

चैकधर्मावच्छिन्ना-पर्याप्तिकत्वरूपविरोधाश्रयत्वात् विरुद्धोभयधर्मावच्छिन्नाभाववत्
घटपटोभयत्वावच्छिन्ना-भावस्यापि केवलान्वयित्वं स्यादिति शंक्ते - यद्यपीति ।

In the elucidation of the very brief statement made by Gadādhara as the reply to the above objection, Raghunatha Shastri is remarkably clear. His views may be summed up as follows:

When we closely analyse the cognition '*ghaṭatvena ghaṭa-ṣaṭobhayam nāsti*' we may find that *ghaṭatva* is grasped here, twice. Once as a property of *ghaṭa* wherein *dvitva* also is grasped, and again independently. Thus, we can say that two kinds of *pratiyogitāvachedakatās* are grasped here in *ghaṭatva*. One is that *avachedakatā* which co-exists with *dvitva* and naturally, *ghaṭatva* has *dvitvadharṃatāvachedakatā* also. Another *pratiyogitāvachedakatā* grasped in *ghaṭatva* is independent. The independence, as Raghunatha Shastri puts it is—'*pratiyoginiṣṭha-viśeṣyatānirūpitā-prakāratvaprayojyatvam*', i.e. its presence is not due to the *ghaṭatva* being a qualifier of the qualificandum, which in the present case is the *pratiyogin*. This *avachedaka* is also *vyādhikaraṇa*, i.e. it does not exist where the *pratiyogitā* exists. In the present case, *ghaṭa* and *ṣaṭa* are the *pratiyogins* and *ghaṭatva* does not exist in *ṣaṭa* which has *pratiyogitā*. Between the two *avachedakatās* mentioned above the first one resides in three properties namely, *ghaṭatva*, *ṣaṭatva* and *dvitva*—which are the qualifiers of the *pratiyogin-ghaṭaṣaṭobhaya*. This *avachedakatā* actually resides in them by the relation of *pariyāpti*—the number '*tritva*' being its limiter. The other *avachedakatā* resides in *ghaṭatva* alone by *pariyāpti* relation and its limiter, is the *tadvyaktitva*—the individuality of *ghaṭatva*.

Now, Raghunatha Shastri points out that we can satisfactorily explain why '*ghaṭa-ṣaṭobhayābhāva*' is not universally present while '*ghaṭatvena ghaṭa-ṣaṭobhayābhāva*' is. In case of the *ghaṭaṣaṭobhayābhāva*, the *pratiyogitāvachedakatā* resides in the three properties namely *ghaṭatva*, *ṣaṭatva* and the *dvitva*, by the relation of *pariyāpti*. The limiter of this *pariyāpti* is the number *tritva*. Similarly, since we have a valid cognition like '*ghaṭaṣaṭobhayavad bhūṭalam*', in the same '*tritva*' the limitorness is determined by the *pariyāpti* of the *avachedakatā* of *nirūpakatā*, which in its turn, is determined by the *adhikaraṇatā* residing in the *bhūṭalam*. It is this *adhikaraṇatā* with which the *abhāva* is opposed. Therefore, in those instances where the above *adhikaraṇatā*, is present, in other words, wherever *ghaṭa* and *ṣaṭa* are present, the *abhāva* cannot exist. On the other hand, the absence, '*ghaṭatvena ghaṭa-ṣaṭobhayam nāsti*' can be a universally present *abhāva*, for the *pratiyogitāvachedakatā* of the absence, by the relation of *pariyāpti*, lies not only in *ghaṭatva*, *ṣaṭatva* and *dvitva*, but also in *ghaṭatva* again, independently. Thus the limitorness of this *pariyāpti* resides in the *tritva* residing in '*ghaṭatva-ṣaṭatva* and *dvitva*', and also in the '*tadvyaktitva*' residing in *ghaṭatva*. But, since nobody has a valid cognition like '*ghaṭatvena ghaṭa-ṣaṭobhayavad*', the *adhikaraṇatā*—the *nirūpakatāvachedakatāpariyāpti* of which could be in the above three properties and also in *ghaṭatva* and consequently the limitorness of this *pariyāpti* could be in the '*tritva*' and '*tadvyaktitva*' is a non-entity. As a result, the absence—

'ghatatvena ghaṭa-paṭobhayābhāva', being un-opposed, can have the universal presence. This is the sum and substance of the following passage in the *Nyāyaratna*:

ayambhāvaḥ—ghatatvena ghaṭapaṭobhyam nāstītyatra ghatatve dviividham avacchedakatvam, ekam dvitvadharmitāvacchedakatvena, aparam ca vyadhikaraṇatvena । tatra prathamāvacchedakatāyāḥ tad abhāvīyapratīyogiviśeṣaṇatāpannatvāvachchinnāvacchedakatāvarūpeṇa ghatatvapaṭatva-dvitvaitatritayaparyāptatā/tad-avacchedakam tat tritvam/dvitīyāvacchedakatvasya ghatatva-mātra-paryāptatāyā tad avacchedakam ghatatva-niṣṭha-tad-vyaktitvam/tathā ca pratīyogitāvacchedakatā-prayāptyavacchedakatā-vyāpakāvacchedakatāka-paryāptikāvacchedakatāya nirūpakatākādhikaraṇatauaova anjāvasya virodhāt ghaṭapaṭobhayābhāvīyapratīyogitāvacchedakatā-paryāptyavacchedakatā-vyāpikā ya ghatatvapaṭatvadvitvaitatritvaniṣṭhā ghaṭapaṭobhayavat bhūtalāmīti pratītisiddhaghaṭapaṭobhayatvāvachchinnādhikaraṇatā-nirūpakatāvacchedakatāparyāptyavacchedakatā tat paryāptikāyā tādrśa tritayanīṣṭhā nirūpakatāvacchedakatā tatkā ya tādrśobhayanīṣṭhā dheyavarūpā nirūpakatā tannirūpitādhikaraṇatā ghaṭapaṭobhyādhi karaṇe vartate iti na tādrśobhayatvāvachchinnābhāvasya kevalānvayitvam/ghatatvena ghaṭapaṭobhayam nāstīti pratītivīṣayābhāva-pratīyogitāvacchedakatāparyāptyavacchedakatāyāḥ tādrśa-tritva-ghatatvaniṣṭha tad vyaktitvayoḥ sattvena ghatatvena ghaṭapaṭobhayavad iti pratītavirahēṇa tādrśāvacchedakatā-vyāpakāvacchedakatā-paryāptikāvacchedakatāka-nirūpakatāyā aprasiddhatvena virodhino'bhāvāt tādrśābhāvasya kevalānvayitvam iti.

अयंभावः - घटत्वेन घटपटोभयं नास्तीत्यत्र घटत्वे द्विविधमवच्छेदकत्वम्; एकं द्विविधमिंतावच्छेदकत्वेन, अपरं च व्यधिकरणत्वेन । तत्र प्रथमावच्छेदकतायाः तदभावीयप्रतियोगिविशेषणता-पन्नत्वावच्छिन्नावच्छेदकतात्वरूपेण घटत्वपटत्वद्वित्वैतत्रितय-पर्याप्तता । तदवच्छेदकं तत्रित्वम् । द्वितीयावच्छेदकत्वस्य घटत्वमात्रपर्याप्ततया तदवच्छेदकं घटत्वनिष्ठतद्व्यक्तित्वम् । तथा च प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकताव्यापकावच्छेदकताकपर्याप्तिकावच्छेदकता- कनिरूपकताका-धिकरणतयैव अभावस्य विरोधात् घटपटोभयाभावीयप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकताव्यापिका या घटत्वपटत्वद्वित्वैतत्रित्वनिष्ठा घटपटोभयवत् भूतलमिति प्रतीतिसिद्धघटपटोभयत्वावच्छिन्नाधिकरणता-निरूपकतावच्छेदकतापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकता तत्पर्याप्तिका या तादृशत्रितयनिष्ठा निरूपकतावच्छेदकता तत्का या तादृशोभयनिष्ठाधेयत्वरूपानिरूपकता तन्निरूपिताधिकरणता घटपटोभयाधिकरणे वर्तते इति न तादृशोभयत्वावच्छिन्नाभावस्य केवलान्वयित्वम् । घटत्वेन घटपटोभयं नास्तीति प्रतीतिविषयाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकतायाः तादृशत्रित्वघटत्वनिष्ठतद्व्यक्तित्वयोः सत्त्वेन घटत्वेन घटपटोभयवदिति प्रतीतिविरहेण तादृशावच्छेदकताव्यापकावच्छेदकतापर्याप्तिका-वच्छेदकताकनिरूपकताया अप्रसिद्धत्वेन विरोधिनोऽभावात् तादृशाभावस्य केवलान्वयित्वमिति ।

The above elucidation of Navya Nyāya concepts by Raghunatha Shastri is an example of his clarity and his marvellous presentation of the subtle issues in which he excelled. The critical analyses which we find in abundance in the *Nyāyaratna* have made the commentary a very valuable one.

Giridhara Upādhyāya (1720)

Giridhara Upādhyāya Jhā was one of the disciples of Gokulanātha Upādhyāya. His only available work the *Vibhaktyarthanirṇaya*, is indeed very useful for its presentation of the Nyāya interpretation of the entire *kāraṅka prakaraṇa*. In this work, Giridhara also refers to other interpretations such as that of the Grammarians and Poeticians. He also refers to the views of his teacher Gokulanātha Upādhyāya. His explanations are very critical and he often makes very novel and interesting points.

To highlight this the following discussion serves as an example:

It is generally admitted by the Naiyāyikas that a relation which is *vr̥tṭyanīyāmaka*, i.e. that which is not an occurrence exacting, is not the limiter of the *pratiyogitā* of an absence. But as to why it should not be admitted to be so, is the question raised. Gadādhara, in his *Vyutpattivāda* discusses the problem briefly. He only says that if such relations are accepted as the limitors of *pratiyogitā* then it leads to *gaurava* as innumerable *pratiyogitas* limited by such relations, will have to be accepted. Though this reply contains some logic yet it does not seem to be convincing. But, Giridhara offers an interesting and more satisfactory answer. He points out that if a relation is not *vr̥tṭinīyāmaka*, it means that the cognition of a thing as residing in a locus, with such relations, can never arise. If even such relations are the limitors of *abhāva-pratiyogitā*, then such absences will have to be considered as universally present, since such absences are without any opposition. Therefore, he holds that a non-occurrence—exacting relation cannot be considered as the limiter of an *abhāva-pratiyogitā*.

It is obvious that this explanation is more satisfactory.

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II

ANVITĀBHIDHĀNA VĀDA VS ABHIHITĀNVAYA VĀDA, AND, PRAKĀRATĀ VĀDA VS SAMSARGATĀ VĀDA

Anvitābhidhāna vāda and Abhihitānvaya vāda

I feel, some clarification is necessary regarding the theories mentioned above, as is stated in the summary, *anvitābhidhāna vāda* and *abhihitānvaya vāda* are generally known as the 'sentence theory of meaning' and the 'word theory of meaning', respectively. But in my view, these English phrases do not convey what the Sanskrit terms intend. *Anvitābhidhāna vāda* is the theory upheld by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and also supported later, by some Vedānta schools such as Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas took the opposite stand and upheld the *abhihitānvaya vāda*. The Nyāya school and also the Advaita school supported this stand.

The two theories opposed each other on the issue of how *anvaya*, i.e. the relation between word-meaning is conveyed. The *abhihitānvaya vāda* contends that words in a sentence, convey just their meanings and the relation between them is communicated by *samabhivyāhāra*, also called *ākāṅkṣā*. *Samabhivyāhāra* is the utterance of the word in a sequence. Since, this *samabhivyāhāra* can be described as a property of sentence, the relation of word-meanings, conveyed by a property of sentence such as *samabhivyāhāra*, is called *vākyārtha* i.e. sentence meaning.

The Prābhākaras and their allies, on the other hand, took a different view. They strongly contended that a word in a sentence, cannot convey just an unrelated thing. In other words, the *anvaya* i.e. the relation which the *abhihitānvayavādins* considered as *vākyārtha*, is held by the *anvitābhīdhānavādins* as *padārtha*—a meaning conveyed by word itself. This, in short, is the difference between the two theories. This controversy, has existed right from the time of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the founder of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā school, and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. The latter celebrated Naiyāyika of *Nyāyamañjarī* fame, vehemently upheld the *abhihitānvayavāda*, and Prabhākara and his followers along with some Vedānta schools mentioned above, equally vehemently supported the *anvitābhīdhāna vāda*. It is also noteworthy here that even the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas though generally known as *abhihitānvayavādins*, have many differences in explaining the theory. Similarly, the Prabhākara school and other Vedānta schools also differ in presenting the *anvitābhīdhāna vāda*.


Prakāratā vāda and Samsargatā vāda

The Nyāya school holds that the *viśayas*, i.e. the contents of a cognition can be broadly divided into three, namely-*viśeṣya*—qualificandum, *prakāra*—qualifier, and *samsarga*—relation. Accordingly, *viśayatā*—contentness also is of three kinds: (i) *viśeṣyatā*—qualificandum-ness residing in qualificandum, (ii) *prakāratā*—qualifier-ness located in qualifier, and (iii) *samsargatā*—residing in *samsarga*—relation. In a verbal cognition, if anything is presented by a constituent of the sentence, be it a nominal base, suffix, root or an indeclinable—all of which are regarded as words by the Nyāya school, it is either *viśeṣya* or *prakāra* and has either *viśeṣyatā* or *prakāratā* in it. As against this, the relation between the *padārthas*, i.e. *viśeṣya* and *prakāra*, which is also a content of a verbal cognition, is neither *viśeṣya* nor *prakāra*, for according to the Nyāya school, it is conveyed only by *samabhivyāhāra* and not by any word of the sentence. Thus, now it is clear that the contentness called *Prakāratā* resides only in such contents of a verbal cognition, which are conveyed by the words of that sentence, to be precise—in *padārthas*. But, the contentness called *samsargatā* can reside only in that which is presented in a verbal cognition by *samabhivyāhāra* and not by any word. Thus, *prakāratāvāda* is a theory which holds a particular content of a verbal cognition, as presented by

a word and similarly, *sāmsargatāvāda* is that theory which holds that the particular content referred to, is not presented by a word, but by *samabhivṛyāhāra*.

Now, this explanation, I feel, is sufficient to make it clear that neither Gadādhara nor Jagadīśa can exclusively be dubbed as either Prakāratāvādin or Sāmsargātāvādin. For, both of them, being *abhīhitānvayavādins*, hold the view that in a verbal cognition, there are three types of contents namely *viśeṣya*, *prakāra* and *sāmsarga*, and whatever, in that cognition, is presented by a word, is *prakāra* or *viśeṣya* and that presented through *samabhivṛyāhāra* is *sāmsarga*. So, the question as to whether Gadādhara or Jagadīśa is Prakāratāvādin or Sāmsargātāvādin, can be raised only in respect of a particular content of a particular instance. For example, both of them concur that identity statements such as '*nīlaḥ ghaṭaḥ*' convey identity between *nīla* and *ghaṭa* which are presented in the verbal cognition produced by the above statement, by the words '*nīla*' and '*ghaṭa*'. Therefore, in respect of the contents such as '*nīla*' and '*ghaṭa*', in the above instance, both Gadādhara and Jagadīśa, are Prakāratāvādins. But in respect of the identity, Jagadīśa contends that the identity here is conveyed by the suffix added to the word '*nīla*' and therefore, it is a *padārtha* and hence a *prakāra*. Thus, while Gadādhara is Sāmsargātāvādin in respect of identity, and Prakāratāvādin in respect of the other contents such as *nīla* and *ghaṭa* of the verbal cognition, Jagadīśa is Prakāratāvādin in respect of all the three namely—*nīla*, *ghaṭa* and identity. But, the point which deserves our attention is that Jagadīśa also has to admit that some other relation, if not identity, ought to be conveyed by *samabhivṛyāhāra*, even in case of the identical statements. The following explanation will make the point more clear:

Nīlaḥ ghaṭaḥ ('नीलः घटः') - this identical statement consists of four words *nīla* + *su* - (नील + सु) and *ghaṭa* + *su* (घट + सु). (सु is a nominative case affix which is indicated by the symbol ':'). According to Gadādhara, both the case affixes added to the two words are meaningless and yet are necessary for the sake of grammatical correctness. Since, here, the identity is not conveyed by any word, but only by *samabhivṛyāhāra*, Gadādhara is a Sāmsargātāvādin in his approach. On the other hand, Jagadīśa holds that only the 'su (सु)' after 'ghaṭa (घट)' is just for the sake of grammatical purity, while the 'su (सु)' after 'nīla (नील)' conveys identity. The following may explain Jagadīśa's position, more clearly:



So, as per Jagadīśa *pratiyogikatva* (प्रतियोगिकत्व) and *Āśrayatva* (आश्रयत्व) are the two relations that are conveyed by *samabhivvyāhāra*, in the cognition produced by the sentence *nīlaḥ ghaṭaḥ* (नीलः घटः). Thus, he has a *Sāmsargatāvādin* approach if these two relations are taken into account.

I hope that the above explanation is clear enough to convey the fact that no Naiyāyika is either *Prakāratāvādin* or *Sāmsargatāvādin* exclusively.

The next question as to what difference is made philosophically if one accepts one or the other of these two theories, is a bit difficult to answer. I shall only point out one difference, among a few made by these two theories. If that can be called a philosophical difference, it can also be regarded as the philosophical significance of these theories.

If *prakāratā vāda* is accepted, as already explained, it means that a particular thing is conveyed by a word in the sentence. This particular thing, being a *prakāra*—a qualifier, is to be related with another meaning conveyed by another word of the sentence. Thus, the relation of these two things also will have to be a content of the cognition. For instance, in the sentence '*nīlaḥ ghaṭaḥ* (नीलः घटः)', if the identity between *nīla* (नील) and *ghaṭa* (घट) is considered as something conveyed by the term '*su* (सु)' added to the word *nīla* (नील), then it becomes a *prakāra*. Then this identity is to be related with *ghaṭa* (घट) conveyed by the other word *ghaṭa* (घट). Here, the relation is *āśrayatva* (आश्रयत्व), for the *ghaṭa* (घट) is the *āśraya* (आश्रय)—the locus of the identity. On the other hand, if this identity is not considered as a thing conveyed by the '*su* (सु)' then it ceases to be a *prakāra*, for it is conveyed by *samabhivvyāhāra* and hence is a *sāmsarga*. It is admitted by all the Naiyāyikas that a relation conveyed by *samabhivvyāhāra* does not need another relation to be related. As a consequence, if a particular thing is regarded as *sāmsarga* then the contents of the cognition are less in number. If the same thing is a *prakāra*, the contents of the cognition will be more, for the relation of the *prakāra* will be an additional content. This is one of the significant difference made by these two theories. Thus, Gadādhara and Jagadīśa are both *Prakāratāvādins* and *Sāmsargatāvādins*. But, regarding a particular content of a particular verbal cognition, they may take opposite stand and then, accordingly may be called *Prakāratāvādin* or *Sāmsargatāvādin* as per the stand taken.

Definition of Vyāpti and Vyādhikaraṇadharmāvacchinābhāva

Concomitance, is one of the most seriously discussed topics in the Nyāya School. Prior to Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, several Naiyāyikas had attempted to offer a satisfactory definition of *Vyāpti*. Gaṅgeśa, in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, has criticised all those definitions, as they contain in their body the absence of *sādhyabhāva* (साध्याभाव). For example, *sādhyābhāvavadvṛtītvam* (साध्याभाववद्वृत्तित्वम्) is one of these definitions.

It means—concomitance which is the essential characteristic of a reason, is “the absence of the relation of the reason in the instances of *sādhyābhāva*”. Gaṅgeśa points out that this definition and also such other definitions which contain *sādhyābhāva* in their body, can be applied only to such inferences where *sādhyābhāva* is a possibility. But, there are some inferences, the *sādhyas* of which, are universally present. For example, in the inference “this is nameable as it is knowable” (idaṁ vācyaṁ jñeyatvāt [इदं वाच्यं ज्ञेयत्वात्]) the *sādhya*, i.e. nameability (*vācyaṭva*), is a universally present attribute and hence its absence is an impossibility. Therefore, the definitions of *vyāpti* consisting of *sādhyābhāva* are not applicable to the inferences as the above.

In order to avoid such a defect in the definition of *vyāpti*, several Naiyāyikas brought in the concept of *vyādhikaraṇadharmāvachchinnābhāva*. According to them, there are two types of *abhāvas*: (i) *samānādhikaraṇadharmāvachchinnābhāva* (S.A.), and (ii) *vyādhikaraṇadharmāvachchinnābhāva* (V.A.). S.A. is that absence of a thing which is characterised by an attribute that actually exists in it. For instance, the absence of a jar characterised by jar-ness *ghaṭatven ghaṭābhāvaḥ*. This absence does not exist there where a jar characterised by jar-ness, is present. Hence, it is not universal. As against this, V.A. is such an absence of a thing which is characterised by an attribute which does not exist in it. For example, the absence of jar, as characterised by *paṭatva*. It is obvious that *paṭatva* is not an attribute of a *ghaṭa* and *ghaṭa* does not exist anywhere being characterised by *paṭatva*. Therefore, such an absence is universal. Thus, the main difference between S.A. and V.A. is that while an S.A. can not be universally present, a V.A. can be universally present. Some Naiyāyikas suggested that though in some inference, the S.A. of the *sādhya* (e.g. nameability), is not found anywhere since, the *sādhya* itself is present everywhere, it is possible to show the application of the definition of *vyāpti* in such inferences also by making use of V.A. of the *sādhya*, which is universally present. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, in his commentary on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa presents some such fourteen definitions which include two of his own while the others were formulated by the earlier Naiyāyikas. This portion of the text is called ‘*Caturdaśa lakṣaṇī*’. Later Gaṅgeśa rejects even these definitions on the ground that there cannot be an absence called V.A. According to him, ‘*ghaṭa* does not exist being characterised by *paṭatva* (*paṭatvena ghaṭo nāsti*) means that there is no *paṭatva* in *ghaṭa*. Thus, it is only the absence of *paṭatva* in *ghaṭa*, and this absence is S.A. only.

In my article on Kṛṣṇam Bhaṭṭa Arḍe, I have chosen a context in which Kṛṣṇam Bhaṭṭa and Raghunātha Shastri both of whom, are though commentators of the same Gādādhari text yet, while answering an objection raised against Gādādhari, have shown originality in their approach by offering different solutions.

Vyāsajyavṛtti dharma and Paryāpti relation

Among the innumerable attributes that we come across, some are *Vyāsajyavṛtti* while the others are not so. *Vyāsajyavṛtti* is such an attribute which can exist sufficiently or fully in more than one locus. For instance, numbers such as *dvitva*, *tritva*, etc. or other. When there are two jars, it is obvious that they have the number 'two'—*dvitva*. That means each one of them possesses the attribute *dvitva*. But what is significant is that none of them can be said to possess the *dvitva* sufficiently or fully. If that were the case, then even when there is only one jar on the ground, we should have been able to grasp it and say—'there are two jars on the ground'. Since we do not have such a cognition, it is obvious that a single jar does not have the *dvitva*, fully. At the same time, we can neither say that there is no *dvitva* in a single jar. For, as already said, *dvitva* being a number and hence a quality, should be residing in each of the group of two jars. Therefore, the Naiyāyikas hold the view that *dvitva*, etc., numbers are both present and not present in each member of the group. They are present in each by mere *samavāya* relation and at the same time, are not present in them by the relation of *sufficiency* which is named as the relation *paryāpti*. Since, each of the members does not possess *dvitva*, *tritva*, etc., by the relation of *paryāpti*, we do not, pointing out to a single jar, say—'this is two or three'. But, since each member has the number *dvitva*, etc., by the relation of mere *samavāya* we can only say that each member of the group, has the number *dvitva* or *tritva*.

Just as the numbers reside in their locus, by the relation of *paryāpti*, there are some other properties which also reside in their locus by the relation of *paryāpti*. *Pratīyogitā*, *avacchedakatā*, etc., are such properties. In the case of the absence of both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, both of them are the *pratīyogins* of the absence and hence have *pratīyogitā* in them. Then, the question arises as to what is the difference between the absence of mere *ghaṭa* and the absence of both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, for both the absences have *ghaṭa* as their *pratīyogin*. The answer given by the Naiyāyikas is that though both the absences have *ghaṭa* as their *pratīyogin* the former one is that absence the *pratīyogitā* of which is related to mere *ghaṭa* by the relation of *paryāpti*, while the latter one has its *pratīyogitā* related to both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* by the relation of *paryāpti*.

Regarding the exposition of relation of *paryāpti* and *Vyāsajyavṛttitva* may be said that as these two concepts are of significance in the discussion on the nature of certain *abhāvas*, familiarity with them is essential. Further, regarding the issues discussed while commenting on the work of Kṛṣṇam Bhaṭṭa and Raghunatha Shastri, I have to make it clear that those are not the central issues discussed either by Gadādhara or by his commentators. Their main concern, in the text called *Çaturdaśa lakṣaṇī*, is the definition of *vyāpti* containing *vyādhikaraṇa-dharmāvachchinnābhāva* in its body. Since the understanding of the nature of such an absence is required to formulate a definition of *vyāpti*, these also are incidentally discussed. Though these issues are thus not of primary concern, I have

chosen them as they involve many interesting epistemological and philosophical points and the commentators have demonstrated their originality in solving a certain problem.

The distinctive nature of the several absences that are discussed in my article may be summed up in conclusion. Accordingly, *ghaṭatvena ghaṭo nāsti* (घटत्वेन घटो नास्ति) is a *samānādhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva* (S.A.), and is not universally present, for it cannot exist wherever a *ghaṭa* (घट) being qualified with *ghaṭatva* (घटत्व) is present. But, the absence *ghaṭatvena ghaṭo nāsti* (घटत्वेन घटो नास्ति) which is a *vyādhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva* (V.A.) is universally present, for a piece of cloth can nowhere exist being qualified with *ghaṭatva*. Similarly, *ghaṭapaṭobhayam nāsti* (घटपटोभयं नास्ति) which is S.A. is not universal, for it cannot exist in the instances where both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*—the *pratiyogin* exist. But, the absence *ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭau na staḥ* (घटत्वेन घटपटो न स्तः) or *ghaṭatvena ghaṭapaṭobhayam nāsti* (घटत्वेन घटपटोभयं नास्ति) which is a V.A. is universally present. For though one of the *pratiyogin* namely *ghaṭa* can exist being qualified with *ghaṭatva* the other namely, *pratiyogin* can no where exist being qualified with *ghaṭatva*. In other words, both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, together have no existence anywhere in the universe, being qualified with *ghaṭatva* and hence the absence of the both being characterised by *ghaṭatva*, is universally present. Since the distinctive nature of these absences can be clearly brought out by introducing the concepts of *vyāsajyavṛttitva* of *pratiyogitā* or *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā*, they are discussed here.

Due to the ambiguity of the Nyāya technical terms which are profusely made use of here, the persistence of further questions is quite natural. However, the points discussed here regarding *ghaṭa-paṭobhayābhāva*, etc., are purely epistemological, even ontological. The references that are made to some metaphysical view points of the Nyāya school, are just incidental and are assumed as universally admitted. For instance, the reference to the nature of *vācyatā* as the will of God; the later Naiyāyikas as a matter of fact, explained *vācyatva* as mere 'will' in the form 'let this thing be conveyed by this word'. Thus, they tried to include even the modern conventions created by all, including laymen. Therefore, though some metaphysical points may have been mentioned they may be ignored as they do not have any bearing on the present discussion. Hence, the logical and epistemological points discussed here can be disengaged from both—the Nyāya metaphysics and the Sanskrit language, and their logical worth can be seriously examined.

III KRODAPATRAS

Among the voluminous works of Nyāya, written during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we come across two types of works which have made a unique contribution in the development of the Nyāya School. These are the *Vādas* and

Kroḍapatras. Between the two, the *Vādas* are generally small treatises which aim at upholding a Nyāya view of a concept by means of a thorough discussion of the same. In fact, the genesis of these *Vāda* works can be traced to the eighteenth century itself. It seems that Raghunātha Śīromaṇi started writing such *Vādagranthas* as *Ākhyātavāda*, *Nañavāda*, *Kṛtisādhyatānumānavāda*, *Vājapeyavāda*, etc. As the very titles indicate, these were written to thoroughly discuss certain specific topics. Later, Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and others continued to write such treatises. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vyutpattivāda*, *Viśayatāvāda*, *Prāmāṇyavāda* etc. are works of the same type. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such innumerable *Vādas* were written.

The *Kroḍapatras* are slightly different from the *Vādas*. They are not as lengthy as the *Vādas*. Though these *Kroḍapatras* were written to explain certain sentences that occur in the original text they cannot be considered as commentaries because they do not continue to explain each and every sentence within the text but treat only selective points made in the original text while discussing them thoroughly. Thus, they may be considered as independent works of the author, because except at the beginning, nowhere does the author explain or comment on any part of the text neither summarising the points which a commentator generally does. Disregarding the text as an entity he concentrates on a particular point by raising an objection on it. He proceeds by rejecting any modification or clarification, pointing out the loopholes in it. When this exercise reaches a stage beyond which no further justification is possible, he presents his own solution, normally by suggesting an *anugama*, a technical device discovered by the Navya Naiyāyikas, by which the point under discussion is ultimately vindicated by plugging all the loopholes. The ingenuity with which the author of a *Kroḍapatra* imagines peculiar instances which nobody can ever think of and points out the untenability of the arguments defending the point under discussion, is indeed something remarkable. He can be compared to a very shrewd chess player who while practising the game, plays the role of two players, one strongly defending a position and the other savagely attacking the same.

The very title '*Kroḍapatra*' suggests the purpose and scope of the small treatises that are called *Kroḍapatras*. '*Kroḍa*' means '*madhya*'—middle. The term '*patra*' which in common parlance means a letter, also means an article, analytical in nature. Thus, a *Kroḍapatra* is an article or a collection of articles with a critical perspective that aim at discussing a point which occurs midway in the content being discussed in the original text. Another explanation given for the term is that *Kroḍapatra* is a paper kept in between the pages. While copying the manuscripts, sometimes some sentences may be missed and in such cases, it becomes necessary to offer some explanation for that portion. At times some scholar may write something to express his own views on a certain point discussed in the text. *Kroḍapatra*, by this explanation, is an article written with either of the intentions mentioned above and kept in the middle of the pages. But in the *Kroḍapatras*, it is seldom so, that the author is trying to fill in the gaps that were created by the person who copied the manuscript. As a matter of fact, the authors of the

Kroḍapatras generally commence their discussion with a point which the original writer has stated as final.

The contribution of the *Kroḍapatras* to the development of the Navya Nyāya tradition is illustrated by two *Kroḍapatras*—*Kālīsankariya* and *Candranārāyaṇīya* named after the authors Kalisankara Bhattacharya and Chandranarayana Bhattacharya who flourished during the A.D. eighteenth century. These two *Kroḍapatras* are held in high esteem in the Nyāya circle and even today they are studied as a part of the advanced study of Nyāya. These two *Kroḍapatras* are on the *Hetvābhāsasāmānya-nirukti* of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, which in turn is a commentary on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's *Didhiti* on the *Hetvābhāsa* portion of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Gaṅgeśa in the *Hetvābhāsaprakaraṇa* of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, suggests one after the other, three definitions of the fallacies of reason. The second definition is:

yadviṣayakatvena jñānasyānumiti-pratibandhakatvam tattvam

यद्विषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वं तत्त्वम् ।

This means that a fallacy of reason is that by comprehending which a cognition prevents an inferential cognition. *Vanhyābhāvavadhrada* is an instance of this definition. It is called the fallacy of *bādha*, while the inference is '*hrado vanhimān dhūmāt*'. The definition is applicable here because the cognition of this fallacy, which arises in the form '*hrado Vanhyābhāvavān*' prevents the inferential cognition.

Commenting on the definition, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi suggests a slight modification by replacing *yadviṣayakatvena* into *yādṛśaviśiṣṭa-viṣayakatvena*. Suppose this modification is not made, the definition would not be applicable to any fallacy. For, since mere '*hrada*' is identical with the '*hrada* qualified by *vanhyabhāva*' the cognition of mere '*hrada*' also is the cognition *vanhyabhāvavadhrada*. But, the cognition of mere '*hrada*' does not prevent the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*'. Therefore, the cognition of *Vanhyabhāvavadhrada* cannot be said as preventive of the inferential cognition. Thus, the definition suffers from the defect of *asambhava*. If the term '*yadviṣayakatvena*', is replaced by the term '*yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatvena*', this defect can be avoided. Apparently, this modification suggested by Śiromaṇi, is meaningless. For, since a qualified object is identical with the 'mere object', the *hrada* qualified with '*vanhyabhāva*' is the same as the mere '*hrada*' and hence the cognition of mere '*hrada*' is also the cognition of the *viśiṣṭa*—the *hrada* qualified with *vanhyabhāva*. But, as Gadādhara suggests here the term '*Yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatvena*' should be taken in the sense of '*Yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayakatvena*'. Now the definition is –

yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayakatvena jñānasya anumitipratibandhakatvam tadrūpāvacchinnavatvam

यद्रूपवच्छिन्नविषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्य अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वं तद्रूपवच्छिन्नत्वम् ।

It means—'A fallacy of reason is the possessing of that property, by comprehending the thing possessed of which property, the cognition prevents the inferential cognition'.

In case of the instance, '*hrado vanhimān dhūmāt*', Gadādhara seems to hold the view that the property by possessing of which the reason in the above inference is considered as fallacious, is '*vanhyabhāvavadhrdatva*'—'Lakeness qualified with the absence of fire'. However, he does not specifically spell it out and moves to the next topic. From this point, the *Kroḍapatras* commence their analysis.

Kalisankara Bhattacharya raises the question—'*atha yadrūpapadena kim dhartavyam?*'—What is signified by the term '*yadrūpa*' (which property) in the definition? The ready answer would be '*vanhyabhāvavadhrdatvam*' in case of the fallacious inferences—'*hrado vanhimān dhūmāt*'. But, Kālīsaṅkara continues to question—'*vanhyabhāvavadhrdatva* means the property called lakeness qualified with *vanhyabhāva* and what is this relation with which *hradatva* is said to be qualified with *vanhyabhāva*? Of course, the relation cannot be the relation of *svarūpa* by which an absence is normally expected to be present wherever its counterpositive does not exist. For, since, fire the counterpositive in the above case, can never be imagined to exist in '*hradatva*', its absence naturally always exists in it and the cognition 'the lake has lake-ness that has no fire' cannot prevent the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*'. Therefore, the possible relation with *vanhyabhāva* here, should be the relation of *sāmānādhikarānya* or co-existence. It may be held that one who knows *hradatva* and *vanhyabhāva* existing together, cannot have the cognition '*hrado vanhimān*' and hence the cognition that 'the lake has the property of lakeness which is qualified with *vanhyabhāva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikarānya* will definitely prevent the inferential cognition—'*hrado vanhimān*'. Kālīsaṅkara points out that this view is not tenable, because there are some such cognitions which cannot prevent the inferential cognition but comprehend a thing which is possessed of the said property. For instance, the cognition—'*sāmānādhikarānyasambandhena vanhyabhāvavadhrdatvavān*'. The peculiarity of this cognition is that it has *hrada* as its qualificandum and *hradatva* qualified with *vanhyabhāva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikarānya* as its qualifier. But it does not comprehend any limiter of the qualificandumness. For the same reason it cannot prevent the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*', which has a limiter of qualificandumness, namely, *hradatva*. Since these two cognitions mentioned above do not have the same limiter of qualificandumness, they cannot be held as *pratibadhya* and *pratibandhaka*. But, this cognition also comprehends *hradatva* as qualified with *vanhyabhāva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikarānya*. Therefore, '*sāmānādhikarānya sambandhena vanhyabhāvavadhrdatva*' cannot be the property signified by the term '*yadrūpa*' in the definition.

The other alternative is to hold that *vanhyabhāva* and *hradatva*—the two properties as denoted by the term '*yadrūpa*'. But as in the case of the first alternative, here also it can be shown that even a cognition which is a non-preventor

of the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*', has as its content the thing possessed of the two properties—*vanhyabhāva* and *hradatva*. For instance, the cognition '*vanhyabhāvahradatvavān*' which comprehends both *vanhyabhāva* and *hradatva* together in *hrada*. As in the earlier case, even this cognition does not have *hradatva* as the limiter of the qualificandumness, and hence cannot be the preventor of the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*' which has *hradatva* as the limiter of the qualificandumness. Thus, Kalisankara points out that it is not possible to specifically state as to what could be the denotation of the term '*yadrūpa*'.

Kalisankara Bhattacharya then, refers to several attempts made to solve the problem, including that of the 'Nayyas' who could be his contemporary Naiyāyikas. He finds fault with some of them. He also refers to the other views without criticising them, thereby indicating that they are acceptable. Only in the case of one view, first, he finds fault with it and thereafter suggests an amendment and accepts it. I shall try to explain here only that view which he concedes as admissible with an amendment. The following are his words -

kecit tu-vanhidharmitāvacchedakatāpannābhāvavāvacchinnadharmitāvacchedakatāpannahradatvameva yadrūpapadena dhartavyamityapi vadanti/tanna/tathāsati vanhidharmitāvacchedakatāpannābhāvavāvacchinnadharmitāvacchedakatāpannaparvatatvamādāya bhramaviṣaye'tivyāpteh/yadi ca tādrśadharmitāvacchedakatāpanna yad vanhyabhāvahradatvādikaṃ tad eva yad rūpa padenocyate tadā na doṣa iti dhyeyam/

केचित्तु - वहिधर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नाभावत्वावच्छिन्नधर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नह्रदत्वमेव यद्रूपपदेन धर्तव्यमित्यपि वदन्ति । तन्न । तथासति वहिधर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नाभावत्वावच्छिन्न-धर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नपर्वतत्वमादाय भ्रमविषयेऽतिव्याप्तेः । यदि च तादृशधर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नं यद् वह्यभावह्रदत्वादिकं तदेव यद्रूपपदनोच्यते तदा न दोष इति ध्येयम् ।

The solution suggested by *kecit* (some)—in case of the fallacious inference—'*hrado vanhimān dhūmāt*', the term *yadrūpa* denotes the property which has the limitorness in respect of the qualificandumness determined by an *abhāva*, the property—*abhāvavāva* of which, has the limitorness in respect of the qualificandumness determined by *vanhi*. The above solution will be easy to understand if we analyse the structure of the cognition—'*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*'. Here *abhāva* is comprehended as qualified with *vanhi*. Thus with reference to *vanhi*, *abhāva* is the qualificandum and the *abhāvavāva* residing in it, is the limiter of the qualificandumness that resides in the *abhāva*. Hence, it can be said that *abhāvavāva* has the limitorness in respect of the qualificandumness residing in the *abhāva* and this qualificandumness is determined by the *vanhi*. Similarly, with reference to the *abhāva*, *hrada* has the qualificandumness and *hradatva* is its limiter.

In short, the term '*yadrūpa*' in the definition, refers to that *hradatva* which has the limitorness in respect of the qualificandumness determined by the *abhāva*; *abhāvatva*, the property of which also has the limitorness in respect of the qualificandumness determined by *vanhi*. Only by comprehending a thing possessed of such a *hradatva*, the cognition could prevent the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*'. Since the other cognitions such as '*sāmānādhikarāṇya-sambandhena vanhyabhāvaviśiṣṭahradatvavān*', '*vanhyabhāvahrada-tvobhayavān*', etc. do not comprehend such a *hradatva*, they cannot prevent the inferential cognition *hrado vanhimān*.

The fault in this second explanation, according to Kalisankara Bhattacharya, is that if such a property as shown above is denoted by the term '*yadrūpa*', then the definition of *hetvābhāsa* will become too wide. For, the inference '*parvato vanhimān dhūmāt*', which is a valid inference, can also be shown as having a fallacy. The point that is being made by him is this—just as the cognition '*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*' prevents the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*', the cognition '*parvato vanhyabhāvavān*' also, actually prevents the inferential cognition '*parvato vanhyābhāvavān*'. The only difference is that while the cognition '*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*' is a valid cognition, the cognition '*parvato vanhyabhāvavān*' is an erroneous one. Anyway, when it occurs, it prevents the inferential cognition '*parvato vanhimān*'. Now, just as the cognition '*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*' comprehends that which is possessed of *hradatva* which has *dharmitā-vacchedakatā* determined by the *abhāva*, *abhāvatva* the property of which also has *dharmitā-vacchedakatā* determined by *vanhi*, the cognition '*parvato vanhyabhāvavān*' also comprehends that which is possessed of *parvatatva* which has *dharmitā-vacchedakatā* determined by the *abhāva*, *abhāvatva* the property of which has *dharmitā-vacchedakatā* determined by *vanhi*. Therefore, if the inference '*hrado vanhimān dhūmāt*' is fallacious, similarly, the inference, '*parvato vanhimān dhūmāt*' also will have to be considered as fallacious.

Kalisankara himself shows the way to overcome the above problem. He suggests that in addition to all that is said, it must also be said that the *hradatva* qualified with *vanhyabhāva*, is denoted by the term '*yadrūpa*'. Since *hradatva* is naturally qualified with *vanhyabhāva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* such a *hradatva* which also has *dharmitāvacchedakatā* as explained earlier, can be taken as the meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*'. But in case of *parvatatva* it is not so. *Parvatatva* might be having *dharmitāvacchedakatā* as shown earlier. But it is not qualified with *vanhyabhāva* as the smoky hill has no *vanhyabhāva*. In other words, since such a *parvatatva* does not exist it cannot be the meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*' and it is also not possible to claim that the inference '*parvato vanhimān dhūmāt*' will have to be considered as fallacious.

This is the amendment that Kālīsaṅkara suggests here and he is of the view that with this modification the explanation of the meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*' given by '*kecit*' is acceptable. We do not know who are these '*kecit*' Naiyāyikas. There is also a custom among the *śāstric* writers to float their own views by the names of others. Kālīsaṅkara too might have followed that custom here.

Candranārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭācārya's work, which is a *Kroḍapatra* dealing with the same text of Gadādhara, discusses more elaborately than the *Kālīsaṅkarīya*, the meaning of the term 'yadrūpa'. In addition to the two possible alternatives that Kālīsaṅkara referred to at the beginning of his analysis, Candranārāyaṇa refers to one more possible meaning of the term 'yadrūpa' and thoroughly explains all the three alternatives. It is interesting to note that Candranārāyaṇa too, without offering any solution to the problems, just criticises the explanations offered by the others. While examining the third explanation of the term 'yadrūpa' and also the explanation offered by some, what he ultimately points out is that if these explanations along with the amendments suggested are accepted, then certain *viśeṣaṇas* later included in the definition by Gadādhara would become redundant. Thus he is candid enough to show the inadequacies in the process of analysing the things connected with the definition of *hetvābhāsa* by Gadādhara who first, blindly, introduced the term 'yadrūpa' in the definition, without bothering to analyse its significance and later included some more *viśeṣaṇas* which would become redundant if the connotation of the term is properly analysed.

Here I shall try to highlight briefly some of the interesting observations that Candranārāyaṇa makes while discussing the significance of the term 'yadrūpa'.

The first possible explanation of the term 'yadrūpa' that Candranārāyaṇa refers to is '*sāmānādhikaraṇyasambandhena vanhyabhāvaviśiṣṭa-hradatva*'. Kālīsaṅkara also refers to this explanation. The fault that Candranārāyaṇa finds here is this that if this is the 'yadrūpa' then it should have been comprehended by the cognition *hrado vanhyabhāvavān* which actually prevents the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*'. But it is obvious that the cognition '*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*' does not comprehend *vanhyabhāva* in *hradatva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. It may be argued that since, in the said cognition, *hradatva* is the limiter of the qualificandumness through the qualificandum that is *hrada*, *vanhyabhāva* is comprehended by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in *hradatva*. But, Candranārāyaṇa draws our attention to the subtle but significant point that though the cognition thus comprehends *vanhyabhāva* in *hradatva* by the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* relation, it cannot be said that the cognition comprehends *yadrūpāvacchinna*. To be more precise, what is meant by the comprehension of the *yadrūpāvacchinna*, is that the cognition must be the determinant of the qualificandumness which has the *yadrūpa* as its limiter (*yadrūpāvacchinna-viśeṣyatākatva*). But, while *vanhyabhāva* is by an indirect relation *sāmānādhikaraṇya* grasped in *hradatva*, the objecthood that is the *viśayatā* in *hradatva*, is not the limitorness determined by the qualificandumness (*viśeṣyatāvachchedakatā*). Hence, the cognition *hrado vanhyabhāvavān* cannot be *yadrūpāvacchhinna-viśayaka* in the sense of '*yadrūpaniṣṭhāvachchedakatāvīśeṣyatāka*'.

Candranārāyaṇa also rejects the second explanation according to which *vanhyabhāva* and *hradatva*—are denoted by the term *yadrūpa*. In that case, the cognition '*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*' which prevents the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*', will have to be regarded as *yadrūpāvacchhinnaviśayaka* which means *yadrūpa* has the limitorness (*avachchedakatā*) determined by the objecthood of the

cognition. It further indicates that *yadrūpa*, that is, *vanhyabhāva-hradatva* together have a limitorness determined by the objecthood of the cognition. But, if we analyse the structure of the cognition '*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*' it becomes clear that it is not so. In this cognition, *vanhyabhāva* is the mode and its modeness is limited by the property *vanhyabhāvatva* and also by the relation called *viśeṣanatāviśeṣa*. But, though *hradatva* also is a content of this cognition, it is not a mode. It is the limiter of the qualificandumness residing in the *hrada*. Thus the *hradatva* has the limitorness, which though is limited by the relation of *samavāya*, is not limited by any property. Hence, it is clear that the objecthood residing in the *vahnnyabhāva* is of the nature of modeness, whereas the objecthood residing in *hradatva* is of the nature of the limitorness and thus are absolutely different. This being the case, it is not correct to say that *vanhyabhāva* and *hradatva* are the *yadrūpa* and that both have the same limitorness determined by qualificandumness of the cognition '*hrado vahnnyabhāvavān*'. Thus, the second explanation also does not hold good.

As per the third explanation, mere '*vahnnyabhāva*' with the relation of *viśeṣanatā* qualified with *hradatvāvachchinnānuyogitākatva* is the *yadrūpa*. This explanation and also the explanation offered by some, according to which *hradatva-vahnnyabhāva*—these two are the *yadrūpa*, are rejected by Candranārāyaṇa, pointing out that if these explanations with all the amendments that will be suggested, are admitted, then the *viśeṣaṇas* which Gadādhara will include later in the definition would become redundant. I do not propose here to discuss these two explanations and Candranārāyaṇa's criticism thereon. I would only like to point out the frankness and the unbiased attitude of the authors of the *Kroḍapatras*, who after a thorough examination of a problem, are prepared even to reject the stand considered as final by the earlier Naiyāyikas.

Among the large number of *Kroḍapatras* that are known to us, only a few are published while being rarely studied. Some of them were secretly guarded by some scholars. *Tritalāvacchedakatāvāda* published by the Mithila Institute of Darbhanga is an example. It is said that for generations, this *Kroḍapatra* was secretly guarded by a tradition which would make use of the arguments and *pariṣkāras* contained in the *Kroḍapatra*, in debates to baffle their opponents. During the last century, as also in the earlier part of this century, Naiyāyika's studies the *Kroḍapatras* with much enthusiasm and consequently criticism and justification of the *Kroḍapatras* also emerged on. Mysore Rama Śāstri's *Śatakoṭi Kroḍapatras* on the *Satpratipakṣa* of Gadādhara is an example. This contains one hundred arguments that thoroughly examine the definition of the fallacy—*Satpratipakṣa*, offered by Gadādhara. Two Naiyāyikas, namely Anantalvar and Krisnatatacharya wrote *Kroḍapatras* called *Śatakoṭikhandaṇa* and attacked the arguments contained in the *Śatakoṭi*. Later, another Naiyāyika authored a *Kroḍapatra* called *Śatakoṭikhandaṇamandaṇa* to justify Rama Shastri's *Kroḍapatra*. Thus, till the early part of this century, the *Kroḍapatra* tradition was a living force but today the tradition flourishes no more.

This article on the *Kroḍapatras*, will be incomplete if the structure of *anugamas* which are frequently made use of in the *Kroḍapatras* is not explained. Hence, an attempt is made here to explain the technique of *anugama*.

The *anugamas* that are suggested as a final solution to a problem are of a wonderful structure. In the beginning they appear to be of a very simple nature. But, soon they will develop into a complex and complicated structure with the peculiar and the multiple relations involved. The structure of an *anugama* thus created is so complex that an ordinary student will find it impossible to penetrate into this fort containing innumerable inner circles.

Here an attempt is made to illustrate an *anugama* with its background.

Anugama

While discussing the meaning of singular case suffix, (*ekavacana-pratyaya*) the Naiyāyikas reject the contention that the number—being one, is the meaning of the suffix. For, such a number is universally present and hence even when there are several jars on the ground, the sentence '*atra ghaṭostī*'—'there is one jar on the ground'—will have to be considered as valid. Therefore, they define *ekatva*—the meaning of the singular suffix in a different manner. Accordingly, *ekatva* means '*sajātīyadvitīyarahitatva*' that is, being devoid of a second which is similar. Now, when several jars are on the ground, the sentence '*atra ghaṭo'stī*' becomes incorrect, because there is another jar similar to it. Here the similarity consists in possessing the attribute:

svasamabhivyaḥṛta-padārtha-samsargitāviśiṣṭa-prakṛtyarthatāvachedaka-dharma.

स्वसमभिव्याहृतपदार्थसंसर्गिताविशिष्टप्रकृत्यर्थावच्छेदकधर्म

that is the limiter of being the meaning of the nominal base (*prakṛtyarthatāvachedaka*) that co-exists with the relation of the locus conveyed by a word used in the same sentence. In the sentence—'*atra ghaṭostī*' the nominal base of the singular number is the word—'*ghaṭa*'. The limiter of being the meaning of this word, is jarness. This jarness, co-existing with the relation of the locus conveyed by the word '*atra*' used in the same sentence, is to be regarded here as the similarity and it is the absence of a similar object of that kind that is the *ekatva*—the meaning of a singular case suffix. When there are several jars on the ground, each jar has a jar similar to it. For, the other jar has not only the *prakṛtyartha-tāvachedaka* or jarness, but also 'the relation of the locus conveyed by the word *atra* of the sentence. That is why in a situation when there are several jars on the ground, the sentence—'*atra ghaṭo'stī*' becomes invalid.

Now an objection is raised against this explanation. Suppose there are two jars on the ground, one is black and the other is yellow - the sentence '*atra nīlaghaṭo'stī*' cannot be said to be incorrect, because actually there is only one black jar on the ground. But, as per the above explanation of the meaning of the singular case suffix, even such sentences will have to be rejected as incorrect as

in the given situation, the black jar has a similar jar with it. In other words, the yellow jar is similar to the black jar, because it has both the *prakṛtyarthatāvachedaka*—jarness and also the ‘relation of the locus’ conveyed by the term ‘*atra*’. Thus, as the black jar has another similar jar with it, and, if the singular case suffix conveys the meaning as is described above, then the sentence when there is a *pītaghata* also, will have to be rejected as incorrect.

The untenability of the explanation of the meaning of the singular case suffix, is shown by another instance also.

The sentence ‘*brāhmano brāhmaṇāya dhenuḥ dadāti*’—‘one Brahman gives away a cow to another Brahman’, conveys the *ekatva* of two Brāhmanas, of whom one is the giver and other is the receiver. The singular case suffix added to the two ‘Brāhmana’ words here, conveys the *ekatva* of both of them. But, if the meaning of the singular case suffix is as above then that cannot be explained in either case. For, as per the explanation, each of them, should be *svasajātīyadvitīyārhaḥ*, that is, must have possessed the absence of the second similar to it. And the similarity as explained earlier consists in possessing the *prakṛtyarthatāvachedaka* and also *samabhivṛtyāhrtasamsarga*. Here the nominal base for the *ekavacana* is the word ‘*brāhmaṇa*’ and hence ‘Brahmanhood’ is the *prakṛtyarthatāvachedaka*. This is present in both the giver and the receiver here. Again both of them possess *samabhivṛtyāhrtasamsarga*—the relation of the object conveyed by a word used in the sentence. Here, such an object is the action ‘giving away’ or ‘*sampradānakriyā*’ that is conveyed by the word ‘*dadāti*’. It is obvious that the relation of this object is present in both the giver and the receiver. Thus, both the Brāhmanas denoted by the two ‘*Brāhmana*’ terms of the sentence have the *samabhivṛtyāhrtasamsarga*. Therefore, each of the two Brāhmanas here, has a *sajātīya*, a second person similar to him. Hence, none of them can be said to possess the *ekatva* denoted by the singular case suffix here.

In order to avoid the above objections the following *anugama* is suggested:

ekavacana viśiṣṭam ekatvam ekavacanārthaḥ

एकवचनविशिष्टम् एकत्वम् एकवचनार्थः ।

This simply means that a singular case suffix means the *ekatva*, that is, ‘being one’ which is related with an *ekavacana*—singular case suffix. Thus, in the instance ‘*atra ghaṭo’sti*’ the singular suffix that is added to the term ‘*ghaṭa*’, means the *ekatva* that is related with the *ekavacana* (the singular case suffix).

Now, naturally, the question arises as to what is the relation of *ekavacana* in *ekatva*. In reply, the following relation is suggested :

sva-prakṛtyarthatāvachedakatva-svaviśiṣṭa-samsargatānirūpakatvobhaya-sambandhena yat svādhikaraṇaṁ tanniṣṭhabheda-pratīyogitānavachedakatvam.

स्वप्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेकवत्त्व-स्वविशिष्टसंसर्गतानिरूपकत्वोभयसंबन्धेन यत्स्वाधिकरणं तन्निष्ठभेदप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वम् ।

In the second relation mentioned above, certain *sāmsargatā* is to be related with the *ekavacana* which is referred to by the term 'sva'. The following is the relation of 'sva' in the *sāmsargatā*:

sva-prayojya-śābdabodha-viṣayatvasāmānādhikarāṇya-svasamānādhikarāṇa-prayojya-śābdabodhaviṣayatā/sāmānādhikarāṇyānyatara-sambandhena.

स्वप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्वसामानाधिकरण्य-स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयता
सामानाधिकरण्यान्यतरसंबन्धेन ।

The understanding of the above relations demands a familiarity with various technicalities, used by the Navya Nyāya school. I shall take it for granted that the reader is sufficiently familiar with those technicalities and will try to explain the above relations as simply as possible.

Let us suppose that there is only one jar on the ground. Only in such a situation the *ekatva*—'oneness' the number residing in the *ghaṭa* becomes related with the *ekavacana* that is added to the nominal base 'ghaṭa'. This *ekatva* which is in the *ghaṭa* is related with the *ekavacana* by a relation which involves in it two relations such as *svaprakṛtyarthatāvachchedakatva* and *svaviśiṣṭa-sāmsargatānirūpakatva*. Since this is the relation of *ekavacana*, here 'sva' refers to the *ekavacana*. Its *prakṛti* (the nominal base), is the word 'ghaṭa'. The *prakṛtyarthatāvachchedaka*, that is the limiter of 'being the meaning' of the *prakṛti* is *ghaṭatva*. As a matter of fact, this *ghaṭatva* is present even in a jar kept somewhere else. But, that jar does not have the second relation of the *ekavacana*, namely, *svaviśiṣṭasāmsargatānirūpakatva*. Here the term *sāmsargatā* refers only to that *sāmsargatā* which resides in the *sāmsarga*—the relation between the ground and the jar that are before us. That relation is the *ādheyatā* residing in the jar before and is determined by the ground. At present, we have to assume that only this *sāmsargatā* is related with the *sva* and not any other *sāmsargatā*. This point will become clear when we try to analyse the relation of *sva* in the *sāmsargatā*. The relation is:

sva-prayojya-śābdabodha-viṣayatva-sāmānādhikarāṇya-svasamānādhikarāṇa-pratyaya-prayojyatādṛś-viṣayatā-sāmānādhikarāṇya etad anyatarasambandha.

स्वप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्वसामानाधिकरण्य-स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रत्ययप्रयोज्यतादृशविषयतासामाना-
धिकरण्यएतदन्यतरसंबन्धेन ।

The above relation, actually, contains two relations and the *sāmsargatā* is intended to be related with *sva* by either of the two relations. The two relations are:

- i. *svaprayojya-śābdabodha-viṣayatva-sāmānādhikarāṇya*
(स्वप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्वसामानाधिकरण्य), and
- ii. *svasamānādhikarāṇa-pratyaya-prayojyatādṛśa-viṣayatā-sāmānādhikarāṇya.*
(स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रत्ययप्रयोज्यतादृशविषयतासामानाधिकरण्य ।)

In the case of the instance 'atra ghaṭaḥ asti', 'sva' as already said, refers to the *ekavacana* suffix added to the word 'ghaṭa'. The 'ghaṭa' mentioned here in this sentence, is the *ghaṭa* which is on the ground before us (*atra*). That *ghaṭa* has the *sāmsarga*, namely *ekadeśa-nirūpitā ādheyatā*. This *ādheyatā* being a *sāmsarga* has a *sāmsargatā*. This *sāmsargatā* is *svaviśiṣṭā* which is related with the *ekavacana* by the second of the two relations mentioned above. This can be explained as follows. The relation is:

svasamānādhikaraṇapratyayaḥprajoyāśābdabodhaviśayatva
(स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रत्ययप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्व)

sva is the *ekavacana* that we hear after the word 'ghaṭa'. *Sva-samānādhikaraṇapratyaya* means the suffix that co-exists with the *ekavacana*. In the sentence 'atra ghaṭaḥ asti' both the *ekavacana* and the suffix *trala* which is a part of the word *atra*, are present. Here the *trala* suffix can be said as *svasamānādhikaraṇapratyaya*. The meaning of the *trala* is *ādheyatā*. By conveying that meaning the *trala* makes it possible for this *ādheyatva* to become an object of the verbal cognition produced by the sentence 'atra ghaṭaḥ asti'. Therefore, the *ādheyatā* has the objectness. This objectness, that is, *viśayatā* resides here as *svasamānādhikaraṇapratyayaḥprajoyāśābdabodhaviśayatā*. Since this *viśayatā* resides in the *sāmsarga—ekadeśanirūpitāādheyatā*, it is now clear that *sāmsargatā* of this *sāmsarga*, has the coexistence of the above *viśayatā*. Thus the *sāmsargatā* which is in the *ādheyatā*, has *svasamānādhikaraṇapratyayaḥprajoyāśābdabodhaviśayatā—sāmānādhikaraṇya*. In other words, the *sāmsargatā* is related with the *sva*, that is, *svaviśiṣṭā* by the above relation. Since this *sāmsargatā* is determined by the *ghaṭa* which actually has the *sāmsarga*, that is, *ādheyatā*, it is now clear that *ghaṭa* is *svaviśiṣṭa-sāmsargatānirūpaka*. Thus, by the two relations, namely, *svaprakṛtyartha-tāvachedakatva* and *svaviśiṣṭasāmsargatānirūpakatva*, *sva* is related to the *ghaṭa* or, in other words by these two relations, the locus of the *sva* is the *ghaṭa* before us. The *ekatva* with which we are concerned now and which has to be shown by us as being related with the *ekavacana* of the word 'ghaṭaḥ', also belongs to the same *ghaṭa*. The difference which may be said to be present in the *svādhikaraṇa ghaṭa*, is the difference of some other *ghaṭa*, and is never that of the same *ghaṭa*. Hence, the counterpositive (*pratiyogī*) of the difference is another jar and the *ekatva* residing in that *ghaṭa* can be said to be the limiter of the counterpositiveness. But the *ekatva* residing in the same *ghaṭa* cannot be the limiter of the counterpositiveness. Hence, when there is only one jar on the ground then only the sentence 'atra ghaṭaḥ asti' becomes valid. For, as already explained above, the jar which is there alone on the ground, can be the possessor of the meaning of the singular case suffix, the meaning being 'ekavacanaviśiṣṭam ekatvam'.

Suppose there are two jars on the ground, then the sentence 'atra ghaṭaḥ asti' becomes incorrect, because none of the two jars, has the meaning of the singular case suffix. This can be briefly explained as follows:

The meaning of the singular case suffix is 'ekavacanaviśiṣṭam ekatvam'. The *vaiśiṣṭya* or the relation of *ekavacana* in the *ekatva* is:

Svaprakṛtyarthatāvachedakatva—svaviśiṣṭa-sāmsargatānirūpakatvobhaya sambandhena yat svādhikaraṇam tanniṣṭhabhedapratiyogitānavachedakatva. Since both the jars are present on the same ground, both of them become *svādhikaraṇa*, that is the locus of *ekavacana* by the two relations, namely—*svaprakṛtyarthatāvachedakatva* and *svaviśiṣṭasāmsargatānirūpakatva*. Since the *ekatva* that is oneness of each jar can be the *pratiyogitāvachedaka* of the *bheda* residing in the other, none of the jars does possess the *ekatva* which is not the limiter of the counter-positiveness of the difference.

Similarly, when there are two jars on the ground—one being *nīla* and the other *pīta*—the sentence ‘*atra nīlaghaṭaḥ asti*’ can be justified.

Here the singular case suffix, added to the word *ghaṭa*, can be said to be related with only the *nīla*-jar and not with the *pīta*-jar for the following reasons. Between the two relations, namely, *svaprakṛtyarthatāvachedakatva* and *svaviśiṣṭasāmsargatānirūpakatva*, the *pītaghaṭa*, as a matter of fact, is related with the *ekavacana* in the word ‘*ghaṭaḥ*’ by the first relation, because the *prakṛtyarthatāvachedaka*—the limiter of being the meaning of the nominal base ‘*ghaṭaḥ*’, that is, ‘*ghaṭatva*’ is very much present in the *pītaghaṭa* also. But, the *pītaghaṭa* is not related with the singular case suffix, by the relation—*svaviśiṣṭasāmsargatānirūpakatva*, for, the *sāmsargatā* which is *svaviśiṣṭa*, that is, related with the *ekavacana* here, is the *sāmsargatā* residing in the *ādheyatā* that belongs to *nīlaghaṭa* alone. This is because that *sāmsargatā* alone has the relation of *sva*, namely *svasāmānādhikaraṇa-pratyayaprayojya-śābdabodhaviśayatā-sāmānādhikaraṇya*. A brief explanation of this is as follows: *Sva* is the singular case suffix. The *pratyaya* co-existing with *sva*, is the *trala* in the word ‘*atra*’. The *viśayatā*, that is, objectness determined by the verbal cognition, resides in the *ādheyatā* of *nīlaghaṭa* only. Since the *pītaghaṭa* is not an object of the verbal cognition produced by the sentence ‘*atra nīlaghaṭaḥ asti*’, the question of its *ādheyatā* having the objectness belonging to *pītaghaṭa* and that too being caused by the *tral*, does not arise. In short, the *pītaghaṭa* though it exists on the same ground on which the *nīlaghaṭa* exists, is not related with the *ekavacana* by the second of the two relations. What actually is thus related with the *ekavacana* here, is *nīlaghaṭa*. Since *nīlaghaṭa* has the *bheda* with *pītaghaṭa*, the *ekatva* of *pītaghaṭa* becomes the *bhedapratiyogitāvachedaka*. On the other hand, since *nīlaghaṭa*, cannot have the *bheda* of itself, the *ekatva* of it, becomes the *bhedapratiyogitāvachedaka*. The meaning of the *ekavacana* suffix, as pointed out earlier, is the *ekavacanaviśiṣṭaikatva*. Such an *ekatva* is actually present in the *nīlaghaṭa*, in spite of the fact that *pītaghaṭa* also is present on the same ground. Thus, the sentence ‘*atra nīlaghaṭaḥ asti*’—when there are *nīlaghaṭa* and *pītaghaṭa* on the ground, can be justified.

The origin of this complicated structure of *ekatva* can be traced to the simple statement ‘*sajātyadvitīyārthahitatvam ekatvam*’ made by Gadādhara in his *Vyūtpattivāda*, while discussing the meaning of *ekavacana*. To make the concept more clear, Gadādhara himself elaborated it as *svasajātyaniṣṭhabhedapratiyogin-avachedakaikatva* and further clarified by stating the *sajātyam*, that is, similarity, contained in it, as—*sajātyam ca svasamabhivṛyāhārapadārthasāmsargitvaviśiṣṭaparakṛtyar-*

thatāvacchedakatvarūpeṇa. The above *anugamana* suggested by Pt. Bachcha Jha, is clear now that it is based only on these certain statements made by Gadādhara.

As a matter of fact, the *anugama* now shown is a simple one compared to the still complicated structure which Pt. Bachcha Jha, suggested later in order to avoid certain objections raised against the above *anugama*. I do not propose here either to discuss or elaborately explain the objections raised and the structure of *anugama* suggested to avoid the objections. But, just to show the mind-boggling complications, which are the result of the various relations that are involved, I shall merely demonstrate the *anugama* with all the relations contained in it.

ekavacanaviśiṣṭam ekatvam ekavacanārthaḥ

(एकवचनविशिष्टं एकत्वम् एकवचनार्थः)

This just means that the meaning of a singular case suffix is the *ekatva* which is related with the singular case suffix. Thus, in the sentence '*atra nīlaghaṭaḥ asti*', the singular case suffix added to the word '*nīlaghaṭa*' means the *ekatva* of *nīlaghaṭa*, denoted by the term '*nīlaghaṭa*'. The following is the relation of the singular case suffix in the *ekatva*:

svaprakṛti-prayojya-viśayatā-viśiṣṭa-nirūpakatādhikaraṇatātvāvachchinnānuyogitāka-paryāptikasambandhāvachchinnavadvṛttibheda-pratīyogitānavacchedakatvam.

(स्वप्रकृतिप्रयोज्यविषयताविशिष्टनिरूपकताधिकरणतात्वावच्छिन्नानुयोगिताकर्पाप्तिक-संबन्धावच्छिन्नवद्वृत्तिभेदप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वम् । [Here, '*sva*' refers to the *ekavacana*])

In the above relation, '*nirūpakatā*' is stated as related with '*svaprakṛti-prayojyaviśayatā*'. The relation of the *viśayatā* in the *nirūpakatā* is one of the following four relations:

Nirūpaktāyām vaiśiṣṭyām ca (निरूपकतायां वैशिष्ट्यं च)

1. *svabhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatāvattva* (स्वाभिन्नमुख्यविशेष्यतावत्त्व)

2. *svabhinnamukhyaprakāratāvachchekatāvattva* (स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व)

3. *svabhinnamukhyaprakāratāvattva* (स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावत्त्व)

4. *svābhinnatādṛśa viśeṣyatāvachchekatāvattva-anyatamasambandhena*
(स्वाभिन्नतादृशविशेष्यतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व-अन्यतमसंबन्धेन ।)

There are four possible, different instances in which a singular case suffix can be found. They are:

1. Where the singular case suffix is added to a word that denotes the main qualificandum (*mukhyaviśeṣya*) for example, '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*'. Here the word '*ghaṭa*' denotes the main qualificandum. The singular case suffix added to this is taken care of by the first of the above four relations.

2. The second type of singular case suffix is that which is added to the word that denotes the 'limitor of the qualificerness' (*prakāratā-vacchedaka*). For example,

'*puruṣoḥ rājñah*'—'This is a king's servant'. Here the *ṣaṣṭhī*—*ekavacana* added to the word '*rājan*' is being covered. In the cognition produced by this sentence, 'servant' is the qualifier and the king is the limiter of the qualierness. To explain the meaning of this *ekavacana* the second of the above four relations, is mentioned.

3. Among the above four relations, the third one, namely '*svabhinna-mukhya-prakāratāvattva*' is included to cover the instance—'*Rāmadārāḥ Jānakī*'. Here the word '*Rāmadārā*' denotes the qualificandum and the word '*Jānakī*' refers to the qualifier. Since the word *Rāmadārā* is in plural number, that suffix cannot convey the *ekatva* of '*Rāmadārā*'—consort of *Rāma*. As a matter of fact, the suffix is considered here as meaningless, but added just for the sake of grammatical correctness of the word. Here the *ekatva* of *Rāmadārā*, will have to be conveyed by the singular case suffix which we hear after the word '*Jānakī*'. As told above, this instance is covered by the third relation.

4. The fourth of the four relations being explained now, is *svabhinna-mukhyaviśeṣyatāvachchedakatāvattva*. This is included here to cover the instance '*rājñah puruṣaḥ atrāsti*'. Here there are two terms ending with a singular case suffix. One is the term '*rājñah*' which is in *ṣaṣṭhī* - *ekavacana*. Again, the main qualificandum of the cognition produced by this sentence is '*puruṣa*'. The *ekatva* of him is conveyed by the singular case affix added to the word '*puruṣa*'. But, if the *ekatva* of the '*rājan*' also is intended in the given sentence, to cover it, this fourth relation becomes necessary.

Before we continue further with this *anugama*, it will be helpful, if we briefly repeat what we have explained so far:

The meaning of a singular case affix is:

svaprakṛti-prayojya viśayatā (स्वप्रकृतिप्रयोज्यविषयता)
viśiṣṭa (विशिष्ट)

nirūpakatādhikaraṇatāvāvacchinnānuyogitākāparyāptika-sambandhāvachchinnavadvytibhedapratiyogitānavachchedakatvam.
(निरूपकताधिकरणतात्वावच्छिन्नानुयोगिताकपर्याप्तिक-
संबन्धावच्छिन्नवद्वृत्तिभेदप्रतियागितानवच्छेदकत्वम् ।)

The *nirūpakatā* underlined above is related with one of the four relations, mentioned below:

1. *svabhinna-mukhya-viśeṣyatāvattva* (स्वाभिन्नमुख्यविशेष्यतावत्त्व)
2. *svābhinna-mukhya-prakāratāvachchedakatāvattva* (स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व)
3. *svabhinna-mukhya-prakāratāvattvam* (स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावत्त्व)
4. *svābhinna-tādṛśaviśeṣyatāvachchedakatāvattva* (स्वाभिन्नतादृशविशेष्यतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व)

In all the above four relations, 'sva' refers to 'svaprakṛtiprayojya-*viśayatā*' in which 'sva' refers to the singular case suffix, the meaning of which is being discussed now. It may be noticed here that each of the above involves relations. Thus, the first relation involves relations of *svābhinnamukhya-*viśayatā** in the *nirūpakatā*. The relations of the *mukhya-*viśayatā** in the *nirūpakatā* is either of the following two relations:

1. *svasākṣānnirūpakatāvachedakatāttva* (स्वसाक्षान्निरूपकतावच्छेदकतात्त्व),
2. *svanirūpita mukhya prakāratāttva* (स्वनिरूपितमुख्यप्रकारतात्त्व ।)

It is obvious that both the above relations which are the relations of *svābhinnamukhya-*viśayatā** in *nirūpakatā*, involve relations. The relations of *svasākṣānnirūpakatāvachedakatāvattva* in the *nirūpakatā*, are four. They are:

1. *svasāmānādhikarāṇya* (स्वसामानाधिकरण्य)
2. *svāvachedaka sambandhāvacchinnatva* (स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व)
3. *svāvachedakānavacchinnatva* (स्वावच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व)
4. *svavṛttitva* (स्ववृत्तित्व)

So far, we have explained the first relation of *svābhinnamukhya-*viśayatā**. The second relation of *svābhinnamukhya-*viśayatā** in the *nirūpakatā* is *svanirūpita-mukhyaprakāratāvattva*. *Mukhyaprakāratāvattva* means 'being replaced with the *mukhyaprakāratā*'. The relations of the *mukhyaprakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*, are two. They are:

1. *svāvachedakatāvāvacchinnapratiyogitākāpratyāptyanuyogitāvachedaka rūpavṛttitva* (स्वावच्छेदकतात्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकपर्याप्त्यनुयोगितावच्छेदकरूपवृत्तित्व)
2. *svāvachedakasambandhāvacchinnatva* (स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व)

Here is a chain of the relations with which *svaprakṛtiprayojya-*viśayatā** is connected with the first of the four relations, namely *svābhinna-mukhya-*viśayatāvattva**.

The second relation of *svaprakṛtiprayojya-*viśayatā** in the *nirūpakatā*, is *svābhinnamukhya-prakāratāvachedakatāvattva*. Since this is a relation of *svaprakṛtiprayojya-*viśayatā**, as before, here also 'sva' refers to *svaprakṛtiprayojya-*viśayatā**.

The relation *svābhinnamukhyaprakāratāvachedakatāvattva* means 'being related with *svābhinna-mukhyaprakāratāvachedakatā*'. Now, we have to show as to how this *mukhyaprakāratāvachedakatā* has the relation in *nirūpakatā*. Either of the following, is the relation of *mukhyaprakāratāvachedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā*,

1. *svaviśiṣṭāvachedakatāvattva* (स्वविशिष्टावच्छेदकतावत्त्व)
2. *svāśrayatva* (स्वाश्रयत्व ।)

The first of the above two relations, namely, *svaviśiṣṭāvachedakatāvattva* involves two relations. One is the relation of 'sva', that is, *svābhinnamukhya-*

prakāratāvachedakatā, in a certain *avachedakatā*. We call this as 'certain *avachedakatā*' as we are not, at this stage, familiar with this *avachedakatā* which is briefly stated as '*svaviśiṣṭāvachedakatā*'. The other is the relation of this *avachedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā*. The following two are the relations of *mukhyaparakāratāvachedakatā* in the particular *avachedakatā*:

1. *svasākṣānnirūpakatā* (स्वसाक्षान्निरूपकता)
2. *svāvachedyaparakāratānirūpitaviśeṣyatvānavacchinnatva*
(स्वावच्छेद्यप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वानवच्छिन्नत्व)

The relations of the particular *avachedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā* are the following four:

1. *svasāmānādhikarāṇya* (स्वसामानाधिकरण्य)
2. *svāvachedakasambandhāvachchinnatva* (स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व)
3. *svānavachedakānavacchinnatva* (स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व)
4. *svavṛttitva* (स्ववृत्तित्व)

So far, we have explained the first chain of the relations of *mukhyaparakāratāvachedakatā* with the *nirūpakatā*. Now, we have to explain the second relation, namely *svāśrayatva*. Here '*sva*' is *mukhyaparakāratāvachedakatā*. The *nirūpakatā* is said to be the locus of *mukhyaparakāratāvachedakatā* with the three relations. They are:

1. *svāvachedakasambandhāvachchinnasambandhitvasambandhāvachchinnatva*
(स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नयंबन्धित्वसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व)
2. *svāvachedyaparakāratānirūpitaviśeṣyatvāvachedakāvachchinnatva*
(स्वावच्छेद्यप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्व)
3. *svaviśiṣṭa-viśayatātvavyāpakatva* (स्वविशिष्टविषयतात्वव्यापकत्व)

The last of the above relations again involves two more relations. One is the relation of '*sva*' in the *viśayatā* and the other is the relation with which *vyāpakatva*, that is pervasiveness of the *nirūpakatā*, is limited. The relations of the '*sva*' in the *viśayatā*, are the following:

1. *svāvachedya-viśayatānirūpitaviśayatvāvachchinnatva*
(स्वावच्छेद्यविषयतानिरूपितविषयत्वावच्छिन्नत्व)
2. *svanirūpitatva* (स्वनिरूपितत्व)

The *vyāpakatāvachedakasambandha*, that is, the relation which is the limiter of *vyāpakatā* is:

1. *svanirūpitāvachedakatāvṛttitva* (स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावृत्तित्व)

As per the above relation, the *nirūpakatā* is pervasive of *viśayatātvā* as it resides in all the instances of *viśayatātvā* by the relation of *svanirūpitāvachedakatāvṛttitva*.

This relation holds good when the *nirūpakatā* resides in the *svanirūpitāvacchedakatā*. The relation with which the *nirūpakatā* is required to be present in the *svanirūpitāvacchedakatā*, is actually not one, but two. They are:

1. *svāvacchedakāvacchinnatva* (स्वावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्व)
2. *svaviśiṣṭaviśesyatā-nirūpitāprakāratāvachhedasambandhāvacchinnatva* (स्वविशिष्टविशेष्यतानिरूपिताप्रकारतावच्छेदसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व)

In the second of the above relations, certain *viśesyatā* is required to be *svaviśiṣṭa*—related with *sva*. The relations of *sva* in the *viśesyatā*, are three. They are:

1. *svāśrayatva* (स्वाश्रयत्व)
2. *svānavacchedakānavacchinnatva* (स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व)
3. *svavṛttitva* (स्ववृत्तित्व)

Of the above three, as per the first, *viśesyatā* is supposed to be the locus of *sva*. Here the relation is either of the following two:

1. *svatādātmya* (स्वतादात्म्य)
2. *svāvacchedyatva* (स्वावच्छेद्यत्व)

So far, of the two relations with which *nirūpakatā* is required to be present in the *nirūpakatāvacchedakatva*, the second, namely *svaviśiṣṭaviśesyatānirūpita*, etc. is explained. The other, that is, the first relation is *svāvacchedakāvacchinnatva*. This is described as *svābhāvavadavacchedakatvānirūpitatva*. Here, *svābhāva* means the absence of *sva*. The *pratiyogitāvacchedakasambandha* of this absence, that is the relation with which the *sva* is negated, is either of the following two:

1. *svanirūpitāvacchedakatāvatva* (स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावत्व)
2. *svāvacchedya-prakāratā-nirūpitaviśesyatāvāvatva* (स्वावच्छेद्यप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वावत्व)

Of the above two relations, the first one refers to the possession of *avacchedakatā* and the second one to the possession of *viśesyatā*. The following are the relations with which the possession of *avacchedakatā* and *viśesyatā*, is intended.

1. *svasāmānādhikarānya* (स्वसामानाधिकरण्य)
2. *svāvacchedakasambandhāvacchinnatva* (स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व)
3. *svānavacchedakānavacchinnatva* (स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व)
4. *svavṛttitva* (स्ववृत्तित्व)

Here ends the chain of relations connected with the second relation referred to in the original definition of *ekatva*, that is, *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviśayatāviśiṣṭa-nirūpakatākādhikaraṇatāvāvacchinna*, etc. The third relation with which *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviśayatā* is related with the *nirūpakatā*, is—*svābhinnamukhyaparakāratāvattva*. The relation of *mukhyaparakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*, is either of the following two:

1. *svanirūpitāvacchedakatāvattva* (स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावत्त्व)
2. *svāśrayatva* (स्वाश्रयत्व)

The second relation *svāśrayatva* means being the locus of *sva*, namely, the *mukhyaparakāratā*. The following two are the relations with which *nirūpakatā* is intended to be the locus of *mukhyaparakāratā*:

1. *svāvacchedakasāmbandhāvacchinnasāmbandhitvasāmbandhāvacchinnatva*
(स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नसंबन्धित्वसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व)
2. *svanirūpitāviśesyatāvattva* (स्वनिरूपितावशेष्यतावत्त्व)

Viśesyatāvattva in the second relation here means 'possessing *viśesyatā*'. Similarly, in the first relation of the two mentioned a bit earlier as the relations of *mukhyaparakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*, *avacchedakatāvattva* is included. *Avvacchedakatāvattva* means 'possessing of *avacchedakatā*'. The relations with which *nirūpakatā* is intended to be possessed of this *avacchedakatā* and also the relations of *viśesyatā* which is mentioned above, are:

1. *svasāmānādhikarānya* (स्वसामानाधिकरण्य)
2. *svāvacchedakasāmbandhāvacchinnatva* (स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व)
3. *svānavacchedakānavachinnatvam* (स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व)
4. *svavṛttitva* (स्ववृत्तित्व)

Here ends the chain of the relations of *mukhyaparakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*. The fourth and the final relation of *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviśayatā* in the *nirūpakatā* of the original definition of *ekatva*, is *svābhinnamukhyaviśesyatāvacchedakatāvattva*. Either of the following can be called the relation of *mukhyaviśesyatāvacchedakatā* in *nirūpakatā*:

1. *svaviśiṣṭāvacchedakatāvattva* (स्वविशिष्टावच्छेदकतावत्त्व)
2. *svāśrayatva* (स्वाश्रयत्व ।)

The first of the above two relations, involves the relation of *sva* in the *avacchedakatā* and also the relation of *avacchedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā*. Those relations are the following:

1. *svasāmānādhikarānya* (स्वसामानाधिकरण्य)
2. *svāvacchedakasāmbandhāvacchinnatva* (स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व)
3. *svānavacchedakānavachinnatva* (स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व)

The second relation, *svāśrayatva*, means that the *nirūpakatā* is the locus of *viśesyatāvacche-dakatā*. The following are the relations with which the *nirūpakatā* is intended to be the locus:

1. *svāvacchedakasāmbandhāvacchinnasāmbandhitvasāmbandhāvacchinnatva*
(स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नसंबन्धित्वसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व)

2. *svanirūpitāvacchedyaprakāratānirūpitāviśeṣyatāvāvacchedyaviśayatāvāvacchedakāv-acchinnatva* (स्वनिरूपितावच्छेद्यप्रकारतानिरूपिताविशेष्यत्वावच्छेद्यविषयतावच्छेदकावच्छन्नत्व)
3. *svanirūpitāmukhya-prakāratāvad-avacchedakatāvatva* (स्वनिरूपितमुख्यप्रकारतावदवच्छेदकतावत्व)
4. *svaviśiṣṭaviśayatāvavyāpakatva* (स्वविशिष्टविषयतावव्यापकत्व)

The last relation here involves the relations of *sva* in a *viśayatā* and also *vyāpakatva*, that is, pervasiveness. The relations of *sva* in the *viśayatā* are the following:

1. *svanirūpitatva* (स्वनिरूपितत्व)
2. *svāvacchedya-viśayatā-nirūpitaviśayatābhinnatva* (स्वावच्छेद्यविषयतानिरूपितविषयताभिन्नत्व)
3. *svanirūpita-mukhya-prakāratāvad-anyatva* (स्वनिरूपितमुख्यप्रकारतावदन्यत्व)

The *vyāpakatā* mentioned earlier, is intended with either of the following relations:

1. *svavṛttitva* (स्ववृत्तित्व)
2. *svanirūpitāvacchedakatāvṛttitva* (स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावृत्तित्व)

Though this chain of relations can be developed further, we may stop here and can say that this explanation of *ekatva*, can cover all the instances of *ekatva*. For a layman, why, even for a scholar who is able to follow the Navya Nyāya terminology only up to an extent, all this exercise may seem to be absolutely meaningless. It is also impossible to convince a layman of the necessity of conceiving innumerable relations, each of which involves many other relations and are mostly unintelligible. But when one notices the use of the singular case in different contexts, it becomes clear that a simple explanation cannot cover all the cases. For instance, take the sentence '*puruṣoyam rājñah*'. Here the singular case suffix is used more than once. The singular case that we hear after the term '*puruṣa*' denotes the *ekatva* that belongs to the qualificandum, whereas the singular case suffix heard after the word '*rājñah*' denotes the *ekatva* that is related to the qualifier, because as per the Sanskrit linguistic rules—*puruṣa* is the qualificandum and *rājan* is the qualifier here. Any explanation of *ekatva* will have to cover all these instances. There are also some peculiar instances wherein the use of singular case affix poses a problem. Bachcha Jha refers to many such instances. When a servant is carrying some money which actually belongs to two kings, the use of a sentence—*rājñah dhanam grhītvā jigamiṣati rājño dāsaḥ*—"The servant of the king desires to go, taking the money of the king" is not valid if the *ekatva* of the *rājan* is intended in both cases - '*rājñah dhanam*' and '*rājñah dāsaḥ*'. In one case, that is, '*rājñah dāsaḥ*' the use of *ekavacana* is quite valid because the person is a servant of only one king, but the same cannot be said in the case of '*rājñah dhanam*', because the money actually does not belong to only one king.

The various relations involved in this *anugama* takes care of this instance also, the validity of which, otherwise cannot be established.

Similarly, there are sentences like 'Rāmadārā Jānakī'. Here, as per the desire of the speaker, either the term 'Rāmadārā' can be taken as the term denoting the qualificandum (*viśeṣya*) or the term 'Jānakī'. In either case, the plural number used after the word Rāmadārā is not intended. Since the word *dārā*, as per the Sanskrit linguistic rules, for the sake of grammatical correctness has to be used in plural number, it is so used. But, the singular number after the word Jānakī, denotes the *ekatva*. Certain relations introduced in the *anugama* are intended to cover instances such as these also. Therefore, though it is very difficult even to make an attempt to explain the utility of the seemingly meaningless relations included in an *anugama*, it can only be said that an *anugama* is employed as a last weapon by the Naiyāyikas through which they can avoid many inconvenient questions and achieve precision to a maximum extent. The *anugama* mentioned above, which satisfactorily explains the *ekatva* that the singular case suffixes used in different situations denote, was designed by the great Naiyāyikas of this century, Bachcha Jha, in his *Gūḍhārthatattvāloka*, a commentary on the *Vyutpattivāda* of Gadādhara. Though Gadādhara discusses the meaning of the singular case suffix in his *Vyutpattivāda* and offers an explanation of *ekatva* which is, by and large, accepted to all, Bachcha Jha continues the discussion further, pointing out the problems that cannot be solved by the explanation of *ekatva* offered by Gadādhara. The objections that he raises and the solutions, including the above *anugama*, are entirely his own. This is only a small instance of the amazing ingenuity for which Bachcha Jha is recognised as a legendary Naiyāyika of this century.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Tarkālaṅkāra, Harirāma, *Viśayatāvāda*, p. xxix.
2. Tarkālaṅkāra, Harirāma, *Viśayatāvāda*, p. xxx.
3. Some doubts have been raised regarding the *sūtra* 1.1.4 which enumerates the six original *padārthas* accepted by Kaṇāda.
4. See the Appendix No. 1.
5. Jagdīśa. *Śabdaśakti Prakāśikā*.
6. Jagdīśa. *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, IV. II: 781.
7. Mohanty, *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth*, p. 35.
8. Tarkālaṅkāra, Harirāma. *Viśayatāvāda*. ed. V.N. Jha. Pune: University of Poona.
9. *Ibid.* p. xxxii, Text 48.
10. Interestingly Professor Badrinath Shukla has pointed out during the discussion later published as *Saṁvāda* that there is a radical distinction in *abhāva* when it comes to first-level sentences and second-level analytical sentences. The denial of second-level analytical sentence does not necessarily mean the denial of the association made in first-level sentences.
11. Tarkālaṅkāra, Harirāma. op. cit. pp. xxviii-xl.
12. Anantācārya, P.B. 1904. *Padavāhyaratnākhara*.
13. The following are the works ascribed to Gokulanātha Upādhyāya :
 - (i) *Dikkāla Nirūpaṇa*—(Nyāya)
 - (ii) *Lāghava gaurva rahasya*—(Nyāya)

- (iii) *Muktivāda*—(Nyāya)
- (iv) *Ṭipphaṇa* on Udayana's *Kusumāñjali*—(Nyāya)
- (v) *Nyāya lakṣaṇa vicāra*—(Nyāya)
- (vi) *Nyāya Siddhāntatattva* or *Siddhāntaviveka*—(Nyāya)
- (vii) *Padavākhyaratnākara*—(Nyāya)
- (viii) *Prabodha Kādambarī of Pramāṇa lakṣaṇa*—(Nyāya)
- (ix) *Pramāṇabodha or moda*—(Nyāya)
- (x) *Śaktivāda*—(Nyāya)
- (xi) *Yogarūddhi vicāra*—(Nyāya)
- (xii) *Viśayatā vicāra*—(Nyāya)
- (xiii) *Svatra vāda*—(Nyāya)
- (xiv) *Tarkatattva nirūpaṇa*—(Nyāya)
- (xv) *Vivarāṇa* or *Vidyota* on Pakṣadhara's *Tattva cintāmaṇyāloka*—(Nyāya)
- (xvi) *Cakraraśmi* on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*—(Nyāya)
- (xvii) *Vidyota* on Raghunātha śiromaṇi's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* Dīdhiti—(Nyāya)
- (xviii) *Mithyātvanirukti*—(Vedānta)

P.B. Anantācārya ascribes the following also to Gokulanātha:

- (i) *Kāvya prakāśa Ṭikā* (Poetics)
- (ii) *Dvaitanirṇaya Ṭikā*
- (iii) *Kunda Kādambarī*
- (iv) *Kādambarī praśnottaraṇī*
- (v) *Ekāvalī*
- (vi) *Kādambarīkīrti Ślokaḥ*
- (vii) *Śivastutiḥ*
- (viii) *Amṛtodaya Niketan*

Introduction to *Padavākhyaratnākara* by P.B. Anantācārya.

- 14. Shukla, Badrinath. *Śataśloki*. Śloka No.82
- 15. *Ibid.*, Śloka No. 83.
- 16. *Ibid.*, Śloka No. 11.
- 17. *Ibid.*, Śloka No. 12.
- 18. *Ibid.*, Śloka Nos. 13–24.
- 19. *Ibid.*, Śloka Nos. 26–28.
- 20. *Ibid.*, Śloka No. 35.