

called 'inner morality of law' to its 'outer morality'. Fuller has conceded that 'in the life of a nation these external and internal moralities of law reciprocally influence one another; a deterioration of the one will almost inevitably produce a deterioration in the other'.⁹⁰ But the problem is not so much of a causal influence, as whether the one can possibly be judged in terms of the other. Can, for example, the inner morality of law be judged at the bar of morality that is external to it? Once this is conceded, Hart's distinction between 'law as it is' and 'law as it ought to be' would be reinstated irrespective of the fact whether law may be said to have an 'internal morality' of its own or not.

But the distinction is meaningful only if the 'law as it ought to be' is allowed to shape and influence the 'law as it is'. This would be as true of Fuller's 'internal morality of law' as of Hart's 'morality' which is supposed to be wholly 'other' than law, for even Fuller's 'inner morality of law' is not completely realized by every legal system that is known by that name. But this itself, as is well known, is the subject of one of the most fundamental disputes in the philosophy of law. The Hart-Devlin controversy on the enforcement of morals is as famous as the Hart-Fuller controversy on the separation of law and morals.⁹¹ It has been contended by Hart, amongst others, that it is not the task of law to enforce public morality. The point was made in the context of a debate which arose out of what has come to be called 'Shaw's case' and Lord Devlin's Mac-cabean lecture, entitled *The Enforcement of Morals*. The judges in Shaw's case had observed that 'the courts should function as the *custos morum* or the general censor and guardian of the public manners',⁹² and Lord Devlin argued in his famous lecture that 'the suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of subversive activities'.⁹³

The issue, however, is a far wider one than the immediate contexts in which it arose. It relates to the whole issue of law and morality on the one hand, and to the function of law, on the other. If it is not the task of law to enforce morals, then what is its function? Hart has, of course, distinguished between positive and critical morality on the one hand and between private and critical morality on the other, and has tried to argue that it is not the task of the law to enforce private

morality, even of the positive kind, that is, that which obtains in society at any particular moment of time. But the question is not whether there is any realm of private morality which law should never enforce. The question rather is what role should critical morality play with respect to positive morality, both of the private and the public kind on the one hand, and positive law on the other. Once it is admitted that critical morality has a role to play and that the demand for a change in positive law on the basis of its moral evaluation is justified, it follows that the moral critic by virtue of the fact that he desires the laws to be changed concedes that the enforcement of morals is at least one of the important functions of law, even if besides it there be many others. The separation between 'law as it is' and 'law as it should be' would lose all meaning if 'law as it should be' is not allowed to influence positive law at all. Similarly, Fuller's notion of 'inner morality of law' would become infructuous if it has no relation to either positive or critical morality. Responsiveness to both positive and critical morality is the essence of a law that is living and alive.

Responsiveness, of course, may and ought to be creative in character. Also, in a sense, it is inescapable, for whether the judge wishes it or not he has to interpret and apply the law to situations for which it was never intended. It is intrinsic to the very nature of law that it can never, in principle, anticipate all the situations to which and in which it may have to be applied. Hart has felicitously called this the area of 'penumbral decisions', and though he disputes that this leads to what has come to be called, following Cardozo⁹⁴, 'judicial legislation', still there can be little doubt that the distinction between 'clear cases' and 'penumbral decisions' is, at best, a tenuous one. To suggest that 'the judges are only "drawing out" of the rule what, if it is properly understood, is "latent" within it',⁹⁵ is obviously to stretch the notion of what is 'latent' a little too far. On the other hand, as Fuller has shown, a judicial interpretation even in the so-called clear cases cannot be made unless the judge asks himself the question, 'What can this rule be for? What evil does it seek to avert? What good is it intended to promote?'⁹⁶ Yet, even if we accept Fuller's point, it would not follow that the distinction between 'law as it is' and 'law as it ought to be' would cease to operate, for our notions of good and evil them-

selves may change. And though, following Hart, one may try to provide continuity between the old and the new notion, it may only be a fiction postulated to provide the illusion that things have not changed much. Conversely, after a revolution, one may emphasize the break and the novelty, even when not much might have changed.

This is not exactly the place to pursue either the Hart-Fuller controversy or the Hart-Devlin controversy any further.⁹⁷ Our only contention is that the criterion of rule-adjudication for the ascertainment of political development must first sort out some of these problems before it can even stake its claim as a relevant idea in the field. The controversy regarding the Nazi legal system illustrates this pre-eminently. But the same could be said of most dictatorships which make a mockery of the so-called 'inner morality of law'. Fuller seems to have assumed too easily that 'Coherence and goodness have more affinity than coherence and evil'.⁹⁸ It would have been difficult for him perhaps to say this had he not confined his attention to unsuccessful tyrannies like that of the Nazis, but also included the lasting and successful tyrannies such as those of the Soviet or Chinese dictatorships. He might then perhaps have accepted the possibility that 'evil aims may have as much coherence and inner logic as good ones'.⁹⁹

It is strange that these issues have hardly received any attention in the literature on political development. One can only conclude that rule-adjudication has been included in the list only to accommodate the traditional tripartite division of political structures and functions into the legislative, executive and judiciary. Basically the interest of thinkers on political development had shifted long back from giving much weight to formal-legal considerations in comparisons between different polities. This perhaps was a result of the fact that formal-legal structures had begun increasingly to be viewed as instruments for the achievements of social ends or as the product of social forces which lay behind them. Both the Marxist and the structural-functional approaches tended to strengthen this way of looking at legal reality, and those who regarded law in any other light except as masking the real interests and forces behind the façade presented by the legal structure came to be considered innocent fools, if not as agents of reactionary

forces. The concepts of civil and political liberty around which much liberal political thought of the previous era revolved fell into disuse and thus the problem of creating legal structures which would foster and safeguard them tended to be completely forgotten. In fact, the concept of political liberty has ceased to be in the centre of political thought, and thus the problem of providing legal safeguards for its preservation and growth has also tended to fall into the background.

But, whatever be the reasons for the neglect of the criteria in terms of which different legal structures may be compared and adjudged, it is clear that unless this preliminary exercise is done, there is no point in looking for the criteria of political development in this domain. Not only this, we should be able to offer justification for the criteria chosen and, at a deeper level, be able to answer the question why political development is identified with legal development or whether any distinction between them has also to be accepted. Perhaps the latter may be accepted as a necessary condition of the former, assuming of course that the notion of legal development is free from the difficulties we have been countering in connection with that of political development.

Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the recourse to rule-adjudication would be of any substantial help in solving difficulties clustering around the concept of political development. Law, in any case, has ramifications far beyond the sphere of what may be considered the domain of the political. It concerns itself with almost all aspects of society and economy, including even those which may be regarded as predominantly personal and private. Positive law would then have to be treated, specially in the way as it is actually operated, as an indicator of the positive morality of a society which, if it is to be judged, may only be done by an appeal to some ideal morality which would have to be justified on other grounds. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that even the sphere of positive morality is far, far wider than that of positive law, and that it would hardly be desirable if the two were to coincide or even if the distance between the two were to lessen to any significant extent in any society or polity. The concept of society is far more deeply related to that of culture, and culture, as everybody knows, is far wider than law. The clue to political

development then may be sought not in positive law or even in the actual process of rule-adjudication as found in a particular society, but rather in the civil or political culture in which all the political processes are embedded and which may be said to give them meaning or significance.

To turn to a discussion of political or civic culture as an indicator of political development is to leave the so-called 'conversion-functions' behind and to move on into a different domain. Yet, our detailed discussion of each of the conversion-functions has revealed their inadequacy for providing satisfactory criteria for political development. It may, however, still be objected that in discussing each of them separately in an *isolated* manner we have done violence to the whole spirit of the discussion on political development. For, it may be said that it was never the intention of the proponents to offer them in such an isolated manner for consideration as a criterion of political development. Rather, they should be treated in their complex interrelationship which alone could serve in a unified manner as an indicator of political development.

The objection need not be dismissed lightly by saying that if each criterion offered has been found to be inadequate singly, it is highly unlikely that the same criteria when considered in some sort of interactive unity would reveal a positive adequacy instead of a compounding of their inadequacies into a whole, which would be even more inadequate in character. G. E. Moore in his *Principia Ethica* has warned us that the value of a complex whole need not be a sum of the values of its parts, and as the notion of 'adequacy' is perhaps a valuational notion we should be well advised to take the objection seriously and find out whether the inadequacies get compounded or cancelled when the criteria are considered not in their isolation but togetherness. But before embarking on this examination it would be well if we briefly consider the claims of political culture, political communication and the System Maintenance and Adaptation Functions as indicators of political development.

(6) *Political Culture as an Indicator of Development*

The concept of political culture is obviously borrowed from anthropological studies on the one hand, and the study of

civilizations on the other. The anthropologists have tended to view culture as the structure of meanings in terms of which the actual observed behaviour of the people of an alien society is interpreted in such a way as to accord with those people's interpretation of their own actions. The student of civilizations, on the other hand, cannot observe the behaviour of people as they have long ceased to exist. The only things he has to work upon are the remnants of what has been left behind and survived the accidents of time. These he has to interpret and, through them, to intuit the meanings, ideals and values in terms of which they gave sense and significance to their lives in their brief mortal sojourn on this earth. The term 'political culture' has perhaps more affinity with the first orientation than with the second. But even there it has more of a valuational orientation in the sense that thinkers who undertake this approach are not interested in interpreting the behaviour of the participants in the political process in those terms which make it meaningful to them but rather as it facilitates or obstructs the realization of what they regard as 'political development'. Thus, in a sense, political scientists who think in terms of 'political culture' are interested in the phenomenon neither as anthropologists nor as students of civilizations, but rather as those who are interested primarily in the study of comparative cultures. As the evolutionary perspective gradually slides into the developmental perspective, cultural relativism and pluralism give way to the notion of cultural development conceived mostly in what may be called an 'ethnocentric' or 'culture-centric' manner.

This 'culture-centricism', however, has itself given way to a thought which treats the whole of culture in an instrumental manner. Since Marx termed the whole of culture a 'super-structure', and Weber propounded the thesis of the protestant ethic in the rise of capitalism, culture has come to be regarded as an instrument for the realization of ends other than its own. It has been treated both as a façade that hides reality from the consciousness of observers and participants alike, as well as that which makes reality tolerable or liveable for man. Seen either as a lubricating oil for the creaking joints of the social machine or as a compensatory dream which makes the oppressive repression of social reality bearable or as a beautiful mask which

hides hideous reality, it is always treated in relation to something other than itself, and an instrument thereof. The talk of 'political culture' is no different, and it is primarily seen in terms of 'political development'. Following Weberian studies on the one hand, and the failure of many new nations of Asia and Africa to make good in the economic domain on the other, the question began to be asked whether the traditional cultures of these societies stood in the way of their economic development. As many of these new nations failed not only in the economic field but also in the political in the sense that they achieved neither stability nor growth, the same questions began to be raised with respect to the political domain also.

But once something is seen instrumentally, it cannot serve as a criterion of that in relation to which it is treated as an instrument, except in the indirect sense that its presence or absence would also be treated as an indicator of the presence or absence of the other. But, even for this, it is necessary that independent criteria be first available for determining whether the so-called effect, or rather that which is supposed to be achieved by some other instrumentality, is itself developed or not. The talk of political culture, therefore, is no substitute for the task of determining viable criteria of development with respect to the political domain.

It may, of course, be argued that as culture usually refers to the pattern of interactive behaviour in any particular domain and the values that are implicit therein and thus capable of being intuited through its continuous and prolonged observation, a discussion of culture with respect to any particular domain is about the domain itself. Viewed in this way, there would be little difference between political culture and the realm which is designated as 'political'. Political development, thus, would become identical with the development of political culture itself. The discussion would, however, then shift to the nature of cultural development in general and of that which pertains to the realm of political culture in particular. On the other hand, there would be the related question of how the two are related and how developments in the one field facilitate or obstruct developments in the other.

The notion of 'cultural development', however, is itself problematic, and stands in need of at least as much analysis as

that of 'political development'. It has been contended that no matter how political development is conceived of or what particular aspect of it is emphasized, the prevalent political culture of a society cannot but be relevant to it, as it would facilitate or obstruct the realization of political development in that sense in the society concerned. As Lucian Pye has written, 'clearly no matter what particular aspect is emphasized political development strikes at the roots of people's beliefs and sentiments about politics, and hence the process of development must be profoundly affected by the character of the political culture of a society.'¹⁰⁰ This is, of course, the tradition-modernity syndrome transposed to the political domain. But if we forget the gratuitous assumption that there can be no concept of political development which does not strike at the roots of people's beliefs and sentiments about politics, or that people's beliefs and sentiments about politics can never be of such a nature as to be in consonance with the values that political development seeks to realize, and pay attention to the idea implicit in Pye's statement, we would find that it is nothing but a tautology. For, as pointed out earlier, political culture is nothing but the beliefs and sentiments about politics as embodied in the verbal and non-verbal behaviour of a people and, depending upon the specific content of the notion of 'political development', it is bound to be conducive or antagonistic to it. Further, if political culture itself is different amongst different groups of people on the one hand, and between the ruling élite and the masses on the other, the question would arise as to which of these different cultures may be considered more relevant to political development.

If, for example, 'in no society is there a single uniform political culture, and in all polities there is a fundamental distinction between the culture of the rulers or power holders and that of the masses',¹⁰¹ then it is obvious that the relation of political culture to political development, howsoever conceived, would have to be conceived in a far more complex and differentiated manner. Further, if the so-called masses themselves do not have any homogeneous political culture of their own, as is very likely to be the case, there would be little point in making the broad dichotomous division between the culture of the rulers and the ruled. Perhaps even the political culture of the ruling élite may

not be as homogeneous as Pye seems to think, and the relevant distinction may lie between those who share a homogeneous political culture, whether they belong to the ruling élite or not, and those who do not, or rather those who share a different culture.

The problem, in fact, is further compounded as political culture itself is a sub-system of culture in general. Or, if it be objected that there is no such thing as culture in general but rather cultures as differentiated with respect to particular domains, the problem may be reformulated and articulated in terms of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the culture obtaining in the political domain with those obtaining in other domains. Sidney Verba has suggested that 'the distinction between political culture and the more general cultural system of a society is an *analytical* one.'¹⁰² But if the distinction were to be merely analytical, it would be difficult to postulate the possibility of heterogeneity between different segments or sub-systems of a culture. Verba is of the opinion that 'the basic belief and value patterns of a culture—those general values that have no reference to specific political objects—usually play a major role in the structuring of political culture'.¹⁰³ But if this is so, the notion of an independent political culture would become meaningless and, in any case, whether it is so or not, is to be established empirically for every case and not assumed *a priori*. Otherwise, the relationship that would have to be investigated would be that between culture and political development, and not between political culture and political development.

The distinctiveness of political culture has been emphasized by Lucian Pye and he has suggested that there are 'four specific values which . . . are apparently related to fundamental issues that arise in the developmental process'.¹⁰⁴ These, according to him, relate to the dichotomies of trust–distrust, hierarchy–equality, liberty–coercion, and the level of loyalty and commitments relating to the primary political identifications of a people. It is obvious that attitudes of trust, equality, liberty and a generalized level of non-parochial identification would be conducive to a polity of a certain kind which may be called 'developed', if these are the values that are taken to characterize or constitute political development. But even amongst these, the

liberty–coercion dimension is distinctive in the sense that very few people would like themselves to be coerced, though they may not mind if others are coerced for the achievement of certain ends. In fact, the attitudes towards the desirability or undesirability of coercion may be expected to vary significantly between the rulers and the ruled. Yet, the amount of actual coercion would be an indication of the gulf between the values of the rulers and the people, and of the extent of the people's resistance to the imposition of values by the rulers.

The other dimensions in terms of which the value-dichotomies have been spelled out seem even far less clear-cut than the coercion–liberty dimension. Trust–distrust, for example, depends primarily on the performance of political rulers, and if they not only have values which are different from those over whom they rule but also dissimulate in their articulation and profess those which they do not even mean to realize, then it is inevitable that the masses would have a feeling of distrust towards all those who rule them. After all, the history of the behaviour of the ruling élite down the ages is not such as to inspire trust in those who have been ruled. The betrayal of trust is such a constant feature of human history that it would be amazing if trusting confidence were still to be found amongst people. But even supposing such an innocence is found amongst a people, would it be really helpful to political development, as Verba seems to think? Or, would it not be playing into the hands of the ruling élite and making their task of political deception easier? The trusting populace is the dream of every ruler, so that he may take them like docile sheep wherever he wants to lead them. Would not a discriminatingly critical populace be better than one that blindly trusts in its rulers?

The same may be said of the hierarchy–equality and the extent and level-of-commitment dimensions of the value-dichotomies pertaining to political culture. The relations of power being essentially asymmetrical, it is difficult to see how equality can ever characterize a political or even an administrative system. But even if it were to be so characterized, it is not easy to see how or why it should give better results than a hierarchical structure. It should be remembered in this connection that the openness of access to various positions in the structure is a different issue from the egalitarian or hierarchical

nature of the structure itself. As for the extent and depth of commitment in terms of identification, it is not easy to see the advantages of national identifications for political development, rather than the so-called regional identifications on the one hand, and the global identifications on the other. If equality and participation are the directions which political development should take, then it is obvious that the political units of which one is a member should not be too large. If human beings are not to be divided into antagonistic and warring groups, it is obvious that too much identification with the nation-state would only lead to a condition of permanent belligerency where each is preparing to fight the other.

The four values in terms of which Pye articulates political culture do not thus seem to be related in any determinate, unique way to the so-called processes of political development even at the first level of analysis. Verba, on the other hand, focuses 'on those basic political values that represent the most general beliefs about the ends of political activity, about the nature of the political process, and about the place of the individual within it'.¹⁰⁵ Besides the fourfold values emphasized by Lucian Pye, Verba suggests that there are 'important political beliefs about how the polity operates—not what it is, but what it *does*',¹⁰⁶ 'in particular it is the expectations the members of a system have as to the output of the government—what they believe it will and ought to do for and to them—that are relevant here'.¹⁰⁷ But, as in the case of Pye's list, Verba's delimitation of the contents of those beliefs which may be relevant for political development does not help in telling us what particular types of belief would help or hinder the process. Also, there seems to be an implicit assumption that the beliefs are an independent variable in the situation. But this usually is not the case. The beliefs in most cases are themselves the result of the past political experience of a people, and can only be changed by a change in the political practice of the ruling élite itself. It is, of course, true that the political élite themselves may arouse expectancies which they may not be able to fulfil. One may think of some sort of a dialectic between the political apathy and political over-involvement of the masses with the political élite playing an arousing and dampening role in the process.

Yet, however interesting such speculations may be, they do not answer the basic question as to how political culture can provide a criterion or criteria of political development. In fact, if political cultures are different, and the term 'culture' includes the values that are considered worth realizing by the culture, it would follow that each political culture would have its own ideas or, rather, ideal of political development. The multiplicity of cultures is, in fact, merely another name for the multiplicity of ideal ways in which societies conceive of themselves, and if political culture is merely an aspect of culture in general, then it is obvious that the diversity of political cultures would be merely another name for the diversity of political ideals.

The idea of a plurality of political ideals, however, seems anathema to political thinkers, so much so that they hardly dare give it a place in their scheme of thought about political development. And this remains true even when they use the notion of culture, which in its anthropological context inevitably implies plurality and multiplicity. Basically, the emphasis in most such literature seems to be on those aspects of culture which are conducive to secularization and differentiation which themselves are treated as criteria of development in general. As Almond and Powell write, 'we have suggested that there is, in general, an association between structural differentiation, cultural secularization, and an expansion of the capabilities of the political system. These associated attributes are involved in the *development* of political systems, although, of course, such development is neither inevitable nor irreversible'.¹⁰⁸ 'Differentiation' and 'capabilities' have already been discussed at length as criteria of political development. As for secularization, it appears to be too conveniently identified with a pragmatic-bargaining attitude prevalent primarily in the U.S.A. and secondarily in England than with what it strictly means, that is, the denial of any transcendent or other-worldly dimension or allowing it to have any say in man's spatio-temporal affairs. In the second sense, almost all modern politics may be regarded as secular, while in the former sense perhaps only the U.S.A. and perhaps U.K. would be regarded as secular. Perhaps even in earlier times the states were not so non-secular as they are now usually supposed to have been.

Religions in the past appear to have provided the same function as the ideologies of today. In other words, they prescribed the verbal rhetoric in terms of which the states justified their policies and with whose values they had to come to terms at least to some minimal extent.

The classification of political cultures 'according to the combination of parochials, subjects, and participants'¹⁰⁹ can be of little help as the distinction between these in terms of the level of awareness about, and participation in, politics relates to the criterion as participation, which we have already examined at length, and does not add anything new to the discussion. The detour to a discussion of political culture thus does not seem to raise any new issues with respect to the problem of political development. The same may be expected to be true of political socialization and political communication which are also associated with the discussion on political development. Yet, before discussing the conversion-functions in their totality as criteria for political development, we might tarry awhile and consider the possible help, if any, which political socialization and political communication may offer in a discussion on political development.

(7) Political Socialization and Political Communication as Indicators of Political Development

The term 'socialization' refers to the whole range of processes through which a newborn baby gradually grows into a full-grown adult member of his society. The process depends on a subtle use of approval and disapproval, of reward and punishment and is based on the involuntary impulse to imitate which is found in all living beings. The imitation extends to patterns of behaviour, ways of feeling, building of attitudes, organization of perception, norms of action, etc. It is, in a sense, a 'communication' from one generation to the next of its specific ways of living in all realms, including those pertaining to knowing, feeling or willing. The specificity of the so-called 'socialization' process with respect to the political realm is no different from the way it obtains with respect to other domains. The formal and informal agencies such as the family, the school, the peer group, the mass media, along with the actual experience of the

individual of those sectors of the political system with which he comes into contact, shape both his perception of the political system and his attitude towards it.

Under the circumstances, it is obvious that one would need a prior decision with respect to the question 'what does political development consist in?' in order to be able to determine what forms of socialization may be considered conducive to it. In a sense, the issue would become relevant only when the prevalent political system in a society is judged to be 'undeveloped' or 'underdeveloped'. The reason for this is that all 'socialization' basically tends to be conservative in character, as it is concerned with conserving through replication and perpetuation what has been achieved in the past. There may, of course, be a form of 'socialization' which tends to institutionalize innovation and experimentation, but even in such situations there is bound to be a heavy emphasis, though unstated and unacknowledged, on the perpetuation of a stable background in the presence of which innovation and experimentation is permitted and encouraged.

The choice with respect to forms of 'socialization' is very limited, particularly as the most fundamental agency of socialization, the family, is not particularly amenable to voluntary control. On the other hand, it does not play a very significant role in 'political socialization', though it does inculcate attitudes which may help or hinder values which are regarded as desirable for the political system. The school, the mass media and the formal and informal peer groups, specially those concerned with politics, may and do play a more active role in the shaping of those explicitly political attitudes which are regarded as desirable by the élites in charge of the political system. Yet in both cases what is desirable for the political system has to be first determined. The resort to the notion of 'political socialization' is thus of little help in throwing any independent light on the idea of political development or in providing any criterion for it. The continuity-discontinuity criterion or the homogeneity-heterogeneity criterion may be offered as indicators of political development, but even then it would be difficult to determine which is to be taken as indicating development. For discontinuity can be taken care of by the usual mechanism of role-differentiation which provides for different norms to be

practised in different situations and heterogeneity welcomed by seeing it as providing that healthy tension which is the harbinger of beneficial change. Similarly, if it be contended that non-hierarchical, non-authoritarian practices of socialization in the family would be conducive to a participatory-democratic way of functioning of the polity, then it would not only prejudge participatory-democratic functioning as a criterion of political development but also entail that citizens reared in such a way would be unfit to work in all those organizations which cannot but be organized on the principle of hierarchical-authoritarian control, such as the army, etc. If it be argued, on the other hand, that the experience with respect to the armies of democratic polities from the Athenian republic to those of the Allies in the Second World War is a sufficient refutation of the contention, then it has to be accepted also that the whole thesis regarding socialization has to be rejected or at least drastically revised.

The claim of 'political communication' to provide a significant indicator of political development is perhaps even more untenable than that of 'political socialization'. And this for the simple reason that it is only an instrument for the realization of functions which may be distinctly political, but which need not necessarily be so. As a generalized instrumentality, it is presupposed by all activity and thus may be regarded as a necessary condition of political development, as of any other. Unless, therefore, some specific forms of communication are regarded as themselves political in character, there would not be much meaning in searching for the criterion of political development in the field of communication. It may be contended that the larger the network of communication and the more efficiently it functions, the greater the likelihood of the political system covering a larger area and being more efficiently organized in the sense of being responsive to the people whose needs it could then more easily decipher. But, first, it is not clear why the size of a polity should be taken as a sign of its development and, secondly, the so-called efficiency in communication may result as much in increase of effective tyranny as in responsiveness to the needs and wishes of the people.

It may be suggested, however, that certain types of com-

munication structures can facilitate or obstruct certain types of political development and, if so, they could serve as indirect indicators of the possibility of finding a particular type of political development in a society. Almond and Powell have distinguished five types of such structures. They are: '(1) informal face-to-face contacts, which spring up more or less independently of other social structures; (2) traditional social structures, such as family or religious-group relationships; (3) political "output" structures, such as legislatures and bureaucracies; (4) political "input" structures, including trade unions and similar interest groups, and political parties; and (5) mass media.'¹¹⁰ The list seems to consist of disparate items, some quite heterogeneous in nature. Most refer to structures whose primary task is other than communication *per se*, though obviously no function can be exercised without involving communication as well. The structures primarily concerned with communication are those of the mass media and the crucial question with respect to them is whether they are autonomous or not. And in case they are formally autonomous, do they enjoy substantive autonomy not only with respect to political interests, but economic interests as well?

The specifically political structures involved in the communication-function mentioned by the authors relate to political 'input-output' structures which we have already discussed. There seems little point in discussing them once again in the context of communication. The idea, however, that developments or changes in political communication in one area tend to influence or affect political functioning in other areas is interesting, but unless we have a clear idea as to the type of changes that we can regard as 'developmental', little would be gained in terms of the elucidation of the notion of 'political development'. The authors have written that 'the performance of political communication in a system may lead to changes in the performance of other political functions, or may limit and inhibit the development of certain types and levels of system capability.'¹¹¹ The statement, however, is not only too general to be of much help but also tends to suggest that it is in terms of their effect on a political system's capabilities that the changes in the communication system ought to be assessed. But as we have already seen in our detailed discussion on capabil-

ities as the criterion of political development, it can hardly provide the pivotal point in terms of which political communication can function as a safe indicator of political development. It may be urged that, depending on one's own preferences with respect to the notion of capabilities, one could treat the extent and efficiency of political communication as a positive or negative indicator of the same. But indirect indicators are only required where direct indicators are not available, and this certainly is not the case with any of the criteria of political development that have been offered, including that of capabilities. In fact, political communication suffers from the same defect as many other criteria discussed earlier in that one can have too much or too little of it, implying thereby that it is not itself an indication of political development but functions as such only in some particular context and relationship. This is to suggest that the criteria cannot be understood in isolation but only in interrelationship, and this is what we propose to discuss next.

(8) *The Criteria in Interrelationship*

Any such complex phenomenon as political development is unlikely to be understood in terms of a single variable alone. It may be contended, therefore, that our attempt to consider each of the criteria that have been offered singly as constituting political development has been doomed to failure from the very start and we should not be surprised if our detailed examination has failed to find any of them fully satisfactory. It is time, therefore, to examine the criteria in their interrelationship and find if such an approach proves more helpful. In a sense, the approach through interrelationships has not remained completely unexamined as the notion of 'capabilities' may be deemed to be primarily interrelational in character. In fact, the whole notion of input-output ratios mediated by conversion-functions is interrelational in character and has been examined and discussed in that perspective. Still, a focussed discussion on political development in terms of an explicit *relationship* between the different variables discussed in the literature is not as superfluous as it may appear at first sight. For, even if there be an element of repetition in the points made, the shift in the

focus may result in some new insights regarding the problem.

The criteria we have discussed up to now in great detail relate to those of (1) participation, (2) differentiation and (3) capabilities. The latter has been discussed in terms of the relation between input and output functions as explicated by Almond and Powell in their classic formulation on the subject. Besides these, we have also discussed in great detail each of the conversion-functions, such as (1) Interest articulation, (2) Interest aggregation, (3) Rule-making, (4) Rule-application, and (5) Rule-adjudication. Political communication is also sometimes treated as a part of conversion-functions, but we have discussed it separately along with political socialization. The relationship between participation, differentiation and capabilities has seldom been directly discussed in the literature. There is a generalized assumption that differentiation *per se* leads to an increase in capability, and that participation leads to greater system-responsiveness which may be taken as an indicator of its increased capabilities. There is, however, a slight difference in the assumptions, in that the latter tends to be made primarily by those who have some sort of commitment to democracy as a political value, while the former is unreservedly accepted by almost everyone who has written on the subject. In fact, there are thinkers like Huntington who consider participation an adverse indicator, specially in the case of developing polities. As the concept of political order or political stability is more central to his thought than that of political development, he assesses the value of political participation in terms of its effect on political stability or order. An increase in political participation makes increasing demands on the political system which it finds increasingly difficult to fulfil, thus leading to political decay rather than political development. In his own words, 'as political participation increases, the complexity, autonomy, adaptability, and coherence of the society's political institutions must also increase if political stability is to be maintained.'¹¹² But it is obvious that it is far easier for political participation to increase than for political institutions to increase in autonomy, adaptability and coherence, thus making it increasingly impossible to maintain political order in face of increasing political participation. As Huntington argues, 'the stability of any given polity depends

upon the relationship between the level of political participation and the level of political institutionalization.¹¹³ And, 'political stability, as we have argued, depends upon the ratio of institutionalization to participation.'¹¹⁴ By 'political institutionalization', Huntington means 'limitations on the resources that may be employed in politics, the procedures through which power may be acquired, and the attitudes that power wielders may hold'.¹¹⁵ But as such restraints are difficult to establish with a sudden increase in participation, the likelihood of the emergence of what he calls 'praetorian' societies is greater in most developing societies than those he calls 'civic'.

We are not interested here in discussing Huntington's position in detail, but it may be pointed out that he uses the term 'participation' in a somewhat unclear sense. For all 'participation' does not necessarily imply making increasing demands on the system, or making them in such a way as to lead to a breakdown of the system. Once a polity has opted for adult franchise and free and fair elections, it has provided the sufficient conditions for 'political participation'. This, however, by no means entails that there would be such an overloading of demands on the system that it is more likely than not to result in its breakdown. Such an eventuality is more likely to occur if 'participation' takes the form of 'populism'. The situation might get further aggravated if 'participation' is conceived of in terms of 'interest articulation'. It may, of course, be argued that even in a situation where 'populism' does not obtain, the mere competition between parties for the support of the electorate would tend to their making tall promises which would drive the polity to disorder and ruin. But this assumes that those who are elected try to fulfil all the promises made during elections or that the electorate takes all the promises that are made seriously, or that it even remembers the promises that the ruling party made at the last election. In normal circumstances it is the overall performance of the party in power that is judged by the electorate and not the detailed, specific promises made at the last election.

On the other hand, it might equally be contended that a too successful institutionalization may hamper development instead of fostering it, for the simple reason that it may purchase stability and order at the price of growth and change. The

institution of caste in Hindu society is a classic example of such a situation. It has become so successful as a principle of social ordering that all attempts at radical innovation based on its denial have been doomed to failure in Indian society. In fact, even non-Hindus in the Indian subcontinent have had to submit to this ordering principle in their social structure, even though it was at variance with the basic tenets of their religion. Islamic and Christian communities in India have found it difficult not to come under the influence of this ordering principle in their social structuring. A successful institutionalization, then, can be as inimical to development as the lack of it, depending on the situation and the context we are talking about.

The relation between 'institutionalization' and 'participation' may, of course, be seen in a more dialectical manner so that it is the tension between the two that provides the condition for development to occur. The dialectical view, of course, may take many forms, depending upon the conception one has of the basic forces whose antagonism and interplay is supposed to determine the system. The Marxian version of the dialectical approach is too well known to be discussed here. However, amongst non-Marxist political thinkers, Fred Riggs may be singled out for his dialectical view of political development. In his well-known article 'The Dialectics of Developmental Conflict',¹¹⁶ he sees political development as a dynamic resultant of the dialectical conflict between differentiation and integration on the one hand, and between capacity and equality on the other. His notion of 'capacity', however, is different from that which is conveyed by the term 'capabilities' in Almond and Powell's system, though perhaps by stretching the sense, it might be made to coincide with it to a greater extent than may appear *prima facie* to be the case. For Riggs, the notion of 'capacity' is primarily related to the desire of the rulers to preserve their power and perhaps increase and enhance it as well. In fact, the 'capacity-equality dichotomy' for Riggs is merely a consequence of the 'élite-mass dichotomy' which itself is a result of the fact that power is not only asymmetrical in character, but also that, by definition, élites cannot but be few in number and that many of those who are not amongst the élites would like to join and be counted as such. As Riggs points out, 'the élite are defined as

those who exercise power, the *mass* as those over whom power is exercised', and that the so-called pressures 'manifest themselves through government, in the desire of rulers to preserve their power and in the demand of the ruled to be heard and considered . . . the typical rationalization for preserving power by ruling élites takes the form of capacity, and the demands of the ruled are expressed as a quest for more *equality*.'¹¹⁷ It is obvious that Riggs has not expressed himself clearly, for there does not seem any intrinsic conflict between the demand of the ruled 'to be heard and considered' and the desire of the rulers 'to preserve their power'. The conflict would become inevitable only if those who are ruled want themselves to become the rulers or share in their power. The situation is insoluble in principle if it is conceived in terms of the dichotomy of élite and mass, as Riggs has done; for, by definition, the élite cannot but be in a minority, and that too a microscopic minority in most cases.

The impasse is sought to be bridged by Riggs through what he calls 'differentiation', as he argues that 'this conceptualization . . . postulates a narrowing of the zone of conflict (acute tensions) as the degree of "differentiation" rises—at least beyond some developmental threshold'.¹¹⁸ The term 'differentiation' includes in itself three concepts for which, according to Riggs, we need different terms for purposes of clarity. They are 'role specialization within a system, effective co-ordination of roles, and the two combined'.¹¹⁹ As everyone who is familiar with Riggs's thought can guess, we are safely on our way to a fused-prismatic-diffracted trichotomy in terms of which the process of development is to be understood. But it is not clear at all how 'differentiation' solves the dilemma of 'élite-mass dichotomy' with which Riggs started his analysis. Riggs has many interesting things to say regarding the identification of the relationship between 'the structure, the goals of equality and capacity, typical forms of conflict, and degrees of diffraction',¹²⁰ but it is difficult to see how this relates to the other, and politically more fundamental, dichotomy between mass and élite, understood in terms of the ruled and the ruler respectively.

It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish between the dialectic imposed by the fact of differential distribution of political power

amongst the members of a polity and the dialectic created by 'differentiation', meaning thereby the increasing specialization of roles within a system and the demand for some sort of integration between them so that the system may work efficiently and harmoniously to some extent and not break asunder.

We need not pursue our discussion of Riggs' twofold dialectic any further, particularly as we will have occasion to revert to it later in our concluding discussion on the concept of development and its relevance for different domains of human endeavour. However, it may be pointed out in passing that the basic weakness of the first dialectic relating to mass and élite is the assumption that political élites are the only élites, and that political power is the only power. Unfortunately for Riggs' model, this does not happen to be the case, and though he has theoretically conceded the possibility that power, presumably political, may itself be the consequence of the possession of other valued conditions,¹²¹ he has failed to draw the consequences of such an admission. The deeper problem, however, relates not only to the relations between different forms and types of power, but of their relative autonomy and independence as well. Otherwise, one would see all values as instrumental to the value one holds as primary and fundamental. The history of socio-political thought is replete with such examples, and one may choose the value one happens to like or the form of power that in one's opinion happens to possess causal primacy over all the others.

The dialectical notion of political development is not entirely absent from Huntington's thought either. Only, in his case the dialectic is more between the conflicting claims of rural and urban centres in the process of development. The crucial factors in the drama of political development, according to him, are the twin conditions of what he calls 'rural majority and urban growth'. The countryside continues to be traditional while the city becomes the centre of modernizing activity. Thus develops what he calls the gap between the political attitudes and behaviour of the cities and those of the countryside. The city, however, remains constant in its function. The variable factor in his analysis is provided only by the countryside on whose behaviour depends whether there would be stability or

revolution. As Huntington says, 'the role of the city is constant: it is the permanent source of revolution'.¹²² However, though the role of the countryside is crucial for political modernization, which, for Huntington, is identical with political development, the source for political mobilization and differential behaviour may be said to rest primarily with the urban political élite, whether they belong to the ruling group or to the opposition. 'The basic political competition', Huntington argues, 'becomes the competition between the government and the urban revolutionary intelligentsia for the support of the peasantry. If the peasantry acquiesces in and identifies with the existing system, it furnishes that system with a stable foundation. If it actively opposes the system, it becomes the carrier of revolution.'¹²³

The relationship between urban and rural areas is supposed to show four phases according to Huntington's system. In the first phase, the countryside dominates the city socially, economically and politically. Both, however, enjoy stability, each at its own level. In the second phase, urban groups develop strength and begin to challenge the rural élite, thus bringing instability into the system. In the third phase, the urban groups overthrow the ruling rural élite. The fourth phase consists of the induction of the rural masses into politics, which itself can occur in four ways depending on whether the sponsors of the 'Green uprising' are (i) nationalist intellectuals, or (ii) a section of the urban élite trying to overwhelm the more narrowly based political opponents, or (iii) a rurally oriented military junta, or (iv) a clique of revolutionary urban intellectuals.¹²⁴

We are not interested here in discussing in detail the adequacy of Huntington's dialectical model of political development. It should, however, be pointed out that the very terms of the dialectic confine the theory to primarily agrarian societies which are being urbanized under the impact of industrialization. The unquestioned assumptions of the theory, thus, are twofold. First, it uncritically assumes that the process of modernization necessarily involves a continuous decrease in the proportion of the rural sector, both in terms of the manpower engaged in it and its relative share in the national income. And, secondly, there seems to be an unconscious assumption that once the problem of rural-urban dichotomy is solved by the

swallowing up of the rural sector, political development would finally have been achieved, as there would be no further significant problems for the polity to solve.

Both the assumptions are naïve in the extreme. The first, though buttressed by large incontrovertible data from the history of industrialization up to now, runs against the increasing evidence that the pattern of economic development of large agrarian countries such as India or China cannot take the form followed by industrialized countries in the past. Not only this, the increasing evidence indicates that the large-scale, capital-intensive, centralized pattern of industrialization based on the use of non-renewable resources is ultimately suicidal in nature. In plain terms, it is alleged that there are just not enough resources to sustain a per capita world consumption at the level which now obtains in the U.S.A. The question obviously is not whether or not such a possibility is attainable in the near future, but whether, given the resource estimates of the earth, it is logically conceivable as a problem in simple arithmetic to think that it could ever be achieved at all. There is, of course, the on-going debate whether the notion of a finite resource base has any meaning at all and whether we need confine ourselves to the resources available on earth alone to satisfy the future needs of mankind.¹²⁵ But whatever side is taken in the debate, one cannot uncritically assume today, as one could perhaps ten or twenty years ago, that there was only one road to economic betterment exemplified by the history of western nations, including that of Japan.

Whatever one may think of the first assumption, the second is even more fundamental and more questionable. There seems no reason to believe that problems of political governance cease or that political good is completely realized the moment the rural-urban dialectic ceases to operate because of the practical abolition of the rural sector in the economy and society. The development of industrial and post-industrial societies does not lessen the tasks of political management or make the political antagonism between different classes and groups disappear, as is known to all the political leaders of these societies. It is therefore surprising to find Huntington writing as if the problem of political development were primarily a problem of underdeveloped countries alone, and has

little to do with the so-called 'developed' societies. He may, of course, plead in his defence that he is only concerned with the problem of political order in changing societies and not developing a generalized theory of political processes which would be applicable to all societies at all levels of their development. But this would be to assume that the so-called 'developed' societies have stopped changing or that there is no problem of political order in them. This, however, is to be blind to the social and political facts of these countries. Huntington's book was published in 1968 and thus, presumably, was written in the late sixties. Yet it shows little awareness of all the social and political turmoil prevalent in the U.S.A. during that period. At the social plane, the period 1958-68 had seen a hundred per cent increase in the crime rate. The comparisons with other nations were even more alarming.¹²⁶ The Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence gives not only these staggering figures, but breathes an atmosphere of hopelessness regarding the situation and wonders if anything could really be done in the matter. The report, for example, states, 'In the last 25 years our country has been deluged with significant Presidential and national fact-finding commissions, starting with President Truman's Commission to secure these Rights in 1947. . . . Thus the problems of poverty, racism and crime have been emphasized and re-emphasized, studied and re-studied, probed and re-probed.' And, 'Surveying the landscape littered with the unimplemented recommendations of so many previous commissions, I am compelled to propose a national moratorium on any additional temporary study commissions to probe causes of racism, or poverty, or crime, or urban crisis. The rational response to the work of the great commissions of recent years is not the appointment of still more commissions to study the same problems—but rather the prompt implementation of their many valuable recommendations.'¹²⁷ But even the possible hope of any such action was remote from the minds of many persons who appeared before the Commission. The Commission itself concluded its Report with the following statement of Kenneth B. Clark which may be taken as typifying the mood of the Commission: 'I must again in candour say to you members of this commission—it is a kind of Alice in Wonderland—with the same moving

picture reshown over and over again, the same analysis, the same recommendations, the same inaction.'¹²⁸

The political situation also was equally bad during this period. This was the time when student protests on the campuses against the Viet-Nam war increased both in intensity and violence. Starting from the Berkeley campus of the University of California in 1959, they continued unabated and spread to almost all the major campuses in the United States. The desertions from the U.S. Army reached grave proportions, and thousands of young men turned their draft cards over to federal officials and announced publicly that they would not serve.

The facts are too well known to be either repeated or documented here. What is surprising is that Huntington seems completely unaware of them or of their relevance to what he is writing on political order or political development in changing societies. And he is not alone in this respect. Rather, every writer on political development seems to be guilty of the same amnesia. One has reluctantly to agree with Hirschmann when he writes: 'I believe that the countries of the Third World have become fair game for the model-builders and paradigm-molders to an intolerable degree.'¹²⁹ And, that 'Having been proved wrong by the unfolding events in almost every instance, the law-makers then migrated to warmer climes, that is, to the less developed countries.'¹³⁰

The dialectical model of political development, whether in the classical version of Marx, or in that of Riggs or Huntington, sees it primarily as a dynamic relationship between two variables alone. The moment, however, we conceive of development as a resultant of more than two variables, the relationship would have to be conceived in a more complex manner. One would have to specify in detail the specific interactive linkages between the particular values of the variables as well as the positive and the negative feedback loops connecting them. Basically, nothing of the sort has been attempted so far.¹³¹ As most thinkers in this field have tended to offer multiple criteria, it is imperative that this aspect should not have been left unattended to. Further, as the relationship between the criteria that have been offered has generally been viewed inversely, it was even more incumbent on the authors to indicate the rela-

tive weightage of the values involved if a viable judgment about political development were to be regarded as feasible. Lucian Pye, for example, has remarked that 'historically the tendency has usually been that there are acute tensions between the demands for equality, the requirements for capacity, and the processes of greater differentiation. Pressure for greater equality can challenge the capacity of the system, and differentiation can reduce equality by stressing the importance of quality and specialized knowledge.'¹³² But if there are such acute tensions between equality, capacity and differentiation, each of which is regarded, severally and jointly, as the criterion of political development, then it is necessary that the problem of proportions and priorities between them be faced and settled. Yet Lucian Pye has done nothing of the kind. One is given no indication as to how much weightage is to be given to each and what exactly is to be the plus-minus equation between such incompatible criteria. The same can be said of many of the 'conversion-functions' which also display an inverse relationship between them. Take, for example, 'interest articulation' and 'interest aggregation'. It is obvious that the more we have of the former, the more difficult it would be to achieve the latter. Any increase in the quantity and diversity of interests would make it increasingly difficult to achieve 'aggregation' in the sense of 'reconciliation' of divergent interests.

Similarly, if we take 'rule-making', 'rule-application', and 'rule-adjudication' together into consideration, we see that an increase in the quantity and complexity of the first leads to increasing difficulties at the level of both 'rule-application' and 'rule-adjudication'. The more the rules enacted, the more difficult it becomes to see that they are properly observed and that the conflicts between them are expeditiously adjudicated. In fact, the possible conflicts between rules, both actual and imagined, may be expected to increase in a geometrical ratio, making it almost impossible for the adjudicating function to be reasonably exercised by finite human beings. In a sense, such a situation is already being approached in many countries where cases demanding adjudication lie for years without proper attention on the part of adjudicating authorities.

It may be suggested that if the relationship is of such an inverse character, the best course to ensure efficient 'rule-

application' or 'rule-adjudication' would be to go slow on 'rule-making'. It would then be in the direction of reduction and simplification of rules that political development will be sought rather than otherwise. But, however seemingly sensible this may appear in the case of 'rule-making', it may not even appear to be so in the case of 'interest articulation'. It will be difficult for anyone to argue that it is best for 'interest articulation' to be lessened so that difficulties may not arise in the way of 'interest aggregation'. Perhaps, the difficulty may be met by thinking of a moving equilibrium between the quantities on the inverse side of the relationship in such a way that the opportunities for an increase in 'interest articulation', or in 'rule-making' are only provided when there is a chance of their being 'aggregated', or 'applied' and 'adjudicated'.

Theoretically, the idea may seem logically impeccable even if it be conceded that in practice it is almost impossible to realize. But besides the issue of empirical unrealizability there is the ethical problem of the desirability of doing so. Just as it is ethically unacceptable that the opportunities for 'interest articulation' be reduced only because the polity is not able to aggregate the interests articulated, so also it may appear ethically unacceptable that an increase in such opportunities be withheld just because the polity is not able to increase its capacity to aggregate them. There may perhaps be an asymmetry in the two situations, as a restriction of opportunities which already exist may seem morally more reprehensible than a failure to provide more opportunities for expression of 'interest articulation'.

The difficulties, however, may be regarded as confined not merely to the empirical and the moral levels, but to extend to the theoretical dimension also. The equilibrium ratio, whether moving or not, is expected to be unity if it is to count as indicating political development. But in such a situation there can hardly be any development, for the indicator would always stand at unity, provided the situation is satisfactory. The difficulty may be avoided by treating unity as an ideal limit which is never actualized in practice because of the empirical limitations inherent in the situation, and treating development as a movement towards it. Any two ratios at different moments of time would then be compared in terms of their approxima-

tion to the ideal ratio given by unity and judged as political decline or development according to whether it is farther from or nearer it. One may also think of the logical possibility that 'interest aggregation' may exceed 'interest articulation' and that 'rule-application' and 'rule-adjudication' may exceed 'rule-making'. Such a situation may be described as 'over-development', in case there are no intrinsic incompatibilities in the concepts of such a nature that any ratio indicating more than unity is ruled out by the very nature of the concepts concerned.

A *prima facie* analysis does appear to suggest this in the case of 'interest aggregation' and 'interest articulation', for it seems meaningless to talk about aggregating interests which have not been articulated by any group or class of persons. The only way out of the difficulty would perhaps be to formulate the concept of 'anticipated interest' which, then, could allow being aggregated even in the absence of any explicit articulation. But, in that case, the problem would arise whether the so-called 'anticipated interest' coincides with the interest of the person or groups if they were to articulate their interests. The notion of 'anticipated interest' has, in fact, occurred in the classical literature of political science under the guise of what is called 'real interests'. The distinction between 'real' and 'apparent' interests, however, undercuts the notion of 'articulated interests' as it implies that people are not the best judges of what they really want. It is only the élite which knows what is best for everybody. And, in most cases, the élite is supposed to be the political élite only. The history of this notion is well known from Plato onwards, and has been helpful to dictators of all hues in justifying their authority which, according to them, has always been exercised for the achievement of the public good.

Whatever the difficulties with respect to the possibility of 'interest aggregation' exceeding 'interest articulation', there seem hardly any regarding the possibility of 'rule-adjudication' exceeding 'rule-making', as the possible disputes that may arise with respect to the rules made is always larger than the rules themselves. Even here, however, both the number and the wording of the rules would have a direct relationship with the number of disputes that may arise requiring adjudication. The larger the number of rules, the greater the possibility of the

disputes arising with respect to them. On the other hand, the wording of the rules may be such as either to encourage or discourage disputes about them, depending on the ambiguity inherent in the formulation itself. But even when the rules are formulated in as clear and precise a manner as possible, what Hart has called 'the open texture of law' would ensure the necessity of adjudication, as no law, in principle, can anticipate or provide for all the complex situations that may actually arise in life. There is, therefore, always a likelihood of rule-adjudication cases being larger than the rules that are made, though it cannot be denied that the larger the number of rules that are enacted, the more will be the occasions that would arise requiring adjudication with respect to them.

We may conclude, therefore, that the interrelationship between the criteria has hardly been the subject of any serious consideration or discussion by the authors who have offered them. Even the awareness that the relation between criteria may be antagonistic in character has hardly resulted in any attempt at answering the question as to how, in such a situation, we could possibly determine whether any such thing as political development has actually occurred or not. Whenever, for example, a plurality of criteria are offered in any field, the first question that has to be raised is whether they are to be treated as independent of one another or not. Yet, even this preliminary question has not been raised in the literature in any focal manner, for it is obvious that in case they are not to be treated as independent, then not only has it to be specified which of the criteria offered are independent and which are not, but it also has to be explained why, if some are not independent, they have to be included in the list at all. Further, in case more than one criteria is offered and each held as independent, it is incumbent on the thinker who is proposing the criteria to indicate what weightage has to be given to the various criteria in order to reach a total assessment of the situation. For, unless some such summation is done, no judgement will be achieved regarding the polity as to whether development has occurred or not. Yet, this problem of weightage has hardly been touched upon in the literature on the subject. It could perhaps be contended that no fixed weightage can be given to the criteria, as it varies with varying situations. There are situations when

'participation' may be given a greater weight as an indicator of 'political development', while in some other set of circumstances it is 'capabilities' that may have to be given greater weight. But then, one has to indicate the sort of circumstances which made a difference to the weightage to be given to a particular criterion and the reason or reasons why it has to be so. Yet there is little in the literature that is helpful towards answering such questions, or which even indicates the awareness that they have to be answered if the quest for the criteria of 'political development' is to have any meaning at all.

The search for the understanding of 'political development' in terms of the interrelationships between the criteria seems to have ended as much in a blind alley as the search for the individual criteria in earlier chapters. There seems to be something fundamentally wrong with the whole enterprise if none of the criteria offered, either singly or in interrelationship, can withstand a sustained examination of their adequacy. Perhaps something is radically wrong with the notion of 'development' itself or with the notion as applied to the field of 'politics'. In the former case, the troubles will lie at the very root and make the whole enterprise untenable in any domain whatsoever. On the other hand, if difficulties arise from the domain of the 'political', it would indicate limitations for the applicability of the concept and suggest its irrelevance for all domains which shared the characteristics of the realm of the 'political'. We will try to explore this issue in the next chapter.

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96. Fuller, p. 664.
97. For Hart-Fuller controversy, see also Hart, *The Concept of Law* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), and Fuller, *The Morality of Law* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
98. Fuller, p. 635.
99. Fuller, p. 635.
100. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 13.
101. Ibid., p. 15.
102. Ibid., p. 521. Italics mine.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid., p. 22.
105. Sidney Verba, p. 527.
106. Ibid., p. 537. Italics author's.
107. Ibid.
108. Almond and Powell, p. 62. Italics author's.
109. Ibid., p. 53.
110. Ibid., p. 167.
111. Ibid., p. 172.
112. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order In Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 79.
113. Ibid., p. 79.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid., p. 83.
116. Fred W. Riggs, 'The Dialectics of Developmental Conflict', *Comparative Political Studies*, 1 (July 1968).
117. Ibid., pp. 202-3.
118. Ibid., p. 205.
119. Ibid., p. 206.
120. Ibid., p. 208.
121. Fred W. Riggs, 'Power plays a critical role in relation to all such values, as a possible consequence of, and as a possible means for securing, the valued conditions', *ibid.*, p. 203.
122. Ibid., p. 292.
123. Ibid., p. 293.
124. Lester M. Salmon, 'Comparative History and the Theory of Modernization', *World Politics*, vol. XXIII, no. 1 (Oct. 1970), pp. 83-103. Contains a good summary and discussion of the views of Black, Huntington and Moore.
125. Donella H. Meadows, Denis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Universe Books, 1972). Also see Mesarovic *et al.*, *Mankind at the Turning Point* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Reader's Digest Press, 1974). See the debate in *Forum* (University of Houston), vol. XIII, nos. 1 and 2, 1975. Also Herman Kahn, William Brown and Leon Martel, *The Next 200 Years* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1976).
126. The Final Report of the National Committee on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Bantam, U.S.A., 1970). The comparative figures for 1966 in

respect of some other countries as given in the report per 100,000 of the population are:

1. Australia	1.5
2. Canada	1.3
3. England & Wales	0.7
4. Finland	2.3
5. Austria	1.1
6. Hungary	1.9

As against these the crime rate in U.S.A. per 100,000 of population happened to be 8.0 in 1966.

127. Ibid., p. 99.
128. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
129. Albert O. Hirschmann, 'The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding', *World Politics*, April 1970, p. 335.
130. Ibid.
131. An interesting attempt in this regard is that of Ronald D. Brunner and Gary D. Brewer, *Organised Complexity* (The Free Press, 1971). But it tends to accept the rural-urban paradigm of Huntington as the only framework of analysis relevant for the study of political phenomena.
132. Pye, p. 147.

5

THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT

In the detailed examination that we have undertaken, the failure of the criteria, both individually and in interrelationship, suggests that there might be something wrong either with the notion of 'development' itself or the field of politics to which it may not be relevantly applicable. The feeling of failure, it might be added, is not confined just to us. After more than a decade-and-a-half of discussion by the best brains in political science we find Charles Tilly asking in the latest volume of the Princeton series on the subject, 'Are these difficulties surmountable?' and answering, 'For my part, I do not think the difficulties are surmountable.'¹ But if the difficulties are not surmountable, it can only be so because in principle it is impossible to do so. But if it is impossible in principle, then the whole enterprise is doomed to failure from the very start, and it is no wonder that we have not been able to find any sure footing amongst any of the criteria that have been offered by many thinkers. Yet even so, it is incumbent on someone who argues for the impossibility to show from where the impossibility arises. And as we have observed earlier, the impossibility may arise from two very different sources, the one relating to the concept of development itself, the other relating to the nature of political reality, to which the concept of development may not be applicable.

But whatever the alternative source from which the impossibility may be said to arise, the primary task would require an analysis of the concept of development without which neither the first nor the second alternative would make any sense. The concept of development, thus, may be said to be crucial to the whole enterprise and unless we are clear about it, we would not be able to know the cause of our failure in finding a viable criterion of 'political development'.

'Development', it would be agreed, is essentially an evaluative concept. In most contexts, its use expresses a positive evaluation, and thus, unless otherwise stated, it should be interpreted as such. Also, it is comparative in character. To talk of development is to compare two stages of the same entity at different moments of time or to compare two different entities in respect of some characteristic which is regarded not only as common to both but also as characterizing them in the same essential manner. Besides these, it may also be said that the notion of 'development', to be relevantly applicable, must also contain the possibility of indefinite extension in the sense that there should, in principle, be no last term beyond which it is not possible of being conceived any further. In other words, there should be no terminus to 'development', in the sense that the very possibility of all further development be impossible in principle.

Besides this, what is perhaps even more necessary is that there should be some unambiguous way of adding the positive indicators and subtracting the negative so that it may be clear whether development has actually occurred or not. For this, it is necessary that some common measure be possible in terms of which the various indicators may be compared and evaluated. This, however, itself requires as a logical prerequisite that there be a clarity about the value or values that are immanent to the domain, and in terms of which the question of development or decay is said to arise. In case there is only a single value which defines the realm, the situation may not give rise to any specific difficulty. But in case there is more than one value inherent to the domain, they may not be necessarily harmonious in themselves, or the means for their realization may be such as to be antagonistic in character in the sense that the very adoption of the means for the realization of one value makes it difficult to adopt the means for the realization of the other value, or even works directly against its realization.

The issues with respect to the identity of the unit or units which are being compared have been pointed out by Tilly in his remarks on the formation of nation-states in Western Europe in the book referred to above. Most writers on development choose as their units of comparison the contemporary nation-states as they exist at present. But, as is well known, most of the

present nation-states did not exist in the past or had different boundaries from their present ones. The history of nineteenth-century Europe is well known in this regard and the effect of the two World Wars on the political map of the world is too familiar to be repeated here. As Tilly remarks, 'the choice of contemporary states as units for the long-run comparison of "political development" causes grave difficulties'.² He takes Germany as a typical example, whose frontiers have been fluid since, say, 1550 to 1950. But if the fact of changing frontiers over periods of time is taken seriously, then Tilly suggests that 'such a literature seems unlikely to yield statements about the conditions under which a given political structure will disintegrate, stagnate, combine with others, or transform itself into a variety which has never been seen before'.³

Tilly's remarks have been made in the context of political development, but it is obvious that as 'development' is a comparative term, the problem of the constancy of the unit of comparison would arise with respect to its application to any field whatsoever. And that where the unit is primarily defined in spatial or geographical terms which are liable to change over a period of time, the difficulties of making a comparative judgement may be remedied, if at all, by taking into account or making allowances for this factor. Some may go even so far as to treat territorial expansion as a sign of development in realms where it is relevant, and its contraction as a sign of degeneration or decay. The imperial expansions of states in the past through diplomacy, conquest or matrimony were always treated as times of growth and glory by historians of various persuasions. There have, of course, been exceptions like Marx or Toynbee who, in their different ways, have refused to accept the age of expansions as a sign of development. Rather, they see it as a sign of inherent weakness at the centre which tries to mask its failures by aggrandizement abroad.

Yet, whether territorial expansion is treated as a sign of development or not, it is obvious that the notion will be relevant only in those cases to which spatial categories apply and where they are regarded as the essence of the matter. Many realms with respect to which questions of development arise may have nothing to do with questions of space, and even when they must have a location, it is not taken to define their identity.

The problem of identity in relation to the unity of units with reference to which comparison is made has been extensively discussed by Toynbee and Sorokin. Toynbee has raised the issue in relation to the study of history and Sorokin in relation to his study of social and cultural dynamics. Toynbee finds his unit of comparison in what he calls a 'civilization' which has both a spatio-temporal spread and an identity of style in its various cultural manifestations which attempted to embody a distinctive vision of values, rooted generally in the successful response of a society to some supreme challenge which meets with such notable success that it seeks to repeat it again and again, even when it ceases to be adequate and leads to breakdown and disintegration.

Toynbee has wavered in his conception of the criterion of unity in terms of which one civilization may be distinguished and demarcated from another for purposes of comparison. On the one hand, he tries to find them in those empirical 'cut-off points' where that which is responsible for the birth of a civilization is simultaneously the cause of the death of some other civilization. The relation, he calls, 'apparentation-and-affiliation'. And, its clearest example he finds in Christianity, which simultaneously lies at the root of modern western civilization and is one of the most important causes of the break-up of the Greco-Roman civilization of earlier times. Christianity, however, is not only the cause of the death of one civilization, and the birth of another, but also one of the higher religions which give meaning and significance not only to human life and history, but to the world of temporality itself. In this sense, the unity provided by Toynbee would have to be conceived in terms of meaning, significance or value whose basic exemplifications are found in the higher religions.

However, neither the relation of 'apparentation-and-affiliation' nor the valuational vision embodied in the higher religions can provide that 'cut-off' point in all cases for the simple reason that according to Toynbee himself, there are civilizations which are not 'apparented' or 'affiliated' or both to any other civilization and that 'higher religions' are not found in all civilizations. One will, therefore, have to go beyond the specificities singled out and emphasized by Toynbee and seek the demarcating principle of unity in some other causal-functional or valuational

principle in the case of those civilizations where the specificities mentioned by him do not obtain. Sorokin, in fact, has enumerated the principles in terms of which different forms of unities may be treated either as given or constructed. Besides the unities provided by such natural demarcators as space and time which provide, so to say, only external unities, there are, according to Sorokin, unities provided by causal-functional and logico-meaningful factors. The latter are obviously more internal and intrinsic, as the principles providing them are more integral to the objects concerned. The causal-functional unities are relative to the scientific knowledge of a period, while the logico-meaningful unities may be regarded as relative to the value-apprehension of an observer. The objectivity, therefore, in their case is relative to the shared knowledge of a period or the shared value-apprehension of a people. However, the relativity gets less and less as we approach individual works of art or literature or philosophy which are regarded by Sorokin as the paradigmatic examples of logico-meaningful unities, or relatively segregated, quantitatively measurable, indefinitely repeatable, individual causal sequences which are well known in so many areas of science. The functional unities, in the same way, are more clearly and unambiguously exhibited in individual organisms which may be taken as their paradigmatic examples. But the moment we move to larger and larger units, the so-called unities become increasingly problematic and relative in character. The unities of whole civilizations as apprehended by a Toynbee, a Spengler or a Sorokin have been the subject of great controversy, as is well known to students of the subject.⁴

However, it would hardly be denied that the criteria for unity have to be specified first so that relevant comparative judgement about development could be possible. After all, the first question is: what is it to which the characteristic of 'development' is being predicated or applied? Similarly, though 'development' is not just 'change', it presupposes it in an essential manner. 'To develop' is 'to have changed', though 'to change' does not necessarily mean 'to have developed'. Hence, it is equally necessary that we determine not only that to which 'change' is being ascribed but also the respect in which it is supposed to have changed. I have discussed at length in my

earlier work, *Considerations Towards a Theory of Social Change*,⁵ many theoretical and conceptual issues relating to 'unity' and 'change', and hence need not repeat them here. Suffice it to say that, whatever be the criterion adopted for demarcation of the units for purposes of comparison, they should not only be explicitly indicated, but also held constant for the duration of the discourse. The requirement may appear elementary and even a prerequisite for intellectual integrity and honesty, but even a cursory glance at the literature reveals that it is conspicuous by its absence. The complaint of Charles Tilly quoted earlier makes sense only in such a background. He writes, 'the Europe of 1500 included some five hundred more or less independent political units, the Europe of 1900 about twenty-five. The German State did not exist in 1500, or even 1800.'⁶ If such is the situation, there can be little surprise that 'the choice of contemporary states as units for the long run comparison of "political development" causes grave difficulties.'⁷ This is, of course, an understatement, or rather a polite way of saying that the whole exercise does not make any sense, as the units chosen for comparison cannot be compared in principle.

What is even worse, however, is the persistent attempt to compare the performance of the newly emergent states of Asia and Africa with those of western countries, not with what they did at comparative stages of their emergence and growth but as they are now in contemporary times. Further, the growth-performance of the newly emergent nations is usually treated as a purely autonomous function of their ruling élites, and not as a complex resultant of their past colonial history combined with the realities of the power situation in the international world around them. The exception to this are, of course, the so-called leftist thinkers who derive their inspiration from Lenin's extension of Marxist thought to cover the imperialist phase in the development of capitalism. They are quick to point out that the political and economic development of the new nations is both hampered and distorted by the international structures of domination and exploitation built by the advanced capitalist countries of the world. But they conveniently forget the fact that the nation-states of eastern Europe are as much, if not more, under the thralldom of Soviet domination as the so-called direct or indirect client-states of the

western superpowers. As Tilly specifically states in answer to the question he himself raises, 'what, then, do we have to learn from the literature of dependency and exploitation? First, the recognition that the nature of the international structure of power, and the relations of particular countries to that structure, account for a major part of the form, change, and variation of the national economic lives of poor countries; there is no obvious reason why that should be less true of political life.'⁸

Besides the problems relating to the unity of the units being compared, there is the deeper problem relating to the units themselves. In case the comparison is merely quantitative, few problems arise. But the moment questions of quality arise, difficulties begin to pile up. The usual way out is to correlate quality to that which can be quantitatively measured, and thus to avoid the dilemma of making direct qualitative judgements and justifying them. But where such a quantitative correlation is not possible for some reason or other, one is reduced to making comparisons based on long familiarity with the field, the training of taste under those who have cultivated judgement in the matter and developing a sensitive openness to that which may emerge with creative novelty in the domain. The history of art criticism is a standing example of this situation where all attempts to do away with the direct qualitative judgement of the connoisseur have failed.

The notion of 'development', however, does not merely involve a comparative judgement in terms of quality, but also what might be called a direction of growth. Interpreted in terms of quality, this can only mean approximation towards an ideal which is more and more visible in its successive embodiments. The ideal, of course, is itself apprehended only through its concrete embodiments and is, so to say, a construct out of them. Yet, as it is never exhausted by its concrete embodiments, it is difficult to understand it completely in terms of the notion of 'logical construction', unless logical constructions themselves begin to be seen as acquiring independence from those examples out of which they have been constructed. The dilemma whether to conceive of that which has been apprehended through, or abstracted from, experience as independent of or unexhausted by it, is well known to students of

philosophy since the days of Plato and Aristotle. The dilemma was solved by Plato through formulating his famous theory of remembrance which asserted that experience was merely the occasion of reminding one of that of which one was already aware in the past, when one was presumed to be directly aware of the world of Ideas themselves. Such a way out is obviously closed to the scientific student of phenomena, though he may perhaps get some leeway by using the Kantian notion of a transcendental presupposition, or of Weber's notion of an Ideal Type, or even the generalized idea of a heuristic device to use it effectively for his own purposes.

The problem, however, gets a little more complicated by the fact that we do not merely talk of the growth of a style, but of its exhaustion also. It has repeatedly been asserted, specially by historians of art and literature, that any particular style, say, the renaissance, the baroque or the rococo emerges, grows and reaches its maturity after which there is only repetition, stagnation and decay. A master is supposed to exhaust the potentialities of a language or the medium in at least one dimension of its development, and after that there are only the epigoni or the epigoni of the epigoni, till a new master arises and blazes the trail in a fresh direction, when the same story repeats itself once again. The idea has been extended to the field of civilizations and cultures, and it has been contended that just as there is a genesis and growth of civilization, so also there is a decline and decay which can hardly be arrested for the simple reason that they have exhausted their potentialities by actualizing what they were capable of actualizing in the course of their history. Spengler's name is most associated with this view, but no one who has reflected on the history of any people has been able to escape the impression that creative heights are achieved in only very brief periods and that too in certain select directions. After that, there seem to be only the valleys, stretching out in space and time, where men remember and repeat that which was achieved for once and all by the old masters.

The history of creativity in cultures and civilizations, thus, shows a double facet. On the one hand, it reveals the exhaustion of possibilities in a particular direction after which there is only repetition, perhaps refinement, but no further growth or devel-

opment. On the other hand, there seem breakthroughs in new directions which achieve a different kind of perfection or excellence than the one achieved before. This may be achieved in the same culture when there is an awareness of past achievement and of the break with it, or in a different culture at a different place or time where no such awareness may exist, or, even where it exists, there is no feeling of break with it as it does not form part of the consciousness of the tradition within which one works.

The concepts of growth and development, thus, appear to find their natural application in the case of the former, though they tend to be extended to apply to the latter also. Only, the extension always appears forced and seems to demand a justification which seldom is forthcoming and, even when forthcoming, appears to be rarely satisfactory. The history of art provides a classic example of such dilemmas. One may, for example, reasonably maintain that the Parthenon is the culmination of Greek architecture and its greatest achievement, but how should it be judged in relation to the masterpieces of renaissance architecture which were built with a feeling of self-conscious continuity with the Greek past, however mistaken it might have been? This remains a difficult and debated question. The comparison of Greek or renaissance masterpieces with those that are known as Gothic raises problems of even a more perplexing kind. The two seem so different in form, spirit and composition that one wonders if anything is gained by the comparison, except the awareness of a difference in achieved excellence or greatness. But, whatever the difficulties, they still belong to a tradition whose historic continuity with each other can be documented and traced. On the other hand, any attempt at comparison with the masterpieces of a historically different tradition, say, that of India or China, would create even greater difficulties. How shall we determine which is greater or more developed, and in terms of what? The simultaneous awareness of the achievements of different times and cultures seems simultaneously to challenge one to compare and also frustrate the attempt to do so.

The same situation obtains in the realm of religion also. How shall one compare the great religions, each of which claims both absoluteness and finality, even in terms of history? Who

shall determine which is better or more developed, and on what grounds? The attempt at intercultural comparison leads to the search for transcultural criteria in terms of which a comparative evaluation may be made. But to talk of transcultural criteria is to talk of universal standards in terms of which not only may everything be judged, but which may also be treated as an ideal which everything is trying to approximate and realize to some extent or other. The radical difference in the case of historical religions in this respect is that they make the claim that the ideal has already been completely and finally realized and that every religion before and after it can be judged in terms of it. Yet, the very fact that the dream of an oecumenical religion acceptable to all has vanished from the minds of the most optimistic votaries of any religion has resulted in a situation where, however deeply one might be convinced of the superiority of one's own religion, one cannot but be aware that others think differently and that one has to live with these differences.

The situation is found in the field of art also, though not perhaps to the same extent. There are persons who think that the art they are familiar with is the only art worthy of being called by that name, and that the art of all other civilizations and cultures should be judged in terms of it. Greek and renaissance art were put on that pedestal by western art critics at one time, though the parochialness of that view has long been exposed by now. Yet, this exposure has been brought about by that very encounter with the arts of diverse cultures and civilizations which, in the first instance, had resulted in the almost total rejection of everything alien as 'barbaric', 'uncivilized', 'underdeveloped'. The first impulse at rejection gradually gave way to the feeling of 'alternative validity', and still later to a search for those universal excellences of form which are the creators of real aesthetic value, apart from the specific content which may be said to vary from one civilization to another.

The practitioners of art, on the other hand, have perhaps always been less parochial than the so-called connoisseurs and critics. They have always tended to incorporate from an alien tradition what they thought could successfully be blended with their own. There may appear here a certain difference

with the religious practitioner who usually tends to be more orthodox and dogmatic in his preferences. All religions have had the notions of 'heresy' and 'heretics' but it will be difficult to find their counterpart amongst practitioners of art, where creative novelty has always been prized over dull repetition. Still, the encounter between different religions, specially those that are regarded as 'major' or 'great', has not been without influence because of the awareness of each on the part of the others. The mutual interaction in India between Islam and Hinduism on the one hand, and Hinduism and Christianity on the other, may be seen as examples of the truth of this assertion. The emergence of the notion of Christian Sanyasa in such Jesuit Fathers in southern India as Father Mochanin and Le Saux, as well as the various reformist movements in Hinduism under the influence of Christianity in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, starting with Ram Mohun Roy, are all evidence of such interaction. Earlier, the interaction between Islam and Hinduism in India had given rise to many sects in both the religions which were frankly syncretistic in character. Similar examples could easily be found from encounters between other religions also. Yet, though examples can be found of mutual modification and influence in the field of religion, they certainly seem less numerous than in other fields such as art or philosophy or science. And this may perhaps be because the deepest identification of man up to now in history has been with his religion rather than with anything else.

However it be, it is clear that the concept of development does not seem to be *equally* relevant to all domains in which it may be sought to be applied. The cases of art and religion we have already examined to some extent. They may, however, be regarded as relating to realms of feeling and emotion where ultimately everything may be considered a matter of taste. But the situation in philosophy, which at least *prima facie* is supposed to be the rational cognitive enterprise *par excellence*, seems no different. If one were to ask oneself the question whether there has been any development in philosophy or not, one would be hard put to answer it either way. Whitehead's well-known remark about all philosophy being footnotes to Plato epitomizes this feeling. Similar is the feeling expressed by the equally well-known adage that in philosophy one is either a Platonist or an

Aristotelian. Yet, there is also the repeated spectacle of a philosopher starting *de novo* on foundations which appear to him not only firmer and surer, but unassailable in principle. Also, there have been recent claims for showing the 'non-sensical' character of most previous philosophy as the cognitive claims it made were unverifiable in principle. On the other hand, there are even more recent claims of the inalienability of metaphysics and a revival of interest in ontology. But, however different these claims and counter-claims may be, they all add up to the same thing. And that is the denial of cumulative growth or development in philosophical knowledge. The repeated search for absolute beginnings shows this as clearly as anything could. Also, how could one take seriously the claims to growth and development in a subject whose practitioners seriously state the literally 'non-sensical' character of almost all its achievement in the past?

Philosophical knowledge, then, seems to share with art and religion the dubious distinction of being resistant to the facile application of the notion of development to its domain. The answer to the simple question, 'what is the status of a past achievement in the face of the present one?', may be taken as a rough indication of the applicability of the notion of 'development' relevantly to a domain. But philosophy is a domain where, like art or religion, the latter does not necessarily supplant the former. A Plato or a Kant remains as relevant to philosophical thought as a Russell or a Wittgenstein. True, no problem in philosophy remains the same after the shock administered by a great thinker, but the latter never replaces the former. The contrast with natural sciences in this context is revealing in the extreme. A student of physics is not only not bothered about the physics of Aristotle or even that of Newton today, but he *knows* that he shall not gain anything worthwhile with respect to the knowledge of physical phenomena by any such knowledge. A philosopher, on the other hand, could never say such a thing. The history of philosophy is not an accidental adjunct to the teaching or understanding of philosophy. Rather, it is central to it, as was so well understood by Hegel and perhaps, in a sense, by Aristotle also. The tradition of developing philosophical thought by the method of writing commentaries on an older text in India evinces perhaps the same situation.

The contrast between philosophy and the natural sciences in respect of the development of knowledge is too glaring to be missed by anybody. In fact, it has led many to doubt if philosophy could legitimately be regarded as an instance of knowledge at all. But what about the social sciences? A nagging doubt seems to haunt the social sciences that however much they try to be 'scientific', they do not become 'sciences' at all. There seems to be no feeling of cumulative growth of knowledge, which is a feature of the natural sciences. There are, of course, radical differences between the various social sciences in this regard. Economics, demography and linguistics appear to be closer to the ideal of achieving some sort of cumulative growth of knowledge in their fields. But, whatever the individual differences in this regard between the different social sciences, there seems little doubt that they are regarded as belonging to the cognitive domain or as a part of the cognitive enterprise of man.

There is a peculiarity regarding the application of the notion of 'development' to these fields which, unless clearly understood, may give rise to ambiguities and perplexities that are difficult to resolve. The concept of 'development' in many fields may be applied either to phenomena belonging to the field itself or to the knowledge about the phenomena or both. One may, for example, legitimately talk about economic development, meaning thereby the rise in national or per capita income or more egalitarian distribution of income or any other criterion or set of criteria that one may choose to adopt. On the other hand, one may equally well talk of developments in the field of economic theory or in the methods of collecting economic data or in that of their interpretation. The two, however, are independent of each other and refer to different domains which should not be confused with each other. There can, in fact, be advances in economic theory along with substantial retardation in economic development, judged by any of the criteria that are usually adopted for measuring the phenomenon.

A similar situation obtains in almost all the social sciences and disciplines relating to the humanities, as the phenomena they study have themselves a qualitative aspect because of which it is impossible not to apply to them the adjectives

'better' and 'worse'. Such a situation, on the other hand, does not obtain with respect to the phenomena studied in the natural sciences. There does not seem any sense in applying the terms 'developed', 'undeveloped', or 'underdeveloped' to the sort of phenomena studied in, say, physics or chemistry or astronomy. The situation may seem a little ambiguous within the realm of phenomena studied by the life sciences. Can the concept of 'development' be relevantly applied to the emergence of new species, or the adjectives 'better' and 'worse' to what we find happening in the field of phenomena pertaining to life? The emergence of life may be regarded as valuable in that it provides both the precondition for the application of the value-judgment and the actual application of its occasion as well. Still, without the emergence of reflective self-consciousness in man, the phenomena of life would only provide the potentiality for such occurrence, and not its actuality. And, in case the potentiality itself is taken into account, the whole set of physical and chemical preconditions necessary for the emergence of life would have to be treated as events to which the idea of 'development' would be regarded as relevantly applicable. Man, in that case, would become the measure of all things, and the process leading to him, whether at the physical, chemical or biological level, would be treated as 'developmental'. Within humanity, one could then choose one's own religion or culture or nation as providing the measuring rod in terms of which historical development could be traced and others placed at a suitable location on the line of development depending on their relative *distance* from that which has been taken as the measure of development.

The ethnocentric and parochial character of the latter exercise is known to most thinkers, and we have already seen its untenability in the realm of art, religion and philosophy in our earlier discussion of them. In the earlier discussion on evolution, we made the same point that the distinction between 'more developed' and 'less developed' is difficult to draw amongst different species except in terms of survival which, excluding those that have become extinct, each species manages to achieve. The question whether any notion of 'development' can escape the charge of parochialism or ethnocentrism is too difficult to be decided with finality here. But what can be said with reasonable certainty is, (1) that the notion of 'develop-

ment' is only derivatively applicable, if at all, to the realm of the inorganic; (2) that within the realm of 'living beings', the application of the notion is primarily projective, in the sense that it is the qualities regarded as desirable amongst human beings or for the achievement of their purposes which are projected on to the animal world in considering them 'developed' or not; (3) that while the concepts of 'growth' and 'development' arise naturally in the context of human life in all its myriad manifestations, it does not apply with equal relevance to all the fields which emerge because of human interaction and creativity. In fact, if there are to be any structural parameters of the human condition, then it may be regarded as axiomatic that there are some constraints in the situation in respect of which any use of the notion of development makes no sense. But if it is so, then it becomes imperative that such areas be clearly demarcated so that the range of expectancy in relation to them may not go beyond bounds and feed on impossible illusions. Even for sheer ontological equality, it is necessary that in some respects at least not only all individuals, but all societies be the same or rather find themselves in the same situation. The privilege of being the latter should not confer advantages in all domains; just as for those whose philosophy of history makes them see it as a continuous decline from some golden past, it should not be seen as conferring disadvantages only on those who, through no fault of their own, happen to live in a later period. To put it in other words, the sheer passage of time should not be treated in such a way as to confer uniform advantages or disadvantages on all domains of human effort and endeavour.

Robert Nisbet has discussed some of these issues in great detail and exposes the difficulties inherent in the notion of change when 'it is made subject to the fundamental concepts of developmentalism'.⁹ In the last chapter entitled 'Reflections on a Metaphor', he suggests that 'the usefulness of the metaphor of growth is determined by the *cognitive distance* of the object to which the metaphor is applied. The larger, the more general, abstract, and distant in experience the object of our interest, the greater the utility of the metaphor. Conversely, the smaller, more concrete, finite, and empirical our object, the less the metaphor's utility.'¹⁰ 'The relevance and utility of the metaphor

of growth are in direct proportion to the cognitive distance of the subject to which the metaphor is applied. . . . The less the cognitive distance, the less the relevance and utility of the metaphor. In other words, the more concrete, empirical, and behavioural our subject matter, the less the applicability to it of the theory of development and its several conceptual elements.¹¹ And, as reality is that which is concrete and empirical, the concepts of growth and development cannot be applied to it. In case the attempt is made to apply them under the mistaken impression that they are so applicable, as many social scientists have attempted to do, it can only lead to disaster. Basically, it is a metaphor derived from organic processes which, if taken seriously and applied to the social realm, would lead to a distorted understanding of their nature. It would be what he has called the abuse of a metaphor, for basically it is irrelevant to the phenomena to which it is being applied.¹² In fact, even in the realm of the organic, the metaphor can only be relevantly applied to the individual and not to the species, though Nisbet does not seem quite clear about it.

However, Nisbet has accepted the uses of the metaphor. He has no doubt that it is applicable to processes in the abstract, specially when they are supposed to cover a vast, large field which is distant from the concerns of our immediate interests. One wonders how Nisbet conceives of the relation between the abstract and the concrete in the field of knowledge. It is obvious that he cannot bifurcate the two in such a manner as to have absolutely no relation with each other. The purpose of the abstract formulation is to illuminate the concrete, just as the use of the concrete is to test the adequacy or validity of the abstract formulation. If the metaphor is irrelevant to concrete phenomena, it is equally irrelevant to the abstract formulation; and if it is held to be relevantly applicable to the latter, then it cannot be entirely irrelevant to the former. The issue is important, for Nisbet seems to be assuming that the concrete can be understood without the help of the abstract, which is contrary to the history of understanding in any field. Further, he seems to have a strange notion of the abstract, in that he thinks that any entity that is too large to be apprehended by some immediate intuition, whether sensuous or otherwise, cannot be regarded as concrete or empirical in character. While

discussing Lynn Thorndike's *History of Civilization*, Nisbet points out that 'we are dealing with an abstract entity given body by attributes drawn from a score of civilizations—technology, arts, agriculture, writing, philosophy, fine arts, etc. and the historically concrete civilizations are used only as periodic incarnations, as it were, of the single entity, civilization. We are not studying, not really, despite appearances, the Egyptians, Greeks, Chinese, Romans, and other peoples. We are studying *Civilization* in its successive and fleeting resting places in Egypt, Greece, China and elsewhere.'¹³ One may be led from this to assume that Nisbet would at least grant historical concreteness to such civilizations as the Egyptian, the Greek, the Roman or the Chinese. But, basically, he seems averse to such an acceptance; though, to be more accurate, it might be said that he fluctuates in his attitude and at least positively rejects it in the sense in which any metaphor of growth or decline could be relevantly predicated of it. He says 'we should feel lost, most of us, without the accustomed civilization—one of Spengler's eight, one of Toynbee's twenty-one civilizations—that came into being (genesis), that matured to fullness (development or growth), that in time suffered decay through forces endemic in Roman polity and culture, and then withered and perished, fit consequence for Rome's never having cured itself of the diseases to which it fell heir in middle age.'¹⁴ The irony is obvious, but perhaps it is even more ironic that the same Nisbet, who waxes so eloquent about the abuses and irrelevance in the application of the metaphors of growth and decay to the study of societies, himself succumbs to it in his book *Twilight of Authority*. The adverse judgment on Spengler, Toynbee and others for their gross misuse of metaphor is almost reversed. It is strange to find the author asking, 'Has the West, in each of its nations, reached by now the condition prophesied by these and other minds of the past?' and answering, 'There is much reason to believe so, and it would require a totally closed mind to be insensitive to the increase at the present time in forebodings of the future.'¹⁵ He feels it enlightening to compare the present age with what 'Sir Gilbert Murray found in another of history's twilight ages, the age of social disintegration and militarism that followed the Peloponnesian wars in ancient Greece and the consequent breakdown of the

Athenian *polis*.¹⁶ The 'repudiation of the political state and of the whole pattern of thinking that has been associated with the state for more than two centuries' on the part of modern youth is supposed to have an illuminating parallel in Greece where 'the breakdown of the Alexandrian Empire . . . was associated with the eruption of numerous otherworldly, often frankly irrationalist, faiths'.¹⁷ The inevitability of the use of the metaphors of growth, development and decay in a comparative context seems thus as transparent here as it could possibly be. Nisbet, for all his fulminations against the comparative method and the abuse of the metaphor in the writings of Rostow,¹⁸ Levy,¹⁹ Smelser,²⁰ and Parsons,²¹ himself appears to succumb to the same temptations, albeit half a decade later.

However, the deeper point made by Nisbet in his earlier book is the contention that unless some sort of an immanent telos is posited for societies or civilizations, the so-called notions of growth and development or of decline and decay cannot be applied to them. And it is his firm conviction that any impartial look at the evidence which history provides does not substantiate any such contention. On the contrary, history, according to him, supports just the opposite conclusion. Change is, generally, the result of an external intrusion, something which cannot but be treated as 'accidental' from the internal viewpoint of the system concerned. According to him: 'change is, however, *not* "natural," *not* normal, much less ubiquitous and constant. Fixity is.'²² 'If we were Newtonians we could say with Newton that "every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it".'²³ Change is, of course, not to be confused with 'mere motion, activity, movement, interaction'.²⁴ 'These, *beyond any doubt*, are constant and ubiquitous. But none of them, as a moment's thought tells us, is synonymous with change.'²⁵ Any change which can be considered of notable significance, 'is intermittent rather than continuous, mutational, even explosive, rather than the simple accumulation of internal variations'.²⁶ And, such a significant change 'is overwhelmingly the result of non-developmental factors; that is to say, *factors inseparable from external events and intrusions*'.²⁷

Basically, the notion of change in the context of the theories

of development involves the related concepts of immanence, continuity, directionality, necessity, and uniformitarianism without which it could hardly be stated, far less developed in any detail. But history as an account of concrete events fixedly anchored in specific space and time does not provide any evidence, according to Nisbet, of the meaningful applicability of such concepts. As he argues, 'the language of history admittedly is not to be converted into the language of developmentalism with its hoary concepts and premises of immanence, continuity, directionality, necessity, and uniformitarianism.'²⁸ And this is so, for '*there is no historical evidence that macro-changes in time are the cumulative results of small-scale, linear micro-changes*'.²⁹

The dilemma posed by Nisbet seems too forced to be accepted unreservedly. That the concepts of growth and development cannot be relevantly applied to any field whatsoever, seems an over-reaction to the unabashed claims of its unrestricted application. True, there seems little justification for the unlimited application of the notions of immanence, continuity, directionality, necessity and uniformitarianism which go to form what may be called 'the development syndrome'. But to argue that the application of the constellation of these concepts is impossible in principle would be to argue that they are self-contradictory in nature, for without that it is difficult to see how the contention could possibly be maintained. Yet, there is nothing logically self-contradictory about them. At least Nisbet has not shown that it is so. But even on the historical plane, his argument does not appear to be as well-grounded as he thinks. It is not true to say that over short periods of concrete historical time, we do not apprehend mutual interaction which is primarily internal to the system. The development in philosophical thought from Thales to Aristotle in ancient Greece or from Kant to Hegel in Germany may be given as one example of this. Developments in science from Galileo onwards, or in distinct domains of art in, say, the renaissance or nineteenth-century France could be treated as other examples. And, even if one were not to accept these as correct examples of growth or development, one could find others in these or other domains, for surely no one believes that all human creations are of the same order, or that they have no relation to each other. Similarly, it is equally wrong for Nisbet to think that 'the

larger, the more general, abstract, and distant in experience the object of our interest, the greater the utility of the metaphor'.³⁰ But as we have shown in some detail, this is not true. In the fields of religion, morality, art and philosophy there is not much impression of growth or development when we apprehend things in the longer, and the larger, perspective.

True, even in those short centuries of actual history when growth is undeniable in a particular field, it does not reveal itself as either immanent or necessary except to a retrospective glance which may reconstruct the story in terms of those concepts. On the other hand, there *is* a continuity and directionality without which no notion of growth or development would be applicable. As for uniformitarianism, it is applicable only in the comparative context when it is argued that there are similar stages in the growth or evolution of different societies or cultures. The concepts enumerated by Nisbet have thus to be differentiated, for while some of them may be regarded as intrinsic to the notion of growth and development, others are required only for a particular variety of the theory of history which tries to interpret the diverse, multifarious phenomena from a certain perspective only.

Whenever, therefore, we find continuity and directionality we may talk of growth or development, provided we have a positive attitude towards the direction which the process is taking.* However, even when such a situation obtains, the prediction may take two very different forms. In one, the movement is from a negative state to a positive one which itself can be completely realized. In the other form, the positive state functions more as an ideal which may be approximated but never actualized. The classic example of the former is the movement from disease to health; there are myriad ways of being ill, but there is only one way of being healthy. Also, one cannot be more or less healthy, though one may say loosely that one is more or less ill, implying thereby either the severity

* It is not being denied that there are 'non-valuational' and even 'dis-valuational' uses of the term, but they are of little relevance to the issue we are discussing. In the former case, only the quantitative aspect is being emphasized, while in the latter, there is a directionality, though in the negative direction. 'Growth in population' may be taken as an example of the former, while the 'growth of a tumour' or the 'progress of a disease' exemplifies the latter.

of the illness concerned or its distance from possible fatal consequences for the person concerned. The closest analogy to the situation with respect to health may be found in 'winning', where also one cannot win more or less, as one either wins or fails to win. There is, of course, the radical difference that 'winning' has a finality about it which 'being healthy' does not. A game that has been won can never be lost, but one may lose the health one has gained almost the very next moment.

On the other hand, there are ideals which one never seems to actualize, or rather, which can never be actualized but only more or less approximated, though even to talk of 'approximation' in their case is unwarranted as one knows them chiefly in the negative sense of dissatisfaction with 'what is', rather than positively as apprehension of 'what ought to be'. In their case, the notion of development implies a movement from positive to positive in an unending series where the latter generally seems to embody more of the positive than the earlier. This, of course, need not necessarily be the case as there may be stagnation or decline in the sense that either nothing new has been added, and there is only a repetition of what was achieved earlier, or even a loss through extraneous processes interfering with the transmission to new generations of what was earlier achieved by the culture. The latter, of course, may interfere with transmission in all domains, for it is a characteristic of all that is culturally acquired that, unless transmitted from one generation to another, it may lapse into complete oblivion incapable of being resuscitated by later generations even if they wish to do so.

There is, however, a sharp difference even in this realm of ideals which can never be completely actualized and which thus provides the possibility of indefinite development to man in many fields of his activities in which he engages both individually and collectively in the course of history. There are realms which do not permit of the application of the notion of cumulative growth where the latter builds on the earlier and includes it as an integral part of itself. The seeking in many of these realms may be rather to break away from the past, to get rid of it and to create something new having little relation to what has gone before, or even an express repudiation of it. Art, religion, morality and philosophy are almost paradigmatic

examples of such realms and we have already discussed them in detail earlier. The point here is that in these domains what appears later in time does not supplant the one that was achieved earlier. Rather, the two together reveal the infinite inexhaustibility of the realm, instead of any unilinear growth towards an ideal where the latter may be taken as a closer approximation, for it contains within itself not only the truth of all that has gone before, but goes beyond it also.

The objection may be made that the contrast we are drawing cannot be sustained by a closer examination of the situation. To the historian's eye, the situation is never as discontinuous as we have tried to make it out to be. After all, the techniques once discovered or values once apprehended or the solutions once proposed become as much a part of the patrimony of mankind which later generations are necessarily heir to, and which they may use in any way they like. On the other hand, the so-called incremental, cumulative model of growth where the latter inevitably contains the truth of the earlier and is in this sense the truer, has come in for serious questioning even in the realm of scientific knowledge which was regarded as the paradigmatic example of the continuous, linear, cumulative, developmental model. Kuhn's attack on the model³¹ may be said to have demolished at least the so-called self-evident character of the assumption. However, the debate that has followed Kuhn's ideas shows that while it is true that there are predominant paradigms of explanation at any one period in the history of science, and that scientists are not easily willing to give up their theories even in the face of facts that seemingly disprove them, the distinction between 'normal' and 'revolutionary' science is not very tenable. Not only is there no such thing as an *exclusive* paradigm of explanation at any stage in the history of science but even after revolutionary change in the so-called 'paradigms of explanation', the facts which were explained by the former theories are explained by the newer ones also.³² In other words, the theories still retain commensurate comparability, and the earlier never stands alongside the latter as demanding cognitive allegiance, except as a creation of the human mind in which context it becomes more like a work of art than as a tool for discovering the truth about a specific domain, which all cognitive theory purports to be.

The question, thus, is not of continuity or discontinuity, of sudden revolutionary breaks or of imperceptible incremental growth, but of the *status* of the earlier achievement after the latter has come into being. Has it to be necessarily superseded or has the earlier to be subsumed under the latter, or can the two stand side by side without involving either of the alternatives? There can be little doubt that there are substantial differences in this respect between different realms, and that the cognitive enterprise in the field of science is the example *par excellence* of the situation where the latter necessarily *claims* to supersede the former and, if accepted, actually does so.

We need not labour any further in establishing the contention that the concept of development is not equally applicable to all realms of human seeking, whether cognitive or otherwise. The crucial question which therefore remains to be answered is whether the realm dealt with by the science of politics is of such a nature as to permit the application of the concept of 'development' to itself. And our answer to this question is in the negative, for the simple reason that the only relevant distinction here is between 'good government' and 'bad government', and not between a 'developed polity' and an 'undeveloped polity', as many contemporary political scientists seem to think. And though it is difficult to say that there are not 'varieties of goodness' or even 'more or less of goodness', Socrates was perhaps not wrong in the Platonic dialogues when he denied both. Perhaps 'the body politic' is really like 'the body' which has a thousand ways of being ill, but only one way of being healthy. Analogies may deceive, but they may illumine as well. And I see no reason why the analogy with individual health need be regarded as more misleading than illuminating. In fact, in a recent discussion Fred Riggs has taken recourse to the same analogy, though he has chosen to draw different conclusions from it. He observes that 'if we compare health with development, then we can see that a balance of height and weight is a consideration—even an important consideration in determining health'.³³ He, of course, explicitly warns: 'my thinking about the prismatic model and the relation of differentiation to integration is not derived from the body metaphor just used, but perhaps the metaphor can appropriately be employed to show that we are dealing with different

variables, and none of them imply unilinearity or irreversibility.³⁴ True, but there is a deeper dissimilarity with the metaphor in that the concept of development does not seem applicable to health except in the indirect sense of reducing illness, creating institutional mechanisms for its prevention and cure, and increasing longevity.

In this article, Riggs has tried to meet the objections I had raised in the course of the debate and attempted to clarify further his own notion of 'political development'. It may, therefore, not be entirely irrelevant to discuss his final position as stated in this paper. He suggests that the word 'development' in the political context be confined to connote 'an increasing ability to make and carry out collective decisions affecting the environment (not the context)'.³⁵ The crucial concepts in the definition are those of 'collective decision', 'environment', and 'context'. As the distinction between 'environment' and 'context' is crucial to this new move in the definition of 'political development', we may devote some time to its clarification. The ecological dimension which the term 'environment' introduces in considerations of political decision-making requires that 'both the cultural and the human environment need to be added to the physical environment in order to form an adequate picture of the ecology of political/administrative action.'³⁶ But while it is necessary to include 'cultural and human environment in the concept of "environment"', it is equally necessary to exclude from its definition all other social systems with which it interacts, for they are what is meant by the term 'context'.³⁷ Clarifying the notion of 'context' further by providing specific examples, Riggs observes, 'thus the context of nation-states is the international system. Within India, the context of Rajasthan is other Indian States, and the context of Jaipur is other Indian cities.'³⁸

But, if taken seriously, the examples would make nonsense of the distinction between 'context' and 'environment' on which Riggs' whole argument rests. If every 'social system' with which one interacts is to be included in the 'context', it is difficult to see how anything except the bare physical environment can be excluded from it, for surely it is not the contention of Riggs that there could be 'cultural or human environment' which was not anchored in a social system. One

could also argue, conversely, that there can hardly be a social system without human or cultural components. But this would be to accept the contention that the distinction between 'context' and 'environment' on which Riggs' whole argument is built, is untenable at its very foundations. It could perhaps be saved by treating it as an analytic distinction which applies to all institutions having on one side the function of power which they have to exercise vis-à-vis all other institutions for purposes of survival and growth, along with the other aspect which Riggs has called the capacity of 'self-determination'. In his own words, 'My view of development, accordingly, is that it involves a growing understanding of both constraints and resources of the environment. Moreover, and this is often the critical element in development, a society may choose to do things that change its environment so as to reduce the element of constraint and increase the element of resources, thereby expanding its own capacity to make decisions that will enlarge the scope of its own *self-determination*.'³⁹ And he makes it clear that 'the relation between a system and its context is governed by "power", not by levels of development'.⁴⁰

It is not, however, quite clear what will be gained by treating the distinction as analytic rather than substantive in character. Power relations are involved everywhere, and they themselves are determined by that capacity of decision-making and self-determination which are considered by Riggs as the distinctive characteristics of the development of a polity. Riggs seems to have an unstated metaphysical belief that any real increase in the capacity of 'self-determination' or 'effective decision-making' on the part of a polity would not result in its domination over, or aggrandizement and exploitation of other polities. He is, of course, vaguely aware that it may not be so. He almost concedes as much when he writes that 'this is not to say that development and aggrandizement are unrelated to each other. A developing country may, certainly, choose to enhance its military capabilities and use them to subject and exploit others.' But he salves his conscience by calling such a possibility a 'negative' development,⁴¹ little realizing that it completely undermines the unbridgeable divide between 'context' and 'environment' on which he built the whole edifice of his argument in reply to my criticism. To introduce the notions of

'positive' and 'negative' development and to correlate them with 'environment' and 'context', is to go counter not only to the radical distinction between the latter on which the hard core of his argument rested, but also to that neutral definition of development with which he started his clarification, when he wrote: 'I think it is helpful to use the word "development" for a kind of change that can be clearly identified, but which one may approve or disapprove of for various reasons—it may combine beneficial with harmful consequences, and it may affect some more favourably than others.'⁴² And, 'to use the word "development" for a decision-making capability is therefore to recognize differences in values and goals—it is not to accord any particular output of decision-making (such as economic growth) the honor of serving as a criterion for development'.⁴³ But if no particular output can be given such honour, why should we call one type of development 'positive' and the other 'negative', or one 'responsible' and the other 'irresponsible'? Riggs has made both the distinctions and thus succumbed to the same temptation which he accuses others of succumbing to, that is, to make the concept of 'development' value-loaded rather than value-neutral.

We have already alluded to the former distinction while discussing his attempt at distinguishing between 'context' and 'environment'. The latter distinction he makes in the context of whether the collective decisions taken by a society take into account their long-run consequences on the environment or not. As he says, 'not to consider the long-run consequences of the impact on one's environment of the decisions taken by a society is to manifest *irresponsible* development; to adapt one's policies affecting environmental transformations to the long-term requirements of survival is to engage in *responsible* development.'⁴⁴ One wonders how Riggs would characterize collective decisions taken by a polity which ignore the consequences on its 'context', whether short-term or long-term, and how he would distinguish between those that ignore only the long-term consequences and take into account only those that are short-term. It would perhaps be still more inconvenient to ask how short is the short-term and how long the long-term for decisions to be characterized as 'responsible' or 'irresponsible'. To raise these questions is not only to reveal the irresponsibly casual

way in which Riggs has made distinctions, but also to show the utter untenability of his attempt to provide a formal notion of 'political development' which would steer clear of all the pitfalls pointed out in my critique of his earlier formulations.⁴⁵

It appears then that the concept of development has not only to be positively value-laden for it to be interesting to thinkers for application to social phenomena, but also that it has to be buttressed by 'premises of immanence, continuity, directionality, necessity, and uniformitarianism',⁴⁶ which most thinkers find extremely questionable. Besides these, what is perhaps even more important for the application of the concept is the requirement that the specific field of its application be defined by a value which is of such a nature that it can possibly be realized through a process of infinite, additive accretion which can be computed through some common measure in terms of which the concerned value may find its quantitative correlate for measurement. The realm of the political, along with many others, does not seem defined by any such value and hence, as we have shown in detail in all these pages, the concept of 'political development' is not a viable concept for the study of political phenomena. The criteria that have been offered up to now have been shown to be untenable, and there can be little hope of finding any unless it be first established that the value or values sought to be realized in the field of politics are of such a nature as to permit not only asymptotic growth but the devising of a common measure in terms of which that growth may be measured. Till such time as this is established, the search for criteria is bound to be fruitless; and there are reasons to think that, if the arguments advanced in the course of this book have any validity, the situation is irremediable not only as a matter of fact, but in principle. This, however, need be no cause for despondency for, as we have shown in this last chapter, the same situation prevails in many other areas which are not only dear to the human heart, but which may even be said to make man more distinctively human.

NOTES

1. Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 619–20.
2. Ibid., p. 618.
3. Ibid., p. 615.
4. An interesting critique of the repeated attempts to find a common spirit between different works of art is found in René Wellek's, 'The Parallelism between Literature and the Arts', a lecture delivered at The English Institute, and printed in W. K. Wimsatt (ed.), *Literary Criticism—Idea and Act* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
5. Daya Krishna, *Considerations Towards a Theory of Social Change* (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1965). See specially chapters V & VI, pp. 103–57.
6. Tilly, p. 15.
7. Ibid., p. 618.
8. Ibid., p. 630.
9. Robert A. Nisbet, *Social Change and History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. vii.
10. Ibid., p. 241. Italics author's.
11. Ibid., p. 267.
12. Ibid., pp. 251, 267.
13. Ibid., p. 245. Italics author's.
14. Ibid., p. 249.
15. Robert Nisbet, *Twilight of Authority* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 8.
16. Ibid., p. 9.
17. Ibid., p. 11.
18. Nisbet, *Social Change and History*, pp. 253–6.
19. Ibid., pp. 256–9.
20. Ibid., pp. 259–62.
21. Ibid., pp. 262–6.
22. Ibid., p. 270. Italics author's.
23. Ibid., p. 270.
24. Ibid., p. 271.
25. Ibid., pp. 271–2. Italics author's.
26. Ibid., pp. 281–2.
27. Ibid., p. 280. Italics mine.
28. Ibid., p. 203.
29. Ibid., p. 288. Italics author's.
30. Ibid., p. 241.
31. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
32. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). See also, Brian Easlee, *Liberation and the Aims of Science* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973).
33. Fred W. Riggs, 'Further considerations on "Development"'—A Comment on Daya Krishna's comment', *Administrative Change*, vol. 4, no. 1 (July-Dec. 76), p. 8. Also, see the whole controversy in *Administrative Change*, vol. I, no. 2

- (Dec. 1973); vol. II, no. 1 (June 1974); vol. II, no. 2 and vol. III, no. 2.
34. Ibid., p. 8.
 35. Ibid., p. 2.
 36. Ibid., p. 4.
 37. Ibid., p. 6.
 38. Ibid.
 39. Ibid., p. 5. Italics mine.
 40. Ibid., p. 6.
 41. Riggs, 'But when it uses its growing capacity in this way, it manifests "negative", not "positive", development', p. 6.
 42. Ibid., p. 2.
 43. Ibid., p. 3. Italics mine.
 44. Ibid., p. 5. Italics author's.
 45. Daya Krishna, 'Shall we be diffracted?—A critical comment on Fred Riggs's "Prismatic Societies and Public Administration"', *Administrative Change*, vol. II, no. 1 and 'Towards a saner view of "Development"', vol. 3, no. 2.
 46. Robert Nisbet, *Social Change and History*, p. 303.

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