

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON
F. S. C. NORTHROP'S THEORY OF
CONCEPTS

The clarity that Professor Northrop has brought into the classification of concepts and its outstanding influence on the manifold problems of science, philosophy, and culture, as evidenced in his two books *The Meeting of East and West* and *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*, are well known. In this paper, however, we wish to suggest that his classification is deficient in a certain respect, and that this deficiency has led to an inadequate theory of certain aspects of experience.

The fundamental division, according to Northrop, is between concepts by intuition and concepts by postulation. A concept by intuition is one that gains its *entire* meaning from the immediately apprehended. A concept by postulation is one that has 'its meaning *proposed* for it theoretically by the postulates of the deductive theory in which it occurs.'¹ The term 'blue', for example, is a concept by intuition when it refers to the immediately sensed blue, and a concept by postulation when it refers to the number of a wave length in the electromagnetic theory of light. It should be noted that the meaning of the term as a concept by postulation is *completely determined* by the postulates of the theoretic system in which it occurs, and that this meaning would be *completely changed* by *any change* in the postulates of the system. Such, however, is not the case with respect to 'blue' as a concept of intuition. It can never change—for it denotes the immediately apprehended sense datum which constitutes its meaning.

The concepts by postulation are further divided into: (1) concepts by intellection; (2) concepts by imagination; (3) concepts by perception; and (4) logical concepts by intuition. The differ-

1. *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*, p. 82 (italics mine).

ence between these consists in the fact that the first can neither be imagined nor sensed, the second can only be imagined but not sensed, and the third are in part sensed and in part imagined. The fourth are merely concepts by intuition which are given a logical universality and immortality by postulation. In each case, the concepts can be either monistic or pluralistic.

The first two alone are pure concepts by postulation, while the last two have an inevitable admixture of concepts by intuition in them. Four-dimensional space and the atoms of classical physics are examples of the first two types, while tables and chairs of ordinary experience and entities such as Whitehead's 'eternal objects' are given as examples of the last two. It is obvious that the latter have sensed elements which the former do not possess.

With this classification in mind, if we try to find the type to which such a concept as 'mermaid' belongs, we shall have some difficulty. It certainly is not a concept by intellection or a logical concept by intuition. It seems at first sight to be a concept by imagination. Such a concept, according to Northrop, is a concept by postulation designating *factors* which can be imagined but cannot be sensed. Now the factors designated by the concept 'mermaid' can be sensed. If, further, we consult the context and the example of Northrop's definition, we would find it entirely unfit to describe such a concept as 'mermaid' as a concept by imagination. For a concept by imagination belongs to a deductive theory with its primitive concepts and relations, and its *entire* meaning is deduced from the postulates of the deductive system. The concept 'mermaid' belongs to no such deductive system. Its meaning is not deduced from any postulates consisting of primitive concepts and relations. And—what is even more important—it has not been postulated, like most concepts of postulation, to take into account, understand, or explain certain problems that arise in experience. This also seems to be the reason why it does not lead to any consequences, to any epistemic correlations and verification.

This suggests that it is not a pure concept by postulation at all. And there seems too much admixture of sensed elements to make it a concept by intellection or imagination. Is it, then, a concept by perception? Northrop's definition of such concepts as concepts by postulation designating factors which are in part sensed

and in part imagined, suggests that it is so. But if again we note the context and the examples, we find that it does not fit into the classification at all. Persons, tables, and chairs have a postulational element, for all that is immediately apprehended is a patch of colour and not a persisting three-dimensional object in public space which is the same for everybody. It is the postulational element which leads, according to Northrop, to errors and illusions of perception. But, unlike pure concepts by postulation, these concepts have a sensed element which is immediately apprehended. Northrop has warned us against confusing concepts by intuition or immediate apprehension with concepts by postulation. Yet in this case, he seems to have confused the two worlds of discourse—for the same concept can certainly not be constituted of postulated and sensed elements.

However, Northrop himself suggests at another place that the sensed elements are not present in the concept at all. He writes: 'When one concludes that the two-dimensional coloured patch before one is the sign of the presence of a three-dimensional desk, one has *epistemically correlated* the two-dimensional coloured patch which one *directly inspects* with one side of a theoretically postulated, three-dimensional, right-angled cornered, external material object which one terms a desk.'² If there is *only* an epistemic correlation between the postulated and the sensed elements, then Northrop has no ground for distinguishing between concepts by imagination and concepts by perception, for the former equally enjoy only an epistemic correlation with the sensed elements. In respect of verification consequent on epistemic correlation, the two also enjoy the same position.

If, then, there can be no difference between concepts by imagination and concepts by perception, and if a concept such as 'mermaid' cannot be classified as a concept by imagination, it equally well cannot be classified as a concept by perception.

If it does not belong to any of the subtypes of concepts by postulation, does it, then, belong to concepts by intuition? The answer seems to be a definite 'No'. A 'mermaid' is not an object of immediate apprehension, and thus basically it cannot be a concept by intuition. If neither a concept by intuition nor a concept

2. Ibid., p. 119 (italics mine).

by postulation, then to what class of concepts does it belong? Or, is it not a concept at all? But a concept, according to Northrop, 'is a term to which a meaning has been assigned'. If this is so, then a term such as 'mermaid' is certainly a concept—a concept whose meaning is understood by all.

The type to which the concept 'mermaid' belongs can perhaps be better understood if we try to note the peculiar characteristics of such a concept. First, it does not denote anything which is immediately apprehended. Secondly, it is not formed, posited, or postulated because of the need to explain or understand some problem that has arisen in experience. Thirdly, it does not require for its validity any objective verification. This might suggest that it is something like the concepts of mathematics where too the validity does not depend upon any objective verification. But mathematical concepts always belong to a theoretic deductive system, while a concept such as 'mermaid' does not. Further, mathematical concepts are essentially abstract and formal, while a concept such as 'mermaid' is empirical and concrete. The fact that we are not interested in its truth or falsity in the ordinary sense of the word suggests that it is a unique type of concept. It is not an object of perception like 'tables' and 'chairs'. But, equally, it is composed of factors which are perceived like 'tables' and 'chairs'. In short, it is what is usually considered as an object of imagination and, thus, may be characterized as a concept by imagination.

Northrop has already used the term 'concepts by imagination' in a certain sense. The sense, however, in which we characterize the concept 'mermaid' as a concept by imagination is totally different. The difference in the two senses has already been indicated in the last paragraph. But if we try to look behind Northrop's usage of the term, we would see that it presupposes our usage, and that Northrop has ignored it only because he has not been interested in it. In a wider sense, the very notion of a concept by postulation presupposes the function of imagination. In a narrower sense, again, the distinction between intellection and imagination implies the imaginative function. But, in either case, he is interested in it only instrumentally. What he wants to know is whether what has been imaginatively postulated is true or false. That there is an *autonomous* realm of imagination which exists in its own right, Northrop seems not to have noticed. He grants this in the

case of mathematics, but only because it provides the possible deductive structures which can be fruitful in the building of various theories which can, in their turn, be verified through epistemic correlations. But that there is a realm where there are no deductive structures and no attempt at verification through epistemic correlations—in short, a realm of Alice in Wonderland—Northrop seems to have forgotten.

Thus, beside the concepts by intuition and postulation whose nature Northrop has so lucidly delineated, there are, we submit, concepts which can best be characterized as concepts by imagination. With these the question of deductive coherence or epistemic correlation does not arise.

This neglect by Northrop of concepts by imagination has resulted in a theory of art and value which seems to us gravely deficient in certain respects. It was inevitable that Northrop, believing that there are only concepts by intuition or postulation, should try to relate his view of art to his theory of concepts. According to him, arts 'when they function in and for themselves are concerned with immediately apprehendable materials.'³ Translated into terms of the theory of concepts, this means that art is concerned with concepts by intuition. In fact, he has explicitly called the factor denoted by concepts by intuition the *aesthetic* component of reality. Art, however, according to Northrop, has a second function also. And this consists in conveying analogically the theoretic component in reality known by science, through theoretically postulated elements verified by epistemic correlations, with the intuited elements in experience. Dante's *Divine Comedy* is pointed to as the classic example of art in its second function.

Leaving aside the problem of art in its second function, if we try to understand the nature of art in its primary aspect as Northrop delineates it, we find that it suffers from grave deficiencies. Patches of colour on the canvas or a series of tonal sounds are not painting or music. They must have a pattern or organization to earn them the name of painting or music. This pattern or organization cannot be said to be postulated or intuited, in Northrop's terminology. For the artist, the pattern is not intuited but created—it did not meet him in experience as he meets, for example, a

3. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

sensum of red. It is not meant that he does not intuit the pattern or the organization in immediate apprehension, but only that such is not the case with the pattern he has created. To the spectator, of course, the pattern is immediately apprehended, but that is only because it has first been created by the artist. Even in a landscape painting, the artist does not merely reproduce the pattern immediately apprehended in the landscape, but eliminates, selects, and adds in the pursuit of an aesthetic coherence whose possibility alone he seems to sense in the landscape before him.

But the pattern, even though imagined, may not be a work of art. In other words, if art is taken as merely a classificatory term, it may not be a good work of art at all. The basis of distinction between good and bad art cannot be found in Northrop's theory. In fact, to him everything conveying an intuited element would be art. Yet, if by art we mean that which is beautiful or aesthetically significant, then certainly we cannot apply the term to all that attempts to convey the intuited element in reality. An impressionist painting—the recurrent example in Northrop's theory of art in its first function—may be bad. Yet it cannot be said that it does not convey the so-called 'aesthetic' component of reality, unless it is implied that all that is immediately apprehended is not only ineffable but also aesthetically significant and beautiful. It is very unlikely that Northrop would hold such a view. We immediately apprehend not merely objects which seem beautiful but also those which appear ugly. Further, the individually intuited elements in their higgledy-piggledy sequence are mostly indifferent with regard to their aesthetic value. Northrop's theory of concepts, thus, has led him to disregard the role of imagination in organizing the immediately intuited elements into a significant and meaningful form.

Northrop's failure to note the dichotomy of 'beautiful-ugly' in the case of art objects has resulted in a theory of value which, though exceedingly novel and interesting, seems deficient in certain respects. He suggests that the validity of specific 'oughts' in the personal and social fields can be determined by an appeal to the prevailing 'is' in the natural field. What is meant is that our view of 'good' depends on our view of 'man' and 'nature' and, as it is the natural sciences which give a fairly objective view of man and nature, the claim of any 'good' to validity can be exa-

mined in the light of whether it is based on an erroneous, or partial, or complete view about the nature of man and the physical universe as determined by the naturalistic sciences. The confusion of 'ought' with 'is' is certainly a fallacy—but only in the field of personal and social facts. With regard to natural facts there is no 'ought'—and, thus, they can provide a fairly objective basis for the determination of 'ought' in the personal and social fields. Moore's 'naturalistic fallacy' is, therefore, re-named by Northrop as 'culturalistic fallacy'.

The presupposition that 'ought' does not apply to facts in the 'naturalistic sciences' is, however, due to a limited view of the nature of 'ought'. If facts in the naturalistic sciences mean the theoretically postulated elements verified through epistemic correlations, then there is an 'ought' about them—the 'ought' that they 'ought-to-be-true'. Otherwise, the problem of epistemic correlations would not arise, and every theoretically postulated deductive system would be valid in its own right. Even if the term 'naturalistic fact' refers to the so-called immediately apprehended facts of nature, the 'ought' does not cease to operate. All immediately apprehended facts are not as they might-have-been or even as they ought-to-have-been. An ugly landscape, like an ugly fact in social or personal life, ought-not-to-have-been. Behind the 'ought-to-do', there stands, as Hartmann has so well pointed out, the 'ought-to-be'. Northrop's theory of art in its primary function as that which conveys the intuitive component of reality has an undertone suggesting that all that is intuited is art and, thus, beautiful. The ugliness, both in what is intuited and in the attempts that seek to convey what is intuited, has been neglected. Northrop's identification of 'is' with 'ought' in the immediately apprehended objects of nature results, thus, from a neglect of the dichotomy 'beautiful-ugly' in art.

His criticism of Moore's theory of the 'naturalistic fallacy' suffers from the same confusion. First, with reference to the term 'good'. Moore does not mean by 'good' only the 'moral good'. It is a generic term including the subdivisions of truth, beauty, and goodness under it. In fact, it is equivalent to the term 'value', and not to 'good' as it is usually understood in the restricted sense of its meaning. Value has a dichotomy within its own being, i.e., it is not merely value, but value-disvalue. If this is so, then the mere

fact that something exists can never be a *ground* for the further fact that it has a value. This is what Moore means by the 'naturalistic fallacy'. The substitution of the term 'culturalistic fallacy' for this merely shows that Northrop is not thinking of value, but of 'good' in the narrow restricted sense of its meaning.

His second point, namely, that Moore himself has committed the naturalistic fallacy, is again due to a confusion. Northrop writes: 'G.E. Moore's "good", given as an immediately apprehended ethical primitive which is indefinable, after the manner of the colour yellow, is as excellent an example as can be found of identifying the criterion of the normative for man with the immediately intuited actual which he introspects in himself'.⁴ The indefinability of 'good' in the generic sense of value follows, for Moore, from the logical fact that it cannot be reduced to any other category. Ultimately, there is no other answer to the question, 'Why is something that good?' except 'It is so'. There is no criterion for the norm—as the norm is its own criterion. In fact, there is not one norm or value but norms or values. The superiority of one value to another can only be realized by intuition, and there may be values between which, as Hartmann has shown, one may fail to intuit which is superior. The value intuited is, however, not a value *because it is intuited*, but it is intuited because it is a value. The colour yellow is not yellow *because it is immediately apprehended*, but it is so apprehended because it is yellow.

The search for a criterion is a search for objectivity. It is assumed that intuition cannot give us objectivity. But there seems no reason why it should be so. There may be factors such as relevant knowledge, social and cultural conditioning, and our own inertia and self-interest, which may stand in the way of our intuiting the norm; but then the same factors stand in the way of our acquiring objective knowledge. It is also generally forgotten that there may be a prehension of new values just as there can be an apprehension of new facts—requiring, in both cases, a reorganization of our structure both of knowledge and of values. There may also be loose ends in values as there are in knowledge.

We are not interested here in developing a theory of value. But it

4. *Ibid.*, p. 280.

may be pointed out that in Northrop's own theory of postulated and intuited elements there lie suggestions of an intuited and postulated theory of values. If we add the imagined elements, as suggested in the earlier part of our paper, an interesting and adequate theory can, perhaps, be built.

We have tried to show in this paper that Northrop's theory of concepts is deficient in certain respects, and that this neglect has resulted in an inadequate theory of art and value in his system.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON
MORRIS LAZEROWITZ'S
THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICS

Professor Morris Lazerowitz has recently brought together a number of his published and unpublished papers under the title *The Structure of Metaphysics*. The unpublished papers include the one entitled 'The Nature of Metaphysics' which explicitly formulates the approach and the view that has been implicitly used in all the other papers. It will be our purpose in this paper to show that his view suffers from the same defect which he has tried to show in others and that his practice hardly accords with his theoretic convictions.

Lazerowitz's contention has both a negative and a positive aspect. Negatively, he has tried to show that metaphysical theories are neither empirical nor a priori nor verbal nor just nonsense as supposed by many thinkers. Positively, he has argued that they are linguistic innovations, whose primary purpose is the disguised gratification of unconscious needs. Lazerowitz seems to think that his positive and negative proofs are intimately related to each other and does not consider the possibility of any other alternative being left in the field.

Lazerowitz's view of metaphysics is profoundly influenced by 'the chronic condition of endless and unresolved debates' in the field and the fact that there seems no way of resolving these disputes to the satisfaction of any of the persons concerned. The paradoxical situation that philosophers sincerely hold positions which they *know* to be false (for example, that we cannot know other minds) and that they continue to hold such positions even when they are shown the contradiction involved in such a situation, has suggested to him the parallel with the behaviour of a neurotic who continues to believe and behave in the same manner even when all objective evidence should have led him to the leave

and alter them. With full consciousness, therefore, he has taken the help of psychoanalysis in understanding the matter and has argued that in metaphysics 'our intelligence has discovered an ingenious way of putting language into the service of emotional needs, and at the same time keeps its discovery a secret from itself' (p. 79). He is aware that the statements of any person may have private meanings for his unconscious, but the difference with the metaphysician's statements lies in the fact that it is their sole function. He writes: 'Unlike the physicist who reports and explains physical phenomena, but whose statements may also have private meanings for his unconscious, the metaphysician can with hardly any exaggeration be said to use his statement solely to express unconscious material. It can almost without exaggeration be said that *his statement* expresses nothing over and above, nothing in addition to, the unconscious material it denotes' (p. 78, italics author's). The slightly hesitant phraseology is only, so to say, a manner of speaking. The author's italics clearly reveal that he has no doubt about the matter. In fact, metaphysics is nothing but a dream with language and the metaphysician nothing but 'a verbal magician who is taken in by his own tricks' (p. 79). He writes: 'Like a dream, a metaphysical theory is a production of the unconscious'. 'A metaphysical theory...is a verbal dream, the linguistic substructure of which has to be uncovered before we can see what it comes to and how it produces its effect' (p. 26). 'Indeed...the metaphysician may be said to dream with words' (p. 149).

Now it would be interesting to ask if Lazerowitz's theory about metaphysical statements is empirical, a priori or verbal in nature. Prima facie, it seems to belong to the first group. At many places, he has explicitly stated that he is proposing a hypothesis and that 'it is certainly permissible to try out still another hypothesis' (p. 149). He says that 'it is now possible to establish them or disestablish them for there does exist a science of the unconscious' (p. 69).

His theory then, is a hypothesis about the unconscious determination of the linguistic behaviour of certain persons known as philosophers. Such a hypothesis can be submitted to the usual verificational tests and be made more or less probable if no alternative hypothesis or hypotheses are as or more adequate to

account for the known facts. Lazerowitz must be aware that even in the field of neuroses, the psychoanalytic hypotheses are not the only ones that hold the field.

But if one accepts this view about the nature of the theory that Lazerowitz has formulated and turns to his book, one is amazed to find that there is hardly any evidence of empirical methodology being used throughout the book. There are no data, either statistical or clinical, on which the theory is supposed to be based. In the whole book, there are only about ten pages (69-78) where the author has tried to analyse the unconscious material behind the metaphysical statement 'Change is unreal'. This analysis, however, is not based on any case-history material that he gathered in his psychoanalytic investigations, but *only* on the linguistic statement that he has met with in the writings of some persons. He seems to believe that the statement is sufficient warrant for the analysis and that the correctness of the analysis is not to be tested by any clinical criteria, as in the case of psychoanalysis, but is inherent in itself and can be intuited by anybody for whom it 'clicks' as it has done for the author. He writes: 'The hypothesis I am going to formulate...' to put the matter subjectively, has 'clicked' 'intellectually for me' (p. 58).

Now, it will be admitted, we hope, by Mr. Lazerowitz that 'clicking' is not a sufficient condition for the establishment of any empirical hypothesis, and he would be a strange scientist indeed who is quite satisfied with a hypothesis just because it has 'clicked' for him. However intuitively certain the 'clicking' may be for the investigator, he has to devise ways and means to test it further. It is also not the case that he has propounded a hypothesis which, though theoretically verifiable, is impossible of being tested in the present condition of our knowledge. The hypothesis belongs to the well-known field of psychoanalytic theories and, whatever may be the limitations of the verificational methodology in that field, there certainly is a methodology to test the various hypotheses put forward in that field. It is inconceivable that Lazerowitz does not know this fact, yet it is equally strange that a serious thinker should formulate an empirical hypothesis and not try to test it.

Perhaps Lazerowitz is too lazy to test his hypotheses. He is the theoretician who suggests hypotheses which seem probable to him

and which are to be tested by those who work in the applied field. If this is true, then his behaviour is puzzling in the extreme. A theoretical hypothesis about a particular type of phenomena should be communicated to those who are working in the field. But Lazerowitz has not communicated his hypothesis to any psychoanalytical journal where it might draw the attention of some practising psychoanalysts who may test it in their clinics. In fact, he seems to be suffering from what he himself has characterized as Moore's paradox. From 1939 to 1952, he has been contributing a number of articles to various philosophical journals including *Mind*, *Analysis* and *The Philosophical Review* in the hope of convincing philosophers of their mistakes. Even in the new volume, he has included two new papers on 'Appearance and Reality' and 'Logical Necessity', hoping to convince the philosophers of the disguised wish-fulfilment nature of their theories. But it is incredible that he should not know that if his hypothesis about metaphysical statements is correct, the philosophers could never be convinced by the type of arguments he has been giving to convert them to his position. And if a philosopher does really get converted after reading any of Lazerowitz's papers he obviously could not have been holding his position for *solely* unconscious reasons. Rather, it must have been the confusions in his thinking which had led him to that position and now that those confusions had been clarified by Lazerowitz, there seemed no reason to hold it.

Lazerowitz has continuously used behaviour as a test of, or rather as identical with, knowing in the course of his arguments. If we apply this criterion to his behaviour, he should be taken to *know* that his theory is *false* and yet to persist in holding that it is *true*. For otherwise, he would have left philosophers long back and started as a practising psychoanalyst to cure the philosophers of their metaphysical wish-fulfilments. The only trouble would have been that he would have hardly received any patient, for no philosopher is yet known to have gone to a psychoanalyst for his metaphysical troubles. The difficulty could have been avoided, particularly in these days of socialism, by asking the state to legislate for the avoidance of the huge national waste involved in so much of national intellectual capital being invested in unfruitful channels. An agitation for a compulsory psychoanalysis of the philo-

sophers should have been launched long ago so that they could be freed from their obsessive verbal dreams and helped towards a better use of their intellectual abilities. Simultaneously with this there should have been a demand for the abolition of the teaching of philosophy in the universities. But, as far as we know, Lazerowitz has done nothing of the sort. Nor does it seem that he intends to do anything of the kind.

It may seem scandalous to urge such considerations against a theoretical position so subtly argued by a philosopher. But we wish to urge with the utmost seriousness that such behavioural consequences are implicit in the view of metaphysics held by Lazerowitz and certain other thinkers. If they feel uncomfortable about the consequences, they should reconsider the view that they have come to hold because of certain reasons.

But perhaps we have been mistaken about the empirical character of Lazerowitz's view about the nature of metaphysics. Perhaps, his theory has an *a priori* character and, therefore, stands in no need of verification through experience. He writes, for example, about 'clicking' and thinks that nothing further can be done about it. Either it 'clicks' for a person or does not 'click' and 'the fact that others do not see shows no more than that they do not see' (p. 58). This 'seeing', however, cannot be any physical 'seeing', even though the example he gives is of that nature. He writes: 'I mean something like this; you look at a drawing in which there are hidden animals sketched into trees, bushes, the ripples in a brook, the contours of a hill, and so on, and suddenly you *see* them. That is all there is to it' (p. 58, italics author's). But obviously he could not mean that there is an analogous physical seeing of geometrically patterned physical objects in the case of his theory about metaphysics. The 'seeing' could only mean metaphorically the type of 'seeing' by which we see the truth of a statement such as ' $2+3=5$ '. But such a truth is of an *a priori* kind and, thus, there may be some justification for the possibility that his theory about the nature of metaphysics is *a priori* in character.

But, according to Lazerowitz, 'If the theories are about phenomena they cannot be *a priori*, nor have *a priori* demonstrations' (p. 44), and yet his theory is about the nature of metaphysical statements and the behaviour of philosophers with respect to

them, the latter of which is certainly a phenomenon in his sense of the word. According to him, the logically necessary is that the opposite of which is inconceivable, but surely we can imagine what it would be for his theory to be false. It is not the case that the statement 'Metaphysical statements do not *solely* express unconscious material' does not, or rather cannot, have descriptive use.

According to his own views of the nature of a priori statements, therefore, his theory about the nature of metaphysics cannot be a priori in character, even though the method of his argument and the insistence on 'clicking' may lead us to think otherwise.

If Lazerowitz's theory about the nature of metaphysics is neither empirical nor a priori in nature, does it then 'in a concealed form, make factual claims with regard to established linguistic usage'? Both the term 'metaphysics' and the term 'dream' have a fairly determinate usage in the English language, but, as far as I am aware, the term 'metaphysical dream' has only a metaphorical, but not any literal, sense. It will be a strange 'dream' indeed which occurred only to a few persons and to them only when they were awake and in full control of their reasoning powers and lasted during the whole of their lives and involved a continuous debate with other persons through which it became modified. We have certainly heard such statements as 'Our life is nothing but a long dream out of which we awake when we die', but it was a poet's use and we were not expected to take it literally. Lazerowitz, however, expects us to take him literally, or does he not?

Perhaps he is merely giving us an analogy. He only wants to draw our attention to certain similarities between a dream and a metaphysical theory. Both are products of the unconscious and their function is the same in both the cases, viz. disguised wish-fulfilment. He writes, for example, that the philosophical statement 'is, so to speak, an exotic plant and requires a *special atmosphere* in which to live and flourish. In this respect it is like a dream, which requires *special* conditions, e.g. a temporarily weakened sense of reality, in order to play its role effectively in the mind of the dreamer. The great importance of the utterance to the philosopher makes it safe to compare it with a dream in still another respect: like a dream it is fundamentally a wish-

fulfilment which can make its appearance against resistances only by presenting itself in a disguised form' (p. 227, italics mine).

It would be interesting to ask Lazerowitz as to the 'special atmosphere' and the 'special conditions' under which alone a philosophical statement can be made. Is a philosopher suffering from a 'temporarily weakened sense of reality' when he writes or thinks or engages in a serious discussion with other thinkers on the subject? Of course, his mind, for the moment, is concerned only with his subject and not with the hundred and one other problems that exist in the world. But that is the situation of every scientist, artist or man of action when engaged on his particular problem. Does he then talk irrelevantly about his subject or does his mind wander aimlessly without coming to the point? Or, does he lose his capacity to disengage himself from his subject and respond relevantly to other problems when they press for his attention?

It will be difficult to answer these questions in the affirmative. Lazerowitz himself is aware that the philosopher behaves quite normally in the ordinary day-to-day behaviour of life. Not merely this, he would perhaps concede that a philosopher may think relevantly in the various physical, social and mathematical sciences also. But, does he then think irrelevantly only when he is concerned with his own subject matter? This is not very likely, and there are always others in the field to point out if ever there is such a case. The 'atmosphere' in which a philosopher works is in no way different from that required by any other theoretical thinker. Obviously, the house must not be on fire and he must not be suffering from excruciating pangs of hunger or pain, but these and 'conditions' like these are required for any activity that transcends the biological level. The philosophical activity does not presuppose any lessening of vital energy or the cessation of higher brain functions which are generally supposed to be the necessary conditions for any weakening of one's sense of reality.

It is impossible to think that Lazerowitz does not know of these things. Ordinarily, he would, we hope, never say of a man who was seriously arguing with him that he was 'dreaming' or suffering from 'a weakened sense of reality' or from 'neurosis'. But when he writes a whole book seriously maintaining that it is so, we can only suspect that he is using the words in a different

sense. That a philosopher's chief method of proving his proposition consists in 'disguised linguistic innovation', is the contention of Morris Lazerowitz in his book. Whether true or not of other theories, it seems a peculiarly apt description of his own practice. The use of the terms 'dream', 'weakened sense of reality' and 'neurosis' are not meant to be descriptive at all, though the author continues to use them as if they were so. The startling effect of his book, however, relies on this very deception and both the author and the reader are mostly unaware as to how it is being produced. But, as he himself has written: 'One cannot refute, nor for that matter establish by proof, a language innovation. One can only like it or dislike it. It can attract or repel, become popular, lose its popularity, be forgotten, be revived, be forgotten again and revived again. But it cannot be refuted or established, be *proved* false or *proved* true' (p. 64, italics author's).

Though incapable of being proved true or false, the linguistic innovation is supposed to satisfy deep emotional needs and it is because of this reason that Lazerowitz contends: 'At a deeper, psychological level our emotional needs blind us to what is being done with language' (p. 66). It should be important, therefore, to inquire about the 'emotional needs' that lie unconscious behind the linguistic innovations of Lazerowitz. As he himself has written: 'What he (i.e. the philosopher) is actually doing is introducing a linguistic innovation the contemplation of which gives him and others pleasure. We can be sure that he gratifies himself unconsciously with his sentence, that it works in behalf of unconscious needs' (pp. 67-68).

The 'unconscious emotional needs' behind Lazerowitz's linguistic innovations are not difficult to find. He wants to be in the line of Copernicus, Darwin and Freud, each of whom is supposed to have given an increasing blow to man's self-love and self-pride. He writes: 'In a famous passage Freud describes three great 'outrages upon its naive self-love' which cultured mankind has had to endure in the last few hundred years. And if the present hypothesis is correct in its general outline, a special group of intellectuals must endure still a further blow to their ego: it exposes these intellectuals, who have prided themselves on being impersonal seekers after truth, as the dupes of games they unconsciously play with language'' (p. 226).

One can almost feel Lazerowitz relishing the blow that he has so deftly given against the 'impersonal seekers after truth'. The gods have fallen from the pedestal and one can revel in the destruction all round. One can, if one so likes, 'discover' other motivations and needs behind this which has so obviously been admitted by the author himself. The game is easy and can be played against anybody if one so desires. But has Lazerowitz ever stopped to ask himself if there is any such thing as 'impersonal seeking after truth'? If there is no such thing, his charge against the philosopher is superfluous. If, on the other hand, he admits that there is such a thing, he should have given the relevant criteria and shown how the philosopher fails to fulfil them. The 'impersonality' is a characteristic of the 'seeking' and not of the particular subject matter with which the 'seeking' is concerned with. Lazerowitz will have to tell us in what way the 'seeking' of the philosopher is so different that it cannot, even possibly, be impersonal.

Lazerowitz's theory about the nature of metaphysics has, thus, a three-layer structure. At the conscious level of our minds, it causes 'the erroneous idea that it states the existence or non-existence of a phenomenon or that the phenomenon has or lacks a certain property'. This erroneous idea 'is itself a pre-conscious re-edition of a familiar term and expresses one or more unconsciously held beliefs, the purpose of which is to satisfy a repressed longing or to ward off a repressed fear' (p. 67).

I do not know if Lazerowitz will welcome this analysis of his theory about the nature of metaphysics. In a sense, he should—for there is no better proof of the validity of a theory than that it applies to itself. His is a philosophical theory about the nature of metaphysics and, thus, it should itself be of the nature which it alleges all philosophical theories to have¹. I suspect, however, that he would not welcome the analysis that I have tried to

1. Lazerowitz has not drawn any relevant distinctions between 'metaphysics' and 'philosophy'. In fact, his theory about the nature of metaphysics is a theory about all philosophical statements and has, in this paper, been treated as such. Any attempt at a distinction will have to find cognitive meaning for a proposition which is neither empirical nor a priori nor verbal in character. He is precluded by his analysis from entertaining any such notion as this.

give in these pages for the simple reason that, if correct, it will deprive his theory of any truth function. He is almost certain to feel the utter irrelevance of our analysis to his theory and be irritated at our crude mimicry of his subtle and acute argument. Such a feeling will, I hope, be all to the good since it might make him understand others' identical feeling with respect to his work. It should be noted that the theory of types can be of no help in the matter, as we are not alleging that the theory does not apply to itself, but only that it does.

If, however, Lazerowitz reflects ever so slightly on his dissatisfaction, he would discover the reasons for others' dissatisfaction with him. He has tried to convince us by certain *arguments* and instead of showing what is wrong with the arguments, we have started analysing their *nature* and the *psychological motivations* lying behind them. This may be interesting, but it is bound to seem irrelevant to the author of the argument. I should confess that I myself am not highly impressed by such sort of refutations, but if I have taken the trouble to play the game with Lazerowitz's work, it is only that he may come to share my dissatisfaction with the type of argument he so often employs against other thinkers' work.

II. Moral Philosophy

THE NATURE OF VALUE
JUDGEMENTS

A value judgement is the assertion or denial of a value predicate of some object or state of affairs. It is not the task of this paper to elucidate the nature of value predicates. Rather, it is only concerned with pointing out an implicit characteristic of value judgements which explains, to a certain extent, the general feeling that a value predicate cannot be reduced without a residuum to some other term or terms describing empirical or non-empirical objects or situations. Such a feeling was voiced powerfully by Moore in his *Principia Ethica*. Since then, many different reasons have been offered for the position. The contentions of this paper may possibly prove slightly more adequate for the purpose, though their interest is hardly exhausted by that context alone.

It is not always that we feel a value judgement to be incapable of being *fully*¹ translated in terms of another judgement which does not contain any term denoting value. Most people will agree that, in certain circumstances, the statement 'I like coffee' is a valid translation of the statement 'coffee is good'. Why, then, do we not feel the same way about other translations of statements in which value terms occur? There certainly are value statements which many would accept as 'persuasive definitions' or as 'covert imperatives' or as ordinary 'declaratives' denoting desire or approval, or even just as 'interjectory exclamations' expressing emotion. But it is equally true that most persons would find some occasion when they would refuse to accept such a translation as conveying *completely* what they

1. We are obviously ignoring the complex problems recently raised about 'synonymity'. If no two expressions can be synonymous, the problem is irrelevant for our purpose. On the other hand, if they can sometimes be synonymous, it is equally irrelevant for our purpose, since it is our contention that in such cases we generally grant identity of meaning.

wanted to convey. Such are the occasions when a value judgement may be said to be made *seriously*. The 'seriousness' does not denote any psychological fact. It is, in fact, merely another name for the situation in which we refuse to accept any non-valuational translation as adequate for a value judgement.

The fact has, of course, been noted by many ethical thinkers. But few have attempted to understand what exactly is involved in such a refusal. The very attempt would seem inadmissible to many who have subscribed to the 'indefinability doctrine' of Moore and others. Those, however, who urge that an adequate translation is possible insistently demand a differential characteristic which may show the value judgement to be irreducible to other types of judgements.

Such a characteristic, we suggest, may be found in an implicit commitment which is involved in a value judgement when it is seriously made. The commitment is to a system of value judgements which valuationally cohere with each other. A value judgement, when seriously made, involves the commitment to modify it if shown that one holds a value judgement which is incompatible with it. The commitment is mostly implicit and, as we shall see further, it does not necessarily involve the giving up of either of the two incompatible value judgements but only the recognition that such an incompatibility should not be.

The nature of this implicit commitment may become slightly more clear if we test the proposed translation with reference to it. The use of a value judgement as a 'covert persuasive definition', for example, does not commit one not to use a different, or even opposed, definition at some other time. Similarly, a 'command' involves no commitment that a contradictory command will not be issued later on or that such a command, if issued, would prove the invalidity of the former one. The same is the case with the proposed translations in terms of 'desiring', 'feeling', 'liking' or 'willing'. None of these commits the speaker to any system of coherent 'desires', 'feelings', 'likings' or 'willingings' and one does not feel unjustified if one switches over to a different set of them.

Such is certainly not the situation with respect to a value judgement which is seriously made. One does feel called upon to account for or modify a contradiction if one's attention gets

called to it in any way. A value judgement is thus supposed to involve a coherent system of value judgements in whose context alone it is supposed to acquire validity. The parallel with a statement in the logico-mathematical or the empirical sciences may perhaps help in understanding the matter.

The statement 'Two plus two equals four' is, by itself, not much of a mathematical statement. It becomes so only when we treat it as consistently following from a set of postulates which give rise to many such statements, all of which form a coherent system together. This, of course, is only a commitment to an ideal situation which, by the very nature of the case, can never be realized. But it is only in the perspective of this commitment that the mathematical enterprise has any significance or meaning. The search for a set of postulates from which every possible mathematical statement could be deductively derived and which would not give rise to any contradictory statements within itself meets an insuperable difficulty in what is known as Gödel's theorem. Even otherwise, the extension of the field of mathematical statements would perhaps have been so continuous as to require a constant revision of the postulational set to be adequate for the derivation of the statements in the new fields. However, at least theoretically, a *final* postulational set would have been possible but for Gödel's proof that a statement can always arise in any mathematical system which is not provable within that system.

Similarly, an empirical statement such as 'The breeze is blowing' has, by itself, nothing scientific about it. Scientific enterprise starts with the attempt to see the fact denoted by such a statement as related to other facts denoted by other statements. The commitment ultimately is to a completely coherent system of all empirical statements, from any of which, with the help of generalized principles, others may be reached. Such an ideal, of course, is intrinsically impossible of achievement. Empirical facts are not something finished and final in their nature. They do not merely change, but change their ways of behaviour as well. The relative autonomy of empirical systems and the probabilistic interactions between different such systems tend in the same direction as well. But, however impossible of achievement the

ideal may be, it alone provides direction and meaning to the scientific activity of man.

The search for coherence that sustains the scientific activity is, it should be noted, empirical and not logical in nature. The coherence that is sought is not deductive in character. The very meaning of empirical concepts is determined not so much by definition as by the behaviour of the objects to which they refer. It is because of this that there is always an element of indeterminacy in them. There are always marginal cases where it is difficult to know if the concept applies or not. It is the requirements of 'application' and 'verification' that distinguish empirical concepts and judgements from other types of concepts and judgements. It may be difficult to elucidate completely the nature of this difference; but that there is such a difference can hardly be doubted.²

Parallel with the seeking for logical and empirical coherence in the logico-mathematical and the empirical sciences, there is, we suggest, the search for value-coherence in the axiological sciences. The commitment to a system of axiologically coherent value judgements is, of course, only an ideal one. But it is in the perspective of that ideal commitment alone that the valuational seeking of man makes sense. We start with immediate value judgements and gradually find that they conflict with each other. Many times the conflict is a situational one in the sense that it is only because of the nature of the physical or social reality that the two values cannot be realized together. Sometimes, however, the conflict is between the values themselves and it is then that we feel that the conflict 'should not be'. The discovery of a new value may modify our attitude to other values. Others, which one regarded as absolute, may come to be seen as having only a limited and relative validity. There is always the search for general value principles from which particular value judgements

2. Many people think that the Law of Contradiction is the sufficient ground for coherence both in the logico-mathematical and the empirical sciences. The confusions involved in this view have been exposed, at some length, in my paper "Law of Contradiction and Empirical Reality", in *Mind*, April, 1957. But this does not mean that there is no principle of coherence involved in the empirical sciences. The nature of this principle, however, has been elucidated neither there nor here.

may be deduced in the context of given specific situations. But the value principles themselves are tested and modified on the basis of our immediate value judgements. The interplay between the general and the particular provides, as in other sciences, the dynamics for the continuous movement in the value sciences.

The coherence to which we feel committed in making a value judgement is, it should be remembered, only a value coherence. It is neither empirical coherence, which we meet in the empirical sciences, nor formal coherence, which we meet in the logico-mathematical sciences. If, for example, two statements are empirically coherent, it does not follow that they are valuationally coherent also. Valuational coherence, in other words, cannot be deduced from empirical coherence. Many thinkers who have tried to reduce value judgements to judgements of empirical facts have failed to see this point. It is generally admitted today, though many thinkers in the past seem apparently to have thought otherwise, that statements which are logically coherent may not be empirically so. The establishment of empirical coherence is something over and above the establishment of mere logical coherence between any two statements. The same is, however, not so widely accepted about valuational coherence, mostly because not much attention seems to have been paid to it.

It may be difficult to articulate explicitly the nature of value coherence. The difficulty derives perhaps mainly from the fact that we tend to think of coherence in logical terms alone. The tendency, however natural it may be, is shown to be misguided by the fact that empirical coherence cannot be derived from logical coherence, nor valuational coherence from the empirical one. The independence of these coherences is perhaps the most powerful argument for the irreducibility of these realms to each other.

It may be interesting here, however, to ask about the relations of these coherences in reverse. Can we legitimately infer from two statements which are empirically coherent the further fact that they are logically coherent also? Similarly, from two valuationally coherent statements, can a valid inference about their being empirically coherent be made? In other words, does valuational coherence imply empirical coherence and empirical coherence the logical one?

In a sense, it seems that it must be so. The transformation equations of logical constants and the logic of quantified propositions must be observed, whatever be the values of the variables in the relevant propositions. The purely syntactical rules of formal logic cannot but be observed in the relations between different propositions. But the use of the *relevant* syntactical form is itself significantly determined by the empirical relations holding between the empirical variables themselves. Logic never asks if the initial proposition or set of propositions is true or not. But the empirical sciences cannot even start without asking this question. The adequacy of the initial proposition can, however, be determined only by considering the actual relations obtaining between the empirical values of the variables concerned. The further deduction again depends more on the observed behaviour of the objects concerned than on the syntactical relations of the logical constants used in the propositions. Even such basic laws as the law of contradiction or the law of excluded middle are difficult to apply when the variables are given empirical values. The elaboration of three-valued and multi-valued logics is standing evidence of the fact that when logical structure does not accord with the structure of facts, we are prepared to revise the former in terms of the latter. This, of course, does not mean that there was anything *logically* wrong with the previous structure, but only that it lacked fruitfulness in dealing with empirical reality.

However it be, the answer to the question 'does empirical coherence imply logical coherence?' seems possible without deciding the general issue about the relations between logic and empirical reality. Logical coherence means deducibility either from a common set of axioms or from each other. In this sense, empirical coherence cannot be said to imply logical coherence, for it is always possible that two statements which are empirically coherent may not be deducible from each other or even from some common set of axioms. In fact, they rarely would be.

The question whether valuational coherence implies empirical coherence can more easily be answered in the negative. Otherwise, the concepts of 'aesthetic coherence' and 'imaginational reality' would never have arisen and most of fiction, drama, and poetry would have been out of bounds for the concept of value.

Even the empirical improbability of two values being realized together does not make the valuational judgement 'they are coherent' or that 'they ought to have been realizable together' meaningless. The empirical coherence thus cannot be deduced from valuational coherence even though it may be a necessary pre-condition for the *realization* of those values.

The independence of these different types of 'coherence' reflects the independence of these realms of study. In each realm, the presupposition of the cognitive enterprise is commitment to the relevant type of 'coherence' in the context of which alone the enterprise becomes meaningful. The search for an 'overarching coherence' between these different realms is the leitmotiv of much philosophical thinking. The unity is sought in terms either of logic or fact or value. The search for some self-evident indubitable premise from which everything could be deduced with a logical or dialectical necessity points to the first as the ultimate source of coherence for these thinkers. At the other extreme are the philosophers who seek a teleological unity in terms of some 'Idea of Good', 'Perfection' or 'God's Will'. In between, we have the seekers of causal unity for whom both logic and values are as much empirical facts as any other.

However, the idea of an 'overarching coherence', though a natural generalization from other types of 'coherence', does not appear to be a valid one. This may seem surprising in view of our contention that the other types of coherence too are not intrinsically realizable in their nature, and function merely as ideal commitments in terms of which our cognitive activity makes sense. Similarly, it may be argued, that the 'overarching coherence' is merely an ideal commitment which, even if intrinsically unrealizable, gives sense and direction to our philosophical quest. This would have had some meaning if philosophers were seeking a 'coherence' in terms of something other than logic, fact, or value. As, however, the prototype of their coherence is always taken from one of these fields, there is no *new* type of 'coherence' which is *specifically* relevant to their field. The 'overarching coherence', in fact, is no new coherence but merely a reduction of other types to the one which the philosopher happens to prefer.

The impossibility of such reduction has been seen by most thinkers these days in the case of empirical judgements. They are

all agreed that these can, in no sense, be just reduced to logical statements. But the same thinkers have not yet despaired of the attempt to reduce judgements of value to judgements of matters of fact. Every age seems to have its preferential idea of reality, and the modern one seems to find it in 'the sensum of red' rather than in some self-evident axiom in which everything is involved.

A value judgement, when seriously made, thus involves a commitment to an axiologically coherent system of value judgements. This commitment is mostly implicit and reveals itself in our refusal to accept its translation in non-valuational terms. In its nature, the commitment is only an ideal one—intrinsically unrealizable and yet necessary to give sense and direction to our explorations in this realm. It shares this quality of commitment with logic and mathematics on the one hand and the empirical sciences on the other. The nature of the commitment is also the same. The differences lie in the nature of that to which the commitment is made. The 'coherence' to which commitment is made in the logico-mathematical, the empirical and the valuational sciences is not the same but rather different in each case. The difference is demonstrated by the *impossibility* of deducing any one type of coherence from any other type. The search for an 'overarching coherence' is mistaken in its nature as it does not seek any *new* type of coherence and ignores the radical independence of the three types proved by the impossibility of their deduction from each other. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of new types which may be discovered later on or sub-types which may have important relevant differences between themselves.

2

VALUE AND REALITY

The relation between Value and Reality may be regarded as crucial to a large part of what goes by the name of philosophical thinking in the major intellectual traditions of the world. Both terms designate a set of experienced facts which can be ostensibly pointed out and from which and within which they may be said to find their meaning. The term 'real' arises only because we find ourselves in situations where we find that things are not as we had taken them to be and that this discrepancy matters to us in some way or other. It is then that the distinction between the real and the unreal arises and we tend to feel that we should get away from that which is unreal and seek or find the real alone. In fact, the distinction between *real* and *unreal*, drawn in whatever terms, usually involves the imperative that one ought to seek the one and avoid the other. The linkage with value at this point seems obvious.

The *unreal*, however, is not just non-existent and thus has to be ascribed some sort of reality. This, in various ways, is the central headache of all metaphysics, and its intellectual insolubility is designated by the term *māyā* in Indian thought. However, whatever may be the being of the unreal, or whatever the ontological status we ascribe to it, it is usually considered as less valuational or even positively disvaluational in comparison with that which is regarded as real.

The ideas of value and reality are thus closely associated. But if the association is attested to by experience, so is their dissociation in other contexts. First, the idea of value arises vividly in most cases when we become aware of a discrepancy between things as they are, or at least as they appear to be, and the way we feel they ought to be, or ought to appear to be. The distinction here is not between things as they are and as they appear to be i.e., between the real and the unreal, but between the real and the ideal, i.e., between things as they are and things as they ought to be.

There is, thus, a two-fold distinction operating at different

levels—the first between the real and the unreal, and the second between the real and the ideal. However, just as there appears an apparently insoluble problem concerning the ontological status of the unreal, which though unreal has still to be granted some sort of reality, so there appears an analogous problem concerning the real and the ideal. For, the distinction between the two, though vital to the very understanding of the two notions themselves, has also to be denied in some sense as values have to be given some sort of a reality also. The trouble in both the cases seems to arise because of the compelling yet divergent reasons which lead us alternatively, or even simultaneously, to the enlargement and restriction of the concept of reality itself.

Everyone knows the history of Occam's razor and Plato's beard, but none seems to have thought of the reasons why the history is not past and over but goes on and on, ever anew. The impulse to widen the realm of the real beyond that which is veridically perceived to exist springs from diverse sources, and for various reasons. The very distinction between veridical and non-veridical, or rather the very attempt to understand them, introduces factors which go beyond all that is perceived to exist. The enterprise of understanding and the enterprise of action both lead men to stretch and widen the realm of the real beyond the existent, since if that were not done the enterprises themselves would become impossible.

The postulation of the reality of values arises from the enterprise of human action, which seeks at a self-conscious reflective level ideals which perpetually question that which is present. The dilemma which the postulation faces is the simultaneous ascription of reality and unreality to the value which exercises such a continuing formative influence on action and yet exercises this just because it is not actual. The question whether a value when actualized is actual is equally difficult to answer either way. In an obvious sense, if it is really actualized, it should be called 'actual'—for, what else could the term 'actualization' mean? Still, it is equally clear that what actually exists is the things or the events or the states of affairs and not the value in any residual sense of the term. Also, nothing seems to be added to the *valueness* of the value by the fact that it exists also—whatever may be meant by the term 'exists' when applied to value.

It has been argued that 'existence' is not a predicate and that, in a deep fundamental sense, nothing is added to the essence of a thing or event or state of affairs by the fact that it also *exists* or *obtains* or *occurs*. The values, on this argument, would lose their unique status and share the fate common to all essences in their relation to *existence*. But this is to forget not only that we know the *what* of an *existent* only if it exists, but also that the *existent* is intrinsically inexhaustible by our knowledge of it. The point that we wish to assert is that the essence of reality is its capacity to trip us and surprise us and thus prove its reality as essentially independent of us. Not only has that which is real the capacity to show all our knowledge to be incomplete but also inadequate and wrong. These two features are ineradicable from the knowledge of any reality, and thus if someone claims that *existence* does not make any relevant difference to our knowledge of that object, he is merely asserting that the objective reality is not *existential* in nature. For, if its reality were existential in nature, existence would be its essence and, thus, not only would it be impossible for it to be known if it were not existing but also its existence alone would confer on it that perennial source of independence which is the ground for the incompleteness and inadequacy of all knowledge about itself.

In fact, the impulse to the postulation of entities that are essentially non-existent derives ultimately from the situation that there are or, at least, seem to be genuine objects of knowledge to which the considerations of *existence* or *non-existence* appear completely irrelevant. This does not mean, as many have mistakenly supposed, that they are or, in principle, can be completely and adequately known. This just is *not* the case—no, not even in logic or mathematics, where the most persistent and heroic attempt was made to think and prove that it is so. It should be an interesting question to ask a particular brand of mathematicians as to why mathematics should not be completely and adequately known and thus exhausted pretty soon if what they say of their subject is really true. Even in the case of objects so obviously and so completely created by men as art objects, this holds to be true. The perennial attempt at interpretation and comprehension by successive generations of critics attests to this in a pre-eminent manner.

The irrelevance of *existence* to some sort of entities does not, thus, make them either unreal or exhaustible, whether in completeness or adequacy, by the knowledge of man. Values, though non-existent in their essence, reveal their reality by the sense of discovery and continuous corrections of faulty apprehension with respect to themselves. The fact of *faulty apprehension* and its subsequent correction, however, suggests the intrusion of the *unreal* into the realm of values also. Equally, it suggests the distinction between truth and error, which, in the first analysis, seemed to belong only to the apprehension of 'what is the case' is relevant in the case of values also. Values themselves, thus, become some sort of facts—facts of another order, another realm, but still facts all the same.

The analogy, though interesting, breaks at a crucial point and thus reveals the nature of value in almost a negative way. The dissatisfaction with any actualized value does not usually emanate from the fact that we have encountered or apprehended a value which we regard or consider as more truly or really a value than the one we actualized, more or less successfully, earlier. Rather, it is the *felt dissatisfaction* that makes us doubt the reality of the value we had actualized and, however much of a fact it may be, we wish to get rid of it, the sooner the better. In a sense, the falsity or inadequacy of a value is revealed or apprehended only when it begins to be actualized. That is one reason why so many of the ideals of man which seem so alluringly attractive when abstractly conceived turn into nightmares or, in other cases, just boring actualities when concretely realized.

The concept of *real value* or of a *value that is really such* is, thus, not the result of a direct apprehension, but merely the shadowy counterpart of the real dissatisfaction which we have with values as they are actualized. It is the dissatisfaction which makes us aware that the value which we had thought to be *real* and *genuine* is not really so. The criterion of the *reality* of a value, thus, is not its conformity with some real value in an idealsphere or even its coherence with other values in any meaningful valuational sense of the term, but rather the deep, inner fulfilment which its realization gives to the actual living human person. This, though analogous to the pragmatic criterion in the realm of truth, is essentially different in the sense that there is no external criterion of success, nor is it even possible to conceive of it in

those terms. Fulfilment, ultimately, is something purely internal, something deeply subjective—or, rather, the very being of the self itself.

The concept of *mokṣa* in Indian thought is, perhaps, an epitome of this very feeling about value—the feeling that only that can be considered truly and really a value in which man finds his lasting and abiding fulfilment. The rest is only an illusion, an appearance which promises but never fulfils itself. It is *māyā* which ever allures, yet always turns back and laughs at the one who pursues her, only to beckon promisingly once more if one tries to turn away.

Fulfilment itself, however, is something ideal, and *mokṣa*, the Indian name for that, is itself the logical limit of a conceived possibility. Many would dispute this. In fact, the religious ideal is the only one which people have claimed to realize, achieve and embody in their lives completely and absolutely. So many people have claimed, and have been claimed, to have realized *mokṣa*, though one could hardly find a single scientist or artist or moralist or lover who would consider himself, or be considered by others, to have realized the ideal he seeks to realize. Yet, though the claim has been advanced too often, it is hardly sustained by the actual life of even one single individual, as evidenced, reported, and believed in by the very disciples of these persons. It is only the blindness of the disciples which seems to sustain the truth of the claim in the face of the evidence which they themselves have piled up and which, to any external observer, belies it so completely.

Further, the *fulfilment* is not merely of one type, but rather of many types. The values that we become aware of in our life, we become aware of in different contexts, and, thus, the diverse dimensions of values merely reflect the dimensions of the life we live through. The differences in dimension or type are usually drawn in terms of the classified three-fold division of all human activities into those of knowing, feeling, and willing. The ideals of Truth, Beauty and Goodness correspond roughly to these divisions and, in fact, are encountered in those domains of human activity.

But a division of values along other lines may prove more illuminating, specially if their relation to reality is to be the centre of attention. The bifurcation of reality into the actual and the ideal

is itself a result of action at the human plane. The closure of that fissure introduced by the action of an imaginative, self-aware consciousness is achieved by a reverse movement where the action is annulled and the consciousness is lost in an enjoying contemplation of itself.

The division of the values into the active and the contemplative seems to me far more illuminating with respect to certain puzzling features of values than the usual traditional classification. Values such as love or friendship or aesthetic contemplation or appreciation of nature or mystic meditation share a common feature and direction which is radically and diametrically opposed to other values such as those of justice or goodness or knowledge. The latter lead *away* from the self to action in the external realm for the pursuit of an ideal only vaguely apprehended. The former turns the self to itself and centre it on a state of consciousness from which its desire is to never fall and remain there for ever and ever.

The distinction between active and contemplative values is a crucial one, for, if we confine our attention to the active values alone, we are led to an intrinsic dichotomy between the actual and the ideal which would appear to be essentially unbridgeable. It is only when we turn to the contemplative value that the gulf between the actual and the ideal begins to heal and we begin to be aware of a fusion of the two which is felt to be the only reality. The concept of the 'real' refers primarily to this fused sense of the actual and the valuational achieved in the transparent immediacy of consciousness. The Indian formulation of ultimate Reality as *Sat, Cit* and *Ananda* perhaps reflects this realization as it is only when the actual and the valuational are fused in consciousness that the experience of Bliss arises.

However, the fusion of the actual and the valuational is not the only fusion that occurs in the realization of contemplative values. Rather, there simultaneously occurs another fusion which is as, or even more, important than the one pointed out above. This is the fusion of the subject and the object in the contemplative act where the value is realized or, rather, realizes itself. It is, so to say, the lessening of the distance between the subject and the object which is simultaneously the occasion for the actualization of the feeling of Bliss and also the experience of reality at the same time. The 'distance', obviously, here does not mean 'physical' distance, but

rather, something psychic, something felt, something, in short, which makes the object appear indifferent, neutral, alien, or even hostile to us.

This fact of 'distance' is clearly revealed in the situations where contemplative values are sought to be realized. In fact, the non-realization of those values consists just in the fact of this 'distance' and the more it is lessened, the more the value is palpably and concretely there. Also, as the 'distance' is purely psychic in nature, its removal is like the removal of a veil which reveals something which was already there. The 'reality' that emerges into being with the abolition of the distance between the subject and the object and the fusion of the actual and the valuational in the immediacy of consciousness seems to have been eternally there, always and ever.

The abolition and the fusion are, of course, only the extrapolated limits of what we experience but only partially. Any one who has reflected on his experience of love or friendship or nature or art or God would realize the truth of this assertion. What we actually experience is not an abolition but only a lessening of the distance between the subject and the object; what is actually experienced is not a complete fusion, but only more or less of it. However, a 'more or less' inevitably suggests the most, the limit of direction without which the direction itself loses all meaning. The Indian thinker, of course, has not treated it in this way. Instead of treating it as the extrapolated limit of a direction which he happens to meet with in experience to some extent, he has regarded it, or at least presented it, as an actual, realized fact of human experience. The experience, of course, is that of a perfected human being. But the trouble obviously is that these perfected beings are themselves treated as existing instead of being seen merely as the extrapolated limit of the distinction between 'good' men and 'better' men that we so easily encounter in our experience.

In a sense, then, the contemplative ideals are as much ideals as the ones deriving from the active values. If justice or moral goodness or scientific truth is intrinsically unattainable in its complete ideality, so is friendship or love or aesthetic absorption or rapport with Nature or mystic contemplation. The latter are as unattainable as the former—or, if they are attained to some degree, so are the former also.

Yet, this similarity between the two should not make us forget the deep difference between them which I was trying to point out before. The realization of the former does not seem to close the hiatus between the actual and the ideal, as that of the contemplative values seems to do, even when they are attained only to a little extent. The reason for this seems to lie in the fact that the closing of the hiatus happens here in the *felt immediacy* of consciousness. In the case of the active values, even when the hiatus is closed, it is always, so to say, closed in the world outside. It is closed or lessened in the realm of the object alone, yet as far as the hiatus between the object and the subject is concerned, it is not healed at all. That is why even in such seekings as those for knowledge, the subjective situation of man seems to remain the same even when, objectively, knowledge really increases. It is because the distance between the subject and the object is lessened along with the distance between actuality and value in the realization of contemplative values that the fissure seems to be completely healed and we say that reality and value are identical in being and essence. This is not merely said but felt and realized in the immediately felt reality of consciousness than which there can be nothing more real to the apprehending awareness.

For the active values, on the other hand, the distinction between actuality and value will always remain and the tension between the two will be the heart of reality and the essence of time. This, of course, will be the situation at the deepest level. At the more superficial level, the reality will be seen as fact or value-neutral and values treated as subjective and unreal.

Time and tension are overcome or abolished only in the realization of contemplative values. Individuals and cultures may be characterized by their prominent pursuit of the one or the other. The reality of time and tension will, then, be a function of the values predominantly pursued and the sense of reality itself be different for those who pursue the one or the other.

The difference between the different contemplative values are themselves of enormous significance, but in relation to the problem of 'Value and Reality', I think they are of lesser relevance than the basic distinction I have tried to focus attention upon in this paper.

3

AN ATTEMPT TOWARDS A THEORY
OF ETHICS

Man's persistent theoretic attempt to formulate the 'significant what' of his life has resulted in what we generally know as the 'theories of ethics'. Whatever the specific 'what' that a particular theory has found to be of ultimate significance, there can be little doubt that those have been the elements that have provided 'significance' to the lives of most, if not all, persons. Pleasure, Happiness, Duty, Perfection—have not these been the things that have provided 'significance' to the lives of all who have lived?

The word 'significance' has been used, advisedly, in place of the usual term 'value'. It is not suggested that the term 'value' has no use for ethical discussion or that men do not seek value. The word 'significance' seeks to convey the fact that what men seek is 'significant living', i.e., a life in which there occur, to a great extent, experiences which are felt to be of utmost significance and importance. That such experiences occur in the life of most persons is a fact. It is equally a fact that they want an increasing rate of frequency for such experiences. The search for values, therefore, is primarily a search for 'significance' and only secondarily a search for the specific 'this' or 'that' of values. Values, thus, seem to have a nuance, a core which, perhaps, is best expressed by the word 'significance'.

The realization of 'significance' however, may only be achieved within the human situation and its structure, therefore, would provide the framework within which that realization would be possible. The human situation, however, does not merely have a structure but also a dimension. The 'lines' of realization, therefore, would not merely be horizontal but also vertical in different dimensions.

The different dimensions of the human situation have been named differently by different thinkers. But there is a common core to which they all seem to point and which may, perhaps,

best be described as the 'immanent-transcendent' aspect of the human situation. F.S.C. Northrop has distinguished between the 'intuitional' and the 'postulational' aspects, while Whitehead has talked of the 'mode of presentational immediacy' and 'the mode of causal efficacy'. The two divisions have, certainly, important differences between them. The mode of causal efficacy, for example, is more primary to Whitehead than the mode of presentational immediacy. Such is not the case with the 'postulational aspect' of Northrop's designation. If anything, the two are at par or if some aspect is to be regarded as more primary and fundamental, then it certainly is the 'intuitional' and not the 'postulational' aspect for Northrop. Further, the mode of causal efficacy is, in a sense, a matter of immediate experience to Whitehead which the 'postulational' aspect is certainly not for Northrop.

The reference to the alternative modes of formulation of Whitehead and Northrop has been made to dispel the overtones of mystery surrounding the word 'transcendent'. The 'transcendent' merely is another name for the fact of self-consciousness in man which itself is an inevitable concomitant of imagination and ideation. The consciousness of the 'Beyond'—the penumbral fringe surrounding the focal immediacy of the present—is, however, not a consciousness of any specific 'this' or 'that', but only of a vague indeterminate generality. The term 'transcendent', therefore, does not refer to any determinate 'this' or 'that', but to a general pole of all experience which is as much a fact of immediate apprehension as the specific, concrete, determinate pole is.

The persistent attempt of man to determine the nature of this indeterminate pole in religion, philosophy, and science has, however, given rise to what Northrop has called the 'postulational' aspect of reality. The 'postulational' aspect is ineradicable from experience as even on the level of ordinary perception it is inevitably involved. But unlike the 'immediately-apprehended' aspect or, in Russell's terminology, the so-called 'hard facts' of experience, postulational systems may change and there may even be alternative postulational systems competing in the field for acceptance. Postulation, however, may operate both with respect to the immediately apprehended particulars of specific sense

data and to the equally immediately apprehended indeterminate generality of what Northrop has called 'the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum'.

The human situation in which 'significance' has to be realized can, therefore, be divided from two angles, the immanent-transcendent and the intuitive-postulational. These two divisions cross each other and, thus, we get the human situation structured into four different aspects—the immanent-intuitive, the immanent-postulational, the transcendent-intuitive and the transcendent-postulational. The intuitive or the immediately apprehended aspect, whether in its immanent or transcendent context, provides the unchanging background of human experience. The 'green' that we immediately apprehend and the 'green' that our ancestors apprehended a few hundred thousand years ago, is the same, though our postulational knowledge about what the 'green' really consists of is entirely different. Of course, the intuitive aspect permits of an increasing articulation, but what is articulated was already there as immediately apprehended and the articulation merely brings to the attention of others what they apprehended but not apprehended or paid attention to.

The increasing articulation of the immediately apprehended and the conceptually postulated gives rise to another world, the world of communication. Midway between these, there arises the distinctively human world, the world of imagination, which alone is a specific human creation. Man, here, neither immediately apprehends nor conceptually postulates in order to explain or understand the immediately apprehended, but creates a world of fancy and imagination which seems to him to have a significance of its own.

In its intuitive aspect, man's situation is intrinsically limited by the structure of his consciousness, which is inevitably egocentric and point-centric. The experiencing consciousness is inevitably one's own and equally inevitably confined to what in psychology is known as the 'specious present'. The phrase 'one's own' does not denote any metaphysically or even empirically *persistent* identity but only that the experiencing consciousness has a locus and that what it experiences is always epistemologically an 'object' to it. In short, it merely states the fact that another person's experience can never be my own. The point-centric

feature of the experiencing consciousness does not deny that what is experienced is always 'differentiations within a field'. It merely states that the experiencing of 'differentiations within a field' is always confined to the 'specious present'.

This, then, may be characterized as the 'Grenzsituation' of man in his 'intuitive' aspect. The phrase is that of Karl Jaspers, but the content that we intend is totally different. The necessity that 'I must die, I must suffer, I am subject to chance, I involve myself inexorably in guilt' are no necessities for the experiencing consciousness. They appear as intrinsic inevitabilities *only when we view man as an object* and even then only as a matter of inference. However inevitable the inference may seem, it should not be forgotten that it is an *inference*. The egocentric and the point-centric nature of the experiencing consciousness is, however, no inference and thus may legitimately claim the title of 'ultimate situation' which man cannot escape.

The 'Grenzsituation' of man with respect to the 'postulational' aspect is that he can never be *certain* about it. That there is such an aspect and that it is inevitably involved in all experience, is a fact. But we can never be certain about the specific 'what' of this aspect. In Whitehead's terminology, the symbolic reference from the mode of presentational immediacy to the mode of causal efficacy can always be wrong. In Northrop's terms, the empirical verification of the postulational system through deductive inference and epistemic correlation always commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent in an 'if... then' syllogism. The reasons in the two cases are completely different—in fact, even diametrically opposite, but the conclusion is the same.

The question of 'certainty' does not arise with respect to the world of Imagination. It exists in its own right as the free creation of man and does not seek anything outside itself. Even the limits of deductive or empirical coherence do not exist for this world. If anything, the need for a new type of coherence is felt with respect to this world—the aesthetic coherence. This coherence, however, is as much the creation of man as the world it is supposed to cohere and organize.

The intuitive, the postulational and the imaginal are, then the three aspects of the human situation. The 'certainty' and 'freedom' seem to be inversely correlated in this series. The 'intui-

tive' aspect seems the most indubitable and, thus, with reference to it we seem to be least free. It can only be acknowledged and not discussed or differed about. The 'postulational' aspect is never certain, but it *must*, at least, be deductively coherent and, in most cases, lead to verifiable consequences through epistemic correlation. The question of 'certainty' is unmeaning with respect to the 'imaginal' aspect. As to 'freedom', even the demand for aesthetic coherence is not necessary to this realm and the demand, even when fulfilled, is of a creative character.

Their 'importance' to signification experience, however, does not seem to be uniform. The intuitive 'aspect' provides the invariant base on which the 'significational' experience is reared. It, certainly, is not 'barren' as Whitehead seems to remark about the mode of presentational immediacy. Experience in the mode of causal efficacy would be absolutely devoid of 'significance' as it is in the case of inorganic matter. Of course, there would be no error, but also there would be no 'significance'. Significance can be achieved only on the base of 'intuitive' consciousness. The 'postulational' aspect seems mostly irrelevant to it. The 'intuitive' aspect, however, being an invariant does not provide for the change and development of the signification experience of man. This is affected most by the imaginal aspect of man's consciousness. The emergence of a feeling for aesthetic form in respect to 'imaginal contents' reacts and transforms our experience on the 'intuitive' level by giving it a shade, a nuance from the aesthetic experience itself. The poet who sings about love gives to our loves a nuance, a tone, a significance that would have been absent if we would not have heard or read the poem. Art, whether in the form of song or dance or pictorial or non-pictorial patterns, has, therefore, always existed in human life, for it alone could raise it from the merely biological to the 'significantly' human level. Religion, which has always been intimately associated with art, has been the other path to 'significance' without which man cannot feel his distinctively human character. 'Significance', therefore, can be realized on the 'intuitive' and the 'imaginal' levels only. It develops by a continuous interaction between the two.

The attempt to live and to realize 'significance' involves, however, certain 'postulational' elements on which our action is

based. It is only the pragmatic failure of our action that makes us change our 'postulational' theory, though the pragmatic success provides no logical basis for our belief in its truth. The physical pain that one feels may be conceived to have different postulational reasons for its existence. The continuous, failure or rather the increasing success of an alternative postulational theory makes people leave one in favour of the other. In certain cases, the alternative postulational systems may even persist side by side as in the case of homeopathic and allopathic systems of medicine in modern times. In any case, the 'postulational' system is not interesting for itself; it always has an intimate relation to action and is retained or given up in so far as it leads or does not lead to successful action. For causal efficacy, then, the 'postulational' knowledge is essential, though for the achievement of 'significance' it is mostly irrelevant.

The immense advance in recent centuries has been in the 'postulational' structure of our knowledge. This has resulted in a great increase in our hold on the causal efficacy of natural phenomena. An increase in causal efficacy, however, does not mean an increase in the achievement of 'significance' on the part of man. For, causal efficacy is not *directly* related either to the world of intuitive or imaginative experience. The margin of causal efficacy required for intuitive or imaginative experience is very narrow. It should merely permit one to exist or, in other words, it should allow the intuitive and the imaginative levels to emerge, exist and persist. Many of the primitive peoples have been found to enjoy a rich intuitive and imaginative life though the postulational knowledge they possess is extremely inadequate when compared to our modern standards. Its adequacy and even complete falsity at certain points does not, however, stand in the way of their survival and achievement of 'significance'. If the realization of 'significance' were to depend on the complete adequacy of our 'postulational' knowledge, it would, then, be a certain mirage, a complete impossibility—for, the postulational knowledge can, by its very nature, never be adequate and whatever is the level attained in the present it is bound to fall short, in most cases, from that which is likely to be attained in the future. If man's realization of "significance" were to be a function of the correctness of his postulational knowledge, then the task

of ethics would be an impossible one. Such, however, is not the case, for the realization of 'significance' occurs only on the intuitive and imaginative levels of consciousness.

The 'postulational' aspect, however, is necessarily involved in action, and action is an ineradicable feature of the situation of man. The awareness of the probable multi-linear effects of alternative modes of causal action does make us desist from one course of action rather than another. The probable chains of consequences are, therefore, important in our decision concerning choice among alternative modes of action within a situation. The more important function of action in the mode of causal efficacy, however, is to *give our consciousness a sense of continuity in time*—a sense which is conspicuously and almost inevitably absent from consciousness in the mode of presentational immediacy. The point-centric limitation of consciousness in its intuitive aspect makes the human situation as felt, lived and experienced, exist in an almost 'eternal present'. The prospect into the future and the retrospect from the past give it, what we may call, the 'eternity in time'.

Consciousness in its intuitive or immediate aspect, then, seems to be outside time. The passage of time is more a matter of inference than of immediate awareness. A sense of unreality pervades our experience of time. We seem to be growing old and changing—and yet we are never aware of it. It is only when we see children growing into boys and boys growing into men and men giving birth to other children or when we compare the present with the remembered past, that we feel compelled to infer that we too, after all, must have changed. Yet we feel inexorably involved in time. Like the old man in 'Sinbad the Sailor', it refuses to leave us alone. Try to achieve anything—and it stands there barring the way crying, like the eternal sentinel, 'thou shalt not bypass me'.

Time, then, is supremely real for consciousness in the mode of causal efficacy. Man, being essentially involved in action, is involved in time also. But time gains 'significance' only when ends, which can be attained only *asymptotically*, are pursued by man. It gives to his life a sense of continuity and purpose which it would otherwise lack and fall into pieces. The shackles of time, however, are not completely secure. One can always escape them

by changing into the mode of presentational immediacy. Here Time does not exist. What exists is the 'eternal present' in which we can always realize 'significance'.

'Significance', then, can be realized directly on the intuitive and the imaginative planes of man's experience. The interaction of these two planes provides the basis for the dynamic development in our experience of 'significance'. Such an experience, however, is essentially non-temporal because of the point-centric limitation of our intuitive consciousness. The *asymptotic pursuit* of an end or ends gives to our life a significance in the dimension of time. Such a pursuit involves postulational elements which need not be completely adequate or correct but, in any case, should leave some margin of pragmatic success for action based upon them.

'Significance' in relation to the transcendent pole of experience, whether in its intuitive or postulational aspects, is the other great fact of life. Such an orientation has been a perennial feature of the great world religions. Besides Art, they form, par excellence, the great signification experience of mankind. Any society or individual that denies or cuts itself off from the transcendent pole of experience merely deprives itself of one of the profoundest sources of 'significance' that is possible to man. Man is rooted in the transcendent and if he remains indifferent or develops a negative relationship to it, he is bound to feel empty and alone in this wide, wide world. The denial of the immanent aspect, however, would be equally fatal—for, it should not be forgotten that, without 'immanence' the experience of 'significance' can never arise.

It has been an unfortunate fact that prophets and thinkers have tended to place an undue emphasis on one aspect rather than another. The challenge of the present is to assert the *simultaneous* validity of both the aspects in man's thought as well as his life. The wisdom of the Ages has not become outmoded by the recent acquisitions of scientific and technological knowledge. Rather, it is eternally relevant—for, man's immanent situation does not change. Buddha, Christ and Confucius are still relevant, for there remains the fact of suffering, of love, and of life. So also exists the transcendent pole in life. One can become increasingly aware of it and love it or be overawed by it—and that is religion.

Equally, however, exists the world of colours and sounds and tastes and smells. And there remains the world of imagination where these are transmuted into a realm where beauty reigns supreme. Above these all, there is the world of interpersonal communication where flesh strains for flesh, mind for mind and soul for soul. It is easy to deny the one or the other. It is easier to assert the supremacy of one and the subordination of the other. But it is the challenge of modern times to assert *simultaneously* and with *equal* validity all the aspects and to hold them indissolubly in both life and thought. The demand may seem impossible, even contradictory—but, even if it is so, consciousness can hold and comprehend them, for that is its very function. To the *experiencing consciousness*, there are neither opposites nor contradictions. They are such only in their *determinate, objectivated* aspects. As experienced they always get a unity through the experiencing consciousness which holds them together in its comprehending awareness.

The situation of man with respect to 'significance', thus, is almost an invariant except in the 'imaginational' aspects of his existence. The 'significance', however, is like value, a bi-polar category. It has always a negative pole which may be characterized as 'dis-significance'. In all the situations, therefore, one can fail to realize significance. The realization of 'significance', however, is possible only within the structure of the human situation. An awareness of this structure would give us the limits of the possible in the realization of significance. Art, religion and contemplative enjoyment of Nature would, within the limits of ego-centric and point-centric limitations of consciousness, give to man's life a 'significance' which he can always achieve if he so desires and wills. Action in the pursuit of asymptotic ends can always give to his life a 'significant' unity in time. Interpersonal communication can crown his experience of 'significance' by an intense give-and-take where each feeds on the other and increases a thousandfold. In short, heaven and hell are not far from man and it depends, to a very great extent, on him whether he would make of his life and that of others a heaven or hell.

THE MORAL AND THE AXIOLOGICAL 'OUGHT'—AN ATTEMPT AT A DISTINCTION

It has recently been argued by Everett W. Hall in his acute study, *What is Value*, that only some such sentence as 'A ought to be B' can show the structure of value and that what it says cannot be conveyed by any corresponding declarative or imperative sentence. In this paper, however, we shall not be concerned with the general nature of 'ought' or even with the question whether it exhausts the notion of value with which it is so intimately connected, but only with the important fact that it shows deep 'typal' differences in its application to different fields.

The fields within which the 'ought' is considered to be usually applicable divides itself naturally into two parts. The one is primarily concerned with the other persons among whom one finds oneself, while the other is oriented to aspects, objects, and situations which have no direct relevance to persons other than oneself. The 'ought' that operates with respect to the former field may be designated as the moral 'ought'¹. With respect to

1. The use of the term 'moral' should not lead to any confusion. 'Moral values' are generally considered to be second-level values which are realized in the pursuit of first-level values. Thus, in a sense, the pursuit of any value may be considered to be a moral pursuit and the obligatoriness that is felt towards any value, a moral obligatoriness. However, we would have to admit a distinction among first-level values, viz., between those that arise from the existence of other persons in their specific relation to me or even from the general fact that there are persons other than myself and those that do not so arise. Even if it is true that the apprehension of all values presupposes the existence of persons other than myself and my active interrelation with them—even then we would have to distinguish between the values that are apprehended with respect to other persons and values which are not so oriented in their reference. It is this distinction among first-level values that we wish to point out and it does not matter how we choose to designate it.

the latter, it may be designated as the axiological 'ought'. It will be the purpose of this paper to show that there are some important differences between the two and that this has consequences, generally neglected, for ethical theory.

That man finds himself among others is a situational feature of his life. The situation, however, is always structured in terms of different roles which are oriented to different value-patterns. Recent studies in social anthropology and sociology have conclusively shown, especially in the recent work of Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, that the interactive behaviour of persons is always oriented to role-expectations which are defined in terms of patterned norms. The complementary expectations give rise to an 'ought' whose generalized fulfilment is the *conditio sine qua non* of the functioning and, thus, the very existence of any social system.

The obligatoriness that arises from the 'ought' in the axiological field, however, has no such complementary character. There is no correlate complementarity to the obligation that I feel with respect to, for example, 'the realization of beauty' (whatever that may mean). There is no complementary obligatoriness because there are no complementary role-expectations. The obligatoriness which is felt with respect to values that are neither primarily derived from nor oriented to other persons, thus, reveals perhaps more clearly the nature of value-obligatoriness than that which arises from the essentially interpersonal situation of man.

The moral 'ought', in fact, is contingent in a double sense. It is contingent, first, on the existence of the other person in relation to whom the 'ought' arises and, second, on his at least relative fulfilment of the complementary role-expectations without which there can be no interactive relationship between persons. To give but one example, the 'ought' that arises with respect to one's friend is not merely contingent on the friend's existence but also on his fulfilment of the relevant obligations that follow from his role as a friend. There is, of course, a varying margin within which different role-behaviours may vary but there is always some sort of a limit beyond which the complementary ought-obligatoriness is considered definitely to cease.

It may be contended that the 'oughtness' of the ought is in no way affected by this contingency. The contingency, in effect, is a

change in situation and any change in situation must affect the 'ought content' in some form or other. But, as we said at the very beginning, we do not intend to discuss the general nature of 'ought' in this paper. However, even if the contention should be correct, it does not affect what we are trying to point out. The interpersonal situation is *essentially* changing because of the possible non-existence of the person concerned or the non-fulfilment of his complementary role obligations. But such a situation does not obtain with respect to the axiological situation of man. The obligatoriness that is here felt is not contingent, at least, in the same sense, for the situation that gives rise to it does not seem to be so changing.

The types of contingency that we are trying to point out with respect to the moral 'ought' should not, however, lead us to think that what we are trying to point out is something akin to Kant's distinction between duties of perfect and imperfect obligation. Leaving aside the question whether there is any meaning in the notion of 'imperfect obligation', we should be able to see that such a distinction does not correspond to the type of the distinction that we are trying to point out. Even if such a distinction be admitted, it would cut across the distinction that we are pointing to. The obligations arising with respect to persons may be either perfect or imperfect and so also the obligations that arise with respect to what we have chosen to call the axiological situation of man. Hartmann's distinction between 'ought-to-do' and 'ought-to-be' is also not the same as this distinction—for, both the moral and the axiological 'ought' belong to the class of 'ought-to-do' rather than 'ought-to-be'.

The contingency that we noted in the case of the moral 'ought' is not so much a contingency in the nature of the 'ought' as in the object with respect to which the 'ought' arises. On the other hand, the object of the axiological 'ought' does not share such characteristics and, therefore, such an 'ought' does not possess that type of contingency.

From another point of view, however, the content of the moral 'ought' seems to be fairly specific and determinate while, in contrast to this, the content of the axiological 'ought' appears to be more general and indeterminate in character. The social patterning of norms with respect to which the

mutual interaction of persons is oriented, provides the specific determinateness without which there can be no complementary interlocking of behaviour expectations and thus, no interaction. Such a situation is not entirely absent from the field of the axiological 'ought'. The scientist, the artist, and even the mystic are not merely oriented to the patterned behaviour expectations of these roles as socialized in society but also to methodological and evaluative norms as practised and formulated within their own fields. But, in the last analysis, the obligatoriness that is felt within these fields is fundamentally to one's own vision and not to what others think or say or value. In science, the necessity of interpersonal verification imposes some limits that give an appearance to the contrary. But increasingly in the case of the artist and almost completely in the case of the mystic, the 'apparent' nature of such an appearance is revealed. The loyalty here is purely to the transpersonally prehended value and not to what others say, think, or feel about it. In fact, the claim of the value prehended may be felt to be of so absolute a character that the scientist, the artist, or the mystic may feel compelled to assert it even against the whole world and at the cost of his life. The locus of value prehension is, thus, seen to be in the individual and the 'ought' claim of values is revealed to be essentially non-social in nature.

But such a situation cannot obtain in the field of the moral 'ought'. It is, of course, true that the Upaniṣadic, the Stoic, and the Christian attempt to give value to each individual *qua* individual and the consequent need of feeling the 'ought' obligatoriness towards every person just by virtue of his being a person, was a great advance in the valuational exploration of man. But this does not replace the fact that the obligatoriness that arises with respect to persons arises not merely because of their being persons, but because they stand in certain specific relations to one another. Such relations are always socially patterned and though in all such relations one can behave well or ill, yet the content of what behaviour is called 'well' is always determined by the socialized role pattern in which one happens to stand. One may behave well towards a servant or a slave or a prisoner but this does not destroy the fact that the very content of behaviour in such a situation is different from the behaviour in other role-situations. In

fact, it cannot be otherwise. For any successful interaction between persons presupposes mutually complementary behaviour expectations and this can only be so if their behaviour is oriented to patterns that are presupposed and accepted by them. In exceptional cases, two persons may explore a new pattern of interpersonal relationships; but even here there would be mutual acceptance and a certain limit beyond which the exploration cannot stretch.

It would be too much to say that no new patterns can be explored in human interrelationships. Recent work in comparative anthropology and group dynamics shows how much there is to be done in this field. Stuart Chase's recent survey in his *Roads to Agreement* is simultaneously an eye-opener and a challenge. It should be read by everyone interested in better intra-group and inter-group relationships. What we are pointing to, however, is the fact that ought-obligatoriness in society presupposes a pre-existent role-pattern which is only to be fulfilled and not explored.

The ought obligatoriness that arises when we apprehend the necessity for new types of behaviour patterns in human interrelationships is, however, of a different type. Here we do not have to observe or fulfil a pre-existent pattern but creatively apprehend a new value and translate it into the world of recalcitrant fact. It means a limitation which is absent both from the field of the moral and the axiological 'ought'. The value that is creatively apprehended has to be realized in the world of interpersonal relationships but in order that such a realization may occur it is necessary that it be *accepted* by the persons or the groups concerned. Such a situation does not obtain either in the case of the moral or the axiological 'ought'—for, in the case of the former, the role-situation has already a pre-existent pattern which has been internalized through the familiar processes of socialization while in the case of the latter the question of others' acceptance does not arise as they do not enter into the picture at all.

There always remains, however, a temptation on the part of the moral prophet to realize the 'ought' that he has discerned by imposing it forcibly on others. Coercion rather than persuasion has always seemed a tempting short-cut to many a moral prophet. But there could be no better way of defeating their purpose, since the use of force precludes the willing acceptance of the

new value. The essence of value consists not in compulsive coercion but in a claim that is acknowledged and assented to—a claim which demands, yet does not necessitate, its own realization. Such a possibility of the use of coercive force for the realization of the moral 'ought' does not exist in respect of the axiological 'ought'. There no direct relation to other persons exists; the question of the use of force does not arise. The apprehension of a new value in the field of the moral 'ought' may, thus, be regarded as providing a transition between the 'ought' arising from role-situation, or what Bradley has called 'my station and its duties', and the 'ought' arising from the so-called axiological situation of man. The transitional 'ought' shows clearly that the primary obligatoriness is to the value and that the locus of value apprehension lies not in the society but in the individual. The traditional 'ought', however, is still bound to the structurally differentiated social situation of man and, for its realization, to other people's acceptance. Such a limitation does not operate in the case of the axiological 'ought'.

The deep differences between the moral and the axiological 'ought' may also be seen in the fact that the two are, in many cases, in essential conflict with each other. When the intellectual, the artist, or the mystic neglects his social or domestic duties, he does so because of the call of a higher and conflicting value. Buddha leaving his wife and child and kingdom at the dead of night for the sake of a possible realization whose glimpse even he had not yet received is the eternal symbol of the call of the supra-moral and the supra-sociological in man's life. The revolutionary, too, may neglect his social or domestic duties but his loyalty remains oriented towards them, though on a different level. He essentially wants to and, therefore, must weave a new pattern of social interrelationships in which he too would be a partaker and not a silent spectator. The mystic, on the other hand, may, but need not, return to society—and even if he does, he never enmeshes himself in the network of social rights and duties. The truth-seeker and the artist, in their own turn, feel the call and the loyalty to their vision and if there should be any conflict between these and the duties of personal or social obligation, there is little doubt in their minds as to their choice or, at least, as to which they ought to choose.

The social situation of man seems, in fact, just a precondition for the realization of supra-sociological values. Just as men must live in order that values relevant to social structuring may arise, so there must be some ordered social structure with its system of complementary claims or what Malinowski has called 'the principle of reciprocity', so that supra-sociological values may arise. It would be wrong to interpret this, as many eminent social and psychological thinkers have done, to mean that the whole complex social structure is merely an elaborate and roundabout means to be biologically alive and the pursuit of supra-sociological values—a still more indirect way of making the social structure function and thus ensuring the biological survival of the individual and his race. Such an interpretation would be as much correct as if someone were to say that life is merely a complicated, roundabout, and extremely indirect way of being dead, i.e., of returning to the inorganic state of matter. To understand the supra-sociological values as performing a lubricating function in the functioning of the social structure is, then, to misunderstand their essential nature. It would be almost equally tragic if the multifarious network of social interrelationships were treated as a mere instrument for the satisfaction of biological needs. The values that are realized at these different levels have a claim in their own right and not merely as an instrument for other values. In short they have an intrinsicity of their own that demands a value-realization for its own sake and not that of anything else.

The relation between the 'ought-claims' which arise from the interpersonal situation of man and those that arise from what we have characterized as his axiological situation may be designated, in Hartmann's terminology, as that which obtains between 'stronger' and 'weaker' values. The 'stronger' value, according to Hartmann, is that which does not need for its existence another value which, however, in its own turn necessarily presupposes the 'stronger' and is, thus, characterized as the 'weaker'. The 'stronger' value, on the other hand, is always the 'lower' in Hartmann's system, while the 'weaker' is correspondingly the 'higher' in the scale of values. The axiological 'ought' thus presupposes for its realization the relative fulfilment of the moral 'ought'. Buddha may leave his wife and child and kingdom but

only on the precondition that there shall be others—and a fairly large number, too—who shall continue to love and live with their wives, bring up their children and maintain the social order by the use of legal or customary sanctions, i.e., in short, rule the state. There seems also little doubt that the intellectual, aesthetic, or spiritual value for which people give up personal and social obligations is undoubtedly a higher value than the day-to-day fulfilment of customary obligations. The martyr who stakes his life, rather than give up the value whose claim he prehends in these different fields, is the clearest symbol of the secondary character of obligations that arise within the field of interpersonal relationships.

This may seem surprising to many ethical thinkers who have, in the main, tried to understand the nature of value-obligatoriness through the 'moral' rather than the axiological 'ought'. The primacy of the moral 'ought' has been so much taken for granted in ethical discussion that the supra-personal and supra-social nature of values seems to have been entirely forgotten. The whole set of questions centering round *prima facie* rightness, duties, obligations, sanctions, punishment, etc., reveals this wrong orientation. The classic case with which ethics is or should be concerned is, according to these thinkers, whether their names are Ross or Kant or anyone else, the fulfilment of promise—the example par excellence of the moral 'ought'. Even those who have found in the concept of the 'good life' the central focus of their ethical thought have failed to see that the 'ought' claim of axiological values is not exactly the claim for a 'good life'. The claim is rather for the objectivating of a value that is vaguely, but, at the same time, irresistibly apprehended. The life of many an artist can in no wise be described as a 'good life'—nor was it in any sense a pursuit of such a life. Yet the claim that they prehended—a Baudelaire, a Van Gogh, a Dostoevsky, or any other name that you can think of—seems to reveal more the nature of values than the so-called leaders of 'good life'.

In fact, the judgement that their lives were not 'good' emanates from the field of the moral 'ought'. It merely means the non-observance or even the positive violation of the customary 'Do's' and 'Don'ts' of their society. The assumption behind the concept

of the 'good life' seems to be that there are not different types of 'ought' and that even if there are, they are not in essential conflict. The essentially anthropocentric character of the concept shows that it is derived from the field of the moral 'ought'—the field of interpersonal relationships whose last term is society or humanity and not anything beyond or outside it. The axiological 'ought' on the other hand, is not so socio-or-anthropo-centric. Rather, it reveals the transcendent nature of the value claim and orientates humanity to a trans-human dimension.

Thus, the differences in the nature of the moral and the axiological 'ought' seem to have some important consequences both for value theory and value attitudes. The primacy and the emphasis that we accord to the one or the other seems to make a relevant difference to our valuational thought and vision. We are not here, however, interested in working out the details of such consequences but only in pointing out that there is a distinction between the 'ought-claims' that arise in different fields and that this distinction has some relevance for ethical thinking.

5

THE INVARIANTS OF THE HUMAN SITUATION—VALUATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

The search for invariants these days—particularly of those prevalent in the human situation—is suspect. Comparative studies of various primitive and advanced cultures have made one hesitant to talk about the so-called 'invariants' which have turned out so frequently not to be invariants at all. The increasing advance in scientific and social technology is the other factor responsible for this hesitant and suspicious attitude. If, in spite of this, we attempt to venture on such a slippery field—it is only to put certain considerations whose neglect, we fear, might not be entirely salutary to the species of which, willy-nilly, we all happen to be members.

Whatever be the significance of the human situation in its transcendental aspect, i.e., in its relation to God, Nature, or History—the significance immanent in its situations is more or less well known to us. Finding oneself surrounded by objects of nature on the one hand and human beings on the other, it is inevitable that one's experience of significance should be felt with respect to them. The beauties of the morn, of the eve, and of night, the dewy freshness of flowers that laugh in the sun, the cool breeze that gently caresses and flies past your cheek—all these and a hundred others make the human heart stop and cry in wonder 'what a delight to be alive on such a day as this!' The loving look that makes the heart burst into a silent song, the friendship that has stood the test of time, the unselfishness that suffers and helps—all these have, time and again, given to man's life a meaning and significance that has made him feel

'A little more, and how much it is
A little less, and what worlds away.'

The significance that thus arises in man's life is not confined to any particular epoch, class, or person. It flows from the very

situation of man as he finds himself among men and nature. The significance achieved in relation to other men, however, is more intense and significant for man than the significance achieved in relation to nature. The reason for this may lie in the lack of intercommunication which makes any communication with nature mostly one sided. There certainly are moments when nature seems nearer to us than man; but, then, they are moments only. The alien character of the objects of nature, however, gets modified through the working of man which gradually transforms them into objects of a more domesticated nature—objects with which he can feel more homely and familiar, as they are the products of his own labour and imagination. It is imagination that makes man seek for beauty in his products and thus creates a second realm of beauty where he sometimes imitates and sometimes transcends nature.

Appreciation of beauty, whether in the form of natural or domesticated objects, and interpersonal relationships form, then, the two invariant values which can be realized by all persons in all sorts of situations. The forced labourer, the persecuted Jew, the slave in Rome, the prisoner in his cell, the soldier on the front—all can and do achieve interpersonal relationships which give to their lives a significance even in the darkness and gloom that surrounds them all over.

There seems, however, still another value of a radically different kind which makes an equal claim for being an invariant. The transcendence of time that is felt in the realization of the above two values is momentary only. The wheels of time move on and the vision breaks. The living experience lies broken into fragments of a fitful memory that later sometimes even eludes the grasp. A yearning for the past that is projected into the future fills the human heart with a vague dissatisfaction and longing for horizons in the Arcadia beyond, where time stands still and happiness reigns supreme. The urge for the Infinite is the urge for the timeless—the timeless that is fleetingly experienced in the appreciation of beauty and the experience of interpersonal relationships. The eternal impulse to change an insignificant present into a significant future provides a dynamic invariant of the human situation which is radically different from the static invariants previously noted.

The three invariants noted up till now have been treated as pro-

viding the occasion for valuational realization to all human beings without reference to epoch, class, or person. But, unfortunately, the concept of value is not a unitary concept. It contains within itself a duality which is inescapable. Value is not merely value but value-disvalue. All the three invariants that seem so significant when seen in their positive aspects turn into bitter gall when they turn to their negative poles. Let a positive interpersonal relationship turn into a negative one—and you know what the difference is between heaven and hell. 'Hell is other people', said Sartre. Yes, but they are heaven too. The difference between heaven and hell is the difference between a positive and a negative relationship. Nature can never be as cruel as man. For, if men love what can nature do and if men hate what will nature do?

And the urge for the Infinite? What has it not trampled upon in its onward path? What mask has it not assumed to lure man into the arms of the devil? What has it not justified? The slave labour, the concentration camps, the mass liquidations, the inquisition, in short, the torture chambers of history.

The essential situation of man, thus, does not lie in the three invariants but in the capacity of being good or evil in those invariant situations. The technological revolution of the contemporary times seems to have hypnotized even the eminent thinkers of today. Like children, they clap their hands and look wonderingly at the technological toys of the twentieth century. An institutional change here and a technological change there, and Arcadia would be here. They forget, however, that the situation of the man in the jet plane and of him who rides on his lonely ass is the same. Their sorrows and their joys derive from the few persons with whom they are in significant relationship and they can always be good or bad in the situations they find themselves in life. No institution or technology can compel a man to be honest—and one can be dishonest in any situation that one meets in life. 'If all men were to behave like this'—is the cry of all reformers. And if they do not, let us force them to do so. But who shall force the valuational dictator to be honest? What shall save him from being a tyrant? And what if he turns into that strange species—the self-righteous tyrant, who kills and tortures and liquidates for the sole end of your own good? No, goodness cannot be guaranteed by institutions or technology or History or Nature or even God.

Man's ethical situation does not change just as his interpersonal situation does not change.

Beyond the ethical situation, beyond the interpersonal situation there lies a still deeper limitation to the human situation. It may be characterized as the psychological limitation. Our consciousness is essentially egocentric and point-centric. Other men's suffering is not my suffering, their joy not my joy. Man is alone, literally alone, in his consciousness. Who has not felt the utter loneliness of pain when the other is felt as really the other? To stand by the beside of one and look helpless at the torture and suffering that tears the heart and to feel and realize that one cannot feel the suffering and pain of one whom one thought one loved—is not that the inevitable tragedy of all human heart? I am I and you are you—and we can only signal to each other on mountains farthest apart. The desire to feel what the other one feels, the desire to be what the other one is, the impossible impulse to be all and feel all—who has not known it?

Man's consciousness, however, is not merely egocentric. It is point-centric too. It is inevitably confined to the 'specious present'. The present pain obliterates all the joy that was in the past and the happiness that sings in the present makes dim the pain that was felt yesterday. Memories and anticipations do, of course, have their joys and sorrows, but only when the present allows it. The past, therefore, is irrelevant to the present in an essential respect. As an *object of knowledge* the present is understood only in relation to its past; but as *felt and experienced* it exists in its own right and feels irrelevant all that is not itself. Not only, therefore, is each man alone in his consciousness but is also alone in each moment of his consciousness. The moment, of course, is not a mathematical 'instant' but, what in psychology is known, as the 'specious present'.

These two features of consciousness, its ego-centric and point-centric characters, make the human situation as *felt and experienced* radically different from the same situation as *objectively known and understood*. Objectively, the situational difference between the Pharaoh and his slave is immense—but as subjectively lived, felt, and experienced it does not seem to be so different. The situational framework is accepted by both, the consciousness flickers from moment to moment; and the worry and anxiety,

arising from objectivities, however different, trouble in the same way. The slave may become an Aesop or an Epictetus, the master a Caligula or a Nero. The valuational and disvaluational possibilities are always there. The son of a carpenter may become a world-teacher, but so also may the son of a prince. Objectively, Epictetus is a slave and Caligula an emperor, Christ only a common man and Pilate the Procurator of Judea—but who does not see through the 'objectivity' excepting the 'objective' thinker of today?

What we are attempting to point, however, is a blasphemy which would be vehemently rejected even by those who see through the 'objectivity'. The life as lived, felt, and experienced could not have been very much different in the case of Christ or Caligula or the Procurator of Judea. The consciousness of each was circumscribed to the immediate present; and the present, when it was succeeded by another present, must have lost most of its significance. Further, the consciousness of each was his own, and however much he might try he could never become the other. To any mind trying to understand, the conscious life of each would appear to be a continuity where the past and the present are indissolubly linked together. But to the mind that lives and experiences, the past does not exist. Whatever is, is in the present. The temporal distinctions do not exist for the *experiencing* consciousness.

The invariant structure of human consciousness sets, then, the limitation to the human situation on its subjective side. On the objective side the limitation is set by the essentially interpersonal situation of man. Within these limitations, man can always realize value or disvalue. His relations with Nature and his urge for the transcendence are the two other situations wherein he can always realize significance. Man's situation, therefore, does not vary from epoch to epoch, from man to man. The sinner and the saint, the emperor and the slave, the primitive and the modern are all the same with respect to the human situation.

Yet, eminent thinkers think otherwise. They have the classified catalogue of everything that humanity has gradually acquired and man counts his riches on his fingers and feels they are right. But he quickly forgets his pride and feels unhappy—for one whom he loves has been cold or because the queue is long and he

has to wait or because—well, there are a thousand ‘because’, and one can choose what one likes.

A neglect of these ‘invariants’ in the human situation has resulted in a hysterical utopianism which believes that heaven is just round the corner. Others, who seem to sense only decline and doom on the horizon, look longingly back on times and ages when the human situation was better. They both forget that the human situation as felt and lived is always the same. Heaven and hell are not in the past or the future but in the present from which the human consciousness cannot escape.

It would be foolish to deny the immense technological advances that have been made in various fields. It would be equally absurd to question the structure of postulational knowledge on which these advances have been based. The problems and the possibilities evoked by the new technique and the new knowledge are a challenge to man’s daring and imagination. Still, these are only the variants and it is as well to be conscious of the invariants, which remain unaffected by the variables of the human situation. The variables provide only the framework; and it is as well to be conscious of that which is within the framework.

The new technique and the new knowledge suggest new possibilities. The invariants are the limits of possibility. A consciousness that is aware both of the possibilities and the limits may temper the valuational conflicts of today. In the field of individual consciousness, the awareness may bring the realization that persons are more important than things, that heaven and hell depend not so much on external conditions as on ourselves.

6

THE ACTIVE AND
THE CONTEMPLATIVE VALUES

Ethical thinking in the English-speaking countries seems to have confined itself too much to an analysis of sentences in which value terms occur. The exploration and articulation of man’s experience of values and of his encounter and involvement with them has been left mainly to the phenomenological and existentialist thinkers of the European continent. A critical reflection on the whole domain is pursued by hardly anybody, even though some recent thinkers in India have seen in values the clue to the understanding of human reality.¹ In this paper, however, I shall try to draw attention to a radical division among values which defines, to a great extent, the central dilemma of the value experience of man.

The realm of values is disclosed to man by a perpetual dissatisfaction with things as they are, accompanied by the feeling that they can and ought to be different. These ‘things’ with respect to which continuous dissatisfaction is felt include one’s own self, other persons, and both natural and social states of affairs. The dissatisfaction provides the dynamics for change, exploration and experimentation. However, the *distinction* between self, others, and social and natural states of affairs continues to operate at all levels. The problems arising from these basic distinctions have seldom been the subject of sustained attention of philosophers, whether in the East or the West.

The problems that arise with respect to ‘the other’ whether in the form of persons or natural or social states of affairs seem essentially different from those that arise with respect to the individual’s own self. The former always engage a man in active interrelationship with something other than himself and, what is

1. N.V. Banerjee, *Concerning Human Understanding*, George Allen and Unwin, 1958.
2. A.C. Javadekar, *Axionoetics*, Allied Publishers, Delhi, 1963.

even more important, are focused in their central concern on a being other than one's own. When such a 'being' happens to be an institution, as is usually the case in most important fields of social action, the situation becomes even more difficult. The problem of action in the context of impersonal institutions has hardly been a subject for reflection among moral philosophers, yet it is they which form such a large part of what engages the active life of man today. Ethical thinking has largely been conditioned by those times and situations when personal face-to-face encounters constituted the largest and the most important part of the interactive life of man. In a sense, they still do but the weight of activity in modern times has shifted to other fields.

The contrast between the values that pertain essentially to the realm of action and those that do not, has seldom been drawn in axiological thought. The distinction between the aesthetic and the moral has certainly been noted and emphasized, as in Kierkegaard. The distinction between the moral and the spiritual or the holy has also been noted and discussed among thinkers who have a deep awareness of religion. There has also been a long debate between the votaries of *via activa* and the *via contemplativa* among the mystics. In India, the controversy between the path of knowledge (*jñāna*) and the path of action (*karma*) has been perennial. Yet, as far as I understand, these distinctions are not quite the same as the one I am trying to point out. They seem only subordinate movements in a larger and more basic division which appears to me to be the heart of the matter.

This division, if I may say so, is between what may be called the active values on the one hand and the contemplative values on the other. The distinction lies primarily in the content of what the consciousness actually seeks and the implications this has for the consciousness itself. The consciousness, that is contemplatively oriented, seeks a state of its own being which it feels to be supremely significant in terms of the actually felt and lived experience of the psyche. The seeking of active values, on the other hand, is not concerned with the type of consciousness that one enjoys oneself but rather with the continuous engagement in an activity which may probably help others or achieve a certain state of affairs in the natural or the social world.

The division, however, is not a division only. Rather, it is an

intrinsic opposition between the two in the sense that the seeking for one jeopardizes and obstructs the seeking for the other. This basically is the importance of the distinction for axiological reflection in my opinion. It has not been seen that the genuine seeker of values faces a fundamental dilemma in the fact that the nurturing and development of one type of value concern militates against the development of the other type. Too often, the distinction has been drawn in terms of egoism and altruism, but the distinction in these terms misses the heart of the matter. Engaging in an activity to produce something other than one's own being and engaging in an activity that is concerned with one's own being alone are two entirely different things. Egoism and altruism may be partial movements within this domain but they by no means exhaust the realm.

The distinction and the dilemma appear at each level of human seeking and concern. Take, for example, such a simple thing as the appreciation of nature. The sky, the hills, the trees are found almost everywhere and there is hardly a place which is deprived of the beauty of a sunrise or a sunset each day. The stars shine and the breeze blows and the moon-light floods the pathways some nights every month. One has only to step out and be immersed in it and lose oneself in communion with nature. It is all so easy, but there are slums in the cities and the green is far-off and the moon is hidden by skyscrapers and the breeze that blows is foul with the stink of choked drains and the excreta of men and animals that lie everywhere. And so it is all to be cleaned and the fresh air let in and the trees planted and the grass grown and the pathway to the moon and the stars made clear of all smoke and smog that hangs in the air. But cleaning the pathway is no easy job. It somehow keeps getting dirty all the time and one feels like Sisyphus engaged in an endless, yet fruitless job. And, what is even more, the dirt and the stink get into one's mind and the consciousness is filled with thoughts of what is to be done, what needs be done, what demands to be done and it has no time to contemplate and commune with the beauty that lay everywhere in the age of innocence when the moral consciousness was not born. Like little kittens, the multitudinous beings tug at the moral conscience and pull it in all directions. The only thing that the moral consciousness knows is need and pain and

suffering and these cannot be contemplated except in the context of an action that tries to remove them or a thought that tries to think the ways of their removal. Each blade of grass requires almost perennial waters to keep it green and so it is with the world and the effort is unending.

This, however, is only the realm of nature. The realm of man, the moral realm par excellence, is even more obdurate. Here, not only is the consciousness disturbed by a hundred claims but it is filled with a feeling of the essential, yet perverse, freedom of the other. And there is not just an 'other' but 'others', almost infinite 'others'—each free and yet equally dependent on the others for its freedom and for the success of its actions. Plurality of free beings is the essential anomaly of the life of action. Even more than this is the *essential dependence* on others for the success of the action in realizing the value for which one usually undertakes it. The value achievement in the realm of action is constantly threatened by the non-cooperation of others and even by their wilful perversity.

The pursuit of active values, thus, leads necessarily to a feeling of dependence upon others. This leads to a feeling of membership in a community if one finds the others co-operative in nature. Otherwise, one feels hampered and frustrated at the very centre of one's pursuit and begins to doubt its authentic character. If the pursuit is persisted in and if others' co-operation is felt essential to its success, then they begin to be coerced, cajoled and manipulated into giving that co-operation which they are not freely and willingly prepared to give themselves. The road is thus made open for the Stalins and Hitlers of history. The coercion and the manipulation violate the central value of the freedom of the other at its very core, but the logic of action tends to dissociate it not merely from the consciousness of the one who acts but also from the consciousness of those for whom the action is undertaken. Action tends to lose itself in the causal nexus and gradually becomes almost completely identified with it. Motives increasingly become an irrelevant factor, especially where others are concerned. Like pale ghosts they may hover around action, but they stand only on the fringe and affect hardly, if ever, the iron chain of causality in which action is always enmeshed.

Effectiveness of action which gradually leads one away from

the freedom of the other and from serious concern for motivation in general, leads also to identification with impersonal institutions through which alone large-scale effective action seems possible. Normally, one's action is in the context of a role within an institutional structure and even where great charismatic personalities emerge, they or their disciples have to institutionalize themselves if they want continuous and effective action. But action within an institutional context leads inevitably to the dissociation of individual responsibility for the action that the institution undertakes and to the assumption of responsibility for actions and identification with policies and decisions which one individually and personally judges to be wrong.

These two features of action within an institutional context seem so important that it may be worthwhile to explore their value implications a little further. It is fairly well known, though little acknowledged or reflected upon, that a certain amount of hypocrisy is *inevitable* for an individual when he behaves or has to behave as a member of a family or nation. One inevitably has to adopt attitudes and take positions on matters which one considers to be definitely wrong. One has, so to say, to *defend* actions which have not been undertaken by oneself and which one judges to be wrong, solely on the ground that others *identify* one with the group which has undertaken the action. The slow denuding of the individual's private, separate sense of responsibility and its gradual merger into a feeling of responsibility for the actions of the collective group, extending even to those which one deems to be wrong, is the inevitable result of such a situation. This, in a certain sense, may seem very much akin to the Christian idea of one's responsibility for the sins of others. But there is a subtle difference between the two. The Christian conception recommends a feeling of responsibility *only* for the sins of others and not for their virtues also. Secondly, it is concerned only with the sins of individuals and not of institutions or groups or collectivities in general. The institutional identification, on the other hand, glories in the achievements of the institution as well as feels responsible for its actions that one considers wrong. Further, it is never concerned with the sins of individuals but rather the mistakes or failures of institutions of which one happens to be a member.

This may appear strange, as all action, whether in a personal or an institutional setting, is ultimately done by some individual or other. But, however true this may appear at the psycho-physical or even the ethical level, it is a fact that no one person can actually feel the responsibility for the actions undertaken by a collectivity even if one has oneself been a party to the decision-making processes of the group. The responsibility is so diffuse that it can be pinpointed nowhere. The decision has emerged out of such a collective process that none basically feels it to be his decision. Even where the decision is ultimately made by a single individual in the first instance, as in monarchies and dictatorships it seldom is felt to be so as, in most cases, it is the result of multiple pressures and considerations. There are many things one would never do in an individual or personal capacity but which, in the context of a family or nation or institution, become right or are even felt as imperatives for one's actions.

The involvement in institutional action, therefore, leads inevitably to an erosion of personal and individual responsibility and to its replacement by a responsibility of another type which may be called 'collective responsibility'. It may be felt that the processes of collective decision-making lead to the realization of some objective, impersonal reason emerging out of the individual, finite reasonings of men and issuing in a general will in which everyone participates. This, obviously, is a *participation mystique*. Yet, however true, it does not take away from the fact that the real individual here is only the collectivity and that too only the collectivity involved in historical time in which the past and the future are as or even more important than the present. The limited, finite psycho-physical person is lost in some super-individual collective being which itself is involved in historical time. There is little to choose between the different strands of western thought in this direction. The last terms seem always to be Society and History, whether the thought styles itself as liberal-democratic or socialistic-communistic in character. It is only that the latter spells out the implications in a more logical and rigorous manner.

The realization of the active values, thus, leads one to an essential involvement in temporality, historicity, and sociality. Rather, one gradually begins to view oneself as a creature of just

these and ultimately perhaps becomes what one views. They become the defining essentials of one's being and the culture built around them reinforces in a hundred ways their perpetuation and consolidation in myriad forms. The contemplative values, on the other hand, lead in a different direction. It is the being itself that is the centre of attention. What matters is the achievement of a state of consciousness, valuable, meaningful, and free in itself. It is the stilling of time, the withdrawal from society, the transcending of History that is the essence of the matter. Even where a relationship with the other is involved, as in romantic love, the realization of the contemplative value is focused on a felt feeling of togetherness where all time is annulled and where no movement stirs, not even that of desire, for all movement would break the stilled world of achieved being in relation to that of the other. The 'other', obviously, may not remain still or may not make that synchronous movement towards stillness which is so essential to the achievement and maintenance of that state of being. This, perhaps, is the heart of the tragedy of romantic love. The 'other' is really the other and he or she is too really so. He or she has an independent being—too concrete, too finite, too independent and too imperfect. Each is at the mercy of the other, vulnerable at the very centre of one's being. Perhaps, the conception of God as the real ultimate object of all love arose out of this situation. The Divine was in one's own heart; he dwelt in one's own thought, even in one's own being. And he was perfect and infinite and concrete only to one's feelings, thoughts and imagination. The history of devotional sects in Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity and the widely prevalent doctrine that human love is only a propaedeutic to divine love are standing confirmations of this.

The contemplative values, then, basically take one away from the other. Though standing at the two extreme poles of the contemplative continuum, the drug addict and the mystic share this in common. They both have a minimal relationship to the world of objects, the world of the other. It is only a point of departure for the achievement of a state of consciousness in one's own being. The drug addict depends on the physical availability of his chosen drug in the external world for the achievement of the state of consciousness that he longs for. This is his limitation. The

mystic overcomes even this limitation. He requires nothing in the world to help him achieve the state of consciousness he aspires to. His will and his imagination suffice him for all that he wants, for all that he longs for. Ultimately, even the prop of the imagined object is given up and what suffices is only the will or what the Hindus have called the faculty of attention which now concentrates upon itself. God is the last imaginary object in this process and the mystics of all lands have always been in two minds whether to treat him as ultimately dispensable or not. The well-known controversies regarding the ultimate status of God among mystics can only be understood in the light of the contemplative seeking for a state of consciousness which is related only in a minimal manner to anything other than itself, whether actual or imagined.

The division and opposition between what we have called the active and the contemplative values is, then, a real one. It is not so much a complete absence of the one element or the other, as a difference of primacy and direction. It is an easy and obvious objection to assert that some amount of action is always involved in the seeking of contemplative values and that the contemplative moment is a necessary component in all action. After all, one has to *open* one's eyes to contemplate the beauties of nature and to *close* them to contemplate the beauty of God. Similarly, one has to perceive and apprehend to engage even in the simplest action. But all this, while true, is completely irrelevant. What matters is the primacy and the direction. The contemplative values would permit action only on the most minimal scale that is absolutely required. The same will be true of active values; they would permit contemplation only to the extent that it is absolutely necessary to action. Each would permit the other only as instrumental to the realization of its own values.

Even more than primacy, however, is the direction in which the pursuit of a particular type of values leads one and the way it makes it difficult to pursue the values of the other type. The pursuit of active values leaves little time or capacity or even inclination to 'stand and stare', while the pursuit of contemplative values makes action meaningless except when transformed into a ritual. Action is so closely linked to causality and is so much a matter of the present that one has to be continuously involved in it all

the time. Further, the commitments in which it involves one not only continuously multiply but also take away time from one's own hands and bind one for the future. One has, so to say, to become 'responsible', that is, not to be free with respect to one's own time; one is 'booked' for months, sometimes for years, in advance and that is the sign of one's importance, one's greatness.

Personalities and cultures can, perhaps, be understood, at their deepest levels, in terms of this primacy and direction. There are important differences within the values that belong to one type of realm, but the distinction between the types leads to differences far more radical. The world of action seems meaningless to those who have opted for the contemplative values. At best, it is a necessary evil, something that has to be done if a society or personality or culture is to survive at all. But then one's heart is never in it; one does it only to the minimum extent required and that too in a perfunctory manner. The world of contemplative values, on the other hand, seems too shadowy and vague and nebulous to those who have given their heart and soul to the realm where active values reign. They all seem such subjective phantoms, hallucinatory creations of self-hypnotized minds, creatures of imagination lost in themselves. Each seems to the other deluded and perverse, seeking things that seem either superficial or unreal.

The plea for integration is easy to make. But the integration can only be attempted in terms of the one or the other. Yet, the two are antagonistic and each refuses to bear a subordinate role for long. The realm of values permits little of subordination among its members even in cases where the hierarchical ranking is quite clear. One value may be lower than another, but only in the sense that if a choice has to be made, then it would be better if the value regarded as higher could be chosen. Normally, one would not welcome the fact that a choice between values is forced upon oneself, even between those which one regards as higher and lower in the hierarchy of values. Further, even if one chooses the lower value in such a situation one does not feel that one is doing something wrong even though one realizes that one would be doing better, if one had made the other choice. On the other hand, even if one does choose the better, that does not mean that one is satisfied with what one has chosen. The sacrifice of the lower

value is a real sacrifice and ultimately it *is* the sacrifice of a value. The choosing of the better does not ensure the realization of the lesser value also. There is just no way to exercise the choice in such a manner that all the conflicting values, whether hierarchical or co-ordinate, are realized together. Those who said 'seek ye first the kingdom of God and all the rest shall be added unto thee' seem to have been rather too optimistic. The kingdom of God may quench the desire for anything else, but that it would also lead to the attainment of kingdoms other than those of the Lord is extremely doubtful. The hope for the integration between what we have called the active and the contemplative values seems, then, as fond, far-fetched and optimistic as the hope for the integration between the kingdom of God and the kingdoms of the world.

The problem of integration, however, is a separate problem from the distinction between the active and the contemplative values which I have tried to highlight in this paper. The distinction is important for the understanding of the realm of values on the one hand, and personalities and cultures on the other. This alone is the major concern of the paper and if the arguments are somewhat tenable the central contention is justified to that extent also.

7

AN ATTEMPTED ANALYSIS OF THE
CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

The factual correlate to the concept of freedom may generally be said to be in a state of conscious feeling which is usually regarded as the feeling of freedom. Freedom can neither be significantly affirmed nor denied of a stone, presumably for the reason that it lacks consciousness. A vital sensitivity may be supposed to be almost an essential accompaniment to all living beings—yet, in what sense can freedom be attributed to unicellular organisms and the whole of the insect world, is difficult to determine. The higher animals can be supposed to experience the so-called feeling of freedom, when they find their instinctive pursuits to be unhampered and attended with success in the achievement of the goal they were pursuing. To an outside observer, however, the activity is hardly free—for, the very ends of the animal's activity are pre-determined and certainly, in no way, chosen by him. It is for this reason that man can overcome the strongest and fiercest of animals—for knowing the determinate ways of their behaviour, he can dismiss the accompanying feeling of freedom in the animal as irrelevant or illusory and treat him as a more or less complicated piece of mechanism with its determinate ways of behaviour. The consciousness of freedom in the animal, therefore, is an accompaniment to a successful seeking of a biologically predetermined end.

With the achievement of self-consciousness in man, however, the problem of freedom rises to an entirely new level. The biologically determined drives, founded on the physico-chemical constitution of the body, present themselves to the mind as ideational inducements to action. Food and sex are not merely sought, as in the animal world, but also *known as sought*. To the self-consciousness of man, food and sex appear not as caused by the physico-chemical changes in the body, but as ideas inviting

relevant modes of action for their realization. The plane of action, therefore, at one leap, transforms itself from the merely biological to the essentially teleological. Memory and imagination, the two aspects of free ideation, help to give a concrete content to this goal-seeking level of the activity of man. The goals and ends that man seeks to realize are chosen from among others that his imagination can conceive for him. The problem of freedom, therefore, now transforms itself into the problem of ends, that is, into the question whether the ends that are being pursued have really been chosen or whether they have just been accepted.

Man, however, does not lose his biological framework with the achievement of self-consciousness. He eats, excretes, and reproduces like other members of the animal kingdom. Like other animals, he feels free when he successfully pursues the goals, and unfree when he fails to achieve them. In these respects, therefore, he is merely a cleverer animal—more intelligent, more cunning, more successful, but still an animal. However, man does not merely want to eat or to make love, but to eat or to make love in a particular way. This is just to say that he is not merely a biological but a sociological animal as well. The satisfaction of the primary biological needs can be performed in diverse sociological patterns—but whatever the pattern, it is always woven round the basic biological needs.

The existence of society with its inter-group and interpersonal relations gives rise to new needs—the needs for love, domination, prestige, power, social approval, etc. These needs, though less insistent than the biological ones, are more persistent and colour the whole life of sociological man in a way that the others do not. Thus, the feeling of freedom in man depends also on the successful satisfaction of these socially induced needs which, if not satisfied, would result in a feeling of intense frustration and unfreedom.

The social pattern in which the biological needs need be satisfied and the secondary needs which arise from the inter-group and interpersonal nature of society, are both determined by the society in which one happens to be born. One accepts the social framework of one's valuational patterns as one accepts the biological framework within which one lives. The reason in both cases is the same; viz., that one is born into it and has been moulded into

what he is by the same bio-social forces which he now comes to accept. The more differentiated a society has become, the more it would be the mores and norms of the *group* in which one happens to be born that determine one's valuational perspective rather than that of the whole of society.

Freedom, therefore, is only within a framework—a framework that is mostly accepted by the individual, even though, in itself, it may be no more necessary than anything else. Nobody feels unfree because he cannot fly or because he cannot reach the moon. It would be a wrong conclusion, therefore, to think that men were not free when there were no airplanes or when there was no interplanetary travel. In the ages when there were no motor cars, radios, televisions, printing presses, and a thousand other amenities of modern life, men felt not less free, for they did not feel at all the lack of these things. The existence of these things today does not make us feel any more free, for they are accepted within the framework of modern life.

Any ignoring of this fundamental fact leads to two popular fallacies which may be called the retrospective and the prospective, respectively. The first is the belief that people in the past were less free than the people of today, and the second that in some future state of affairs people would be more free than they are today. As people mostly accept the perspective of the bio-social situation within which they are born, they experience their freedom or unfreedom within the limits set by the perspective and not by the limits of the perspective itself.

The consciousness of man being not merely egocentric but also, what we may call, point-centric i.e., confined to the specious present, feels free or unfree with regard to the problem that occupies it at the moment, irrelevant of the past or future failures or successes. Also, the nature of the perspective from which the problem emanates is irrelevant to the question of the problem being a problem. There is therefore no total feeling of freedom or unfreedom, but a feeling that continuously varies as a result of a change in the nature of problems that occupy the specious present of the individual consciousness. Further, the feeling is independent of the specific nature of the problem with which the human mind happens to be concerned at the moment. It depends

rather more on the success or failure in the solution of the problem.

It should, however, be noted that even the perspective of failure can be adjusted to either by giving up the goal sought or by accepting the limitations that the perspective imposes on the individual concerned. The two, of course, do not exclude each other and in fact, are generally complementary to each other. Yet they are, in some sense, different. A paralytic, for example, does not exactly give up the goal of becoming well but he also, on the other hand, accepts the limitations imposed and exercises his freedom within those limitations. His problems, if he is a paralytic of fairly long standing, are no more concerned with the paralytic perspective, for that he has come to accept as his framework of living. Similarly, the man who is in jail, the man who is born blind, the man who has had an accident, the man who has lost a near and dear one—these and a hundred others, who find themselves in similar situations, accept the perspective of their living and do not feel free or unfree because of it, excepting in some vague generalized way—the way, perhaps, in which a person feels unfree because he has a body, because he has to work within the limitations of space and time, because he grows old.

The bio-socially determined ends within the framework of the cultural patterns one happens to have been born in are accepted by most persons and the feeling of freedom or unfreedom, in their conscious life, depends mostly on the success or unsuccess in the attainment of these ends. To the objective observer, therefore, man seems to be as much determined as any other animal. The subjective feeling of freedom is treated, here also, as irrelevant or illusory. A cleverer manipulation of means for the satisfaction of bio-socially determined ends appears as freedom only to the participant and not to the objective observer.

However, man being capable of achieving self-consciousness can, at times, question the ends that he seems to be driven to pursue. This 'bracketing of ends' may occur either with regard to some particular group of ends or with regard to the whole notion of ends itself. In the first case, one becomes a reformer or a revolutionary; in the other, one comes to question the very biological base of life itself. The framework formed by birth, copulation, and death is seen in its rigid outline and the world-

shattering question, 'why live?' stares one in the face. Man stands poised before his inmost being, face to face with the ultimate freedom—the freedom to deny his whole being, to annihilate it, to make it destroy itself. Man is the only Being who can choose not to Be. Therein lies his greatest freedom—the freedom from ends, from life, from conscious Being. He is the only animal who can commit suicide, a self-conscious annihilation of itself.

Still, the self-conscious annihilation does not present itself as a 'must'; it merely presents itself as a choice—a choice, that is the ultimate foundation of freedom in man. The horizon of not-being or rather the not-yet-conscious-being makes possible the freedom of being-that-is-conscious. This freedom, however, is realized not by death—for, Death is merely the attainment of Being where the question of freedom or unfreedom does not arise. It is not even the entertainment of death as something-that-can-happen-to-one or even, in Heidegger's phrase, as the inmost-possibility-of-one's-own-being, that can bring us face to face with our ultimate freedom. If death is merely seen as an external or internal necessity, man can only submit to it—whether with a protest or not, it does not matter. It is only when Death is seen as a choice—as the self-conscious annihilation of one's own *Dasein*—that it appears as Foundational Freedom.

Such a possibility has generally been called by the name of 'suicide'. But suicide is mostly resorted to because life has not measured up to expectations. It is not resorted to as a 'free choice' but only as a choice that one has been constrained to make because there has been frustration or failure in life. It is life that triumphs in such a suicide, for it is not annihilation that has been accepted, but the values of life, *for the sake of which* one chooses annihilation. On the other hand, in the situation we have been writing about, one chooses Death, if one really decides to choose it, not because life has failed to come to one's expectations but because—well, 'one chooses it'. It is, therefore, more akin to what Shakespeare has called the 'shuffling off of this mortal coil'. But the 'mortal coil' here is not the body, but the 'conscious being' and it is not 'shuffling off' but 'giving up'.

Face to face with one's inmost freedom to choose not to be, one can choose otherwise. One can accept the framework of birth, copulation, and death and posit ends on the secondary level and

seek to realize them. However, as the feeling of freedom does not depend on the fact whether the ends are posited by you or for you but only on the fact whether they have been *accepted* by you, the question of positing is irrelevant. Furthermore, the feeling of freedom is dependent not merely on the fact whether the end has been accepted by one as one's own or not, but also on the fact of its successful or unsuccessful realization.

The feeling of freedom, if we look further, would seem to depend not merely on these factors but also, in a somewhat deeper sense, on one's whole attitude to ends and to the seeking and realization thereof. Excepting the somewhat flexible limits of the biological framework, this would seem to be true in most cases. The spiritualists' insight is here truer, for it is not seeking but our attitude to seeking that is important. The *Bhagavadgīta's* ideal of non-attachment to the fruits of action or the ends that we seek is an articulation of this very insight. Buddha's saying that it is craving which is the root of all bondage, is another formulation of the same insight.

The positing of the end gives us a feeling of freedom; the realization of an accepted end gives us also the same feeling. But unless we transcend the notion of 'ends', we shall never transcend the limits of our freedom. The spiritualist has tried to attain this through the cultivation of disattachment, through, what in a different language may be called, the transcending of the inherent duality involved in all values. The end that he prefers, is better; but, only phenomenally so. From the viewpoint of the supreme transcendence, it is neither better nor worse, but just plays its part in the scheme of things we do not know.

The freedom that occurs from the attainment of the conscious transcendence of all values, has usually been described in religious literature as 'liberation within life.' It suggests an undertone of suspicion that the liberation is not completely so—that, in fact, the biological framework has been accepted. Still, it should be seen that it is the *conscious* transcendence that gives us this feeling of freedom and not just the fact of transcendence itself. A stone, which equally enjoys the fact of transcendence, cannot be said to feel free because of that fact. Similarly, on a deeper plane, it is not the fact of death that gives us the feeling of freedom but the conscious transcendence of life through death. In

most cases, death happens to one as Life has happened to one, i.e., an occurrence in which we are involved, but which we do not choose. But with regard to Death, there is, at least, the possibility of choice—a choice that is utterly precluded in the case of Life.

Our emphasis on consciousness as the focal region in which the problem of freedom arises and to which alone it applies may seem unsavoury to many objectivists of today. But even they would admit that the problem is utterly irrelevant to the regions where consciousness cannot be supposed to exist. Of course, the function of consciousness, on the objectivistic view, would consist in the envisagement of ends and the freedom would consist in our capacity for their realization. If, on the other hand, the sociologist and the psycho-analyst point that the ends envisaged are only seemingly determined by the free self-consciousness of man, the objectivist would hardly have any reply. The revolutionary communist is as much determined in the choice of his ends and activity as the bourgeois reactionary. The individual choice may be more a result of psychological than sociological factors. A Marx, had he been born in the times of transition from feudalism to capitalism, would have exposed the horrors of the feudal society and hailed the new capitalistic era as the golden age of freedom. He would have written and organized and fought and would simultaneously have felt that he was free as against his feudal opponents who were merely the victims of a social system they could not outgrow.

But, as we now know, he would have been wrong. He would have been as much free as the bourgeoisie ideologues whom he had derided so much. And the social forces which would have brought forth the capitalistic structure into being, would in their turn, have been as much free as a woman who brings a child into being. Both parties to the fight would have felt constrained to bring out certain results and, as *their consciousness would have accepted that result as their own*, they would have felt free.

Hegel, however, would have told us that freedom does not consist in the general form of willing but in the content of what is willed. He writes, 'The perpetually recurring misapprehension of Freedom consists in regarding that term only in its formal, subjective sense, abstracted from its essential objects and aims....' (*The Philosophy of History*, p. 41). The freedom, for him, therefore,

consists in having the 'essential itself' as the object of its existence. 'This essential being', he writes, 'is the union of the subjective with the *rational will*'. (p. 38) But, even for Hegel, this union must be a self-conscious achievement, i.e., *accepted* by the individual consciousness as its supreme good. 'Men' he writes, 'are objects of existence to themselves, as regards the intrinsic import of the aim in question. To this order belongs that in them which we would exclude from the category of mere means—Morality, Ethics, Religion. That is to say, man is an object of existence in himself only in virtue of the Divine that is in him—that which was designated as the Reason; which, in view of *its activity and power of self-determination*, was called 'Freedom'. (pp. 33-37. Italics mine).

If the distinctive characteristic of man lies in his 'activity and power of self-determination' it seems difficult to understand that the self-determination would be 'really' self-determination only when the self determines itself in a particular way. In what sense can Lucifer be said to be less free than Gabriel? Of course, both are either not free at all as against the freedom of God or free in a way in which even God is not free. The freedom of Gabriel, it should be noted, does not consist in the identification of the content of his willing with what the universal reason wills, but *in the fact that he chooses to accept this identification*.

The Communists of today commit the same mistake when they identify the freedom of the individual with the content of his choice. A person is supposed to be free when he chooses Communism; but when he chooses otherwise, he is supposed to be in bonds of a bourgeois past. This seems to be true only in the sense that Lucifer in his revolt seems more free than Gabriel who merely accepts the situation. But this is to forget that self-conscious acceptance is as much free as self-conscious rejection. Roy Fuller was equally, if not even more, free than Auden, Spender, and others who joined the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. Further, the acceptance of Communism in the Soviet Union is as Gabriel-like as those of the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries. The Lucifers of that regime are those whom the Gabriels of that land and their legions elsewhere do not like.

Freedom, therefore, does not lie in the acceptance or rejection

of this or that, but in the very fact of self-conscious choice of either. However, as the self-conscious choice is always made within a perspective and as the perspective forming the framework is generally accepted, all persons feel free most of the time. But, as we said earlier, the strange possibility of questioning not this or that perspective, but the whole notion of perspective as such, is open to man. What one chooses in the face of this ultimate possibility of questioning, is not our concern. That the biological framework can be questioned and that the Lucifers of this realm become the Gabriels of no other realm, are the two great facts which the consciousness of man can come to face within itself. Yet, even at this point, the 'Either—Or' of Man is not taken from him and he stands before his ultimate Freedom—To Be or not to Be.