

CHAPTER 4

Developments in Mīmāṃsā from Eighteenth Century Onwards:

A Reconstruction Based on the Construction by Thangaswami Sarma Entitled, "Development of the Literature Pertaining to Mīmāṃsā System of Philosophy"

I

The Mīmāṃsā texts are divided into the *sūtra granthas*, the *adhikaraṇa granthas* and the *prakaraṇa granthas*. The *sūtra granthas* consist of the *sūtra* texts themselves and the commentaries on the *sūtras*. Two major traditions of commentary are generally identified: the first deriving from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa whose work comprises of the *Śloka vārtika*, the *Tantra Vārtika* and the *Tripitikā*, while the other begins with Prabhākara (A.D. 700) who is the author of *Bṛhatī* and *Laghvī* on Śabara's *Mīmāṃsā sūtra bhāṣya*. The prominent commentators in the Bhaṭṭa tradition are Vācaspati Miśra I (A.D. 960); Pārthasārthi Miśra (A.D. 1075) and Appaya Dīkṣita I (A.D. 1585) whereas in the Prabhākara tradition there are Śalikanātha Miśra (A.D. 825), Bhavanātha Miśra (A.D. 1050), Nandīśvara (A.D. 1280), and Rāmānujācārya (A.D. 1750).

The *adhikaraṇa* texts include the *Śastradīpikā* of Pārthasārthi Miśra, the *Nyāyamālā Vistāra* of Vidyāraṇya (A.D. 1350), *Prābhākaravijaya* of Nandīśvara and *Nayaviveka* of Bhavanātha.

It is held that the works on Mīmāṃsā had declined with the Vijayanagar empire, particularly as the performance of the complicated *yajñas* themselves declined in the culture. This might have been an indirect consequence of the spread of Islamic rule in the country. However, as a hard-core intellectual component existed in Mīmāṃsā, it is not quite clear why works on it declined as this did not occur in Nyāya or Sāṃkhya. A number of expository works known as *prakaraṇa granthas* however were written, many of which not only have new doctrines to propound. But also continue to explain the older doctrines in a clearer manner.

From the latter part of the sixteenth to the twentieth century, a number of *prakaraṇa granthas* were written. These can roughly be divided into three periods: A.D. 1550–1750, A.D. 1750–1850, and A.D. 1850–1950.

About twelve original works and fourteen explanatory works were written during A.D. 1550–1750; thirty-four original works and fourteen explanatory works from A.D. 1750–1850; and about eleven original works and fifteen explanatory texts from 1850–1950. A large part of these texts are unpublished. Besides these, we also find some *Vṛttigranthas*. The Mīmāṃsā texts do not generally discuss *pramāṇa-prameya* as do the Nyāya texts. Yet there is some discussion of it in certain texts.

Some of the more important of *prakaraṇa* texts have been written by Āpadeva (A.D. 1610), Khaṇḍadeva (A.D. 1640), Laugākṣī Bhāskara (A.D. 1660), Kṛṣṇa Yajvan (A.D. 1730) and Vanceśvara Yajvan (A.D. 1830), who have authored the *Mīmāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa*, *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, *Bhāṭṭa Rahasyam Artha Saṃgraha*, *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā* and *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi*, respectively. The *Mīmāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa* contains a detailed, lucid exposition of most of the issues central to Mīmāṃsā, supported by examples. Though it seems to follow the already accepted principles and does not try to say anything new, it is still one of the best *prakaraṇa granthas* available. Similarly, the *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣa*, a source of precise information regarding the definition of technical terms used in Mīmāṃsā shows that a need was felt for such a work.

Two important thinkers of the seventeenth century: Āpadeva and Khaṇḍadeva form the subject of studies from the eighteenth century onwards. The contribution of Āpadeva II is discussed in a work by Chinnaswamī Shastri (1910) and also by Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar (1929). The first work on Khaṇḍadeva is by Śambhu Bhāṭṭa (1695), followed by one by Vañceśvara Yajvan (1830) and another by Rama Subramanyama Shastri (1927). In *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi* which is a commentary on *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, Vañceśvara Yajvan criticised the foundation of the new *adhikaraṇas* by Khaṇḍadeva and tried to re-establish the old forms of classification of subjects on the basis of earlier texts in the tradition. One of the important thinkers after Āpadeva and Khaṇḍadeva is Kṛṣṇa Yajvan, whose work has been discussed and commented on by Gopāla Bhāṭṭa Śāstri almost immediately after it was composed in 1750. Further survey of Kṛṣṇa Yajvan's work by Nityananda in A.D. 1915 and by Nathurama Sarma in 1906 also exist. Thus we have three works on Kṛṣṇa Yajvan between 1750–1915. His work, *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā* appears to have been modelled on the well-known *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* in the Vedānta tradition which, according to Karl Potter, is a sophisticated culmination of the long tradition of Vedāntic thinking in India.¹

From 1800 to recent times one does not see any specific development in Mīmāṃsā, though short works have been written explaining Mīmāṃsā doctrines. These are basically concerned with the old Mīmāṃsā rather than with the new writings which had come into being under the impact of Navya Nyāya.

Thus a total of about twenty-one important published works occur during this period which are primarily an explication of the following works :

1. *Śabara Bhāṣya*.
2. *Śāstra Dīpikā*.

3. *Mīmāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa*.
4. *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*.
5. *Bhāṭṭa Rahasya*.
6. *Artha Saṃgraha*.
7. *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā*.

If one looks at the commentaries, one finds that *Nyāya Prakāśa* has been commented upon four times, the *Artha Saṃgraha* six times, the *Bhāṭṭa Rahasya* thrice, apart from frequent commentaries on the *Śāstra Dīpikā* and *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā*. Amongst some new works which try to discuss matters a little differently, the following may be mentioned:

Tattva Siddhānta Ratnāvalī by Jina Swami Shastri (1870–1950). (This is supposed to be one of the best books on Mīmāṃsā published during this period.)

Bhāṭṭasāra by Krisna Tatacharya (1875).

Bhāvabodhinī by Vidyasankara Bharati (1933).

Mānmevodaya Śloka Vārtikam by Shrinivasacharya (1900 onwards). (This book discusses the issues relating to *pramāṇa* not only in Mīmāṃsā but also in other schools of Indian philosophy.)

Mīmāṃsā Nyāyamañjarī by Pattabhiram Shastri: (Twentieth century).

II

The main issues with which Mīmāṃsā seems to have been concerned right from the beginning are: the *Apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda; the *Svataḥ Prāmāṇya* of the Veda; and issues regarding the foundational basis of linguistic meaning *śabdavarūpam*; issues regarding the self as being both an agent of action and the enjoyer of the fruits of that action; *ātmanśvarūpam*, the determination of the exact meaning of those Vedic sentences which concern the Vedic ritual or the Vedic sacrifices—*vākyavarūpam*; the determination of the exact nature of *dharma* and *adharmā*, particularly as it relates to action; and finally the eternity of the relation between the word and its meaning (*śabdārtha sambandha*).

Bhāṭṭa Rahasyam by Khaṇḍadeva is in which the issue of linguistic meaning, which has played such an important role in the history of Indian philosophy, is raised. The work criticizes the views of other schools on this subject, particularly those of the grammarians who try to find the roots of meanings in the basic roots from which all words arise. It also criticizes the Nyāya view which attempts to find the primary meaning not in the roots of words but in the meaning of the word which is arrived at through an analysis of forms which comprise the most basic unit of a word in a language. It tries to compare this position with that of Mīmāṃsā in which an attempt is made to discover the basis of linguistic meaning in *bhāvanā*. Khaṇḍadeva strives in this connection to go beyond the earlier Mīmāṃsā in an analysis of what this *bhāvanā* consists in. The work is a refinement of the earlier presentations on the subject from the Mīmāṃsā point of view.

Khaṇḍadeva, thus is primarily concerned with the issue of linguistic meaning which again seems to be enmeshed in the specificities of the Sanskrit language while at the same time it touches the universal problem of meaning involved in all linguistic communications.

Whether linguistic communication should be treated primarily in the context of influencing others or even oneself, to do something or, better still, to bring about a change in some situation or merely to inform for the sake of information without this information being in any way related either to the changes in one's behaviour and/or feelings or even the cognitive perspective that one may have are further complications of the issue. It is of course difficult to say how the latter can ever be completely dissociated from the pure information that linguistic communication is supposed to provide to someone else. In this context, one of the primary problems is whether linguistic communication is seen as addressing someone else or establishing a relationship with the other from whom, in turn, one would require a complementary communication so that the relation may become a two-way affair. What exactly should be the nature of this complementary communication so that the circuit may, at least, be temporarily completed? The situation, in fact, is even more complicated as linguistic communication may be a one-to-one, a one-to-many, and sometimes even a many-to-one interaction. However, many of these issues have obviously not been addressed in the classical analysis of linguistic communication either in Mīmāṃsā or in any other school of Indian philosophy.

The following issues in linguistic meaning appear to have been discussed in this tradition:

1. The understanding of sentence meaning was an issue of whether meaning in a sentence was a result of the meaning of its constituent words or whether it was something over and above the meaning of the individual words that comprised the sentence. The problem was whether the meaning of the sentence was merely a summation of the individual words it consisted of or whether it was something new which emerged from the total meaning of the words but which could not be individually reduced to them. This is the well-known problem of the relation between the parts and the whole as well as what has usually been called the problem of "organic unities".
2. The other issue relates to the non-linguistic dimension of a human being which seems to be determined by the idea of "what ought-to-be" in contrast to all other types of beings who appear to be determined only by what there "is". The usual term for this in the Indian tradition is "*dharma*" which distinguishes man from all other beings.

One of the important issues emerging from the theory of conduct and the norms governing it relates to "*ekavākyatā*" in the texts of the tradition dealing with *dharma* and consisting of diverse injunctions for the regulation of conduct contained therein. The same issue also arises in those texts which are considered

as primarily cognitive in character and are supposed to deal with the nature of reality. Thus whether the text deals with *dharma* or *tattva*, the problem always consists in interpreting it in such a way that the apparently inconsistent statements in it are given a consistent or coherent meaning. The Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation try to perform this task in relation to the diverse and often conflicting injunctions regarding what is to be done. Similarly, the Vedāntic tradition tries to do the same with the Upaniṣadic texts which have sometimes differing and contradictory statements regarding the nature of reality. However, both school restrict their enterprise of finding non-contradiction between statements which occur in with matters that cannot be known either by perception or by reasoning. The search for such a unitary coherence of meaning between apparently conflicting statements was later on extended to the *āgamic* texts belonging to the so-called Vedic tradition such as the *Purāṇas*, the *Gītā* and the *Śrīmad Bhāgvat*. They generally excluded the Buddha and the Jaina *āgamic* texts from such an enterprise, as these not only belonged to the non-Vedic tradition, but were explicitly self-proclaimed as anti-Vedic in character.

It was only after the late eighteenth century with the appearance of Ram Mohan Roy that this kind of enterprise was extended not only to include both Buddhism and Jainism, but also other religious tradition such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism, resulting in what has come to be described as the essential unity of all religions. In spite of all these extensions, it never was extended to include those statements in either the *śruti* or the *āgamic* texts, or even the revealed texts of other religions which concerned empirical matters of fact and hence whose truth could be established by the normal processes of perception and influence. This essential limitation of what has been called *śabda pramāṇa* has scarcely been noticed or properly exercised as it leads to a radical demarcation between what has generally been called the *dr̥ṣṭa* and the *adr̥ṣṭa* in the tradition, thus severely restricting the authority of the *śruti* or the *āgamic* texts to that alone which could not, in principle, be ever known by human reasoning or empirical experience.

The presupposition of total coherence, of course, applied in a sense to all descriptive statements about reality, for any sign of incoherence may be an indication that either what is real has not been grasped in its totality or in its true nature, or that the incoherence is apparent in nature and can be resolved only if a further analysis of the statements were to be undertaken. Even in the domain of the empirical sciences there is a continuous attempt to unify all knowledge that is accepted as true, though this always remains an ideal as knowledge in different fields is always growing and the inter-relationship between knowledge in different fields is not easy to achieve in any unified manner.

The situation with respect to texts that are considered to be revealed, as having a foundational authority, is of course different as they always claim a completeness and finality. The notion of *ekavākyatā* here is axiomatically assumed, for otherwise it would basically contradict the completeness and infallibility of statements about reality. The Mīmāṃsā has however, explored the notion of

ekavākyatā in respect to injunctive statements, an attempt which does not seem to have been seriously made in any other tradition of philosophizing. It does so as it sees the *śruti* texts as primarily concerned with injunctions or imperatives, and not with descriptions of reality, that is, such is the case or such is not the case. The problem of the coherence of all imperatives, is thus, open for philosophical consideration and though it has only been raised in connection with the injunctive statements in the Vedic canon, the issue is a far larger one and relates to the coherence of norms as well as to the specific injunctions following from them.

It is not clear whether the Mīmāṃsā school has addressed itself adequately to the issue. Every injunction to be carried out presupposes not only the freedom of the agent for whom the injunction is meant but also something about the nature of the relevant reality in which the action has to be performed. The reality in the human context consists of inert materials and objects as well as living beings, including some who are themselves agents and for whom also the injunction is meant by virtue of the fact that they are agents and thus able to carry out an injunctive command. On the other hand, those injunctions that are more specific and limited are meant for only certain types of agents who are in some particular situations or have some qualities distinguishing them from others.

Not only do we have the problem of the coherence of all injunctive statements, but there is also the problem of the coherence of all actions done by a human being, just as there is the co-ordination problem of the unity and coherence of reality which is presumably the subject of all descriptive statements. Do all actions form part of a totality just as all facts are supposed to be a part of a totality which we usually call reality? If so, what shall be the relation of a part to the whole in the context of action? In fact, the situation is even more complicated in the case of action as the unity, totality and coherence which we are seeking in the realm of action would have to belong not only to the actions of one agent alone but to all the agents together, including even those who are no more, having ceased to be and those who have not yet come into being and are still to appear in the future. The unity of a plurality of specificities which are different from each other as well as those which were there in the past and those which will occur in the future along with those which are in the present, arises in the case of facts also. But the situation in the realm of action is radically different as actions are supposed to emanate from an agent considered to be free and this freedom of agency tends to render essentially problematic the search for coherence, particularly with respect to those agents who are in the present or who are still to be there in the future. The Mīmāṃsā thinkers seem to have neglected this aspect of the question, though they have thought a great deal about the part and the whole in the case of actions, and the difference between primary and secondary actions. The primary, thus, consists only of that part of the action which is directly done for the achievement of the purpose for which the action is undertaken, while secondary actions consist of all those actions which are incidental to the former, and in which there can be a great deal of variation due to many factors including those of space, time and information

available to one while undertaking the action. This, it should be remembered, is not the same distinction as the one which obtains between 'instrumental' and 'intrinsic' actions, though it certainly has some similarity to it. The distinction between *kṛtārtha* and *puruṣārtha*, that is, actions undertaken for the sake of performing a particular sacrifice and those that are done for the realization of a human purpose or end, points in this direction. Yet, the concept of a *puruṣārtha* raises the question as to whether any action, whatsoever, can ultimately be conceived of as a *puruṣārtha* in itself.

The notion of *dharma* or what "ought-to-be-done" and its relation to what "ought-to-be the case", leads Mīmāṃsāka thought in another direction. The distinction arises from the fact that an action is done to bring about a situation which is supposed to be "good". Further, the performance of such an action brings about a quality both in the action, and the situation of the agent who performs the action. Normally, this three-fold distinction has not been seen in reflection on human action in the context of the performance of *dharma*. But, one may make a distinction between the quality that arises in the action, particularly in a valuational context and call it "right" while the quality that arises in the agent by doing this action may be called "moral goodness". On the other hand, the quality that belongs to the situation as and when it is brought about by the "right action" may simply be called "good". This property, however, will have to be distinguished from the property that belongs to the same situation when it is desired to be brought about and hence given a different name, though generally such a distinction has not been made in the thought about the moral action. This is concerned with the question of the attribution of the property which arises when such an 'ought' is either fulfilled or violated. Such a property can only belong to the agent, that is, the *ātman* or the self and has been called *pāpa* and *puṇya*, that is, merit or demerit in the system.

The other question that arises in this context is how one can have such a knowledge, for both perception and inference can only give one the knowledge of what is the case. Perception, obviously, tells us only what "is" and as inference is based on perceptions, it cannot give us any other kind of knowledge except that which relates to what is the case. There is, of course, the question whether one can become perceptually aware of what is not there. But even if there are negative facts it will be difficult to accept that such a perceptual apprehension will arise apart from any expectation regarding what was supposed to be there or what one was looking for or wanting or desiring to be there. Without the notions of expectancy in terms of past experience or those of wanting and desiring, the notion of a negative apprehension of perceptual facts does not seem to make sense. But in case one accepts that both memory and desire lead to anticipations in experience, one may perhaps understand how the notion of "what is not there but should have been" or "should be" comes into being and how it gives rise to what one should do so that what one wants to happen may actually take place. The journey from "should" to "ought" is perhaps not very difficult, though many moral thinkers have considered it to be so. Yet, there is little doubt that the move

from the "should" to the "ought" involves a move from subjectivity to objectivity and from particularity to universality in the sense that though the "should" would perhaps be meaningful for a particular case or individual, the "ought" generally can never be confined to the particular and the individual alone.

Besides the issues of unity, totality and coherence of action, there are the problems of knowledge and validity regarding the "ought-to-be" and the "ought-to-do", both of which are at the heart of human action. The apprehension that something "ought-to-be" involves the consciousness that something is not the case and thus involves an apprehension of "negativity" as a necessary element. The apprehension of negativity may arise either from memory or from desire. The apprehension of negativity which arises from memory is based on the fact that something which was formerly the case does not now obtain. On the other hand, the one deriving from desire sees it in terms of a future that might obtain if one made the necessary effort and which one would like, if it were to be there. The "felt demand" to use the phrase of K.C. Bhattacharya, that something which "is not there", "ought to be there" results in the awareness of the "ought" which, when self consciously reflected upon, gives rise to the genuine notion of "ought" cut off from all relation to individual memory and desire. This is analogous to what happens in the case of "knowledge" when self-conscious reflection on perceptual experience gives rise to the demand of rationality, that if something is really there and is known to be so although only by oneself, it should be the same for everybody else. Reason in the cognitive domain performs the same function as it does in the practical domain, converting that which was privately apprehended into something public, and objective thus making it shareable with all other human beings who have the same cognitive, connative and affective structure projecting a common world in which and through which they live.

But while there may be some continuity between the perceptual and the rational or the particular and the universal in both the domains of knowledge and action, self-conscious philosophical reflection finds a radical break between the transition from the subjective to the objective, and from the particular to the universal both in the realms of knowledge and action.

Mīmāṃsā, thus, from the very beginning, argues that the knowledge of *dharma* cannot be derived either from perception or inference, a position that is very close to the modern one which argues that "ought" cannot be derived from "is", or that to derive an "ought" conclusion, one must have within the premises, at least one premise, which already contains an "ought" within it. The modern discussion on the subject did not raise the question as to how this premise containing the ought was arrived at. Or, in other words, how the knowledge of ought arises at all if it is not derived from either perception or inference. The Mīmāṃsaka's answer to this question was that it is derived from the Veda or the *śruti* which was a source of the foundational "ought" given by no human or divine authority. Translated into modern language, the Mīmāṃsaka's contention seems to be that if "ought" cannot be derived from "is", then one has to postulate an ultimate "ought" or what Kelsen called a "grund norm" from which all other

“oughts” and norms are derived. The idea can perhaps be better understood if we take the analogy of a constitution which provides the foundation for everything else, which derives its validity from it. The constitutions, however, though foundational and ultimate in a sense, nevertheless are human creations and are known to have originated in time; they also generally provide for amendments through a process which they themselves allow for. Thus they are contingent in a double sense in that they could have been otherwise than they are and that they can be different from what they are today. Also, there was a time when they were not there. The Mīmāṃsāka tries to remedy all these contingencies by postulating a timeless, eternal, non-human, foundational “ought” from which all other oughts are derived. This is generally named as the Veda or the *śruti*. Interestingly, it also formulates not only the non-human origin of this foundational “ought” but also its independence from any superhuman or divine authority. These foundational “oughts” are not formulated by any gods, as their autonomy will be essentially compromised if it were accepted that they were the result of some divine command. For, if they were to be accepted as having been given by Divine Will, then one would have to logically admit that the command could have been different and that the authority which has given the command was ultimately superior to the command itself. The doctrine of *apauruṣeyatva*, or the non-origination of the Veda by any human or divine authority, should be understood in some such way. This also necessitates the postulation of the doctrine of the eternity of sound, for if sounds have an origin, and if this ultimate “ought” has to be embodied in a language which involves a dimension of morality or *dharma* in it, then one would not be able to accept the eternity of *dharma* or morality as it is essentially embodied in that which itself is not eternal.

The Mīmāṃsakas therefore, formulates the doctrine of the *nityatva* or the eternity of *śabda*, that is, the Word or the sound, besides the doctrine of *apauruṣeyatva*. It is not quite clear whether the Mīmāṃsā explores the question of the unity of this primordial eternal “ought” as formulated or embodied in language, or whether it discusses the question of the manifestation of sound in relation to a prior unmanifest stage as Bhartṛhari seems to have done in his *Vākyapadīya*. Nor it is clear whether the Mīmāṃsaka or even Bhartṛhari distinguish between sound and language. Pure sound as everybody knows, is explored in music which has little to do with what is usually called language.

The relation between *svara* and *śabda* is still to be explored and though the musical traditions of India have formulated a tradition of a primordial, foundational, undifferentiated sound in the notion of *nāda brahman*, it is not quite clear what its relation to the notion of *śabda brahman*, which Bhartṛhari is supposed to have formulated in his *Vākyapadīya*, is. *Śabda* can perhaps never be divorced from meaning. On the other hand, it seems strange to talk of *artha* or meaning in the case of *nāda* or even *svara*. The Mīmāṃsaka does not seem to have considered these issues as he appears to have got stuck in the specificity of the primordial texts known as the Veda and the injunctive commands contained therein. The *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*, from which the Mīmāṃsā tradition of philosophizing is

supposed to have originated, ensured this as they were concerned being only tangentially and fitfully concerned with the larger issues. Primarily, the specific injunctions regarding the various *yajñas* contained in the Vedic texts are what they were mainly occupied with especially in reconciling the apparent inconsistencies found with respect to them. The later commentators and thinkers in the Mīmāṃsā tradition did address themselves to various issues but could never free themselves of the limitations arising from the foundational perspective in which the *sūtras* were composed. Yet, there has perhaps never been such sustained thinking on the nature of the injunctive imperative in any other philosophical tradition as that which occurred in India in the Mīmāṃsā school of thought.

That the "ought" has to embody itself in a language created a crucial issue for the Mīmāṃsā thinkers. This resulted in the attempt to discover what that element of language was which contained this injunctive force for anyone who heard the language. Unfortunately, they made no clear distinction between an imperative sentence and a sentence containing an "ought", even though they seem to have distinguished between different kinds of *vidhi vākyas*, that is, sentences containing injunctions and the different ways in which language achieves or ensures this. Also, the relations between the primacy of the injunctive function in language with all the other functions that a language is supposed to perform and the diverse ways in which it simultaneously fulfills those functions appears to have been discussed in detail. In fact, the mapping of the *vidhi vākyas* and the relation of the *vidhyārtha* and all other *arthas* in the Mīmāṃsā tradition needs to be investigated so that a clear picture of Mīmāṃsā thought in this regard may be grasped.

Interestingly, Mīmāṃsā's focus on the injunctive implications of language and various modalities through which language performs its injunctive function arose from the fact that it had to construe the injunctive import of the Veda in the context of the various *yajñas* that it prescribes, and as no human or divine authority was supposed to have given these injunctions, its meaning could only be understood through an intensive reflection on the language in which they were embodied. The Vedic injunctions themselves appear, however, to be ambiguous in that they were not like the Ten Commandments which clearly spelt out in terms of "Thou shalt not" what was commanded not to be done. The usual form of the Vedic injunction was preceded by the phrase "One desirous of", epitomized in the word, "*kāma*" in the well-known injunction "*Svargakāmo yajet*", thus implying that one who was desirous of heaven should perform this sacrifice; but such an expression appears to be conditional on one's desiring heaven or desiring something else as without that precondition one would not perform the prescribed *yajña* which was meant to fulfill the desire if it was performed according to the ritual described in the Vedas. The distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical imperative, thus, seems to have never been clearly drawn. It is of course true that in some of the later discussions on the subject, it was emphasized that one "ought" to desire the "desiring" of the heaven as it was not an optional matter for the term "*svarga*" or heaven connoted that which was

ultimately desirable for a human being. However, such a construction seems obviously forced, as there seems to be no grammatical difference between *svarga* and other things which are also desired such as *vr̥ṣṭi*, or rain, or a *putra*, that is, a son, which also are mentioned in the Vedas themselves and for which appropriate *yajñas* are prescribed.

There is, of course, the *agnihotra* which is prescribed unconditionally and which has to be performed daily. Yet, though it is not done for the sake of a specific fruit that one desires, still in case one does not perform it, it is said that some untoward evil consequences may ensue and hence in order to ward them off, one has to perform it regularly. It is interesting, in this connection, to note that the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament are primarily negative in character and it is not made quite clear as to what reward one will achieve if one observes them except that one will not incur the sin which one is supposed to get by violating them. This has some analogy with the logic of the daily *agnihotra* which, however is a positive and not a negative injunction. All in all, the Vedic injunctions are far more positive in character than their biblical counterparts and breathe a different atmosphere than those found in the Judeo-Christian tradition.

A philosophically important consequence of this was the sustained attention to the notion of an injunction or *vidhi* which became a subject of specialized study in Mīmāṃsā. Perhaps the first outstanding work in this regard was that of Maṇḍana Miśra in A.D. seventh century whose "*Vidhi Viveka*", inaugurates a discussion on how to clearly distinguish and demarcate those elements in a sentence which primarily lend it an injunctive force and thus determine the direction of action on the part of one who listens to it or reads it.

Vācaspati Miśra I in the A.D. tenth century wrote on the *Vidhiviveka* in a work entitled, *Nyāyakanikā*. However, one of the most controversial works in this regard appears to have been written by Appaya Dīkṣita I sometime in the sixteenth century. Appaya Dīkṣita I was associated with the Vijayanagar empire and though primarily an Advaita thinker, he wrote on many subjects including Mīmāṃsā. His work, *Vidhirasāyana*, gave rise to a long series of important commentaries written both in refutation of, and in support of what he had said. Besides these, there were also plain expository works on what he had written in the *Vidhirasāyana*. The works which tried to controvert what he had written are *Vidhitrayaparitrāṇa* by Veṅkaṭādhvarin (1637), *Vidhidarpaṇa* and *Vidhi-viveka* by Kolluri Nārāyaṇa Śāstrin (1680), *Vidhirasāyanadūṣaṇam* by Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa (1593), *Vidhibhūṣaṇam* by Veṅkaṭanārāyaṇa (1740) and *Vidhicamatkāracandrikā* by Nārāyaṇācārya. These works were written in criticism of the contentions in *Vidhirasāyana* by Appaya Dīkṣita I. There was also a series of works in support of Appaya Dīkṣita I, for example, *Durūha Śikṣā* written around A.D. 1650 by Appaya Dīkṣita III, *Vidhirasāyanabhūṣaṇam* (1650) A.D. by Gopāla Bhaṭṭa, *Phalasāṅkaryakhaṇḍanam* (1650) by Anantadeva, *Vidhiratnāvalī* (1750) by Śrīnīvāsadāsa (D.U.). Besides these, there are a number of works which were mainly expository:

Mīmāṃsākaustubha and *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* by Khaṇḍadeva and *Mayūkhamaṅgalikā* by Somanātha Dikṣita (1640).

One of the important issues discussed in the above works particularly, *Phalasāmkaryakhaṇḍanam* relates to whether the fruits or results of one's action can affect the results of another action. In other words, what are the interrelationships between actions? And, do actions have to be conceived of in an isolated monadic manner where each has its own consequences totally unaffected by other actions or where the consequences of one action are continuously affected and modified by those of other actions? This seems to be an important issue though perhaps it has not been as focally discussed as it should have been, particularly in the context of the theory of *karma*, which has played such an important part in Indian thinking about action.

The theory of *karma* usually conceives of action in terms of its consequences on the self, but as the actions are many and varied in nature, one does not know how exactly this cumulative effect occurs in respect of the agent or the doer of the action. Also, we have pointed out earlier that an action has at least three or four major dimensions and hence its consequences must be seen in all these separate, though related, dimensions. But, then, the question would arise what is the relation between the different consequences of an action in all these dimensions, and whether these different consequences affect one another in some intimate and integral way? We have called these qualities which an action produces as "moral goodness" or "*pāpa* and *punya*", or merit and demerit, when it relates to the self or the agent whose *samkalpa* or *will* has brought it into being. On the other hand, the action itself has the quality of "rightness" in it, if it is intended to produce a situation which is good, whose "goodness" is different from the goodness of the situation which is actually brought about by the action when it is done. But, whatever be the names that we may give to the qualities or the properties that an action may have in all these different dimensions, the question remains regarding the relationship between these, as the well-known discussion about the "rightness" and "goodness" in the works of Moore and Ross² on the subject have attested that the two properties may be and are independent of each other. Thus, an action may be right without the situation that it intends to bring about being necessarily good and, as everyone knows the actual situation produced by an action may be valuationally different even when the intended consequences were good. As for the effect on the self or agent one generally assumes that if the intention was good, then the quality that arises in the agent, may be called "moral goodness", but it would be strange if the actual situation produced by the action were to be valuationally different from what the person had intended, then it would not affect the consciousness of the person who had done the action. This may be regarded as "retrospective effect" of the action or rather of the consequences of one's action on oneself and thus the whole question of "retrospective effects" will be opened up which perhaps has never been seriously considered in the literature on *dharma* or the one that deals with moral issues either in India or in the West.

But the possibility that the consequences of an action may have retrospective effects on the agent also raises the question whether this retrospective effect, modifying the self in some manner, influences future actions and thus has a "prospective" effect also. This simultaneous backward-and-forward movement in the consequences of action generates a circular continuum in such a way as to influence what future actions will be, thus ensuring consequences not only in the external situation which it was supposed to change or bring about but also future actions which the agent may do.

The whole problem of *phalasāṃkarya*, thus, seems to be far more complicated than appears at first sight and if we bring in the question of consequences of the action of different human agents on one another, then the problem of *phalasāṃkarya* will assume a dimension which may prove both baffling and troublesome for the theory of *karma*. In fact, no society perhaps can be conceived without postulating some such sort of mutual interaction where the consequences of the action of each person on others and the consequences of their action on him or her, as the case may be, is inevitably felt.

Thus, the great debate on the issue of *phalasāṃkarya* started by Appaya Dikṣita I would be seen in the light of these questions and a close analysis should be made of his arguments and issues raised therein. But this is a task for the future for, as far as we know, no such work has been done upto now. Closer attention to the debate may also lead to an exploration of whether such an issue was raised by Mīmāṃsā thinkers earlier or not. It is unlikely that such an important point had been completely missed by them. Unless the whole discussion viewed on Mīmāṃsā is seen from this perspective, little can be said with any certainty at the present stage of our knowledge in respect of the issues mentioned above.

III

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LITERATURE PERTAINING TO MĪMĀMSĀ SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

(From A.D. sixteenth century to A.D. twentieth century)

Thangaswamy Sarma

The system of Mīmāṃsā maintains that: (i) the Vedas are *apauruṣeya* (not the composition of any particular individual or any person); (ii) the Vedas are self-sustained and authoritative by themselves; (iii) (a) all the Vedic utterances are meaningful because the words contained therein convey their respective and sequential meaning owing to their innate capacity, (b) all the Vedic utterances are meaningful because the words contained therein convey their overall meaning after adjusting themselves into a sequential order because of their intrinsic capacity; (iv) the *ātman* (individual self) is both agent and enjoyer; (v) among the Vedic statements—(a) some belonging to *Karma Kāṇḍa* section enjoin a person

to perform certain actions that will make him accrue merits, and (b) some other belonging to *Karma Kāṇḍa* section prohibit a person from doing certain actions—if done, will make him accrue demerits, and; (vi) the Vedic statements along with their import have eternal validity (reality). This system of Mīmāṃsā is found to possess a continuous flow of literature—that is, similar to any other system and it has developed itself from unknown times. Just as it is found in other systems, even so in Mīmāṃsā, we come across innumerable books of highly significant and terse style.

Works of the Mīmāṃsā system may broadly be divided into three groups as *sūtra* (aphoristic) works, *adhikaraṇa* (analytical) works, and *prakaraṇa granthas* (systematic monographs). The works of the *sūtra* group include: (i) *sūtra*, (ii) commentaries such as *śabarabhāṣya*, *vārtikas*, commentaries and sub-commentaries on *vārtikas* and the works of Vācaspatimiśra, Pārthasārathimiśra, Appayadīkṣita and others—these belong to *Bhāṭṭa* school of Mīmāṃsā. Similarly, works belonging to Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā also find a place in the *sūtra* group of works, viz. *Śabarabhāṣya*, *Bṛhatī*, *Rjuvimalā*, *Nayaviveka*, *Prabhākara-vijaya*, *Prakaraṇapañcikā* and others, as well as the works of Prabhākara, Śālikanātha, Nandīśvara, Bhavanātha, Rāmānujācārya and others. So, with regard to the *sūtra* group, the two principal varieties are (i) *Bhāṭṭa* school: beginning with the works of Kumārīlabhaṭṭa, continued with those of Pārthasārathimiśra, and ending with those of Appayadīkṣita; (ii) the Prabhākara school : beginning with the works of Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, those of Nandīśvara and Bhavanātha, and ending with the works of Rāmānujācārya.

The works of *adhikaraṇa* group include *Śāstradīpikā*, *Nyāyamālā*, *Vistāra*, etc.

The works of *prakaraṇa* group include mainly the small works of *Vāda* (dialectics) and expository types—which analyse and substantiate the Mīmāṃsā tenets enshrined in the source-books (i.e. belonging to the first two groups). The *prakaraṇa granthas* include: *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi*, *Bhāṭṭa Kaustubha*, *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, *Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-paribhāṣā*. Even the *Nyāyamālā* is a *prakaraṇa grantha*. However, the works other than the *Nyāyamālā* have been written between sixteenth and twentieth centuries.

According to chronological sequence these works may be assigned to three periods: (i) A.D. 1550 to 1750, (ii) A.D. 1750 to 1850, (iii) A.D. 1850 to 1950. To the first period belong 12 original works and 19 commentaries. In the middle period 34 original works and 14 commentaries were written. To the modern period belong 11 original works and 15 commentaries. Sixty of the above works are yet not published and are only available in manuscripts in different oriental/university manuscript libraries (in India) and ancient libraries (in India and abroad). The *Vṛtti* works of the Mīmāṃsā literature, namely *sūtra* (aphoristic), *bhāṣya* (commentarial), *vārtika* (brief exposition) are found in plenty. A few works discuss the specific topics (*adhikaraṇas*) and are in the form of commentary or brief exposition. Some other works deal with the system of Mīmāṃsā explaining *paribhāṣā* (technical terms) or *lakṣaṇa-pariṣkāra* (interpretation of definitions).

Being Vedic exegesis, the Mīmāṃsā system does not insist on the discussion of the *pramāṇa* (means of valid knowledge), and *prameya* (objects of valid knowledge), though such a discussion is the main *forte* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. However, there are a few works relating to these areas as well in Mīmāṃsā literature. Such works belong to the category of *prakaraṇa* works. In the past centuries (fifteenth to nineteenth), the growth/development of works in the *Bhāṭṭa* system has outnumbered that in the *Prabhākara* system. In these centuries, a number of commentaries on the *Śāstrādīpikā* have been written, and these exceed the commentaries on the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*. The number of commentaries on the *Bhāṭṭarahasya* is fairly limited. However, all the works above mentioned only explain the original texts and no innovative ideas are found in them. Yet, there also exist works which explain certain principles explicitly, without quoting the relevant sections from the original source-books. In a few contexts, these works refute the views of earlier writers, or may even substantiate the earlier writers' contentions. Among the very important and note worthy compositions are: *Bhāṭṭakaustubha*, *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, *Śāstramālā*, *Mānameyodaya*, *Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-prakāśa*, *Aṅgatva-nirukti*, *Arthasaṅgraha*, *Mīmāṃsā-paribhāṣā*, *Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi*, *Adhvāra-mīmāṃsā*, *Kutuhalarṛtti*, *Mīmāṃsā-maṇḍanam*, etc.

The *Bhāṭṭakaustubha*


This work covers the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* from the "arthavāda-pāda" to the end of the "Balābalādhikaraṇa" (from MS I. ii. 1 to MS.III. iii.37). It is a Navya-Mīmāṃsaka work, for it explains the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* almost following the Navya-Nyāya style, and it also deals with the main theme of *śābdabodha* (exegetical purport of Vedic statements). In a way, it is an elaborate commentary of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā system promulgated by Jaimini, and it contains discussions on very abstruse topics of the select *adhyāyas* of *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*. However, it discusses in detail, the main contents of the 12 *adhyāyas* of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*. The *Bhāṭṭakaustubha* is a unique treatise of elaborate analysis. All categories and principles of the Mīmāṃsā system find a place in this commentary, and hence, there is no need to consult other works for an exposition of the essential doctrines of this system. The views of earlier writer of this system are well analysed in this work. The contents of the terse text, *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* are also clearly explained in this commentary. Hence, one can say that the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* is a summary, and the *Bhāṭṭakaustubha* is an elaborate gloss thereon.

The *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*

This commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* covers almost the entire range of the original work, i.e. from the second *pāda* of the first *adhyāya* to the end of the twelfth *adhyāya*. This commentary follows the Navya-Nyāya style and mainly deals with an exposition of the essential topics. The important *Mīmāṃsā-nyāyas* (subtle

explanatory techniques of the system) are also analysed in this work. The logical arguments of objections and the proper reply to them are also found herein. The main viewpoints of the *Bhāṭṭa* school of Mīmāṃsā are explained. The technical terms of Mīmāṃsā are dealt with in detail. The general principles, as explained in: (i) the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, (ii) the *Bhāṣya* thereon, (iii) *Vārttika*, (iv) *Śāstradīpikā*, (v) *Nyāya-ratnākara*, (vi) *Vidhīrasāyana*, etc., are given elaborate treatment in this commentary. Any views which are contradictory have been refuted but, the treatment of the topic *śabda-prayoga* [interpretative usage of Vedic proposition] is somewhat brief. Though the Navya-Nyāya style is adopted, this commentary belongs to Navya-Mīmāṃsā type of texts, for it refutes the views of the ancient masterpieces of the system, namely. *Tautātītamatatilaka*, *Śāstradīpikā*, *Nyāyasudhā*, etc.

A few commentaries on the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, are: *Prabhāvalī* of Śambhūbhaṭṭa, *Bhāṭṭacandrodaya* of Bhāskarācārya, *Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi* of Vanceśvarayajvan, and *Bhāṭṭakalpataru* of Ramasubrahmanya Shastri. There is also a very brief gloss by name *Bhāṭṭanayodyota* which has not yet been printed. Lakshmana Paṇḍita, grandfather of Lakshmidhara (a commentator on the *Saundaryalaharī*), has written a commentary (on the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*) which seems to be a refutation of the views of the *Prabhāvalī*. This is mentioned in the commentary on the *Saundaryalaharī* by Lakshmidhara.




The *Bhāṭṭarahasya*

This Mīmāṃsā treatise explains *śābdabodha* (exposition of Vedic statements) and refutes the views of the alien systems. The view of Vaiyākaraṇas (grammarians), i.e. “meaning of verbal root is all-important in any proposition”, and the view of the Naiyāyikas (followers of the Indian system of logic), i.e. exposition or derivation of the meaning of a statement is mainly based on the meaning of words in the nominative case (first declensional case) are refuted: and the proposition of the Mīmāṃsakas based on *bhāvanā* (interpretative exposition for *śābda-bodha*) is established on a firm pedestal. This work establishes the association of *bhāvanā* (in derivation) with regard to both verbs and noun-formations of verbal roots (namely *tiñantas* and *kṛdantas*). It incorporates the following topics: *dharma* and *adharmā* (the two principal objectives of the Mīmāṃsā systems), the import of *tiñ* (*vidhitīñ*), i.e. essential purport of commands, the true import of statements concerning do’s and don’ts, the meaning of *dhātu* and *lakāras*, the objective

import of accusative termination and the essential meaning of case endings of instrumental and other cases, etc. The work also refutes the views of other systems. By comparison, this work is quite unique in composition being based on the Navya-Nyāya style. Khaṇḍadeva the author of the above three works has refuted certain views of earlier writers—such as those asserted by: the author of the *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* and the *Mīmāṃsāvārttika*; by Pārthasārathimīśra, and ending with Appaya Dikṣita. In a few places he reiterates the views of ancient masters. However, in refuting the views of Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa—author of *Śāstradīpikā*, *Prakāśa*, *Bālaprakāśa*, and the *Vidhiraśāyanadūṣaṇa*, etc. Khaṇḍadeva is found to be too involved, he does not refer to Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa by name (while criticising his views) but uses the words “*kaiścit*” (meaning—the views held by “some”). The reason for this may have been that Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa was the brother’s son of Viśveśvara Bhaṭṭa who is the teacher of Khaṇḍadeva.

The Hierarchy



Development of the System
based on the exposition of main doctrines

The development (in exposition) is found to be more relevant with regard to: (i) elucidation of the meaning of the *sūtras* of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, (ii) discussion on *śabda-bodha* (the derivation of the meaning of Vedic texts), and (iii) refutation of the views of the opponents.

A. Discussion on *Vākyaārtha-bodha* (Deducing or understanding the Meaning of the Vedic Statement/Sentence)

The meaning of a statement/sentence consists in: (i) a combination of the meaning of the words contained in it, or (ii) the meaning of the one chief/

principal word, with the meaning of the other words being subordinate (to that of the main word), or (iii) the status of the meaningful construction of the words constituting the statement/sentence. The cognition/understanding of the meaning of the statement/sentence is variously termed as: (i) *vākya-rtha-bodha*, (ii) *anvaya-bodha* (understanding the purport through valid construction), and (iii) *śabda-bodha* (cognition of the purport through sound and sense-words and their meaning). The valid cognition (*pramā*) of *śabda-bodha* is produced by meaningful words and hence beyond the purview of *pratyakṣa* (perceptual cognition), and *anumiti* (inferential cognition), for *śabda* (verbal testimony) is a separate *pramāṇa* (means of valid knowledge). Those who accept two *pramāṇas* namely *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* have to accommodate *śabda-bodha* within inference itself. In the case of inferential cognition, everywhere it essentially needs the presence of knowledge of pervasion and consistent observation of the application of *vyāpti* (pervasion). With regard to the knowledge of verbal testimony, even without the knowledge of pervasion, one arrives at *śabda-bodha* through the instruments of knowledge of *ākāṅkṣā* (expectancy), etc.; and hence *śabda-bodha* cannot be included under *anumiti* (inferential cognition). The person who wants to ascertain the presence of fire on the mountain, has no other resort than to seek the help of inferential cognition. Hence, such a desire to establish something necessitates the aid of *anumāna* (inference). However, *śabda-bodha* occurs even without the desire, when there is the presence of knowledge of ascertainment. Therefore, both inference and verbal testimony differ from each other; and no *śabda*, indeed, is a separate *pramāṇa* (means of valid knowledge).

Śabda-bodha (knowledge of verbal, scriptural testimony), though accepted by many systems of Indian philosophy, is found to be of three categories, namely as accepted by (i) Naiyāyikas (logicians), (ii) Vaiyākaraṇas (grammarians), and (iii) Mīmāṃsakas (Vedic exponents).

According to the Naiyāyikas, *śabda-bodha* consists in the primary significance of words ending in *prathamā vibhakti* (nominative case): for example, in the statement, "Caitra brings a pot", knowledge of the purport is gained as "Caitra is the agent favourable to the action of bringing the object, pot". This kind of arriving at the verbal cognition (interpretation) is pointed out by Vācaspati Mīśra while explaining the aphorism, "*vidhirvidhāyakaḥ*" (a command enjoining the fulfilment of an action) (*Nyāyasūtra*, 2.1.64). Action (*kṛtī*) is the prime signification of *ākhyātā* (nouns, etc.), and it is construed through *bhāvanā*; even *saṅkhyā* (numbers/counting) goes in consonance with the meaning of *ākhyātā* (nouns)—in this way, it has been explained in the first chapter of the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*. In the *Śabda* chapter of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* the derivation of *śabda-bodha* is further explained as: the words constituting a compound word give the meaning - even without the power of unifying factor between words—(i) through the construing of smaller words found in the compound-word, and (ii) through establishing the purport by the innate suggestive capacity of *upasargas* (grammatical prefixes), and (iii) through the discussion of the senses of verbal roots, etc. Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya has explained, in his *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* all the necessary

components needed for arriving at *śabda-bodha*, namely, meaning of nouns, verbs and compound words. The meaning of suffixes are discussed in the *Vyutpattivāda* and the meaning of stems, in the *Śaktivāda*. To get the correct *śabda-bodha*, the meanings of *avyayas* (indeclinables) such as *na*, *ca*, *yadi*, etc. are expatiated in the *Trīṃśacchlokī*. Thus there are quite a few important works of Nyāya system on “*śabda-bodha*”.

With regard to Vaiyākaraṇas (grammarians school of philosophy), it is held that the *ākhyāta* (nominal verb/verbal noun) tends to indicate mainly an action that is completed and so is existent for example “*bhāva-pradhānam-ākhyātam*”. *Bhāva* stands for the meaning of the root, and *pradhāna* connotes the noun (that has an adjective). To explain: in the case of a statement, “Caitra brings a pot” the main purport (*śabda-bodha*) arrived at is “the action of bringing the pot (object) by Caitra (the agent)”. The development of the analysis of *śabda-bodha* in the Vaiyākaraṇa (grammarians) tradition can be gauged from (i) the quotations of earlier works (ascribed to Kātyāyana and others, and not extant now) as found in the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, (ii) the brief indications made by the *Vākyapadīya*, (iii) slightly elaborated in the works like the *Śabda-kaustubha*, the *Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa-sāra* and the *Laghu-mañjūsā*, etc.

The view of the Mīmāṃsaka is altogether different from that of both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiyākaraṇas where the purport of a Vedic statement (*śabda-bodha*) is concerned. For, the Mīmāṃsaka holds that the purport consists in the *bhāvanā* (main action) suggested by the meaning of the *ākhyāta* (nominal verb). Here the *śabda-bodha* (understanding of the main purport of a statement) is derived as “Caitra brings a pot” portrays the action taking place now, of bringing one pot (object), as carried out by Caitra, the agent. In another example, “Devadatta cooks the (raw) rice”, the Naiyāyikas derives the *śabda-bodha* (the main import of the statement), conveying: “raw rice” is the object of action, Devadatta is the agent (locus) of the action that is favourable to the cooking (of rice): in other words Devadatta is the agent of the cooking of rice. The Vaiyākaraṇa holds the *śabda-bodha* here as : the cooking has the object in ‘raw rice’, the agent of action being Devadatta.

However, the Mīmāṃsaka does not accept both these views : he points out the defect in these as follows : (i) *kāraṅkas* (syntax based on verbs and declensions/nouns) go in unison with verbs alone—this is a main rule; hence even in the case of the meaning of first (nominative) case ending of a noun, it is proper to construe the verb with the noun in the first case (*abhihita-kāraṅka*). As the Naiyāyika does not adhere to the above rule in his derivation (interpretation), therefore, this is the lacuna in respect of the Naiyāyika. Universally the meaning of the suffix is primary: the meaning of the *prakṛti* (stem) qualifies it (the sense of the suffix). This is the rule of interpretation of the sentence—purport; but, if one transgresses the rule, by abandoning the meaning of the suffix which comes in juxtaposition with the verb, it is a lacuna; and this lacuna is found in the explanation of *śabda-bodha* by Vaiyākaraṇa. But the Mīmāṃsakas accept the derivation of *śabda-bodha* (knowing the import of Vedic statements) through the

understanding of the meaning of *ākhyāta* (nominal verb/verbal noun) indicating the importance of *bhāvanā* (the fulfilment of an action) as the prime substantive idea. Therefore, the *bhāvanā* in the case of "Caitra cooks the raw-rice" implies the action of cooking presently with (i) the object being raw-rice, and (ii) the agent/doer being Caitra. The *śabda-bodha* is understood in this way only whether it be Vedic or secular statements in contexts like *bhāva-ākhyāta* (the noun in the context of existent proposition), *vidhipratyaya* (suffix intended to convey order, and *nañvākya* (prohibitory statements).

The above *prakriyā* (derivation/interpretation) of the knowledge of *śabda-bodha* has been discussed mainly in (i) the *Tattvabindu* (of Vācaspati) that stresses the main basis of *śabda-bodha*, (ii) *Bhāvanāviveka* (of Maṇḍanamiśra) that proclaims the importance of *bhāvanā*, and (iii) the *Vidhiviveka* discussing the import of *vidhi* (essential injunctions). But, the discussion on *śabda-bodha* was just made in passing in the works that described the meaning of *adhikaraṇa* (main sectional topics of Mīmāṃsā), i.e. in the *Śāstrādīpikā*, the commentary thereon namely *Śāstramālā* and in the *Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi* etc.—which were written in twelfth century and later on. However, in the *Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi*, in the first *pāda*, namely *Tarka-pāda*, six *pramāṇas* (means of valid knowledge) are discussed: herein, in a brief commentary through *sūci-kathā-nyāya* (maxim of dealing with a few illustrations when a number of topics have to be analysed), a few topics of *śabda-khaṇḍa* (chapter on *śabda*, knowledge of verbal/scriptural testimony) are delineated. It may be added that the *Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi* deals exclusively with the meaning of the *sūtras* of the Jaimini, and was written by Viśveśa-bhaṭṭa alias Gāgābhaṭṭa, preceptor of Khaṇḍadeva. Thus, the description of the meaning of verbs, noun (*ākhyāta*), *lakāras* (tense and moods), stems, noun-declensions, compounds words the main implied import of *samāsa* (compounds), and *nañ* (negative suffix), etc. are set forth. Based on *Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi* alone, the main interpretation/derivation of the *śabda-bodha* is carried out even in the *Bhāṭṭarahasya*.

B. Definition of "Dharma"

The definition of *dharma* in the systems of Indian philosophy is the context of a vast spectrum of meanings. Thus, the Buddhists view *dharma* as *vāsanā* (a mental impression) belonging to *jñāna* (knowledge), but not produced from *jñāna*. The Jainas refer to *dharma* as *pudgala*, (i) that takes the shape as *deha* (body) etc., (ii) produced by *puṇya-viśeṣa* (special merit) and (iii) of the form of *paramāṇu-s* (minute particles). The Saṅkhyās call *dharma* as *Vṛtti-Viśeṣa* (special mode) of *antaḥ karaṇa* (internal organ/mind) produced from the rituals like *yāga* (sacrifice), etc. The Naiyāyikas (Indian logicians) hold *dharma* to be a special virtue of *ātman* (individual soul) generated by the performance of prescribed acts, and call it *adrṣṭa* (unseen effect). Also one set of the followers of Mīmāṃsā call *dharma* as "*apūrvā*" (which was not earlier, i.e. it is an effect or one that is generated). The followers of Āgamas call *dharma* worship of *pratīkas* or *caitya* (icons in temples).

The Bhāgavats point out *dharma* as the realization of the *ātman* through the practice of meditation (*yoga*). The Paurāṇikas (Torch-bearers of *Purāṇa* tradition) call *dharma* the main practice of spiritual righteous discipline (*ācāra*). The Vaiśeṣikas contend : that from which one attains the great progress and final beatitude is *dharma*. A few others opine that there is no *dharma* greater than *satyam* (truth). When there are so many different viewpoints about *dharma*, Sage Jaimini puts it in a nutshell as “*Codanā-lakṣaṇo artho dharmah*” i.e. *dharma* consists in the meaning of Vedic utterances that enjoin a person as “do this” or “refrain from this”. In the view of Navya-Mīmāṃsakas, namely Khaṇḍadeva and others, *dharma* is conducive of *iṣṭasādhana* (fulfilling one’s desire) which is within the purview of the knowledge produced from the Vedic passages alone: whereas *adharmā* is that which produces *aniṣṭa* (that which is not liked by a person) found within the range of the knowledge from the Vedic text alone. Therefore, *dharma* consists in *vidhīyamāna* (that which is enjoined as to be carried out),—(i) being different from *apūrvā*, (ii) which is conducive of achieving the fruit—final beatitude through *adr̥ṣṭa* (unseen effect) that is completely bereft of any connection with *aniṣṭa* (not desired at all). Such a kind of definition for *dharma* has been accepted by the author of the *Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-prakāśa*, *Kṛṣṇayajvan*, *Laugākṣī-Bhāskara* and others.

C. Discussion in the Import of “*Liñ*” (in Vedic texts)

In the Vedic passages the meaning of the words (verbs) used in *Liñ* (injunctions/prohibitions) is taken for interpretation/discussion; for these texts, in a way bring to light certain actions that are conducive to fulfil one’s desire or to achieve certain aims/goals. Different systems of Indian philosophy (*dārsanikāḥ*) hold altogether different contentions with regard to the import of the verb used in *Liñ* (potential mood).

The Nyāya system holds: *vidhi* or command is the specific import of the verbs used with suffixes of (i) *liñ*, (ii) *loṭ*, and (iii) *tavya* (must). This has three aspects, first as being the means for fulfilling one’s desire, second the urgent need to complete the task (one has to carry out the work without fail), and third it has no connection whatsoever with anything that is most harmful. In all the three aspects, the verbs used in *liñ*, etc. convey their meaning fully, for they are inseparable from the import of the relationship existing between *viśeṣaṇa* (adjective) and *viśeṣya* (substantive). Because of the interpretational capacity intrinsic to them, those verbs produce three kinds of meaning simultaneously. Such a knowledge intended by these suffixes of the verbs induces earnest activity on the part of the agent, and so these usages of the verbs are called *pravartanā* (directing or enjoining). Hence inducement is the main import of the suffixes, *liñ*, etc.

The Vaiyākaraṇas (grammarians) hold that inducement or enjoining is there for the sake of achieving or fulfilling one’s desire. It amounts to being the means (*upāya*). They contend that the meaning of *vidhi* is “inducement” (*pravartanā*),

i.e. nothing but the means to attain one's aim/intention. In the *Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍanācārya, the meaning of *vidhi* is set forth as *pravartanā*, in the explanation of *puṁso naiṣṭābhyupāyatvāt*. Pārthasārathimiśra, in his *Vidhinirṇaya* also, states that *vidhi* stands for *pravartanā*, that is, the means for achieving one's intention. In the *Nyāyasudhā*, the section with the commentary on *Arthavāda-adhikaraṇa-siddhānta-vārttika* sets forth that *vidhyartha* (meaning of *vidhi*) implies an *alaukikī* (extraordinary) act of the person who has the initiative, and the *vidhi* is the cause of an inducement to the agent. A particular viewpoint of a distinct group is also arrived at, namely *vidhyartha* (the import of *vidhi*) represents the intention of "encouraging one to fulfill one's desire"—as a corollary to all earlier views on *vidhyartha*. To corroborate such a distinct view, we are also ready to include "desire" as part and parcel of the meaning of suffixes like *lin*, etc. in Vedic texts. If "desire" is held to possess the locus in *ātman* alone and not having a locus in an insentient object, then one should accept the validity of *Īśvara* (God) as propounded and established in the *Upaniṣads* and also derive *vidhyartha* (import of *vidhi*) as forming part of the Lord's will. Or it is also to be accepted that an *alaukikī dharma* is *vidhyartha* (import of *vidhi*): (i) referred to by the words (verbs) with "*lin*" terminations etc., and (ii) found in those suffixes to make a person interested/involved. But *vidhyartha* (import of *vidhi*) does not provide the basis for the means, to attain one's desire fulfilled.

D. Reference to *Bhāvanā*

According to one prevalent view *bhāvanā* (intentional motivation)—as expressed by the word of nominal subject (noun) as found beyond the reach/range of the meaning of *dhātu* (verbal root)—is also derived, referring to the import of a statement (*śābda bodha*). To explain : When the question is put—"what does he do", the reply given is : "he cooks", herein, the *samānādhikarāṇya* (grammatical coordination) is quite well known between the terms, *karoti* (does) and *pacati* (cooks). The intentional purport of the term *karoti* in conjunction with that of the term *pacati*, through the coordinate relation between them, conveys the *bhāvanā* (intention in fulfilling a task) of the former, to enjoin the latter as well. Now, if it is asked whether the *bhāvanā* belongs to the verb of noun, the reply would be: the *bhāvanā* does belong to *ākhyāta* (noun) and not to *dhātu* (verb), because the verbal roots like *pac* etc. have multifarious senses and this is not the case with regard to *ākhyāta* (noun); hence the conclusion : *bhāvanā* is spoken of with regard to *ākhyāta* (noun) only.

E. The View of Khaṇḍadeva

In his works, *Bhāṭṭīpikā*, and *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, etc., Khaṇḍadeva, a Navya-Mīmāṃsaka has in detail dealt with the meanings of *lakāras* (the suffixes of tenses and moods),

dhātus (verbs), *suppratyayas* (suffixes added to grammatical compound words), and *nañ-pratyaya* (negative particles), etc. These have not been explained in the earlier works of Mīmāṃsā system. Especially the meanings of *lin-lakāra* and *supvibhakti pratyayas* are construed to imply *bhāvanā* (over-all action). Even *paramparā-sambandha* (relation through hierarchy) has been derived to mainly portray the *śabda-bodha* (chief import of the sentence).

F. Meaning of Verbs

With regard to meanings of *dhātus* (verbal roots), the Mīmāṃsā system upholds the pristine importance to their orientation to action—*sarvo vyāpāraḥ dhātvarthaḥ* after refuting the viewpoints of Vaiyākaraṇas (grammarians) and Naiyāyikas (logicians).

G. Navya-Mīmāṃsaka View

According to the Navya Mīmāṃsaka (latter-day adherents of Mīmāṃsā), *karmatva* (being an object), *kartṛtva* (being an agent/subject), *karaṇatva* (to be an instrument), etc.—all these form a unified *upādhi* (adjunct) to the chief action. Since the *dharma*—that is exclusive of *jāti* (genre) and *akhaṇḍopādhi* (undivided/unified adjunct)—alone is worth explanation (definition), having abandoned the view of *anirvacanīyatvam akhaṇḍatvam* (that which is impartite can never be described/declined as such and such), the definition of *akhaṇḍatva* (being impartite/ever being a whole) as, (i) being different from the *samavāya* (inherence) relation, and (ii) being different from the relation of an object to its own essential nature. Therefore, for the Navya Mīmāṃsakas who are fond of accommodating the principle of *akhaṇḍatva* (indivisibleness/wholeness/impartiteness), similar to *pratyayatva* (being suffix) etc., even *karmatva* (to be an object), *kartṛtva* (agency) etc. fall within the range of *akhaṇḍa* (impartite). So the meanings of *dhātus* such as *pākatva* (cooking) etc., in unison with their general purport, convey mainly the unified *dharma*. The meanings of declensional suffixes indicating *karmatva* (being an object, etc.) have to be construed with *bhāvanā* (the main enjoined action), (i) through *paramparā-sambandha* (step-by-step understanding), i.e. through the meaning of their own verbal roots and being an instrument thereof, and (ii) not by the direct relation of self-identity—the latter being the Naiyāyika's view. The existence of *bhāvanā* is established in the case of the meaning of words ending in *kṛt-pratyaya* and *ṇamul-pratyaya*, etc. The distinction of *bhāvanā* even in regard to the meaning of the *Kṛt*-suffixes which are found as subsequent part of *ākhyātas*, explains the meaning of the qualifying words (*viśeṣaṇa*) of a verb (*Kriyā*): the main import of *dviṭyāvibhakti* (accusative case suffix) is established through the discussion on the *vārttika* (a principle found in the sub-commentary)—*tato-na atrāpi dṛśyate*.

H. Authority of dharma in the Bhāṭṭdīpikā

It is finally established in the *Bhāṭṭdīpikā*, while dealing with the authority of *smṛti* and *ācāra* in expounding *dr̥ṣṭārtha* (seen effects), that the *smṛti* and *ācāra* which relate to *adr̥ṣṭārtha* (unseen effect) are to be regarded as superior in authority. Such a superiority in regard to the authority of *smṛti* and *ācāra* is even quite tenable in the sciences of Āyurveda, Sāmudrika, Vāstuvidyā, Ethics (Nītiśāstra), Śālihotra, Elephant-taming, Cookery, etc. *Śyenayāga* is accepted as *dharma* because it has been laid down in the Vedas, but people of modern research hold it to be *adharmā* on the ground that its effect being destructive in character and hence *pratyavāya* (a type of crime).

I. The Main Doctrine - vidhi

The system of Mīmāṃsā holds *vidhi* (Enjoined Action) alone as the supreme treasure and as the most favoured doctrine. Therefore, through the foremost aphorism, “*vidhinātveka-vākyatvāt ...*” (because of being construed as a single proposition/statement along with *vidhi*), *arthavāda* (supplementary or secondary statement in the form of praise/eulogy), *mantra* (hymn), *nāmadheya* (nomenclature), *smṛti* (traditional scripture), *sadācāra* (righteous custom of elders), *ātma-tuṣṭi* (self-satisfaction), etc. go in union with *vidhi* and, thus, they gain authority. Never are the Vedic texts held to be sensible or tenable without any connection with *vidhi-vākya* (an injunction/prohibition). Further, it is told that *vidhitva* (to be a *vidhi*—a command, law, rule) consists in: (i) “inducing a person to proceed with an act, after reminding him of a fact that he has not known earlier”, (ii) making one to understand an object/principle that is purposeful/useful, (iii) the main purport of a statement that is supplemented by *arthavāda*, *mantra*, *nāmadheya*, etc. that render a person more enthusiastic in carrying out the main act (*vidhi*), (iv) producing the right knowledge of *dharma*s such as the form of the means to achieve a goal that is desired by a person (in the view of Navya Mīmāṃsaka), and (v) *dharma* as the prime import of the words with the ‘*Liñ*’ suffix etc.—as intended to be carried out—as enjoined in the statement with the application of the *Liñ* suffix, etc. The meaning of *vidhi* is *śabda-bhāvanā* (main performance of action through verbal testimony)—in accordance with the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā. For the Prabhākaras the meaning of *vidhi* implies *Kāryam* (the action should be done). The Navya Mīmāṃsakas set forth the main import of *vidhi* as meaningful *bhāvanā* as construed with the *śabda-bhāvanā* (the essential order of *śabda*).

The inner classification of *vidhi* has been established in the commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.2.16 (in the *Siddhānta-sūtra* sub-commentary of Ādhāra-Agnihotra *adhikaraṇa*)—as numbering eight; and the following explanations are given in the *mantrādhikaraṇa sūtra* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, 1.2.42: (i) *atyantam aprāpte vidhiḥ*: The injunction is when its fruit cannot be obtained by any other means; (ii) *Pākṣika*

sati niyamaḥ: It is called *niyama* when the enjoined action of a *vākya* is optional; (iii) *Tatra anyatra ca parisāṅkhyā*: When the action intended to be carried out as feasible in one case at once, and similar to it for further instances as well. The illustrations (instance) for these technical aspects of *vidhi*, *niyama* and *parisāṅkhyā* have also been described. In the *Vidhirasāyana*, popularly referred to as a work of Appayya/dīkṣita, many discussions of the above-cited views are found; namely the defects like *avyāpti* (non-pervasion), etc. in the definitions of *vidhi* are pointed out first; but later on, the reply for the objections are indicated; the discussion on the important topics of the twelfth *adhyāya* (of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*) is made with profuse illustrations along with clear-cut definitions for some technical terms; the explanations of the *vārttika* are analysed, pointing out objections and clarifications thereon with examples. An self-commentary on the *Vidhirasāyana* is also extant. However, subsequently many criticisms and appreciations (on the *Vidhirasāyana*) by later writers on Mīmāṃsā have appeared. Among them a few works may be cited, namely the *Durūhasikṣā*, the *Vidhibhūṣaṇa*, the *Vidhiratnāvalī*, the *Vidhidūṣaṇa*, the *Vidhītraya-paritrāṇa*, the *Vidhiviveka*, the *Vidhi-camatkāracandrikā*, the *Vidhidarpaṇa*, the *Mīmāṃsā-Vidhi-bhūṣaṇa*, etc.—while some of these have been printed, the others are in manuscript form. Even though a few criticisms against the *Vidhirasāyana* are found scattered in the *Mīmāṃsā Kaustubha*, *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* and *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, there is not available any independent work that refutes the *Vidhirasāyana* altogether. However, there has been some development in the discussion on *vidhi* and its classifications:

<i>Vidhirasāyana</i>		
REFUTATION		APPRECIATION
1. <i>Vidhītraya-paritrāṇa</i> (1590–1660 A.D.)	1. <i>Mīmāṃsā Kaustubha</i> (1575–1665)	1. <i>Durūhasikṣā</i> (1650)
2. <i>Vidhidarpaṇam</i> (1670–1750)	2. <i>Bhāṭṭadīpikā</i> (1575–1665)	2. <i>Vidhirasāyana-bhūṣaṇam</i> (1700)
3. <i>Vidhiviveka</i> (1670–1750)	3. <i>Bhāṭṭarahasyam</i> (1575–1650)	3. <i>Phalasāṅkaryā Khaṇḍanam</i> (1715)
4. <i>Vidhirasāyanadūṣaṇam</i> (1650–1750)	4. <i>Mayūkhamālikā</i> (1640)	4. <i>Vidhiratnāvalī</i> (1750)
5. <i>Vidhibhūṣaṇam</i> (1711)		
6. <i>Mīmāṃsāvidhibhūṣaṇam</i> (1700)		
7. <i>Vidhicamatkāra Candrikā</i>		

H. Authority of dharma in the *Bhāṭṭīdīpikā*

It is finally established in the *Bhāṭṭīdīpikā*, while dealing with the authority of *smṛti* and *ācāra* in expounding *dr̥ṣṭārtha* (seen effects), that the *smṛti* and *ācāra* which relate to *adr̥ṣṭārtha* (unseen effect) are to be regarded as superior in authority. Such a superiority in regard to the authority of *smṛti* and *ācāra* is even quite tenable in the sciences of Āyurveda, Sāmudrika, Vāstuvīdyā, Ethics (Nītiśāstra), Śālihotra, Elephant-taming, Cookery, etc. *Śyenayāga* is accepted as *dharma* because it has been laid down in the Vedas, but people of modern research hold it to be *adharmā* on the ground that its effect being destructive in character and hence *pratyavāya* (a type of crime).

I. The Main Doctrine - *vidhi*

The system of Mīmāṃsā holds *vidhi* (Enjoined Action) alone as the supreme treasure and as the most favoured doctrine. Therefore, through the foremost aphorism, “*vidhinātvēka-vākyatvāt ...*” (because of being construed as a single proposition/statement along with *vidhi*), *arthavāda* (supplementary or secondary statement in the form of praise/eulogy), *mantra* (hymn), *nāmadheya* (nomenclature), *smṛti* (traditional scripture), *sadācāra* (righteous custom of elders), *ātma-tuṣṭi* (self-satisfaction), etc. go in union with *vidhi* and, thus, they gain authority. Never are the Vedic texts held to be sensible or tenable without any connection with *vidhi-vākya* (an injunction/prohibition). Further, it is told that *vidhitva* (to be a *vidhi*—a command, law, rule) consists in: (i) “inducing a person to proceed with an act, after reminding him of a fact that he has not known earlier”, (ii) making one to understand an object/principle that is purposeful/useful, (iii) the main purport of a statement that is supplemented by *arthavāda*, *mantra*, *nāmadheya*, etc. that render a person more enthusiastic in carrying out the main act (*vidhi*), (iv) producing the right knowledge of *dharma*s such as the form of the means to achieve a goal that is desired by a person (in the view of Navya Mīmāṃsaka), and (v) *dharma* as the prime import of the words with the ‘*Liṅ*’ suffix etc.—as intended to be carried out—as enjoined in the statement with the application of the *Liṅ* suffix, etc. The meaning of *vidhi* is *śabda-bhāvanā* (main performance of action through verbal testimony)—in accordance with the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā. For the Prabhākaras the meaning of *vidhi* implies *Kāryam* (the action should be done). The Navya Mīmāṃsakas set forth the main import of *vidhi* as meaningful *bhāvanā* as construed with the *śabda-bhāvanā* (the essential order of *śabda*).

The inner classification of *vidhi* has been established in the commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.2.16 (in the *Siddhānta-sūtra* sub-commentary of Ādhāra-Agnihotra *adhikaraṇa*)—as numbering eight; and the following explanations are given in the *mantrādhikaraṇa sūtra* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, 1.2.42: (i) *atyantam aprāpte vidhiḥ*: The injunction is when its fruit cannot be obtained by any other means; (ii) *Pākṣika*

sati niyamaḥ: It is called *niyama* when the enjoined action of a *vākya* is optional; (iii) *Tatra anyatra ca pariśaṅkhyā*: When the action intended to be carried out as feasible in one case at once, and similar to it for further instances as well. The illustrations (instance) for these technical aspects of *vidhi*, *niyama* and *pariśaṅkhyā* have also been described. In the *Vidhirasāyana*, popularly referred to as a work of Appayya/dīkṣita, many discussions of the above-cited views are found; namely the defects like *avyāpti* (non-pervasion), etc. in the definitions of *vidhi* are pointed out first; but later on, the reply for the objections are indicated; the discussion on the important topics of the twelfth *adhyāya* (of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*) is made with profuse illustrations along with clear-cut definitions for some technical terms; the explanations of the *vārttika* are analysed, pointing out objections and clarifications thereon with examples. An self-commentary on the *Vidhirasāyana* is also extant. However, subsequently many criticisms and appreciations (on the *Vidhirasāyana*) by later writers on Mīmāṃsā have appeared. Among them a few works may be cited, namely the *Durūhasikṣā*, the *Vidhibhūṣaṇa*, the *Vidhiratnāvalī*, the *Vidhidūṣaṇa*, the *Vidhitrayaṣaritrāṇa*, the *Vidhiviveka*, the *Vidhi-camatkāracandrikā*, the *Vidhidarpaṇa*, the *Mīmāṃsā-Vidhi-bhūṣaṇa*, etc.—while some of these have been printed, the others are in manuscript form. Even though a few criticisms against the *Vidhirasāyana* are found scattered in the *Mīmāṃsā Kaustubha*, *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* and *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, there is not available any independent work that refutes the *Vidhirasāyana* altogether. However, there has been some development in the discussion on *vidhi* and its classifications:

<i>Vidhirasāyana</i>		
REFUTATION		APPRECIATION
1. <i>Vidhitrayaṣaritrāṇa</i> (1590–1660 A.D.)	1. <i>Mīmāṃsā Kaustubha</i> (1575–1665)	1. <i>Durūhasikṣā</i> (1650)
2. <i>Vidhidarpaṇam</i> (1670–1750)	2. <i>Bhāṭṭadīpikā</i> (1575–1665)	2. <i>Vidhirasāyana- bhūṣaṇam</i> (1700)
3. <i>Vidhiviveka</i> (1670–1750)	3. <i>Bhāṭṭarahasyam</i> (1575–1650)	3. <i>Phalasāṃkarya Khaṇḍanam</i> (1715)
4. <i>Vidhirasāyanadūṣaṇam</i> (1650–1750)	4. <i>Mayūkhamālikā</i> (1640)	4. <i>Vidhiratnāvalī</i> (1750)
5. <i>Vidhibhūṣaṇam</i> (1711)		
6. <i>Mīmāṃsāvidhibhūṣaṇam</i> (1700)		
7. <i>Vidhicamatkāra Candrikā</i>		

J. Explanation of somena yajeta

According to the ancient Mīmāṃsā writers the explanation of *somena yajeta* is dependent on *matyārtha-lakṣaṇa*, i.e. first of all, one has to procure *soma*, and then, it is enjoined on the agent to perform the *soma* sacrifice. This explanation was intended by them, out of fear of *Vākyabheda* (a contingency of using two sentences). However, Navya Mīmāṃsakas who accept the aspect of *paramparā-sambandha* (hierarchical relationship) in understanding the import of words (*śābda-bodha*), do not accept *matyārtha-lakṣaṇa* (the secondary significance through *matyārtha*) for the term *soma* with regard to the Vedic text *somena yajeta*; but they accept the meaning of *soma* through *bhāvanā* as construed with *karāṇatva* (being instrumental). They say: it cannot be said that many instruments could not be construed at a time, for it is tenable to have different kinds of instruments at a time, and it won't be possible to have any instruments of similar nature (same genre). As a means to achieve the fruit of sacrifice, *bhāvanā* (action) is a *karāṇa* (main instrument); but the *soma* plant is an instrument of the fruit namely. *yāga* (sacrifice) itself; thus there is *paramparā-sambandha* (hierarchical relation). So, *soma* is the *itikartavya* (procurable means), and hence, it is construed with *yāga* (sacrifice); ultimately, *matyārtha-lakṣaṇa* is not at all applicable—according to the conclusion of the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*.

K. Another Navya Mīmāṃsaka View

To say: a person is a brahmin only if he/she is born of brahmin couple alone, is not an inviolable condition for, through other criteria, even Sage Viśvāmītra among others are held to be brahmins, thus, the Navya Mīmāṃsakas contend.

L. The Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi of Vāñceśvara Yajvan

The commentary on the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, namely the *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi* was composed by Vāñceśvara Yajvan of south India. This commentary is of immense use as it explains vividly certain abstract topics contained in the original text. In many places, the commentary refutes the view of the original text as the latter sets forth a *Navya Adhikaraṇa - racanāprakāra* (i.e. a new method of classification of *adhikaraṇa*). This commentary follows the pattern and style of the *Bhāṣya*, *Varttika* and the *Śāstradīpikā* with regard to the enumeration of *adhikaraṇas* (major subdivisions) of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*; for example, this is clear in *Ākrītyadhikaraṇa*, 1.3.10; *udbhīd-adhikaraṇa*, 11.4.2; *vājapey-adhikaraṇa*, 1.4.6, etc. In the *vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa* even the regional language is accepted as authoritative.

After the period of Sāyaṇa Madhvācārya, very scholarly works of *Mīmāṃsā-Śāstra* are not available either as *Sūtragranthas* or *Adhikaraṇagranthas*. Similarly, after the period of Khaṇḍadeva, people became less interested in rituals like *yāga*

(sacrifice), etc. Therefore, the traditional hierarchy of learning and teaching got eclipsed midway with regard to; (i) the works of *sūtra*, *bhāṣya*, *vārttika* etc. and (ii) later-day innovative treatises. In such a situation when the urge to learn and teach the Mīmāṃsā system or to acquire sound scholarship in the *Mīmāṃsāsāstra* surfaced, it was required to be fulfilled through easy means and within a short period. Great scholars, therefore, attempted to prepare simple manuals of Mīmāṃsā that pointed out the essential tenets (from the source-books), similar to the existence of such simple works in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. As those works belonged to a particular thematic approach, they are known as *Prakarāṇa-granthas* being comprehensive with a concise rendering of the facts. A few works of this style are: Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-prakāśa*, Kṛṣṇayajvan's *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*, and Bhāskarabhaṭṭa's *Arthasaṃgraha*, etc.

The *Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśā* (A.D. 1700)

This work has been prepared to highlight the nyāya's (special themes) used in the tenets of Mīmāṃsā (on Vedic analysis and secular applications of those texts) mainly for the benefit of the lay readers who do not know the doctrines of Mīmāṃsā. Even though there are occasional cross-references, the work is easy to follow. Many definitions and illustrations are explained here in a lucid manner, for example: (i) the two kinds of *bhāvanā*, (ii) the subdivisions of *vidhi*, *mantras*, etc. in the Veda, (iii) authoritative passages of the vedas, (iv) the different types and aspects of *dharma*, (v) different kinds of *vidhi*, (vi) the different means of valid knowledge which refer to *dharma* as *aṅga* (subordinate), (vii) *smṛtyācāras* (customary adhering to *smṛti* digests), (viii) *pramāṇas* which deal with *krama*, (ix) *arthavāda* (laudatory subdivisions), (x) *apūrvā-prameyas*, etc. For readers who want to learn and understand specific topics of *smṛti* and Mīmāṃsā, this work ably analyses these, especially, the subtle and intricate aspects so that it can be compared to the *Jaiminīya Nyāyamālā*.

The *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā* (A.D. 1700–1760)

Kṛṣṇa Yajvan's *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā* is a detailed text that explains the technical terms through a word-to-word interpretation, along with simple definitions and illustrations. There are no *śāstra-caricā* (detailed discussions of the doctrines of the system) nor any innovatory approach to the principal teachings of Mīmāṃsā. So it is similar to the *Tarkasaṃgraha* of the Nyāya system.

In the recent period from the eighteenth to the twentieth century no development or growth in the study of Mīmāṃsā has occurred. However, numerous short tracts of Mīmāṃsā and a few commentaries have been written in this period. These mainly deal with the ancient Mīmāṃsā tradition. Some among these are printed, while others have not been published at all.

A. *Unpublished Commentaries*

1. Campakanātha's C. on the *Śāstradīpikā* A.D. 1710, etc.

B. *Printed Commentaries*

1. Vāñceśvaradikṣita's C. *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi* on *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, 1798–1832.
2. Vaidyanathashastri's C. on *Śābarabhāṣya* (up to Tarkapāda), 1850–1950.
3. V.S. Abhyankar's C. *Prabhā* on *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (MNP), 1880–1950.
4. Madan Mohan Sarma's C. on MNP, 1900–2000.
5. Cinnasvāmi Sastri's C. *Sāravivecanī* on MNP, twentieth century.
6. Uttamur Viraraghavacharya's C. *Suddhasvāda* on MNP, twentieth century.
7. Rāmeśvara Śivayogī's C. on *Arthasaṃgraha*, 1839.
8. Krisnanatha Panchanana's C. on *Arthasaṃgraha*, 1898.
9. Tatacharya's C. *Tantraprakāśikā* on *Arthasaṃgraha*, 1890–1945.
10. Jivananda Vidyasagara's C. on *Arthasaṃgraha*, 1900.
11. Pattabhiramashastri's C. *Arthadīpikā* on *Arthasaṃgraha*, twentieth century.
12. Pramathanatha Tarkabhusana's C. *Amalā* on *Arthasaṃgraha*, twentieth century.
13. Sudarshanacharya's C. on *Śāstradīpikā*, 1970.
14. Peri Suryanarayana Shastri's C. *Bhāvaprakāśikā* on *Bhāṭṭarahasya*.
15. Subrahmanya Shastri's C. *Viṣamagranthābhedinī* on *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, 1900–1992.
16. D.T. Tatacharya's C. *Parīṣkāra* on the *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā*, 1922.

A few small manuals of Mīmāṃsā based on ancient source-books have been brought out in this period. Of course, these do not profess any novel approach. Among them, some unprinted texts are:

1. The *Tantravilāsa* of Lakṣmaṇa Paṇḍita, eighteenth century
A brief treatise on the contents of six *Adhikaraṇas* of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* (beginning with *Guṇakāmādhikaraṇa*).
2. The *Piṣṭa-paśu-nirṇaya* of Vaidyanātha Pāyeśuṇḍe (1710–1800)
This unpublished work deals with the use of *piṣṭa-paśu* (an image prepared out of rice-flour in the form of animal/goat) during *yāga* (sacrifice) pointing out ways and means to continue Vedic rituals and practices even in the present century when *ahimsā* (non-violence) is strongly advocated by people and governments alike.
3. The *Arunādhikaraṇasāriṇī Vivaraṇī* of Śrīnivāsācārya - 1770
This *Prakaraṇagrantha* explains in the style of Navya Nyāya, the “*Arunādhikaraṇa*” with regard to text, “*Arunāyā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā gavā somam krīṇati*”. When there arises the objection whether “*arunā*” is to be

taken as *guṇamātravācī* (only with the import of quality) or *guṇaviśiṣṭavācī* (meaning construed along with quality), it is explained on the confirmed view found in the *Śrībhāṣya* (or Rāmānuja) as found in the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* text.

4. The *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra-dīpikā* of Yallabhaṭṭa (Ella-bhaṭṭa) - 1900
This is a small *vṛtti* (glossarial commentary) on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* and not yet printed.
5. The *Matyarthalakṣaṇavicāra* of Bhaskaracharya and Svami Shastri - nineteenth century.
A dialectical tract explaining the *lakṣaṇa* (secondary significance) of *matyārtha* in the Vedic statement like *Paśunā Yajeta* - whether here one has to explain *paśunā* as *paśumalā* or just *paśunā* (i.e. through that which possesses *paśutva*, beasthood, or just that which is *pasu*—an animal). This unprinted tract follows the pattern of a dialogue between Svami Shastri and Bhaskaracharya, the former posing an argument and the latter giving a reply.
6. The *Tantranītilahārī* of Ramanujacharya - 1850
This unprinted *vṛtti* (succinct commentary) on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* follows both the Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara schools of Mīmāṃsā. The author the *Śāstridīpikā* and the *Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-viveka*.

A Few Printed Works on Mīmāṃsā of Modern Period

1. The *Tantra-Siddhānta-Ratnāvalī* of Chinnaśvami Shastri 1870–1950
A very good printed *prakaraṇa* (monograph) work, this *Ratnāvalī* provides an easy digest of important doctrines of Mīmāṃsā, even for beginners and general readers of philosophy.
2. The *Bhāṭṭasāra* of Krishna Tatacharya 1875.
This period tract puts, in a nutshell, the essential teachings of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* summarising the contents of each *pāda* of the twelve *adhyāyas* of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*.
3. The (*Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*) *Bhāvabodhinī* of Vidya-Sankara Bharati, a chief pontiff of Karavīra-Śaṅkarapīṭha (Formerly known as Narahari Shastri) 1937
A very useful printed work for the students of Mīmāṃsā, this *vṛtti* tract is a simple but unique glossarial commentary explaining, (i) each word found in a *sūtra* (aphorism), and (ii) the general purport of all *adhikaraṇas* (major sections) one after another.
4. The *Mānameyodaya-śloka-vārttika* of Srinivasacharya twentieth century
An *anuṣṭubh* (*śloka*) type composition, this *Mānameyodaya* not only explains the principles of *pramāṇas* and *prameyas* but also the principal doctrines of the major systems of Indian philosophy.
5. The *Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-mañjarī* of Pattabhirama Shastri 20th century
The *Mīmāṃsā nyāyas* (special themes) and the purport of the important

adhikaraṇas of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* are dealt with briefly in this printed *prakaraṇagrantha* (monograph).

NOTES

1. Potter, Karl H. 1977. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. III, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.
2. Moore, G.E. 1903. *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Ross, David. 1967. *The Right and the Good*. Oxford Clarendon Press.