
*sattāśrayaḥ iti bodhaḥ*).

#### V Comments

Following The Navya Nyāya analysis of the different parts of the *Mahāvākya* we have an idea about the justification of each and every term, each and every grammatical formation of the terms, each and every prefix and suffix and some *avyayas* used in the sentence. The English rendering of the meaning is given for the better understanding of the non-Sanskritists. I personally agree with the analysis of Professor Tatacharya to some extent. Though it seems to be clumsy to go through the different parts of the sentence, it is necessary for the sake of accurate and precise expression following the Navya Nyāya terminology. As for example, the meaning of *rājaputrī* is *rājasambandhiputri* the second case-ending in *putrīṁ* gives rise to the meaning of the superstratumness limited by relation of inherence (*samavāyasambandhāvachchinnamādheyatvaṁ*), *raktapuspaṁ* means a flower identical with the property 'red' (*raktabhinnam puspaṁ*), the *avyayas* like 'eva' 'api' (*in adyāp*) etc. meaning 'anyabhinna' (different from other), 'pūrvadina-samuccaya' (assemblage of the previous day) etc. These specific manings can be pointed out if many peculiar relations and technical terms are used.

It is said in connection with the second part of the sentence that '*nityabhraman-śabdasya sārvaśālikabhramaṇavati athavā pratidinabhramaṇavati*'. In this connection I would like to mention that the original term should be '*nityabhramaṇā*' (with feminine suffix *ṣāp*) but not *nityabhramaṇa* as mentioned by Professor Tatacharya. Moreover, the meaning of the term *nitya* as *sārvaśālika* or *pratidina* may be questioned. Is it really intention of the speaker that the beautiful princess comes for a stroll 'everyday' (*pratidinam*) or 'always' (*sārvaśālika*)? *I do not think so*. Because from the English sentence it is known that 'the beautiful princess

came for an early morning stroll'. Here the term '*nitya*' is redundant, as there is no mention of everyday stroll or stroll covering all times (*sārvaśālika*). If at all the term *nitya* is kept, intact, the meaning of it as *sārvaśālika* should seek a justification which is lacking in the present analysis. Moreover, the Sanskrit translation of the term-'an early morning' is not done in the given translation. The term '*nitya*' should have been replaced by the word-'*prātaḥ*', to keep the sanctity of the original English sentence, which is unfortunately not done.

In context of the explanation of the second part of the sentence, Professor Tatacharya has given the different meaning of the actions-*abhibhāṣaṇa* and *kathana*. To him the meaning of the root *bhāṣa* prefixed by *abhi* is *abhibhāṣaṇa* (addressing)-*abhipūrvakabhāṣa-dhātvartha abhibhāṣaṇa* and the meaning of the verb *vada* is 'saying'-*vadabhatvārthe kathane*. Though the difference is shown in the first part, these are not maintained afterwards, but used in the same sense in the second part of his elucidation. The definition of *abhibhāṣa* is given as '*jñānajanakaśabdaprayogaḥ*' (i.e. the application of words giving rise to cognition). Afterwards Professor Tatacharya has taken the meaning of *abhibhāṣaṇa* and '*kathana*' in the same sense, because the former is referred to as *prathamābhibhāṣaṇa* while the latter as *dvitīyābhibhāṣaṇa*. In fact, there are two verbs- *abhibhāṣaṇa* and *kathana* in two different contexts and hence these two cannot be used in the same sense. The first one is used in the context of general experience and the second one is in the context of specific sentence in the form- 'I will remember this sweet fragrance all my life'?. These specific meanings are hinted at with the usage of the two verbs, which should have a separate mention in the analysis. However, the given analysis may be taken for granted if the meaning of the term *abhibhāṣaṇa* is taken in a general sense '*jñānajanakaśabdaprayogaḥ*' i.e. the usage of a term for generating some cognition, then both the verbs can be taken in the same sense, which perhaps Professor Tatacharya wants to mean.

Lastly, one may raise a question whether 'sweet fragrance' can really be translated as '*madhuraḥ sugandhaḥ*'. The term '*sugandha*' means '*surabhigandha*' i.e., sweet smell, in one word, fragrance. If it is so, why is the adjunct '*madhuraḥ*' inserted to '*sugandha*? Is it not tautologous? I do not know if there is any justification of such usage. Professor Tatacharya also did not highlight this issue, which was essential in the Navya Nyāya pattern of analysis accepted to be most precise and accurate in logical thinking. If it is said '*amadhuraḥ sugandhaḥ*', it is contradictory in terms. If something is '*amadhuraḥ*', not-sweet or bitter, it is more '*sugandha*' or fragrance. Again, the explanation of the concept of subtlety (*sukṣmatva*) is not given by Professor Tatacharya. One can similarly raise a question- Is there any '*sugandha*' in this world which is of *shūla* (as opposed to *sūkṣma*) type? These probable questions are not replied to in the given *bhāṣya* of the *Mahāvākya*.

Vol. XVII, No.3

Raghunath Ghose

#### What exactly is meant by the term '*anuyogi*' and '*pratiyogi*'?

What exactly is meant by the terms '*anuyogi*' and '*pratiyogi*' in the Navya Nyāya mode of analysis of sentences or in the knowledge produced by them? What is their *vyāvartaka lakṣaṇa*, to use Nyāya terminology? What, for example, would be the *anuyogi* and the *pratiyogi* in the following sentences?

*Bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaḥ*

*Bhūtale ghaṭābhāvasya abhāvaḥ*

*Kaliyuge dharmābhāvaḥ*

*Ākāṣe sarva-sattayāḥ bhāvarūpa padārthānām abhāvaḥ*

*Satyam vada*

*Satyam vada priyam vada*

*Satyam vada dharmam cara*

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Daya Krishna

#### Reply

The words '*anuyogi*' and '*pratiyogi*' are rarely used in the analysis of sentences. They occur mainly in the analyses of cognition. In a cognition the epistemic qualificandum is the *anuyogi* while the epistemic qualifier is the *pratiyogi*. In the first four sentences given, obviously the first term is *pratiyogi* as it is in the locative case. In the remaining two there is no *pratiyogi* or *anuyogi*.

The Sanskrit rendering of the complex English sentence is:

इदं तदेव जपापुष्पं भास्वदरकं, यस्य सूक्ष्म-मधुर-आमोदेन इपत् अभिभूता अत्र पूर्वं राजोद्याने प्रातः भ्रमणाय समागता सुन्दरी राजकुमारी यत् सा स्वसख्यः तत् पुष्पं अनुलक्ष्य भणति यत् अद्य न कद्यपि तत् आमोदं विस्मरिष्यामि इति।

Vol XVII, No.1

N.S. Dravid

#### Is 'ghato ghatah' necessarily a meaningless sentence in Navya Nyaya framework ?

It is usually held that the Naiyāyika cannot accept a sentence such as '*ghato-ghatah*' as meaningful in a system for, according to him, any sentence to be meaningful must give some new knowledge. However, we have received the following statement from Professor V.N.Jha of Pune University arguing that the Naiyāyika will have to accept the sentence '*ghato-ghatah*' as meaningful, if he wants to stick to his definition of *anyonyābhāva* as the latter entails the former:

The Navya Nyāya provides the definition of *anyonyābhāva* or *bheda* as follows:

तादात्म्य-सम्बन्धवच्छिन्न

प्रतियोगिताक-अभावः

"A mutual absence is that absence the contra-positive of which is delimited by the relation of identity."

The Example may be paraphrased as either

घट प्रतियोगिक भेदवान्-घटः

घट प्रतियोगिक-भेदवान् घटः

Let us expand either of them:

घट प्रतियोगिक-भेदवान् पटः

=घटनिष्ठ प्रतियोगिता-निरूपक भेदवान् पटः



=तदात्म्य (=अभेद)-

सम्बन्धावाच्छिन्न-घटानिष्ठ प्रति-योगिता-निरूपक-भेदवान् पटः

Implies that

घट घटः, घटः न पटः

पटः पटः, पटः न पटः

Unless this is accepted the definition of भेद cannot be justified according to Nyāya. As a matter of fact, the tradition says that घटः अभेदेन घटे अस्ति, अभेदेन पटे नास्ति.

That is what I mean when I said *ghaṭo-ghaṭah* has to be accepted by Navya Nyāya.

Vol.XV, No.2

V.N.Jha

### Reply 1

#### A Note on Navya Nyāya View of Tautology

V.N.Jha's contention that Navya Nyāya has to admit tautologies as significant is inadmissible but not for the reason that 'any sentence to be meaningful must give some new knowledge' as stated in the introductory passage of 'Notes and Queries', JICPR, Vol. XV, No.2. A significant sentence repeatedly uttered does not cease to be meaningful even if its several instances do not yield new knowledge. The correct reason for the denial of the meaningfulness of tautology in Navya Nyāya may be explained as under.

It is quite true, as Jha says, that because a pot is not locus of its difference it is pot itself. But this is only a matter of fact. What however we are concerned with here is the problem of the significance of a (tautological) statement. Gadādhara, the great Navya Nyāya logician, raises and answers this very problem in his *Vyutpattivāda*, a treatise on Nyāya semantics. A part of the concerned passage is given below.

अभेदान्वयबोधश्च विरूपोपस्तियोरिवेति व्युत्पत्तिः घटो घटः, दण्डवान् दण्डवान् पाकं पचतीत्यादौ घटत्वदण्डवत्वपाकत्वाद्यवच्छिन्ने तद्रूपावच्छिन्नस्य

तथाविधान्वयबोधधानुदयात् अथ तत्प्रयोजकसमानविमर्कित्वादेः सत्त्वात्कथं न तादृशान्वयबोधः अत्राहुः।

घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविशेष्यताकाभेदसंर्साघटत्वाद्यववाच्छिन्नप्रकारकशाब्दबोधस्य कचिदप्यनुदयः

The reason for denying the meaningfulness of 'tautology given here is that the verbal cognition of the denotends of two coordinate terms in a sentence arises only if the connotations of the terms are different from each other. This rule is in conformity with common usage. There is a logical basis also for the rule which may be explained thus: Navya Nyāya which admits many kinds of relations has divided them into two broad classes, viz. the class of location-determining (वृत्तिनियामक) and that of non location-determining (वृच्चनियामक) relations. Conjunction, inherence, etc. are relations of the former kind as, things that are locus and locate respectively are related by these relations. Identity and many logical relations are of the latter kind as the entities joined by these relations are not the locus and the locates in respect of each other. Nothing can be supposed to be located in itself by the identity-relation although everything is self identical. This is the reason why difference as a kind of negation is distinguished from occurrence-negation-called 'atyantābhāva' or 'samsargābhāva' in the classification of negation in Indian logic. The counterpositive of the occurrence-negation excludes it from its locus while the counterpositive of difference excludes the difference from itself with which it is identical but not located in it by the identity relation.

Further there cannot arise a verbal or even a nonverbal cognition of a thing as both the epistemic qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and the epistemic qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) in the cognition. Unless the epistemic qualifier and the qualificand are different from each other the cognition cannot be determinate or predicative at all. It cannot be indeterminate either as it has a definite subject. It will have to be reckoned as an instance of imperfect cognition. If however identity involved as relation in the cognition is turned into a

property so that the cognition has the form. 'The pot is self-identical', then the cognition can well be determinate but then it will not remain tautological in the strict sense of the word.

It may be argued here that if we can say truly that 'a pot is not different from or the locus of the difference from itself'. Then we can say truly that 'a pot is a pot'. However the above mentioned distinction between difference and occurrence-negation and the consequent difference in the application of the principle of double negation to the two kinds of negation can very well meet the argument. The negation of the occurrence-negation of a thing is identical with the thing but the negation of the difference from a thing is supposed to be identical not with the thing but with the distinctive property of the thing. So the statement 'a pot is not different from itself' would not imply the statement 'a pot is a pot'. It would imply only the statement 'a pot is endowed with potness'. Tautologies are therefore as senseless and devoid of statementhood as the simple subject term 'a pot' or 'the pot' is.

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N.S.Drauid

## Reply 2

### A Note on Identity Relation

Professor N.S.Drauid, following the line of Gadādhara, has tried to highlight the meaninglessness of the tautology as found in the case of identical statement. So far as my understanding goes, the defect of tautology as found in the West is not accepted in Indian Logic. To him nothing can be supposed to be located in itself by the identity-relation although everything is self-identical. To this point I beg to differ, because each and every object becomes *abheda* with itself. The *abheda* means 'the absence of mutual absence' (*bhedābhāva*). If it is possible logically to say that something is different (*bheda*) from something, it is quite natural or there is also a logical possibility of saying that something is not *different* from something. If *bheda* becomes an object of

description, why not *abheda*? That an object is non-different from itself is an 'information' in the true sense of the term, because in terms of 'non-difference' an object is known as different from another. In the Nyāya framework the absence called *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence) would become 'inconceivable' or 'meaningless' if there were no idea of '*abheda*' i.e. the absence of mutual absence. Any idea of *bheda* presupposes the idea of *abheda*. For this reason *bheda* (*anyonyābhāva*) is defined in terms of *tādāmyasambandhāvaccinnapratiyogitākābhāva* (i.e. an absence, the absenteeness of which is limited by the relation of identity.) Without the acceptance of identity the *anyonyābhāva* (*bheda*) cannot be admitted as a form of *abhāva*. I do not know in such cases how the position of Gadādhara can be defended.

Professor Drauid argues that if the epistemic qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the epistemic qualificand (*viśeṣya*) are not different from each other, the cognition cannot be determinate at all. If in this context determinate cognition is taken as a *savikalpaka* knowledge then the definition of it may be considered carefully. It runs as follows: *Viśeṣṇa-viśeṣya-samsargāvagāhi jñānam*' (i.e. a cognition in which qualifier, qualificand and their relation are revealed). In the present case of 'A jar is a jar', the first ('a jar') is to be taken as a jar existing in proximity to our eyes and the second one ('a jar') is taken as a jar seen earlier and in between these two there is a relation (*samsarga*) called *tādātmya*. Though the same word (a jar) is used at both the places, the first one may be taken as a qualificand and the second one is a qualifier and *tādātmya* (identity) is the relation. Hence it is a case of determinate cognition. In our daily life we generally make such identity-statements in the above-mentioned sense and there is a successful communication with others. Once a friend of mine came to my house on the occasion of *Sarasvatī pūjā* in my childhood. Customarily if some guest comes during this occasion, he is given some *prasāda* (some eatables sacrificed in the name of the

goddess). When my friend was given a plate full of *prasāda*, he took a small portion of it. When he was asked the reason for not taking the rest, he answered boldly, '*Prasāda is Prasāda*'. I didn't have any difficulty to understand the import of the sentence though I didn't read philosophy at that time. He wanted to mean that *Prasāda* does not lose its sanctity and purity if taken in a small portion, because it is virtually a *prasāda*, which cannot be compared with other objects. As it is *prasāda*, the quantity of it is irrelevant. Hence, these statements cannot be totally ignored as meaningless.

Lastly, I would like to know from the scholars whether there is any Sanskrit term for expressing '*tautology*'. If it is translated as '*punarukti*', then what may be the differentiating factors between *punarukti* and *tādātmya* (identity). It seems to me Professor Dravid did not make a distinction between these two, but in the West there is a distinction between them. However, even if the sentences like '*ghaṭo ghaṭaḥ*' are taken as tautology, they may be taken as virtuous ones, but not vicious. Whatever is stated in the form of a sentence in the Indian Logic is material but not merely a formal one. Hence there is hardly any sentence which is meaningless in the context of Navy Nyāya if it possesses conditions like *akāṅkṣā* etc. Any sentence which is determinate must be '*relational*', which entails some meaning. The terms like hare's horn (*śaśāśṅga*) etc. do not convey any meaning as they are absurd entities (*alike*) which do not come under any category (*padārtha*) accepted by them.

Vol. XVII, No. 2

Raghnath Ghosh

### Reply 3

Reaction on the Expression *Ghato-Ghataḥ* by V.N.Jha published in the JICPR, Vol. XV, No.2

Dr.V.N.Jha's argument is not clear. By drawing our attention to the definition of *अन्योन्याभाव*, provided by the Naiyayikas, he seems

to argue that since घट etc. objects have the difference of घट, घट has to be admitted as having घटतादात्म्य and hence the expression 'घटो घटः' conveying the same, is quite acceptable. But, what I fail to understand, is as to why Dr. Jha takes the trouble to prove the identity of jar in the jar. घटतादात्म्य in घट is a universally admitted fact and there is no necessity to prove it by referring to the definition of अन्योन्याभाव. Anyway, Gadadhara's discussion in व्युत्पत्तिद, aims at finding out the reasons for the absence of the expression 'घटो घटः'. This implies that none has ever doubted the absence of such expressions. But, Dr. Jha seems to hold that since घट has घटतादात्म्य there must also be an expression conveying the same and घटो घटः. could be such an expression. If this is his view, I think it is not justifiable. For, let alone in Sanskrit, in no other language, are such expressions found. For instance, in English, we come across the expressions such as 'a blue jar', 'a red jar' etc. But we never find the expressions like 'a jar jar'. This shows that whenever two words in the same case affix, which generally denote the objects that stand in the relation of identity, are used then they are such that they denote different properties. The expression घटोनील is an example. The two words that are here, denote the objects that are related by the relation of identity and the properties they denote viz घटत्व and नीलत्व are different from each other. But in the case of the alleged expression 'घटो घटः' it is not so. For, the two terms denote the same property namely घटत्व. In short, an expression like घटो घटः can not convey the identity of jar in the jar, for the properties denoted by the two terms are not different.

Then the question may arise as to how the identity of a jar in the same can be conveyed. The answer is simple. It can be conveyed by the sentences such as 'घटो घटाभिन्नः' or घटा घटतादात्म्यवान् etc. The difference between the alleged expression

'घटो घटः' and the above sentences, is too obvious and needs no explanation.

The Naiyayikas hold this view, mainly with regard to verbal cognitions and a non-verbal cognition wherein both qualifier and qualificand are presented through one and the same property, can occur. Nothing can prevent us to infer 'घट : तादात्म्येन घटवान् घटत्वात्.' The inferential cognition produced by it, would have घट as both qualifier and qualificand, and तादात्म्य as the relation.

Vol. XVII, No.2

D.Prahalada Char

#### Reply 4

Reply to the Query on 'Ghato Ghatah' published in the JICPR, Vol. XV, No.2.

"घटो घटः" इति वाक्यं न प्रमाणम्

अभेदान्वयबोधश्च विरूपोपस्थितयोरेवेति व्युत्पत्तिः। विरुद्ध-धर्माभ्यामुपस्थितयोरेव अभेदान्वयबोधो भवतीत्यर्थः। यया 'नीलो घटः' इत्यत्र नीलत्वघटत्वाभ्यां विरुद्धधर्माभ्यामुपस्थितयोः नीलघटयोः अभेदान्वयबोधो भवति। घटत्वघटले न विरुद्धधर्मौ। अतः 'घटो घट' इत्यत्र घटत्वावच्छिन्ने घटत्वावच्छिन्नस्य अभेदसम्बन्धेन शब्दबोधो न भवति। विधेयांशेऽधिकावगाहि-शब्दबोधस्वीकारात् 'घटो-नीलघटः' इत्यत्र अभेदान्वयबोधो भवति। तत्र विधेयां शो नीलस्याधिकस्य प्रवेशात्। 'घटो घटः' इत्यत्र च उद्देश्यकोटौ विधेयकोटौ च केवलघटस्यैव प्रवेशात् विधेयकोटौ अधिकावगाहित्वाभावेन अभेदान्वयबोधो न जायते।

तद्दर्मावच्छिन्नाभेदसंसर्गावच्छिन्न प्रकारतानिरूपित विशेष्यतावच्छेदकतासम्बन्धेन शब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति तद्दर्मभेदः कारणम्। 'द्रव्यं घटः' इत्यत्र घटत्वावच्छिन्नाभेद सम्बन्धावच्छिन्न प्रकारतानिरूपित विशेष्यतावच्छेदकता सम्बन्धेन द्रव्यत्वे जायमान शब्द बुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति द्रव्यत्वे घटत्वभेदः कारणम्। घटाभिन्नं द्रव्यमिति शब्दबोधो जायते। यत्र विशेष्यतावच्छेदक प्रकारतावच्छेदकयोः भेदो वर्तते, तत्रैवाभेदान्वयबोधो भवतीति सिद्धम्। 'द्रव्यं घट' इत्यत्र द्रव्यत्वं विशेष्यतावच्छेदकं, घटत्वं प्रकारतावच्छेदकम्। 'घटो घट' इत्यत्र तु घटत्वमेव विशेष्यतावच्छेदकं प्रकारतावच्छेदकयेति विशेष्यतावच्छेदक प्रकारतावच्छेदकयोः भेदाभावात् अभेदान्वयबोधो न भवति। अयत्र कार्यकारणभावः शब्दबुद्धिं प्रति पृथगुक्तः।

ज्ञानसामान्ये सर्वानुगतः कार्यकारणभावः तद्दर्मान्यवृत्ति विषयतासम्बन्धेन ज्ञानं प्रति तद्दर्मभेदः कारणम्। ज्ञानत्वं व्यापकधर्मः। शब्दबोधत्वं व्याप्यधर्मः। व्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्ने कार्ये जननीये व्यापकधर्मावच्छिन्नकार्यस्य सामग्री अपेक्षिता। ज्ञानमात्रं घटत्वान्यवृत्ति विषयतासम्बन्धेन घटत्वभिन्ने एव वर्तते। एवस्य व्यापकीभूत ज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नोत्पादक सामग्री घटत्वभेदघटितेति 'घटो घट' घटत्वभेदविरहात् घटत्वे उक्तज्ञानापत्तिः। अतः शब्दबोधाजनकं 'घटो घट' इति वाक्यं न प्रमाणम्।

संशयनिवर्तकं यत् तदेव प्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति। 'घटो घट' इति वाक्यस्य न कस्यापि संशयस्य निवर्तकम्। द्रव्यं घटत्व घटत्वाभावोभयावगाहि 'द्रव्यं घटो न वा' इत्याकारक-संशयनिवर्तकत्वेन द्रव्यं घट इति वाक्यं प्रमाणम् प्रकृते 'घटो घटो न वा' इति संशयो नास्ति। तस्य घटे घटत्व-घटत्वाभावोभयावगाहित्वेन आहार्यत्वं वर्तते। बाधकालीछवाजन्यं ज्ञानं आहार्यम्। त्वं न कस्यापि प्रतिबन्धं, प्रतिबन्धकस्य भवति। अतो 'घटो घट' इति वाक्यं प्रमाणं भवितुं नाहीति।

तादात्म्यसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न प्रतियोगिताकत्वमन्योन्याभावस्य लक्षणम्। घटतादात्म्यस्य घटे वर्तताम्। परन्तु 'तादात्म्यसम्बन्धेन घटो घटेऽस्ति' इति प्रतीतिरापादयितुं न शक्ये। तादात्म्यसम्बन्धस्य वृत्त्यनियामकत्वात्। 'घटतादात्म्यवान् घट' इत्यपि प्रतीतिरापादयितुं न शक्यते। विधेयस्य घटतादात्म्यस्य उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकरूपत्वाङ्गीकारे घटतादात्म्यं घटत्वस्वरूपमेव। तदानीमुद्देश्यतावच्छेदक विधेययोः ऐक्यात् भेदाभावात् तदाक्यं अप्रमाणमेव भवति।

अपि च शाब्दबोधे आकांक्षापि कारणम्। प्रकृते घटत्ववदुद्देश्यक घटत्वविधेयक शब्दबोधजनने आकांक्षा नास्ति। आकांक्षाभ्रमात् जायमानः शब्दबोधः प्रकृते भ्रमात्मकः। अतः त्वज्जनकं 'घटो घट' इति वाक्यं सर्वधाप्रमाणमेव भवति।

एवस्य 'घटो घट' इति वाक्यं नैयायिकैरवश्यं प्रमाणत्वेन अङ्गीर्तव्यमिति नास्ति नियमः नास्ति सिद्धान्तस्य।

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श्रीपाद सुब्राह्मण्यम्

#### Reply 5

Further Observations on the Navya Nyāya View of Tautology on the Note of Dr. Raghunath Ghosh published in the JICPR Vol. XVII No.2. p.170-1 under the heading 'A Note on Identity Relation'

Raghunath Ghosh's objections<sup>21</sup> to my account and justification of the Navya Nyāya view of Tautology have been directly or indirectly answered by me in my earlier note on the view. The first general objection to the view in Ghosh's own words is as follows '...each and every object becomes *abhēda* with itself. The *abhēda* means the absence of mutual absence (*bhedābhava*). If it is not possible logically to say that something is different (*bhēda*) from something, it is quite natural or there is also a logical possibility of saying that something is not different from something. The first thing to be pointed out in these statements of Ghosh is the gross and repeated misuse of the Sanskrit words *bhēda* and *abheda* in them. The right words to use are *bhinna* and *abhinna* respectively. What Ghosh urges in these statements is the fact that *abhēda* or self-identity can well be a predicate in a significant identity-statement like 'A pot is non-different or identical with itself.' Now the statement which I have made in my note<sup>22</sup> runs thus: 'If however identity involved as relation in the cognition is turned into a property so that the cognition has the form 'The pot is self-identical' then the cognition can well be determinate but then it will not remain tautological in the strict sense of the word.' This makes it clear that I had already anticipated the above objection and answered it by way of defending the Nyāya view. It need not be thought that the above-mentioned statement is implicitly tautological as identity is merely shifted in it from the position of relation to that of the predicated property. If there is doubt about a thing's remaining self-identical throughout its existence the above sentence can alone dissipate the doubt, not a statement like 'A pot is a pot', unless the second word 'pot', in the statement is stressed, but then the stress would signify self-identity.

Before passing to the second objection of Ghosh it has to be particularly pointed out that logic cannot dictate to common usage. The function of logic is limited to analyzing and defending the prevalent usage, finding if possible proper justification for it. Tautologies, despite their vogue in logical symbolism are never employed by sensible persons in their

<sup>21</sup> Ghosh, R.: A Note on Identity Relation, *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 2, pp. 170.

<sup>22</sup> Dravid, N.S.: Navya Nyāya View of Tautology, *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, pp. 13

everyday discourse, mainly because they do not at all serve to communicate any meaning. As a matter of fact tautologies subvert the meanings of common words and so they cannot be treated even as formally true. For example the tautology ' $p \equiv p$ ' employs the conjunctive symbol in an uncommon sense as there are not two 'ps' to be conjoined by the symbol for 'and'. Also nothing can have itself as its predicate which the symbol for 'and'. Also nothing can have itself as its predicate which the equivalence symbol in the tautology signifies. Mathematical expressions and equations are however like the familiar identity-statement, 'The morning star is the evening star' in which the same entity is referred to by two different descriptive expressions. In the strict sense therefore mathematical expressions and equations are not tautologies.

Ghosh's second and third objections answer themselves. A present object apprehended and referred to as the same as the previously-perceived one does not instantiate tautology but recognitive judgement or statement in which the subject term is characterized by presentness and the same term as characterized by pastness functions as the predicate-term. Again in the remark quoted by Ghosh viz. 'A prasad is a prasad' the difference in meaning of the two tokens of the same word 'prasad' is so obvious that nobody would treat the remark as tautologous. What is true of the remark is also true of all those statements that are nontautological and yet are reducible to tautologies. For instance the statement 'The morning star is the evening star' is, as it stands nontautological and yet it is directly reducible to the tautology, 'The morning star is the morning star'. Although the original statement is nontautological the statement resulting from or equivalent to it is not and need not be nontautological. The equivalence between the nontautological and the tautological statements is accountable—as in the case of the words 'morning star' and 'evening star' on the basis of the distinction of sense and reference. The statements refer to the same statement entity although their senses are not the same.

At the end it may be mentioned that all Indian philosophies distinguish the subject and predicate-terms in a significant statement as the unassertedly and assertively stated terms respectively. There can never be a change in roles of these terms without changing or distorting the meaning

of the statement concerned. In tautology the subject and predicate terms can always be interchanged which means that neither plays the role that is respectively essential to them.

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N.S.Drauid

### Reply 6

#### A Logical Illumination of *Tādātmya* Relation in Navya Nyāya

##### I

A query has been made in the *JICPR* (Vol.XV, No.2,p. 169) whether identical statements like *ghaṭaḥ ghaṭaḥ etc.* give rise to any meaning or not. In response to this query our senior friend Professor V.N.Jha has put forth the key-point in justifying such statement. In this paper I would like to represent some more supplementary arguments in favour of accepting *tādātmya* relation in Navya Nyāya along with highlighting the key-point mentioned by professor Jha.

##### II

Though the term *Tādātmya* is used in Buddhism and Navya Nyāya, both the systems have taken this relation in a completely different sense which needs to be focussed here for the proper understanding of the concept. Other various philosophical complications may stand on the understanding of this relation, if this part is not discussed properly.

##### III

The Buddhists admit that identity (*Tādātmya*) is a relation. From this it will lead to another assertion that there are relata, because relation only remains in two objects as far as the Buddhist view is concerned. The Buddhists have used the term *Tādātmya* (identity) in a very specific sense. i.e. in the sense of *similarity*, but not in the sense of absolute sameness as understood by Navya Naiyāyikas. According to them, *tādātmya* or identity is the similarity in the sense that one relatum would be less extensive than the other. The Buddhists accept identity between *śimśapātva*

(i.e. property existing in *śimśapā*, a kind of tree) and *vrkṣatva* (treeness). It can safely be said that wherever there is *śimśapātva*, there is *vrkṣatva* or treeness, but not the otherwise. As the property *vrkṣatva* (treeness) has more extensive pervasion than *śimśapātva*, from the *śimśapātva* one can easily infer *vrkṣatva* (treeness) due to having the relation in the sense of similarity (*tādātmya*) there. But, on the other hand, from the property of a tree (treeness), one cannot infer *śimśapātva* because treeness has got more extensive pervasion in the sense that we cannot say 'wherever there is *vrkṣatva* (treeness), there is *śimśapātva*' because 'treeness' covers all the trees in this world, not to speak of *śimśapātva*. That is why, the Buddhist concept of *tādātmya* is taken neither as completely identical nor completely non-identical, but in the sense of similarity. An object covering narrower place remains in another object existing in wider places as shown above.

Dharmakīrti has explained the above mentioned identity as a reason for deducing a predicate when the subject alone is by itself sufficient for that deduction, i.e. when the predicate is a part of the subject. It is, therefore, not absolute identity but it is a partial identity<sup>23</sup>. If there is a class and a sub-class relation, it is called 'identity' in the above-mentioned sense of the term. The relation between flower and stone, for example, is absolutely different (*atyantābheda*) and hence the identity relation cannot be accepted. If, on the other hand it is accepted '*ghata* is a *kalaśa* (i.e., a jar is a jar) there such relation cannot be accepted due to their absolute identity (*atyantābheda*). Such type of identity is not accepted in the Navya Nyāya. Even to the Buddhists this relation is an unreal one as it comes under *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Like *Tadutpatti* this notion of *Tādātmya* (identity) is taken by the Buddhists as a means of ascertaining *Vyāpti*. Such a form of inference is not accepted by the

<sup>23</sup> Śāyanamādhava : *Sarvadarśanasamgrahaḥ (Bauddhadarśana)*.

Naiyāyikas. For, they would at most describe the properties like treeness (*vrkṣatva*) as a form of universal called *parasāmānya*, i.e. a universal covering more places than the other property like *śimśapātva* which is called *aparāsāmānya* due to its existing in comparatively less places. If the former is a set, the latter would be taken as a subset. There is no question of Inference according to Nyāya it may be taken as a perceptual cognition. On the other hand, the Buddhists cannot say that this is a case of perceptual knowledge, because to them unique singular (*svalakṣana*) alone is real as it is momentary. Any cognition other than this (*svalakṣana*) is inferential which has got unreality in the sense of phenomenal reality (*samvṛtisatyatā*)

Though identity comes under *samvṛtisatyatā*, the concept may not be understood in this sense only. Some might say that it is the case of similarity, but not identity. According to the Navya Naiyāyikas, the *tādātmya* relation may be taken in the following way.

#### IV

The term *tādātmya* may be understood at the very beginning as the absence of *bheda* (difference) which is accepted as *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence). If the term *tādātmya* is replaced by the term '*abheda*' it would mean an absolute absence of a *bheda*, i.e. mutual absence. Why is *tādātmya* called *abheda*? For, it is nothing but an absence of *bheda* as it is said in the *Vyutpattivāda abhedastādātmyam* (i.e. identity means the absence of mutual absence). Here 'absence' means 'absolute absence' (*atyantābhāva*)<sup>24</sup>.

Identity (*tādātmya*) is possible only when difference (*bheda*) is excluded according to *Navya Nyāya*, i.e. when it is said that a jar is not a cloth (*ghaṭo na paṭah*). A jar is understood as different

from a cloth. The Naiyāyikas will say that in a jar there is the mutual absence of a cloth. That is, the Navya Naiyāyikas can distinguish these two objects as having mutual absence of a cloth in a jar. Though this distinction is known perceptually, it can also be inferred if someone has strong desire to do it (*siṣādhayiṣā*). In this case the syllogistic argument in the form 'A cloth is possessing mutual absence from a jar, as it possesses clothness in it' (*ghaṭānyonyābhāvavān paṭatvāt*). However, the distinction between two objects is a subject of perception or Inference. If it is possible, why is some sort of relation between two objects having no distinction (*abheda*) not accepted? If *bheda* is admitted as a content of cognition, why not the case of *abheda*? The term '*abheda*' would mean the constant absence (*atyantābhāva*) of *bheda* (mutual absence or *anyonyābhāva*). This absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) of *bheda* (mutual absence or *anyonyābhāva*) may be interpreted as the absolute absence, the absentee of which is limited by mutual absenceness (*bhedatvāvaccinnābhāva*). It may be interpreted in another way. It is an absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) whose absentee is a *bheda* i.e. mutual absence (*bhedapratyogikābhāva*). Both the interpretations are not tenable because if they are accepted, they lead us to the land of absurdity. If the former interpretation (*abhedoyadibhedatvāvaccinnābhāva*) is taken into account, the absolute negation would not be available anywhere. Because the mutual negation (*bheda*) of any object can be found everywhere, and hence the absolute negation of the *bheda* (mutual absence), the absentee of which is limited by *bhedatva*, i.e. distinctness is not possible. For, the absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) is contradictory to its absentee-the absentee of which is limited by *bhedatva* (i.e. mutual absenceness). As an object having *anyonyābhāva* or *bheda* is not available anywhere, the absolute negation of it limited by *bhedatva* is contradictory by virtue of the fact that *bheda* which is taken to be absentee limited by the property *bhedatva* is not at all possible. If it is said that

<sup>24</sup> Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. 1, p. 251 Dover Publication, New York, 1962

there is the absolute negation of *bheda* limited by *bhedatva* is contradictory, because the *bheda* limited by the limiter of *bheda* (*bhedatva*) is always available and hence to search for its absolute negation leads to absurdity (*abhedo yadi bhedatvāvacchinnābhāvastadāprasiddhih*)<sup>25</sup> This thesis would be nullified if a single case (*vyakti*) of a constant absence exists in a particular case. That is, the absolute negation would not be found in such cases. It has been said here that *bheda* limited by the property of being *bheda* (*bhedatva*), i.e. *bhedatvāvacchinnabheda* is general. Hence an individual manifestation of *bheda* limited by *bhedatva* would never be available, because everywhere there is a *bheda*. Even if it is accepted that an individual manifestation of *bheda* is there but not in general (*bhedatvāvacchinnā*); then in this case also there is a contradiction to the absolute negation of the mutual absence or *bheda*. Because, we do not find a place in this world where there is no individual manifestation of *bheda*<sup>26</sup>. So the absolute negation of the mutual absence is not possible.

In order to avoid these difficulties another proposal may be suggested. In such a case the mutual absence, the absenteness of which is limited by being property of *bheda* (*bhedatvāvacchinnābhāva*), which cannot be accepted, but the mutual absence (*bheda*), the absenteness of which is another *bheda* (*bhedapratiyogitākābhāva*) can easily be accepted in order to remove the earlier difficulties. If in a particular locus there is the mutual absence of a particular object, there may be *bheda* (mutual absence) of another object. As for example, if there is the mutual absence of a jar (*ghaṭabheda*), then there may be another *bheda* or mutual absence of a cloth (*paṭabheda*) because a particular manifestation (*vyakti*) of *bheda* may remain in another locus where there is another *bheda* as it is an absence, the absentee of which is

<sup>25</sup> *Vyutpattivāda*, p.63, Chwkhambha Edition

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p.49.

*bheda* (*bhedapratiyogitākābhāva*). Let us suppose in a particular place there is a *bheda* (mutual absence) of p; it can easily be said that there is the mutual absence of q as it is not taken as a *bheda*-which is limited by *bhedatva*.

If the second interpretation (*bhedapratiyogitākābhāva*) is taken as the meaning of the term *abheda* (identity), it would give rise to some erroneous cognition, viz. 'The water is blue' (*vadi ca bhedapratiyogiko bhāvastadā nilamjalamtityādivādivākyasyāpi prāmāṇyāpattiḥ Jale dviitvādinā nilabhdādyabhāvasyāpi sattvāt*)<sup>27</sup>. In this context the absolute negation of *bheda* of *Nila* (*nilabhdābhāva*) can be found in water, because here *nilabheda*, i.e. the absence of the *nilabheda*, is having the property of the conjoint two objects, i.e. water and *nilabheda* (*vyāsajyayrtīdharmā*) as the limiter of the absenteness. Water is not blue in the actual world and hence water can always be expressed as having no colour, i.e. blue. This sentence would mean that there is a *bheda* or *anyonyābhāva* of blue (*nilona*) in water. Though the *anyonyābhāva* or *bheda* of blue (*nilabheda*) is not found in water normally, yet it can be said to exist in water if the absolute absence of the mutual absence (*bhedābhāva*) is taken as *bhedapratiyogitākābhāva* i.e. an absence, the absentee of which is *bheda* or mutual absence. If we take another object (jar) with the mutual absence of blue (*jale nilabhedaghatobhayam nāsti*), the absolute absence has got two absentees-the mutual absence of blue (*nilabheda*) and a jar (*ghaṭa*). In this case it can be said that the absolute negation has got 'mutual absence of blue' (*nilabheda*) as an absentee. Here we find another absentee, i.e. jar. From this it can be said that the absolute absence of both the mutual absence

<sup>27</sup> *Yasya kasyacidbhedasya sarvatruiva sattvāt abhāvasya pratyōritāvachedakatvāvacchinnena saha virodhāt bhedatvāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāvāprasiddhirityarthah.* Commentary on *Vyutpattivāda* by Jayadeva Misra [Chowkhamba, p. 49.



of blue (*nīlabheda*) and the jar may be designated as having the mutual absence of blue (*nīlabheda*) as its absentee. Hence, the absolute absence of the mutual absence of blue (*nīlabhedābhāva*) can be said to exist in water and for this reason the previously mentioned sentence- 'water is blue' refers to erroneous content and hence one could claim its validity. Because, that which possesses the absolute negation of the mutual absence of blue in it is identical with blue. Hence the object can surely be called blue, which is actually not found in the phenomenal world, For this *asiddhi* (i.e. substantiation of something which is absurd) would surely follow<sup>28</sup>.

From the foregoing discussion it can be said that identity (*tādātmya*) is nothing but non-distinction (*abheda*) which implies an uncommon property (*asādhāraṇa dharmā*) existing in the self (i.e. *Sva*) i.e. a particular object. This uncommon property exists in one and only one object (*Abhedastādātmyam Tacca svavṛtṭyasādhāraṇa dharmā Asādhāraṇyañcaekamātravṛtṭitvam*)<sup>29</sup>.

If the distinction of some object (*bheda*) is admitted from another one, it will logically follow that there might be some cases where there is *abhedatva* or identity or *bhedābhāvatva* (absence of mutual absenceness). In fact, the Buddhists have accepted the method of *apoha* (negative reasoning) depending on this phenomenon of distinction (*bheda*) of a particular from other. As for example, a cow can be known as it possesses distinction from 'non-cow'. In the same way, they recognize a jar as such by virtue of its distinction from 'non-jar'.

If distinction (*bheda*) of a particular object from others is admitted by the Buddhist, why would it not be admitted *abhedatva* (identity) in the sense which the Navya Naiyayikas have

<sup>28</sup> *Vyutpattivāda*, p. 49 (same editor).

<sup>29</sup> Dr. D.C. Guha: *The Navya Nyaya System of Logic*, Old Edition, pp. 74-8, 1968.

admitted. It has already been discussed that the Buddhists have accepted the term '*tādātmya* (identity) *not*' in the sense of absolute sameness. However, there is no point in rejecting *abheda* or *tādātmya* in the sense of absolute sameness.

If it is said- 'Devadatta is Devadatta' or 'a jar is a jar', they convey the sense of absolute sameness (*bhedābhāva*) between two objects. It has been accepted that a jar exists in itself through the relation of identity (*tādātmyasambandhena ghaṭaḥ svasmin eva vartate*). The importance of *tādātmya* as relation may easily be understood if the definition of *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence) is carefully noticed. We generally explain *anyonyābhāva* (*bheda*) with the example- 'A jar is not a cloth' (*ghaṭo na paṭaḥ*) where the absentee (*pratiyogī*) is a cloth (*paṭa*). How do we know this? In reply to this question, the relation of identity for knowing an object as non-different from other is to be admitted. If it is asked why a jar is different from a cloth, because the absentee or *pratiyogī* which is a cloth (*paṭa*) does not exist in itself (*paṭa*) through the relation of *tādātmya* (*Tādātmyasambandhāvacchinnapatiyogitākābhāvaḥ*). That is, that something is different from something is known by the absence of *tādātmya* between them.

There is another significance of accepting *tādātmya* as a relation. When it is said by one- 'Calcutta is Calcutta', 'Rabindranath is Rabindranath', it cannot be ignored as having no meaning. If these sentences are uttered, these convey some meaning to the hearer. Generally, when we want to express some incomparability of some city or person, we express it with these types of identical statement. The city Calcutta has got certain characteristics of its own which cannot be compared with other cities, but with itself. The same is the meaning of the second sentence- Rabindranath is Rabindranath.

Such identical statements carry some weight in the case of metaphor in the sense of *Rūpaka*. When a face is identified with

the moon (*mukhacandra*), the *upameya* (object which is compared) is 'face' which is identical with the 'moon', the *upamāna* (an object with which some thing is compared). The ascription of identification between two objects inspite of not concealing their difference (*atisamyāt apahnutabhedayoḥ upamānopameyayoḥ abhedāropah*)<sup>30</sup> is called *Rūpaka*. Sometimes the *Upameya* is used as *upamāna* in order to express the incomparability of the object as pointed out by Bhaṭṭhari. In these cases due to having a strong desire (*vivakṣā*) of the speaker *Upamāna* may be assumed as non-different from *Upameya* though in the real world it is not true. The identification between them is shown which is a kind of artificial intellectual exercise with a view to showing the incomparability of the object. Though there is the imposition of identity (*abhedāropah*) the two objects (*upamāna* and *upameya*) are not bearing contradicting properties (*parasparaviruddhavattvena upasthāpita*).

Some Indian thinkers are interested to make an artificial difference between two identical objects after using the term 'iva'. Bhaṭṭhari in his *Vākyapadiya* said that two objects, though identical, are demonstrated in such a way that one will think of their difference. But this difference is artificial in order to show the absolute sameness of the object. In the sentence- '*Indra iva dasyuhā bhava*' (like Indra become the dasyu-killer) which is addressed to Indra, the term 'iva' shows the relation of standard and the object of comparison on the basis of an artificial difference. It reminds me of a romantic line said to a lover by his lady love '*Tomar tulanā tumi ogo*' (i.e. you, are comparable to 'you' alone) or '*Tumi ye 'tume' ogo*' (you are really 'you'). Where a really different object is not available as standard of comparison, it itself is used as the standard in order to bring out its incomparability. As

<sup>30</sup> Vyutpattivāda, p. 63.

for example the statement: '*Rāmarāvaṇayoryuddham rāmarāvaṇayoriva*' (i.e. Rama-Ravana fight is like Rama-Ravan-fight) is also a case of identity statement<sup>31</sup>.

Viśvanātha, the author of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, has accepted the meaningfulness of such identity-expression as he has accepted such statements as a form of rhetoric (*alanṅkāra*) called *ananvaya*. When an object is imagined as having both the property of *upamāna* (*upamānatva*) i.e. the object with which something is compared and the property of *upameya* (*upamānatva*) i.e. the object compared simultaneously is called *ananvaya* (*upamānopameyatvomekasyaivatvananvayah*)<sup>32</sup>. In short, if an object is taken as both *upameya* and *upamāna* simultaneously, it is called *ananvaya*.<sup>33</sup> As for example *Viśvanātha* has given the following example '*Rājīvamiva rājīvaṁ jalam jalamivājani candraścandra ivāndraḥ saratsamudayodyame*.' That is, when autumn comes in full swing, the lotus becomes like a lotus (*rājīvam rājīvamiva*) untouched by mud of the rainy season, water becomes like water (*jalam jalamiva*) untouched by mud, the moon becomes like the moon (*candraścandra iva*) uncovered by thick cloud.<sup>34</sup>

The Navya Naiyāyikas also have used the term 'identity' (*tādātmya*) in such cases, but not always. They have also admitted the identity between a jar (*ghaṭa*) and 'a blue jar' (*nilaghaṭa*).

If the Buddhist asked Navya Naiyāyikas the reasons of accepting such a sense of identity, they might say that there is

<sup>31</sup> kusumapratimā on *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Ch.X

<sup>32</sup> Bhaṭṭhari: *Vākyapadiya*, III/14/253-254 and III/14/563-566. My paper : 'Jnāpya-jnāpaka-bhava Relation' in V.N.Jha (Ed.): *Relations in Indian Philosophy*, Satguru Publications, Delhi, pp. 79-87, 1992.

<sup>33</sup> Viśvanātha : *Sāhityadarpaṇaḥ*, Ch X/37

<sup>34</sup> *Ekasyatva in padārthasya upamānopameyatvam yugapadeva upamānatvamupameyatvanca kalpitascet tadā ananvayo nāmālanṅkāraḥ syāt.* Kusumapratimā on *Sāhityadarpaṇaḥ* on X/37

identity between 'a jar and a blue jar' from the general standpoint, but not specific (*sāmānyena abhedah na tu viśeṣataḥ*).

The Navya Naiyāyikas may in other ways justify the above-mentioned identity according to the general accepted principle- 'A qualified entity is not different from a pure one (*viśiṣṭam suddhānātiricyate*). From this it is, however, proved that the *tādātmya* in the sense as taken by the Buddhists is not at all capable of being rejected. It is also established that the statements like '*ghaṭo ghataḥ*' bear some logical basis.

'*Saradaḥ kālasya samudayena sampūrṇabhāvena udyame pravṛttau āvirbhāve sati, rājivam rājivamiva padmam padmamiva ataḥdrām kardamādimalahīnamajani thatā candraścandra iva atandro ghanāvaraṇarūpamalaśūnyaḥ ajani jātaḥ.*'

*Ibid*

Vol. XVIII, No. 2

Raghunath Ghosh

**What is the difference, if any, between *abhāva anupalabdhi*?**

VOL. XIX, No. 2

Daya Krishna

**Reply**

*Abhāva* and *Anupalabdhi* get significance primarily in the premises of epistemology relating with Pūrvaśāstra and so also with Advaita Vedānta in the realm of Indian philosophy. There is indeed difference in the implications of these two terms. A keen observation into the analytical outlook of both Mīmāṃsā (*Purva* and *Uttara*) reveals their epistemological uniqueness and clarity in interpretation of the process of cognition so that one can discriminate true knowledge from the false ones.

Knowledge in its empirical realm represents the particular modes of mind-stuff that is constantly subject to change. Among those modes, similar ones are classified into respective divisions in the epistemological interpretations of philosophy. Hence, separate types of knowledge have to

originate from distinct means of knowledge. According to the observations in Pūrvaśāstra and Advaita Vedānta, the process of knowledge is to be analyzed in consonance with human experience. Human beings experience the knowledge of existence and non-existence of objects in the empirical world. The senses along with the mind lead one to the knowledge of objects existent in nature at a limited particular time and space. Generally, philosophers consider this process alone to theoretize the means of knowledge. But apart from this, one has to recognize the experience of non-existence of objects enquired by one within the limitations of particular space and time even without sense-activity. Mind also fails to find out the enquired particular thing and thereby one cognizes the non-existence of that thing. Thus affirmative as well as negative types of knowledge have prominent place in human life. These two contradictory types of cognition cannot be originated by similar means of knowledge. In this way, analyzing human experience of knowledge in a reasonable way, Pūrvaśāstra and Advaita Vedānta dared to put forth a unique means of knowledge named *anupalabdhi*. The essence of the knowledge arising from this means of knowledge is negation that brings a uniform kind of voidness in human mind though related with various objects and affairs. Therefore this means of knowledge is not divided into many subdivisions as is done with the case of other affirmation-sensing means of knowledge.

As the terms indicate, 'Abhāva' and 'Anupalabdhi' have different meanings and implications. *Upalabdhi* refers to human cognition and hence *anupalabdhi* refers to the absence of it. As a means of valid knowledge, this is defined in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* as follows:

ज्ञानकरणानुभवावनुभवासाधारणकारणमनुपलब्धिरूपं प्रमाणम् ।

Here itself, it is evident that the means of knowledge is named *Anupalabdhi* whereas the knowledge arising from this means refers to 'abhāva'. *Abhāva* is absolute non-existence which embraces the whole universe. Everywhere one can experience the non-existence (*abhāva*) of things which are absent there. When it is mentioned particularly and brought to peculiar occasion, it reforms itself into a valid knowledge originated from a valid means. Here the relevance of *Anupalabdhi* can be

disclosed. All other means of valid knowledge bring the cognition of existing objects whereas *Anupalabdhi* alone is competent to make man conscious of the non-existence of familiar objects in particular space and time.

Advaita Vedānta, though it advocates the non-dual Brahman as the sole reality and considers the whole universe as false, does not hesitate to admit the fact that Brahman is to be realized while living in this world itself. Therefore, up to the attainment of true knowledge, one should consider the world and the objects in it as real and valid. In such a context, one should examine and analyze ones own experience not in a superficial manner, but with deep concentration and justice. This is the inspiring factor of this system behind the analysis of various types of knowledge and their means while considering their underlying distinctions. This is why Advaitins refute the view of Naiyāyikas that negative invariable concomitance leads to negative inference. Negative knowledge arising out of inference cannot be justified, for, *anumāna* occurs first in the mind, which brings cognition in a positive manner. Common man's experience of knowledge also puts forth the fact that the mind brings the knowledge of existing objects and affairs previously experienced in an existent form. Possessing this nature of analyzing facts in their utmost depth, Advaita Vedānta rejected the Buddhist view of non-recognition of *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. In this way, if one penetrates into the nature and purpose of *pramāṇas*, it can very well be asserted that there should be the recognition of six *pramāṇas* which can engage in the production of different kinds of knowledge. Moreover, such an interpretation, being reasonable and all-embracing, could not affect the true principle of Advaita Vedānta because according to this system, the universe where these means of knowledge are valid is merely relatively real. The relatively real is incapable of nullification of the absolutely real principle. Therefore there need not be hesitation in admitting all those proposition that can work as the means of valid knowledge. It will not undervalue any philosophical system. On the other hand, this true and honest interpretation increases the value, relevance and public acceptance of the system. Advaita Vedānta

is undoubtedly successful in this regard which presents and analyzes empirical affairs in a true and just way. Hence they consider *Anupalabdhi* as a separate *pramāṇa* for acquiring the cognition of the non-existence of particular objects and affairs in the world. In this way, 'व्यवहारे भाट्टनयः' is not a blind following of the facts and doctrines proposed by Bhāttamīmāṃsakas. But with due reflection and observation, Advaita recognizes almost all empirical theories put forth by Bhāttas.

Vol. XIX, No.4

N. Usha Devi

#### *Abhāva, Sāmānya etc.*

1. Is there a *Sāmānya* of *abhāva*? In case there is, is it known by perception or inference?
2. What is the difference between *atyantābhāva* and *sāmānyābhāva*, in case the latter is accepted as a genuine universal by those who accept *abhāva* as a separate *padārtha*?
3. What is the difference, if any, between *abhāva* and *anupalabdhi*?
4. How are *prāgabhāva* and *dhvamiśābhāva* known? Is the beginninglessness of the former different from the endlessness of the latter and, if so, how is this difference known?
5. Is *anyonyābhāva* known by *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*? In case it is the latter, how can any *vyāpti* be established in the usual sense of *vyāpti* in the Nyāya tradition? Alternatively, if it is supposed to be known by *pratyakṣa* how could there be two simultaneous *indriyārtha sannikarṣa* which themselves will have to be different from each other?
6. In case *indriyārtha sannikarṣa* is supposed to be a necessary condition for *laukika pratyakṣa* according to Nyāya, how can there be a *pratyakṣa* of *abhāva* as, by definition, there can be no *indriyārtha sannikarṣa* in its case? The same problem arises in the case of *sāmānya*, in case its perceptual apprehension is accepted as is generally alleged to be the case with Nyāya.

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Daya Krishna

## Reply

1. No *sāmānya* or universal of absence (*abhāva*) is accepted in Nyāya; every absence is specific to what is absent by *akhaṇḍopādhi*, by specific distinction. Thus absence of horse is different from absence of cow. Nyāya does not recognize a general absence without a specification of what is absent.
2. *Atyantābhāva* in Nyāya has nothing to do with a universal as *sāmānya*. It had two phases in Nyāya. At first there was a distinction between *sāmāyikābhāva* (temporary absence) and *atyantābhāva* (constant absence). The example of the first would be absence of a book from the shelf, of the second would be absence of cold in fire. In later Nyāya both were put under *atyantābhāva* with the tag constant (*nitya*), which ought to be added only to the second type above. To many the title *atyantābhāva* for temporary absence might appear a misnomer.
3. *Anupalabdhi* is the subjective aspect of non-perception of the absent object, *abhāva* is the objective aspect of perception of the absence of the object, in the locus.
4. Absence before creation is easily known when we see the creation of some thing like a pot by the potter, absence after destruction is seen in the broken parts or disappearance. The two cannot be identified because that would lead to rehabilitation of the destroyed object from the beginningless past, by double negation.
5. *Anyonyābhāva* is just difference, and can be perceived. The eye, for instance, can come in contact with two different objects like a horse and a cow. One might attend to them severally.
6. *Indriyārtha sannikarṣa* is not with the absent object, but with the locus qualified by the absence of the object. Thus an empty cashbox would be seen as qualified by cashlessness.

Some of the difficulties in Nyāya theory of absence as a category (*padārtha*) arise because they do not emphasize the importance of expectation in perception of *atyantābhāva*, specially of the temporary type. No one perceives the absence of the moon in an empty cashbox because no one expects the heavenly luminary there. Also the definition given for

*anyonyābhāva* is meant for different species, but would actually extend to different members of the same species also.

Vol. XX, No.2

R.N. Mukerji

The Concept of *Āhārya-jñāna*: Some Queries

I have been recently looking into some works by Viśveśvara Paṇḍeya, a thinker of the earlier part of the eighteenth century. Lively and innovative, Viśveśvara has written on a number of subjects. In *vyākaraṇa*, he composed a new commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini, taking especial note of philosophical issues. The first three chapters of this work have been published. Viśveśvara was also concerned with philosophy more directly and has two works on Nyāya or rather Navya-nyāya: the *Tarka-kutūhala*<sup>35</sup> and *Dīdhiti-prakāśa*; these works, so far as I know, are unpublished.

What interests me here is a work of Viśveśvara on *alanākāra*, the *Alanākāraakustubham*. It seems to be one of the first works of its kind to make detailed and extensive use of the full force of Navya-nyāya methods and terminology in the area of poetics. It defines different *alanākāra*, figures of poetic speech, with Navya-nyāya precision, carefully distinguishing one *alanākāra* from another through definition and analysis, raising questions, presenting counter-examples of *avyāptis* (examples which the definition should include but does not), and *ativyāptis* (examples that should lie outside the definition but do not) and taking up arguments seeking to demolish the definition presented. This is a procedure which, at its best, in seeking to demarcate boundaries with articulate finesse, imparts, interestingly, a richness of conceptual detail and nuance to the area that lies *within* a boundary.

Using Navya-nyāya logic and language, one cannot avoid bringing in Navya-nyāya ontology and epistemology—or so it seems to me. Viśveśvara, indeed, *uses* them deliberately for his own purposes; as my query, I hope, will show:

35. The *Tarka-kutūhala* has been published.

A distinction—which Viśveśvara makes at length and with great deliberation—is made between two major *alanākāras*, *upamā* ('simile', which depends on 'sādṛśya' or 'similarity' between two disparate things) and *rūpaka* ('metaphor', which leans on *abheda* or 'identity'). In Viśveśvara, as in all good Ālanākārikas, one is aware of the distinction at two different levels: the intuitive, or rather the aesthetic, and the structural or the linguistic, that is, the different words and expressions through which the two *alanākāras* are articulated. Viśveśvara, like other Ālanākārikas seeks meaningfully to combine the two levels in his exposition. The main focus is on capturing the unique 'feel', the individual evocative force of an *alanākāra*—its *vicchitti-viśeṣa* in Viśveśvara's own words—as different from others. In doing so, Viśveśvara, with his love of *Navya-nyāya*, devotes great attention to the logical analysis of the language used to express the two *alanākāras*. He grants, however, that language in poetry has an evocative power or *vyājanā*, not amenable to a straight-forward structural analysis, and that, structurally or grammatically, the same language that expresses a simile is also used to express an inane, quite *vicchitti*-less, similarity. The judgement of the *sahṛdaya*, therefore, must be kept in mind. Conceptual finesse lies in the skill with which this judgement itself can be articulated, especially in distinguishing *alanākāras* like *upamā* and *rūpaka* which, though distinct, are yet also felt to be close to each other (Viśveśvara describes 63 distinct *alanākāras*). The attempt, to take an example from another field, is like discriminating discursively between different *rāgas*, close in structure to each other.

What I have tried, briefly, to sketch above is to introduce the context of my queries and what Viśveśvara is intent upon, for it is my feeling that few, if any, of my readers even among those who are *Naiyāyikas*, would have heard of this evidently important thinker, who is better known to Ālanākārikas. I do not wish to expound Viśveśvara's thought here which, obviously, needs a lengthier and fuller deliberation.

Let me come now to my queries. They concern a concept used by Viśveśvara in distinguishing *rūpaka* from *upamā* the concept of *āharya-jñāna*. According to Ālanākārikas, what distinguishes *rūpaka*

(expressed in the standard example as, *mukham candraḥ*—'face-moon') from *upamā* (expressed as *candra iva mukham*—'moon-like face') is an overpowering sense of *abheda* (non-difference or identity). Both *upamā* and *rūpaka*, it is argued, share a sense of *sādṛśya*, similarity, between two disparate things, but in *rūpaka* this *sādṛśya* is pushed to the background and overpowered by *abheda*, the feeling that the two things are one and not separate, and this is what distinguishes *rūpaka* from *upamā*. 'Everyone agrees', Viśveśvara remarks at the end of his discussion of *rūpaka*, 'that the body of the *rūpaka* is formed through a *sādṛśya* (similarity) between two distinct things and is, thus, based on a sense of *bheda* (difference)—*bhedagarbhasādṛśya rūpakaśarīratvena sarva-sammataṭvād...*'. However, its soul, which marks it as *rūpaka* and distinct from *upamā*, lies in *abheda*. Viśveśvara expresses this in his formal 'definition' of *rūpaka*, embodied in a *kārikā*, which initiates his discussion of *rūpaka*. His 'definition' is as follows: '*rūpaka* is the *alanākāra* where there is *abheda* (non-difference) between that to which something is compared (this is the *upameya*; the *mukha* in our example), and the thing it is compared to (the *upamāna*; *candra* in our example)—*tadrūpakam tvabhedaḥ syādupamānopameyayoryatra*'. (see pp. 203-44 of the *Alanākāra-kaustubham*, with Viśveśvara's *Kārikās, Vṛtti and Vyākhyā*, reprinted by Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1987).

The peculiar feel or *bodha* of *abheda*, lying in a tension between similarity and identity, that marks a metaphor, had posed a kind of theoretical challenge to interested thinkers and many Ālanākārikas had tried to characterize the *bodha* through different conceptual moves. Viśveśvara summarises and discusses the more 'modern' of these moves which had by his time already begun to travel the pathways of *Navya-nyāya*.

The *Naiyāyikas* (meaning the *Navya-naiyāyikas*), he says, make use of the concept of *āharya-jñāna* in this context. *Āharya-jñāna* may be roughly translated as 'make-belief knowledge'. The dress an actor assumes in becoming someone he is not, is known as *āharya*, though I am not sure if this association—obvious to me—is also present in the *Naiyāyika*'s mind in using the word '*āharya*'. It does not seem so.

The Naiyāyika argues: when we utter a sentence such as, *mukham' candraḥ*, identifying the *mukha* with *candra*, there is a *bādha* or rather the knowledge of a *bādha*, a *bādha-jñāna*, an obstructive knowledge, which prevents the two words to be conjoined into a sentence. In *mukham' candraḥ* (very roughly, just to present the words, 'face-moon'), the togetherness of *mukha* and *candra* has a grammatical intent of producing a sense of *abheda* or identity between *mukha* and *candra*. But we know that the two are distinct things and cannot be identical. This *bādha-jñāna* comes in the way of even letting *mukham' candraḥ* become a meaningful sentence. How, then, do we actually take the expression as a *rūpaka*, despite the *bādha-jñāna*? It is here that *āhārya-jñāna* comes into play. It overrides the *bādha-jñāna*. *Āhārya-jñāna* functions through my *icchā*. When I have an *āhārya-jñāna*, I willingly, out of my own *icchā*, overcome *bādha-jñāna* and allow a knowledge to take place which would not have otherwise taken place. The standard example given here is, *vahninā siñcati*—wets with fire—an instance where *bādha-jñāna*, for the Naiyāyika, totally obstructs sense, since we know that fire cannot wet. Here, too, Viśveśvara says, *āhārya-jñāna* can, according to certain Naiyāyikas, function, allowing *vahninā siñcati* to make sense. This for the Naiyāyika is a really extreme example. Viśveśvara does not, however, specify, what kind of sense *vahninā siñcati* now makes. Is it a figure of speech? He does not say so. From what he says, it appears that *āhārya-jñāna* is granted the force of rendering the (for the Naiyāyika) nonsensical jumble of words that is *vahninā siñcati* into an ordinary meaningful sentence.

In Nyāya thinking it is necessary that a *yogyatā*, a 'fittingness' be there for two words to be related in a certain way in verbal knowledge, and *yogyatā* depends not upon grammar but upon the nature of the things being related. *Vahninā siñcati* lacks *yogyatā*, since fire cannot be instrumentally related to the act of wetting, and hence is absurd; it cannot give rise to any knowledge at all. Nyāya, I should think, can yet allow the possibility of sense here through more than one move, *lakṣaṇā* for example. The Ālaṅkārikas among the *Naiyāyikas* had chosen to bring in the concept of *āhārya-jñāna*. *Āhārya* works through my desire to have the knowledge. I

willingly grant *yogyatā* (and so it is called *āhārya-yogyatā*) where it is not otherwise there (allowing fire, in our example, an instrumentality it does not have, and conjoining *mukham'* with *candraḥ* with a relation of *abheda*).

This is an interesting move, but to my mind it gives rise to a number of queries.

(1) It appears to me that the concept of *āhārya-jñāna* itself has no conceptual *yogyatā* (if one might use such a term) to be allowed a place in the Nyāya scheme of things. Nyāya has a kind of essentialism which insists that *yogyatā* is given in the very nature of things and their relations; expressions which flout it cannot, in principle, give rise to *śābdabodha* or verbal knowledge. How, I wonder, can the concept of *āhārya-jñāna*, then, be at all accommodated in Nyāya? Also, there is the question of the relation between *icchā* and *jñāna*, a question interesting in itself; but taking the question in regard to Nyāya, I cannot see how *icchā* can be instrumental in *producing* knowledge, as it is in *āhārya-jñāna*? One can imagine 'desire for knowledge' (*jñāneccha*) in Nyāya but how can one think of 'knowledge produced through desire' (*icchā-janya-jñāna*)? *lakṣaṇā*, Nyāya allows, and *lakṣaṇā* can get rid of *bādha*. But *lakṣaṇā* has an associative logic of its own and functions as a means for removing quirks in language, arising out of usage. It is not *icchā*-produced, and thus not incongruous in Nyāya. But *lakṣaṇā*, some thought, might straighten out a wayward sentence, translating it into a 'correct' one. It cannot fully explain metaphor.

Viśveśvara reproduces a line of argument concerning the inadequacy of *lakṣaṇā* for *rūpaka*. The argument was that all *lakṣaṇā* can do in a case of metaphor such as *mukham' candraḥ* is to project similarity through association (*mukham'* is similar to *candra* for it shares the attributes of beauty, radiance, pleasingness and the like which *candra* has), and thus removing the *bādha* produced by the awareness that *mukha* is not *candra*, conjoin *mukham'* and *candraḥ* into a sentence. But then what we will have is a simile and not a metaphor. Because for metaphor a sense of *abheda* is essential, and it is for this reason that it becomes necessary to bring in *āhārya-jñāna*.

Another thing I remember in this context is that during the *saṃvāda*, which was later recorded in the book *Samvāda: A Dialogue Between Two Philosophical Traditions* (ICPR and Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1991), Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharyya had raised the question: how does the Naiyāyika understand the meaning of the sentence, *śabda nityaḥ*—‘sound is eternal’—since for him the sentence is as meaningless as *vahninā siñcati*? And if the Naiyāyika does not understand the sentence, how does he refute it (*Samvāda*, p. 151, etc.)? In his interesting answer Badrinath Shukla had used some intriguing concepts to explain the Naiyāyika’s comprehension of such sentences, but not the concept of *āhārya-jñāna*. The question is, could the concept have been used?

(2) This brings me to another puzzle. *Āhārya-jñāna*, it appears, is believed by Naiyāyikas to be possible only in *pratyakṣa*, ‘direct perception’. (This may have been why Badrinathji did not use it). But such a notion seems even more incongruous in the Nyāya scheme than the notion of *āhārya-jñāna* itself. Illusions are another matter; they are not the willful seeing of one thing as quite another. And illusion disappears when the thing is perceived for what it is. *Āhārya-jñāna*, on the contrary, comes into operation upon seeing things as they are and then moving into a world of imagination. The question, however, is how can *pratyakṣa* in Nyāya accommodate *āhārya*?

It seems, though, from what I have understood from the *Nyāyakośa* of Bhīmācārya Jhalkīkar (see under *āhārya*) that *āhārya* could not only mean a kind of willing perception but it could also be somewhat similar to *bhrama* or illusion. It was seeing something with an attribute the ‘opposite’, so to say, of what it actually had (*svavirodhi-dharma-dharmitāvācchedam svaprakāramam jñānam*). For example, seeing a mountain with fire as without fire. Such ‘seeing’, or such *āhārya-jñāna*, has not been characterized by Jhalkīkar as a ‘willing knowledge’, as Viśveśvara clearly characterizes the *āhārya* that he speaks of (*‘satyapy ukta bādha-jñāne mukhatvāvācchinnaviśeṣyatāka abhedasaṃsargaka candratvāvācchinna prakāraḥ bodho jāyatāmīti योग्यातज्ञानम् sambhavatyeva, icchadhina-jñāne bādhabuddherapratibandhakatvāt*, op. cit., *Vyākhyā*,

p. 207, where the *Vṛtti*, explained in the *Vyākhyā* here, takes up *āhārya-jñāna*, calling it a Naiyāyika’s concept). Jhalkīkar notes other examples of similar *bhrama-like āhāryas* which appear to be different kinds of the same species. These are not imbued with the spirit of a conceptual reaching out towards the world of imagination, which Viśveśvara’s *āhārya* has, and, moreover, one cannot help wondering why they should not be included under *bhrama*? Why form a new category? The Ālaṅkārikas among the Naiyāyikas, who brought in *āhārya*, had, evidently, felt that they needed a concept which was distinct from *bhrama* if one were to properly comprehend metaphor. Still, one is bound to ask how the concept was made to fit into Nyāya, if at all. Or, how can a Naiyāyika do so within the system, even though it may not have been done earlier.

(3) Intriguingly, the *bhrama-like āhārya* and the *icchā* produced *āhārya* have both been made to share a strange property. They are both limited to *pratyakṣa*. But metaphors are expressed in language, and should be a species of *śābdabodha*, how, then, can an *āhārya* which is confined to *pratyakṣa* be meaningful in explaining them? One would think that *āhārya* belongs to the field of *parokṣa*. It is a concept meant to articulate fiction, and some Naiyāyikas, it appears—though not Viśveśvara—had extended it to *śābdabodha*. On what grounds, I do not know. In *pratyakṣa*, too, one can, I think, imagine instances of *āhārya-jñāna*. Theatre comes immediately to mind. Besides, there are games where one willingly assumes one thing to be another: a chair could be monster ‘who’ will eat you if you sit on it...Such a thing is done even in explaining lay-outs: a glass on the table can become a house from which another glass, the house we want to reach, is shown to be lying at such a distance, in such a direction. And so on. But Naiyāyikas, even if they be Ālaṅkārikas, do not seem to have such examples in mind, so far as I know. They do not extend the scope of *āhārya* beyond metaphor into a realm of *āhārya* worlds in general. Is this merely accidental or is there something in the grain of Nyāya which goes against it?

(4) But can *āhārya* not be extended to ‘virtual’ worlds in general, even to theoretical models and theory-making? Can we, in fact, not talk of *āhārya* worlds of different kinds? Let us make some Nyāya-like



argumentative moves—and probe at possible *vyāptis* and *vyāvṛttis* in order to see how far we can extend the concept of *āhārya*. (Such moves may not be exactly Nyāya-like, where the usual move is the other way round: to intuitively assume a field and define it through *lakṣaṇā*, examining it for *avyāptis* and *ativyāptis*, and modifying it for a better fit, but they are, I think, quite in the same spirit.) Taking metaphor as the basic (*mūrdhanya*) example, the *vyāpti*, I feel, can be extended without difficulty to the world of fiction, theatre, games, and the like. But let us take a possible *vyāvṛtti*. Is the world of dream, for example, an *āhārya* world? The *vyāvṛtti* here lies in the fact that *icchā* does not play a 'voluntary' role in producing the *jñāna*, the awareness, of a dream. I say, 'voluntary role', purposely, because *icchā* can be argued to produce dream in a deep and latent sense, *icchā* functioning as *vāsanā*, as some would put it. But even if we grant that *icchā* causes dream in some such sense, this, clearly, cannot be a function of *āhārya-jñāna*, because there is no *willing* suspension of *bādha* here. There is indeed no *bādha* even, which needs to be removed; *bādha* might arise later on waking up, but that is another matter. But what about daydreaming? The world of day-dreaming is a willingly created world; it is a world of the fulfillment of *icchā* and we enter it through *icchā*, willfully pushing the real aside. Take the man in the famous story who found ajar (a philosopher's *ghaṭa*), and began weaving a wish-fulfilling dream: the jar, he imagined, will buy him a hen, its eggs will fetch money to buy more hens; he will become rich and marry a lovely wife; and when she disobeys him give her a lusty kick, like this. Here the story takes an ironical turn. The *ghaṭa* breaks into pieces with the sweep of his leg, and the dream comes to an unwished-for end; but the question is, can we consider such a dream as an instance of *āhārya-jñāna*? Or does it lie outside the area covered by the concept? Or, rather, does it really, as it might also seem, lie on the periphery of *āhārya*? How should one place it?

Let us take a different and a more serious instance, from truth rather than imagination. What about scientific hypotheses? Or even 'established' scientific theories. Are they not cases of *āhārya-jñāna*? In conceiving a hypothesis, I enter into a virtual world, a world of imagination, which

though concerned with truth is not actually true. One might here argue that such a world is not really one of make-belief, and is conceived as possibly true; the *bādha* here, thus, is itself a virtual, or provisional *bādha*, and not an actual one. But then one would have to modify the *lakṣaṇā* or characterization of *āhārya-jñāna* we have set out with, and a good Naiyāyika will do this, if he feels that the objection is well-taken. (The question, of course, can arise that in comprehending metaphor, too, can we really speak of a *bādha*, or is it that the Naiyāyika feels so because he takes a certain sense-perceived world to be given and true? But let us not raise this question here). Yet, supposing we modify our *lakṣaṇā*, we can, may be, move to divide *bādha* itself into two distinct kinds, (1) actual and (2) virtual or possible. The problem, then would be to understand the concept of a possible or virtual *bādha*. Can such a *bādha* really be a *bādha*? But let us make a further move in what we had been saying earlier. A scientific hypothesis is just a step towards a scientific theory. But if the theory, according to a well-known principle, is to be considered essentially falsifiable, then is the *bādha* not built into the very fabric of the scientific conception of truth? Why should we not consider scientific knowledge *āhārya-jñāna*? A scientific theory, one might object, is plainly different from a metaphor. But why should the concept be limited to metaphor and not extended to scientific theories—or the world of theories in general—if this can be done without a proper and valid *bādha*? For if there is a *vyāvṛtti* here, it has to be shown. The concept of *abhyupagama* in Nyāya seems to me to come close to the making, or at least the consideration of hypotheses, why should the knowledge of *abhyupagama* not be *āhārya-jñāna*? *Siddhānta* in Nyāya, however, seems to have been made immune to *āhārya*. But is it really so? For a non-Naiyāyika, for example.

But let me also try and take up what appear to me as some *avyāptis*, which the *lakṣaṇā* of *āhārya* as the knowledge of imaginary worlds should, ideally, include but does not. *Āhārya* assumes the privileged knowledge of a 'real' world, which creates a *bādha* when we wish to enter a world of imagination; and we must willingly suspend or override the *bādha* if we wish to do so. What about music then, the pure music of *rāgas*, or pure dance, *nṛtta*, or abstract painting or even pure design? These appear to be

worlds created through imagination, yet can we speak of *āhārya-jōana* here? If so where is the *bādha* projected by the knowledge of a real world? We just slip into these worlds of the imagination, without anything obstructing us. Perhaps we can speak of an *icchā* here, but on what grounds can we speak of a *bādha*? And if there is no *bādha*, can we speak of the knowledge (which is a willing, absorbed awareness) of these worlds as *āhārya*? But why limit ourselves to the arts, granted generally to be realms of imagination. What about some realms of thought: mathematics and logic, for example. Can we not place them in the arena of the *āhārya*? But mathematics, it may be argued, is certainly different from music in the sense that mathematics can apply to reality. But what about those areas of mathematics which have no such application? Would they be *bādhitā* and need *āhārya-jñāna* for us to be able to enter them? These pure worlds of the arts and of thought have each a sense of *yogyatā* or appropriateness of their own. Hence we can speak of *bādha* within them. Is this *bādha* in any sense analogous to the *bādha* arising in the Naiyāyika's *āhārya*? If so, can we suspend or override it through an analogous *āhārya*? It does not seem so, and so it would appear that *āhārya* functioning through an *icchā*-created *āhārya-yogyatā* is out of bounds here.

What I have said may have strayed and meandered, somewhat frivolously, perhaps, at places, but I feel it has not strayed away from the questioning and argumentative spirit of Navya-nyāya. I hope it will elicit response, making clarifications and perhaps even stringent or dismissive counter-arguments, that will help in making the concept more transparent. Hopefully, there may even be sympathetic responses, carrying the line of thought into more meaningful directions. I found the concept of *āhārya-jñāna* exciting. Hence this note.

Vol. XIII, No. 1

Mukund Lath

### Reply 1

The question 'whether deliberate falsehood in cognition can have a place in the Navya-Nyāya scheme of things or epistemology', raised by Lath is interesting but not one which has not been raised and answered

(affirmatively) by Nyāya authors. Lath need not have been at pains to search out possible instances—from different fields—of *āhārya* cognitions. Such instances are just at hand. The jaundiced person seeing the conch before him as yellow, knowing fully well that it is nothing but white, is an oft-quoted example of false cognitions known as false by the knower. Another familiar example of such a cognition is 'a man seeing the moon as double by pressing his eye-ball'. Before answering Lath's question I would like, to point out that a slightly similar question has been raised by Gangeśa himself about inferential cognition. I quote here Gangeśa's remarks on this point as they occur in the *Pakṣatā* section of his *Tattvaciptāināni*. The remark is this 'प्रत्यक्ष दृष्टमप्यर्थ अनुमाने बुभुत्सन्नेतर्करासिको'. This means that, although ordinarily doubt about the presence of the major in the minor is necessary for the inference of the former, yet if there is strong desire to infer the perceived major in the minor, then even the absence of the said doubt does not obstruct the occurrence of the inference of the major. Perceptual certainty about the presence of the major in the minor is certainly preventive of the inference of the major but the desire for the inference tilts the balance in favour of the inference and thus the inference emerges despite perceptual knowledge being already there.

Turning now to metaphorical cognition and other similar cognitions, it may be pointed out that there is nothing unreasonable if it is maintained that a person can have the cognition which he knows to be false. Doesn't a debater seek to defend a view just to defeat his opponent when he is fully aware that the view being defended is false? Not only this, when a person refutes a certain view, hasn't he to take full cognizance of the view refuted? It is quite natural, for example, for a jaundiced person to assert, 'I see the conch as yellow but I know that it is white'. All deliberate falsehoods are more or less of this type. When the contradictory cognition is present, the contradicted cognition cannot be prevented even from emerging into being. The contradiction itself involves reference to the contradicted cognition. The only difference in the occurrence of the contradicted cognition from the same uncontradicted cognition is that there

is present in the former case introspective awareness of the contradictory character of the contradicted cognition in the mind of the cogniser. The presence of desire for the occurrence of the contradicted cognition tilts the balance in its favour by weakening, so to say, the contradictory force of the contradicting cognition. The causal collocation productive of the contradicted cognition is strengthened by the addition of desire and thus despite contradiction the contradicted cognition does arise. There is nothing unreasonable in this view. Lath has quoted S.J.B.'s query to late B.N. Shukla regarding the possibility of the occurrence of verbal cognition—शब्दबोध—from the incompetent sentence 'he irrigates with fire'. I do not know what answer Shuklaji gave to S.J.B.'s query. The right answer to the query—which is very simple—is that when the sentence is known to lack competence it is not that no verbal cognition is yielded by the sentence. The false cognition arising from the sentence is introspectively cognized (अनु व्यवसाय विषय) as false by the cogniser. Thus the false cognition becomes an epistemic qualificand in the introspective cognition 'That he irrigates with fire' is a falsehood'. Of course, the cogniser is inwardly aware of the falsehood but poses as if he does not believe in the falsehood. In all deceptions the introspective awareness that what one is saying or communicating is false is always present in the mind of the deceiver.

A significant question may be asked here. Granted that the deceiver is aware of the falsehood of a cognition does he have the (original) cognition or not? If he has, what is the status of this (object) cognition? Does the person denying the statement, 'one irrigates with fire', first have the cognition that 'one irrigates with fire' and then deny it? If he has, what is the nature of this cognition? The answer to the question is simple. In the backdrop of a contradictory cognition the emergence of the contradicted contradiction is only in the capacity of an epistemic qualificand of 'falsehood' as inwardly apprehended. Where a person makes the remark—to deceive another—that 'plants are being irrigated with fire' what he intends his listener to understand is that 'his (listener's) cognition that fire irrigates' is true (although he himself knows it to be false). The

listener's false cognition of irrigation with fire is presupposed by the deceiver when he makes the deceptive remark.

The *āhārya* cognition is not ordinary illusion. There are illusions and illusions. Nyāya does not enumerate all the different types of false cognitions or illusions. All these are subsumed by Nyāya under the general category विपर्यय. Vedānta calls it अध्यास (which is quite different from 'ordinary illusion').

One question does yet remain to be answered. The question is this: 'How does the imaginative falsehood practised in metaphor yield pleasure or joy when it is known that it is nothing but falsehood?' Nyāya's answer to the question—which is quite different from the poeticians' and also not quite satisfactory—is, that often deliberate self-deception is more pleasurable than other-deception. It is a kind of creative activity by means of which one seeks as it were to defy reality which is felt as restrictive of one's cognitive freedom. Phantasizing is a kind of recreation to which one takes recourse when one is bored with the stark reality of the external world.

The *āhārya* cognition that the face is the moon is not inferential. So the well-known Nyāya explanation that even perceived objects can be inferentially known if there is a strong desire for inference, cannot be applied straightaway to the said cognition. The cognition is perceptual and it is supposed to take place in defiance of the contradictory perception that the face is different from the moon. The desire or predisposition to perceive the face as identical with the moon is *āhārya* cognition as a result of which the contradictory force of the difference-perception is vitiated. But since the contradictory perception is not dissipated, the *āhārya* cognition that emerges in succession to the latter is of the nature of *mental perception* (मानस प्रत्यक्ष as Nyāya calls it). It is therefore almost similar to the internal perception of one's own pleasure, pain, etc. Thus the contradictory perception is visual while the *āhārya* perception is mental. The explanation based on introspective awareness of falsehood applies to other cases of *āhārya* cognitions mentioned above which need to be distinguished from the *rūpaka* cognition. There are different types of

*āhārya* cognition having different causes like *vāsanā*, desire, predisposition, disability of sense-organs, strong prejudices, and so on.

The sum and substance of the points discussed above along with a few more points may be put down as follows;

(1) The *āhārya* cognition is quite different from the illusory cognition although both are false cognitions. Because of this difference in nature of the *āhārya* cognition Śaṅkara calls it *adhyāśa* and illustrates it with the help of the cognition of the double moon that a person may have by pressing his eyeball even while knowing that there is only one moon.

(2) The said cognition is sometimes inferential but it is usually perceptual. It is not always caused by the desire to have it for oneself although the desire to deceive or may cause it. If the cognition is meant for oneself it occurs as the qualificand of 'invalidity' and has the form, for example, 'That plants are irrigated with fire is a falsehood.' To mislead a credulous person one may however make the blatantly false statement that 'plants are irrigated with fire'.

(3) The reflective or introspective invites future awareness of the *āhārya* cognition as the epistemic qualificand of falsehood that one may have, is mental (called मानस प्रत्यक्ष in Sanskrit) but its character of privacy is unlike the privacy characterizing mental states like pleasure, pain, etc.

(4) As stated above the *āhārya* cognition is usually perceptual overriding another perceptual cognition which contradicts it. The presence of passion, obsession, desire, etc. in the causal collocation of the *āhārya* cognition helps it to weaken the causal collocation of the contradicting cognition. But such weakening of the causal collocation of the contradicting cognition (happens in the case of other kinds of cognition too). What happens is that the contradicting cognition is followed in the second moment of its occurrence by the emergence of the contradicted cognition as its causal collocation is reinforced by the induction of *āsanā*, passion, make-believe, etc. Thus, in the case of the *āhārya* cognition we have one kind of perception prevailing upon or overriding another kind of perception itself. If the contradicting perception disappears due to time-lapse the

residual impression left behind by it persists till the contradicted cognition comes into being.

(5) The admission of *āhārya* cognition raises the question of why the same entity is not cognized again and again by cognitions similar to each other if one desires to have such cognitions. (Novelty is not—according to Nyāya—a characteristic feature of a valid cognition). However, the possibility of monotonous types of cognition pertaining to the same entity may be called into question even by Nyāya.

(6) Another question that the *āhārya* cognition may give rise to is that Nyāya's admission of this cognition may force it to admit tautological cognitions too, provided there is a strong desire to have them. The question may have two answers. One, Nyāya can deny that any sensible person does or will ever have such a desire to know where there is nothing to know in the tautology. Two, the tautology may be desired to have propositional or even factual character. In a proposition there have to be both a subject and a predicate. The subject must be endowed with subjecthood and the predicate with predicatehood. The predicate cannot be contained into the subject. The subject is the determinandum and the predicate the determinant. How can one and the same thing play both these roles? Of course, a thing can be known or sensed indeterminately but then such a sensing cannot have the form of tautology.

(7) The *āhārya* cognition may be viewed even by Nyāya as an emotive content masquerading as determinate cognition. This is why it is sometimes described or called 'wishful thinking' which—as per Nyāya view—means wish assuming the form of thinking. Thus it may be treated as a peculiar type of illusion. Here there are two illusions involved, viz, the illusion of wish parading as thinking and the illusion of the wished object as the object of thought or knowledge.

(8) From the above discussion it becomes quite obvious that Nyāya cannot go all the way with poetics in its explanation of *Rūpaka*. There is however a mode of interpretation of *Rūpaka* which, without infringing Nyāya doctrines can maintain the validity of *āhārya* cognition. In the stock example of *Rūpaka*, viz. 'The face is the moon' the word 'moon' may be

taken to mean (or suggest) by means of 'laksana' a majority of characteristics of the moon. Then the sentence can bear the interpretation that the face is endowed with almost all the characteristics of the moon. Simile may now be distinguished from *Rūpaka* quite easily. If only a few characteristics are common to two things then they may be described only as alike and not as identical with each other.

Vol. XIII, No.2

N.S.Drauid

### The Concept of *Āhāryajñāna* in Navya-Nyāya: Some Reflections

A few interesting philosophical problems have been raised by Professor Lath in connection with the concept of *āhāryajñāna* in Navya-Nyāya (*JICPR* Vol. XIII, No.1). As the problems are very much cogent, interesting and thought-provoking, an effort has been made to illuminate these logically from the purview of Navya-Nyāya.

A problem of how one can think of 'knowledge produced through desire' (*icchājanyajñāna*) has been raised (p.174). A solution to this problem may be offered in the following way. Let us look towards the exact nature of *āhāryajñāna*. The knowledge which is produced out of one's own desire at the time when there is the contradictory knowledge is called *āhāryajñāna*. (*Virodhijñāna-kālinecchāprayojyajñānatvam āhāryajñānatvam* or *Vādhakālinecchājanyam jñānam*).<sup>i</sup> The word *āhārya* means 'artificial', which is found in the *Bhāṭṭikāvya* where the ladies are described as *āhāryasobhārahaitairamāyāḥ*<sup>ii</sup> (that is, free from artificial beauty). From this, it follows that the word *anāhārya* means 'natural' which is expressed by the term 'amāyāḥ'. When we talk of *āhārya*-knowledge, it has to be taken as an artificial knowledge on account of the fact that between two objects an object is *deliberately* thought as otherwise in spite of knowing the distinct character or real nature of these two objects. In these cases one's desire of thinking an object as otherwise acts as an instrument (*icchājanya*). It is to be borne in mind that the Navya Naiyāyikas have given much importance on *vivakṣā* (that is, will to say). Let us put forth some cases where we find a knowledge produced through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanyajñāna*). One is allowed to say *sthāli*

*pacati* (he cooks with clay-pot) with the nominative case-ending to the pot instead of the correct expression '*sthālyā pacati*', with the instrumental case-ending with the word *sthāli* if one so desires.

Apart from these there are a few cases where we find knowledge attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) as in the case of *paṅṣatā*. If someone bears a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayaṣā*), he can infer in spite of having *siddhi*. ('siṣādhayaṣāsattve numitirbhavatyeva'<sup>iii</sup>). It is permissible as the Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of *pramāṇasamplava* (that is, capability of applying various *pramāṇas*) to ascertain an object. According to this theory, 'fire' which is perceived can be inferred if someone so desires. That a cloth is completely different from a jar is completely known from the perception and hence there is not at all any necessity to infer a cloth as distinct from a jar. In spite of this one is found to infer: 'It (that is, a cloth) is endowed with the mutual absence of a jar, as it has got clothness' (*ghaṭānyonyābhāvavān paṭatvāt*). All these cases are supportable as an individual desires to do so and hence the role of *icchājanyatva* in the attainment of knowledge cannot be denied. But it should be clearly borne in mind that all *icchājanya*-inferences or knowledges-are not *āhārya*. The *icchājanya-jñāna* as found in the case of *rūpaka* and *tarka* are the instances of *āhāryajñāna*. From the above mentioned cases it is proved that desire may act as the instrument of knowledge which is called *icchājanyajñāna*.

Another problem has been raised how the concept of *āhāryajñāna* can be accommodated in Nyāya as the sentence conveying such cognition has no *yogyatā* (p. 176). It may seem strange to us as to why such artificial nature of knowledge is at all essential in the context of nyāya. Though there is no direct result of the deliberation of such artificial knowledge due to not having semantic competency (*yogyatā*), it plays a great role in pointing out the exact nature of an object *indirectly*.

The importance of accepting *āhāryajñāna* can be realized easily if we ponder over the importance of *tarka* as a philosophical method. *Tarka* is nothing but an *āhāryajñāna*, which is evidenced from the definition given in the *Nīlakanthaprakāśika* on *Dīpikā* "Āhāryavyāpyavattābhramajanya

āhāryavyāpakavattābhramastarkah<sup>iv</sup>. That is, *tarka* is an imposed (*āhārya*) erroneous cognition of the existence of a pervader (*vyāpaka*) which is produced by another imposed erroneous cognition of the existence of a *vyāpya*. If the knowledge in the form-There is fire in the lake' (*hradovahnimān*) is produced out of one's desire at the time where there is the awareness of the contradictory knowledge in the form-'there is the absence of fire in the lake' (*hrado vahnnyabhāvavān*), it is called *āhārya*. In this case erroneous cognition is deliberate which is not found in ordinary illusion.

The main purpose of accepting *āhāryajñāna* is to ascertain the true nature of an object (*viśayapariśodhaka*) and to remove the doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśamkānivartaka*). The *āhāryajñāna* existing in the former type-'If it has no fire, it has no smoke' (*Yadyaṁ vahnimaṅ na syāt tadā dhūmavān na syāt*) ascertains the existence of fire in a particular locus. In the same way, the Navy Naiyāyikas have accepted another form of *tarka* which is also *āhārya* in order to eliminate one's doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśamkā*). If someone bears a doubt whether smoke and fire have an invariable relation or not, this doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśamkā*) can be dispelled by demonstrating the *āhārya*-knowledge in the form: 'If smoke be deviated from fire, it will not be caused by fire'. (*dhūmo yadi vahnivyabhicārī syāt tarhi vahnijanyo na syāt*). From this it is indirectly proved that as smoke is caused by fire, it will not be deviated from fire.'

By virtue of being *āhārya* both the parts-the ground (*āpādaka*) and consequent (*āpādya*) are imaginary or hypothetical. If the first part is true, the second part would become automatically true. But it is a well known fact that the second part is not true in so far as we do not get any smoke which is not caused by fire. So, the doubt as to the deviation of fire with smoke can be removed by applying the *tarka* in the form of *āhārya*. It, being a kind of mental construction, is useful for removing doubt and hence it becomes promoter to *pramāṇas*. This *āhārya* cognition is otherwise called *aniṣṭāpatti* or *aniṣṭaprasaṅga*, that is, introduction of the undesired through which the desired one is established. This imposition of the undesired is of two types: the rejection of the established fact and the

acceptance of the non-established object (*Syādanīṣṭam dvidvidham smṛtam prāmāṇikaparityāgasthetaraparigrahaḥ*). If there is an *āhāryajñāna* in the form-'water cannot quench thirst', there would arise an objection-'If it is so, no thirsty people should drink water'. It is known from our experience that water is capable of quenching thirst, which is denied here and hence it comes under the first type of *aniṣṭa*.

If it is said that water causes burning, there would arise objection in the form-'If it is so, the drinking of water would cause a burning sensation.' The burning sensation from water is not an established fact, which is admitted here and hence it belongs to the second type of *aniṣṭa*. We often take recourse to *āhāryajñāna* even in our day-to-day debate. If an opponent says to a Naiyāyika that self is non-eternal (*anitya*), he may first agree with what the opponent says in the following manner-'O.K., initially I agree with you that self is non-eternal'. This agreement for the time being is *āhārya* and the next step in the form-'If self were non-eternal in nature, there would not have been the enjoyment of *karma*, rebirth or liberation due to the destruction of the self' is also *āhārya* which indirectly points to the eternity of self. In the same way, various expressions like 'If I were a bird, I would have flown from one place to another, if you were a firmament, I would have stretched my wings like a crane' (which reminds me of a Bengali song- *Tumi ākāś yadi hate āmi balākār mato pākhā meltām*) can be included under- *āhāryajñāna*.

The accommodation of *āhāryajñāna* in Navya Nyāya is primarily to promote an indirect method through which truth is ascertained. In the indirect proof in symbolic logic the negation of the conclusion is deliberately taken which is also an *āhārya* and from this it is shown that, if this is taken as a conclusion, it will lead to some contradiction or absurdity. If the negation of P which is originally a conclusion is taken as a conclusion of *āhārya*-type and proved it as contradictory or absurd, it will automatically follow that the original conclusion, that is P (*ānāhārya*) is true. This method is also called the method of proof by *reductio and absurdum*.<sup>v</sup>

In metaphorical expressions such *āhāryajñāna* bears a completely different import. *Rūpaka* remains in the representation of the subject of description which is not concealed, as identified with another well known standard (*rūpakam rūpitāropād viṣaye nirapahnave*).<sup>vii</sup> In the famous case of *rūpaka-mukhacandra* the *upameya* is 'face' which is identified with 'moon'. In this case, the distinction between these is not concealed in spite of having excessive similarity. Though the difference between them is not concealed yet there is the ascription of the identification between two objects (*atisāmyāt anapahnutabhedayoḥ upamānopameyayoḥ abhedāropah*). In spite of knowing the distinction between *upamāna* and *upameya*, there is the hypothetical ascription of identity deliberately which is also an *āhārya*.<sup>viii</sup>

From the above discussions, it is known to us that the accommodation of the *āhāryajñāna* presupposes some intention of an individual. In the case of metaphor, *āhāryatva* is taken recourse to in order to show the extreme similarities between two objects. In the same way, *āhāryajñāna* is accepted by the logicians to ascertain the real nature of an object indirectly. Hence *āhāryajñāna* can be utilized as an accessory to a *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇānugrāhakarūpeṇa*). Though the semantic competency (*yogyatā*), the criterion of the meaningfulness of a sentence, is not found in the sentences conveying *āhāryajñāna*, meaning of such sentences is easily understood by others. Had these been not understood at all, the absence of *yogyatā* cannot also be known. Moreover, as there is semantic incompetency, a search for other indirect or secondary meaning is permissible. As there is the absence of *yogyatā* in the expressions like *mukhacandra* and 'If I were a bird, I would have flown' etc., a thorough search for indirect meanings like extreme similarity (*atisāmya*) between face and moon, the absurdity of describing a man as bird, etc. have to be ascertained. It is to be kept in mind that the semantic competency is essential only in the case of direct meaning (*śakyārtha*) but not in implicative or suggestive meaning (*lakṣyārtha* or *vyaṅgyārtha*). In fact, an implicative or suggestive meaning is looked for if there is the incompetency among the words (*mukhyārthavādhe*). Hence the semantic incompetency

paves way to the indirect meaning as found in the expressions like 'I am building castles in the air' etc. Following the same line it can be said that *āhāryajñāna* can communicate something to us indirectly in spite of not having the said competency.

Professor Lath further adds: can we speak of *āhāryajñāna* existing in the pure music of *rāgas*, pure dance or abstract paintings that are new worlds created through imagination? In response to this, the following suggestions can be made. Though *āhāryajñāna* is a product of imagination, all imaginations cannot be taken as *āhāryajñāna*. The imaginary ideas as found in the fanciful stories or fairy tales, etc., are not *āhārya*. Some imagination is created out of one's own will (*icchāprayojya*) at the time when one is conscious of the contradictory knowledge (*virodhijñānakālīna*). In spite of being conscious of the fact that fire cannot stay in the lake, we imagine that the lake has fire out of our strong will. It is the case of *āhārya* as already mentioned. In the case of pure music, dance and abstract paintings, we are not aware of the contradictory knowledge (*virodhijñāna*) through which the imaginary states are sublated (*vādhita*). Though these are the cases of imagination having the characteristic of *icchāprayajyatva*, or *icchājanyatva*, they are not *āhāryajñāna* due to the lack of the other characteristic, that is, *virodhijñānakalīnatva* or *vādhakālīnatva*. In the case of *āhāryajñāna* both the characteristic should be taken as adjuncts of imaginations. An imaginary cognition associated with *icchāprayojyatva* or *icchājanyatva* and *virodhijñānakalīnatva* is called *āhārya*. Due to the absence of the second characteristic the charge of *avyāpti* of the definition of *āhāryajñāna* to the pure music, etc., does not stand on logic.

(I am very grateful to Professor Hemanta Kumar Ganguly, retired Professor of Sanskrit, Jadavpur University and Dr( Mrs.) Nandita Bandyopadhyaya, Reader in Sanskrit, Jadavpur University, Calcutta, for their kind help and encouragement while writing this paper.)

#### Notes and Reference

<sup>i</sup> *Nyāyakoṣa Mahāmahopadhyāya* Bhimācārya. Jhalkikar (ed.), Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, 1928, p. 136.

<sup>ii</sup> *Bhaṭṭikāvya* 2/14.

<sup>iii</sup> *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse no.70.

<sup>iv</sup> *Nilakanthaprakāśikā* on *Dīpikā* on *Tarkasamgraha*, p. 376. edited by Satkari Sharma Bangiya, with seven commentaries, Chowkhamba, 1976.

<sup>v</sup> *Tattvacinātamanī* (Anumānakhaṇḍa), Gaṅgeśa, Vyāptigrahopāyāḥ chapter

<sup>vi</sup> *Symbolic Logic* (4<sup>th</sup> ed.), Irving M.Copi, Macmillan, London, 1973, p. 53.

<sup>vii</sup> *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Chapter X, edited by Haridās Siddhāntavagīśa, p. 620. 1875 (B.5).

<sup>viii</sup> *Kusumapratimā* on *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Chapter X, edited by Haridās Siddhāntavagīśa, 1875 (B.S.), p. 621.

Vol XV, No.1

Raghunath Ghosh

### *Dhvani* and *Vyanjana*

1. What is the difference, if any, between the notion of *dhvani* and that of *vyanjanā*? In case there is none what is the novelty in Anandavardhan's doctrine of *dhvani*? In case there is any difference, what is it?

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Daya Krishna

### Reply 1

Anandavardhana does not claim that he is discussing the theory of *Dhvani* for the first time, and he talks of this theory as a well-known principle. In fact in the very first *Kārika* of his *Dhvanyāloka* he explicitly says that the principle of *Dhvani* is already a well-known theory in scholarly circles.

In *Sahityasastra* the word *Dhvani* is used in different contexts to denote five meanings which are (i) the suggestive word, (ii) the suggestive meaning, (iii) the meaning suggested, (iv) the process of poetic suggestion, and (v) the poem where this process materialises. *Dhvani* therefore has a wider connotation in the field of *Kāvya*.

The credit for establishing *Dhvani* theory could be given to Anandavardhana owing to the fact that no other earlier work is available on *Dhvani*-theory in *Kāvya* and also owing to the fact that he was the first *Acharya* to have discussed the implications of *Vyanjanā* in *Kāvya* at such an extensive level.

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Radhavallabh Tripathi

### Reply 2

There are similar terms like *Dhavanana*, *Dyotana*, *Vyanjanā Pratyayana*, *Āvāgamana* and *Prakṣānā* to express the fourth power function (distinct from the three—*abhidha*, *tātparya* and *lakṣanā*), *Vyanjanā Vyāpara*. However, a mere presence of *Vyāgyasamsparaśa* (suggestion) does not constitute *Dhvani*. What constitutes *dhvani* is that *Vyāgya* which is also exclusively important in relation to other elements of beauty in the poem and ideal poetry itself can be none other than *Dhvani*. In fact *Dhvani* is the name of the whole poetic process. It is the basic principle of poetic creation.

It is Anandavardhana's contention that only the *dhvani* theory can adequately explain all the facts of the poetic process to the satisfaction of the creative poet on the one hand and the appreciative critic on the other. He succeeded not only in laying his finger on *rasa* as the soul of Poetry but also in offering an explanation of it in terms of *dhvani*. Although *Dhvani* is the quintessence of poetry, and *rasa* is the quintessence of *dhvani*. *Dhvani* is an exclusively poetic feature concerned with exploiting the beauty of every element in the medium of language like *alamikāra*, *guṇa* and *rīti* to serve the ultimate artistic end of *rasa*.

In verse 13 of *uddyota* 1, Anandavardhana defines *dhvani* that the suggested sense must be dominant over the expressed sense (*vachyartha*) in order that the piece of composition be the proper locus of *dhvani*. The term *dhvani*, therefore, is applicable not only to *vyāgārtha* or the deliberate use of *vyanjanā vyāpara*, but also to all the constituent factors of suggestion of poetry. He further says that not only suggestive meanings and suggestive expressions can serve the purpose of *Kāvya* but the art of arrangement, the effective employment of them flashes suddenly across the truth-perceiving mind of perceptive critics.

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Dharmanand

### Reply 3

*Dhvani* and *Vyanjanā* are not the same. The difference between the two can be explained by invoking the idea of 'sphota' or the meaning of a word in the mind of the listener. The listener apprehends the *Dhvani* uttered



by the speaker in the form of a word and understands its meaning (direct or implied) through 'sphota' of the samē.

*Vyanjanā* is a style of expression of ideas through implication. Ānandāvardhana was the first to introduce the notion of *Vyanjanā*.  
Vol. XVIII, No.2 Vinod Kumari

### Vākyapadiya

'Has there been a tradition of philosophizing initiated by *Vākyapadiya* or it has been an isolated work accepted as outstanding by everybody but not followed by anybody?'

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Daya Krishana

### Reply

*Vyākaraṇa* is one among six *Vedāṅgas* namely: 1. *Śikṣa* (the science of proper articulation and pronunciation), 2. *Chanda* (the science of prosody), 3. *Vyākaraṇa* (grammar and philosophy of language), 4. *Nirukta* (etymological explanation of difficult vedic words), 5. *Jyotiṣa* (astronomy), 6. *Kalpa* (the science of ritual or ceremonial matters). (See, *pradhānam ca saṭ svaṅgeṣu vyākaraṇam*, *Harivṛtti* on Vp. 1/11.)

*Vyākaraṇa* belongs to the tradition of *Veda*. It can be said that the vedic spiritual thinking is promoted against the hedonistic way of life prevailing in vedic time and the language and grammar flourished as means to enrich the spiritualism. Philosophy of language and grammar, as a respected discipline, is a result of reflections on the content of language and grammar for clarification, conception and wisdom and flourished as '*sarva veda pariśadam*' in the tradition to which *Bhartṛhari* belongs.

The vedic thinking on language and grammar was developed, basically, in two separate ways by Pāṇini and by Vyāḍi. Pāṇini first of all formulated the rules regarding formation, categorization designation, definition and abstraction of the words, their meanings and the relation between them. He on the whole provided us an interpretation of *Vaikhari-speech* (the sanskrta language-tokens we use for speaking, reading and writing) without missing the philosophical influence he derived from the tradition. Vyāḍi, a

contemporary to Pāṇini, propounded the philosophical aspect of the language and grammar in his *San̄graha* which is not available but the verses of which are frequently quoted by Mahābhāṣyakāra Patañjali and Bhartṛhari. Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana pre-Pāṇinianian advocates of the philosophical aspect of *Vedāgama* have been referred to by Pāṇini in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Pāṇini all has also referred to their theories in his *Mahābhāṣya on Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Bhartṛhari has elucidated their theories respectively in two separate chapters of his *Vākyapadiya* namely, *Dravya-samuddesaḥ* and *Jāti-samuddesaḥ*. Apart from them, Sphoṭāyana and Niruktakāra Yāska are also enumerated in the tradition who influenced the philosophical aspect of the tradition of language and grammar. No work of Sphoṭāyana is available. Pāṇini has referred to his name in *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. He was, perhaps, the founder of the *sphoṭa* theory which later flourished as *sphoṭa* theory of language. The *Nirukta* of the sage Yāska is primarily an etymological interpretation of the difficult *Vedic* terms but contains philosophical statements of the tradition also.

As we have mentioned earlier, Pāṇini, on the whole, provided an interpretation of *Vaikhari-speech* without missing the philosophical influence he derived from the tradition in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Points of philosophical importance of his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* attracted Kātyāyana for his *Vārttika*, Patañjali for his *Mahābhāṣya* and Bhartṛhari for his *Vākyapadiya*. They tried to show that *Vaikhari-śabda* is only instrumental in the cognition of a language which is being revealed (*Madhyamā-śabda*). In this regard it is notable that the theory of three levels of speech is a *Vedic* theory propounded by the Ṛgvedic verse *Catvāri vākaprimitā padāni tāni vidurbrāhmaṇā ye manīṣiṇaḥ, guhā trīṇi nihitā nengayanti turīyam vāco manusyā vadanti*. Ṛgveda 1/164/45, and was settled as a basic statement for the philosophical theory of *language* and *grammar* of the tradition to which *Munitraya* belong. This and many more *vedic* verses have been referred to by the sages, namely Kātyāyana, Patañjali and Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari, in his *Vṛtti*, has referred to a number of verses (*Rgveda* 10/17/4, 1/164/45, 4/58/3) and many more verse are quoted in his *Vṛtti* on Vp. 1/130, 1/118, 1/ 120, 1/142.

Bhartṛhari is a grammarian philosopher of the tradition of *Munitraya* (Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patanjali). As authorities on the tradition of language and grammar he has specifically referred to the names of these sages as the *Sūtrakāra*, *Anutantrakāra* or *Vārttikakāra* and *Bhāṣyakāra* respectively (Vp. 1/23). He himself has claimed that he learnt the philosophy of *sūtra*, *vārttika*, *bhāṣya* and of others from his teacher *Vasurātra* and that constitutes the subject matter of his *Vākyapadīya* (Vp. 2/476-82). This is evident from the fact that the subject matter of *Vākyapadīya* contains all those concepts which were discussed by Pāṇini in his aphorism.

Bhartṛhari has repeatedly said that his philosophy of language and grammar belongs to the tradition of *Āgama* of the *śiṣṭas* (see Vp. 1/27, 29, 30, 41, 43, 141). He has used the term *Āmnāya* in the same sense of *Āgama* (see, Vp. 1/2, 120, 134) and, it is different from *Purāṇāgama*, (Vp. 1/48). From the verses quoted by him in *Vākyapadīya* it is clear that he, by *Āgama*, meant *Vedāgama* including *Veda*, *Upaniṣads*, *Śikṣā*, *nirukta*, etc. (see *vedo maharṣibhiḥ ... samāmnātam pṛthak pṛthak* Vp. 1/5, *vedavidbhiḥ* Vp. 1/7, *Āmnāya vidoviduḥ* Vp. 1/20, *Āmnāyaveda* Vp. 1/134) and not *Tantrāgama* which is not opposed to *Vedāgama* but is a later scripture. Somānanda, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, philosophers of *Tantrāgama*, are seen much influenced by Bhartṛhari. They have refuted some ideas of Bhartṛhari but have accepted his basic ideas. Against Bhartṛhari's theory of three levels of speech they have accepted four levels of it. They have criticized Bhartṛhari for not accepting *Parā* and, thus, they claim to represent the *Āgama* in its true spirit. In connection with the levels of speech-principle, it is notable here that Bhartṛhari's theory of these levels is based on cognitive ground. *Śabda*-principle, in his holistic philosophy, is the only Reality pervading all, in different forms and levels of beings, known by different sources of knowledge, i.e., we know verbal-tokens (*vaikharī-śabda*) by perception, language as idea (*madhyamā-śabda* or *sphoṭa*) as a unit directly revealed or figured in the mind in communication. *Paśyantī* in itself is beyond our knowledge because it is neither a perceived nor a revealed unit of awareness in nature; it is known

by implication or by presumption as the ontological substratum of the language revealed by itself in the mind. *Paśyantī* is not a philosophical-object because it is not a being revealed; but inferred. *Parā*, the being beyond these levels, is unacceptable to him as a philosopher. It is not an object of knowledge even of inference but he does not feel any need to refute it. It as a transcendental metaphysical reality is a subject matter of *sādhana*.

*Vākyapadīya* as Bhartṛhari himself says is the *Āgamasāṅgraha*. *Vasurātra*, his teacher, was highly impressed by the *Sāṅgraha* of sage *Vyāḍi* and so was Bhartṛhari and, perhaps, this might be the reason behind claiming *Vākyapadīya* as *Āgamasāṅgraha*. Bhartṛhari, himself, and his commentator *Punyarja* in Vp. 2/476-82 accept that it was *Vasurātra* who initiated the interpretation of the philosophy of grammar in the light of the theories of *Munitraya* and that of other theories.

The influence of *Vākyapadīya* is not only viewed in the commentaries on it, but also in the discussions, on language and its relation to reality, that occur after it. Almost all schools had to come to term with what Bhartṛhari had said on the issue and they may be seen as 'defining' their position in reference to the position of *Vākyapadīya*.

Many of the ideas of *Vākyapadīya* were not only modified and developed later but have become relevant recently in the context of the development in philosophy of language in the contemporary western tradition of philosophizing also.

Vol. XX, No.2

D.N. Tiwari

#### What exactly is the difference between *Śabdi Bhāvanā* and *Arthī Bhāvanā*

What is the significance of this difference in the understanding of the relation between language and action?

Vol. XVII, No.3

Daya Krishna

#### Reply

Professor Daya Krishna asks the following two questions:

(1) What exactly is the difference between *Sabdi Bhāvana* and *Arthī Bhavana*?

(2) What is the significance of this difference in the relation between language and action?

In reply to his questions I would like to say the following:

*Śābdi Bhāvanā* is consciousness of a word or linguistic phrase used as an imperative. *Ārthi Bhāvanā* is consciousness of the objective to be realized by acting in accordance with the imperative. Thus, the former bhavana is concerned with the understanding of language and the latter one with doing an action.

Now, either the two *bhāvanās* are distinct from each other, the former coming first and the latter next, or they form one psychosis in which they do not occur separately, even though they can be distinguished from each other conceptually. If we accept the first alternative, we have to answer the question: How does language lead to action? If the second, then we need to answer the question: Can language and action form one psychological whole?

In answer to the first question just raised we may say that when an imperative is heard or received by a person who is already disposed to act very faithfully in accordance with the imperatives of the received type, his mind is automatically activated to form a will to act in accordance with the received imperative. In such a person there is a transition from one state of mind to another.

But in answer to the next question we have to say that the imperative received does not start any thinking process, but straightaway 'triggers' the action. I am reminded here of Stevenson's theory of persuasive function and Austin's theory of performative function of language, and also of what is called the *niyoga*-function of the *Vaidic Vidhi*. What needs to be specially noted here is that language can through some of its uses influence a person straightaway to act in some specific manner. In such actings there are not two *bhāvanas* or consciousnesses occurring successively in the mind of the actor. So, there cannot be in such actings any relation between the imperative language received and the recipient's intention to act. In such actings there is just one consciousness in which what happens is that the language acts. If this phenomenon of language acting appears to be too

unrealistic, we can very well say that in such a unitary consciousness the imperative language makes its addressee keenly intent to act in accordance with itself. So, in such consciousness there can hardly exist any relation between language and action. Perhaps any search here about a relation between language and action is a wild-goose chase.

Vol. XVIII, No. 2

N. Mishra

### Different Types of Philosophical Texts in the Indian Tradition?

Philosophical literature in India is usually characterised as *Samhitā*, *Saṅgraha*, *Samuccaya*, *Kāṇḍa Kaṇḍikā*, *Kārikā*, *Sūtraadhikaraṇa*, *Bhāṣya*, *Vyākhyā*, *Prakarāṇa*, *Vārtika*, *Vṛtti*, *Ṭīkā*, *Nibandha*, *Kroḍapatra*, *Panjikā*, *cūrpi*, etc.

What are the exact differences between them and how does one demarcate one from the other? Are the texts designated by these terms characterized as such by later writers on the basis of the characteristics they had or their authors themselves had characterized them as such. When did the distinctions get crystallized and was there any overlapping between texts which could be designated as either?

Vol. XII, No. 3

Daya Krishna

### Reply

In the first 22 slokas of *Parāśarōpapurāṇam*, chap. 18, Sri Parāśara said:

Now I will state in brief the essence of a *Śāstra* which is worthy of being known specially by those highly intelligent people who desire *mokṣa*. 1

अथ शास्त्रार्थसंक्षेपं प्रवक्ष्यामि समासतः ।

मुमुक्षुभिर्महाप्राज्ञैर्वेदितव्यो विशेषतः ॥१॥

Learned ones have given the meaning of the word *śāstra* in two ways: (i) regulative, as being a source of regulation; (ii) *śāsanam*, as providing description. 2

शासनाच्छसनाच्चैव शास्त्रमित्युच्यते बुधैः ।

शासनं द्विदिघं प्रोक्तं शास्त्रलक्षणवेदिभिः ॥२॥

Regulation is of two kinds: (i) prescriptive, and (ii) prohibitive. Similarly *śāsanam*, has some positive thing for an object and is not concerned with action or activity. 3

तत्रैकं विधिरूपेण तदन्यत् प्रतिषेधतः ।

शासनं भूतवस्त्वेकविषयं न क्रियापरम् ॥3 ॥

It is the one who does not know, rather than the one who knows or the *ātma* or body, who is eligible to know the prescriptive *śāstra*, prohibitive *śāstra* and the *sāstrta* which has for its object some positive thing. Being backed by or based in *cāturvarṇya*, being in an *āśrama*-state, having attained a certain age and similarly qualified by other conditions one has a *śāstra* which is specific to some specific need. However, a noble person or a good person is motivated into a *śāstra* by virtue of one's nature. Such a one cannot be prevented from following an enquiry. He is free from impositions such as *varṇa āśrama*, age, state, etc. 4-7.

विधिरूपस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रतिषेधात्मकस्य च ।

केवलं भूतवस्तेकविषयस्य तथैव च ॥4 ॥

अज्ञोऽधिकारी न प्राज्ञो नैवात्मा नैव विग्रहः ।

चातुर्वर्ण्यं समालम्ब्य कञ्चिदाश्रममास्तिक ॥5 ॥

वयोविशेषमालम्ब्य तथावस्थान्तरं परम् ।

विशेषालम्बनं शास्त्रं विशेषे सति सत्तम ॥6 ॥

प्रवर्तते स्वभावेन तस्यास्ति न निवर्तकम् ।

वर्णाश्रमवयोऽवस्थाविशेषाध्यासवर्जितः ॥7 ॥

One who knows Brahma would not cast even a side-glance over a *śāstra*. Such a one is not motivated by virtue of having a body alone. 8

ब्रह्मवित् सकलं शास्त्रं कटाक्षेणापि नेक्षते ।

देहावलम्बनेनैव केवलं न प्रवर्तते ॥8 ॥

*Śāstra* is destroyed (may cease to exist), body remains in this world, but the fruit lies elsewhere. O! Muni! there can be no *śāstra* having for its subject only *ātma*. 9

शास्त्रं नश्यति देहोऽत्र फलमन्यत्र हीरितम् ।

केवलात्मानमालम्ब्य सुने शास्त्रं न किञ्चन ॥9 ॥

The ignorant one (*ātma*) as other than the body, is motivated because of illusion—illusion generated by *samśāra*, and is eligible to know *śāstra*. Because of attachment, bondage and freedom are thought to lie in *ātma*. Initially, O! Muni! *śāstra* appears to have many dimensions and multifacets, but it turns out to be one-dimensional when rationally determined. On the command of *Śiva* alone (we) construct the logical rules determining *śāstra*. 10-11

प्रवर्तते ततो देहादन्योऽज्ञो भ्रान्तिमाश्रितः ।

आत्मा शास्त्राधिकारी स्यात् स हि संसारविभ्रमात् ॥10 ॥

तस्मिन्नात्मनि मोहेन बन्धमोक्षौ प्रकल्पितौ ।

शास्त्रमापाततो भाति मुने बहुमुखं नृणाम् ॥11 ॥

Having fewer letters, being beyond doubt, pregnant with meaning, expressing everything, free from *stōbha* and free from defect, those adept in *sūtras*, call (such an expression) *sūtra*. Where the meaning of a *sūtra* is described by the sentences and the related terms which are in consonance with the *sūtra*, we have *bhāṣya*. 12-15

निरूपिते तु न्यायेन विभात्येकमुखं पुनः ।

शास्त्रनिर्णायकं न्यायकलापं मुनिसत्तम ॥12 ॥

सूत्ररूपेण कुर्वन्ति शिवस्यैवाज्ञैव तु ।

अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद् विश्वतो मुखम् ॥13 ॥

अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सुत्रविदो विदुः ।

मुनयश्च मनुष्याश्च प्रसादादेव शूलिनः ॥14 ॥

सूत्रार्थं भाष्यरूपेण यथावद् दर्शयन्ति च ।

सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र वाक्यैः सूत्रानुकारिभिः ॥15 ॥

Muni and men with the blessings of *Śiva* explain properly the meaning of *sūtras* in terms of a *bhāṣya*. With the blessing of Rudra-Pārvatī and with the strength of their *tapa*, some people elucidate *bhāṣya*. Separating the words, stating the meanings of terms, breaking *samāśas*, etc., ordering sentences and resolving the objections—these are five characteristics of elucidation. 16-17

स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ।

प्रसादादेव रुद्रस्य भवानीसहितस्य तु ॥16 ॥

कुर्वन्ति केचिद् व्याख्यानं भाष्यस्यैव तपोबलात् ।  
पदच्छेदः पदार्थोक्तिर्विग्रहो वाक्ययोजना ॥17 ॥

Some ancestors, with the blessings of Rūdra, with already attained strength of their *tapa* describe the meaning of *bhāṣya* in the form of a *vārtika*. *Vārtika* is that in which are considered what is stated, unstated and wrongly stated. Some people expound the meaning of a *bhāṣya* in brief or in an elaborate way in *prakaraṇa* according to their own intelligence. Those who are conversant with the divisions of *śāstra*, call *prakaraṇa* tat which deals with some part of a *śāstra*. 18-21

आक्षेपस्य समाधानं व्याख्यानं पञ्चलक्षणम् ।  
केचिद् वार्तिकरूपेण भाष्यार्थं कथयन्ति च ॥18 ॥  
उत्तनुत्तदुरुक्तानां चिन्ता यत्र प्रवर्तते ॥19 ॥  
तं ग्रन्थं वार्तिकं प्राहुः वार्तिकज्ञा मनीषिणः ।  
स्वबुद्धेयधीनं भाष्यार्थं सङ्ग्रहेणैव चाथवा ॥20 ॥  
विस्तेरण प्रकुर्वन्ति केचित् प्रकरणात्मना ।  
शास्त्रैकदेशसम्बद्धं शास्त्रकार्यान्तरे स्थितम् ॥21 ॥

With additions like *sūtra*, *bhāṣya*, etc. a *śāstra* provides direct access to knowledge. 22

आहुः प्रकरणं नाम शास्त्रभेदविचक्षणाः ।  
सूत्रभाष्यादिभिः शास्त्र साक्षाद् वेदनसाधनम् ॥22 ॥

Vol. XIV, No.1

Ambika Datta Sharma

### **Mahājana—What Does it Mean?**

Arvind Sharma, in his book *Hindusim for our Times* (OUP, 1996), interprets the term *mahājana* in Yudhishtira's answer to Yakshā, namely *mahājana yena gata sa pantha* in two ways. It may, according to him, mean (1) a great person (2) a great number of persons. Even though he agrees that 'the first sense is the obvious one' he considers the second sense to be 'surprisingly logical' and avers that 'tradition, in this context, favours it.' His contention that the first sense is obvious is apparently based on the etymology of the word *mahājana* itself. The term *mahājana* is derived from a combination of *mahā+jana* which means great+man, that is, great man. but for the second which he considers to be 'though less obvious' but

more plausible' one, he has advance an argument. His argument is as follows:

Before saying *mahājana yena gata sa pantha*, in the first part of the answer, Yudhishtira asserts that (1) The Śrutis differ among themselves (2) The Smṛtis differ among themselves (3) The sages differ among themselves (4) The essence of *Dharma* is concealed in a cave. These sages are 'presumably great persons'. 'And if it has already been asserted that the sages who were great persons differ among themselves, then how does the great man/men, the *mahājanas* help us overcome the dilemma?' Therefore, he concludes that 'the sense of a 'great number of persons' must be favoured.

In order to support his contention Arvind Sharma has quoted P.V. Kane's translation of the same verse, in his *History of Dharmāśāstras*, Vol. V, Part 4, pp. 1271, which goes as follows:

Rationalization is unstable, Vedas are in conflict with each other, there is no single sage whose opinion is held to be authoritative (by all), the truth about *Dharma* is enveloped in cave, (that is, it cannot be clearly discerned) and that therefore, the path (to be followed) is the one followed by the great mass of people.

According to Arvind Sharma, 'Nilakantha, in the Sixteenth century, in his commentary on the verse (*Brahmasūtra* IV.2.7) takes it clearly in this sense: for he glosses it as *bahujanāsammatamityarthah*. I have found that even in *Satyānandī-dīpikā*, the commentary on the above *sūtra* the term *mahājana* in *evamiyampyutkrantirmahājānagataivanukirtyate* is used in the sense of *Janasadhanagata*, that is, which is found in common people. V.S. Apte in *The Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary* describes महा as the substitute of महत् at the beginning of *Karmadharaya* and *Bahuvrīhi* compounds, and also at the beginning of some other irregular words. He defines महाजनः as '(1) a multitude of men, a great many beings; the general populace or public; (2) the populace, mob; (3) a great man, a distinguished or eminent man (4) the chief of caste or trade; (5) a merchant tradesman. Monier William in his *Dictionary from Sanskrit to English* after saying that महाजनः is 'always used in the singular and rarely

used in the plural', defines it as '(1) a great multitude of men (2) the populace; (3) a great or eminent man, great persons; (4) the chief or a head of a trade or caste; (5) a merchant. Further he also says that it means '[a house] occupied by a great number of men'.

A clarification of the term *mahājana* is of great importance for understanding the concept of *dharma*, for if it means 'greatman' then the path is one which is shown by the great man or may be class of great men. And the question about *dharma/path* boils down to who is a great man? Which itself is a problematique. By accepting this definition we concede that the sages, that is, *ṛsis* cannot be regarded as great men as we have already rejected them to be the source of the path because they differ among themselves and there is no consensus among them regarding the nature of the path.

On the other hand, if we accept the definition of *mahājana* as 'great mass of people' then the notion of *dharma* as a categorical imperative loses sense. For then the path is that which is followed by the great mass of people. On this view, therefore, the path shall be determined by the majority of the people. It shall lead to egalitarianism, if the great mass of people is dishonest, then dishonesty shall be the *dharma*. If a greater number of persons, at a given time and in a given state are corrupt then corruption shall be the norm, the *dharma*. But *dharma* cannot be so shifty. One continues to believe in honesty as one's *dharma* even if a large section, nay even all, the people become dishonest. Such is the force of *dharma*. So, path cannot be determined by the masses but is determined by the classes. In fact, if we look at the history of mankind we find that in all ages the path is shown by an enlightened individual who has either gained it from the study, meditation, experience, insight or intuition of it. Masses just follow the path shown to them by him. Rama, Krishna, Śāṅkara, Buddha, Mahavira, and in our own times Ramakrishna, Paramahansa, Ramana Maharishi, Sri Aurobindo and Mahatma Gandhi are clear exemplars. Mankind has always looked to this enlightened individual for guidance in case of doubt and for the resolution of all kinds of conflicts confronted by them. It is the *śīsta vyavahāra* and not the *loka vyavahāra*

which determines the path. This view is supported by *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* (1.11.4) which says.

Accordingly, one has to follow the path shown not even by an ordinary Brāhmaṇa but only by the Brāhmaṇa who has high ideals, who has the expertise, who is devoted to good deeds, who loves everyone, who acts out of a sense of duty, and who does not act out of avarice, hatred or ill-will. He has to be one who has attained equanimity and has goodwill for all. He has to be one whose words and deeds do not differ. In short, he is the one who is virtuous.

अथा यदि ते कर्मविचिकित्सा वा वृत्तविचिकित्सा वा स्यात् ।

ये तत्र ब्राह्मणाः सम्मर्शिनिः । युक्त आयुक्त । अलूक्षा धर्मकामाः ।

स्युः यथां ते तत्र वर्तेरन् । तथा तत्र वर्तेथाः । अथाभ्याख्यातेषु ।

ये तत्र ब्राह्मणाः सम्मर्शिनिः । युक्त आयुक्त । अलूक्षा धर्मकामाः ।

स्युः यथां ते तत्र वर्तेरन् । तथा तत्र वर्तेथाः । एष आदेशः ।

एष उपदेशः । एषा वेदोपनिषत् । एतदनुश्रमनम् । एवमुपासितव्यम् । एवमु चैतदुपास्यम् ।

This is quite close to Mill's 'competent judges', from whose decree 'there can be no appeal'. Of them he says: 'On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures...the judgement of those who are qualified by knowledge of both or if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final.'

How is this dilemma about the meaning of the term *mahājana* to be resolved?

Vol. XV, No.3

Ashok Vohra

### Reply

Ashok Vohra in his query entitled 'Mahājana: What does it mean?' published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 3, seems to be worried over the meaning of the term '*mahājana*' which was used by Yudhiṣṭhira in his reply to Yakṣa's inquiry regarding the nature of the path to be adopted by people. The reply, as is well known, was '*mahājano yena gataḥ sa panthah*'.

Vohra points out that Arvind Sharma in his book *Hinduism for Our Times* (OUP, 1996) has mentioned two meanings of '*mahājana*': (1) a

great person, and (ii) a great number of persons. But none of these two meanings is acceptable to Vohra in the present context. For, he says, 'if it means 'great man' then the path is one which is shown by the great man or may be class of great men. And the question...boils down to who is a great man?...*r̥sis* cannot be regarded as great men...because they differ among themselves and there is no consensus among them regarding the nature of the path' (p. 151). So, whom to follow? The second meaning also is not acceptable to him. To quote his own words, 'If a greater number of persons, at a given time and in a given state are corrupt then corruption shall be the norm, the *dharma*. But *dharma* cannot be so shift' (p.151).

Thus, Vohra is under a dilemma and he finds it difficult to resolve. At the end of his query he almost despairingly asks, 'How is this dilemma about the meaning of the term *mahājana* to be resolved?' (p. 152). But then, why does Vohra think that he is under such a dilemma which does not allow any escape from it? He himself, in his query, notes that according to *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* what are ultimately relevant are not the individual persons, but high ideals, sense of duty, equanimity, good will, virtue, etc. And he has also talked in his query about Mill's 'competent judges' who obviously cannot be competent by being mere persons, nor even by being a multitude of persons, but by possessing the ability to discriminate between the desirable and the undesirable in human actions. Such judges, in adjudicating matters, certainly use principles which are high or *mahā*, because it is only these which people *ought* to act on. And whoever acts on such moral principles is surely a *mahājana*. This particular use of the epithet *mahā*, which is not a 'numerical' use but a 'moral' one, is neither eccentric nor unusual. Nor is it linguistically or grammatically unidiomatic. As Vohra himself points out, one of the meanings of '*mahājana*' given in V.S. Apte's *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary* is 'a great man, a distinguished or eminent man'. And in Monier William's *Dictionary from Sanskrit to English* also one of the meanings is 'a great or eminent man, great person'. Now, if *mahājana* is an *eminent* or *distinguished* person, and if his eminence or distinction is not related to

caste or trade (each having been mentioned *separately* in both the above Dictionaries), but to the treading of the path of *dharma* (as is indicated by the context of Yudhsthira's reply), '*mahājana*' must mean 'a person who acts in accordance with *dharma* or moral duty'. Gandhi was called '*mahātma*', not because he was Karam Chand Gandhi, but because he practised the high moral norms of *satya* and *ahimsā*. If, thus, '*mahātma*' can have a moral significance, why can't '*mahājana*' have the *same*?

And it is worth noting here that moral norms or principles are not the fiats of any individual or any group of individuals, nor even of any scripture; these norms or principles have 'their own sanctity. They truly lie hidden deep down in the cave (*guhāyām*), and they need to be dug out. How they are dug out, or, if we drop the metaphor, how they are thought out and known is not the question at issue here. Here the question simply is: What does '*mahājana*' mean? And in the light of what we have said earlier, it can quite safely be said that '*mahājana*' means 'a great person who acts in accordance with high moral principles and is worthy of emulation'. And so the path that he treads is the path which can very well be an exemplar.

Vol. XVI, No.3

Nityanand Mishra

### India's Intellectual Tradition: Dead or Alive

The Problem that troubles me most concerning Indian tradition is the 'closed mind-set' of the traditionalists. What is not clear is the extent to which one can isolate such a practice from tradition *per se*, if one believes that something of the latter kind indeed exists. Keeping in view the oral beginnings of the Indian tradition, the problem is all the more serious. The traditionalists seem to be saying: 'Accept what we say if you want to know what Indian tradition is all about. You have to first accept the tradition to become eligible to pass critical judgement on it'. Granted! But what if in the process one loses one's critical discernment and becomes 'traditional'? It seems to imply that one has to first become traditional to know what tradition is all about. Perhaps, there is nothing wrong in having such an attitude provided the tradition is 'attractive' enough to attract followers. But this does not seem to be the case as the followers of Indian tradition

are ever shrinking in number, unless of course one is willing to grant the status of traditionalists to the saffron brigade. Such an attitude will also not permit the complaints that traditionalists often make of being ignored.

In such a situation the important thing seems to be to inquire whether the Indian tradition is dead or alive. If it is dead, then one can only write its history and inquire into the reasons for its death, i.e., one has to account for its death and find out whether it has died for good. If it is not the case then how are we, as students of philosophy, to provide a criterion of goodness, for not all good things seem to stand the tyranny of time? In my view our failure to provide such a criterion would force us to accept some unadulterated form of social Darwinism. However, if it has died for good (or is in the process of dying) then why should we not celebrate its death or decline, whatever be the case? In such a situation will not clinging on to tradition be a sign of backwardness in the sense of traditionalists' failure to change with the times, their lack of adaptability? Is it not therefore the duty of the traditionalists to work out ways so that people can take cognizance of the Indian tradition? It has in any case ceased to be 'attractive' enough to inspire people to follow it. Should not followers of the Indian tradition take note of this fact and work upon it?

Moreover, why should anyone try to follow it? What, for example, does it offer to a woman or a *Sudra*? What place does tradition have for them? Have these sections of society not experienced it as oppressive and even exploitative? How is one to distinguish the ideological content of the Indian tradition from its other aspects? What I am also not sure about is the extent to which such queries can be accommodated within the Indian tradition. This can perhaps be clarified if one knows whether Indian tradition is a homogeneous thing or not, i.e. whether there is a multiplicity of voices in it or not. If there is a multiplicity, then is it also not necessary to identify such voices and work out their relationships? I wonder if anyone has really tried to do it. It will also be interesting to know how successful such attempts, if ever made, have been. These are some of the issues that come to my mind concerning Indian tradition. May be, someone can find time to help me clarify some of these issues.

### 'Indian Intellectual Tradition : Dead or Alive ?' A Response to Ravindra

M. Singh

The issue, 'Indian Intellectual Tradition: Dead or Alive?', is a complex one. A lot of conceptual knots have to be untied before we can have a clearcut view of the matter.

We must, first of all, understand the implications of the terms *tradition*, *traditional* and *traditionalist*. The *Chambers' Dictionary* defines *tradition* as 'customs, practices, tales and beliefs handed down from generation to generation'. In other words, tradition stands for the accumulated wisdom of our social practice to prove the irrelevance of tradition. If we could do away with the ideas of joint family or guru *śiṣya* relationship, dismiss the ideal of *mokṣa*, and distort the real meaning of *dharma*, why could we not do away with the caste system? Tradition exists in us. It is what we make of it. So if we could do away with *mokṣa* and *dharma* but retain the caste system, we can act similarly when we borrow from the western tradition. Besides, in the so-called modern societies, do we not find discrimination against the Jews, the Blacks, the non-ethnic?

Mankind, at present, is thirsting for change- a change which in reality is a rootless, restraintless change of the values and norms of life. In this mad race man sometimes finds himself without an anchor sheet. This has evoked, most often, an extreme reaction either in the form of ethnic cleansing in Germany, revival or racism in Britain and America, or the saffron brigade in India. These are the perverted ways of reaffirming one's roots. It will be much saner if the Indian intelligentsia sincerely endeavours to chalk out a path for the Indian society which can strike a balance between tradition and modernity.

Vol. XI, No. 2

Tantra Patnaik

### What exactly is meant by the terms Logos and Nous in Greek

What exactly is meant by the terms 'Logos' and 'Nous' in Greek philosophy? What is the difference between them? Are they opposed to each other? Or, are they complementary to each other?

Vol. XV, No. 1

Daya Krishna



We have received the following clarification regarding the distinction between *Logos* and *nous* in Greek philosophy from Professor Richard Sorabji, King's College, London:

In Greek thought, *Logos* is contrasted with *nous* from Aristotle onwards. The former refers to a step by step reasoning process which leads to an understanding while the latter (*nous*) does not need to do so as it has already arrived. *Nous* is sometimes thought of as intuitive. In the Neo-Platonist tradition it is considered as timeless. Episteme in Aristotle believes *scientific* understanding. Aristotle means that episteme passes from the premises (often definitions) which are initially grasped by *nous* from which inferences are drawn through *Logos* usually by syllogistic reasoning to an understanding of the further attributes of the thing defined. For example, it passes from the definition of triangle to seeing that it follows from the definition, with other premises, that interior angles will be equal to two right angles.

Vol. XV, No.2

Richard Sorabji

### Kant's Doctrine of the Categories: Some Problems

Kant's famous doctrine of categories suffers from an essential unclarity which needs to be rectified so that an adequate understanding of Kant's position may be possible and its assessment done on that basis.

For Kant, the categories are the transcendental forms of thought, particularly in the context of what he has technically called 'understanding'. There would have been no problem with respect to this except for the fact that the twelve categories he has mentioned have themselves been divided by him into those of quantity, quality relation and modality. These are the four headings under each of which there are further sub-divisions, leading thus to the famous twelve categories of Kant.<sup>36</sup>

36. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan, London, 1963, p. 113.

The categories under quantity are:

- I. Unity
- II. Plurality and
- III. Totality

The categories under quality are:

- I. Reality
- II. Negation and
- III. Limitation

The categories under relation are:

- I. Inherence and Subsistence
- II. Causality and Dependence and
- III. Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)

The categories under modality are:

- I. Possibility-Impossibility
- II. Existence-Non-existence and
- III. Necessity-Contingency

It is obvious that the categories are not all on a par for while the categories of quantity and quality have only a simple trinity under them, those under relation and modality seem far more complex even in Kant's own presentation. Under 'modality', we have an intrinsic opposition built within the category itself while under 'relation' the categories seem to have a dual character almost in all the three sub-divisions under it. This dual characteristic, however, does not seem to derive entirely from the fact that a relation generally holds at least between two terms and hence may be seen from the point of view of either of them. 'Subsistence', or to use Kant's term '*accidens*', is certainly not the complementary of 'inherence' (*substantia* in Kant's language). Similarly there is hardly any notion of reciprocity or community between 'agent' and 'patient' as given in Kemp Smith's translation.

The generalized problem with respect to the categories mentioned by Kant is that neither can they be regarded as being necessarily a transcendental form of thought, nor can *all* of them *together* be considered as such, for the necessity only is that at least one of the categories under each of the four sub-headings need be there. However, there is no

necessity as to which one should be there. To talk of twelve categories therefore is to be basically mistaken, for, in each act of thought or understanding what need be present is only one of the categories under the four headings of quantity, quality, relation and modality and not all of them.

The first question that needs to be clarified, therefore, is whether all the twelve categories have to be inevitably present in every act of thinking or understanding as they are the constitutive forms of what it means to be 'thought' or only four need be present, one each out of the sub-set given under quantity, quality, relation and modality.

The second question is: what is the relationship between the dual nature of the sub-categories under 'relation' and 'modality' for, in actual fact, we have not three but six categories under them. Thus it needs to be clarified as to what is meant by the necessity of one of the categories under 'relation' and 'modality' being necessarily present in every act of thinking and understanding for it is obvious that, at least under 'modality', both possibility and impossibility cannot be present together. Nor, for that matter can existence and non-existence go together. On the other hand while cause and effect, that is, causality and dependence can be present at the same time, one is not sure if this is possible in the case of inherence and, subsistence.

There seems to be also a difference between categories under 'modality' and those under 'relation'. For, while it is clear that out of the categories under 'modality', only one of each pair can obtain in a judgement, the situation is not so clear-cut in the case of the categories under 'relation'.

The third question that needs to be clarified is the relation between the first two categories under 'quality', that is, reality and negation and the second pair of categories under 'modality', there is existence-nonexistence for, *prima facie*, 'existence' seems to be the same as 'reality' and 'non-existence' the same as 'negation'.

These are some of the problems regarding Kant's doctrine of the categories which needs to be resolved, for unless these are clarified the exact import of Kantian thought cannot be understood.

Vol. XI, No.3

Daya Krishna

### Reply 1

#### Comments on Prof. Daya Krishna's 'Kant's Doctrine of the Categories'

Let us approach the problems raised in the note through Kant's theory of judgement in general in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this connection, table of categories and table of judgements are given below side by side:

#### Table of Categories

I
Of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality
II
Of Quality
Reality
Negation
Limitation
III
Of Relation
Inherence and subsistence ( <i>substantia et accidentia</i> )
Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)
Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)
IV
Of Modality
Possibility-Impossibility
Existence-Non-existence
Necessity-Contingency

#### Table of Judgements

I
Of Quantity
Universal
Particular
Singular
II
Of Quality
Affirmative
Negative
Infinite
III
Of Relation
Categorical
Hypothetical
Disjunctive
IV
Of Modality
Problematic
Assertoric
Apodeictic

2. It is stated in the paper that 'the categories are the transcendental forms of thought, particularly in the context of what he has said technically called 'understanding'. Here, a distinction does not appear to have been made between general forms of thought and transcendental forms of thought, or between general logic and transcendental logic. The categories listed in the table are general or formal forms of thought, they acquire transcendental or material character only after they get themselves schematized in terms of temporal determinations. Similarly, understanding in its general character requires to be distinguished from its transcendental character. According to Kant, understanding in general shows its specific transcendental nature in the process of schematizing its pure forms of thought called pure or unschematized categories of understanding. In other words, we have to take cognizance of multiple employments of the faculty of understanding: Logical, transcendental, empirical, rational, etc.

3. General logic abstracts from all content whether sensuous or nonsensuous, for it concerns itself solely with the forms of thought. On the other hand, transcendental logic abstracts from all empirical content, but not from a *priori* determinations of space and time, as pure content of transcendental aesthetic. That is, the pure forms of perception form the content of transcendental logic. It will not be surprising if we say that pure categories can be applied to things in themselves if elements of nonsensuous intuition are provided to understanding for their synthesis into objects. Kant makes it plain: 'the categories in their pure significance, apart from all conditions of sensibility ought to apply to things in general, as they are, and not, like the schemata, represent them only as they appear. They ought, we conclude, to possess a meaning independent of all schemata, and of much wider application. Now, there certainly does remain in the pure concepts of understanding... a meaning but it is purely logical, signifying only the bare unity of representations' (A/147. p.186).

4. It is fundamental to Kant's thought that the nature of pure categories is tied up with that of the pure forms of judgements. Kant did not borrow the pure categories readymade from his predecessors or picked them up from the given range of experience, but derived them from an

examination of logical forms of judgement. It is clear from the table that to each judgement there corresponds a category, and that there is exactly the same number of judgements as there are categories. Kant writes that 'there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts of understanding which apply *a priori* to objects of intuition in general, as, in the proceeding table, there have been found to be logical functions in all possible judgements' (B/105. p. 113).

5. Keeping the aforesaid in view, we shall look into the specific questions raised in the note about the nature of the categories, particularly the sub-categories under 'relation' and 'modality'.

6. Since the pure categories are derived from the pure forms of judgement, the nature of the latter will be reflected in the former. Let us take the category of causality and dependence under 'relation' and the category of possibility-impossibility under 'modality'.

7. A judgement in the hypothetical form takes the form, 'If A is B, then C is D'. It makes an affirmation under a condition. Hence, the category will be the relation of dependence or conditionality. The category in question is not an aggregate of two conceptions, but a *relation* of conditionality between two conceptions. This is likely to be an explanation of the dual character of the category.

8. The first form of the modal judgement is problematic, 'A may be either B or not B'. The assertion is neither conditional nor unconditional. The category in accordance with this form of judgement is possibility-impossibility. There does not seem to be any, 'intrinsic opposition', for each category represents a distinctive moment of the judgement itself. If we accept Kant's traditional method of logic as a guiding principle for the discovery of categories, then objections against them in the note seem to be hardly tenable. The dual characteristic of the category of possibility-impossibility represents the intrinsic dual nature of the corresponding judgement, and a similar situation holds good in respect of other categories under 'modality'.

9. The first question (p. 144) may be viewed in the light of what has been said above, keeping in mind that the categories are moments of thought or judgement in general. Thought in Kant is a unity and its unity is

presupposed in the unity of consciousness or mind. Kant's holistic conception of thought is required to be noted against Hume's atomistic conception of thought.

10. The Second question (p.144) has received fair treatment in 4 to 9.

11. The third question may be clarified with reference to the peculiar character of the judgements and the corresponding categories under 'quality' and 'modality'. In the affirmative judgement, the subject is unconditionally thought under the predicate, while in the negative it is posited outside the sphere of the latter, and the relative categories are reality and negation respectively. As to modality, the case is that the entire judgement comprising subject and object is referred to the subject or the faculty of cognition. The categories here are existence and non-existence. The category of *reality* cannot be the same as *existence* and that of negation as non-existence, since the modes of judgement from which they are derived cannot be the same. The whole philosophy of Kant seems to rest on distinctions between various types of judgements and the categories thought through them.

#### Notes and References

1. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by N.K. Smith, Macmillan, London, 1950, pp. 107 and 113.  
Vol. XII, No.3

Kaushal Kishore Sharma

#### Reply 2

As the first 'essential unclarity' to be rectified in Kant's doctrine of the categories, Daya Krishna mentions the number of categories, whether there are only these twelve transcendental or constitutive forms of thought and whether all of them or only four, 'one each out of the subset given under quantity, quality, relation and modality' must be present.

**Comment** Though Kant declares that in his transcendental classification of the concepts of pure understanding he had followed Aristotle's logical

classification of judgements<sup>37</sup>, he leaves no doubt that with regard to nature and number of the categories no final reason could be given:

'This peculiarity of our intellect that it can bring about a *a priori* unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only by these and that particular number, is as little capable of further explanation as why we have just these and no other functions of judgement, or why time and space are the only forms of our possible intuition.'<sup>38</sup>

Kant however insists that these twelve categories offered by him are the basic/fundamental/primitive categorial concepts for and of any cognitive performance (*Stammbegriffe*). Pertaining to the basic concepts of quantity, i.e., unity, plurality, totality, Kant concedes that there are also other concepts of quantity which he calls derivative (*abgeleitete* concepts or *Prädikabilien*, yet he maintains that none of these are basic, meaning that they are not needed in every act of knowing and hence no necessary formal elements of logically correct and objectively valid judgements/propositions.<sup>39</sup> Hermann Cohen, founder of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, had already emphasized in his *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* (1873)<sup>40</sup>, that it is of minor relevance whether there are just these twelve or some more categories; what does matter is only that there are such basic concepts as the necessary *a priori* conditions of any valid onto-logical knowledge.<sup>41</sup> Though I would not reckon Heidegger among the most qualified interpreters of Kant, his often sidelined fundamental statement in the introduction to *Sein und Zeit* (p. 12), that the ontical distinction of *Dasein* consists in *Dasein's* being ontological (meaning that the substantial characteristic of *Dasein* is the ability to intellectually understand, to have reliable knowledge of one's own and other beings' being) marks

A 79ff./B 105ff.

38. B 145f.

39. Dryer, p. 137.

40. Kant's Theory of Experience.

41. *Ontology* Kant identifies with his design of transcendental philosophy for it is solely concerned with the *a priori* concepts and principles of any objectively valid knowledge (B 873). *Ontology* 'can inform us...only of the conditions *a priori* under which we can obtain knowledge of things generally in experience'. (N 5936).

adequately Kant's conception of the self-object relationship, self and object not being independent entities but correlated elements of all-possible cognitive experience; for in Kant's doctrine the categories are not, as in Aristotle's, ontical structures (*Seinsformen*) but ontological concepts, formal structures of thinking (*Denkformen*).

As to the sub-question whether all twelve categories must be present in the act of knowing, one must realize that in the exposition of the categories as the *a priori* conceptual forms of the understanding, Kant distinguishes between the ones of quantity and quality (the mathematical categories) and those of relation and modality (the dynamical categories); of these the former only refer directly to what is given in sense-perception/intuition and are thus constitutive of the time-space manifold as such, whereas the latter are constitutive of *objects* in space and time, which Kant formulates in the highest principle of synthetical judgements:

'Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of a synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in any possible experience.'<sup>42</sup>

This means to say that the categories have no meaning and serve no purpose apart from spatio-temporal intuitions:

'The notion of connection involves besides the notions of the manifold and of its synthesis the notion of unity. Connection is the representation of the *synthetic* unity of the manifold.'<sup>43</sup>

Knowledge, in Kant's interpretation, is not (the comprehension of a natural, an ontically present relation between things, which is there independent of a knower; knowledge is rather the creative act of establishing a relation between what is given in sense-perception/intuition and its *a priori* concept, the result being knowledge itself, a *relatio transcendentalis* which Kant expresses in the fundamental principle (Grundsatz) of his Transcendental Idealism that

'the conditions *a priori* of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.'<sup>44</sup>

42. A158/B 197.

43. B 130 f.

Kant's definition of 'object' however depends on his definition of 'nature' in the transcendental (not transcendent) sense, *i.e.* nature as the sum-total of all objects of experience.<sup>45</sup> He emphasizes his intention to show how

'the conditions *a priori* of the possibility of experience are at the same time the sources from which all the general laws of nature must be derived.'<sup>46</sup>

These conditions being the *a priori* categories permits him to proclaim the human understanding/intellect in itself as the source of laws of nature:

'The understanding does not derive its laws (*a priori*) from nature but prescribes them to it.'<sup>47</sup>

And since nature is to be understood as the realm of objects, in the above mentioned sense, the categories (not as material structures of being but as formal structures of thinking) in co-operation with the *a priori* forms of spatio-temporal sense-perception are the principles of all generally valid/scientific knowledge.

In each and every cognitive statement in the form of a synthetic judgement *a priori* at least four of the twelve categories are to be employed, one each of the four sets. And Kant concedes that others, the derivative concepts, may also be at work in the process of knowing; but he 'maintains that these twelve connective concepts are distinctive among other concepts in being intellectual rather than sensible concepts, in being pure rather than empirical concepts, and in being basic rather than derivative.'<sup>48</sup>

Yet Kant seems to apply special importance to the categories of relation, and if one has some difficulties, to cite Daya Krishna, with 'the dual nature of the sub-categories under 'relation' and 'modality', one should remember Kant's remark that his table of categories might evoke

44. A-111; also A 158/B 197.

45. *Prolog.*, A 74 (ξ 16).

46. *Ibid.*, A 77 (ξ 17).

47. *Ibid.*, A 113 (ξ 36).

48. Dryer, p. 113.

some rather meaningful reflections with regard to the scientific form of all theoretical knowledge, one of them being that the third category of each of the four classes arises from a connection of the second and first of its class; so is, for instance, totality nothing else but plurality under the aspect of unity, limitation nothing but reality connected with negation, community is the interactive causality between substances, and necessity is nothing but existence granted by its possibility.<sup>49</sup> Kant seems to propose or even to hold that the third category of each set is present in every judgement/proposition, it being the synthesis of the two others of the same set which are, in this synthesis, annihilated as well as conserved in an encompassing concept. Stated in a more neutral form one could say that 'there will then be one elementary *a priori* concept or category for each of the different ways in which objective empirical judgements confer objectivity and generality on the corresponding perceptual judgements.'<sup>50</sup>

Coming to Daya Krishna's question pertaining to the first two categories in the class of quality and the second pair under modality and his *prima facie* impression that 'reality' seems to be the same as 'existence' and 'negation' the same as 'non-existence', we should turn to that part of the Transcendental Analytic which deals with the synthetic *a priori* principles of the understanding (*Analytik der Grundsätze*), part II; there we find in the paragraph entitled *Anticipations of Empirical Perception (Antizipationen der Wahrnehmung)* the statement that

'In all appearances the real which is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, *i.e.*, a degree.'<sup>51</sup>

Here the concept of 'reality' is restricted to what is given in sense-perception/intuition and not to a thing as such, a thing as a subject-independent entity. In this sense 'reality' refers to something being in time and 'negation' to something not being in time. What in empirical intuition corresponds to sensation Kant calls *realitas phenomenon*. Empirical reality

49. B 110.

50. Körner, p. 49.

51. A 166/B 207.

means objective validity of appearances; the contrasting concept would be that of transcendent reality as the mere (empty) thought of a thing in itself.

The concept of 'existence' is not identical with that of 'reality', since existence is not a certain qualification or determination of a thing but the thing's *absolute position*, the concept of 'position' taken as identical with that of being. Hence, Kant says under the heading *The Postulates of Empirical Thought (Die Postulate des empirischen Denkens)*, a sort of an introduction to his refutation of (material) idealism (Descartes, Berkeley), in contrast to his own transcendental/theoretical idealism:

'Whether, therefore, perception and its train can reach, according to empirical laws, there our knowledge of the existence of things can also reach. But if we do not begin with experience or do not proceed according to the laws of the empirical connection of appearances, we are only making a vain display to guess and discover the existence of anything.'<sup>52</sup>

We may hold that there exists a necessary being which we are used to call God, but this is a mere, empty thought and not an empirically verifiable concept of such a being, which is to say that its empirical reality cannot be scientifically proved by means of the *a priori*/pure concepts of the understanding; and we may therefore conclude that not everything that might be thought of as existing could also be proved as having empirical reality, and hence the concept of 'existence' has a wider range than that of (empirical) 'reality'; it transcends the realm of pure transcendental or theoretical reasoning into that of the postulates of pure practical reason.

To sum up: The categories are basic/fundamental concepts of an object in general and as such *a priori* forms of every objectively valid knowledge; they are not in themselves knowledge but mere forms of thought for constituting knowledge from given sense-perceptions/intuitions. An application of a category to what presents itself in sensible experience becomes possible only by means of a transcendental temporal determination which Kant calls *schema*: hence, for instance, the schema of 'substance' is continuity (*Beharrlichkeit*) of what is real in time.

52. A 6/B273f.

Whether my comments can serve as a clarification of Daya Krishna's queries or whether they might even have complicated them is not for me to decide; but when working on these comments I realized once more the validity of Schopenhauer's commencing sentence of his *Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie* in the Annexe to Vol. I of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (The World as Will and Idea):

'It is much easier to point out the faults and errors in the works of a great mind than to present a distinct and complete exposition of its value.'<sup>53</sup>

#### References

- A. First edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781.  
 B. Second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1787.  
 Prolog. *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, 1783.  
 N Indicating the items of Kant's Nachlass (left papers) as listed in *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften* (Kant's collected works), ed. Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Prussian Academy of Sciences), Berlin.  
 Körner S. Körner, *Kant*, Penguin Books, 1955.  
 Dryer D.P. Dryer, *Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics*, 1966.  
 Vol. XII, No.3  
 Herbert Herring

#### Reply 3

##### Kant's Doctrine of Categories: An Attempt at Some Clarification

In this note I wish to respond to Daya Krishna's note, 'Kant's Doctrine of the Categories: Some Problems' (*JICPR*, Volume XI, Number 3, May-August 1994, pp. 143-44). in which he raises some questions concerning Kant's doctrine of categories as found in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. In doing this, I will not deal with these questions directly, one by one. What I will do is to say a few things, according to my understanding of things, strictly keeping in

53. For a more detailed information on Kant's Epistemology and Ontology I refer to my books *Das Problem der Affektion bei Kant*, Cologne 1953 (Supplement 67 of *Kant-Studien*) and *Essentials of Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy*, Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1993.

view these questions. I hope that what I am going to say will help in answering these questions.

(1) Kant mentions twelve categories, which he classifies under four different heads, three under each head: unity, plurality and totality under quantity; inherence and subsistence (*substantia et accidens*), causality and dependence (*cause and effect*) and community (reciprocity between agent and patient) under relation; and possibility-impossibility, existence-non-existence and necessity-contingency under modality. Now, I find that all these categories are exactly on a par with one another, in the sense that each one of them is one and not more than one, including those under relation and modality. But they are not on a par with one another, in the sense that they are different from one another under the same head or under different heads. They are different from one another under the same head, as for example, there are the different categories of unity, plurality and totality under quantity. They are different from one another under different heads, as for example, the categories under relation, as far as I can see, are relational categories, whereas those under any of the other three heads are not relational categories. Like a relational term in logic, as the terms husband and wife, a relational category may be defined as one which is composed of two terms which are correlative to one another, and that means to say, which are definable only in terms of one another.

I have said above that even the categories under relation are, in each case, one and not more than one. This is now easily seen. I have said above that the categories under relation are relational categories, and I have also defined a relational category. Now, if the categories under relation are relational categories and a relational category is as I have defined it to be, then it follows that the categories under relation, like relational terms, are, in each case, one and not more than one. These categories may be composed of two terms, as indeed they are, but since these two terms are correlative to, or definable only in terms of, one another,

these categories like relational terms, are, in each case, one and not more than one. Now, it only remains for me to show that the categories under relation, as far as I can see, are relational categories. And again, this is easily done as follows: (1) to say that something is a substance (in one sense) is the same thing as to say that it is the support of accidents; and to say that something is an accident is the same thing as to say that it is supported by a substance. (2) To say that something is a cause is the same thing as to say that it is the cause of an effect; and to say that something is an effect is the same thing as to say that it is the effect of a cause. (3) To say that something, say A, is an agent in reciprocity is the same thing as to say that something else, say B, is an agent in reciprocity with A; and to say that B is an agent in reciprocity is the same thing as to say that A is an agent in reciprocity with B. Here following Kant, we can also say that if A and B are agents in reciprocity with one another, then B is a patient in relation to, or is determined by A, and A is a patient in relation to, or is determined by, B.

I have also said above that the categories under modality are just as well, in each case, one and not more than one. The first category is either the category of possibility or the category of impossibility; and not both. The second category is either the category of existence or the category of non-existence; and not both. The third category is either the category of necessity or the category of non-necessity/ contingency: and not both. And all the three categories are either the categories of possibility, existence and necessity, or the categories of impossibility, non-existence and non-necessity/ contingency. It is unthinkable that Kant would have put under one and the same category both possibility and impossibility; under one and the same category both existence and non-existence; and under one and the same category both necessity and non-necessity/contingency.

(2) Kant mentions twelve categories, which he classifies under four different heads. But, as far as I can see, he does not mention whether all the twelve of them, or some number less than that, have to be present in each and every synthesis of the manifold of pure intuitions. The question has been asked whether, according to Kant, all the twelve categories have to be present in each and every synthesis of the manifold of pure intuitions, or only four of them, one category from each head. Now, as Kant himself does not seem to mention anything about it, we have to make up our own mind in this connection. Now, as regards the first alternative in the question asked: if it is the case, as it may be said to be, that all the three categories under any of the four heads (say, the categories of unity, plurality and totality under the head of quantity) are distinct from one another in such a way that all of them, or even two of them, cannot be present at the same time in the synthesis mentioned; that is to say, not more than one of them can be present at the same time in the synthesis mentioned; then, it follows that all the twelve categories cannot be present in each and every case of the synthesis mentioned, that not more than four of them can be present in each and every case of the synthesis mentioned, one category from each head.

Further, as regards the second alternative in the question asked above: if, as it appears, according to Kant, every synthesis of the manifold of pure intuitions would be subject to all the four heads of categories (thus, to take a concrete instance, the synthesis of all earthly things as being perishable is subject to the category of unity under the head of quantity, to the category of reality under the head of quality, to the category of substance and accident under the head of relation, and to the category of existence under the category of modality): and if, as we have already seen in the preceding paragraph, not more than four categories can be present in each and every case of the synthesis mentioned, one category from each head; then, it follows that exactly four categories,



neither more nor less, would have to be present in each and every case of the synthesis mentioned, one category from each head.

(2) The question has been asked: what is the difference between the categories of reality and negation, which fall under the head of quality, and the categories of existence and non-existence, which fall under the head of modality? I think that the clue to answering this question could be looked for in Kant's table of judgments, upon which his table of categories is claimed to be based. On that basis, we could say the following; the categories of reality and negation, as falling under the head of quality, would in some way relate to the affirmation or denial of something of something, respectively. And the category of existence or the category of non-existence, as falling under the head of modality, would in some way relate to the relation of actuality (as distinguished from that of possibility or that of necessity) or non-actuality (as distinguished from that of impossibility or that of non-necessity/contingency) of something with another, respectively.

Vol. XIV, No.1

R.K.Gupta

#### Kant on Reason

What is the relations between theoretical and practical reason in Kant?

What is the difference in Practical Reason as evidenced in the prudential action on the one hand and the one displayed in Moral action ?

Vol. XIX, No.1

Daya Krishna

#### Reply

##### A Note on Theoretical and Practical Reason in Kant

In this note, I wish to respond to Daya Krishna's Notes and Queries 2 and 4 in *JICPR*, Volume XIX, Number 1, January-March 2002, p. 243, I wish to respond to them together, not separately.

One may call Kant's first critique *Critique of Pure Theoretical Reason*, and his second critique *Critique of Pure Practical Reason*.

Pure theoretical reason consists in giving the form of knowledge. Here we have forms of sensibility and forms of understanding. Here we also have Ideas of Reason, which arise from our illegitimate use of understanding beyond sensibility, Pure practical reason consists in giving the form of morality. This is our being able to will the maxim of our action as a universal law. Thus these forms of reason are distinct from one another. But they have this in common that they both are a source of universality.

Pure practical reason is distinguished from practical reason which is not pure. The latter deals with means required for the attainment of an end, which may be actual or possible. An actual end is one which we all desire; this is happiness. A possible end is one which we may or may not desire. In connection with pure practical reason, we have laws of Morality. In connection with practical reason dealing with means required for the attainment of an actual end, we have Counsels of Prudence. In connection with practical reason dealing with means required for the attainment of a possible end, we have Rules of Skill. While the Laws of Morality are categorical in character, both the Counsels of Prudence and the Rules of Skill are hypothetical in character.

Is morality a subject of theoretical understanding, or rather of pure theoretical reason, and thus subject to the limitations which it imposes? Form of morality, as we have seen above, is given by pure practical reason, which is distinct from pure theoretical reason having its own form. Further, there are no moral sensible intuitions, no moral sensible data, which could be subject to the limitations which pure theoretical reason imposes. As a result, we can say that the answer to the question just mentioned must be in the negative. However, there is something else here. The form of pure practical reason has to be applied to facts of experience in order to obtain particular moral laws. But these facts of experience are already subject to the form of pure theoretical reason. As a result, there must be a meeting point between the form of pure practical reason and the form of pure theoretical reason in

obtaining particular moral laws. Kant himself takes cognizance of such a situation. He says, '... between the realm of natural concept, as the sensible, and the realm of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed, so that it is not possible to pass from the former to the latter (by means of the theoretical employment of reason), just as if there were so many separate worlds, the first of which is powerless to exercise influence on the second: still the latter is *meant* to influence the former—that is to say, the concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the sensible world, the end proposed by its laws; and nature must consequently also be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom.' (*The Critique of Judgement*, translated by J.C.Meredith, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1952, p. 14.)

Vol. XIX, No.4

R.K.Gupta

#### Kant on Perpetual Peace

The recent events in Iraq have highlighted once again the problem of war and peace, and the role that supra-national political organizations such as the United Nations are supposed to play in this regard. On one side, we have the notion of 'independent' 'sovereign' states which can not accept, by definition, any authority, superior to or higher than, themselves. On the other hand, if peace is to be preferred to war, then one has to accept equally the necessity for some supra-national organizations to ensure this.

The problem was examined by Kant who tried to deal with it in his work entitled *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* and contains the blue-print of the 'articles' required for an organization which may possibly ensure peace between states. The work discusses the relation between politics and ethics, an issue which has generally been ignored by almost all those who have thought about politics or ethics, as if they had little relation to each other. Ethics has been seen as an individual enterprise, and politics has been seen as an arena where only power matters, particularly when it concerns relations between states.

In this connection Kant develops the notion of 'public right' which he treats as a 'transcendental' presupposition of thinking about the public domain.

It is time that political thinkers and philosophers become aware of Kant's pioneering work in this regard and carry it forward for all its worth, as even after what has happened nations have to return to the peace table and think of how to avoid wars.

Vol. XX, No.1

Daya Krishna

#### Reply

##### Towards Perpetual Peace

Under Focus on page 197 of *JICPR*, Volume XX, No.1, Daya Krishna refers to the recent events in Iraq, and then, in that connection, to Kant's treatise *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. This treatise has three parts. The first part contains six preliminary articles, the second two definitive articles, and the third one secret article. My purpose here is not to give a synopsis of these articles and discuss them. What I wish to do is to formulate yet another preliminary article, and incorporate it as the third article in Kant's list. There will then be seven, not six preliminary article as a result of what has currently been happening in Iraq. This shows that our moral life grows, further opens up, with the growth of our moral experience. I state below the new article and an explanation.

A state shall not covet what belongs to another state, and try to acquire it by deceit or force.

There are problems amongst people. One of the reasons is their indulgence in dishonest dealings, which is the same things as crookedness. One of the reasons why they do so is their greed. There are times when they reinforce their crookedness by force. When people resort to crookedness, they treat others merely as means or objects of exploitation.

I make bold to make here one more point. There is the Indian word *dādā*. In one of its meanings, it may be said to stand for a person who is ever ready to use force in order to have his will done or make his presence felt. I would like to coin the word *Dadaism*, and define it as the

attitude or theory to that effect. Dadaism in this sense differs from Dadaism in another context. In this other sense, Dadaism refers to 'an early twentieth century international movement in art, literature, music, and film, repudiating and mocking artistic and social conventions' (*The Readers' Digest Oxford Wordfinder*). The people who are responsible for the present state of affairs in Iraq exemplify Dadaism in my sense of that term.

Vol. XXI, No. I

R.K.Gupta

### War and Philosophy

The issue of war has seldom been a centre of attention in philosophical thought anywhere in the world, even though *The Gita* in the Indian tradition starts with it and the problem it poses. The work of Levinas focusses attention on this issue and suggests that no thinking about 'values' can be honest if it does not take it into account. Warfare questions almost all the values that man strives to seek in order to make his life worth living. He opens his discussion with the startling statement 'Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality.'

Moral values are questioned in life by everybody and those who try to be moral are considered fools by others who prosper by willful denial of all values in their life.

War brings this issue to a head and forces one to make a radical distinction between the 'we' and 'they' in which the 'other' is not seen as a human being and, thus has no 'rights' which derive from that very fact. In the *Mahābhārata* Yudhiṣṭhira, the son of Dharma explicitly says that there are situations where to do *dharma* becomes *adharmā* and where *adharmā* becomes one's *dharma*. Levinas asks 'Does not lucidity, the mind's openness upon the true, consist in catching sight of the permanent possibility of war?' The state of war suspends morality; it divests the eternal institutions and obligations of their eternity and rescinds *ad-interim* the unconditional imperative. In advance, its shadow falls over the actions of men. War is not only one of the ordeals the greatest of which morality

lives; it renders 'morality derisory' at the beginning of his work entitled 'Totality and Infinity', Tr. by Alphonso Lingis, published by Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2002.

The work needs serious attention as it brings out the question of politics and ethics in the centre of attention, particularly in the current context of systematically planned and organized terrorism in different parts of the world by 'convinced idealists' on the one hand and others who, at least, *prima facie*, do not seem to believe in any values whatsoever as they do not distinguish between guilty and innocent in the orgy of violence and the two combined in the war perpetuated by America in the contemporary world in defiance of the collective will of the UN and the world.

Vol. XXI, No.4

Daya Krishna

### Reply

#### The Issue of War\*\*\*

It is indeed very timely that Professor Daya Krishna (hereinafter DK), the Editor of *JICPR*, has, under the column 'Focus' (Vol. XXI, No. 4, October-December 2004), raised the question of the relevance or otherwise of war in the present world scenario. He, in this regard, draws the attention of his readers to the 'current context of systematically planned and organized terrorism in the different parts of the world....' I, too, while concluding my Lecture given on November 2005 in an ICPR sponsored meeting of the Patna University Philosophy Department, had said, But then, what is the present environment for man in general? Well, it is certainly the one besieged with perhaps the worst kind of terrorism. And it is definitely proving to be a very serious and dangerous challenge for the whole Modern World. Surely, this challenge cannot be met with any docile, or 'pacifist' method. It can be met only 'wisely', that is, only philosophically. Philosophy is not concerned merely with knowing but also with doing.'

So, DK has really done a single service to humanity by bringing the question of war under the focus of people's attention. And, while doing so, he has given too much kudos to Levinas for having brought to the notice

of the people this issue of war through his book *Totality and Infinity* (Trans. By alphonso Lingis, published by Duquense University Press, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, 2002). DK, in his *Focus*, also points out that Levinas in his work, has denounced the importance and merit of morality while dealing with this issue of war. According to this thinker (as pointed out by DK), 'The state of war suspends morality; it divests the eternal institutions and obligations of their eternity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional imperatives.....' War is not only one of the ordeals greatest of which morality lives; it renders morality derisory. So, it appears that Levinas is very much in favour of political expediency, and that even at the cost of morality. Maybe, Levinas is more 'Canakyan' than Canakya himself.

But then, I too, from my own side would like to evaluate this very provocative thinker. And, before I do so, I would like to say a few words about DK himself. The very first sentence with which DK begins his 'Focus' is 'The issue of war has seldom (italics mine) been a center of attention in philosophical thought *anywhere in the world* (italics mine), even though the Gita in the Indian tradition starts with it and the problem it poses'. In this statement the two terms 'seldom' and 'anywhere in the world' have been, I think, used rather listlessly. If the former term is 'temporal', the latter is obviously 'spatial'. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* 'seldom' means 'not often'. But has the issue of war been discussed by thinkers only rarely? And then, the use of the phrase 'anywhere in the world' here is all the more deplorable. If, as DK himself admits, the *Gita* did at least raise this question, then his use of 'anywhere in the world' is, to the least, very careless.

Think of the Vedic God (*deva*) Indra (Vrtraghna) who killed Vrtra the demon (*danava*). This god-demon tussle might be altogether mythological, but even then it indicates that Vedic people were agog with war-related ideas and activities. Maybe, there was some historical truth behind this Indra-Vrtra war myth. Anyway, the phrase *devasura sangrama* of the Vedic literature is much too significant in respect of the Vedic culture and

civilization. And then, if we go down the memory lane, we can come across such war-heroes and war-sponsors as Rama, Krsna Canakya, Sivaji Maharaja, Rana Pratapa, quite a number of Sikh Gurus-The most prominent being Guru Govinda Singh-Tilaka, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose etc.

Now, if we turn to other countries we find that there, too, there have been persons or episodes who or which were either for or against war, viz., Moses, Christ, Prophet Mumammad, Zarathustra Martin-Luther King, Tolstoy, Confucius, Nelson Mandela, Crusade, Jihad, Jewish Elimination, etc. So, I think, neither the use of 'seldom', nor of 'anywhere in the world' by DK is justified.

Now, Let us come to Levinas who seems to have made a mockery of morality. But even then, it appears, he has been covertly applauded and praised by D.K. But, what are Levinas's credentials? They are :

1. He himself says, 'Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality.' Well, this statement is, clearly enough, not only befooling all others, but is also a pre-judging of the entire issue of the role of the discipline or morality. Are we really duped by morality.

2. He further says, 'Moral values are questioned in life by everybody and those who try to be moral are considered fools by others who prosper by willful denial of all values in their lives.'

Now, before we somewhat critically investigate Levinas' views, we may just point out here the glaring self-contradiction in the statement quoted above. Well, when moral values are questioned by 'everybody', who are those who try to be moral? Are these latter fellows included in 'everybody'? If not, what does 'everybody' mean after all? Well, when Levinas does not give any importance to such simple logical requirement, importance must be given to his arguments against the 'role of morality in life can easily be guessed.'

Now, let us come to Levinas' Statement that 'The state of war suspends morality...'. Well, by making such a statement he 'undoes' what Mahatma Gandhi 'did', and 'did' rather successfully by means of life-long struggle virtually on an international platform. We know the Mahatma established the principle of *ahimsa* or non-violence about which Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said 'Gandhiji applied this seemingly negative thing in an active way to mass problems in South Africa and India'. And this very 'seemingly negative thing was 'the bond of union' between the Mahatma and the great Russian Prophet, Leo Tolstoy.

Regarding non-violence the Mahatma had said, 'The non-violence of my conception is a more active and more real fighting against wickedness'. And, he did not go in for any violent war, for that implied suspending or ignoring of morality. and his reason virtually is that a war, in the final run, is nothing else but neglect of principles. Principles of behaviour, if they are genuine, must have to be universal, and were there is universality, there must have to be welfare, and where there is welfare, there cannot be any illegitimate bloodshed and killing.

Well, even if Levinas, as a thinker, has been guided above by the easy ideal of practical expediency, he has atleast been guided by an ideal of some sort. But then, once you are under the guidance of an ideal, whatever that ideal may after all be, you are under the grip of some sort of a principle. And if principles, then universality and also (using the very title of Levinas' book) totality and infinity, and, ultimately, welfare. Are all these ingredients of a genuine principle very derisory of high moral values?

DK, however, in his 'Focus' does harp on, 'The work of Levinas focuses attention on this issue and suggests that nothing can be honest, if it does not take it [Levinas's book] into account'. And he also gives credence to Levinas' statement: 'Warfare questions almost all the values that a man strives to seek in order to make his life worth living.' Well, I wonder what sort of a worth Levinas' worth living' indicates! Anyway, let DK accept all these observation of Levinas without any mental reservation. But the question remains : how should one react to these observation of

Leyinas? Should others, too, discard morality, so that warfare may have an unbridled license for destroying the whole world at 'its sweet will'? This question does demand an immediate answer!

Vol. XXIII, No.2

Nityanand Mishra

#### Kant on Morality\*\*

Kant in his *Critique of Judgement* has seen 'beauty as a symbol of morality' (Section 59, J.H. Bernard's translation, New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1964, p. 196). Morality, for Kant, is supposed to be a purely formal quality of 'willing' when it wills the 'good' and, if so, how can beauty which is necessarily sensuous and uniquely individual symbolize something which can never be sensuous or individual, in principle? In case it is argued, as Kant seems to do, that there is a 'universal' element in the apprehension of beauty as it is the 'object' of a 'disinterested' spectator, would it imply that a perceptual object, in Kant's system, can have also a 'universal' element in it which is as directly apprehended as the 'particular' or the 'individual' that is apprehended by the senses?

Vol. XIX, No.3

Daya Krishna

#### Reply

'Morality, for Kant, is supposed to be a purely formal quality of 'willing' when it wills the 'good' and, if so, how can beauty which is necessarily sensuous and uniquely individual symbolize something which can never be sensuous or individual, in principle?' I will like to make the following observations.

Both in allegory and symbol, one sensible thing stands for another, which is beyond sensibility. But the two have independent origin. Allegory primarily belonged to the sphere of talk, of the logos, Hence, it is a rhetorical or hermeneutic figure, But symbol is not limited to the sphere of the logos. Symbol is something sensible, which is shown and enables one to recognize something else which can never be sensibly present. The word 'symbol' is derived from the Greek word 'symbolon'. In Greek tradition, symbolon' was a technical term for a token of remembrance. 'The host presented his guest with the so-called *tessera hospitalis* by

breaking some object in two. He kept one half for himself and gave the other half to his guest. If in thirty or fifty years' time, a descendant of the guest should ever enter his house, the two pieces could be fitted together again to form a whole in an act of recognition. In its original technical sense, the symbol represented something like a sort of pass used in the ancient world; something in and through which we recognize someone as already known to us'.

The common structure of representation of one thing which is never sensibly present - by another which has sensible presence finds chief application in religion, since it is not possible to know the divine in any other way than by starting from the world of senses. But there is a difference in the way the two relate the sensible to the nonsensible. Symbol presupposes a metaphysical connection of the visible and invisible, for the world of the senses is the outflowing and reflection of truth. Allegory does not assume an original metaphysical relationship such as symbol claims but, rather, a connection created by convention and dogmatic agreement, which enables one to use a presentation in images for something that is imageless. The symbol is the coincidence of the sensible and the nonsensible, while allegory is the meaningful relation of the sensible to the nonsensible. Symbol can be interpreted inexhaustible as it is indefinite. Symbol is opposed to allegory since the latter stands in a more exact relation to meaning and exhausted by it. In symbol, what is represented is itself present in the only way available to it.

When Kant claims to take beauty as symbol of morality, he gives his interpretation of the intrinsic metaphysical connection. In my essays *The Beautiful as the Symbol of the Morally Good*,<sup>2</sup> I have tried to give my understanding to what Kant was doing when he took the beautiful as the symbol of the morally good. I have interpreted his views in light of his claim in 59 of *Critique of Judgment*, 'Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the charm of sense to the habitual moral interest possible without too violent a leap.' Through his theory of symbolization, Kant bridges the gulf between the nonsensible goodwill and sensible action.

If we keep this interpretation in mind, then the second question you raise also can be answered in the affirmative. Your second question is, 'In case it is argued, as Kant seems to do, that there is a 'universal' element in it which is directly apprehended as the 'particular' or the 'individual' that is apprehended by the senses?' Since Kant is giving his theory of symbol to correlate the goodwill which is nonsensible, to determinate action which is sensible, is it not required that in the apprehension of the determinate morally good action, we also apprehend the goodwill, which has universality in it?

#### Notes and References

- 1 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, Translated by Nicholas Walker, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 31

- 2 JICPR, Vol. XX, No.3

Vol. XXI, No. I

Binod Kumar Agarwala

#### Intellectual Work and Morality\*\*

Attention is drawn to the following statement of Russell which *prima facie*, seems strange, specially as it suggests that the 'moral' quality of one's consciousness may affect one's intellectual work:

By this time I had secured Whitehead's cooperation in this task, but the unreal, insincere and sentimental frame of mind into which I had allowed myself to fall affected even my mathematical work...This defect in my work was due to a moral defect in my state of mind. (The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1967, p.151)

Vol. XVII, No.3

Daya Krishna

#### Reply 1

A Reply to Professor Daya Krishna's Query regarding Russell moral effect.

**Observations**

In *JICPR* (Vol. XVII, No. 3, p. 179) Professor Daya Krishna draws the attention of the readers towards a statement of Russell which according to the Professor seems strange 'especially as it suggests that the 'moral' quality of one's consciousness may affect one's intellectual work'. The Professor perhaps thinks that a person's moral goodness or moral badness has nothing to do with his performing an intellectual job. Surely enough, not only a saint but also a sinner can be a great mathematician.

However, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Indian Edition, Scientific Book Agency, Calcutta, 1985) gives as one of the meanings of the word 'moral' as 'of, relating to, or acting on the mind, character, or will'. Now, if we take the word 'moral' used in Russell's statement as meaning what Webster has given in his Dictionary, then perhaps there is no strangeness in Russell's statement, not even *prima facie* strangeness.

But there is a difficulty here. Russell himself has used in his statement the word 'even' before his phrase 'my mathematical work'. The implication of the use of the word 'even' should, I think, be that a mathematical work is not affected by any moral quality either good or bad. Even then he says that this mathematical work was affected by a moral defect.

But then one may argue here that there are certain qualities of mind which are very necessary for doing any type of systematic and purposeful work. They are, to name a few, being realistic (not fanciful), being sincere (not undevoted to the task), and being calculative or ratiocinative (not sentimental or not liable to be swayed away by emotions). And because these qualities can be cultivated by a person wilfully, they can quite well be regarded as moral qualities. And lack of such qualities can very well be regarded as a moral lack or a moral defect. Morality, as we know, is related to freedom of will, responsibility, sense of guilt, praise and blame, reward and punishment, etc. Russell has pointed out in his statement that the defect of his mind that affected his mathematical work was his own creation ('allowed myself to fall'), and I think his statement is suggestive of his readiness to own the responsibility and even his willingness to be

**Queries with Answers**

condemned for it. Perhaps the building up of a frame of mind necessary for doing an intellectual work is an indispensable and unavoidable duty of the person who wants to undertake such a work. Accordingly, such a building-up becomes his bounden moral duty. And if he fails to carry out this duty, he acquires a moral defect.

But then it may be pointed out here that what has been regarded above as a moral necessity is perhaps just a methodological requirement. Without the qualities of the mind that have been enumerated above, no difficult goal of any sort can be achieved. But only when the goal is a moral goal, the method used for its realization is a moral method; and any defect in respect of such a method will be regarded as a moral defect. Mathematical excellence cannot be a moral goal, because it is not concerned with social behaviour, nor is it concerned with social harmony or social development. Ignorance of mathematical knowledge can permit excuses, but not doing of moral action cannot. No person can be condemned for not writing a *Principia Mathematica*.

So, it is not just *prima facie* but really very strange that Russell has regarded his unrealistic, insincere and sentimental frame of mind to be morally defective in the context of doing his mathematical work. Now, we have two options before us. If we go by Webster's Dictionary, we can reject even the alleged *prima facie* strangeness in Russell's statement. But if we take morality not in its lean psychological sense as taken by Webster, but in its full-blown social sense in which it is usually taken then we shall have to admit that there is in Russell's statement not just *prima facie* strangeness, but real strangeness.

Vol. XVIII, No.2

N. Mishra

**Reply 2****Knowledge and Morality : a short note****Observations 2**

Under Focus I *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No 3, p. 179), Daya Krishna quotes the following statement from Russell: 'By this time I had secured Whitehead's cooperation in this task, but the unreal, insincere and sentimental frame of mind into which I had allowed myself to fall affected

even my mathematical work...This defect in my work was due to a moral defect in my state of mind' (*The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1967, p. 151).

He finds it *prima facie* strange that the moral quality of one's consciousness should affect one's intellectual work. The question which I would like to ask here is this: what exactly is the relation which Russell may have in mind in this place between a person's state of mind which he may consider morally unsatisfactory and the quality of his intellectual work? A possible answer to this question is that the person's said state of mind produces disquiet in him, and this disturbs his concentration, and this affects the quality of his intellectual work. However, this answer will not do. For it will only show there to be a relation between his lack of concentration, which is an intellectual matter and may be caused by moral disquiet as also in a variety of other non-moral ways, like the loss of a dear one and the quality of his intellectual work, and not between something of a moral kind and something of an intellectual kind. But, then, what other relation may Russell have in mind?

One can talk of different kinds of relations between knowledge and morality. The well-known relations are: knowledge and its use for immoral ends and the use of immoral means for the acquisition of knowledge. I do not wish to go into these at the moment. But there is a kind of relation upon which I would like to spend a little time here. In my paper, 'Knowledge and Morality' (*Gandhi Marg*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 57-67), I have mentioned several intellectual and moral qualities which are presupposed in our pursuit of knowledge; and I have dwelt upon the latter at some length. The intellectual qualities include the following: (i) a person who pursues knowledge should clarify his problem to himself and formulate it as exactly as possible; (ii) he should be as clear, precise, simple and straight as possible in his expression and use no jargon; (iii) he should find out, through his own reflection or discussion or in any other way, the various objections which may be raised against his position and give them due consideration; and (iv) he should accept his thesis, even after he has done his best to confirm it, only tentatively. The moral

qualities include: (1) a person who pursues knowledge should make sure that he is interested in the problem which he wants or undertakes to explore; (2) he should be determined to persevere in his work in face of things which threaten to bring it to a premature end; (3) he should allow his work to take its own course and time; (4) he should do his best to understand a point of view which is different and opposite, and even to sympathize with it; that is to say, he should do his best to be tolerant towards such a point of view; (5) he should be ruthless, that is, totally unbiased, in his examination of people's positions, including his own; (6) he should have the awareness that he may have made some or the other mistake in the course of his work, that it is possible that his work is not worth much and that it is not worth much on the whole any way; that is to say, he should be humble about his work; (7) he should be prepared to suffer privations; and (8) he should allow his work alone, and never considerations of any personal gain, to dictate to him the results of that work; that is to say, he should be entirely objective and unselfish in determining the results of his work.

What Russell may have in mind may bring to light yet another moral quality presupposed in our pursuit of knowledge, or yet another kind of relation between knowledge and morality.

Vol. XVIII, No.2

R.K. Gupta

(iii) A short note in response to Daya Krishana's query regarding Russell's statement

### Reply 3

#### Observations

Under Focus I, Daya Krishna draws the readers' attention to what he calls a '*prima facie* strange' statement by Russell in his autobiography, which implies that one's morality affects his intellectual work. I would like to suggest that this alleged anecdote from Russell supports the following contention: Knowledge is derived from and determined by one's 'way of life'. Meaning that since knowledge is a way-of-relating or an act of



defining-a-status (as in Śāṅkara's 'This is not' a snake, but a rope'), this very way of relating cannot be divorced from the knower. In other words, a person gains a certain kind of knowledge when he becomes a certain being. This might be obvious when dealing with 'spiritual knowledge': in order to know Brahman, one has to become Brahman ('becoming' which is phrased in the first-person mahāvākya 'Aham Brahmasmi'). This might be 'logical' when speaking of 'anthropological knowledge': to know a foreign culture, one has 'to get into it', to live and experience it, to become (as much as possible) a part of it. But I would like to further claim that the notion of knowledge-as-way-of-life is in fact applicable to each and every kind of knowledge, even mathematical, as shown by Russell. The 'way of life' in our anecdote is what he calls 'state of mind'. What Russell actually says is that a state of mind which he characterizes as 'unreal, insincere and sentimental' and as 'morally defective', had an influence over a certain kind of knowledge, i.e. 'mathematical-knowledge'. His statement implies that in order to gain (or in his case to regain) such knowledge, one has to become real, sincere and non-sentimental. But it can also imply that our state of mind (any state of mind) affects (positively or negatively) the type of knowledge accessible to us. 'Knowledge as way of life' not referring then to an outer lifestyle, but rather to an inner-attitude. And if the contention sketched here briefly is accepted, then what seemed *prima facie* strange becomes more understandable.

Vol. XVIII, No.2

Dani Ravch

**'Death is not an event in life...' (Wittgensteins Views on the Metaphor of Death)**

What exactly does Wittgenstein mean, when he writes 'Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death' (*Tractatus*-6.431), and 'Death is not an event in life. It is not a fact of the world. If by eternity is understood not infinite temporal duration but non-temporality, then it can be said that a man lives eternally if he lives in the present.' (*Notebooks*-9.7.1916). The commentaries on the *Tractatus* do, not help much. Max

Black in his *A Companion to Wittgenstezn's 'Tractatus'* makes only the following remarks: 'It is a sufficiently remarkable thought.'

Vol. XVIII, No.1

K.C. Pandey

**Explication on above**

'...in life we are surrounded by death...'

'To the extent there is courage, there is connection with life & death.'

Ludwig Wittgenstein


At the outset one must say that it would be wrong to reflect upon Wittgenstein's aphorisms, whether in the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* or in his other works, in isolation. In order to grasp their full import one has to see them in the context in which they are made. Wittgenstein himself exhorts his readers *ad nauseam*, and is never tired of advising them not to see the issues raised by him out of their context. So much so, that even in the Preface of the *Tractatus* he begins by saying 'Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it—or at least similar thoughts.' And again, 'Each sentence that I write is trying to say the whole thing...' (*CV* p.9). Mr. K.C. Pandey misses this, and therefore his query regarding the place of a sporadic remark, or a cluster of occasional remarks on death by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, in particular and his other writings in general, in the extensive context of Western Metaphysics, is misplaced.

In the *Tractatus* the remarks about death are found in the paragraphs numbered 6.431, 6.4311 and 6.4312. These are the paragraphs, which occur in the context in which Wittgenstein is labouring to enunciate the nature and 'general form' of a 'logical proposition'. The question with which Wittgenstein is concerned here is: 'why logical propositions cannot be confirmed by experience any more than they can be refuted by it.' (*TLP* 6.122) The point that he wishes to make is 'Not only must a proposition of logic be irrefutable by any possible experience, but it must also be unconformable by any possible experience' (*TLP* 6.122). He wishes to establish that 'The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. They have no 'subject matter'. They

presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense; and that is their connection with the world' (TLP 6.124).

To illustrate his point Wittgenstein makes use of analogies with Hertz's Mechanics on dynamical models (TLP 4.04, 6.36 1), Law of causality (TLP 6.31-6.33), Newtonian mechanics (TLP 6.341-6.343), laws, like principle of sufficient reason (TLP 6.35) and finally uses the simile of death. In TLP 6.431 Wittgenstein states 'So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end' (emphasis added). Here the words 'so too' refer to the fact that death in no way alters the world and if at all one insists that it does alter it, then that alteration is only of 'the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language' (TLP 6.43). In TLP 6.4311 Wittgenstein further elaborates his above contention by saying that 'Death is not an event in life; we do not live to experience death.' In *Culture and Value* he elaborates it further when he says: '...one can only foresee one's own death and describe it as something lying in the future, not report as it happens' (p. 12). At the time death strikes a person, the person ceases to be a person anymore. Personhood is co-terminus with the occurrence of death. A person and his death cannot co-exist. This temporal relation is inbuilt in the concept of death. Wittgenstein in *Culture and Value*, rebuking the 'Philosophers who say: 'after death a timeless state will supervene', or 'at death a timeless state supervenes' 'tries to draw to their notice 'that they have used in a temporal sense the words 'after' & 'at' & 'supervenes' & that temporality is embedded in their grammar' (p. 26).

Death has no subject. 'The subject' according to Wittgenstein 'does not belong to the world; rather, it is a limit of the world' (TLP 5.632). It is '—not a part of it' (TLP 5.641). For Wittgenstein, I must hasten to add, 'the world is my world' (TLP 5.62) and 'The limits of my language mean the limits of my world' (TLP 5.6). He illustrates this by taking the 'form of the visual field'. A representation of the form of the visual field does not refer to the perceiving eye. In TLP 5.633 1 he categorically says, the form of the visual field is surely not like this



And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by the eye' (TLP 5.633). Similarly, nothing in my life allows me to infer that it is limited by 'my' death. Wittgenstein comparing life with visual field says in TLP 6.4311: 'Our life has no end just the way in which our visual field has no limits.'

To illustrate his point further, Wittgenstein takes the example of a book, which describes the world as I found it; such a book would not contain any description of the experiencing I—the subject of the book (Cf. TLP 5.631). One could further illustrate the concept of 'limit' by taking the example of a circle. What should be regarded as the limit of a circle? Is the inner edge of the segment forming the circumference of the circle to be treated as its limit, or is it the outer edge? The problem is further complicated by the fact that the line constituting the circumference cannot have any breadth, as a line by definition cannot have breadth. So, can we at all regard the circumference to be part of the circle, or do we have to regard it as the limit of the circle? Whichever way we may decide, it would in no way change the nature, and our understanding of circle; it can in no way change 'what can be expressed by means of language' (TLP 6.43). But in case the answers to the questions posed by us do change the nature of a circle then its effect would be 'that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole' (TLP 6.43).

The idea of Wittgenstein in taking the example of death in the *Tractatus* as well as in *Notebooks* is not to discuss the nature of death—a point missed by Pandey—but it is to clarify the distinction between saying and showing. Just as it can only be shown that death does not alter the world but only brings it to an end, likewise the general form of a proposition can only be shown. 'Propositions' according to him 'show the logical form...They display it' (TLP 4.121). One cannot talk about, or discuss the nature of logical form within the perimeters of language

because it itself is the form of language in the sense that it is what makes language itself possible. Similarly, Wittgenstein maintains, that though 'only death gives life its meaning';<sup>54</sup> it is 'death which is the limit of life and manifests in life itself. This is in keeping with Wittgenstein's conception of Philosophy namely that Philosophy sets 'limits to what can be thought; and in doing so, to what cannot be thought' (TLP 4.114) and that it tries to 'signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said' (TLP 4.115). And one has to remember that according to him 'What *can* be shown, *cannot* be said (TLP 4.1212).' It is also consistent with his general thesis stated in TLP 6.522 namely that 'There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical.' Death too, as argued above, manifests itself in life in the sense that it is the phenomenon of death which prompts us to ask questions about life and its meaning, and that is why it has a mystical aura around it. It is mystical, as Niels Bohr puts it, because 'we are both spectators and actors in the great drama of existence'. It is also mystical because its nature and experience cannot, and I mean logically cannot, be put in words. It is like something about which the *Kena Upanishad II.3* says:

*Yasyāmatm' tasya matam' matam' yasya na veda sah  
Avijñātām' vijñātām' vijñātāmavijñātām.*

That is 'He knows It who knows It not; and he knows It not, who knows It. To the man of true knowledge, It is the 'unknown', while to the ignorant It is the 'known'.' Rahim says about the same thing:

*Rahiman baat agamya ki, kahan-sunan ki naahin,  
Jo jaanat so kahan nahin, kahe so jaanat naahin.*

This is 'O Rahim! one cannot talk about the nature of the inconceivable; one who knows it, does not speak about it and the one who speaks about its nature does not know it.' It is something about which not a lot of blabbering but silence is the best mode of communication. Anyone who eventually understands their true nature recognizes all talk about them

as nonsensical. Wittgenstein too says the same thing when he says in TLP 7 'What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.'

I am neither sure nor competent to say whether the religions whose origins are traced to India for example, Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism treat death as an event in the world. But if they do, then either they are saying something very tenuous or they are talking from the third person perspective alone. It is tenuous in the sense that whatever happens to a person—even *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* or *mukti*—happens in the world (*jagat*) and not outside or beyond it. The best description that one may give of a *mukta*, or the one who has attained *nirvāṇa* or *mokṣa* is that he is in the world yet he is not in it. But on the other hand, if they are talking from the third person perspective alone then they are missing one of the most vital characteristics of 'death' namely that death certainly is the limit of a person's life. It cannot be regarded from the first person perspective an event in the person's life. 'My' death, for example, from my perspective shall be the limit of my life. A moment before my death shall be an event in my life. The events and circumstances leading to my death can be painful or peaceful but the death itself can neither be painful nor peaceful. It is just an occurrence, a happening like many others and is peculiar in the sense that it brings an end to my conscious worldly life (*ihloka*); it brings down the final curtain for 'me' from the third person perspective.

Vol. XVIII, No.1

Ashok Vohra

#### Wittgenstein on Fact

What exactly does Wittgenstein mean by the word 'fact' in the *Tractatus*? Is it the referent of an atomic proposition and if so, has the world, constituted as it is by atomic facts, no actual relations between them except those 'superimposed' by the logical connectives which alone 'connect' the atomic propositions? *JICPR*,

Vol. XIX, No. 3.

Daya Krishna

#### Reply

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein introduces two words for 'fact': *tatsache* (1.11-2) and *sachverhalt* (2.0122-2.0124). *Tatsache* is translated as 'fact'

54. Quoted in Ray Monk, *The Duty of A Genius*, Vintage, p. 139.

and *sachverhalt* as 'state of affairs'. While the former may be understood as a complex of facts, the latter may stand for atomic facts, which are independent of each other (2.061). In this sense, we can say that the world is constituted of atomic facts which are without any actual relation between them.

Atomic facts are so called because they are ontologically independent of one another, since from the existence or non-existence of one, nothing can be inferred about the existence or non-existence of another (2.062). That is, an atomic fact is unrelated to other atomic facts. However, all the atomic facts together constitute the world (2.04). They are in the logical space (1.13).

The atomic facts or the states of affairs are represented or pictured by the atomic or elementary propositions. Each atomic proposition T stands for an atomic fact. This is how a neat pictorial relation is established between the atomic propositions and the world (4.21).

As regards the relations among the facts which arise in the logical space, if not in the ontological space, the *Tractatus* introduces a mechanism of connection *via* the logical space. The logical space is a mosaic of relations as the 'world divides into facts' (1.2). This is because the world is represented in a truth-functional language. Language imposes division on the world. That is why there is a network of relations not only among the facts but also among the propositions. However, relations are out and out logical since they are established by connectives and are imposed on an ontologically discrete world.

Space and time themselves are logical relations among the facts and not among the things which constitute the atomic facts. Atomic facts or states of affairs are concatenations of objects (2.0272-2.032). The objects themselves are not in space and time. They constitute the unchanging substance of the world (2.021, 2.023).

Vol. XIX, No.4

R.C. Pradhan

### Science and Non-science

How can there be such a discipline as Philosophy of Science when attempts at demarcation between science and non science have failed in spite of the Herculean efforts of Popper. In fact, the same fate seems to have befallen the attempt to demarcate between cognitive and non-cognitive enterprises of man.

Moreover, if there are no 'essences', as is now commonly believed, how can there is philosophy of anything, or even such a thing as 'philosophy' itself. The denial of 'essence' entails the impossibility of demarcating or drawing of boundaries and, if taken seriously, would result in blurring all sharp distinctions. And, in case this is correct, distinctions indicated by such old-fashioned phrases as 'philosophy of...' would only be archaeological remnants of older, out-moded, confused ways of thinking.

Vol. XVI, No.3

Daya Krishna

### Reply 1

The Other Side of Paradigms! Comments on the query regarding 'Philosophy of Science' published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No.3

It has been, of late, noticed that there have been a lot of questions concerning the essence of science and philosophy. In this paper I have attempted to figure out the essence of theoretical pursuits in general and scientific enquiries in particular, by delving into the potential source of scientific paradigms, from an existential point of view. This paper, in some way, highlights the point that subjectivity cannot be outrightly ruled out from the scientific arena, and that the *subjective-configuration* of the data is the essence of science and other theoretical enterprises like philosophy.

The general trend of the time is that our enquiries, to be deemed worthwhile, must be scientific. Any unscientific discourse is classified as mere opinion founded on baseless speculations and belief. To be scientific, in any discourse, is to meticulously follow the pertinent set of scientific principles and adhere to its methodology. The foundation of scientism lies in its methodology.

Scientific methodology inculcates a certain set of parameters—such as observation, hypothesis formation, experimentation and putation, comparison of the results with the facts and evaluation of it, classification and generalization etc. All these steps are worked out with much logical precision, so that the investigators would emulate and embrace what is known as the scientific methodology; if at all it endeavours in bringing about results that are scientifically c ally meaningful and convincing. However, scientific investigations are usually based on a certain set of already established scientific theories. It is these theories that pronounce scientific verdict upon a phenomenon under investigation. Hence these theories are the foundation principles that Kuhn in his work *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* calls *Paradigms*. Paradigms are the set of theoretical framework, within which scientific investigations progress. It is a characteristic set of scientific techniques with the help of which one not only observes the given data but also gives an explanation of the given phenomenon. Thus, paradigms are the basic set of principles which determine the course of one's approach to the given phenomenon and the functional principles which justify one's knowledge of the given phenomenon. This is so, because by making our observations selective, paradigms distinguish between what one should observe and what should be neglected in a given phenomenon. Hence, paradigms are the theoretical framework against which scientific investigations and theories are adjusted. If an investigation brings forth successful results, within the parameters of the paradigm, then it is well vindicated. But if it falls short, it is either negligible or yet to be adjudged with the future tests, with more evidence. This is much evident in Kuhn's writings, as he puts it in *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (1962, p. 81)

No one seriously questioned Newtonian theory because of the long-recognised discrepancies between predictions from that theory and both the speed of sound and motion of

mercury. The first discrepancy was ultimately and quite unexpectedly solved by experiments on heat undertaken for a very different purpose; the second vanished with the general theory of relativity after a crisis it had had no role in creating.

The foregoing claim is an indication that, usually, paradigms are unquestioned. They are like the standard foot-scale. In Kuhn's account there is no harm in hanging on to a theory, even if at the moment it cannot produce sufficient explanation for the shortcoming of its predictions. Kuhn makes it clear in his work that scientific activity is essentially a puzzle-solving activity. In this process anomalies of theories are put forth as problems to be solved. But the task of resolving these anomalies are carried out without any presumption that failure to solve them will lead to the rejection of the theory in question. Kuhn here points out the example of Vulcan which was posited basing on the success of Newtonian physics in the discovery of Neptune—to be the inter-Mercurial planet that is responsible for the deviation of Mercury from its path. But, unfortunately Vulcan could not be discovered. Dispite this, Newtonian physics continued to be successful in many other fields. Hence, it would have been irrational on the part of scientists to give up a knowledge-increasing model of reality like Newtonian physics. Nonetheless, my contention is that all theories are probabilistic and render only partial and probabilistic viewpoints. This is so, because the theories are to a large extent determined by the subjective conditions that impinge upon the processes of their discovery. And, if we strictly base our investigations on a particular paradigm (Like Newtonian physics 2), our discoveries will be one-sided and what is beyond the reach of this particular paradigm will never be discovered nor be understood. Hence, we need innumerable, well-tested, paradigms to investigate upon and discover the diverse modalities of reality. In Kuhn's account a paradigm is a frame of reference into which things must fall in proper order. If so, Marxism and psychoanalysis too are some sort of paradigms as theoreticians base their assumptions

on them. Thus, the function of a paradigm is to direct our cognition and make them selective. Paradigms determine the standard of a theory and the predictive characteristic of a theory. But, how does one determine the accuracy of a paradigm itself? Is there any authentic set of rules which can justify the feasibility and credibility of a given paradigm?

It is at this juncture that one may need to call on Popperian *falsification* theory, in order to justify the Kuhnian paradigms. Popper holds that if a theory (that stands as the paradigm) yields to Falsification criterion, then one must discard it and work out a new theory that would stay as a paradigm until it is further discarded by the criteria of Conjecture and refutation. So in Popperian account, search for refutation, by counter evidence, is the trademark of scientism. Popper being an anti-inductionist, holds that the reason behind this is that one can never conclusively prove a theory, but can only disprove it. This is so, because a generalization based on induction by simple enumeration is refutable by just a counter evidence. And proving a theory amounts to the accumulations of experiences of its previous workability and the subsequent inductive generalization. This implies that only objective theories are vulnerable to falsification criterion and be scientific. But, subjective theories, like psychoanalysis and Marxian economics are not vulnerable to falsification, as the theoreticians try to defend the shortcomings(s) of their theories. However, falsification criterion is used in evaluating theories. So, falsification is, as it were, the paradigm that stands as an aid in rating the liability of theories; while these theories (like Newtonian physics) themselves stand as paradigms that enhance further investigation. Popperian philosophy of science, while leaving an open platform for scientists, also, as it were, propagates innumerable Kuhnian paradigms, and falsification theory is a major way of judging those paradigms. This not only renders falsification theory a boost as the paradigms (a Meta-Paradigm), but also puts it into devastating danger of vindication its

own scientific spirit by its own laws. That is, if falsification theory is to be scientific, it should undergo and stand the test of falsification. The law of contradiction states that a thing (theory) cannot be both itself and not itself at one and the same time. So in our endeavours to falsify the theory of falsification, if we could somehow succeed, then falsification theory, itself false, cannot any longer stay as a paradigm in justifying the scientific status of other theories. Thus.

1. The Credibility of a scientific investigation is determined by its relationship with a paradigm-if it is within the framework of the paradigm then it is scientific and if not, it is either unscientific or one must wait for further evidences.
2. Scientific calculations and predictions must be within the parameters of the set paradigm.
3. Scientific theories (which themselves are paradigms) stand in — relation to some other paradigms; one paradigm would need another paradigm to justify itself and one of the ways to justify itself would be to subject itself to the principle of falsification.
4. Thus, even the theory of falsification itself has to stand before the falsification-paradigm, in order to establish its scientific tenability. Is it not a vicious circle?

To go a step further, in Popperian line, to test a theory one needs to construct sub-theories (or what he calls, conjectures), which would make bold and unexpected predictions, and if they are (at least one of them is) false then it would be sufficient to reject the theory and declare it unscientific. According to popper, a theory is well corroborated, if it is highly testable and yet survives severe testing. In other words, for a theory to be scientific it must be potentially falsifiable. As he writes, 'statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable observations.' The testability of a theory is related to its capacity to yield testable predictions with empirical content. Popper's example to this point

is the bold and highly improbable predictions, that Einstein made by his theory of gravitation, about the deviation in the path of light which was thought to be caused by the presence of a heavy body. This prediction was not tested until the year 1919, when a total eclipse of the sun made the testing possible. But should this test have run against Einstein's prediction, then he would have renounced his theory; because counter-evidences stand against it. However, in this way, in my opinion, even a hypothesis, which is otherwise unproved can be justified to be a scientific paradigm-provided that all the bold and unexpected predictions that are based on the hypothesis in question are proved true. An elegant example to this point is the Avogadro Number. The Avogadro Number ( $6.4 \times 10^{23}$ ) is in itself a hypothesis, but very much used in molar chemistry. This is so, because the predictions based on it are proved to be workably true. Still more, certain factual statements like 'virus exists', 'there are cells in the human body etc. are empirically true, though they do not have potential falsifiers. Does it mean that they are unscientific? Here, one needs to keep in mind that certain things are justified by some sort of relationship that it holds with certain known things, and that they may also possess some kind of, justifiable, relationship with some unknown things. Sometimes these unknown relations may be more valuable in establishing its worth. Perhaps, the same sub-theories that the Avogadro hypothesis claims to justify could be justified by some other, may be, yet undiscovered theories. In other words, the same fact can be proved and justified in innumerable ways by an infinite number of potential theories. Our ignorance of such theories could be due to technological limitations or intellectual limitations, or both; along with the divergent orientations of our psychological apparatus. It is worth mentioning here that the psychological set-up of a person, to a great extent, determines the scientific aspirations of that person.

Given the above points, what I would like to state is that, what holds true in any scientific investigation is a complex relationship, in some way, between the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge. It is not merely a perceptual relationship, rather a deep-rooted psychological relationship between the knower-coloured by the perspective that s/he holds about life, self and the universe-and the knowee (object of knowledge). Every paradigm is not only relative to the psychological perspective that one cherishes, but also that the creation and selection of any theory as a paradigm for any investigation is the by-product of one's psychological set-up. Our psychological apparatus is imbued with certain form of moral. Religious, cultural, socio-economic and political compulsions and concerns. These compulsions and concerns can be held responsible for colouring our precepts and strategies. Thus, our thought processes are determined not only by our somatic constitution, but also by the impact of socio-cultural moorings. At this point I would like to state that a successful paradigm is the by-product of some (positive) sort of personal-situational factors; and that the grooming of a paradigm is not an accidental act, but an act spontaneously and deliberately precipitated by some preponderant psychological impetus. This is not only obvious in Einstein's discovery of relativity theory (compelled by his obsessive desire to move the clock as fast as possible), but also well evident in Newton's discovery of planetary motion. Newtonian theory of planetary motion-though based on the general gravitational law-is an off-shoot of his faith in some Supreme Being. That is to say, it might have been inspired by his theological considerations in understanding and uniting phenomena and noumena with mathematical accuracy. Here, one may reckon the age-old aphorism *man is the measurer of all* and juxtapose it with Berkeleyan subjective-idealism that *perceiver constitutes the world*. The point that, no matter how objective one tends to be, one's psychological whims and aspirations determine the strategic progress of scientific investigation and discoveries is buttressed

concretely by various evidences provided by modern science and technology. Man's desire to fly and establish dominance over other planets determines the discovery of scientific theories (in-aero-physics) that would work as a paradigm in constructing space-ships and the development of space technology. More so, in information technology; let alone the advancements in medical science and missile technology-which are the consequences of man's desire to perpetuate his mundane existence by subjugating his enemies, both at microcosm and macrocosm. Man's desire to communicate with people afar determines the discovery of theories (in energy physics) that would work as a paradigm in the invention of sophisticated information technology. Yet, notwithstanding the initial discoveries, every day more sophisticated and improvised versions of a technology emerge: Now, what is the principle behind all this sophistication? Well, it is none other than (empirical and logical) configuration possibility. A system, be it abstract or concrete, can be configured in an infinite number of ways. And the discovery of every potential theory is the resultant of configuration of the data in a particular way or other, depending upon the psychological orientation and aspiration of the person at work. An example of this point is that both Newton and Leibniz, being influenced by their own existential concerns and subjective state, could independently develop Calculus.<sup>4</sup> hence, the foundation of scientism is built upon the rock of configurational possibility of the data, which is determined by the existential and subjective state of the investigator. This not only harkens us to the jigsaw of psychological relativism operating in scientific investigation, but also warns us of the threat of a stringent psychological determinism that it would accentuate. In other words, at the deeper strata, a theory (or what we call paradigm) is, implicitly, the outcome of a certain form of configurational activity that, somehow, operates within the psyche of the investigator. Anything that is constitute, abstract or concrete, has a configurative structure. It is this

configurative structure that makes something what it constitutionally is and installs on it a convincing meaning. This was readily understood by Leibniz, as he wrote to Bartholomew Bosses, about infinitesimals: Infinitesimals are Psychooical fictions, though they have their place in calculations, like the imaginary roots in algebra.<sup>5</sup> So also is the case with both philosophy and science. Philosophers and scientists, being concerned with unfolding the manifold dimensions of reality, are constantly engaged in the activity of logical configuration of ideas, while the genesis of these ideas might have been triggered by some subjective concerns. And what is logical is also subjective, because logical processes are in-here and not out-there, hence the essence both science and philosophy is *subjective-configuration*. Is it not what Jainism teaches in syadvada?

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Charles P. Alexander

#### Reply 2

The demarcation problem of science, indeed was one of the chief motivations of early Popper but so was understanding the phenomenon of science specially its ontological commitment. The first is usually concerned with the distinction between science and non-science but the other, the problem of the ontological commitment of science is known as the



problem of realism as opposed to operationalistic or positivistic interpretation of science.

Let us first take the demarcation problem. Popper first formulated this not only in the context of the phenomenon we call science; he had a deeper intention. Non-scientific propositions are based on unchangeable beliefs. Therefore in the absence of some strong requirement which distinguishes science from religion, it was assumed, we'll not be able to defend the objective status of scientific theories. On the other hand none of the existing theories offered any interpretation of science which allowed cognitive claims made in the sciences, that is about the world, at the same time leaving the possibility of new sciences.

Popper was working in the thirties at which time two influential views were operationalism and logical positivism. The first one succeeded in gaining some ground explicitly because of new discoveries in physics, namely, relativity theory and quantum mechanics. Both of them departed substantially from classical mechanics. The Classical picture of the world could not offer a viable interpretation of those theories. Usual notions like space, time, matter, causality took a severe beating due to the nature of the claim made by these theories. The Classical picture told us that space and time are different—indeed to believe Kant—they are forms of external and internal experience. To begin with Einstein needed a concept of simultaneity to derive his Special Theory of Relativity. But new relativity claims that they are dimensions of a 'frame' and every frame has its own time. Time-difference in one frame may be transformed to be different in a different frame. Further, Classical Mechanics posits point particles having exact space-time location. This could give us a well defined ontology since each entity is exactly identifiable in a space-time framework. Quantum mechanics, on the contrary, claims that there are essentially non-separable but, *presumably*, distinct entities like a pair of electrons having different spins. They are distinct because they have some distinct properties but when we treat them theoretically, no separable description (wave function) is possible. Operationalism heroically offered a solution. It preached: don't think in terms of the world or the entities it is made of. Think of the

operations taking place in the laboratory [Brigdeman 1960]. Everything is but codification of that activity. Science is all about that and nothing else.

So we have a solution in the form of dissolving the metaphysical question. These classical questions are non-questions now. No problem about absoluteness of space.

Questions regarding the nature of time or simultaneity are eliminated. So the fate of the questions 'what are the furniture of the world?' or 'what is nature of matter?' are irrelevant. The only philosophical activity possible was to recover the operational meaning of the scientific propositions.

The positivists started from a general Philosophy of Language armed with a theory of meaning and their typical reductionism. So they also preached that doing Philosophy of Science is to get to the meaning of sentences the theory produces. But for them meaning was 'method of verification'. So again we end up in the laboratory. Look at sentences which are verified (actually or possibly). But what can be verified? Certainly, or so they claimed, not the existence of an electron or proton or...Therefore, talking about these entities which are, allegedly, the centers of various observable properties, need not have a place in science. They are 'theoretical terms' and should be eliminated. With them all questions about their metaphysical status are converted to non-questions. In this view philosophy of science is but a reductionist activity with the sole aim at getting to observable properties alone. But they were ready to accept only the verification theory of meaning. So all non-scientific discourses were claimed to be meaningless. The demarcation problem was solved as a consequence of the theory of meaning [for a mature view see Carnap 1967, specially the Pseudoproblem part].

When Popper [Popper 1968] was writing on Philosophy of Science such philosophical attitudes were ruling the horizons of science. He could correctly see that verificationism could not serve as the foundation of a viable Philosophy of Science; because lot of labour goes behind deciding what is observed and what is not. We need, possibly, simpler theories, to come to the conclusion. To take an example, in any experiment involving a cyclotron, we shall have to assume that we know the properties of the electrons fired at the target. But we have already used a lot of magnetism

and electricity physics to do that. So what about the pure observable properties? Any meaning depending upon such observable properties is already theory loaded. Therefore, there is no verification.

But, in physics at least, we do have activities like Michelson-Morley's experiment (M-M) or Millikan's oil drop experiment. It involves tiny charged oil drops in a special situation so that they remain suspended between two charged plates due to combined effects of the gravitational and electric forces. Why take such trouble? Everyone knew that Michelson-Morley's experiment 'proved' that classical relativity is wrong. So Popper thought that here lies the answer. Instead of verification he offered falsification as the real basis of science. The result was that he could at once explain the necessity of experiments as well as give us a ground to demarcate between science and non-science. For no religious pronouncements are falsifiable. Further, such theory allows us to claim knowledge of worldly objects because nothing was eliminated in the process of getting to the meaning of the scientific claims. On the whole therefore Popper's position was taken to be a significant Philosophy of Science.

So what was the issue? Find a place for experimentation within the activity of science so that we can allow cognitive claims made in science. But, as is well known, this apparent strength of his position was also his bane. For Lorentz came up with a theory with the additional hypothesis of universal force. This additional theory was able to take care of the null result obtained in the experiment. So did the M-M experiment falsify classical relativity? Popper sought to dub the hypothesis as *ad-hoc*. But when is a theory *ad hoc*? When is it falsifiable. Well, when is a theory falsifiable? Only when we separated all the *ad-hoc* hypotheses. Nice result it is, but we shall come back to this later.

Thomas Kuhn [1970] came into the debate at this point. He argued that even falsifiability is not all that unproblematic. For him theories are never falsified. They gradually die out. A theory is accepted or rejected in a paradigm society projects. So he was actually asking a different question; when is a theory accepted in a social paradigm?

If this little puzzle above shows anything then it is this that Popper was addressing some other issues also apart from looking for a place for experiments within the domain of science. One issue is seen immediately: that of theory change. When can we say that there is a need for theory change. Popper's preaching that a scientist should go for most far fetched conjectures and look for its falsification, can have a meaning only when we have settled this issue of theory change. Lakatos [Lakatos and Musgrave 1970], the man who succeeded him in his chair in LSE thought he had an answer. He taught us that a theory is part of a research program and has a hard core and a periphery. This hard core is shared by all the theories of the program. It cannot be touched. What can be changed in the face of any challenge from any experiment is its outer layer. So given a core a theory may be falsified and a new hypothesis may be inducted when experiments disagree with its prediction. So Lakatos thought we have a different question to answer: when can a theory succeed another? When is there a growth of knowledge? Besides, we have now other areas to investigate, viz., what makes a hard core a hard core, *i.e.* question of rationality and consequently we should better devote ourselves to internal and external histories of science. So Philosophy of Science now has a different face. We now do not talk about *the Science* but *a* scientific research program. But there was this spin off. Getting to know the world through science view was again taken up recently and a battle was fought on Scientific Realism. The issue is now what motivates the activity? So the old Popperian problem is resurrected in a different form. The problem now is: What explains the behaviour of the scientists and what follows from such explanation? It was argued that realism affords the best explanation of why should one indulge in constructing and refuting scientific theories at all? If we forget demarcation and its problems, is *falsifiability* good enough reason, as a matter of fact, to explain the behaviour of most of the scientists in countless laboratories and science departments. If posed this way *falsifiability* as a criterion is hard to defend. So again there is reason to change tack. Putnam and other scientific realists took the activity of the scientists as data and thought of explaining on the basis of theory of language, more specifically a theory of reference. Indeed language is the

most immediate and therefore the most dependable data we have. But Putnam & Boyd [see their articles in Leplin 1984] took it for granted that scientists describe (part of) the world. The problem is then how is it possible to describe? Or what view of the language allows us to describe?

But again this very basis of explanation was rejected by many philosophers. Van Fraassen [1980] for example rejects this very premise that scientists describe at all. For him a scientist only 'saves the phenomena'. Very often the description's view invokes the *criterion of simplicity* as a methodological rule of coming to the right description. Because as we have seen in the case of M-M experiment, there were several explanations and the simpler explanation, that of Einstein, was picked up. Einstein and many others, including Chandrasekhar explicitly argued that true description must be simple. Van Fraassen with Sellers rejected this. Nature may not have much to do with simplicity. It is just a methodological requirement. Unless we reject this there seems to be a vicious circle. Why is nature simple? Because simple descriptions (read theory) are true. What description is true? Simple descriptions are true! Reject this and we have only pragmatics of explanation to defend simple theory; therefore not defending any particular theory as true description. Acceptance of a theory is ultimately pragmatic. Simple theories are more easily unusable. So Van Fraassen has an explanation for the motivation question. But is the answer true as a matter of fact? Note that at bottom it is an empirical statement that scientists just try to save the phenomena. I am almost sure most of the scientists wouldn't accept that. In any case it is not at all clear that this is the only way to answer the motivational question. Certainly Van Fraassen's is not the only answer. What are the other answers?

\* Others like Larry Laudan [in Hacking 1981] thought our task is to investigate into the puzzle-solving aspect of science. For this we can look at history and try to characterize what were the problems posed and how people thought to have solved them. He thinks solving a problem might be challenge enough and a scientist might find enough in a problem to motivate him. But solving a problem is a response to understanding

something which is not understood otherwise. So again distancing ourselves from the *experiment and world* view to *understanding and reason* view of some of the features we call science. In the process we have left behind verification or falsification.

At this point a different question was asked: What could really be the very subject of appraisal? To begin with, it is the activity called science of course. But even science, specially during revolutions, does indulge in a lot of methodological, conceptual debate. Methodologists are now beginning to ask: is there a pattern in the methodological debate? Pandit [Pandit 1981] thinks that methodological/ metatheoretical variance at various levels should also be taken seriously. Science for him is *negative feedback controlled problem solving systems*.

However, one thing is sure. Philosophers were taking scientific theories more seriously than taking them as data for explanation. So these concepts got the prominence, viz., *Confirmation, Acceptance, Verification, Falsification, Truth, Verisimilitude, Theoretical Term, Theory Change, Rationality, Progress* etc. So that when Popper was apparently asking the question of the divide between science and religion he actually ended up asking the question, what makes an hypothesis *ad hoc*. Others similarly reduced the issue of verification or operational meaning.

On the other hand the inevitable consequence of taking theories too seriously led realists like Putnam to accept *internalism*. Thereby reducing his position to a kind of nominalism.

Ian Hacking and Nancy Cartwright on the other hand direct our attention to the fact that the important part of what is called science, experiments, are left behind. The question raised by Kuhn and Quine and accepted by internal realists, theory-ladenness of data is pushed too much. As if we always decide on the basis of a theory. Hacking chooses the example of Henri Becquerel's discovery of  $\gamma$ -rays. He just discovered that photographic plates are exposed even after remaining under cover. Did he have a theory before he discovered the exposed plates? However Hacking didn't play it too far. We have another question: did he have a theory before he recognized it to be exposed by  $\gamma$ -rays? However Hacking

certainly brought some new blood in the debate between realist and non-realist in philosophy of science. His suggestion is not to take the overall meaning indeterminacy at face value and associated scepticism all that seriously. Instead he asks us to look for what is happening in the experiments. His slogan is: if we can use something to produce a phenomenon then it must be real.

This is what we shall have to ascertain; did we use the entity in question to produce some phenomena? If we did, then in what sense is it unreal? Putnam tried to rescue the reference and therefore realism through his brain-in-a-vat argument: If we are brains-in-a-vat then we are not brains-in-a-vat. So reference must exist out there. But what is it that exists? Putnam prescribes to 'cut it as you like'. The role of theory comes in as soon as we try to say something! Hacking almost plays the same game. It is almost an experimenter's transcendental argument. Producing a phenomenon requires doing-with. So if you are not doing-with then you are doing-with. The focus is now shifted from description to intervention. But do the theoretical under-determination, that is internal realism, and the experimenter's determination supplement each other? That much is not available. For we do not know how to use the universal to produce some phenomena. Neither has anybody ever used *bare mass*.

Nancy Cartwright [1983] proposed a distinction between theory realism and entity realism. According to her Hacking's intervention thesis goes well with entity realism. Cartwright supplements Hacking's thesis with the additional requirement of causal efficacy. But to recognize that, we shall have to know what a cause is. Cartwright [1983] proposes that we take Mill's method of determining the cause and proceed to look for the entities. Putnam's way, to internalism was based on the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem. Cartwright rejects that. Theories, she argues, are necessarily products of idealization. 'Truth doesn't explain much.' For if a theory is true then it cannot explain. If it cannot explain then it cannot be used. Therefore, a theory with data cannot produce a consistent whole. So there is no model at all. If there is no model at all then there is no question of innumerably many models. Laws of physics lie.

But is Mill's method all that perfect? Don't we get back all the problems of confirmation we had before? In Cartwright [1978] she gets back to this question. She doesn't think that laws of physics lie. They are true now but because they speak about capacities and how these capacities play the causal role. Theories are still false but because there will have to be a layer of constructions in between phenomenological and the general laws. As an empiricist she *hopes* to eliminate this layer.

In any case several questions remains unanswered. For example, what if the theories talk about the capacities but have a difference in some respect—like quantum theory and hidden variable construction? Will it be all that easy to solve such puzzles only on the basis of 'causal efficacy'? I have some grave doubts. The possibility of causal laws may not be sufficient to *nail down the form* of causal laws. We'll need something in the structural level like right geometry or right logic.

Cartwright did a great job in arguing that the measurement postulate is an artifact of mathematics. But her scheme does not have a specific place for geometry or logic. The question of empiricism in logic was first raised by Quine and forcefully argued by Putnam and many others. It is argued that foundational problems in quantum mechanics can be solved using a different logic, *i.e.*, quantum logic. It was first proposed by von Neumann, though Reichenbach proposed a three valued logic of quantum mechanics. But interpreting quantum logic itself became quite a problem. Cartwright's scheme does not answer this question. I think an answer is possible if we extend her scheme. Quantum logic also explains but this explanation is structural. It shows why some systems can't fail to behave in the way they do in Quantum Mechanics. But that is a different topic [Mukherjee 1994].

We are yet to touch mathematics, chemistry, biology, statistics, economics and cognitive science. In economics we have a parallel view in Amartya Sen [see 'Description as Choice' in Sen 1983]. He also takes theories to be of instrumental value only; still true descriptions are possible. Cartwright confines herself mostly to physics, Sen limits his discussion to economics only. The question is: can we generalize?

Usual discussions about methodology of inductive reasoning depended on logical possibility. Recent work in logic and mathematics shows that

this criterion of logical possibility, being intimately linked with the notion of consistency is not all that well defined. Some are of the opinion that logical possibility is not very useful in discussions about Hume's problem. Instead they find computability is a better tool to handle such situations [Glymour et al. 1987 and 1993; Kelly 1995. Gillies 1996]. So models and ideas from artificial intelligence are coming in a big way in Philosophy of Science. This I think is a big paradigm shift. Instead of asking if there is any logical way of settling admissibility and/or unavoidability of a particular hypothesis, we should ask if there is any computational reason for acceptance of the same. If not acceptability, can we have good reasons to refute a putative hypothesis with certainty using effective computability? Further, given a set of data, one may ask what new concept/concepts it might support. Even though such works are just beginning, this should be a very fruitful exercise in Philosophy of Science.

There are other areas also full of interesting possibilities. There is this very interesting question in methodology of biology regarding the nature of explanation in Darwin's *The Origin of Species*. Ruse thinks there is an explanatory core from which a wide class of facts could be obtained. But the issue of supremacy could not be settled on this account alone. There are arguments [Recker 1987] to show that a wider perspective is necessary to account for Darwin's work.

A related field is Consciousness Studies. There are claims that consciousness can be explained away [Dennett 1991, 1993]. However there are contrary claims (using arguments from both Philosophy of Science as well as philosophy of language) why this could not be done [Chalmers 1996].

In an interesting article McMullin [in Peacocke 1981, pp 17-57] addressed the question of the use of the *anthropic principle* in science. It is well known that this principle has its roots in theology. In particular he asks, How should cosmology relate to theology?

So my view is that Philosophy of Science does not need a clear-cut distinction between science and religion. At issue is explaining and understanding science. The debate on science taught us to take science not

at face value but as data to explain and understand. What level we need to go to or we shall have to go to may not be settled *a priori*. It might very well depend upon the context. Philosophy of Science does not need essentialism. Neither does it need something like Wittgenstein family resemblance.

Further, even theological questions might very well be important to understand science.

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Bijoy Mukherjee

### Reply 3

#### Can the 'Game' of Wittgenstein Entertain the 'Essence' of Daya Krishna?

1. There is no 'essence' of any concept that can fill the blank '-' in 'philosophy of -'.
2. Denial of the 'essence' of a concept entails that there is no boundary of its applications.
3. Therefore,
  - (a) The philosophy of - has no boundary (no matter what you put in the blank).
  - (b) Philosophy has no boundary.
  - (c) Distinctions suggested by putting distinct words in the blank of 'philosophy of -' would only be archaeological remnants of older, out-moded, confused ways of thinking'.<sup>55</sup>

The question involved in Professro Daya Krishna's query<sup>56</sup> is basically this: Can we deny (3), if we accept (1) and (2)? The query has a significant implication. That is, if nothing is wrong in the above argument, our philosophical investigations are sheer paper works without any conviction. If our philosophical enquiry convinces us of the absence of 'essence', our use of any concept should not presume an essence. Consequently, none of our conceptual study should be confined to any particular concept, even, our conceptual study need not be just conceptual because,

Below is correct one

<sup>55</sup> Daya Krishna (1999), *JICPR*, Vol. XVI No. 3, p. 157.

<sup>56</sup> Daya Krishna (1999), *JICPR*, Vol. XVI No. 3, pp 156-7

not only that every ordinary concept is bereft of an essence, the concept of concept may have the same fate, hence, be without a boundary or definition.

One may try to refute (3) on the ground that (3b) does not follow from (3a). That is even if philosophy consists of its different branches which have no demarcated boundaries, it does not imply that philosophy has no demarcated boundary. An area of investigation may have a boundary even if its sub-areas do not. Secondly, one may consider (3c) as harmless as the truth that all human beings are mortal. That is, no investigation is endless, the growth of every kind of investigation has a culmination point that gives way to a new kind of investigation, hence, the truth of (3c) is acceptable without any problem. These two moves are superficial. Because, like the truth of (3a), the truth of (3b) follows from the denial of 'essence' and (3b) is not dependent on (3a). The reason for which a subarea has no demarcated boundary, for the same reason, the main area may not have. In other words, if, for example, philosophy of science has no boundary because there is no essence. Secondly, unlike the truth that all human beings are mortal, the truth of (3c) is not natural. Death is natural, so also life, and each of us has a natural impulse to live. But, is there anything natural that forces one to do his/her conceptual study on a well defined area of investigation? No. The only impulse one may think of is social, if not logical. The logical impulse is to have a purpose prior to an investigation but the purpose is socially determined. Were the human society be empty of scientific investigations, none would have thought of a philosophy of science'.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>57</sup> The fields of interest in different departments of philosophy in India give a corroborating picture of this. Looking into the social environment in which the deadening figures of a department are trained in the field they have specialized, one can realize what has actually gone deep into the department's present state of

To find a fault in the above argument, we may go for the 'game' of Wittgenstein, an important concept of an important anti-essentialist.<sup>58</sup> The point of Wittgenstein's 'game' is to argue against the idea that every concept has an essence that we refer to in expressing the concept through language.<sup>59</sup> For Wittgenstein, no such essence is available and, since expression of any concept through language becomes meaningful owing to its 'use', neither such an essence nor a definition corresponding to the concept is required for an explanation of meaning. Instead of essence, what we actually observe are the overlapping and criss-crossing similarities among the members that come under the concept.

'Family resemblance'<sup>60</sup> characterizes the kind of similarities that different applications of any particular concept actually have. Of course, one may argue, all the members of a family have one traceable common origin after which the family has been named. But Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance' accounts only for the visibles like build, feature, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc.<sup>61</sup> To avoid the problem that whether we really have one traceable common origin of a family or not, we can concentrate on 'game', considering 'game' the paradigm family resemblance concept that

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affairs internationalism, nationalism, regionalism or colonialism proportionate to its hold in the minds of the leading figures.

<sup>58</sup> Wittgenstein's idea of *ágameá* is well received, but not left unchallenged. Rowe, M.W. (1992) 'The Definition of *ágameá*' *philosophy*, 67, pp. 467-79, offers a definition of *ágameá*. Of course Rowe's definition does not convincingly counter Wittgenstein's argument against essentialism.

<sup>59</sup> Of course, Wittgenstein's concept of *ágameá* also attempts to explain the constitutive character of the rules followed in language. But, the introduction of *ágameá* is basically an attempt to explain the absence of essence or common feature of the instances of a general concept.

<sup>60</sup> To characterize the similarities among games, Wittgenstein would not think of any better expression than 'family resemblance'. See Pl:67 (Wittgenstein, I. *Philosophical Investigations*, (trans.) Anscombe, G.E.M., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., is abbreviated as PL.

<sup>61</sup> Pl: 67

attempts to explain (i) that there is nothing common to all the members, and (ii) that the overlapping and criss-crossing similarities in the basis on what the concept is applicable to different members.<sup>62</sup>

One may try to locate the essence of 'game' in the similarities or points of resemblance: every game must have at least one point of resemblance. For example, if F1, F2, F3, . . . , Fn are the different points on which at least one or other game resembles with at least one other game, then, every game has F1vF2vF3v. . . vFn. In short one may try to define 'game' by disjoining the similarities. But Wittgenstein considers it 'playing with words'.<sup>63</sup> Because, (i) it does not specify any particular feature but expresses something vague, namely, F1vF2vF3v. . . vFn, and (ii) these features of similarities need not be limited, hence, the compound of disjuncts may not be limited.<sup>64</sup> But if the ground of the rejection of F1vF2vF3v. . . vFn is its 'vagueness and its 'limitedness', then no definition by means of the actual applications of a concept can be acceptable. For, whether the definition is vague or not, it cannot account for the infinite possibilities.<sup>65</sup> Accordingly, we cannot define philosophy as an investigation having at least one feature with which at least one among the philosophy of science, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of history, the philosophy of culture and so on resembles with at least one other. If we follow Wittgenstein, we cannot define philosophy

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<sup>62</sup> In fact, the common origin is not the real point to be pondered over because it is almost impossible to find out the origin of most of the general concepts.

<sup>63</sup> Pl: 67

<sup>64</sup> Pl: 68

<sup>65</sup> As Dr. Chinmoy Goswami suggests (in correspondence), perhaps quantification plays a crucial role in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. The length of the compound F1vF2vF3v. . . vFn is too wide to clearly represent one common factor and, hence becomes vague; it is too narrow to represent the infinite possibilities, hence, becomes very limited.

by means of whatever actual divisions of philosophy we have. Because, it would fail to account for the infinite possible divisions.

Even if the number of groups is limited, if there is no essence, none can identify a new group of games when no present game has any of those features that the new one has and the only way a game can be identified is in observing some similarities/resemblances with the present games. For it is possible to have a new group of games having completely new features of which none appears in any of the present games.<sup>66</sup> Without an essence, in the process of transformation, the overlapping and criss-crossing similarities may include anything under this sky. In this process, it is quite possible to have a group of games in which no feature of any actual game exists. Perhaps, to resist such uncontrolled transformations we are tempted to adore to an essence.

Accordingly, an unidentifiable branch of philosophy is possible, if there is no essence of philosophy and the only means of identification is the finding of some similarities/resemblances with the ongoing philosophical activities of one kind or other. But, should we call an unidentifiable branch of philosophy a branch of philosophy; an unidentifiable group of games a group of games?

<sup>66</sup> Let A,B,C be three mutually exclusive sets of features and G a group of games such that, given anyx,

x belongs to A if and only if x belongs to every member of G,

if x belongs to B then x belongs to at least two members of G

x belongs to C if and only if x belongs to at most one member of G.

if one divides all the actual games available to us into an n number of groups, G1,G2,G, . . . Gn, having the mutually exclusive common features, A1,A2,A3,... An, the mutually exclusive resembling features, B1,B2,B3,... Bn, the mutually exclusive dissimilar features, C1,C2,C3.. Cn, respectively, such that

(i) (A1OA2OA3O..OAn)(B1OB2OB3O..OBn)=

(ii) (C1OC2OC3O..OCn)

(iii) (A1OA2OA3O..OAn)(B1OB2OB3O..OBn)=

(iv) (C1OC2OC3O..OCn)

then, no feature of the group Gn+k exists with any actual game available to us, when

No. Then, either we must accept 'essence' or we must employ some means other than the finding of similarities/resemblances to identify. The first alternative is unacceptable in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. The second alternative is acceptable and it clarifies one more point on Wittgenstein's 'game'. That is, Wittgenstein's 'game' as a paradigm family resemblance concept does not account for all the possible games but the actual games. Family resemblance does not characterize the similarities/resemblances among the future members of a family; likeness between unobserved non-existents and the existents is not at all a point in 'family resemblance'.<sup>67</sup>

Witgenstein's game does not claim that, in place of essence, the similarities/resemblances among the individual instances can enable one to foresee all the possible individuals. Precisely because whatever enables so would be the other name of 'essence'. Wittgenstein's anti-essentialism claims that nothing really exists in the possible instances of a concept and, hence, nothing can exist as a common to both-the actual instances and the yet to come possible instances. Thus nothing can be common to all the actual and possible instances of a concept. 'It is one of the most deeprooted mistakes in philosophy to see possibility as a shadow of reality.'<sup>68</sup> Such a mistake tempts one to find something common between the actual individuals and the possibilities and, the, name that alleged common something the 'essence' of a concept.<sup>69</sup>

No doubt, 'Bring me a flower' means 'Bring me a,b,c, or some other flower rather than 'Bring me a,b,c,';<sup>70</sup> the meaning of 'He is

<sup>67</sup> However, this point may be related to *ärule-followingâ* and, hence to *âgameâ* when *âgameâ* is used to explain the constitutive rules of language.

<sup>68</sup> PG.p.283 (Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Grammar*, (Ed.)Rhees, R.(Trans) Kenny, A., Blackwell Publishers, 1974, is abbreviated as PG.)

<sup>69</sup> For Wittgenstein, not only that there is nothing common but also that there is nothing in between, He says, There is no third thing between the particular enumeration and the general signâ (PG,p.281)

<sup>70</sup> This example is from PG, p. 276.



playing a game is different from 'He is playing hockey', 'He does philosophy of science' is different from 'He does philosophy'. But, at the same time, getting a flower follows from getting a rose, playing hockey implies playing a game, doing philosophy of science implies doing philosophy. That is, even if a general concept and its instances are so different from each other that one does not touch the other,<sup>71</sup> their expressions have a close relationship. The relation may be described as a grammatical relation. The signs expressing the concepts and the signs expressing the instances are used with certain rules. Those rules ensure that the above relation between the two types of expressions holds good. Nothing else determines that relation, hence, no common thing or essence is needed to explain that relation.

'He is playing a game' and 'He is playing hockey' are empirical propositions. But 'he is playing a game follows from he is playing hockey' is not an empirical proposition, it is a grammatical proposition. For, unlike the two empirical propositions, it is a proposition about the two propositions; a description of language rather than reality. The rules involved in the use of propositions describing reality are expressed through the grammatical propositions. In Wittgenstein's words, "(3x).fx follows from fa" is not a proposition (empirical proposition) of the language to which "(3x)fx" and "fa" belong; it is a rule laid down in their grammar.<sup>72</sup> Even if the so called essence is taken for granted, it cannot go against the inference-(3x).fx follows from fa 'expressed through the grammatical proposition. On the other hand, one of the main reasons for which 'essence' is upheld, though mistakenly, is to explain that inference. The explanation misleads because it presupposes a mistaken idea, namely, the idea of considering the possibilities real. Subscribing to this mistaken idea, one fails to

<sup>71</sup> In PG p. 276, Wittgenstein says, énumeration does not touch the concepts áplantâ and áeggâ at all.â

<sup>72</sup> PG.p.279

distinguish the propositions about empirical propositions from the empirical propositions.. Therefore if we are so much acquainted with the word 'essence' that we do not like to miss it in philosophy, then, the essence that does not mislead us and helps us in understanding the relationship between a concept and its instances may be attributed to Grammar. For, 'Essence is expressed by grammar,'<sup>73</sup> However, in this sense, essence cannot be a thing, concrete or abstract, to be identified or posited in the concepts or in their instances. Because, grammar is not a thing, thought it 'tells what kind of object any thing is.'<sup>74</sup>

The argument that represents Professor Daya Krishna's query concerns us only if (a) we are anti-essentialists, and (b) we do not consider the conclusion (3c) trivial. This discussion assumes both (a) and (b). The nontriviality of (3c) demands an answer to the question: How do we actually use a concept without demarcating its boundary?<sup>75</sup> I think, Wittgenstein's 'game' as a paradigm family resemblance concept answers it correctly, and Professor Daya Krishna's query assumes the 'essence' that Wittgenstein's 'game' forbids.

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Laxminarayan Lenka

#### Reply 4

The denial of 'essence' entails the impossibility of demarcation...and if taken seriously could result in blurring all sharp distinctions.

The above argument which has been used here to deny the possibility of Philosophy of Science, Law or something else can be refuted by indicating the fact that each sphere of knowledge has certain basic principles or say presuppositions which may be called its privilege points.

<sup>73</sup> Pl: 371

<sup>74</sup> Pl: 373

<sup>75</sup> As (3c) is not an isolated assertion but inferred from (1), (2), (3a) and (3b), if the asked question has no answer then (3c) can mislead us to acceptâ essenceâ by *reduction ad absurdum*

Such points are only believed and not questioned within that sphere. But it does not mean that those presuppositions cannot be questioned at all. It is the function of philosophy to question those presuppositions; hence we can meaningfully use the phrases as 'Philosophy of...'

In case demarcation between science and non-science is not acceptable leading to blurring of all sharp distinctions, can we say that religion and natural sciences, e.g. physics, chemistry etc., belong to the same area or level? The progress in any area, as regards its study is possible only if demarcations are accepted and there is a systematic approach, otherwise there will be chaos in the realm of knowledge. After all, we have to distinguish pure imagination from sensory perception and categorize them accordingly.

The stand taken in the given view will be dogmatic as it does not allow freedom to question the fundamental assumptions of any area.

Denying the essences entails denial to all abstractions, even in mathematics and physics, because there too the formulae are based on the belief that all the similar cases will be the possible applicable cases for formula.

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Vinod Kumari

<sup>i</sup> *Nyāyakośa Mahāmahopadhyāya* Bhimācārya. Jhalkikar (ed.), Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, 1928, p. 136.

<sup>ii</sup> *Bhāṭṭikāvya* 2/14.

<sup>iii</sup> *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse no.70.

<sup>iv</sup> *Nilakaṅṭhaprakāśikā* on *Dīpikā* on *Turkasāṅgraha*, p. 376. edited by Satkari Sharma Bāngiya, with seven commentaries, Chowkhamba, 1976.

<sup>v</sup> *Tattvacintāmaṇī* (Anumānakhaṇḍa), Gaṅgeśa, Vyāptigrahopāyaḥ chapter

<sup>vi</sup> *Symbolic Logic* (4<sup>th</sup> ed.), Irving M.Copi, Macmillan, London, 1973, p. 53.

<sup>vii</sup> *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Chapter X, edited by Haridās Siddhāntavagīśa, p. 620. 1875 (B.5).

<sup>viii</sup> *Kusumapratimā* on *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Chapter X, edited by Haridās Siddhāntavagīśa, 1875 (B.S.), p. 621.