Negation: Can Philosophy Ever Recover From It?

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All that is 'is'. Where from does, then, 'is not' appear in thought and claim to be as 'real' as that which it seems to deny, and yet through its denial seems to render it a greater reality.

Everything is, and yet it ceases to be, or does not remain the same, and so the 'is not' becomes as much a part of experienced reality as that which 'is', always is. It, however, is not there just alongside with it, but infects it in a way that changes its very nature as the past becomes a part of the present, haunting it with memories and infusing it with desire for recreating that which once was and is now no more.

The present might be a 'relief' from the past, but the logic of the analysis would remain the same; only the signs will change. The negative will become positive and the positive negative, but memory and desire will function in the same way, transforming that which is present into something else.

The ambiguous role of negation in language, thought and experience has created problems and paradoxes for philosophy. Such paradoxes have functioned in a subterranean manner and determined its history without its being aware of it. Negation is usually a sign of something being 'untrue', being not the 'edit' but a negative statement may be true and in case it is true, its 'truth' should be of the same order or type as that of a positive or affirmative statement. On the other hand, if it is supposed to be different, the 'truth' itself will be riven apart and become a 'divided house', leading to consequences that might be difficult to live with.

A positive or affirmative statement seems simple. One has only to find if it is the case, and if it is so, is it true. But what if it does *not* obtain and thus, by a strange twist, renders the corresponding negative

judgement true? The non-occurrence or non-obtaining of a situation or state of affairs begins to play a positive role in knowledge. This is not exactly the 'falsifiability' that Popper talked about, but rather the ghost which Quine wanted to exorcise from philosophy for ever.

A true negative judgement has to have a semantic dimension in order to be true. But what is the nature of this semantic dimension is not clear as it is defined negatively. To say that something is not red, is *only* to deny the colour 'red' to it, and to do nothing else, except perhaps to delimit the range of values of 'something' to those which can meaningfully take a colour-predicate. But then, the statement 'something is red' would have done the same.

The problem with an empirical value of the predicate-variable is that it brings 'empirical' considerations into the picture that radically affect, or even distort, the logical purity of the thought that was mirrored or embodied in the formal structure of the statement concerned. To say 'something is not red' is not the same thing as to say 'something is not P' as the negative of 'P' connotes an indefinitely extended universality which excludes only p. But 'p' is a 'predicate-variable'; its values are restricted by definition only to those that can function as 'predicate' in a sentence. 'Something' symbolized by the variable 'S' stands for that which, at least in that context, cannot function as a 'predicate'. But such a consideration would not only make that distinction between the 'subject' and 'predicate' are relative, and render the discourse purely verbal or linguistic without any epistemological or metaphysical significance.

The sentences, however, are not only of the subject-predicate form, and at least the 'subject' has to be quantified if then are to have any 'truth value' at all. The sentence 'Rose is red', logically speaking, is not a sentence at all as unless we specify whether we are talking about all roses, or some roses, or this particular rose, the sentence cannot be known to be true or false, i.e. its truth or falsity cannot be established. In other words, it has only the 'appearance' of being a sentence, and not a 'real' sentence in the proper sense, or it is just a 'pseudo-sentence', to use the current logical jargon to describe the situation.

The idea of quantification and its presumed neccessity for assigning a truth value to a sentence-form and thus turning it into a 'real' sentence

runs into difficulty as to what thi term 'all' does not really mean an what to exclude from it. The exclus value that we give to the variable st by its placing, has already been rest is, implicity defined both in epist What is a 'subject' and why onl function in that capacity, is neve empirical exclusions that are invol the 'all' and reveal that the facade of

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runs into difficulty as to what this quantification really means. The term 'all' does not really mean anything as one just does not know what to exclude from it. The exclusion, when it comes, comes from the value that we give to the variable standing for the 'subject term' which, by its placing, has already been restricted to function as a 'subject', that is, implicity defined both in epistemological and ontological terms. What is a 'subject' and why only a class of objects or terms can function in that capacity, is never questioned. The logical and the empirical exclusions that are involved already vitiate the 'all-ness' of the 'all' and reveal that the facade of universality was not really universal.

The problem, in fact, is further complicated by the simple unasked question whether the value given to the variable is to be understood extensionally or intentionally; in case it is understood extensionally, it is bound to be a limited, finite set to which no new member could be added by definition. It is what used to be called 'Induction by simple enumeration' and raised no problems. The only interesting addition to this characterization has been that the so-called members of such a 'universal' class need have nothing in common except the purely formal characteristic of belonging to that class, and that their number may be as small as you please. Normally, a class which has only one member, or even no member, is supposed to be excluded from this privilege of being regarded as 'universal' in this extensional sense of the term. But there is no reason why a unit class with one member only or a null class with no member, should not be regarded as 'universal' in the sense mentioned above. It is true that the idea of unit or 'null' class was formulated in the context of arithmetic which Russell had defined as a 'class of classes that were equal to a given class' and, hence, as a second-order class and so could have an infinite number of 'first-order' classes as their member. But this is irrelevant, because what we are talking about is *not* the 'universal' in the sense of the class of all classes which gives rise to the paradox of classes, but something which, though masquerading as 'all', is not 'all' as it can easily be counted and exhausted in a finite number of steps as it has been defined extensionally.

The problem with the intentional definition of 'all' is different. Here the class is literally inexhaustible as any number of new members can be added to it, except in the case where the defining characteristic

itself excludes it. The problem is with the notion of definition itself and whether the candidate proposed for the membership of the class *actually* possesses that characteristic or not. But the idea of definition and that of essence which is associated with it have been rejected on this ground, and the idea of an extensional definition proposed in their place to avoid the difficulties caused by them. But whatever the choice or the way out of the difficulty, the universal quantification required to make a proper sentence in the logical sense of the term is intrinsically incapable of overcoming the formal difficulty that, viewed as an indefinite conjunction of elementary or atomic sentences, it cannot be proved even to be 'true' by the very fact of its being construed in such a way. It, of course, can be proved to be false, for even if *one* of the conjuncts in a logical conjunction happens to be false, then the entire conjunction is false, as that is the way conjunction as symbolized by the connective 'and' is defined in truth-functional logic by everybody these days.

The problem created by the only other accepted quantifier in logic, whether modern or Aristotelian, is slightly different. The quantifier called 'existential' and traditionally conveyed by the word 'some' cannot, in principle, by proved to be false as it is construed as a disjunction of infinitely many atomic sentences.

The quantifiers, of course, are interdefinable and, if so, one may wonder what this asymmetry between the two really means. The formal equivalence as a result of inter-definability, however, hides the substantive difference we have pointed out due to the tricky nature of negation which is used twice to get the one defined in terms of the other. The formal and semantic dimensions get confused, as becomes evident if one asks what the translation really means. To ask the question is to dive into deep waters, which the formal logician wished to avoid as he does not want to talk about 'meanings' even though he is continuously trying to translate ordinary language sentences which will become meaningless without their semantic import into his formalized language and illustrating the 'meaning' of his formal symbols by explaining them in terms of the way we use ordinary language. The strategy, as everyone knows, is old and was used in traditional logic to translate any affirmative proposition into its equivalent negative

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The strategy employed depend universally accepted rule that 'the affirmation' and on the conventiona may be *affirmed* of a subject withou in any way whatsoever. The positiv however, raises the question as to predicated, just as the rule concern question regarding the nature of 'negation' or 'negating' is exactly s is the function of negation, or e 'thinking' about reality and for th

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proposition and *vice versa*. After all, 'p' is equivalent to 'not, not "p"' and "not-p" as equivalent to "not p" or, rather, *is* "not-p"'.

The strategy employed depends on the one hand on the almost universally accepted rule that 'the negation of a negation results in affirmation' and on the conventional acceptance that a negative predicate may be *affirmed* of a subject without affecting its 'affirmative character' in any way whatsoever. The positive ascription of a negative predicate, however, raises the question as to what exactly is being ascribed or predicated, just as the rule concerning 'negation of negation' raises the question regarding the nature of the operation of negation, or what 'negation' or 'negating' is exactly supposed to do. What, in other words, is the function of negation, or even its necessity in the context of 'thinking' about reality and for the 'description' of reality itself?

Negation negates, but then there must be 'something' to negate, and that something has to be presupposed by the act of 'negating'. The act, thus, is both contingent and parasitic, as there is no necessity about it and it would certainly not be there if something else were not there. But what would be there, if there were no negation? Not even 'something', as that something would have to be 'asserted'. One would have to say it *is* and to say 'it is this' is to distinguish it from something else and say 'it is not that'. But is the act of assertion necessary, and need it necessarily involve the act of distinguishing?

The issue is both logical and epistemological in nature and, as always, has metaphysical overtones which are unavoidable if one happens to be self-conscious about the whole thing. Russell tried to introduce the sign for 'assertion', corresponding to the sign for 'negation' as, in his view, what was being asserted or denied was the proposition or something that could be the 'object' of either and thus, independent of these relations as neither was necessary to it. The proliferation of the notion of 'propositional attitudes' revealed that 'assertion' and 'negation' were not the only epistemological 'acts' in relation to that which was the object of thought, even if they were what logic could comfortably handle and thus declare that they constituted the essence of what 'knowledge' could possibly be meant to be.

But the term 'knowledge' has to be wider than just 'affirmation' or 'negation', as these not only presuppose what is to be affirmed or

negated, but also that some doubt has arisen in one's mind or some question raised by someone else regarding it. Doubting is questioning that which is neither asserted nor denied and questioning, whether by oneself or another, points to the dubitability of that which was considered to be 'indubitable' by oneself. Descartes is the clearest example of this in modern Western philosophy, but a clearer example of the fact that 'knowledge' does not, and cannot, consist in affirming or denying may be found in the logico-epistemological articulation of scientific method as 'hypothetico-deductive-verificational', i.e. that which consists in a continuous, unending interplay of imagination, reason and sense-experience where each supplements, enlarges and restricts the other. Knowledge, in this perspective, is not an assertion or denial, but a complex and inter-related web or even a net of statements which are always structured in the form of an 'open' relationship permitting movement either way, resulting in an essential revisability or modifiability in principle, but leaving it to the practitioners concerned to decide what, and when, to do so.

Knowledge, thus, is a succession of interconnected assertions perpetually expanding and perennially changing as a result of doubt and questioning, in which negation plays only a subsidiary role that is purely temporary in character. This, however, is not to see it as a logician does, not even of the type that sees logic as dialectics, for neither doubt nor questioning are negation and, in any case, they are not predetermined either as to their content or even form, as negation has to be. Strangely, neither Hegel nor Marx seem to have understood the nature of true dialectics as they superimposed on what was a free activity of reason the notion of necessity taken from traditional logic where the movement of reason was seen as bound by necessities which no seeker of knowledge could ever be free from as they were the very conditions of knowledge which was not only defined but constituted by them.

Kant had earlier attempted to be free from the constraints of logic by making it transcendental and thus seeing the entire activity of knowing as a free activity in which reason exercises its objectivating function through the superimposition of the categories which had an internal structure that he articulated in the well-known section of the

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Critique of Pure Reason, called *The Transcendental Analytic*. But Kant has insisted that the moment one forgot the transcendental nature of the whole enterprise of Reason, one would forget the freedom underlying it, and treat it as a character of the 'given' and land oneself in insoluble antinomies, and feel bound hand and foot to something that was totally independent of oneself. The bondage to reason was as much a bondage, as the one to causality, and the freedom from bondage consisted in seeing that they were all 'transcendental' in character.

Negation, for Kant, resides in the transcendental paraphernalia of thought or 'thinking' when it tries to 'know' anything and hence, like all the other categories, cannot be a feature of reality-as-it-is-in-itself. But reality *is* or rather, 'to be' is 'to be real'. In Kantian terminology, 'to be' is 'to appear' or 'to be given' or even 'to be intuited', and for something 'to appear' is to be, as it can hardly be otherwise.

But, for Kant, negation which is a necessary feature of thinking that is 'trying to know', is not pure negation, but rather a negation that, through negating, *asserts* something. The infinite judgement in Kant synthesizes both the affirmative and negative judgements in it and is the 'real' judgement under quality and not the affirmative and negative judgements *separately* as they were for Aristotle. It has the form of the affirmative, as it has to be, for all knowledge has to have the character of an assertion analogous to the one contained in what he called 'anchauunng'. But the content of the affirmation is a negation. The statement 'X *is* not-red' is the well-known example where what is being asserted is the ascription of a practically 'infinite' predicate through exclusion or negation. The simple, usual construal of the negative judgement hides this infinite extension of the exclusion which the negation involves. But, at a deeper level, it opens the problem as to what a formally affirmative statement with a positive content says or does, something that Kant does not seem to have considered in his discussion of the subject. The only possible reason for this perhaps was that ascriptive assertion of a positive content does not seem to raise any problem as the world *is* what it *is*. But while the assertion of a negation raises the problem of the ontological status of negation which is being affirmed as a *predicate*, the assertion of the positive content raises the problem of the ontological status of that of which

something is predicated or what is usually designated as 'subject' in philosophical literature. Ontologically, the 'subject' is supposed to have a 'precedence' over the predicate and hence is called 'substance', a term denoting that which alone is supposed to be ontologically real, presumably because it is that to which the properties 'belong', or that which 'possesses' them. But the question what is this 'possessing' or 'belonging' does not seem to have been asked or answered in a clear manner. Can the 'substance' be bereft of all the properties, or can the properties be there even if there were no substance to belong to? This is the central question which does not seem to have been asked or debated or even answered in the Western discussion of the subject.

Locke's classic formulation of the subject and development of thought around this subject from Berkeley to Hume on the one hand, and from Descartes to Kant on the other, does discuss the issue but in a tangential manner. The ghost of substance as a 'Know-not-what' haunts everybody except Hume who accepts that qualities need not belong to anything, but does not even raise the question whether the same may also be true of substances as they may also exist without qualities. The thinking from Descartes to Leibnitz bypasses the problem posed by Locke, and Kant tries to cut the Gordian knot by suggesting that substance and quality are two terms of a relation which is necessary for thought and is called 'inherence', forgetting that the Lockeian ghost had reappeared as the 'thing-in-itself' with this difference that it could not be thought of either as a 'substance' or as a 'property' and yet which was still necessary, for without it whatever 'appeared' would lack 'grounding' or 'objective support' and thus become devoid of all reality whatsoever.

The asymmetry between the positive and the negative predication and the problems raised thereby have been squarely faced and discussed in the Indian philosophical tradition, though for some strange reason, they have not yet formed a part of the philosophical self-awareness of thinkers even after a great deal of interaction between the two traditions during the last two hundred years or so. The Buddhists had long ago done what Kant failed to do, i.e. give up the notion of substance and opted for a pure property- or quality-based understanding of things, and thus had exorcized the 'substance ghost', whether in its Lockeian or Kantian version from their philosophical thinking, for ever. The

Advaitin, for his part, had boldly which not only needed no propert properties as it was absolutely re related to them by 'inherence' whic fact, had Kant thought a little fui 'thing-in-itself' had to be withoui 'relation' was transcendental in ; 'causality' and 'reciprocity', as he c Advaitin position, though they con it were 'substance'.

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Advaitin, for his part, had boldly accepted the idea of a 'substance' which not only needed no properties, but which could not have any properties as it was absolutely relationless and hence could not be related to them by 'inherence' which the Indian tradition also knew. In fact, had Kant thought a little further, he would have seen that the 'thing-in-itself' had to be without any relation as the very idea of 'relation' was transcendental in all its modalities, i.e. 'inherence', 'causality' and 'reciprocity', as he called them. This is perhaps the real Advaitin position, though they continued to think and write of it as if it were 'substance'.

The problems raised by the negative predication created real havoc in Indian philosophy, and no one can understand India's philosophical dilemmas unless one sees the roots and genesis of this problem. Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logician, brought forth the discussion by asking what was meant by the affirmative assertion of a negative predication and answered that what was positive was the 'non-availability' (*anupalabdhi*) of something which, if it would have been there, would have been available to the senses and, thus, known. The fact that it is not being perceived when all the conditions of 'perceptibility' are fulfilled becomes the *ground* or (*hetu*) for the assertion of its absence. The discussion arises in the context of inferential knowledge where Dharmakīrti had already suggested that the inferential basis of a positive predicate would either be that it was already included implicitly in the subject itself, or that it was causally related to it as an effect. The former he called *svabhāva-hetu* and the latter *Kriyā hetu*.

Dharmakīrti's analysis of the negative predication gave rise to the obvious question as to how to distinguish between 'non-availability to the senses' and the 'absence' or *abhāva* when one was supposed to be the ground for the other. There has to be a distinction if the inference is to be an 'inference', and in case there was none, why not assume that the 'absence' or *abhāva* was directly perceived? This was the road that the Naiyāyikas took and, after much hesitation, took perhaps the boldest step in the history of thought by declaring not only that 'absence' was directly perceived, but that it was also ontologically real, an independent *padārtha*, as the Vaiśeṣikas called it. This move from epistemological and semantic independence and 'reality' to ontological independence

and reality of 'positive negativity' resulted in creating new problems for the Naiyāyikas, which they had not even dreamt of.

The immediate problem was regarding the type of ontological status to be accorded to this new entrant in the class of 'reals' to be accepted by the system. The Vaiśeṣika thinkers, who were more interested in the problem had already divided the realm of the ontological 'reals' into two classes, i.e. *sattā* and *bhāva*. These roughly correspond to what have been called 'existents' and 'subsistents' in the Western tradition, but the Vaiśeṣika distinction is, at least *prima facie*, clearer as it seems to be based on independence of the reasoning activity of the mind, or what they called *buddhī* in their system. Substances, qualities, and actions or movements were, in the world, independent of the knowing activity of reason, while inherence, universality and singularity were not. The former, therefore, existed, while the latter came into being because of the knowing activity of reason, and hence, though intersubjectively objective, were *buddhyāpekṣā*, or reason dependent, or relative to reason in their nature.

Abhāva could not belong to either of these classifications and, hence, had to be *sui generis* in character. It was as positively existent as those which were supposed to exist, as it was perceived and yet it was also as necessary to reason, as without it, reason could not be. The activity of thinking involved distinguishing, differentiating, demarcating and this involved, as the Buddhists had seen, positive affirmation of the negative predication which, for them, was only an epistemological necessity without much ontological significance on its part. For the Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, the ontological reality of non-being or *abhāva* opened doors for ontological investigation that created problem after problem for their epistemology.

If 'absence' was to be an object of direct apprehension, the role of senses in it could not be easily determined. Moreover, the apprehension of 'absence' implied prior presence of the object which was now absent, and this could be of at least two types. The simplest one was change of location, or something missing; the other one was the 'destruction' of the object, or 'death' in the case of that which was 'living'. This second kind of absence, strangely, was 'unending' even though it had a beginning. But once the idea of 'destruction' or 'death' was seen as

giving rise to the 'reality' of 'absenc⟨ of the question regarding the 'com⟨ 'origination' or 'birth', and its 'abse⟨ it were to be admitted, would hav⟨ having an 'end', for it ended wit concerned.

The strange situation created by t⟨ was 'beginningless' and the other 'e⟨ metaphysical reflection amongst th⟨ discovered them. It was the thinkers Buddhists and the Advaitins, wh⟨ the metaphysical possibilities lying so-called 'appearance' and 'disappea⟨ reality for which they were essential nature? Or, was this continual appe⟨ present that was ever becoming 'pa⟨ Advaitin and the Buddhist seem to h⟨ without seeing that on either alter⟨ becomes unreal, and so also 'life' a⟨ if there were no 'future' and what memory? The momentary present o⟨ meaningless and even unrecogniza⟨ gets from memory on the one han⟨ shaping each other and giving that l⟨ which makes one *feel* and say 'it ⟨

The two 'infinite' absences tha⟨ implicit in the relation of the 'prese⟨ the fact that things come into bein⟨ are things that can never come into then that would have to be granted ⟨ did just that in the case of that whi⟨ western tradition. 'Impossible' was *would* be. The Naiyāyikas called t⟨ of Quine questions this, he has only status of the 'null-class' in logic ⟨ disciplines will be possible wi⟨

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giving rise to the 'reality' of 'absence', the door was open to the asking of the question regarding the 'coming-into-being' of the object or its 'origination' or 'birth', and its 'absence' before that. This 'absence', if it were to be admitted, would have to be 'beginningless' and yet as having an 'end', for it ended with the 'origination' of the object concerned.

The strange situation created by these two 'absences'—one of which was 'beginningless' and the other 'endless'—seems to have aroused no metaphysical reflection amongst the Naiyāyikas, who appear to have discovered them. It was the thinkers of the other schools, primarily the Buddhists and the Advaitins, who appear to have been struck by the metaphysical possibilities lying hidden in the analysis. Were the so-called 'appearance' and 'disappearance' 'passing episodes' in a deeper reality for which they were essentially contingent, or epiphenomenal in nature? Or, was this continual appearing and disappearing the eternally present that was ever becoming 'past', the very nature of reality? The Advaitin and the Buddhist seem to have argued for these two alternatives without seeing that on either alternative time, as we 'experience' it, becomes unreal, and so also 'life' as we 'live' it. What will 'action' be if there were no 'future' and what will 'identity' be if there were no memory? The momentary present of the Buddhist would become totally meaningless and even unrecognizable without the form and colour it gets from memory on the one hand and desire on the other, the two shaping each other and giving that living pulsating throb to the 'present' which makes one *feel* and say 'it *is*' and hence is 'real'.

The two 'infinite' absences that the Naiyāyikas discovered were implicit in the relation of the 'present' to the 'past' and the 'future', and the fact that things come into being and cease to be. But in case there are things that can never come into being because of their very nature, then that would have to be granted absolute absence, and the Naiyāyikas did just that in the case of that which was said to be 'impossible' in the western tradition. 'Impossible' was that which *could* not be, and never *would* be. The Naiyāyikas called this *atyantābhāva* and if any student of Quine questions this, he has only to ask himself about the ontological status of the 'null-class' in logic and mathematics and whether these disciplines will be possible without postulating its reality. The

'null-class' or the 'empty set' may be thought to be so, because it just happens to be so because there *is* no actual member that belongs to it. But, would one distinguish between that which is only empirically so and that which is necessarily so. The *not* of 'impossibility' belongs to the latter class, and even in it, perhaps, one would have to distinguish between empirical impossibility and logical impossibility. The Naiyāyikas seem to be aware of the latter distinction as the examples they give implicitly contain it though they never seem to explicitly say so.

The ontological acceptance of something that is, and has to be, always absent creates a problem for the knowledge-enterprise that has never been squarely faced in the western epistemological tradition. Thinking has to use what has come to be called the joint method of agreement and difference, and this assumes that things are sometimes present and sometimes absent, for if something were to be always present, it could not be known just as if it were to be always absent. The Naiyāyikas called these *Kevalānavayī* and *Kevalavyatirekī*, and the acceptance of their reality created insurmountable problems for the definition of concomitance, whether causal or non-causal, that is required for any satisfactory definition of inferential knowledge or *anumāna*.

Was difference, then, necessary to knowledge and, if so, was 'difference' a kind of 'absence' also? The Naiyāyikas saw the problem and the difficulty, but opted for understanding the notion of difference in terms of 'mutual absence', i.e. as the 'absence of one in the other'. The standard example is that of jar and the cloth, or *ghata* and *pata*, but one may choose one's own examples as the world is full of them. 'To be' is 'to be different from something else' and if 'difference' is real, then this would be 'absence' or *abhāva*, and the world would be nothing but full of absences or *abhāva* as 'to be' will be 'to negate' or 'to deny' or 'to be different' or, in other words, not to be the other. But then why only from the cloth or the *pata*, and not from everything else? The Buddhist adopted this alternative and developed the theory of *apoha* where a thing has to be understood in terms of its difference from *everything* else, and not just from *one* thing, as the Naiyāyikas thought. But was there any difference between the difference that one thing had from another, and the difference that it had from something

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else? The 'difference' obviously has to be different, and the Naiyāyikas suggested that each of the different 'differences' had to be specifically qualified in order to differentiate the one from the other. They introduced the notion of the 'qualifier' or the *avacchedeka* to achieve this but forgot that this would have to be infinitely large as the 'objects' from which it has to be different keep on growing all the time. Kant had a vague apprehension of this when he called the judgement capturing this as '*unendlih*' as the class from which it was to be 'excluded' had to be 'open', as it could not be closed in principle.

But neither Kant nor the Naiyāyikas or the Buddhists saw that as far as knowledge was concerned, it was the positive that alone mattered and that the unending difference which it had from everything else was only a creation of self-conscious reflection which created the problem that had little relation to the knowledge-enterprise in which it was engaged. That the situation will become different in the realms of action and feeling is a different story that we need not enter here. As far as knowledge is concerned, we might as well bury the problem or consign it to flames and get rid of it forever. Negation in thought is a 'shadow' projected by the affirmation and hence it is nothing 'real' as one need not do anything about it, nor does it demand that something be done about it. Where this obtains as in feeling and action, there has to be something *positive* about it but, as far as we know, little has been thought about it. But if the negation has to have a 'positivity' about it in order to be effective, the 'positive' would have to have a 'negativity' in it in order to be seen as what it is not, that is, as lacking something or, in other words, not being, 'completely positive'.