

of the same kind as one can imagine a situation where there are two jars of different colours where even though there are more than one objects of the 'same kind' one can easily convey the singularity of reference by the suffix in case one qualifies the jar with the particular colour that it has such as, say, a yellow or a blue jar. In the Sanskrit language, the sentence conveying this singularity will be '*atra nīlaḥ ghaṭaḥ asti*' or '*atra pītaḥ ghaṭaḥ asti*', where the singularity of *ghaṭa* is conveyed by the suffix even though there are two objects occupying that space. The discussion, it is obvious, does not distinguish between '*ekatva*' and '*viśiṣṭa*', that is numerical oneness of the object conveyed by the suffix and the uniqueness of the object.

The Naiyāyika continues to complicate the situation by imagining another situation where there are not two pots on the ground but two brahmanas where one gives a cow to the other. Here there are two persons belonging to the same caste and not distinguished in any other way and yet the suffix conveying numerical singularity will be used in the situation. The objection does not take into account the fact that though both persons belong to the same caste, they are still distinguished by the fact that while one is giving, the other is receiving a cow. But, the *kroḍapatra* writer is not deterred as he suggests another sentence permitted by the rules of the Sanskrit language where a term like '*dārā*' is always used in the plural even if it refers to only one person as in the sentence '*Rāma dārā Jānakī*'. As the oneness here cannot be conveyed by the suffix because of grammatical reasons, it is supposed to be conveyed by the term '*Jānakī*' which, in turn, is supposed to qualify the term '*dārā*' which though plural in character conveys the singularity of reference because it is modified by the term '*Jānakī*'. The specificity of this relation is termed in Navya Nyāya as *svābhinnamukhyaprakāratāvat*.

In fact, the proliferation of diverse relations made necessary by the requirement of accounting for these different kinds of situations is further complicated in that every relation generates a universal to which it has again to be related by some relation or other. A brief discussion of this has already been undertaken earlier in connection with the notions of *anuyogitā*, *pratiyogitā* and *avacchedakatā*. Some philosophical interesting relations which have to be postulated in this process are *svābhinnatva*, *svavṛttitva*, *svāśrayatva*, *svasamānādhikarṇatva*, *svaviśiṣṭatva*, *svatādātmya*, *svāvachchedyatva*, *svanirūpitāvachchedakatva*, *svanirūpitāviśeṣyatāvatva*, *svanirūpitātva*, etc.

Though all these seem to be examples of what is called reflexivity in modern logic, which has not explored this type of relation in such diversity and complexity as Navya Nyāya appears to have done.

The *vāda* as well as the *kroḍapatras* hardly discuss the issues that had engaged the attention of the author of the *Nyāya Sūtras* or the older Naiyāyikas, as for example: the non-eternity of sound, the radical difference between hearing and vision as sources of perceptual knowledge, the specific problems relating to visual perception, the problems relating to eternity or the transience of knowledge or the issue as to whose property knowledge should be considered to be when it arises. Similarly, the problem of the whole and the part and the exact nature of

the *śabda pramāṇa* seem to have receded from the attention of the philosophical world. What sort of philosophical problems engaged the attention of Nyāya philosophers in the successive stages of its development from Gautama onwards?

The *Kroḍapatras* seem to have ceased being written roughly sometime at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the exception of Paṇḍit Gauda Subramaniam Shastri's work on the *Kroḍapatras* referred to above. Perhaps the last *Kroḍapatra* was written by Ramsastri Mysore giving rise later both to a refutation and defence entitled respectively, *Śatkoṭikhandaṇam* and *Śatkoṭimaṇḍanam*. The reason for the sudden cessation of writing of the *Kroḍapatras* is not known, but their influence on some of the later writers such as Bachcha Jha, is clearly evident.

The *Vādagrāntas* and the *Kroḍapatras* are an evidence of increasing specialization in the writing of philosophical literature in India, a trend which may be regarded as distinctly 'modern' in the contemporary sense of the word even though many of these writers lived in the pre-modern times and did not know anything of what goes by the name of modern tradition in the west.

However, the Navya-Naiyāyikas appear to have been living in a 'closed' world of their own where only the adequate formulation of a definition seemed to matter, and remained little affected by the realms to which the definition was supposed to apply, or by the changing social and political environment in which they lived. The autonomy of a cognitive realm could hardly have been carried any further. The case of Navya Nyāya in India should be a cause for reflection as to whether such a situation obtains in many areas of contemporary philosophical thought in the West. If an acquaintance with Navya Nyāya occasions such a reflection, comparative philosophy would have achieved one of its purposes, that is 'freeing' one from the limitations and prejudices of one's own intellectual traditions. On the other hand, an acquaintance with Navya Nyāya may also reveal the unexplored possibilities and directions of contemporary logical and epistemological thought in the western tradition. Either way, it would make a real contribution deriving from a confrontation between two powerful intellectual traditions which developed independently in complete ignorance of each other.

But in the tradition of Navya Nyāya thinking in twentieth century, India ultimately found a new radical innovator in the personality of Paṇḍit Badrinath Shukla who was regarded as one of the most outstanding Naiyāyikas of his time and whose recent death has robbed India of one of its greatest traditional practitioners. His two works entitled, *Śatslokī* and *Dehātmaṇḍana* provide a striking example of the possibility of creative original thinking even within the older settled classical modes of philosophical thought in India. These are short works, the former consisting of only a hundred *ślokas*, as its title indicates, and the latter, a lecture given on the occasion of a gathering of eminent Nyāya scholars from all over India at Sarnath in Varanasi in A.D. 1985. The gathering itself was unique as it, for the first time, brought together the foremost Naiyāyikas from different parts of India to discuss issues raised in the context of Nyāya by modern philosophers trained in the western tradition in India. The meeting lasted for four days

and the lecture was delivered in the evening of the third day to the Paṇḍits gathered there along with many others from Varanasi.

The *Śatslokī* starts with a discussion regarding the notion of *mokṣa* or *apavarga* in Nyāya and argues against the traditional view held by almost all Naiyāyikas that in the state of liberation, the *ātman* is not conscious of anything and hence its having any positively felt state of consciousness such as pleasure or bliss does not arise. In the course of his discussion on the subject, Paṇḍit Badrinath Shukla raises new questions about the notions of *apavarga* and *niḥśreyasa* on the one hand and *mithyājñāna* and *tattvajñāna* on the other. He points out that nowhere in his discussion of the subject, has Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtras* identified *apavarga* and *niḥśreyasa* or defined the latter as that where the possibility of all suffering ceases. Surprisingly, he does not refer to Uddyotkara's discussion of the subject wherein he clearly states that every realm of knowledge has its own *niḥśreyasa* and that it is only the *ātmavidyā* which may be said to have *mokṣa* or *apavarga* as its *niḥśreyasa*. Thus, if Uddyotkara's contention had been taken seriously, a clear distinction would have been drawn between the two in the Nyāya tradition which, for some reason, did not take place.

In his discussion of the notion of *mithyājñāna*, Badrinath Shukla makes an even more fundamental point which, if seriously taken, would cut at the very root of one of the most firmly-held, axiomatic tenets in the Indian tradition. This relates to the identification of the self with the not-self such as body, mind, *buddhi*, etc., which has been regarded as the paradigmatic example of false knowledge or *mithyājñāna* or *adhyāsa* in the Indian tradition. Surprisingly again, though Shukla points out that such an interpretation of *mithyājñāna* is nowhere to be found in Gautama's *Nyāyasūtras*, but is, so to say, imposed on it by Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Sūtras*. Shukla, however does not see that such an understanding of *mithyājñāna* is not peculiar to Vātsyāyana's Nyāya alone, but is common to Śāṅkhya and, later, to what came to be called Advaita Vedānta in the Indian tradition. Badrinathji's questioning of this interpretation of *mithyājñāna*, thus, not only subverts Vātsyāyana's interpretation of the subject in the Nyāya tradition but also the Śāṅkhyan and the Advaitic interpretations which are closely similar to it. In fact, Vātsyāyana's interpretation itself might have been influenced by the Śāṅkhyan thought prevalent in his times. In any case, Shukla's contention that one may clearly differentiate between two entities such as, say, the body and the self, and yet attribute or 'impose' the qualities of the one on the other without necessarily giving rise to 'false' knowledge raises a fundamental objection to the widely-held argument regarding the identification of the self with the 'not-self' and the ascription of those properties to it which primarily belong one to the 'not-self' at its various levels. Such a situation had generally been known and discussed in the tradition, but only in the context of the *alaṅkāra śāstra* where *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā* were always accepted as legitimate dimensions of meaning without which no literary creation could be conceived. There was the related problem of understanding *sādṛśya* and *rūpaka* in the context of understanding artistic creations. The former, in fact, plays a significant role in the acceptance

of *upamāna* as a separate *pramāṇa* even in Nyāya, where it is similarity between 'cow' with which one is familiar and the 'gavaya' which one has not seen but which in many respects, is similar to the cow and hence this similarity or *sādrśya* is the ground of inference regarding it. There is also the problem of *āhāryajñāna* which is generally accepted by everybody. But, inspite of all these similarities, affinities and earlier intimations on the subject, no one seems to have as clearly and focally formulated the issue, particularly in the context of the basic *adhyāsa* on which a large part of the super structure of Indian philosophy has been built, as has been done by Paṇḍit Badrinath Shukla in his *Śatslokī*.

In *Śatslokī*, Shuklaji, suggests that the term 'desirable' and 'undesirable' should be understood as that which leads to the upward growth or development (*utkarṣa*) of the self or to its degradation and downward movement (*apakarṣa*), respectively. This is to link *preyasa* to the *śreyasa*, though he uses the term *anukūla* and *pratikūla* and suggests that this is how the terms '*sukham anukūlam*' and '*duḥkham pratikūlam*' should be understood. Such an understanding however would require an independent criterion of what is to be regarded as *utkarṣa* or *apakarṣa*, a direction that Shuklaji does not explore. Instead, he reverts back to the traditional Nyāya understanding of self as omnipresent, eternal and blemishless forgetting his own contention made later on in his lecture on *Dehātmaavāda* that one need not postulate any independent self for understanding experience but also that such spatio-temporal characteristics as omnipresence and externality can hardly be ascribed to the self which is essentially non-spatio temporal in nature.

Shuklaji's *mithyājñāna* or foundational ignorance appears to lie in the belief that anything can possibly affect the self or lead to its *utkarṣa* or *apakarṣa*. But this will tend to undermine the whole realm of *dharma* or moral action, and not only the possible linkage of *utkarṣa* and *apakarṣa* with pleasure and pain, as Shuklaji seems to think. Also how will the removal of this *mithyājñāna* have any effect? If by its very nature the self cannot be affected by anything then how can it be affected by *mithyājñāna* as Shuklaji seems to contend. Though he has neglected this problem he has considered in detail the usual Nyāya objection that if any positive effect is produced by such a knowledge, then like all effects, it can only be transient in nature. Shuklaji's answer to this age-old objection is that, firstly, it would lead to the Buddhist theory of momentariness which is not acceptable to the Naiyāyika and secondly, that, a positive effect is destroyed only if it is the result of some previous *adrṣṭa karma* and as the occurrence of bliss is not produced because of any *adrṣṭa karma* since they all have been destroyed by the removal of *mithyājñāna*, the so-called positive effect need not be destroyed, at least in the framework of Nyāya analysis. It is not clear, however, as to how the removal of *mithyājñāna* produces its effect only on the self and not on anything else including the *karma* of the person concerned. This, of course, is a general problem with all those schools of Indian philosophy which believe in the notion of a foundational ignorance and that its removal will result in final liberation which itself is unending in character. There is, however, another problem with regard to Shuklaji's analysis and that relates to the question, whether

'blissfulness' or *ānanda* was an intrinsic character of the self or whether it occurs just as a result of the removal of foundational ignorance. In case he believes in the former, then the question would arise as to how his position is different from that of Advaita Vedānta which also believe that *ānanda* is a natural 'property' of the self.

In the course of his treatment of the subject, Shuklaji discusses some of the specifically Nyāya doctrines regarding the destruction of a special quality by *saṃyoga* and the necessary destructibility of any perceivable quality by another. However, there seems to be some apparent inconsistency in his arguments in this regard, particularly as in the case of the latter he seems to deny the perceivability of blissfulness in the ordinary sense of the term and in his discussion on the subject he brings in the notion of *adr̥ṣṭa*, merit or demerit which is supposed to permanently belong to the self because it is not perceivable in the usual sense of the term. But, according to Shukla himself, *adr̥ṣṭa*, even though a permanent property of the self, does get destroyed when *mithyājñāna* is destroyed; but if so, the question is how can he maintain in principle the non-destructibility of *ānanda* resulting from the destruction of *mithyājñāna*. However, there can be little doubt that Shuklaji is struggling to get rid of the notoriously inconvenient heritage of Nyāya regarding the absence of any feeling in the state of liberation and that in the course of his attempt, he has said many interesting things in the *Śatslokī*.

But, far more radical is his denial of the necessity for postulating any separate *ātman* or self. He suggests that the body itself may be considered as the self for all practical purposes. The establishment of *dehātma-vāda* in the Nyāya framework was such a radical step that only the Cārvākas in the Indian tradition are supposed to have upheld it and no one could believe that such a great Naiyāyika, who was also a deeply religious person, could possibly have argued for it. But, Shuklaji did, and that too in a public lecture delivered at the Conference of Nyāya scholars from all over India who had gathered at Kashi, one of the holiest places for them. It was a shocking experience for all and they must have tried to forget it as soon as they could. Yet, the arguments he had given invite the philosophical attention of all those who are not committed to any particular metaphysical belief and challenge the practicing Naiyāyika and even the non-Naiyāyika in the Indian tradition not only to refute the arguments he had given but also to creatively develop them in new directions.

The main contention of Paṇḍit Badrinath Shukla seems to be that there is no necessity of postulating the separate ontological reality of a third entity such as *ātman* when the two entities which Nyāya postulates and accepts, that is, the body and the mind, can by themselves satisfactorily account for all the phenomena for which the *ātman* has been postulated in the system. This ultimately would be an argument from Okkam's razor which states that one need not unnecessarily postulate the existence of entities if one can avoid doing so. The Buddhists have been the standing example of such a position in the Indian tradition. But, then the Buddhists do not postulate the existence of any substances, whether

spiritual or material. The very notion of *dravya* or substance is denied by them to have any 'reality', except for heuristic purposes.

Shuklaji however tries to deny the necessity of postulating the reality of *ātman* only in the limited context of Nyāya metaphysics. He does not deny the notion of substance or that body and mind are actual substantive realities. Most of his arguments are basically concerned with accommodating the accepted Nyāya positions and in replying to the objections which are urged against ascribing qualities such as knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort to the body and qualities such as merit, demerit, *saṃskāra* to the mind. According to him, most of these objections are untenable and he argues that the said properties can easily be considered as the properties of the body or the mind. Shuklaji's analysis comes close to the western position which generally has not made a distinction between the mind and the self, though surprisingly he considered knowledge as a property of the body and not the mind as most western philosophers have thought. Ultimately, Shuklaji ascribes externality to the mind and thus invests it with all those properties which are generally ascribed to the *ātman*. He also seems to have forgotten his own views in the *Śatślokī* and does not attempt to reconcile them with the one's he argues for in his lecture on *dehātmavāda*. Both the *Śatślokī* and lecture on *dehātmavāda* show a great original mind steeped in the philosophical traditions of India yet, struggling to get out of the settled modes of classical Indian thought. But, it is equally clear that he is not able to throw out the metaphysical baggage which every traditional Indian thinker carries with him so as to address himself to the pure philosophical problem that he is dealing with. The creative possibilities that lie within the domains of the classical tradition of Indian philosophical thought are exhibited here as also how if those who are steeped in that tradition when challenged to think anew can do so. It may be remembered in this context that Paṇḍit Badrinath Shukla had not only participated in the Rege experiment which has been documented and published as *Samavāya*, but was also the guiding spirit therein. He also had provided the leadership in the convening of the conferences on Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Kashmir Śaivism in which an attempt was made to give a new direction to traditional thought in these systems. It is difficult to say how his continuous interaction with persons steeped in the western philosophical tradition contributed to the innovative experiments he made in the *Śatślokī* and the *dehātmavāda* lecture but there can be little doubt that the philosophical atmosphere he breathed in must have had something to do with it. His sudden departure from the philosophical scene of India was a great loss as he provided a bridge between the two philosophical traditions in India, something no one else has been able to provide since his passing away.

I  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NYĀYA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY  
DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND ONWARDS

To trace the development of the Nyāya School of philosophy during the period of the Eighteenth century, is indeed a very tough job. This does not imply that the writing done in this field, is very scanty. As a matter of fact, the impetus given by Gadādhara and other stalwarts of the Nyāya System during the second half of the seventeenth century, through their excellent commentaries on the *Dīdhiti* of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi as also some of their independent works, inspired, many a thinker during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to contribute to the continuity and development of this philosophical system. From the bibliography prepared under the editorship of Dr. Karl H. Potter, we come to know that during this period more than a hundred works, that enriched the Nyāya tradition, were written. Some of them, are widely known and studied seriously even today. But, it is equally true that many other works are still in the form of manuscripts awaiting publication. As the number of students and researchers interested in a serious study of the works of this school, is diminishing fast it is unlikely that these will be published in the near future. In these circumstances, an assessment of the development of this School based mainly on a superficial study of some of the published works, may not be as authentic and accurate as required. Yet, on the basis of the printed material available, a sincere attempt has been made here to trace the development of the Nyāya school of philosophy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

As a preliminary to this task one must examine the influence that the seventeenth century wielded on later developments. In the entire history of the Nyāya school, particularly that of the Navya Nyāya school, the seventeenth century has to be considered as the golden age of the Navya tradition. It was during this period that the Navya Nyāya tradition developed as a major branch of the philosophical system of this country, through the excellent commentaries on the *Dīdhiti* of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi which itself was a superb commentary on Gaṅgeśopādhyāya's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Though there are some other commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and *Dīdhiti*, the three written during this century, namely *Gādādhari*, *Jagadīśi* and *Māthurī*, which are thus widely known being associated with the names of the authors, stand apart from the other commentaries by their critical approach as well by their use of a perfect Nyāya terminology with the help of which they could analyse issues with a subtlety that was hitherto unknown in the philosophical world. Further, being elaborative in nature, these commentaries actually rendered yeoman service to carry further discussions on the topics dealt with by *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and *Dīdhiti* where they are typically brief. Little wonder then that these commentaries dominated the later period to such an extent that Nyāya students engrossed in the study of some of the portions of these texts neglected the study of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and *Dīdhiti* in their entirety. Thus the domination of these commentaries though it contributed in its own way

to the continuity and development of the Nyāya tradition, in the later period, should also be held responsible for the decline of interest in discussing and evaluating many significant philosophical issues that the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and *Dīdhiti* raise. This attitude of the *Naiyāyikas*, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which was due to the enormous influence of the commentaries of Gadādhara and others, did cost the system dearly, for it unfortunately checked the growth of the Nyāya tradition as a philosophical movement. Whatever may be the adverse effects of these texts, their invaluable contribution to the Nyāya system as a whole and the tremendous influence that they wielded on the later period can never be minimized.

Another interesting and equally significant development in the seventeenth century, was that it is during this period that the two works of Nyāya, the study of which later came to be regarded as a must for any beginner in the Nyāya studies, were written. They are *Tarkasaṃgraha* and the commentary-*Dīpikā* by Annambhaṭṭa and *Kārikāvalī* with the commentary - *Nyāya Siddhānta Muktaṭvalī* by Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya. These two works, though very brief, brought out in the simplest possible, terms, the latest position of the *Naiyāyikas*, comprehensively covering the Nyāya school in its entirety. It is also significant that the usefulness of these works, was soon recognised and commentaries were written almost immediately. The famous *Muktaṭvalī Prakāśa*, well known as *Dinakarī* by Dinakara Bhaṭṭa (A.D. 1660) and the commentary thereon called *Taraṅgiṇī* also known as *Rāmarudrīya* by Rāmarudra (A.D. 1680) were written very soon after and students and scholars alike received them with appreciation. Thus in the seventeenth century, the achievement in the Nyāya school was indeed spectacular. During this period, not only were the principal commentaries on the *Maṇi* and *Dīdhiti*, of a very high standard, but the texts that could make the Nyāya school familiar to all the students of *Darśana*, irrespective of the fact that actually they were the ardent pursuants of the other *Darśanas*, were also written. The implications of this development were far reaching. The commentaries on the *Maṇi* and *Dīdhiti* were so impressive not only from the point of view of their contents but also from their style that most of the Nyāya works written during the eighteenth century and onwards, were directly or indirectly commentaries on those commentaries. Meanwhile, a tradition of solely studying one particular out of these three commentaries on the *Dīdhiti*, also developed. Thus in the southern parts of the country the study of *Gadādhara* mostly became popular while the study of the *Māthuri* and the *Jagadīśi* became popular in the other parts of the country. The study of *Nyāya Śāstra* came to be regarded as a necessary prerequisite for the students of all the other *śāstras*. The influence was so perceptible that the scholars of the *Vyākaraṇa* and even *Alaṅkāra Śāstra* adopted the Navya Nyāya technical language to expound their respective theories. These are some of the implications of the development in the field of Nyāya, that took place during the seventeenth century.

The term 'development', in any other context, is used to denote a further step in expounding a theory or a concept revealing a new idea higher or



unknown, or sometimes, entirely rejecting what has been stated on the topic so far. Such a development had taken place in the other areas of Indian philosophy such as the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, the Uttara Mīmāṃsā, grammar and poetics. In the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā School, Prabhākara rejected many concepts evolved by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and expounded many theories which were altogether novel. In the Uttara Mīmāṃsā, each succeeding ācārya rejected the earlier *Siddhānta* in its entirety and propounded new theories interpreting the *śrutis*, *smṛtis* and the *sūtras*, in a totally different manner. In Grammar many new theories were floated by the Navyas. In poetics, new *Prasthānas* such as *alaṅkāra*, *rīti*, *dhvani*, *vakrokti*, etc. were discovered by the poetics who found fault with the earlier theories and with great vehemence attempted to establish their new findings. Thus in almost every school, a lot of changes had taken place.

Whether such a meaningful change or development, did really take place in the entire history of the Nyāya school at any stage need to be explored. It is in Udyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta and Udayana that we see an attitude which, if it could be said, led to the development of the school. On several occasions, they reject the earlier interpretation of the *Sūtras* and offer a new interpretation. But, interestingly they never seem to question the very concepts and theories of the earlier thinkers. Their contribution lies in clarifying the Nyāya concepts more convincingly and putting forward new arguments to counter the arguments of the other philosophical schools, particularly those of the Buddhists and also in defending their *Siddhāntas* from the onslaughts of the other philosophical schools. Perhaps, Bhāsarvajña among the Prācīna Naiyāyikas and Raghunātha Śīromaṇi among the Navyas, were the only two prominent figures among the Naiyāyikas who not only criticized the earlier concepts but also suggested their own modifications. But, the later Naiyāyikas never took theories seriously. Some occasional academic interest might have led to a study of their works in which earlier theories are rejected, but they are generally ignored. Raghunātha Śīromaṇi himself does not seem to be very serious about his own criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories in his *Padārthatattva Nirūpaṇa*. For, in his commentaries on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* for which he is held in high esteem, he explains *Tattvacintāmaṇi* in a splendid manner faithfully following the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition which he severally criticises in his small independent work—*Pdārthatattva Nirūpaṇa*.

#### *Gokulanātha Upādhyāya (1710)*

If the development of the Nyāya School is seen in terms of a gradual evolution of the concepts that took place, from time to time, such an evolution during the eighteenth century and onwards, does not exist. By the eighteenth century in fact all the concepts that the Nyāya School evolved, had taken a definite shape and the later Naiyāyikas had little scope to enforce any modification in those concepts. In other words, all the possible alternatives of a problem were thought of and the investigation of the issues reached such saturation that no new

modification that could be named as development occurred. Actually, the contribution of the later Naiyāyikas lies in their taking a particular view of a problem of which several views are held and substantiating it with the arguments consisting of new points which were not discussed earlier. Thus the later Naiyāyikas by their fresh look and also definiteness of the issues already known, infused fresh breath and vigour to the School hence this activity cannot be termed as worthless. Here, I shall select a few authors whose creative intelligence succeeded in advancing some new points against the views believed to be final. Such an instance is provided by the *Padavākyaratnākara* of Gokulanātha Upādhyāya.

This Nyaya thinker who flourished during the first half of the eighteenth century A.D, was a native of Mithila.<sup>12</sup> Some hold the view that he belonged to the second half of the sixteenth century. But, the presence of critical analysis of many views of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya in the works of Gokulanātha Upādhyāya indicates that the latter belonged to a period succeeding that of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. Since Gadādhara belongs to the second half of the seventeenth century, Gokulanātha is rightly assigned the date of the first half of the A.D. eighteenth century. Through his works we learn that he studied all the *śāstras* under his father Digambara Upādhyāya.

Gokulanātha Upādhyāya<sup>13</sup>, credited with the authorship of more than twentyfive works, was a Naiyāyika of a very high order. Most of his works are on Nyāya, but he also wrote on the Vedānta and Alankāra Śāstra. He has also written some literary works which include a drama called *Amytodaya Nāṭakam*. It is noteworthy that the reputed Naiyāyika, Giridhara Upādhyāya, the author of *Vibhaktiyarthanirṇaya* (published 1902) was one of his disciples.

Among his many works the *Padavākyaratnākara* is held in high esteem by scholars. P.B. Anantacharya who published *Padavākyaratnākara* for the first time in 1904, stated that it excelled even *Vyutpattivāda* and *Śabda Śaktiprakāśikā* of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, respectively. As the very title indicates *Padavākyaratnākara* discusses the important subtle issues connected with *pada* and *vākya*, in twenty three chapters. In this work he not only clarifies the Nyāya position, but also presents both the grammarians' and the poeticians' views, with a critical, comparative outlook. While clarifying the Nyāya views, he refers to both the Prācīnas and the Navyas. Thus, on many occasions he criticizes Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya also. An instance where Gokulanātha Upādhyāya criticizes the stand taken by Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya is outlined below.

There are two views regarding the manner in which *abheda*, i.e. identity is presented by the statements which are known as identical statements such as *Nīlaḥ Ghaṭaḥ*. According to one view, identity is presented in verbal cognition as a qualifier (*prakāra*), while the other view holds that it is presented as just a relation (*samsarga*). In case it is considered as a qualifier, it is said to be the meaning of the singular case affix *su* which is added to the word *nīla*. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has discussed the point in his *Vyutpattivāda* at length and finally concluded in favour of the view that *abheda* is presented in verbal cognition as relation only as there is simplicity. Gokulanātha, in his *Padavākyaratnākara*,

reopens the issue and opposes the stand taken by Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. He points out that if *abheda* is presented as a relation in a verbal cognition, for instance in the cognition produced by the sentence 'Nīlah ghaṭah', then the *anupūrvī* (sequence of letters) in the form of being the term 'ghaṭa' which ends with the case affix 'su' and is uttered along with the term 'nīla' ending with the case affix 'su' (*svāntanīlapada sambhāvyaḥṛta svānta ghaṭapadatva*) will have to be admitted as the *ākāṅkṣā* that leads to the verbal cognition. Since this *anupūrvī* consists of many letters it will entail the defect of *gaurava*. If *abheda* is considered as the meaning of the case affix and hence as a qualifier then the simplicity is obvious. In the given instance, i.e. 'nīlah ghaṭah' the meaning of the term 'nīla' now becomes the qualifier and the meaning of the case affix, i.e. *abheda* becomes the qualificandum. And again the same *abheda* becomes the qualifier and the meaning of 'ghaṭa' becomes the qualificandum. Thus, the cognition arising from the sentence, 'Nīlah ghaṭah' has *abheda* as the qualificandum in respect of the *nīla* and has the same *abheda* as the qualifier in respect of the *ghaṭa*. Now, we can say that for the verbal cognition in which *abheda* is the qualificandum and the *nīla* is the qualifier, the *ākāṅkṣā*, i.e. the sequence of the words 'nīla' and 'su' is essential. Similarly, for the cognition where *abheda* is the qualifier and *ghaṭa* is the qualificandum, the *ākāṅkṣā* of the words 'ghaṭa' and 'su' is needed. When the two *ākāṅkṣās* are thus accepted as the cause of the cognition produced by the said sentence, Gokulanātha argues that there is simplicity, because none of them contains so many letters as does the *ākāṅkṣā* involving both the words 'nīla' and 'ghaṭah'.

Here, one may contend that the above argument is not satisfactory, for the simplicity explained, is just apparent. It is true that the *ākāṅkṣā* suggested by the *saṃsargatāvādin*, as the cause of the verbal cognition, consists of more letters than the *ākāṅkṣā* suggested by the *prakāratāvādin*. But, the *prakāratāvādin* has to admit, as shown by himself two *ākāṅkṣās* as the cause of the verbal cognitions in which all the letters of that single *ākāṅkṣā*, are distributed. Thus the simplicity shown by the *prakāratāvādin* actually does not exist.

Rejecting the contention, Gokulanātha clarifies his point as follows:

The *ākāṅkṣā* held as the cause of the verbal cognition by the *prakāratāvādin* consist of the words 'nīla' and 'su', and 'ghaṭa' and 'su'. While the *ākāṅkṣā* admitted as the cause of the same cognition by the *saṃsargatāvādin*, is inclusive of both the words—'Nīlah' and 'ghaṭah'. Now, it is clear that due to the possibility of changing the position of the words 'Nīlah' and 'ghaṭah' as 'ghaṭo Nīlah' and 'nīlo ghaṭah', the *saṃsargatāvādin* has to accept the causality in the two *ākāṅkṣās* namely being the word 'ghaṭa' ending with 'su' and followed by the word 'nīla' ending with 'su' followed by the word 'ghaṭa' ending with 'su'. Thus the *saṃsargatāvādin* has to put up with two *gauravas*—firstly inclusion of a large number of syllables in the *ākāṅkṣā* and secondly acceptance of causality in the two *ākāṅkṣās*. But, though the *prakāratāvādin* also has to accept two *ākāṅkṣās* as the causes of the verbal cognition as shown earlier, they do not contain as many letters as the

*ākāṅkṣā* suggested by the *sāmsargatāvādin*. This shows that the *prakāratāvādin*'s stand is less defective.

But, the *sāmsargatāvādin* would not admit his defeat at this stage. He continues to argue that the same *ākāṅkṣā* which he accepts as the cause of the verbal cognition, will have to be accepted as the cause, by the *prakāratāvādin* also. To prove his point he chooses the sentence '*Nīlah ghaṭaḥ paṭaḥ śuklah*'. It is clear that the above sentence does not convey the identity of *nīla* in *paṭa*. But, the *Sāmsargatāvādin* contends that if the two *ākāṅkṣās* suggested by the *Prakāratāvādin* are sufficient to produce the verbal cognition of the identity of *nīla* in *ghaṭa*, then the above sentence also should produce such a cognition, since the two *ākāṅkṣās*, namely: (i) Being the word '*nīla*' ending with '*su*', and (ii) Being the word '*ghaṭa*' ending in '*su*' are present here. The only way left to avoid such a situation is to accept an *ākāṅkṣā* in which both the word '*nīla*' and the word '*paṭa*' are included as the cause of the cognition comprehending the identity of *nīla* in *paṭa*. Such an *ākāṅkṣā* is obviously the *ākāṅkṣā* suggested by the *Sāmsargatāvādin*. Thus, the *Sāmsargatāvādin* successfully shows that the *Prakāratāvādin*'s view can not claim any simplicity in it.

Gokulanātha Upādhyāya admits the above contention of the *Sāmsargatāvādin*, but still sticks to his claim that *Prakāratāvāda* is preferable to *Sāmsargatāvāda*.

He supports his claim with the following argument:

If *abheda* is considered as a relation then it would be difficult to justify the usages such as '*Śikhi dhvastaḥ*'. In this sentence, the term '*dhvasta*' denotes the counterpositive of destruction (*nāśapratīyogī*). Whenever the identity plays the role of a relation then, provided that the two words end with the same case affix, the meaning of one word will have to relate with the meaning of another word. In the given example, as per the above rule, it is necessary that the meaning of the word '*Naṣṭa*', i.e. counterpositive of destruction, be related by the relation of identity with the meaning of the other word '*Śikhī*' (a person with tuft). Since such sentences are used when the person is still alive with his tuft gone, the sentence is a valid one. If the meaning of the word '*naṣṭa*' is related with the tuft meaning '*Śikhā*' in the part of the word '*Śikhī*', then the meaning conveyed by the sentence would be correct. But, the formation of the sentence would be incorrect, for the use of the same case affix after the two words—'*naṣṭa*' and '*śikhī*' is wrong as they are not conveying the same thing. Thus, the usage of the sentences like '*Śikhī naṣṭaḥ*' can not be justified if the cognition produced by them comprehends identity as a relation. On the other hand, Gokulanātha Upādhyāya contends that if identity is regarded as the meaning of the '*su*' case affix added to the word '*naṣṭa*' then there would not be any difficulty in explaining the meaning of the sentence. For, now, the *abheda* of the *naṣṭa*, the meaning of the case affix added to the word '*naṣṭa*' can be said as related to the meaning of the word '*Śikhī*' by the relation of *svāśrayaviśiṣṭatva*, i.e. being possessed of something which is the locus of '*sva*' the *abheda*. In the above case, the locus of *sva*, is *Śikhā* the tuft. Now, the question may be asked that since it is *śikhā* which actually has the direct relation of the *abheda*, how can the words '*naṣṭa*' and '*śikhī*' be regarded

as *samānādhikaraṇa* - conveying the same thing. Gokulanātha Upādhyāya asserts that to become *samānādhikaraṇa* a word need not convey something which has the identity directly. Instead, if it denotes something which is related with *abheda*, with whatsoever relation, even then it is considered as having *samānādhikaraṇa* by virtue of which the word can have the same case affix as the other word.

While here Gokulanātha Upādhyāya finds fault with the views of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya on many other occasions he differs with Gadādhara. The nature of *abheda* is one such example. Gadādhara thoroughly discusses the nature of *abheda* and explains it as *tādātmya*. He further explains it as *tadvyaktitva*—the individuality of the thing or the person, or the absence of difference, the counterpositiveness of which is limited with *tadvyaktitva*. If this explanation is accepted, how can the cognition grasping the *tadvyaktitva* of a thing which is hitherto unknown, be explained. Since this *tadvyaktitva* is unknown, the denotative power of the 'su' case affix, regarding the so far unknown *tadvyaktitva*, also is unknown. Hence, the case affix can not convey this novel *tadvyaktitva*—is the objection here. Gadādhara tries to answer this objection by suggesting that all the *tadvyaktitvas* are universally known through *sāmānyapratyāsatti*. Just as all the smokes and fires that can not be seen by us directly, can be denoted as being perceived through *sāmānyapratyāsatti*, all individualities can thus be known to us by way of *Sāmānyapratyāsatti*, the *sāmyadharmā* being—*Ekamātravṛttitva*. In other words, we may not know all individualities existent individually but it is possible for us to know them generally—as the attributes residing in only one thing. Thus Gadādhara suggests that it is possible to know the denotative power of a case affix even in such individualities that are actually unknown to us, individually. Gokulanātha Upādhyāya solves the same problem in a different way. He suggests that even unknown things can be conveyed through an *Upalakṣaṇa*—an indicator. For instance, pronouns such as 'tvam' or 'ta' that are used with regard to things and their properties which are unfamiliar to us, face the same problem, that is the impossibility of knowing the denotative power of those words in such unknown things and properties. Naiyāyikas solve the problem by making use of an *Upalakṣaṇa*—an indicator. The point is that when a pronoun 'Sah' is used to convey a person, say Chaitra who is unknown to us, it is possible for us to explain that we know the denotative power of the word 'sah' with regard to Chaitra. For, the denotative power of such words in things that are possessed of an attribute indicated by 'being a limiter of the contentness determined by our cognition' - *buddhiviśayatāvaccedakatva* is accepted. It means that when the speaker uses the word 'sah' in a particular context it is obvious that he has somebody in mind. Thus, when we come to know of the intention of the speaker through the context, we also come to know of the person and his attributes as intended to be conveyed by the speaker and instantly we come to know of the denotative power of the word even in such hitherto unknown individuals. Gokulanātha Upādhyāya suggests that the same explanation is possible in the case of affixes having their denotative power in respect of *abheda*—i.e., *tādātmya* or the individuality which is unfamiliar to us. Here, Gokulanātha states that '*Ubhayāvṛttidharma*'—'being a

property which does not exist in two' can be taken as *upalakṣaṇa*. Through this, he holds that it is possible now to even know the so far unknown properties and individuals.

Now, it may be argued that there is not much difference between the views of Gadādhara and Gokulanātha in solving the stated problem. But, if we carefully examine the two views, Gokulanātha's views appear to carry more weight. For, according to Gadādhara, the *tadvyaktitvas* are known to us in a general manner and hence when we grasp the denotative power of a case affix in these *tadvyaktitvas*, it is grasped in them only generally. Therefore, when these *tadvyaktitvas* appear in a verbal cognition the denotative power may appear only in a general manner. But, the view of Gokulanātha Upādhyāya on the other hand is that, even those *tadvyaktitvas* which are so far unknown to us, can then appear in a verbal cognition, in the individual forms. This according to him is possible, because the case affixes have their denotative power in all the *tadvyaktitvas* in their individual form only. It is true that such *tadvyaktitvas* are innumerable and most of them are unknown to us. Yet, it is possible because '*Ubhayāvṛttitva*' is considered here as the *upalakṣaṇa*. As an *upalakṣaṇa* it enables us to know all those *tadvyaktitvas* by helping us to grasp the denotative power of the case affixes in all the *tadvyaktitvas* and consequently to be comprehended by the verbal cognitions. At the same time, the *upalakṣaṇa dharma* can remain neutral as not being comprehended by the verbal cognition. This advantage makes the stand taken by Gokulanātha Upādhyāya, more acceptable.

Apart from Gokulanātha Upādhyāya's critique of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, his contribution to the development of the Nyāya school, during the eighteenth century is indisputable. In fact, any assessment of the contribution of an author is incomplete unless all his works are reviewed. But, since all his works are not available, an attempt is made to evaluate his contribution by reviewing only one of his works, *Padavākyaratnākara*.

#### *Dharmadatta Jha (Bachcha Jha) (1853–1918)*

The contribution of Dharmadatta Jha, to the development of Navya Nyāya, is indeed enormous. He was a multifaceted genius an original thinker and a philosopher. He had a mastery over the Vedānta, the Dharmasāstra, Jyotiṣa and the Sāhitya also. It is said that he had written a commentary called *Tattvāloka* on Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's commentary on the *Gītā*. He is also said to have written a *Campū* called '*Sulocana Mādhava Campū*', apart from several commentaries on Prācīna Nyāya works such as a commentary on *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and a commentary on *Nyāyabhāṣya*. Among his several works it is the Navya Nyāya works that earned him accolades from all sections of traditional scholars in India. His commentaries generally called *Gūḍārtha Tattvāloka* or *Vivecana*, are of a very high order. They are very terse and do not follow the pattern of the other commentaries. Bachcha Jha takes it for granted that the reader is well acquainted with the

original text and hence he generally does not bother to explain this, as the other commentators would normally do. He generally picks out certain subtle philosophical points that surface from the discussions found in the original text or the conclusions arrived at. Even seemingly innocent remarks made by the original author, which other commentators would conveniently ignore, attract the attention of this thinker and he uses these to make certain significant points. All his discussions reach a logical end and are never incomplete or wanting, usually ending with a *pariškāra*, the mode of solution peculiar to the Navya Nyāya School.

An instance where Dharmadatta Jha draws attention to the significance of the usage of a few words in the original text is provided by the opening sentence in the *Jāgadīśi* on *Siddhānta lakṣaṇa dīdhiti*:

*Vahnitvāvachinnasya sarvasyaiva dhūmādīman-niṣṭhābhāva pratiyogitāvachedakābhūta-tat-tad-vyaktitvāvachinnatvād avyāptirityanyathā vyācaṣṭe—pratiyogitānavachedako yo dharma iti.*

वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नस्य सर्वस्यैव धूमादिमन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकीभूततत्तद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छिन्नत्वादव्याप्तिरित्यन्यथा व्याचष्टे—प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदको यो धर्म इति ।

This introduction to the *Dīdhiti* suggests some modification in the final definition of *Vyāpti* formulated by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in his *Tattavacintāmaṇi*. The final definition of *Vyāpti*, suggested by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya is:

*Pratiyogya samānādhikaraṇa-yat-samānādhikaraṇāntyantābhāva-pratiyogitāvachedakāvachinnam yan-na bhavati tena samam tasya samānādhikaraṇyam vyāptih.*

प्रतियोग्यसमानाधिकरणयत्समानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नं यन्न भवति तेन समं तस्य सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिः ।

It means that *Vyāpti* is the co-existence with that which is not possessed of an attribute that is the limiter of the counterpositiveness of an absolute absence, that coexists with the *hetu* and does not co-exist with the counterpositive.

The *Dīdhiti* has modified the above definition as:

*Pratiyogya-samānādhikaraṇa-yad-rūpa-viśiṣṭa samānādhikaraṇāntyantābhāva-pratiyogitānavachedako yo dharmah tad dharmāvachinnena yena kenāpi samam samānādhikaraṇyam tad rūpa viśiṣṭasya tad dharmāvachinna yāvan nirūpitā vyāptih.*

प्रतियोग्यसमानाधिकरणयद्रूपविशिष्टसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदको यो धर्मः तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नेन येन केनापि समं सामानाधिकरण्यं तद्रूपविशिष्टस्य तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नयावन्निरूपिता व्याप्तिः ।

Among the several modifications made here, in the modification under consideration is the definition by Maṇikāra, *Sādhyā*—the meaning of the second '*yat*' should be such that it is different from the one possessing the limiter of the

counterpositiveness. The definition modified by Śiromaṇi intends that the limiter of *Sādhyatā* should be different from the limiter of the counter-positiveness.

Jagdiśa explains the reason for this modification as:

*Vahnitvāvacchinnasya sarvasyaiva dhūmādīman-niṣṭhābhāva pratiyogitāvachedakī-  
bhūta tat tad vyaktitvāvacchinnatvād avyāptirityanyathā vyācaṣṭe—pratiyogitā-  
navachedako yo dhrma iti.*

वह्नितावच्छिन्नस्य सर्वस्यैव धूमादिमन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकीभूततत्तद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छिन्नत्वा-  
दव्याप्तिरित्यन्यथा व्याचष्टे—प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदको यो धर्म इति ।

This implies that if the definition offered by the Maṇikāra is retained as it is, then the definition would suffer from the fallacy of *Avyāpti*. For, in the instance '*Vanhimān dhūmāt*', the definition is not applicable. Here, the *Sādhyā* is not a particular fire, instead it is fire in general. Thus the definition becomes applicable only if all fires (without exception) do not possess the limiter of the counter-positiveness of the absence that co-exists with the *hetu*—smoke. But, when the fires are taken individually, it is quite possible to show that each of them does not exist in some other location where another smoke is present. Thus, all the individualities (*tadvyaktivas*), without exception, can be shown as being the limitors of the counterpositiveness that belong to all the individual fires. In other words, in the inference, '*Vanhimān dhūmāt*' all the fires which are the *sādhyas*, are possessors of the limitors of the counter-positiveness of those absences that co-exist with the *hetu*—smoke. Thus, the definition is not applicable to the above inference and consequently, is to be considered as fallacious. In order to avoid the above fallacy, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi suggested the modification with which it becomes possible to avoid the fallacy.

This elaboration only serves the background in which Jagadiśa used the phrase '*Vanhitvāvacchinnasya sarvasyaiva*' in the first sentence of his commentary and we are not at present, concerned with the question as to how Raghunātha succeeded in avoiding the above fallacy. The pertinent question being raised here is why is, it that Raghunātha said—'*vanhitvāvacchinnasya sarvasyaiva*'—'all those that are qualified with fireness', when in its place he could simply say—'*vanheḥ sarvasyaiva*'—'all the fires'. The question appears to be very trivial. But, Bachcha Jha does not fail to notice the significance of the use of those words. He remarks :

*Atra vanhitvāvacchinnasyetyuktiḥ sārvaḥauma vyākhyānam dūṣayitum*

अत्र वह्नितावच्छिन्नस्येत्युक्तिः सार्वभौमव्याख्यानं दूषयितुम् ।

Accordingly, when Jagadiśa said '*vanhitvāvacchinnasya*' instead of '*vanheḥ sarvasya*', it was to reject the interpretation of the same definition of *Vyāpti* by Sārvaḥouma. To avoid the same fallacy of *avyāpti*, Sārvaḥouma interprets the definition in a different way. He suggests that the second '*ya*' in the definition



offered by Maṅikāra, should be taken as ending with the locative case affix which is elided. Thus, 'yat' means *yasmin*—'in which'. Again the word 'avacchinna' in the definition, should be interpreted as meaning 'avacchedakatānirūpita'. Thus, according to Sārvabhūma, the modified definition of *Vyāpti* would be:

*Hetusamānādhikaraṇa pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva pratiyogitāvachedakāvacchinna pratiyogitvātyantābhāva vat sādhyatāvachedakāvacchinna sāmānādhikaraṇyam.*

हेतुसमानाधिकरणप्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वात्यन्ताभाव  
वत्साध्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नसामानाधिकरण्यम् ।

According to this modified definition, the *sādhyā*, in an inference, should have the absolute absence of the counterpositiveness which is determined by the limitorness which in its turn, is determined by the counterpositiveness determined by an absence that co-exists with the *hetu* and does not co-exist with its counterpositive. The co-existence of such a *sādhyā*, is considered here as *vyāpti*. When Sārvabhūma, thus modified the definition, he held the view that 'counterpositiveness' is an *avyāpyavṛtti* attribute. An *avyāpyavṛtti* is that which co-exists along with its absence. Thus, in the inference '*vanhimān dhūmāt*' all the *sādhyā* individuals in their individual capacity, may be absent in some locus of the *hetu* and therefore may not be the '*apratiyogins*' of an absence co-existing with the *hetu*. Yet, since '*pratiyogitā*' is accepted as *avyāpyavṛtti*, its absence also can be present in the same *vanhi* when it is present in the locus of the *hetu*. Thus, in a valid inference, the absence of the counterpositiveness determined by the limitorness which is determined by the counterpositiveness which in its turn, is determined by the absence co-existing with the *hetu*, can be shown as present in the *sādhyā*.

Bachcha Jha remarks that it is to reject this interpretation offered by Sārvabhūma, that Jagadīśa used the words '*vanhitvāvacchinnaśya sarvasyaiva*' where he could simply say '*vanheḥ sarvasyaiva*'. Explaining the view of Jagadīśa here, Bachcha Jha states that the whole of Sārvabhūma's interpretation is based mainly on the notion that *pratiyogitā* could be *avyāpyavṛtti*. But, this idea is wrong, for it is the nature of *pratiyogitā* to be invariably present in all the instances of the limiter of *pratiyogitā*. In the above instance, the limiter of the *pratiyogitā*, viz. the innumerable *tadvyaktitvas* are always present in their respective loci - the innumerable fires. Therefore, it would not be correct to hold that the *pratiyogitā* limited by the *tadvyaktitvas* can be absent in their loci when the *pratiyogitā* is limited by the generic attribute '*vanhitva*'.

*Badrinath Shukla*

*Śataślokī* by Sri Badrinath Shukla is a small treatise consisting of, as the title indicates, just hundred, very simple ślokas. Though Sri Badrinath Shukla is well

known as an erudite traditional scholar of Nyāya Śāstra, here he has shown that when it comes to philosophical issues, he is an independent thinker.

In this small work he discusses the nature of *niḥśreyasa*, i.e. *mokṣa*. Naiyāyikas believe that this *niḥśreyasa* is the absolute cessation of all sufferings. But the interesting point towards which Sri Shukla draws our attention, is that nowhere in his *sūtra*, has Gautama said anything about the nature of *niḥśreyasa*.<sup>14</sup> Many hold the view that Gautama has clearly stated in the *sūtra* that *apavarga* is the absolute annihilation of sufferings. Since, *apavarga* and *niḥśreyasa* are the same, they contend that according to Gautama *niḥśreyasa* is nothing else, but super annihilation of sufferings. But, again, Sri Shukla reminds us that nowhere has Gautama said that *niḥśreyasa* and *apavarga* are the same.<sup>15</sup> Sri Shukla also draws our attention to Gautama's view that *mithyājñāna* is the root cause of all our sufferings and that it will be uprooted by the *tattvajñāna*. However it has never been disclosed as to what is the exact nature of *mithyājñāna* or *tattvajñāna*.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, Sri Shukla holds that if we are simply guided by the *sūtras* it is impossible to conclude the nature of *Niḥśreyasa*, i.e. *mokṣa*.

But, the Nyāya School has maintained all along that emancipation is only the super annihilation of sufferings and this stand, as Sri Shukla points out, is based on the *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya*.<sup>17</sup> Vātsyāyana seems to hold the view that the *mithyājñāna* is the identification of body, sense organs, etc. with the self. This identification makes the self to think that whatever is pleasant to the body is pleasant to the self and whatever causes pain to the body, causes pain to the self. Thus, the delusion makes the self love certain things and hate others. Due to this *rāga* and *dveṣa* the self will indulge in performing virtuous, impious or neutral actions. As a result of these, the self will have births and rebirths in which it has to suffer as if endlessly. When the self obtains the *tattvajñāna* and realizes the difference between the self and the body, etc. immediately the false knowledge which was the root cause of this bondage—full of sufferings, will get destroyed. As a result, the self will be free from *rāga* and *dveṣa* which are the causes of all sorts of actions. In the absence of actions the self will not have any merit or demerit that cause the chain of births. Thus, the self will be totally released from all the sufferings.<sup>18</sup> This, in short, is the Nyāya view of emancipation.

Sri Shukla raises a very fundamental question based on common experience, as to how a person of a discerning nature, can aspire for a state in which there is no pleasure. For, no person howsoever frightened of suffering, would like to abandon pleasure. Therefore, Sri Shukla argues, that one can not aspire for complete cessation of the cycle of birth and rebirth, which actually is the state of emancipation according to the Naiyāyikas, since then one will have to lose pleasure also, permanently.<sup>19</sup> The Naiyāyika's argument in defence of their stand as put forth by Vātsyāyana, is that there is no pleasure which is not associated with pain and hence one who is afraid of pain, should not crave for pleasure too.

In order to reject this view, Sri Shukla re-examines the nature of *mithyājñāna* and *tattvajñāna* as described by Vātsyāyana and his commentators.<sup>20</sup> Vātsyāyana

says that *mithyājñāna* is a cognition of the identity of body in the self. But, Sri Shukla argues that this does not seem to hold good.

It may be contended that if there is no identification of the body with the self, how is it that the attributes of the body such as thinness are super-imposed in the self. Sri Shukla convincingly argues that it is not necessary to identify the body with the self in order to explain the super-imposition of the attributes of the body in the self. Although two things are known as quite different, the super-imposition of the one on the other is also seen. For instance, the victory gained by an army is attributed to the king, although the king is known as being quite different from the army. Similarly, the self might be known as distinct from the body and yet the super-imposition of the attributes of the body would be possible. Sri Shukla also points out that unless there is an erroneous cognition of the identity of the two things, the super-imposition of the attributes of them on the other is impossible, therefore similarly the super-imposition of the attributes of different sense organs on the self simultaneously would be impossible. A person who is both blind and dumb, super-imposes blindness and dumbness—the attributes of the sense organs on the self. Here, it cannot be said that the person has a false cognition of identity with the two sense organs. For, he knows that eyes and ears are two distinct sense organs. This shows that the self never erroneously cognises the identity of either the body or the sense organs with itself. Therefore, Sri Shukla concludes that it will be wrong to hold the view that *mithyājñāna* is to cognise the identity between the self and the body or sense organs.

If the cognition of identity between the self and its body, etc. is not the *mithyājñāna*, for it can never arise, then what exactly is *mithyājñāna*? Sri Shukla replies that *mithyājñāna* is the cognition that grasps pleasure as desirable and suffering as undesirable. But one may dispute this by pointing out that pleasure is actually desirable and similarly suffering also is actually repulsive and hence how could such cognitions be considered as *mithyājñāna*. Sri Shukla replies that a thing can be considered as *anukūla*, i.e. desirable only when it causes some *samutkarṣa*, and similarly, a thing can be considered as *pratikūla* i.e. repulsive only when it causes some *apakarṣa*, i.e. degrading. When this 'anukūla' and 'pratikūla' are found to have quite different connotations, it will be clear as to why the cognitions 'sukham anukūlam' and 'duḥkham pratikūlam' are to be regarded as *mithyājñāna*. For, as the cognitions mentioned above, pleasure and pain should be *anukūla* and *pratikūla* to the self. But, the self by nature, is omnipresent, eternal and blemishless. Hence neither pleasure nor pain can affect it in any manner. Therefore, Sri Shukla holds that pleasure or pain cannot be discarded on the ground that they will affect the self.

The point that Sri Shukla's arguments highlight, is that when a person knows about himself, the false view about *sukha* and *duḥkha* will definitely get uprooted. Then just as the erroneous cognition leads to a sense of pleasure which is invariably associated with pain, the realization of the self, since it is a *tattvajñāna*—a true knowledge, should also lead to the experience of bliss. Thus,

Sri Shukla, by admitting the presence of pleasure even during the state of emancipation, challenges the time-old *Siddhānta* view guarded with all vehemence by the Naiyāyikas.

Again, Sri Shukla admirably answers certain objections raised, namely that the pleasure which is produced by *tattvajñāna* during the state of *mokṣa* is a positive effect—*bhāvakārya* and as a result it should get destroyed after some time. If thus the bliss in the *mokṣa* is prone to destruction, there cannot be any difference between *saṁsāra* and *mokṣa*. Sri Shukla ridicules this argument as smacking of the theory of momentariness advocated by the Buddhists. Clarifying the point he argues that if by just happening to be a positive and also an effect, a thing gets destroyed then it should get destroyed soon after its production. In fact, a positive effect gets destruction if and only if it is produced by *karmādrṣṭa*—the merit produced by the earlier action. Since the state of *mukti* is attained only after all the previous actions are destroyed, the bliss in *mokṣa* cannot be a product of earlier actions. Thus, due to the absence of a destroyer, the bliss in *mokṣa*, though it is a positive effect, can last eternally.

An argument according to which the bliss in the state of *mukti* cannot be eternal, is that a special quality of an all-pervasive substance is destroyed by the ending of a special quality. Therefore, the bliss of a liberated soul being considered as a special quality of the all-pervasive self, will have to be destroyed by a quality, say by a *saṁyoga* that occurs in the self.

Sri Shukla rejects even this argument pointing out the inherent inconsistency in it. As per the argument only such special qualities which are perceivable, are destroyed by a succeeding quality. If a special quality is non-perceivable, it is never destroyed by such qualities. For instance, *adrṣṭa*—merit or demerit, the special quality of the self is never destroyed by any successive quality. Similarly, the bliss in the state of *mukti*, though a special quality is not perceivable in the normal sense of the term. For, the only sense organ that can perceive bliss is mind. But, *mukti* is such a state in which no sense organ exists. Therefore, the bliss in *mukti* is like the *adrṣṭa* in self. Hence it is not destructible like the pleasure that we experience during the state of *saṁsāra*.

Another significant point Sri Shukla makes is that if *mukti* means merely the annihilation of pain then it has to be admitted as a state devoid of any consciousness, and in that case nobody would aspire for it.

In addition to these arguments Sri Shukla also employs as per the Nyāya tradition, certain inferences to prove his point.

Sri Shukla's, paper on '*Dehātmanvāda*' which he presented at the Seminar on Nyāya held in Saranath in the year of 1985 is another very important and interesting work. Here also Sri Shukla, as in his '*Śata-Ślokī*', treats a new path by questioning a faithfully accepted stand point of the Nyāya School which has been followed by the Nyāya traditionalists. While Raghunātha Śīromaṇi and even earlier, Bhāsarvajña had raised objections against certain doctrines of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika tradition, the '*Śata-Ślokī*' of Sri Shukla it may be said can only be seen as an extension of the arguments that Bhāsarvajña presented in his work. But the

article on *Dehātmavāda* is an absolutely an original thought. Earlier the Cārvākas and other non-believers put forth various theories to reject the separate existence of *ātman*. They argued that either the body or the sense organs, particularly *manas* can be identified with the self and it is not necessary to accept the existence of a separate self. Apparently the '*Dehātmavāda*' of Sri Shukla also appears to uphold the same theories. But, a closer observation reveals that he modifies the earlier theory of *Dehātmavāda* by holding that it is not merely the body that is identified with the *ātman*; instead the body associated with mind is *ātman*. This modification suggested by Sri Shukla is a very significant one and it helps him to avoid all the flaws that were shown in the earlier theories. The arguments can be summed up as follows:

There is no need for a separate *ātman*. All the functions that an *ātman* is supposed to perform, can be managed by body itself along with the mind. It is held by the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas that *ātman* is the locus of fourteen qualities such as cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, merit, demerit, impression, number, dimension, severality, conjunction and disjunction. Sri Shukla maintains that among these qualities those such as cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred and effort which are perceptible, are actually the qualities residing in the body. The imperceptible qualities such as merit, demerit, and impression (*saṃskāra*) belong to mind. Thus there is no need to accept a separate substance called *ātman* as the locus of the above qualities.

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School contends that the above qualities cannot be the qualities of body as they belong to the category of special qualities. The special qualities, according to the school, are produced either by the similar qualities of the parts which are the inherent causes of the substance—product, or by heat (*pāka*). Cognition, pleasure, etc. cannot be said to be produced in the body by the similar qualities of its parts. For, the parts of the body being non-sentient, do not possess such qualities. Neither can heat be considered as the cause for the production of such qualities in the body because, the qualities produced by heat, are always preceded by the destruction of the similar qualities in the same locus. For instance, the yellow colour in a mango fruit, produced by heat, is preceded by the destruction of the green colour in the same fruit. But, the first ever cognition produced in a body can not be preceded by the destruction of a similar cognition in it. Thus, the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School contends that if body is the self it is impossible to explain the occurrence of qualities such as cognition etc. in the body.

Sri Shukla rejecting the above contention states that the above argument of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School is mainly based on the assumption that cognition, etc. are special qualities of *ātman*. He points out that this assumption of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School is a baseless one as these qualities can also be considered ordinary qualities such as conjunction (*Samyoga*) etc. are. The ordinary qualities, as we know them are, sometimes, produced by a cause other than the similar qualities of the parts or heat. The advantage in accepting cognition, etc. as ordinary qualities of body is illustrated by the following. Generally a special quality of a

substance continues to exist till the destruction of the substance. But, in case the body itself is not soul and cognition, etc. are special qualities of it how is soul that the qualities are destroyed when the soul continues to exist.

Sri Shukla further argues that the problem does not arise when cognition, etc. are considered as special quality of the earthy body. For, a special quality of any earthy object is either produced by the similar special quality of the parts or by heat. But, Sri Shukla points out that cognition, etc. cannot be considered as special qualities of body, for a special quality is that which resides in only one substance. Smell of earth, sound in space, etc. are such qualities and are considered as special qualities of earth, etc. But, cognitions etc. when regarded as the qualities of the earthy body, cannot be held as special qualities for they reside in the other substances also, such as the bodies made of water, etc. Thus when they are not the special qualities of the earthy body, they question as to why these are not produced by the similar special quality of the body, etc. would not be relevant.

Sri Shukla also refers to other pertinent objections raised against the *Dehātmavāda* and replies, as presented below:

If cognition etc. are the qualities of body, then why are these not perceived by the *Cakṣus*. It may be replied, that there is no such rule that all the qualities of body be grasped by a single sense-organ. In fact, the qualities such as colour, etc. are also not grasped by a single sense-organ. While the colour of a body is grasped by the *Cakṣus*, its smell, touch, etc. are grasped by various other sense organs. Similarly, cognition, etc. and qualities of body, are grasped by the mind. It is true that qualities of body such as colour, etc. are grasped by only the external senses. Hence one may argue that cognition, etc. also must be grasped by the external senses only. To this, Sri Shukla's reply is interesting. He maintains that the name '*Antarindriya*', i.e. internal sense organ, even though it grasps some qualities that belong to the external thing like body, is quite correct, for, unlike the other sense-organs it is internally situated in the body. As a matter of fact, there is no harm even if we consider the mind as an external sense organ. However the name *antarindriya* which has been in vogue since a long time, is also justifiable. For, the mind can grasp only such qualities which are inside the body.

It may be argued further that just as the qualities of body can be perceived by a different person, cognition, etc., if they are the qualities of body, must also be grasped by other persons. Sri Shukla rejects the argument and maintains that it would have been possible for the mind to grasp the cognition residing in another body, had it been in contact with it. But, mind which is atomic in size resides always inside the body and cannot have any contact with the cognition residing in the other bodies. Thus, Sri Shukla maintains that it can grasp only those cognitions that reside in the same body in which the mind also is present.

Another strong objection raised by the Nyāya tradition against the *Dehātmavāda* is that since a body is continuously changing, in old age the body is quite different from the body of boyhood. Thus a person in old age cannot remember what he had experienced earlier in his boyhood. For, nobody can

remember something experienced by others. Sri Shukla maintains that this objection cannot find place in the *Dehātmanvāda* expounded by him. According to his theory, *samskāra* which causes recollection later, is not produced in the body itself when the experience took place. As per his theory it is produced in the mind. He maintains that though the experience takes place in the body, due to the peculiar contact with the mind, the experience though is residing in the body which is the locus of the experience, can generate the impression in mind. Since this mind unlike the body, is eternal, it continues to exist in old age also. Impressions residing in it can produce the recollection in the aged body also, as the locus of the *samskāra*, the mind has a peculiar contact with the aged body.

Another objection raised against the *Dehātmanvāda* by the tradition, is that with the death of body, the actions performed by it will also get destroyed without yielding any result to the performer. Similarly, the body newly born, will have experienced the results of the actions which it did not perform at all. If an *ātman*, separate from the body, is accepted, since it is an eternal thing, it is possible to explain that no action will perish unless it yields the results to the performer and no *ātman* will escape the results of the action performed. Pt. Shukla maintains that his *Dehātmanvāda* has an answer to the objection. According to his theory the merits and demerits caused by the actions of the body, do not reside in the body. Instead, they become the properties of the mind which is an eternal substance. After the death of the body the performer of actions, the mind will get associated with a new body which is produced as a result of the previous actions still residing in the mind. Now the new body will experience the fruits of the earlier *ācārs*. Thus Sri Shukla maintains that no action as per this theory, will get destroyed without producing the results. However, the other question as to how the new body the non-performer of the previous actions could be able to experience the fruits of the actions done by another body, still remains. But, Sri Shukla sets aside the question holding that his theory does not accept the rule that only the doer should experience the fruits of the actions. Instead, he asserts that a body will experience the fruits being controlled and associated by only that mind, being associated with which a body could perform the actions. In short, according to his theory, what is needed for the experience of the results of actions, is just the association of the mind the carrier of the merits and demerits and not the identity of the performer.

Sri Shukla also refers to another objection raised against his theory of *Dehātmanvāda*. The objection is that the theory in its enthusiasm in rejecting a separate *ātman*, has unwittingly ended in conferring *ātmatva* to the two things, namely, body and mind. One absurdity of this stand is that the theory will have to admit the co-existence of two contradictory properties such as eternity and non-eternity in the *ātman* which is identified with both body and mind which are non-eternal and eternal, respectively.

Rejecting the objection, Sri Shukla clarifies that his theory identifies the *ātman* only with body and not with both—body and mind. For, he points out, that the marks of *ātman* such as desire, volition, etc. which are enumerated by Gautama

in his Nyāya sūtra, are admitted by this theory in body only. The mind which just carries the qualities such as merit, demerit and also impressions, is just an aid to the ātman and hence the absurdity pointed out earlier, is due to the lack of proper understanding of the *Dehātmavāda*.

The above brief exposition of the contents of *śataślokī* and *Dehātmavāda* shows that Sri Shukla, inspite of his commitment of the School, was an independent and original thinker. But, the unfortunate thing is that the two treatises did not generate any serious discussion either among his contemporaries or among the young Nyāya-Scholars but has remained as just a symbol of Sri Shukla's sharp intellectual exercise.

*Kṛṣṇam Bhaṭṭa Ārde (1800)*

Among the several Nyāya writers of the nineteenth century, Kṛṣṇam Bhaṭṭa Ārde occupies a very prominent place. The Ārde family, had the reputation of being a family of authors.<sup>1</sup> His commentary on Gādādhari, *Mañjūṣā* generally known as *Kṛṣṇambhaṭṭīya*, is regarded as one of the most scholarly commentaries on Gadādhara's works. We have his commentary on the whole of the *Vyāpti Grantha* of Gadādhara, which includes *Pañcalakṣaṇī*, *Caturdaśalakṣaṇī* and *Siddhānta lakṣaṇa*. Besides this, his commentaries on *Avayava*, *Pakṣatā*, *Satpratipakṣa* and *Savyabhicāra Sāmānyanirukti* of Gadādhara, also are held in high esteem by the Naiyāyikas. He has also written a commentary on *Jāgadīśi* by the same name *Mañjūṣā* or *Toṣiṇī*. It is also learnt that he had commented upon Udayana's *Kiraṇāvatī*. *Padārtha Candrikā Vilāsa* written in refutation of Mādhava Sarasvatī's *Mityābhāṣiṇī* is also attributed to him.

His commentaries are written in very terse Navya Nyāya style, and not only explains the Gādādhari text wherever it is necessary, but also, on many occasions carry further the discussions where Gadādhara has left. Thus, his commentaries not only render a very valuable assistance in understanding the original text, but also contribute a lot to the development of thought. The following is an instance that reflects his contribution to the development of thought regarding a very subtle Navya-Nyāya epistemological concept.

While introducing the definitions of *Vyāpti*, consisting of "absence limited by a property whose loci are different from its counter-positive" (*vyādhikarāṇa dharmāvachchinnābhāva*) Gaṅgeśa cites the absence of *vācyatva* (*Samavāyitvena Vācyatvābhāva*), with the help of which the definition of *Vyāpti* becomes applicable to even such *hetu-s* whose *sādhyas* are only positive. Here, Gadādhara gives expression to the objections raised by some about the nature of the absence mentioned. It is contended that the absence of *Vācyatva* as limited by *Samavāyitva*, can not be considered as an absence limited by a property whose loci are different from its counter-positive. In support of this view, they point out that *vācyatva* which actually is *padaśakti*, is, according to the Naiyāyikas, the will of God. Hence, they argue that *vācyatva* being a quality, has *samavāyitva*—the limitor of the



counter-positiveness, in it and consequently the absence cannot be regarded as *vyādhikaraṇa-dharmāvaccinnābhāva*.

Admitting the contention that *vācyatva* is the will of God, an attempt is made to explain that the absence is still *vyādhikaraṇadharmāvaccinnābhāva*. The point made here is that *vācyatva* the counterpositive is not mere will, but is a qualified will—*tatpadabodhyatvaṣprakāratvaviśiṣṭā icchā*. Thus, the *pratiyogitā* of the absence resides by *pariyāpti* relation here both in the qualifier and the qualificandum namely, *icchā* and *tatpadabodhyatvaṣprakāratva*. Between the two, the will—the qualificandum has *samavāyitva*, while the qualifier which is none of the five—*dravya, guṇa, karman, sāmānya* or *viśeṣa* has not. Since thus the locus of the *pratiyogitāpariyāpti*, does not have the limiter of counterpositiveness, the absence has to be regarded as *vyādhikaraṇadharmāvaccinnābhāva*.

The above contention that the absence under consideration, is *vyādhikaraṇa-dharmāvaccinnābhāva*, is based on the notion that *pratiyogitā* is a *vyāsajyavṛttidharma* (property of pair). But, it is held that the very notion is wrong, for the *pratiyogitā* of an absence of a qualified thing, resides only in the qualificandum, being limited by the qualifier and it never resides in the qualifier also. In short, *pratiyogitā* is not at all a property of pair. Therefore, *samavāyitva* the limiter of the *pratiyogitā* of the absence under discussion, can not be considered as a *vyādhikaraṇadharmā*, as it is present in the will of God wherein the *pratiyogitā* also resides by *pariyāpti* relation.

As against the above view, it is also strongly contended that it is necessary to consider *pratiyogitā* as a property of pair. Otherwise, it is pointed out that the absence '*ghaṭatvena ghaṭa-paṭobhayam nāsti*'—'*ghaṭa* and *paṭa* both do not exist, as limited by *ghaṭatva*' would not be a universally present absence. It is obvious here that this absence is universally present. But this characteristic of the absence, cannot be explained if *pratiyogitā* is not *vyāsajyavṛtti*. For, an absence, as is known, does not exist where the *pratiyogin* possessed with the limiter, is present. In the present case, if *pratiyogitā* is not *vyāsajyavṛtti*, it means that different *pratiyogitās* reside in *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* separately. As a result, the instances where *ghaṭa* is present, can be said as the instances of the *pratiyogin* qualified with *ghaṭatva*—the limiter of *pratiyogitā*, in the present case and in such instances the presence of the *abhāva*—'*ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭobhayam nāsti*' can not be satisfactorily explained. In case, *pratiyogitā* is accepted as *vyāsajyavṛtti*, the *pratiyogitā* of the present absence, will have to be admitted as residing by *pariyāpti* in both - *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*. Since this pair cannot be the possessor of the limiter namely *ghaṭatva*, there is not a single instance where the locus of *pratiyogitāpariyāpti* possessing the limiter, is present. Hence, only by accepting *pratiyogitā* as *vyāsajya-vṛtti*, the universal presence of the above *abhāva*, can be satisfactorily explained.

But, Gadādhara has a different solution to the problem. He contends that the universal presence of the *abhāva*—'*ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭobhayam nāsti*', can be explained by holding *pratiyogitāvaccedakatā*—limitorness determined by *pratiyogitā*, as *vyāsajyavṛtti*. In the present case, the *pratiyogitāvaccedakatā* is residing by the *pariyāpti* relation, not only in *ghaṭatva* but also *ghaṭapaṭobhayatva*. Since an absence

is opposed to the *pratiyogin* possessing an attribute that has the *paryāpti* of *pratiyogitāvachedakatā*, the *abhāva* under consideration, can now be explained on its universal presence. The point is that we cannot find a single instance where a thing possessing both *ghaṭatva* and *ghaṭapaṭobhayatva*, the locus of the *paryāpti* of *pratiyogitāvachedakatā*, is present and hence the *abhāva* 'ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭobhayam nāsti' being unopposed, can be present universally.

Though Gadādhara could thus satisfactorily explain the universal presence of the *abhāva* under discussion, without accepting *pratiyogitā* as a property of pair, as he himself points out, another problem will surface. The problem is the difficulty in explaining the non-universality of the absence 'ghaṭa-paṭau na staḥ'—'ghaṭa and paṭa both do not exist'. It is obvious that this absence not being a *vyādhikaraṇa-dharmāvaccinnābhāva*, is not universally present. But, if an absence is held as being opposed to the *pratiyogin* possessing an attribute that has the *paryāpti* of *pratiyogitāvachedakatva*, then the *abhāva* mentioned above, will have to be universally present. For, the *pratiyogitāvachedakatā*, of this *abhāva* has *paryāpti* in the three properties namely *ghaṭatva*, *paṭatva* and *ghaṭapaṭadvitva* and the *pratiyogin* possessing all the three is nowhere present.

Having thus presented the problem, Gadādhara himself suggests a solution by the following single statement:

*Tathā ca tatra dvitvadharmitāvachedakatāpannasyaiva ghaṭatvādeḥ avachedakatā pratiyate, atra svātantrayenāpīti bhedah*

तथा च तत्र द्वित्वधर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नस्यैव घटत्वादेः अवच्छेदकता प्रतीयते, अत्र स्वातन्त्र्येणापीति भेदः ।

Apparently, the above statement seems to be rather very simple. But, the superb explanation offered by Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, garbed in exquisite Navya Nyāya terminology, would reveal the subtleties which otherwise a student would fail to notice. At the outset, he pinpoints the property with which an absence has the opposition:

*Yadyat sambandhāvachinnā yadyaddharmaniṣṭhā pratiyogitāvachedakatā tat tat sambandhāvachinna tat tat dharmāniṣṭhāvachedakatā nirūpita pratiyoginiṣṭhādheyatā nirūpitādhikaraṇatayā sākamabhāvasva virodhaḥ.*

यद्यत्सम्बन्धावच्छिन्ना यद्यद्धर्मनिष्ठा प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकता तत्तत्सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नतत्तद्धर्म-  
निष्ठावच्छेदकतानिरूपितप्रतियोगिनिष्ठाधेयतानिरूपिताधिकरणतया साकमभावस्य विरोधः

The above can be explained by means of an example. The cognition 'ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ (घटपटौ न स्तः)' which comprehends the absence of *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, also grasps the *pratiyogitāvachedakatā*—limitoriness determined by the *pratiyogitā*, in the attributes namely—*ghaṭatva*, *paṭatva* and *ghaṭapaṭobhayatva*. The *avachedakatās* that are thus comprehended, are further limited by different relations. The *avachedakatā* residing in 'ghaṭa-paṭobhayatva' being a property of pair, resides there by the relation of *paryāpti* qualified with *ghaṭatva-vyāpakatva* and

*paṭatva-vyāpakatva*. On the other hand, the *avacchedakatās* residing in *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*, are limited by the relation of *samavāya* which is qualified with *dvitva-vyāpyatva*.

Now, when there are both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* on the ground, it is possible to have a right cognition—‘*bhūtalam ghaṭa-paṭobhayavat*’. This cognition comprehends the *bhūtala* as the *adhikaraṇa* and also the *adhikaraṇatā* in it. Similarly, it also comprehends both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* as *ādheya* and the *ādheyatā* in them. The *avcchedakatā* determined by this *ādheyatā* lies in the three properties namely, *ghaṭatva*, *paṭatva* and the *ubhayatva*. The *avacchedakatā* determined by the *ādheyatā*, in the above case, is limited by the same relations with which the *avacchedakatās* determined by the *pratiyogitā* of the absence ‘*bhūtale ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ*’—‘*ghaṭa* and *paṭa* are not on the ground’. Thus, it can be said that an absence is opposed to such an *adhikaraṇatā*, the *ādheyatā* determined by which, is residing in a *pratiyogin*, the *pratiyogitā* residing in which, determines an *avacchedakatā* which is limited by a relation and a property which are the same as the relation and property that limit the *avacchedakatā* determined by the *pratiyogitā* of the absence. And as earlier explained, where there are both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* on the ground, it has the *adhikaraṇatā* described above. Hence, there will not be the absence. When both of them are not on the ground, it does not have the said *adhikaraṇatā* and hence the *abhāva* can exist. Thus, the above *abhāva* is not universally present.

Though thus, the non-universality of the absence comprehended by the cognition ‘*bhūtale ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ*’ can be satisfactorily explained, the question as to how to explain the universal presence of the absence cognised by the cognition ‘*ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ*’, may still persist. Since the *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* properties such as *ghaṭatva*, *paṭatva* and *ghaṭa-paṭobhayatva* are the same for the absence discussed earlier and the absence mentioned now, the question becomes very important.

As stated earlier Kṛṣṇambhaṭṭa very convincingly explains Gadādhara’s reply against the background of his explanation of the property with which an absence has the opposition. First, he brings out the main difference that exists between the cognition ‘*bhūtale ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ*’ and ‘*ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ*’. Accordingly, just as the cognition ‘*bhūtale ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ*’ grasps limitorness in the three properties such as *ghaṭatva*, *paṭatva* and *ghaṭa-paṭobhayatva*, the cognition ‘*ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ*’ also grasps the *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* in all the same three properties. Similarly, the relation—the *pariyāpti* qualified with *ghaṭatvavyāpakatva* and *paṭatvavyāpakatva* that limits the *avacchedakatā* in *ghaṭa-paṭobhayatva*, and also the relation—the inherence qualified with *dvitva-vyāpyatā* that limits the *avcchedakatā* in *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*, are also grasped by the cognition ‘*ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ*’. Yet, it is distinct from the cognition ‘*ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ*’, for this reason that it also grasps *avacchedakatā* in *ghaṭatva* separately, as limited by the relation of pure inherence. When we thus notice the distinction, it is easy to see why the absence ‘*ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ*’ is universally present. Here the *pratiyogin* of the absence is *ghaṭapaṭobhaya*. The *ādheyatā*—the occurrence that it has, can never be limited by mere *ghaṭatva*

which is not a property of *paṭa*. Hence, it is obvious that *ghaṭatva* which by the relation of pure inherence is the limiter of the *pratiyogitā*, cannot be the limiter of the *ādheyatā* residing in the both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, by the relation of pure inherence. This means that the *adhikaraṇatā* determined by the *ādheyatā* limited by mere *ghaṭatva* and pure inherence does not exist at all. When thus the opposition to the absence—*ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭobhayābhāva*, is a non-entity, it is but quite natural for the absence '*ghaṭatvena ghaṭa-paṭobhayābhāva*' to be a universally present absence.

The above explanation offered by Kṛṣṇambhaṭṭa appears to be quite satisfactory. But, he himself, is not willing to accept the explanation. The reason is not that it is logically incorrect. Instead, he is afraid of the possibility of inconsistency in the views expressed by Gadādhara in this context. Earlier Gadādhara, having rejected *pratiyogitā* as a *vyāsajyavṛtti* held that the universal presence of the absence '*ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭobhayābhāva*', can be managed by admitting *avacchedakatā* as *vyāsajyavṛtti*. Suppose, the explanation offered by Kṛṣṇambhaṭṭa is accepted, there will not be any necessity in admitting the *avacchedakatā* also as *vyāsajyavṛtti*. This is stated by Kṛṣṇambhaṭṭa as the view of others:

*Atra vadanti—evam sati prakadharmāvacchinnāparyāptitvarūpavirodham  
niṣkṛya avacchedakatāyā vyāsajyavṛtittva svīkāravaiyarthya parasamgaḥ.*

अत्र वदन्ति—एवं सति प्राकधर्मावच्छिन्नापर्याप्तित्वरूपविरोधं निष्कृष्य अवच्छेदकताया  
व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वस्वीकारवैयर्थ्यप्रसंगः ।

In order to avoid such an inconsistency in Gadādhara's views, Kṛṣṇambhaṭṭa gives another explanation which clarifies Gadādhara's stand without leading to any inconsistency. Accordingly :

The cognition '*ghaṭapaṭobhayam nāsti*' comprehends the absence, of which *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* are the *pratiyogins*. The *pratiyogitā* residing in them has '*dvitva*' as its limiter. The limitorness of this '*dvitva*' is, in turn, is limited by the relation of *paryāpti* qualified with '*ghaṭatvavyāpakatva*' and '*paṭatvavyāpakatva*'. When *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* are on the ground, it means that the *pratiyogin* namely, both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* are there on the ground being qualified with '*dvitva*', the limiter of *pratiyogitā*, with the relation of *paryāpti* mentioned above. In such a situation the above absence cannot exist and, thus, it is not universally present. The following words of Kṛṣṇambhaṭṭa convey the above idea:

*Vastutas tu ghaṭapaṭobhayaṁ nāstītyādau ghaṭatvavyāpakatvaviśiṣṭa paṭatva-  
vyāpakatvaviśiṣṭaparyāptisambandhāvacchinnadvitvanīṣṭhāvacchedakatāka  
evābhāvaḥ pratiyate/Ghaṭapaṭobhayavati ca tādrśābhāvasya sārvatrikatvam/  
pratiyogitāvachchedakatāparyāptyadhikaraṇadharmaviśiṣṭapratiyogyadhikaraṇatayā  
sādharmaabhāvasya virodhāt.*

वस्तुतस्तु, घटपटोभयं नास्तीत्यादौ घटत्वव्यापकत्वविशिष्टपटत्वव्यापकत्वविशिष्टपर्याप्ति-  
सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नद्वित्वनिष्ठा-वच्छेदकताक एवाभावःप्रतीयते । घटपटोभयवति च तादृशसम्बन्धेनो-

भयत्वविशिष्टस्य सत्त्वात् न तादृशाभावस्य सार्वत्रिकत्वम् । प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतापर्याप्त्यधिकरण-  
धर्मविशिष्टप्रतियोग्यधिकरणतया सार्धमभावस्य विरोधात् ।

But, unlike the above *abhāva*, the absence 'ghaṭatvena ghaṭa-ṭaḥbhayam nāsti', is universally present. Kṛṣṇambhaṭṭa's explanation is as follows:

Although, as in the case of *ghaṭaṭaḥbhayābhāva*, the *pratīyogitā* of the absence 'ghaṭatvena ghaṭaṭaḥbhayam nāsti', resides both in *ghaṭa* and *ṭaḥ*, unlike in the earlier case, the *avacchedakatā* resides by the relation of *pariyāpti* not merely in the *dvitva* but also in *ghaṭatva*. Thus, the locus of the *avacchedakatā* by *pariyāpti* relation or the locus of the *avacchedakatā-pariyāpti* are both 'ghaṭatva and ghaṭa-ṭaḥdvitva'. Since these two attributes have the opposition of 'non-co-existence', nowhere can we find a thing possessing them. Therefore, the absence - 'ghaṭatvena ghaṭa-ṭaḥbhayābhāva' has to be accepted as universally present absence. Kṛṣṇambhaṭṭa puts these views in the following words:

*Ghaṭatvena ghaṭaṭaḥbhayam nāstīti pratītisiddhābhāva-pratīyogitāvacchedakatāyāḥ  
ghaṭatvatādṛśobhayatvaitad ubhayapariyāptatayā pūrvokta-rītyā tayordharmayorvi-  
ruddhatayā tathāvidhāvacchedakatāpariyāptyadhikaraṇoktadharmadvayaviśiṣṭa-  
pratīyogyaprasiddhyā sāvatrikatvam ityeva bhāṭṭacāryeṇa mahgsayaḥ iti.*

घटत्वेन घटपटोभयं नास्तीति प्रतीतिसिद्धाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतायाः घटत्वतादृशोभयत्वैतदुभयपर्याप्ततया  
पूर्वोक्तरीत्या तयोर्धर्मयोर्विरुद्धतया तथाविधावच्छेदकतापर्याप्त्यधिकरणोक्तधर्मद्वयविशिष्टप्रतियोग्यप्रसिद्ध्या  
सार्वत्रिकत्वमित्येव भट्टाचार्याणामाशयः इति ।

The above explanation is an example of the manner in which the commentary runs. The main intention of the commentator is to bring out the logical or philosophical points that the original text contains. During this exercise, he substantiates the point being discussed with his own ideas. But, if the original text cannot be supported due to its own weak points, the commentator strives hard to explain the consistency that the text might possess. The student may not find any development of thoughts here, but the benefits of the logical, epistemological or philosophical insights that are presented, is the purpose served by the commentary of Kṛṣṇambhaṭṭa Arḍe.

#### *Raghunatha Parvate Shastri (1853)*

As the name indicates Raghunatha Parvate Shastri was of Maharastrian origin with versatility in Advaita Vedānta as well as Nyāya. His well-known Advaita work, *Śaṅkarapadabhūṣaṇam* was written in refutation of the famous Dvaita Vedānta work of Śrī Vyāsa Tīrtha—*Tātparya Candrikā*. He also wrote a commentary called *Nyāyaratna* on some portions of Gadādhari. His *Nyāyaratna* on the *pañcalakṣaṇī* portion of Gadādhari was published by Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay. The *Nyāyaratna* on the *caturdaśalakṣaṇī* portion of Gadādhari was published by the Adyar Library, Madras, in 1986.

Raghunatha Shastri's *Nyāyaratna* is one of the superb commentaries on the *Gādādhari* and it excels in bringing out the subtle points that Gadādhara makes in his text. In fact, Raghunātha Śāstrin's explanation are more valuable for highlighting such subtleties that carry more information with clarity. It would be interesting to compare *Nyāyaratna* with the *Mañjūṣā* of Kṛṣṇambhaṭṭa Arde and the explanation of *Nyāyaratna* on the distinction between the absences - 'ghaṭapaṭobhayābhāva' and 'ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭobhayābhāva' in the *Gādādhari* dealt with by Arde earlier, affords this opportunity.

Raghunatha Shastri, at the outset, clarifies the problem in very clear terms. Accordingly, the cognition 'ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ' cannot be regarded as grasping the *pratiyogitāvachedakatā* in the 'ubhayatva' alone. For, in that case, the *abhāva* would not be comprehended even in such instances where some *ubhaya* (some two things) are present. Hence, it is necessary to hold that the cognition grasps *avachedakatā* in such an 'ubhayatva' which co-exists with *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*. Now, the dilemma arises as to whether 'ubhayatva' co-existing with *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*, is to be considered as the limiter, or whether the *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva* co-existing with the 'ubhayatva' be considered as the limiter. Since there is nothing which can make the second alternative unacceptable, we have to agree to the suggestion that the cognition comprehends limitorness in *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva* also. Further, it is generally known that a property grasped in the *pratiyogin* is the limiter of *pratiyogitā*. Thus, in the present case, *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva* which are grasped in the 'ubhaya'—the *pratiyogin* must be regarded as the limitors. The result is that since the three limitors namely *ghaṭatva*, *paṭatva* and *ubhayatva* have the opposition of not having the co-existence, we cannot find a thing anywhere, possessing the *avachedakas*. Therefore, just as the absence 'ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭobhayābhāva', the absence 'ghaṭa-paṭobhayābhāva' also will have to be regarded as universally present.

In the words of Raghunatha Shastri,

*Nanu ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ iti pratītiḥ kevalam ubhayatve nāvachedakatvam avagāhate, tathā sati yatkiñcid ubhayatve tādṛśapratītyanudayāpatteḥ/Ato ghaṭatva-samānādhikaraṇa-paṭatva samānādhikaraṇ dvitve'vacchedakatvam avagāhata iti vaktavyam/tatra ca dvitvasamānādhikaraṇam ghaṭatvam paṭatvam veti vinigamanāvirahāt pratiyogyamśe bhāsamānatvād vā ghaṭatvapaṭatvayor-apyavachedakatvāvagāhan aucityāt trayāṇāmevāvachedakatva prasaktau teṣāṃ caikadharmāvacchinnāparyāptikatva-rūpavirodhāśrayatvāt viruddhobhaya-dharmāvacchinnābhāvavāt ghaṭapaṭobhayatvāvachchinnābhāvasyāpi kevalānvayitvam syād iti śamkate-yadyapīti.*

ननु 'घटपटौ न स्तः' इति प्रतीतिः केवलमुभयत्वे नावच्छेदकत्वमवगाहते, तथा सति यत्किञ्चिदुभयवति तादृशप्रतीत्यनुदयापत्तेः । अतो घटत्वसमानाधिकरण-पटत्वसमानाधिकरणद्वित्वेऽवच्छेदकत्वमवगाहते इति वक्तव्यम्; तत्र च द्वित्वसमानाधिकरणं घटत्वं पटत्वं वेति विनिगमनाविरहात् प्रतियोग्यंशे भासमानत्वाद्वा घटत्वपटत्वयो- रप्यवच्छेदकत्वावगाहनौचित्यात्, त्रयाणामेवावच्छेदकत्वप्रसक्तौ तेषां