

3

THE CRITERION AS CAPABILITIES

If 'participation' seemed to emerge naturally as a criterion of development immanent to the realm of the polity itself, and 'differentiation' as relating to the structure which all polities must have, the criterion in terms of 'capabilities' may be said to belong to the functions which every political system is expected to perform. And, as any system may work well or ill, better or worse, we may determine the degree to which it performs its functions. Also, as presumably all political systems are expected to perform the same functions, they may be compared with one another in respect of the way they discharge these functions. Development in this context would perhaps mean the elaboration of such new political structures as raise the very level of performance itself. The 'raising of the level' would perhaps mean a rise in both the floor and the ceiling of the performance concerned.

The term 'capabilities', on the other hand, has another dimension which relates it primarily to a polity's relations with other polities. There certainly are relations which a polity has with members and groups belonging to itself, but, in a world where other polities exist, its 'capabilities' are measured with respect to what it can do to use, exploit, overcome and even conquer other polities for its own benefit. In former times, there was little hypocrisy about all this. It was regarded as the first duty of a ruler to enlarge his domains, conquer other kingdoms, capture booty and slaves, force them to pay tribute and accept his suzerainty or sovereignty over them. Until comparatively recently, the great rulers in history have always been those who founded or extended or consolidated great empires. The art of war, in a certain sense, presupposed 'high capability' in all fields and was perhaps its ultimate test also. Yet, few thinkers

in modern times would be prepared to accept this in its naked formulation. It is difficult for them to believe that Tamerlane or Genghis Khan had created a more developed political structure than the civilizations they destroyed. And if war were to be accepted as an arbiter of 'political development', then political scientists would have to welcome it as the ultimate justifier of all their hypotheses about which polity happened to be more 'politically developed' on the basis of their measurements.

It may seem a little far-fetched to bring in 'success in war' as the operational criterion for judging the relative 'capabilities' of different polities. But, basically, there could be no other criterion, unless we accept that a polity defeated in war could still be regarded as 'politically developed' in the sense that it had greater 'capabilities' than the one that defeated it. As this would seem to many to be almost a contradiction in terms, there appears no escape to accepting the consequences of admitting 'capabilities' as the criterion of 'political development', unless we are prepared to give up the criterion itself. It may not be amiss here to note that this is also one of the consequences of the so-called evolutionary perspective in the study of political development. To be defeated in the struggle for survival is the ultimate test of evolutionary inferiority. The business of war is superior to the business of peace which, in this perspective, is nothing but the continuation of war by other means. The phrase is that of Clausewitz, but the truth of the contention is merely a function of the perspective in which it is embedded.

The existence of polities other than one's own is, however, logically contingent in the sense that they are not necessarily presupposed by the existence of one's own polity. To put it in other words, there is no necessity for there to be polities rather than just one polity. And, in case there were to be only one polity, there will be no problem of its proving its superiority in political development over others through victory in war. But though a polity may be one, yet even in its case, there is the problem of its relationship with its own members. And these relationships can be of various kinds. Also, over a period of time the relationships may change and thus raise the problem of political development or decay in a diachronic perspective.

What sort of relationships, then, are to be taken as signs of

'political development', and of 'political decay'? Considered in the perspective of 'capabilities' as the criterion of 'political development', there could be little doubt about the answer. Only a polity which extracts the utmost out of its members could be regarded as 'politically developed'. It will be the degree of exploitation or extraction achieved that would determine the degree of development attained by a polity. But this would be to underwrite totalitarian dictatorship as the most developed form of political system, as presumably it is the most efficient organizational instrument for the extraction of whatever is sought to be extracted by the ruling élite of a polity. Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia would be the most developed polities according to this criterion.

In a certain sense, the very notion of the state as the embodiment of supreme coercive power may be said to underwrite the primacy of the coercive function which a polity is supposed to perform. It is a short step from this to regard an increase in the coercive capabilities of any polity as a sign of its political development. And once this step is taken, there is little to stop it from being regarded as a desirable goal in the direction of which every polity should try to develop. There is, in fact, a fundamental ambivalence in the notion of the state as embodying the unity of society in itself and also as being the ultimate seat of coercive power. The notion of coercion divides the polity into those who are coerced and those who coerce, while the notion of unity tries to suggest the common interest of the whole which is supposed to be embodied in the state. The bridge between the two conflicting aspects is built by the pernicious doctrine enshrined in Marxist apologetics that coercion is exercised in the interest of those who are coerced. There is, however, the complementary truth in the deeper thought of Marx that till the actuality of coercion exists, no state can claim to embody the unity which it ideally wishes to be. This, of course, is coupled with the Marxist illusion that the continuing technological miracle of capitalism when combined with the organizational, institutional structure of a socialist society would result in the elimination of conflicting class interests which necessitate the coercive character of the state. But even if the utopian vision of a society to which the science of economics would have become irrelevant (because of the non-scarcity of

goods and services) were to be accepted as factually possible, it is difficult to see how the essential asymmetry of power-relations could be avoided without giving up the notion of polity altogether. Perhaps it is felt that the asymmetry of power-relations is itself a consequence of the existent scarcity of goods and services, and the abolition of the latter would also mean the abolition of the former. But in that case a polity would no more remain a polity. Rather, it would lapse into society from which all political scientists have tried to distinguish it. Yet, to the extent that the necessity of the distinction remains, a polity's claim to represent or articulate the so-called unity of society would be suspect.

It may be urged, on the other hand, that the functions of the state may be conceived better in a different way. After all, no state has ever been valued just for its victories over others or for its coercive control over its own people. It is the ideas and ideals embodied in the notion of the welfare state that point to the way the concept of 'capabilities' should be understood and articulated. But this would lead to the question of choosing between diverse notions of welfare and of exploring the interrelations between them. 'Welfare', obviously, is not such a homogeneous category as many seem to think, nor is the relation between its different conceptions so positively correlated as many appear to imply. Even the question of weightage between different conceptions is not easy to handle, and the ultimate choice between a *laissez-faire* notion of the state, which allows the issue between different weightages to be settled by the market-mechanism whether of the economic or political variety, or the élite decision of a dominant minority, which is supposed somehow to know the real interests of the people, is difficult to make. Perhaps, at least on the intellectual plane, the honest solution may be said to lie in articulating with clarity as many concepts of 'welfare' as one can think of, provide diverse weightages in different models, and work out the possible coherence and incoherence between them.

But, however honest such a solution may seem, it would introduce a plurality into the very heart of 'welfare', and thus jeopardize the idea of 'political development' in terms of which different polities were sought to be measured and compared. It may be objected that, theoretical subtleties and logical possibili-

ties apart, the notion of 'welfare' belongs primarily to the realm of material goods and public services with special emphasis on their just or equitable distribution between groups and classes of people. Yet, even if this were to be accepted there would remain a formidable difficulty in conceiving of 'capabilities' in terms of 'welfare' alone in total exclusion of all other notions of 'capabilities', specially those that concern the relation of a polity to other polities. It is possible that a high rate of per capita consumption of goods and services in a particular polity is itself a direct consequence of its direct or indirect exploitation of other polities, making it impossible for the exploited polities to achieve higher rates of 'welfare' for their citizens. This situation is not likely to be affected in any substantial manner by the extent of distributive justice obtaining in a particular polity. For it is highly probable that a substantially high level of distributive justice in a particular society is itself ensured by the fact that it is able to exploit others to a significant degree. The role of colonial exploitation in the development of industrial societies of the West is well known. But what is not so well known is the fact that the ideal of the welfare state with the corresponding notion of distributive justice might not have featured in the practical programme of hard-headed politicians except for the fact that a situation of relative abundance had been created by that very exploitation of colonial peoples.

The so-called socialist countries are in this respect no different from those that are called capitalists. The relations of the Soviet Union to countries of Eastern Europe which it had conquered militarily from Hitler's Germany did not show any marked difference from those between Western countries and the territories they had conquered earlier in Asia and Africa. Marxist thought has always pointed out the crucial importance of the accumulation of capital. But the need and the necessity of this accumulation has got nothing to do with either the socialist or the capitalist character of a polity. It has to do only with the economic factors involved in the situation. Marx was saved from this terrible realization by the fact that in his own thought he relegated this necessary but unpleasant task to capitalism which was supposed to have completed the process by the time socialism appeared on the scene. Unfortunately, the countries in which the communist movement succeeded did not

have their work of capital accumulation completed by the capitalists and thus it had to be undertaken by the communists themselves. In doing so, they not only put the capitalist exploiters to shame by showing how the whole thing could be done more efficiently, but also, incidentally, proved the utter irrelevance of the capitalist-communist dichotomy to the issue concerned.

The deeper assumption of Marx, however, consists in his belief that there is some sort of upper limit beyond which further accumulation of capital in significant quantities is not needed. But this could only be true on the basis of a static economy which would involve not only a static population and a static technology, but also a static structure of wants. On the other hand, one could perhaps assume a moving equilibrium between the three to give the same result also. But, whether the situation is conceived of in terms of a moving equilibrium or a static economy, the assumed conditions seem too unrealistic to be taken seriously. Even if they were to be realized, it could only be by accident and for short periods. The need for savings and capital accumulation for faster rates of economic growth may, therefore, be assumed to obtain in most societies most of the time. And if savings and capital accumulation involve the postponement of current consumption, necessitating painful sacrifice on the part of the populace, it would always seem preferable to impose this on *other* people or peoples of *other* countries, if possible. It is usually done on both the fronts, and that too simultaneously. But the rigours of internal exploitation of one's own people can be mitigated to a large extent by the external exploitation of other peoples. It thus serves in the economic self-interest of a people to turn a blind eye to, if not actively connive at and even welcome, the direct or indirect exploitation of other people. In fact, it is easier in respect of other peoples as not only are aliens considered barbarians in almost all cultures, but also because they are too distant for their sufferings to be visibly registered on the sensitivities of those who benefit from the exploitation. Of course, the same mechanism is used for safeguarding one's own psyche against the intrusion of the fact of exploitation of others even within one's own society or country. But as there is at least some identification specially in the context of societies which have become nation-states with

universal franchise and citizenship, it becomes a little more difficult to continue to do so than in the case of peoples with whom one has little, if any, identification.

The notion of distributive justice in the context of material goods and services in terms of which a polity's 'capabilities' are supposed to be measured thus makes sense only if the whole world were to be a unified political system. Yet, if that were to be the case, the only assessment of comparative 'capabilities' would be with respect to the world polity's own past, as there would be no other polity with which it could be compared. This might be taken as rendering the whole enterprise of finding a measurable criterion of political development meaningless. What purpose would it serve to formulate a criterion if there are no polities to compare? Yet, if multiple polities are to be necessarily postulated so that criteria for purposes of comparison may be significantly employed, it is very likely that the so-called 'political development' of a particular polity may imply as a necessary precondition the lack of such development in other polities. And this, not only in the logical sense that 'more developed' implies the 'less developed', but in the causal sense that one becomes 'more developed' by making some other people or country 'less developed'.

The objection may be raised that we are taking too seriously the Marxist analysis which predicates economic development on the necessary exploitation of the producers of their surplus value, and its utilization as investment for further production. The term 'exploitation' in Marx is both a technical and a moral term, the two senses of which are conflated together to produce the scientific revolutionary ardour which most communists claim for themselves. But, as psychologists have pointed out, most violent emotions thrive on confused thought, and the Marxist revolutionary seems no exception to this. To the extent that the notion of 'exploitation' is the result of a technical definition it can have no moral connotation. It may give a scientific aura, but that is another matter.

The hard core of Marx's definition of exploitation lies in its being derivative from the more fundamental notion of 'value-creation' in his system. 'Exploitation' is, on the one hand, a function of the notion of 'value-creation' in his system and, on the other, of the fact as to whether the surplus value so created

is appropriated by the creator himself or by somebody else. As Marx does not concede the value-creating function to the entrepreneur, all collective value-creation is bound, by definition, to be exploitative in character. Similarly, because Marx does not accord any value-creating function to the socio-political functionaries who ensure the existence of conditions without which no productive activity can occur for long, any complex society is bound to be 'exploitative' by definition. The only way to get out of this definitional impasse is to give up the definition, and see society as a co-operative enterprise in which each is necessary for the other. This also could take us out of the necessity of seeing a polity as an exploitative mechanism. The functional perspective in the social sciences tries to do just this; but in doing so, it unwittingly underwrites the justification of all existing institutions, whatever may be their complexion or character. It excludes the idea of 'institutionalized exploitation' by definition and *justifies* the *status quo*, whatever may be its nature. This, in fact, is the critique from the radical camp of the structural-functional perspective in sociology. The concept of 'dysfunctionality' tries to take care of this, but in doing so it takes the heart out of functionalism itself.

The Marxian and the non-Marxian frameworks, thus, suffer from an identical defect. They make it impossible for a society or polity to be both 'exploitative' and 'co-operative' in character. What is needed, therefore, is a conceptual framework which, without making all social relations necessarily exploitative, does not gloss over the fact of exploitation itself. This, however, is not exactly our task here and may, therefore, merely be taken as a criterion of the adequacy of any conceptual framework in this field.

The thinking of 'capabilities' in terms of 'social justice', specially in its economic form, thus, encounters basic problems which appear difficult to avoid, at least as presented in the usual form. The other direction which comparison of 'capabilities' in terms of the amount of 'social justice' achieved in different polities may take, is what has usually been called the observance of 'due process of law'. Law, in fact, is supposed to ensure justice, and to the extent a polity is able to ensure that no discrimination is practised in the application of the law to different classes or castes or categories of persons, it may be

said to have actualized or achieved a just state of affairs within its boundaries. The laws themselves, however, may be considered discriminatory or even unjust in a deeper sense. The usual Marxist critique tends to emphasize this aspect of the matter. But, then, it is obvious that the critique of any positive law can only be undertaken in terms of some ideal notion of justice which the usual thinking about law designates as 'natural law'. The critique may, of course, be undertaken from different viewpoints. But, then, the natural laws implicit in them would also be diverse, and though there will be a natural tendency to decide between the different ideals or seek some overarching coherence or transcending synthesis between them, the result can hardly be expected to be acceptable to all or even taken as final by any particular group for all times.

The comparative estimate of 'social justice', then, may perhaps best be undertaken by finding on the one hand the extent to which 'due process of law' is observed in a particular polity and, on the other hand, to discover the extent to which its positive law departs from the natural law as conceived of or determined by a particular group of thinkers. The other dimension which should perhaps equally be taken into account relates to the *actuality* of discrimination in the application of law to persons of different economic, social, political or racial status in a polity. This obviously is different from the degree of actual observance of 'due process of law' as demanded by the legal system itself. The former concerns itself with the distortion or even perversion of the positive legal system by forces extraneous to it, while the latter concerns itself with the 'manner' rather than the 'matter' of justice as ensured by law. The idea, of course, is that the observance of due procedure is as important as the final judgment reached or delivered in any case. It is an emphasis on the formal aspect of the matter, a counterpart of the notion of 'formal truth' in Western logic.

'Social justice', however, forms only one part of the total spectrum of values which a society tries to realize for itself, and the 'capabilities' of a polity may be judged by finding the extent to which it is able to achieve their realization for its citizens, both individually and collectively. The 'values' whose realization is to be assessed may be those professed by the society itself, or those by the thinker concerned. But, whatever

the case, they have to be specifically articulated so that the assessment may be made as openly and concretely as possible. However, even then the distinction between 'manifest' and 'latent' values, 'verbalized' and 'behavioural' values, and between 'individual' and 'collective' values would have to be kept in mind.

On the other hand, the notion of 'capabilities' may be seen in predominantly 'instrumental' terms, that is, as essentially neutral between the realization of diverse kinds of value. It would be like 'wealth' or 'power' which, it is generally admitted, may be used for the achievement of different ends, depending upon what one desires to achieve. And, even though it may be true that there are many things intrinsically valuable which cannot be achieved by these generalized instrumentalities, it can hardly be disputed that, in certain amounts, they are the necessary precondition for the realization of any value whatsoever. This perhaps follows from the fact that our existence is an embodied existence, and that the notion of the 'realization' of values involves their concrete embodiment in spatio-temporal reality where it achieves a public visibility which is different from mere imaginative projection.

Such an 'instrumental-neutral' sense of 'capabilities' has been worked out in detail by Almond in his 'Input-Output' model of a political system in which the relationship between the two is mediated by what he calls 'conversion-functions'. It is the best-thought-out framework for the understanding of political systems in a comparative developmental perspective yet to be offered by any political thinker who has devoted himself to the task. It therefore deserves the serious and sustained attention of anyone concerned with the notion of 'political development' and its availability for a comparative assessment of different political systems in a cognitively significant and meaningful way.

The 'Input-Output' model of Almond has been developed over a long period and adumbrated in a number of books and articles published at different times. However, it would perhaps not be wrong to concentrate on only a few focal expressions of his ideas which seem sufficient for our purposes. These are found in his book *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*¹ and two articles, entitled 'A Developmental Approach to

Political Systems'² and 'Political Development—Analytical and Normative Perspectives'.³

He takes from David Easton the distinction between two classes of inputs into the political system, viz. *demands* and *supports*. Demands are further classified under four headings:

- (1) demands for goods and services such as wage and hour laws, educational opportunities, recreational facilities, roads and transportation;
- (2) demands for the regulation of behaviour, such as provision of public safety, control over markets and labour relations, rules pertaining to marriage and the family;
- (3) demands for participation in the political system, for the right to vote, hold office, petition governmental bodies and officials, organize political associations and the like; and
- (4) symbolic inputs, such as demands for the display of the majesty and power of the political system in periods of threat or on ceremonial occasions, or demands for the affirmation of norms or the communication of the policy intent from political élites.⁴

Support inputs also may be classified under four headings:

- (1) material supports, such as the payment of taxes or other levies, and the provision of services; such as labour contributions or military services;
- (2) obedience to laws and regulations;
- (3) participation, such as voting, joining organizations, and communicating about politics; and
- (4) manifestation of deference to public authority, symbols and ceremonials.⁵

The output side is also classified into four types of transactions initiated by the political system. These are:

- (1) extractions, which may take the form of tribute, booty, taxes, or personal services; (2) regulation of behaviour, which may take a variety of forms and affect some subset of the whole gamut of human behaviour and relations; (3) allocations or distributions of goods and services, opportunities, honors, statuses, and the like; and (4) symbolic outputs, including affirmation of values, displays and political symbols, statements of policies and intent.⁶

The inputs consisting of demands and supports are converted by the political system into 'extractive, regulative, distributive and symbolic outputs'.⁷ The political system, so to say, 'pro-

cesses inputs, and converts them into outputs'.⁸ 'The demands entering the political system are articulated, aggregated, or combined; converted into policies, rules, regulations; applied, enforced, adjudicated.'⁹ The conversion-functions of the political system, thus, may be divided into:

- (1) the articulation of interests or demands; (2) the integration or combination of interests into policy proposals; (3) the conversion of policy proposals into authoritative rules; (4) the application of general rules to particular cases; (5) the adjudication of rules in individual cases; and (6) the transmission of information about these events within the political system from structure to structure and between the political system and its social and international environments.¹⁰

These, in other words, are the well-known conversion-functions of Interest Articulation, Interest Aggregation, Rule-Making, Rule-Application, Rule-Adjudication and Political Communication. The Rule-Making, Rule-Application and Rule-Adjudication are merely new names for the legislative, executive and judicial functions of traditional political theory. The other three, however, have perhaps not been so explicitly formulated before.

This rather detailed delineation of Almond's classificatory terminology of Input-Output factors in his own words was necessary in order to get as clear a grasp of his contention as possible. It all seems very neat, clear-cut and precise till one begins to examine it closely and ask some pertinent questions. There is, first, a radical difference on the Input side between Demands and Supports, and to treat the two together as though they were of the same type is to confuse the issue at the very beginning of the analysis. The two may, and actually do, vary independently of each other and may even be opposed to each other. *Supports*, in fact, are treated as almost the same as *Output*, except for the fact that there is a difference in the point of view from which the phenomenon is viewed. For example, the same taxes or levies which are paid count as support-inputs when regarded from the viewpoint of the taxpayer or the citizen who has to pay the taxes or perform the services, and as an output when viewed as extraction on the part of the political system from its citizens. One wonders if the enforced collection of booty and tribute on the part of an exploiting political élite would be

called a Support-Input by Almond. The term 'support', however, may not imply that what is given for the system is being given voluntarily and willingly, but only that it is being *actually* given, whether willingly or not.

The same is true about all the other sub-divisions of the so-called classification of Support-Inputs and Outputs quoted earlier. One may, in fact, arrange them in tabular form facing each other and see the point we are trying to make. The classificatory schema may be presented in the following way:

<i>Supports (Inputs)</i>	<i>Output</i>
1. Material supports, such as payment of taxes or other levies, and the provision of services, etc.	1. Extractions, such as tribute, booty, taxes, personal services, etc.
2. Obedience to laws and regulations	2. Regulation of behaviour
3. Participation, such as voting, joining organizations, etc.	3. Allocation or distribution of goods and services, honours, statuses, etc.
4. Manifestation of deference to public authority, symbols and ceremonies	4. Symbolic output, such as affirmation of values, statement of policies, etc.

The first, second and fourth items are obviously the same, seen from two different sides. Only item 3 shows a discrepancy which perhaps is mediated by the unstated assumption that allocation or distribution is related in some direct or indirect way to the actual fact of 'participation' in the system. But the term 'participation' includes so many things that it is difficult to consider all as Support-Inputs into the political system. In fact, a closer scrutiny may reveal that it is difficult to distinguish in many cases between the so-called Support-Inputs and Outputs of the system. For example, it is not clear why the extractions effected by a political system should be treated as its *output*, when that is what it effectively gets from its subjects or other politics in the environment for itself. Similarly, one wonders if the output entitled 'Regulation of behaviour' refers to the *actual* enforcement of law or merely to the making of laws which hopefully will be obeyed by most of the people for whom they are made. In the former case, they are completely identical with

the so-called Support-Input entitled 'Obedience to laws and regulations'. In the latter, they would be identical with the rule-making function which is supposed to be not an Output at all but a conversion-function in Almond's system.

The role of conversion-functions will be analysed in Chapter 4, but here it may be pointed out that there seems to be little consistency in the different Support-Inputs and Outputs that are given in the table. Thus, while the first cannot be different even in principle in the two columns, the second can be so only if it is identified with a conversion-function. The fourth, on the other hand, may be interpreted either as identical or different depending upon the treatment of symbolic output, as that which evokes a manifestation of deference whenever it is displayed, or as such whether it does so or not. The third, on the other hand, bears hardly any relation unless it be assumed that the distributive allocation of goods and services is in proportion to one's participatory input into the political system. This obviously is not the case, specially if we remember all the ambiguities involved in the notion of 'participation' and the related discussion concerning it in the first chapter.

The Input-Output model has been borrowed from economics where it has been a relatively successful tool in assessing the comparative efficiency of different economic systems. Yet, unless certain basic conditions are fulfilled, the model is not meaningfully applicable, as it may make no sense to talk of inputs and outputs in the situation. One such condition is the existence of what may be called a *common measure* in terms of which the so-called inputs and outputs may be aggregated, computed and compared. The other, and perhaps even more fundamental condition, is the existence of a fairly clear-cut demarcation between what is to count as input and what as output. In other words, there should be fairly determinate criteria on the basis of which we should be able to judge, at least in most cases, which is to be regarded as input, and which, output. The former condition is fulfilled in the field of economics by money which functions as the common measure in terms of which the value of everything may be expressed. The second condition is also fulfilled almost completely in the case of individual units, though in the case of large aggregates certain problems arise. What is input for one unit can be output

for another, and thus the computation for the total economy would obviously have to be different in character. Marx saw this as the key issue with respect to the problem of profit, for while one could understand one man's profit as another person's loss, how could one understand the profit in a total economy where all the individual profits and losses would cancel out? An analogous problem in the field of physics may be said to arise with respect to the conservation laws which postulate a complete constancy of mass or/and energy in the total system.

The problems arising out of the concept of a 'total system', however, are so purely theoretical that none of the empirical sciences concern themselves with them in great detail. Also, at the purely theoretical level, the question always arises whether the universe can be treated as a 'closed system', specially when it has to be treated as essentially 'open' with respect to time. But on the other hand, if it is not a closed system, how can it be called a 'universe', or considered as a 'total system'?

Time is essential to any Input-Output analysis. The purpose of the undertaking is to know what amounts of input of a particular kind would result in what amounts of output that we want. For the basic purpose of the exercise is to be able to control the phenomena to some extent at least. The investment-output ratio, for example, is a key factor in the planning of economic development in any country. One would have to know what rate of investment is needed to achieve a particular growth rate in the economy. Similarly, one would have to know how much of the investment required is to come out of savings, whether enforced or voluntary, and how much out of deficit financing. Similarly, one has to have some idea of the direction of investment and the so-called gestation period when the output may be expected.

These are all elementary examples, as every student of economics knows. They can, however, be made as complicated and sophisticated as one likes. The basic point, however, would remain the same. An Input-Output analysis makes sense only if we can determine what types of inputs determine what types of outputs, and in what quantity. Also, we should be able to control the inputs into the system to some extent so that we may get the desired outputs. If these two conditions are missing, the

Input-Output analysis is a futile exercise which may provide aesthetic satisfaction to those who undertake it, but is utterly irrelevant for the understanding or the control of empirical phenomena.

But these conditions are not found in the Input-Output analysis offered for political systems by Almond. There is not only no common measure in terms of which all the so-called political inputs and outputs could be expressed, but also no idea as to what types and quantities of inputs would result in what types and quantities of outputs. Similarly, it is obvious that the so-called inputs into the system cannot be controlled in any significant sense of the term.

Almond, of course, has argued that amongst the possible inputs in the system, the most important are those put in by the political élites themselves. As he writes: 'We do not wish to leave the impression that inputs necessarily come only from the society of which the political system is a part, and that the political system must be viewed only in "conversion" terms. It is typical of political systems that inputs are generated internally by political élites—kings, presidents, ministers, legislators and judges.'¹¹ It may, therefore, be legitimately held that to the extent the inputs are generated by the political élites themselves, they can also be controlled by them. And if they also form the most important part of the inputs, the control exercised by them would become crucial also.

Unfortunately for Almond's analysis, his contention not only cuts at the root of the Input-Output analysis, but also ignores the fundamental difference between the inputs generated by the political élites and those generated by all the rest for the system. There seems to be a built-in structural conflict between the inputs originating from the political élites and those originating from others who do not occupy the position occupied by the political élites in the system. This arises mainly from the fact that, while the major interest of the political élites is to continue to occupy, strengthen and improve the positions they already hold, the interest of those outside is to oust them from the positions they are in. The so-called interest-aggregation function about which we shall have more to say later on, finds its essential limitation in the natural self-interest of the political élite to strengthen and perpetuate itself. This is perhaps a part

of what are called the 'system maintenance and adaptation functions', but it is clear that the terminology adopted merely glosses over the essential conflict involved in the situation.

A deeper question arises with respect to the contention that the political élites themselves generate demand-inputs into the political system. Normally, a system does not have demands of its own, except perhaps for its maintenance and perpetuation, which mostly happen to be fairly conservative in character. The Input-Output analysis takes the system for granted and works only on the assumption that no arbitrary inputs shall be generated by the system itself. The system's neutrality and instrumentality is an essential prerequisite for any Input-Output analysis to be successfully applicable also. The contention, therefore, that the most important inputs into the political system arise from the political élites themselves renders the whole Input-Output model irrelevant for purposes of political analysis, unless we treat the political élites in this role as outsiders to the system. This, however, would save the model at the expense of making it almost impossible for empirical application. If the political élites occupying positions of power are analytically treated as outsiders making demands on the system, then the system would become almost metaphysical in character. Or, alternatively, the system would become an elaborate game where the same set of persons are alternatively seen in their role of making demands on the system and then in the role of fulfilling the demands made on them by the system. This may be welcome to protagonists of the Theatre of the Absurd, but presumably not to those who claim to be political scientists.

The measurement of the 'capabilities' of a political system in terms of Input-Output ratios on the model of economic theory thus runs against some basic and fundamental difficulties which do not appear easy to overcome. Perhaps it may be said that the heart of the political system lies in what Almond has called the 'conversion-functions', as it is primarily through them that 'output' is realized by the political system. It may, then, be in the performance of the 'conversion-functions', that the concept of political development might find its sure footing and in terms of which different polities could be compared. A detailed consideration of 'conversion-functions' is therefore

required to find out whether they could adequately fulfil the task of serving as possible criteria for judging political development.

NOTES

1. Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966).
2. Almond, 'A Developmental Approach to Political Systems', *World Politics*, vol. XVII, no. 2, January, 1965.
3. Almond, 'Political Development: Analytical and Normative Perspectives', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. I.
4. Almond, 'A Developmental Approach to Political Systems', *World Politics*, vol. XVII, no. 2, January 1965, p. 193.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 193-4.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 196-7.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 194-5.

4

THE CRITERION AS CONVERSION FUNCTIONS

The 'conversion-functions' are divided by Almond into six separate functions which, though interrelated, are yet regarded as relatively autonomous in character. They are designated as Interest Articulation, Interest Aggregation, Political Communication, Rule-Making, Rule-Application and Rule-Adjudication. The last three are the well-known functions of government, traditionally designated as the legislative, executive and judicial functions. Interest Aggregation is perhaps nearest to what in traditional political theory is known as justice. Interest Articulation is perhaps a new function explicitly ascribed to or expected of a political system. On the other hand, political communication is presupposed by all the other functions as without it they could not be performed at all.

The conversion-functions may legitimately be regarded as the heart of the political system, and thus it is reasonable to expect that the criteria of political development may be found there. The conversion-functions, however, happen to be both relatively autonomous and interrelated in significant ways with one another. It would therefore be desirable to consider them both individually and in interrelationship with each other.

(1) *The Criterion as Interest Articulation*

Interest articulation is regarded by Almond as 'particularly important because it marks the boundary between the society and the political system'.¹ He defines it as 'the process by which individuals and groups make demands upon the political decision makers'.² Even the differences between different types of political systems may be understood in terms of 'the forms which

interest articulation takes, the degree to which interest articulation structures are specialized and autonomous and the style of interest articulation'.³ Almond has divided his discussion of the matter into four parts, viz. (1) the kinds of structures which perform the interest articulation function; (2) the variety of channels through which demands are articulated; (3) the styles of interest articulation; and (4) the effects of modernization on articulation.⁴

It is obvious, therefore, that to the extent interest articulation is to be treated as a criterion of political development, it would have to be considered in these dimensions. However, while one is fairly clear that the degree of specialization and autonomy in the structures that perform the function of interest articulation and the varieties of channels through which the demands are articulated would usually be accepted as indicating political development, it is difficult to see what forms or styles of interest articulation would be regarded as indicators of political development.

The interest articulation structures have been classified according to two major components: 'the type of *group* initiating the articulation, and the type of *access channel* through which it passes the message'.⁵ Besides the generalized fact that individuals are 'articulators of their own interests',⁶ and that there are '*anomic interest groups*',⁷ the major division is between what have been called '*nonassociational interest groups*'⁸ and '*institutional interest groups*'.⁹ Now, it may be taken for granted that, given the perspective of the current writings on political development, an increase in interest articulation would be taken as a positive indicator of political development. But it is not quite clear whether equal weightage is to be given to all the forms of interest articulation. For example, should an increase in the nonassociational interest group in relation to the institutional interest groups be taken as indicating political development or not? Similarly, if the reverse tendency is observed, how are we to interpret it? Also, is an increase in the *anomic interest groups* to be taken as an indicator of political development or political decay? This is important, as the interest articulation of anomic interest groups consists of 'riots, demonstrations, assassinations, and the like'.¹⁰ If treated as positive indicators along with all other forms of interest articulation, we would have the problem

of treating its absence as a counter indicator of political development in many societies. In fact, riots, demonstrations, assassinations, would have to be welcomed and even planned, given such a positive interpretation of interest articulation of anomic interest groups. On the other hand, if we treat it as a negative indicator we would have the added problem of balancing the weight of the negative indicators against the positive. Further, if we have to distinguish 'between (a) spontaneous violence by anomic interest groups, and (b) violence and demonstrations as a means of access, which any group may use',¹¹ we would have to face the added problem of either regarding both as negative indicators or only one, and, if so, which.

The problem gets more complicated if it is accepted, as Almond and Powell do, that 'demonstrations and mass violence' may be 'an integral part of the system itself'.¹² One wonders what such a statement means. The reference to Peru is not of much help as it is confined to the labour groups which use it as a means 'to bring pressure to bear upon the centralized executive'.¹³ Also, if 'violence always has the possibility of passing beyond the control of its promoters',¹⁴ and if such a 'passing beyond' is accepted as undesirable, it is difficult to see how violence could be treated as an *integral* part of the system unless there are structural mechanisms to see that it does not pass beyond some permissible limit specified by the system itself.

The problem of associational interest groups and their relative weightage *vis-à-vis* non-associational groups on the one hand and institutional groups on the other, would also have to be satisfactorily resolved if interest articulation is to be treated as a criterion of political development.

Besides the problems posed by the diversity in structures through which the conversion-function of interest articulation is performed, it may be presumed to become even more complicated if we are also expected to take into account the diversity of access channels and the styles of interest articulation. Both are supposed to be important in the classificatory scheme elaborated by Almond and Powell, and if interest articulation is to be treated as a criterion of political development, they too must be taken into account.

The question of channels and means of access is, as Almond and Powell urge, 'largely a question of political communication'.¹⁵ But if so, it overlaps with another conversion-function which is supposed to be independent and autonomous in character. The interrelations between different conversion-functions will be the subject of detailed discussion in section (8) of this chapter, but the fact of significant overlapping between them raises problems of its own. Political communication and channels of interest articulation are merely two names for the same reality, just as style of interest articulation is the same as designated by the term 'political culture'. Political culture, of course, is wider than the style of interest articulation as it includes patterns of political behaviour in other realms also. But 'channels' of interest articulation are not a sub-sector of political communication; they are identical with it. Such an identification will become untenable if the 'communication' of interests that are aggregated is also considered as political communication. But, then, the so-called rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication activities would also be seen as performing the function of political communication and, thus, fall under it.

The concept of 'communication channels' is wider in fact than those which are supposed to subserve only the function of political communication, or even just that of interest articulation. It is doubtful if communication channels are ever so specialized as to subserve only one function, be it political or any other. Normally, the channels are neutral with respect to the messages conveyed through them. However, when the channels primarily consist of persons, there may be substantial selectivity and systematic distortion in the messages that are conveyed. Perhaps the distinctive nature of political communication may lie in the fact that it consists primarily of persons who try to bring various matters to the notice of those who are in a position to take effective decisions with respect to those matters. There would then be the specific problems relating to selectivity and distortion which are peculiar to human agents of communication. But whatever be the problems, they would hardly affect the basic identity of 'channels' of interest articulation and political communication, as pointed out earlier.

The channels described by the authors range from physical

demonstrations and violence to the formal and institutional channels such as established political parties, legislatures, bureaucracies and mass media. In between these two extremes comes what they have called 'personal connection', and 'elite representation'. Similarly, in the discussion of political communication, they have designated the major types of communication structures as '(1) informal face-to-face contacts, which spring up more or less independently of other social structures; (2) traditional social structures, such as family or religious group relationships; (3) political "output" structures, such as legislatures and bureaucracies; (4) political "input" structures, including trade unions and similar interest groups, and political parties; and (5) the mass media'.¹⁶

If we compare the two lists given above, one in the context of interest articulation and the other in the context of political communication, it is obvious that they are the same. The channel designated as 'personal connection' in the context of interest articulation has merely been bifurcated into two in the context of political communication and designated 'informal face-to-face contacts' and 'traditional social structures'. One significant omission in the list of political communication structures is the lack of any mention of physical demonstrations and violence, which is supposed to play such an important role in the channels of interest articulation that the authors have gone out of their way to point out that it may be treated in at least some cases as an integral part of the system itself. In fact, the footnote on page 82 in connection with James L. Payne's book *Labour and Politics in Peru* goes on to suggest that the 'views of possible roles of violence long held by Western political scientists'¹⁷ may just be ethnocentric. But if this is so, violence would have to be taken as a positive indicator of political development for, presumably, the ethnocentricity of western political scientists lay in regarding it as negative in character. The still more significant feature of the quotation designating the types of communication structures, however, is its explicit admission of political 'input' and 'output' structures. The significance of this admission, particularly in relation to the conversion functions and our earlier discussion on construing political development in terms of input-output ratios, will be discussed later on.

Besides the diversity in the structures of interest articulation

and the channels through which they make themselves felt, there is diversity in the styles of interest articulation. As Almond and Powell write, 'The performance of the interest articulation function may be manifest or latent, specific or diffuse, general or particular, instrumental or affective in style.'¹⁸ Besides these, there is 'the distinction between a pragmatic, instrumental style and an ideological one', which 'is particularly important in interest articulation'.¹⁹ The dimensions in which the distinctions of style have been articulated by the authors are too well known to students of political science to need explication here. They are fairly close to the pattern-variables of Parsons discussed earlier. The only important departure from the Parsonian scheme lies in the admission of the dichotomy, pragmatic vs. ideological. The use of the term 'instrumental' in the quotation is not very happy as it had already been used by the authors as a contrast to 'affective' and it does not exactly connote the contrast to the 'ideological' which is sought to be conveyed by the term.

Further, it is difficult to see how the contrast 'ideological-pragmatic' could refer to *styles* of interest articulation. The reference to catholic and communist groups in France and Italy is hardly illuminating, as they are distinguished by the content of their demands and their views about the nature and function of political systems. It is not a question, therefore, of style at all, but rather of a fundamental difference in the way one conceives of the nature of a polity. In a sense, the other contrasts also refer more to the content rather than the style of interest articulation. However, perhaps the more relevant point in the context of any discussion of political development is to discover as to which of them are to be regarded as positive or negative indicators of such development.

The Parsonian variables have been closely linked to the dichotomy of tradition and modernity with which most sociologists and political scientists approach social and political phenomena. As modernity is almost always treated as the equivalent of development, the criteria characterizing modernity are also treated as indicators of development. Thus it is that manifestness, specificity, generality, and instrumentality are usually treated as indicators of modernity and thus of development also. There are certainly those who talk of the

modernity of tradition and even question the identification of Weberian 'rationality' with development.²⁰ But such voices are few and far between. The dominant majority still interprets the notion of development in Parsonian and Weberian terms. As Almond and Powell point out; 'The more latent and diffuse the style of interest articulation, the more difficult it is to aggregate interests and translate them into a public policy which will alleviate sources of discontent.'²¹ And they write further, 'rigid ideological perspectives, highly particularistic demands, and emotionally charged expressions of desires also make reconciliation of diverse interests more difficult than when the style of these interests is more pragmatic and instrumental'.²²

The above interpretation of the styles of interest articulation in the context of political development sees them primarily in terms of their facilitating or hindering interest aggregation. But if this be the case, then interest articulation *per se* cannot be an index of political development in any significant sense of the term. Rather, it would be the aggregation of interests which would be central to the matter. But before we turn to a discussion of interest aggregation, it would be advisable to consider the three dimensions of interest articulation together.

The predominant structures through which interests are articulated, the type of access channels that are habitually used and the styles which are most frequently adopted are the three major dimensions in which the phenomenon of interest articulation is to be assessed in relation to political development. Normally, it may be assumed that an increase in institutional and associational groups increasingly making use of political parties, representatives in the legislature, bureaucracies and the mass media for articulation of their interests in a pragmatic manner and formulated with clarity, specificity and generality, is a sign of political development in a society. On the other hand, if nonassociational or anomic groups increasingly emerge on the scene utilizing violence, demonstrations and riots for the articulation of demands which are diffuse, particular, emotional and ideological in nature, it would presumably indicate political decay rather than political development in a society. However, for those who opt for a dialectical view of development such phenomena would have to be interpreted differently.

They would be seen as providing that dialectical tension which would most probably result in a synthesis of conflicting interests at a higher level. Also they would be seen as evidence of either the absence, insufficiency or breakdown of the usual access channels for the articulation of interests in a political system. In other contexts, it might merely be evidence of extra pressure generated by organized interests which are also using the legitimate access channels for pressing their demands.

The problem posed by the diverse and conflicting interpretations of the same phenomenon depending upon the context in which it is seen, the values in terms of which it is evaluated and the understanding of the dynamics of the situation in terms of what it is supposed to develop into, creates insuperable difficulties in the way of any straightforward interpretation of any phenomenon as an indicator of political development. Perhaps the solution would lie in the explicit articulation of the values in terms of which the evaluation is being done, the context in which the phenomenon is being placed and the dynamic interrelationships on the basis of which the future is being projected. But the moment this is done, alternative contexts, values and dynamic interrelationships would come into the picture and the judgement about political development begins to depend upon the choices one makes regarding them. Also, the moment all these factors are taken into account, the judgement would become so subtly qualitative in nature as to lose all relevance for purposes of quantitative measurement and comparison. It would become more like the judgement of historians, and the whole attempt to render the study of political science 'scientific' would relapse into the situation from which it was sought to be retrieved.

The deeper problem, however, relates to the assumption that the articulation of any and every interest is desirable in a polity, and that the task of a political system is to reconcile and aggregate all interests so that they may be satisfied to the maximum. The assumption, it is generally forgotten, presupposes not only the *primacy* of politics but also its *totality vis-à-vis* the social system. Such a totalitarian view of the function of politics may be natural and perhaps even welcome to practising politicians, but that it should be so to political scientists also is surprising indeed. For, it should be obvious to

them that if freedom is one of the central values to be preserved, safeguarded and enhanced by the political system, it is essential that freedom from *politics* itself be seen as one of its essential components. It is not exactly a happy situation if people continuously think in terms of their interests, articulating them and presenting them as demands to be fulfilled by the political system. Political scientists hardly realize how much their view of what may be called 'political welfare' is built on the economic model. Instead of 'wants', they talk of 'interests', and as 'wants' for the economist are and ought to be unlimited, so also for the political scientist 'interests' are and ought to be unlimited. But as economists are discovering that 'unlimitedness' of wants is essentially suicidal when confronted with the essential 'limitedness' of non-renewable resources, so also political scientists might discover increasing articulation of interests to be a menace to the health and stability of a political system.

The other assumption of those who write of interest articulation in the context of political development appears to be that the 'interests' of various groups are ultimately harmonious in character. For if this were not so, the more the interests were articulated the more would they tear the polity apart by the essential impossibility of the resolution of their conflict. The Marxists, along with all who have a dialectical view of development, take just such a view of class interests. They treat them as essentially irreconcilable and thus as the ultimate motive force for the revolution through which alone antagonisms will be resolved. But while the revolution reverses the position of those who hold power, it does not abolish the conflict of interests amongst the various groups, which is a result of that relative scarcity of goods and services which renders, in principle, their equal distribution impossible. The only recourse in such a situation is to suppress the articulation of interests as much as possible, and to replace the notion of 'wants' with 'needs' in the economic sphere and of 'interests' with 'values' in the political sphere. The term 'values' refers to something for the sake of which the 'interests' of individuals and groups, however large, are sacrificed in a deliberate, self-conscious manner. The use of brute, total and naked force for the achievement of these objectives is well known to students of recent political history. But what is not so well known is the fact that any society which

conceives of itself in terms of egocentric interests cannot but lead to the development of an increasingly anarchic situation which can be retrieved only by a dictatorship of some sort or other. That this has not yet occurred in many western democracies where the view of society as a field of competing interests is propounded is merely due to the fact that some overarching value system beyond the competing interests still obtains in those societies and that, fortunately, many of them do not practise what they preach.

The situation in the so-called developing countries, however, is radically different in that they seem to take the 'interest articulation' view of a democratic polity too seriously and thus consider it obligatory to encourage as much interest articulation by as many groups as possible. This, however, leads only to a situation of continuously increasing anarchy which is then sought to be stopped by one form of totalitarian control or other. The counterpart of Adam Smith's 'hidden hand', though not explicitly formulated in democratic political theory, has yet to be postulated to make it function. But as the 'hidden hand' is provided only by cultural and motivational constraints, it may not be available at hand to counteract the drive towards anarchy inherent in the 'interest' view of politics propounded by many political scientists who have recently written on the subject.

There is, however, a deeper distinction from the realm of economics which, if not noticed, may lead to even greater disasters for political thought and consequently for political practice also. Economic theory at least ensures that if the conditions of perfect competition were realized, prices would stabilize at a point maximally advantageous to everyone concerned. It may be true that the existence of quasi-monopolistic institutions on the one hand and the differential distribution of income on the other perpetually stand in the way of the achievement of conditions of perfect competition in any society whatsoever. But at least the theory assures us that *if* it were to be achieved, maximal satisfaction and utilization of resources would be ensured. Unfortunately for political theory, it can ensure nothing of the kind. Even if each person were to articulate all the interests he has, there is nothing in the theory to show that they must reach an equilibrium point where maxi-

imum satisfaction will be ensured for all the interests of all the people.

It may be urged that the articulation of interests may range from the mere expression of a demand to a sustained and concerted action for its achievement even at the cost of staking one's life for the fulfilment of the demand. The genuine intensity of the demand could thus be weighed on a graded scale determined by the actual sacrifice one is willing to make for its fulfilment. The sacrifice would thus be the cost that one is willing to incur for the fulfilment of one's interest and the equilibrium point reached when one of the parties to the conflict of interests decides that it is not in its interest to make any more sacrifices for the fulfilment of its demands. The limiting case would be reached, as in the case of war, when one or both the parties decide to fight to the finish till one or the other is completely subjugated or annihilated. This would be the analogue of the price-theory in economics, where the effectiveness of demand is measured by what one is prepared to pay for it. But to judge the effectiveness of an interest in terms of the 'force' that one is prepared to exercise for its achievement is to revert back to a view of politics propounded by Thrasymachus in *Plato's Republic* and Hobbes in his *Leviathan*. There is, of course, no intellectual harm in this provided it is done openly and with full consciousness of all the consequences. The equilibrium point on such a view, it should be clearly understood, has nothing to do with the so-called 'maximal fulfilment of diverse interests'. Rather, it is a situation where those who have the utmost power rule, and those who have lost the battle for power have either already lost their lives or preferred to live in subjugation or slavery.

'Interest articulation', then, can hardly serve by itself as an indicator of political development. In different contexts an increase in it either in terms of extent or intensity or both may mean a growth in the political awareness of a people or just an overloading of the political system leading to its breakdown and decay. In fact, as in most cases the demands on the political system would tend to outrun its capacity to meet them, the only likely result would be increasing revelation of the incapacity of the system to meet the demands made upon it, resulting in its replacement by a system which does not permit the freedom of

'interest articulation' by the citizens, or restricts it severely. It may be suggested, therefore, that the heart of the problem of political development should be sought in 'interest aggregation', rather than in 'interest articulation', since whether the interests are articulated or not the task of a polity is to aggregate the diverse interests to the utmost possible extent.

(2) The Criterion as Interest Aggregation

To turn from interest articulation to interest aggregation as a criterion of political development is to turn from what is demanded of a political system to what it *actually* delivers to its members for whom it is supposed to function. And there can perhaps be little doubt that a political system should ultimately be judged by what it does for its citizens. However, if what is done is seen in terms of 'interests' and that too of those who are able to articulate them most effectively, there would be an in-built distortion in the criterion itself. For the interests of even those who are not able to articulate themselves ought to be of paramount concern to the polity. And, at a still deeper level, what should engage the attention of a polity is not so much the satisfaction of interests as the facilitation of the realization of value or values for its people.

The term 'interest aggregation', however, is unfortunate in another respect. Even if we talk in terms of 'interests', what is sought to be achieved is not so much an aggregation as a reconciliation of diverse and opposing interests. The term 'aggregation' is too summative in nature to convey the difficulty and complexity of the task involved. Further, in the specific technical sense in which it is used by Almond and Powell, it connotes only the intermediate stage of aggregation rather than the final stage where what is aggregated takes the form of positive enactment as law. It is related more to the phase where policy alternatives are formulated rather than to that where a final choice with respect to policy alternatives is made. According to Almond and Powell, 'The function of converting demands into general policy *alternatives* is called interest aggregation.'²³ Also, it is made explicitly clear that the term 'interest aggregation' is reserved 'for the more inclusive levels of the combinatory process—the structuring of major policy alterna-

tives and also distinguish it from the final process of authoritative rule making'.²⁴

It is of course conceded that every articulation of interest involves an 'interest aggregation' of some sort, and that complete aggregation is made only at the level when an authoritative rule is finally formulated. As the authors write, 'interest aggregation can occur at many points in the political system', and that even 'a single individual may take into account a variety of claims and considerations before articulating his own demands'.²⁵ In fact, 'some degree of aggregation is almost inevitably carried out at all levels from individual interest articulation to the final decision-making'.²⁶ But if this is the situation, what is the point of treating it as a separate category, completely dissociated from interest articulation, on the one hand, and rule-making, on the other? The only justification offered is that unless there are some such midway institutions specializing in the task of aggregating diverse and different interests that have been articulated at various levels in the system, the final decision-maker will be overwhelmed by the indefinite multiplicity of interests pressing for his attention and be either completely immobilized from taking any decision or forced into erratic or impulsive decisions.

But 'immobilism' or 'impulsive decisions' are not exactly a function of the 'non-aggregation' of interests in a polity because of the absence of specific, differentiated structures devoted to the performance of that task. The first usually results from the fact that the conflicting interests seem so balanced against one another that it is difficult to favour one or the other without disturbing the unity and peace of the polity in a substantial manner. On the other hand, it may also be a result of the psychological inability of the political élite to take difficult and unpleasant decisions which may disturb the *status quo* in a substantial manner. But whether the reason for 'immobilism' lies in the first or the second or a blend of both, it can hardly be said to be due to the fact that a polity has not evolved differentiated structures to perform the task of 'interest aggregation'. Similarly, it is difficult to believe that 'impulsive' or 'erratic' decisions have anything to do with the fact that the articulated interests have reached the decision-makers in an 'unaggregated' manner. Rather, more often, they are the

result of a crisis situation which makes *unexpected* demands on the decision-makers who also happen to be temperamentally incapable of reacting coolly to a crisis situation.

The authors recognize that, in certain circumstances, 'immobilism' may be the only sound policy for the decision-making élite as the *status quo* represents the best compromise between warring interests in the situation. They write, 'the possibility must be kept in mind, however, that in systems with high levels of conflict and disagreement over policy direction, the maintenance of the *status quo* may be as satisfying to as many groups and individuals as any single possible pattern of change'.²⁷ But it is not made clear how the creation of differentiated, interest-aggregating institutions would be of any special help in achieving this. The so-called 'immobilism' in the sense of maintaining the *status quo* derives not from the presence or absence of these institutions, but from the internal social, economic and cultural structure of the society in which the decision-maker is situated and of which he is also an integral part. The decision-maker, of course, need not be a single person, and, in fact, seldom is. But that would scarcely affect the situation except in making it more complicated, as the plurality of decision-makers may represent a diversity of interests amongst themselves.

However, this diversity and plurality of interests does not disappear even after their supposed aggregation by the differentiated structures evolved by the so-called 'politically more developed' societies. For, according to the authors themselves, interest aggregation is only concerned with '*converting demands into general policy alternatives*'.²⁸ But assuming that the alternatives are real alternatives in the sense that the adoption of one leads to consequences which are diametrically opposed to those which would follow from the adoption of the other, it is difficult to discover what advantage the decision-maker gets by the creation of differentiated structures for aggregating interests. The aggregated policy alternatives would be so contradictory in nature that the dilemma of the decision-maker faced with the perennial task of reconciling the irreconcilables would, if anything, be more aggravated. He would certainly gain a clearer consciousness of the choices involved and the relative costs that each choice entailed in the circumstances concerned. But this

task is in no way dependent on the existence of differentiated aggregating structures. Rather, it is a function of the knowledge of causal interrelationships that obtain in the relevant fields and, in fact, are generally available to the decision-maker whether such differentiated institutions for interest aggregation exist or not. On the other hand, the sharpness in the formulation of policy alternatives which happen to be mutually exclusive and dichotomous in character, would only render the task of the decision-maker more difficult, as he does not have to adopt one of the contradictory alternatives formulated by the differentiated structures devoted to the task of interest aggregation, but, rather, to evolve a new alternative which maximizes the interest-satisfaction of all concerned.

The above view of the decision-maker's function assumes that he himself does not represent any specific interest or interests in the society concerned. For, if he were to do so, he would have to adopt the policy alternative which maximally aggregates the interests he represents, and ignore completely the interests which are conflicting or antagonistic to his own. Many theories of political life tend to argue that such is actually the case, and that the whole discussion of the decision-maker serving some overarching public interest which somehow transcends and reconciles conflicting private and group interests is just a façade which deceives nobody. The Marxist theory of state is honest enough to propound this view of political life explicitly, but somehow forgets to apply the truth to its own case, thus indirectly justifying the *necessity* of the façade in all cases. Yet, the very fact that such a necessity is felt by all holders of public office is indicative of the fact that the essence of the notion of functioning in a public capacity is always conceived of in such a manner, and only that exercise of the function is considered *legitimate* which is exercised with such an end in view. But if it is impossible to exercise the function in such a way then the purpose of the polity is defeated at its foundations, and both liberal and radical solutions are doomed to failure from the very start.

The in-built hopelessness of the situation is masked by the fact that theoreticians tend to postulate a freedom for themselves which they consider impossible for others and which their theory rules out in principle, or a society in which there

are no incompatible interests at all and to which perhaps the notion of 'incompatible interests' does not apply in principle. Usually the two tend to go together. The theoretician blithely assumes that not only is he free from all the determinations which others are subject to, but that out of a society where it is impossible for any decision-maker to transcend his particular class interests and to think and act in terms of the interest of the whole, would emerge another where there being no classes, the decision-makers would think and act only in terms of the interest of the whole. There is, of course, the further point whether in a class society there could be any such thing as 'the interest of the whole'. But then the paradox would become deeper, as what we are asked to believe is the possibility of the emergence of a society where there would not only be no incompatible interests to reconcile, but also no possibility for any such incompatibility to ever arise in future from a society where this was impossible in principle.

For once the possibility of competing interests is admitted in a polity, the decision-maker would either have to be given the task and the capability of reconciling these interests or the polity would have to continue to subdivide till it reaches autonomous units with homogeneous interests or accept a perpetual alternation between diverse interests or groups which dominate each other either by force or fraud or both.

Marxists, for example, make an exception in their own case and think they can transcend the determination, which normally should be their fate, of working to realize the interests of the class into which they happen to have been born by a biological accident. Equally, they tend to postulate the existence of a society in which there will be no conflict of interests at all, or, if there is conflict, that there will be no doubt as to which are the legitimate interests that ought to prevail. The former is the well-known notion of the classless society towards which all history moves and which alone justifies all history, as without it, it would be a tale of senseless injustice and irredeemable horror. The latter is the well-known dictatorship of the proletariat which is a necessary instrument for the realization of the former. There is also perhaps the assumption that the proletariat constitutes the majority of the people, and that in some metaphysical sense its interests represent the interests of

the whole. The majority, of course, may range from 51 to 99 per cent and to the extent it approximates to the latter, the metaphysical sense also tends to coincide with the empirical. But as in most countries where Marxist revolutions have taken place, the peasantry formed a major part of the population and as, according to most Marxist thinkers, the peasantry is not only no part of the proletariat but has interests that conflict with those of the latter, the interests which the dictatorship pursues in the name of history on behalf of the proletariat tend to be more and more metaphysical in character and the divergence between the empirical and the metaphysical tends to widen. On the other hand, the advanced industrial countries where at one time the proletariat really constituted the majority and in which Marx thought the socialist revolution would take place, have shown a disquieting decline in the proportion of the proletariat in their post-industrial phases. It is not only the white-collar worker who begins to outnumber those engaged in the industrial field, but also those who work in what has come to be called 'the knowledge industry' who begin to outnumber both.²⁹ The decline in the proportion of persons engaged in agriculture, which was such a marked characteristic of western countries in their first phase of industrialization, is followed by a second and a third phase when the proportion of people engaged in industrial production first declines relatively to those engaged in the service industries and then to those engaged in the knowledge industries. The dictatorship of the proletariat in these countries, therefore, would represent the actual interests of a minority which only by some metaphysical sleight of hand could be made out to represent not only the interests of the whole but of the future also.

The importance of the notion of the decision-maker as a person who tries to reconcile conflicting interests is that if his function is conceived of in this way the 'interest aggregation' performed by the so-called intermediate structures of Almond and Powell, instead of helping him, would make his task even more difficult. For, according to them, the task of the interest aggregating structures is not to reconcile divergent interests but to aggregate 'the articulated interests into *major policy alternatives*'.³⁰ Now, though the authors have not clearly spelled out what they mean by 'policy alternatives', it may reasonably

be assumed that the alternatives so formulated are exclusive in the sense that if one of the policy alternatives for implementation is accepted one necessarily excludes the satisfaction of all those interests which are presumably aggregated in the other policy alternative. Not only this, the alternatives so formulated are presumably exhaustive in character. If so, the decision-maker is left in an impossible position where he can hardly exercise his function, for he can only choose out of the policy alternatives which aggregate opposing interests into sharp, clear-cut dichotomies and, in doing so, become the instrument for the realization of one set of interests against others. The close relation of the interest-aggregation function to the structure of political parties in Almond's presentation strengthens this interpretation even more, as the so-called 'policy alternatives' can only be formulated by different parties which presumably represent opposed and conflicting interests.

It is true that bureaucratic structures are also supposed to perform the function of interest aggregation and, presumably, they would be concerned with what we have called the reconciliation of diverse interests rather than their formulation in sharply opposed and exclusive alternatives, which political parties are supposed to do. But then it is difficult to see why bureaucracy should formulate alternative policy proposals except in the sense that there may be alternative ways of reconciling the interests. Yet, even if it be conceded that it is tenable to speak of alternatives in such a context, it is clear that the bureaucracy itself would have to work out the cost-benefit ratios of the different strategies of reconciliation, and recommend the strategy which does so in the best possible manner.

It is, of course, true that the bureaucracy, like political parties, might have its own particular interests to foster. But, in that case, it would not be performing the function specific to itself. On the other hand, the very *raison d'être* of political parties is supposed to be the articulation, propagation and fulfilment of *some particular interests* against others. In fact, the unawareness of the radical distinction between the sort of interest aggregation that is demanded from bureaucracy and that which is supposed to be performed by political parties is perhaps the central weakness of the authors' discussion regarding this issue.

But the moment such a distinction is made, one is bound to ask what is gained by the sort of interest aggregation which political parties are required to perform in the Almond-Powell model? The authors are aware of the dangers which a divided, fragmented polity faces if its members articulate their diverse interests in irreconcilable terms. But they forget that the function they ascribe, or rather prescribe, for political parties does just that.

Their plea, of course, is that the bureaucracy cannot exercise its function effectively unless there are other agencies which perform the same function in an autonomous, independent fashion. They contend that 'in order for the bureaucracy to aggregate effectively, a system with a strong and effective decision-making center outside of the bureaucracy itself is generally necessary. Without such a center the bureaucracy may not be able to maintain its autonomy and coherence.'³¹ But, first, this refers only to the independence and autonomy of the decision-making centres from those that perform the interest-aggregating function. And, secondly, it says nothing about the necessity of a plurality of interest-aggregating institutions functioning independently of each other. Even if such a necessity be admitted for the reason that separate agencies working independently of each other might arrive at solutions which a single agency working on its own may not possibly envisage, it by no means follows that such a function can only be discharged most effectively by political parties, as the authors seem to think. Nor does it follow that it will be facilitated if some institutions aggregate interests not in the sense of reconciliation of conflicting interests but in the sense of formulation of policies devoted to the achievement of one set of interests against others. For, this is usually what political parties do and also what they are supposed to do in the model set for them by Almond and Powell. It may be noted in passing that a political party does not and cannot suggest *policy alternatives*, as the authors seem to think. Rather, each political party can only suggest *one* policy alternative which is such as to maximize, if followed, the interests it represents. The other alternatives can only be formulated by other political parties or by the bureaucracy or other institutions concerned with the task. The alternatives so formulated are supposed to

be considered by the decision-making authority, which may choose any one out of them or formulate a new one on its own.

The relation of the decision-making authority to the various agencies which formulate the policy proposals for its consideration is, however, not the same. The policy alternative proposed by the political party which happens also to be the ruling party is in a totally different position than all the other alternatives proposed by other institutions. It occupies a pre-eminent position in the sense that the ruling wing of a political party is supposed to implement the policies formulated by the party, and if it deviates from them, it does so only marginally. Thus, if a political party is conceived of as the representative of only a certain group of interests, it is almost inevitable that its ruling wing does nothing else but cater to those interests. On the other hand, if a political party is conceived of as a specific viewpoint for the reconciliation of conflicting interests or as a particular manner of reconciling these interests, it becomes the bounden duty of the ruling wing to take note of all the alternative proposals for reconciliation and try to adopt the one which, in its judgement, has the possibilities of achieving it to the maximum extent.

It is a well-known fact that whenever a political party comes to power, its ruling wing feels constraints and obligations which it had not even suspected earlier, and of which the non-ruling wing generally remains unaware. This has often created tensions between the two wings, specially in cases where the party comes to power for the first time and, even more so, when the party conceives of itself in ideological terms. Perhaps we could distinguish between parties that conceive of themselves as the representative of some particular interests only, and those that do not conceive of themselves in such a manner. The particular interests may be those of a class or caste or race or region or religion or linguistic group. But in all such and similar cases, the political parties ought to be regarded as performing only the function of interest articulation and not of interest aggregation, except in the trivial sense in which the articulation of any interest already involves some sort of aggregation or other. It is only when a political party conceives of itself as representing not this or that interest but rather the interest of the whole that it may be said to be performing the function of interest aggrega-

tion primarily. However, it is difficult for any political party to perform this function with great effectiveness unless it comes to power, and even then it is only its ruling wing which apprehends the problems and difficulties of reconciliation in their totality.

Political parties, thus, do not seem to be such efficient instruments of interest aggregation as Almond and Powell seem to think. Nor is it clear, as they seem to imply, that a political party's interest-aggregating function frees the decision-maker in carrying out his task more effectively. Rather, it should be seen as a *constraint* on the decision-maker, as a continuous pressure on him to subordinate interest aggregation in terms of the polity and society as a whole, for which he feels responsible, to the interests of the political party which he represents and which seldom, if ever, coincide with the interests of the totality. The authors are, of course, aware of the problem of fragmentation in aggregation patterns, but they do not quite see that the way they conceive the role of political parties in the function of interest aggregation, cannot but lead to the augmentation of such a situation. And, though it may be accepted that 'the emergence of fragmented policy alternatives in the aggregation process is "caused" by basic cultural and economic features of the society, it can be alleviated or exacerbated by the way in which mediating interest aggregation is performed',³² it is difficult to believe that political parties are the institutions *par excellence* for achieving such alleviation, or that they invariably or predominantly do so.

In fact, there is an inverse relation between interest articulation and interest aggregation in the sense that the task of aggregation becomes increasingly difficult as the number of articulated interests increases. But as increase in interest articulation is itself seen as a sign of political development, it is obvious that if aggregative processes do not keep pace with it, the polity would become increasingly fragmented, which would be a sign not of political development but of political decay. And, as articulation is always easier to achieve than aggregation, it is bound to run ahead of the latter and make its task increasingly difficult, if not impossible. Such an inverse relationship between the criteria offered by the authors for political development is not confined merely to interest articulation and

interest aggregation. Rather, as we shall see in section (8), it is a feature of other criteria also.

Besides the so-called structures of interest aggregation, Almond and Powell regard the style of interest aggregation as equally important for indicating whether a polity may be regarded as politically developed or not. By style, the authors refer to 'the way in which the structure performs the function: the general operating rules it manifests'.³³ They distinguish between 'three different styles of interest aggregation, corresponding roughly to increasingly secularized political subcultures of the interest aggregation structures'.³⁴ These styles are characterized as 'pragmatic bargaining, absolute-value oriented, and traditionalistic'.³⁵ The third, that is the traditionalistic style, is presumably supposed to characterize all past societies, while the first two are supposed to differentiate the totalitarian régimes of the fascist and communist varieties from the democratic. At the heart of the pragmatic-bargaining style is supposed to be 'the accommodation of diverse interests', and 'compromise and the atmosphere of the market place are supposed to dominate the process of interest aggregation'.³⁶ On the other hand, in the absolute-value oriented style of interest aggregation, 'a rigid framework is imposed upon the *expression* and aggregation of all group interests'.³⁷ Also, 'such a style often results in the systematic exclusion of the demands and interests of *major* groups in the population'.³⁸ Thus it is not only that the articulation of interests is rigidly controlled in the absolute-value oriented style of interest aggregation, but that, though the interests pursued are supposed to represent the real or true interests of all, in fact they are only the interests conceived of by a minority in the name of the totality, even when most of the actual groups constituting the population reject the formulation.

The distinction between the 'apparent' and the 'real' interests is, thus, at the heart of the absolute-value oriented style of interest aggregation, it being assumed that the so-called 'real' interests are unknown to all except the privileged few, or rather the privileged *one*, who alone may know what they are. But, then, there seems little point in calling it interest aggregation, as it is not diverse interests which are aggregated in this style; instead, the very notion of diversity of interests is denied and

relegated to the realm of the 'apparent' rather than the 'real'. It belongs, in Plato's terminology, to the realm of opinion rather than knowledge. But in this sense it would be wrong to say that the so-called traditional societies of the past have not been characterized by this style of interest aggregation. Most theocratic states, particularly those belonging to the Judaic tradition, have always thought of themselves as defenders of the Faith and in possession of Truth, as against the false knowledge of the heretics and infidels. In this respect, there is little to choose between these states of the past and the fascist and communist states of today.

The objection may be raised that the ideological posture of a society only affects the rhetoric used and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the style adopted for purposes of interest aggregation rather than the fact that there remain diverse and conflicting interests demanding such aggregation. That such interests are deemed as 'apparent' rather than 'real' does not affect the fact that they have either to be extirpated completely or placated to some extent. As it is usually not possible to achieve the former totally, the latter has to be attempted even when not approved or liked. Not all the heretics can be killed, or all the profit- or power-seekers eliminated. And if this cannot be done, then these persistent and conflicting interests will have to be defused in some manner or other. The *actual* practice of openly ideological régimes, whether of the religious or the secular variety, seems to confirm this. Most religious régimes have to come to terms with the existence of heretic minorities or even of heretic majorities within their own midst. A classic case of the latter was Islamic rule in India where a religious ruling minority had to come to terms with a ruled majority belonging to a different religion. The Mughal Empire sought to solve the problem by inducting first the Rajput nobility and later the antagonistic Marathas into their administrative system. Later, the British Empire adopted the same policy, though in a more openly secular framework than that of the Mughals. The secular dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini, specially in their imperial phase, did not last long enough for this truth to be perceived. But the Soviet variant of the pattern has shown, specially in its relations with East European countries, an evolution which may be regarded as analogous.

Yet, even if it is conceded that the task of interest aggregation remains to a great extent the same under ideologies of different persuasions, it may be accepted that they can make a significant difference at some stages in the development of a polity. This will be specially true of the early stages when ideological passions are high, the search for ideological purity absolute and the urge for implementation of the ideal imperative. But even at other times, the Mullahs and the Pandits, or, to use more sophisticated terminology, the ideologues of the party, have to be placated, for they and their rhetoric provide legitimacy to the élite in power. In fact, it may be hazarded as a hypothesis that, in the later stages of a polity, the strength of the ideologues would be a function of the weakness of the ruling élite and the difficulties it may be facing at home or abroad.

Thus, as the absolute-value oriented style of interest aggregation is found in large parts of human history, the attempt to distinguish it from the traditionalistic style does not seem very happy. Further, Almond and Powell's definition of the traditionalistic style is such that it will be found in most polities, except at the moments of their revolutionary beginnings. 'Traditionalistic styles of aggregation', write the authors, 'rely upon the patterns of the past in suggesting policy alternatives for the future.'³⁹ But this is not an unusual phenomenon at all, and the policies of all the polities most of the time may be characterized in some such terms. It is surprising to find authors who have written so much about 'political socialization' treating as 'traditionalistic' a reliance on patterns of the past even for *suggesting* policy alternatives for the future.

It may be true, as Toynbee has pointed out, that this is the bane of all polities and the fundamental cause of their decline and decay. The idolization of an ephemeral self or technique or institution may be the cause, as Toynbee contends, of the fact that societies, nations and individuals tend to fall in love with that which once was successful in meeting a challenge or overcoming a difficulty in the past. But this is only another name for the learning process through which we assimilate the present into the past; if sometimes the assimilation is unwarranted because the present happens to be sharply dissimilar from the past, the action based on the assimilation might prove disastrous for the actor concerned. But this is a risk inherent in the situation,

and unless the actor is sensitive to both the similarities and the differences in the situation, he is unlikely to respond creatively to the changing situation. This is as true of the field of knowledge, as that of action. Significant breakthroughs in the former are as much the result of getting away from the accepted paradigms of explanation as the revolutionary breakaway from the traditional patterns of response in the case of the latter. But neither knowledge nor action will be possible, if new paradigms are set up each day and new revolutions proclaimed each hour. Continuity is at the heart of civilization and consists in nothing else except the reliance on patterns of the past for acting in the present so that some determinate, desirable future may be realized.

As for the pragmatic-bargaining style, it not only assumes an actual diversity of interests, but also of their social *legitimacy*. To the extent that *actual* diversity of interests may be said to characterize all societies, such a style of interest aggregation may also be expected to be found there on almost *a priori* grounds. However, as pointed out in our discussion of the absolute-value oriented style of interest aggregation, unless this actual diversity is provided an ideological legitimacy in the political system, there will be a continuous tension and strain between what the ideology demands and what the actual exigencies dictate in the situation. The Hindu world-view legitimizes such a plurality and diversity at the empirico-religious level, while the liberal-democratic view seeks to do the same at the socio-political level. In a certain sense, the legitimization of interest articulation already entails the legitimization of the plurality and diversity of interests. And once the plurality and diversity of interests is accepted as legitimate, the pragmatic-bargaining style of aggregating these interests will also be accepted and adopted openly. But accepting the legitimacy of plural and diverse interests may also lead to the increasing fragmentation of a polity, making the task of integration more and more difficult.

Fragmentation, in fact, is the third parameter in terms of which the discussion about interest aggregation has been carried on by Almond and Powell. But the context in which they consider the problem of fragmentation relates primarily to patterns of interest aggregation. The focus of attention is on

whether the structures performing the interest-aggregation function do it in such a way as to reduce the fragmentation or sharpen it even further. That a certain amount of fragmentation exists in the polity is assumed; the only relevant question in this context is supposed to be whether the specialized and differentiated structures designed to aggregate these interests do so to lessen the antagonisms and the differences amongst the various interests, or to increase them to breaking point. But if the task of the differentiated structures is to aggregate the various interests, it is difficult to see why they should do it in such a manner as to aggravate the divisions and cleavages amongst the various interest groups. Perhaps the clue to this seeming anomaly lies in the fact that the interest-aggregating structures are supposed to convert demands into *policy alternatives* which, because they are conceived of as mutually exclusive in character, sharpen and intensify the implicit differences and oppositions between the interests of the various groups. Further, as these policy alternatives are supposed to be formulated primarily by political parties opposed to each other, the likelihood of their formulating the policies in such a manner as to be sharply opposed to each other is perhaps greater than it would otherwise have been. On the other hand, it should also not be forgotten that the parties have to seek the widest electoral support to come into power and thus have to formulate their policies in such a way as to aggregate the interests of the largest number of groups as far as possible. This perhaps is the reason why in most countries where democratic parties function, they tend to approximate to each other at least in their verbal pronouncements over a period of time. On the whole, the aggregating function is perhaps better performed by the bureaucracy than political parties, even though this is contrary to what the authors think.

It may, therefore, be safely said that it would only be in extraordinary circumstances that aggregating structures would help increase the fragmentation of a polity. On the other hand, the emphasis on interest articulation can certainly lead to a fragmentation of the polity, as each interest so articulated would clamour for its satisfaction at the expense of others. Not only this, the very fact of thinking in terms of interests tends to fragment a polity. It may, of course, be contended that all

polities are in fact fragmented and that the articulation merely brings this fact out into the open. But there can be little doubt that the fact of articulation itself makes the interests far sharper and more defined than they would otherwise have been. Also, the fact of articulation makes one far more *identified* with the interest than one would otherwise have been. All dictatorships know this so well that they do not allow free articulation of interests, except sometimes as a ruse to tempt the differences to come into the open so that their proponents may be eliminated from the body politic. The classic case of such a strategy was Mao's call in China 'to let a hundred flowers bloom, to let a thousand thoughts contend', resulting in the rolling of heads of all those who were innocent enough to believe him. Thus, if fragmentation has to be avoided on the ground that it is a negative indicator of political development, one would have to throttle not only all unlicensed articulation of interests but also all thinking in terms of 'interests'. And this is what all totalitarian systems attempt to do. Yet, it is difficult to believe that they would be regarded as paradigmatic examples of political development by anybody, including Almond and Powell themselves.

The authors are, of course, aware of the difficulties created by interest articulation for modernization and political development. As Almond and Powell point out, 'clearly the tendency of social and economic modernization to expand communication levels, to increase inclinations toward participation, to widen the gap between rich and poor (at least in the short run in many cases), and generally to *increase the number of autonomous demands arising from the society*, places growing stress upon the aggregation structures.'⁴⁰ The stresses are relieved by many modernizing systems through the creation of 'a controlled form of participation and a hierarchical and unified aggregation'.⁴¹ But how can this authoritarian solution be characterized as 'development' when it seeks to negate the very features supposed to constitute the core of political development? There is little consolation in being told that 'even in cases of "authoritarian" solutions, the divisions and conflict often reappear in new form within the ruling party or the élite itself'.⁴² Factions or divisions in such a situation do not represent the interests of those outside the system who constitute the majority, but only

of the various sectors of bureaucracy and the military which alone have access to the decision-makers in case they happen to be different from them.

Interest aggregation, then, as a criterion of political development seems to be full of so many holes as to be hardly capable of holding any water, at least in the form in which the authors have presented it in their work. According to them, the existence of differentiated structures dedicated to the task of interest aggregation is a sign of political development, provided the whole task is performed in a pragmatic-bargaining style and with a view to alleviating and bridging the differences that obtain between diverse and conflicting interests of various groups and classes constituting the polity. The aggregation structures, it should be remembered, must not only be differentiated from the major interest articulation structures, but also from the central decision-making structures. The love of differentiation and the market-place is writ large on such a contention, but it is difficult to see how the so-called pragmatic-bargaining style of interest aggregation becomes relevant to an institution which is specifically *differentiated* to perform only this task. In case it is really *differentiated*, it cannot enter into a dialogue or a process of give-and-take with other interest groups, for *it has no interests of its own* and thus can only try to reconcile the diverse and conflicting interests of others to the best of its ability. Also, as it has been made mandatory for such an institution to propose *policy alternatives* for the consideration of decision-makers, it can devise different valuational criteria in terms of which the alternative reconciliations could possibly be attempted. The public debate could perhaps then be focussed on the justifiability of the criteria themselves in terms of which the reconciliation ought to be attempted.

Almond and Powell have not only felt no necessity to formulate any such criteria, but they appear to be completely unaware of the problem itself. Further, they do not seem to have noted the contradiction in saying that 'some degree of aggregation is almost inevitably carried out at all levels from individual interest articulation to the final decision-making'⁴³ and the demand that 'aggregation structures must be differentiated from the central decision-making structures' and that 'they must also be differentiated from the major interest articulation

structures'.⁴⁴ Also, that if this demand for differentiation is made essential for considering a polity developed, then at least the presence of political parties cannot be regarded as such, for they not only are 'major structures for performing the function of interest aggregation', but also play an important role 'as institutional interest articulators'.⁴⁵ Further, while pragmatic-bargaining style may possibly prevail within a political party, it can do so only because it also performs the role of interest articulation. Otherwise, there would be little meaning in talking about pragmatic-bargaining between different interest groups, as in a developed polity they are supposed to articulate only their own interests and not enter into any bargaining with each other in order to place their aggregated demand before decision-makers. It may be suggested that this is just the task which the differentiated interest aggregation structures should undertake. In other words, they should help the various interest groups to come together and enter into a meaningful dialogue so that they could bridge their differences and reach an agreed solution. But then there would be no *policy alternatives* for them to present to the decision-makers, only the agreed decision which would be presented by the parties themselves without the intermediacy of the differentiated aggregation structures. In fact, within this perspective, these structures would become increasingly redundant as the interest groups would begin to enter into direct negotiations with each other and thus begin performing the function of interest aggregation themselves.

The specific criteria of interest aggregation offered by the authors are thus of little help in understanding the notion of political development. Besides the difficulties we have already pointed out, there is the added difficulty that they do not seem capable of quantitative measurement. For purposes of comparison, therefore, they can hardly be of much use. But if they cannot do this job, they are irrelevant to any discussion of political development, as the comparison between different polities and of the same polity at different times is the very purpose for which the concept was formulated. It may be added that the concept of interest aggregation gains credence as a *prima facie* criterion of political development because of its generalized sense of reconciliation of diverse and conflicting

interests, which is one of the primary tasks of any polity. But it is not clear whether the specific technical sense in which Almond and Powell use the term achieves this end necessarily, or even in a pre-eminent manner. In fact, they themselves fluctuate between the technical and the general use of the term. In the technical sense, for example, such a statement as 'some degree of aggregation is almost inevitably carried out at all levels from individual interest articulation to the final decision-making',⁴⁶ is meaningless, for neither the individual nor the final decision-maker 'convert demands into general policy alternatives'⁴⁷ in terms of which the function of interest aggregation is defined at the very beginning of the discussion.

(3) *The Criterion as Rule-Making*

The policy alternatives proposed by the differentiated structures of interest aggregation have ultimately to be placed before the decision-maker or decision-makers, who have to make the final decision. The choice may be made between the alternatives proposed or some further alternative that may be formulated and opted for by the decision-makers. But whatever the choice, it has ultimately to issue in an authoritative pronouncement embodying the final decision in a rule which gives the verdict on the diverse and conflicting interests clamouring for satisfaction. It may thus be regarded as the crucial place in which the criterion of political development may be found. And, in fact, it does occupy such a place in the so-called conversion-functions of Almond's list. After the interests have been articulated and aggregated, the laws have to be formulated which try to satisfy the interests to the extent it is feasible and desirable to do so. The rule-making function, then, may be regarded as the political function *par excellence* and those who are after the holy grail of political development presumably hope to find it there.

But assuming that we can find it there, it would be relevant to ask where exactly we shall seek to find it. Shall it be in the number of rules made or in their contents or in their relationship to the interests that have been articulated and aggregated? One looks in vain in Almond and Powell for an answer to this question. Rather, their interest centres only on whether or not differentiated rule-making structures have emerged in

the political system, and whether or not 'the legitimacy of a process whereby new rules are made by secular political institutions'⁴⁸ is acknowledged. Besides these, perhaps, the authors' only other focus is on whether there has been a 'shift from the traditional to constitutional restraints on political actions'.⁴⁹ Their emphasis is thus primarily on distinguishing between traditional and modern political systems, assuming as a matter of course that what is modern is bound to be 'more developed' also. But, as we have already pointed out a number of times, a differentiated structure does not ensure anything by virtue of its 'differentiation', except perhaps the clear-cut location of responsibility for the functions performed or not performed.

As for 'the legitimacy of a process whereby new rules are made by secular political institutions', the contrast between the sacred immobilism of traditional societies and the secular dynamism of modern ones is perhaps too overdrawn. The myth of keeping the revealed rules intact by a process of continuous reinterpretation in the light of changing needs imposed by a changing environment, is paralleled by the continuous amendments to the constitutions of modern states, resulting in changes affecting the very fundamentals of the constitutions under the camouflage of keeping their sacred constitutionality intact. Constitutions, in fact, perform the same function as the revealed rules of ancient times and are treated in the same way. They are not as 'secular' as is usually made out by writers on political theory. Perhaps, the very concept of a 'constitution' is unsecular. How can something unchanging serve as a standard for processes and situations which are essentially changing in character? Even the distinction between those parts of a constitution which cannot be changed and those which can, along with the due processes of changing them, is not unknown to traditional societies with their revealed rules that they are supposed to follow. The distinction between *Śruti* and *Smṛti* in Hinduism and that between *Sunna* and *Sharia* in Islam are only the most conspicuous examples of this.

The obsession with the contrast between tradition and modernity appears to have blinded many political scientists to the fact that traditional societies were never as unchanging as is usually made out, or that modern societies are not as changing

as many have unquestioningly assumed them to be. The so-called substitution of traditional restraints on political action by constitutional ones is doubly spurious for, as everyone knows, all law is given content by a process of continuous interpretation on the part of the judiciary and is subject to subversion by political pressures of the most diverse kinds which can only be resisted, if at all, by the *traditions* of the polity that have become so ingrained in all the various segments of the political élite that they are restrained from violating the constraints, not from any outside authority, but from within. This is usually called 'political culture' in recent writings on political science, but, in fact, it is merely another name for tradition which is anathema to the protagonists of political modernization. Basically, all constraints are rooted either in the internalized processes of socialization, which is merely another name for tradition, or in mere brute and naked fear of violence, which is a denial of all culture and civilization. When the former are absent, constitutional restraints are of little avail as the history of most constitutional governments in the Third World so graphically shows. In such situations, anyone who can mobilize the organs of violence may nullify the constitutional constraints with such ease that one wonders if they were ever there at all.

The differentiation of institutions devoted to the task of law-making and the replacement of traditional restraints on political action by constitutional ones could, then, hardly be regarded as criteria of political development. In fact, Almond and Powell themselves appear doubtful whether such differentiated, clear-cut structures can be located. Their very reason for preferring the use of the term 'rule-making' for 'legislation' relates to the fact that 'the term "legislation" seems to connote some *specialized structure and explicit process*, whereas in many political systems the rule-making function is a diffuse process, difficult to untangle and specify.'⁵⁰ Lest it be thought that such a diffuseness is characteristic of only traditional political systems, the authors warn that 'in most political systems, but *particularly in modern democratic ones*, the performance of rule-making, like that of articulation and aggregation, will be dispersed and delegated.'⁵¹ According to them, not only this but the whole problem of identifying the rule-making structures

in political systems is 'one of specifying *the whole set of agencies and institutions* involved in the process, determining the kind of things they do, the way they do them, and how they interact to produce general rules.'⁵² But if this is the situation not only with respect to rule-making but also regarding interest articulation and aggregation, what happens to the contention that 'political development has been defined as the increased differentiation and specialization of political structures and the increased secularization of political culture'?⁵³ Perhaps, like politicians, political scientists are not expected to be consistent, or perhaps their left hand forgets what their right hand has written. In any case, the two statements read together would make the realization of 'political development' almost impossible in principle. This would be true not only in respect of 'the differentiation and specialization of political structures', but also of the 'secularization of political culture'.

It is debatable whether the concept of culture can be understood in purely secular terms, if culture is taken to mean not only the style and pattern of behaviour in any particular domain, but also the values one tries to realize and actualize therein. The ideals of justice, equality and freedom even in the socio-political realm can hardly be understood in purely positivistic and behaviouristic terms. But even if the possibility is admitted at the purely theoretical level, it is difficult to see how any actual empirical society could be characterized as such. The whole mythology of constitutions, courts and legislatures, with their sacred oaths and solemn rituals, militates against this secularization. The non-secular character of all this is hidden from the political scientist because of the language he uses to describe the phenomenon. The deeper reason, however, lies in the parochial culture-centredness of the western psyche which equates sacredness with theocentricity and thus treats all thought which does not accept the existence and authority of God as secular in character.

The emergence of differentiated rule-making structures, the legitimation of rule-making by secular structures and constitutional restraints on political action, thus, are not of much help as criteria of political development. Can the thinking in terms of quantity or content be of more help in the matter? An increase in the amount of rule-making can be taken as an index

of political development only if rule-making *per se* is regarded as a criterion of political development. Some people, of course, might treat it as such, particularly as traditional polities are not supposed to make any rules and modern polities perhaps do nothing else. But an increase in the quantity of rule-making may be taken to indicate that the society is facing increasing problems which it is trying to solve through legislation. Yet, if this is the interpretation, a relative decline in rule-making after such an increase would alone indicate that it has been successful in solving the problems for which it was undertaken. On the other hand, it may be urged that the increasing complexity of societies demands increasing legislation for their regulation and that the latter always lags behind the former. It can even be urged that the rules themselves may give rise to new and more complex problems whose solutions require the enactment of fresh rules, and that this cycle may go on *ad infinitum*. There is, thus, the possibility of a completely immanent necessity for a continuous increase in the rule-making function without influence from any external factor.

Yet, whatever the reasons behind the quantitative interpretation of rules as an indicator of political development, it will hardly be disputed that it is the easiest to fulfil and that, in fact, most so-called underdeveloped countries would rank quite high on that count. On the other hand, if we choose to take the content of the rules into account and base our criterion of political development on that, we would open the whole issue of criteria once again. For, unless we decide what ends the rule-making function is to subserve or achieve, it would be futile to look into the contents of those rules when judging the political development of the polity concerned. The question of ends, however, is seldom directly raised in most discussions of political development. It is assumed that if there is the widest possible participation in the political process and institutional mechanisms for the articulation of as many interests as possible, it would somehow be ensured that the rules made by the decision-making authorities would satisfy the largest interests of the greatest number of citizens of the polity. The deeper assumption, perhaps, is that there can be no *a priori* determination of ends which the rules ought to fulfil. Rather, each person is the best judge of his or her own interests, and the task of the

political authorities is only to ensure their reconciliation and satisfaction to the greatest extent possible. However, even in such a situation the authorities cannot escape the responsibility of ascribing differential weightage to the diverse interests that have been articulated and brought to their attention by those who have tried to aggregate them. All interests cannot be given *equal* weightage, letting only the number of persons who share an interest count in the final calculation. Perhaps the notion of the 'greatest good of the greatest number' does just this. But even there one has to decide whether the interests of the underprivileged, even if they be in a minority, should or should not be given more weightage than others. The disabilities resulting in deprivation could arise either from natural or social factors, but in either case the dilemma of choice would remain the same. The only difference would perhaps be in a feeling of guilt arising from a sense of responsibility in the case of the latter which will be absent in the former. Still, as man's capacity to modify and improve upon the resources of nature increases, the distinction tends to get increasingly blurred. On the other hand, social constraints may be felt to be more difficult to overcome as they are not only man's own creation but are internalized within his being to such an extent that he begins to define himself in those terms. To fight against them is to fight against oneself, and that is not only a difficult thing to undertake but almost impossible to succeed in.

It is, thus, the relation of rules to interest articulation and aggregation that may be said to provide the criterion by which we may judge whether the content of the rules that are formulated by the decision-making authority or authorities connote political development or otherwise. The amount of interests satisfied and the amount of differences reconciled in proportion to those that have been articulated and aggregated could be the measure of political development of a polity. It is not, of course, very clear whether the proportion should be calculated in terms of the interests articulated or in terms of the interests aggregated by the differentiated structures which are entrusted with the performance of that task. Almond and Powell themselves have not made it clear whether, in their view, the decision-making authorities are supposed to take into consideration *only* those interests which are presented to them

by the aggregating structures, or whether they want them to be free to take into account even those that might have been left out completely by the aggregating institutions for one reason or another. In the former case, the proportion would have to be calculated on the basis of the aggregated interests alone, while in the latter, the aggregated interests might even be completely ignored and the proportion calculated only on the basis of the articulated interests. As the authors fear that unless there are intermediate aggregating structures, the decision-makers will be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of demands and thus be rendered helpless to construct effective and consistent policy,⁵⁴ it may be taken that they would opt for the alternative that only the aggregated interests should engage the attention of the decision-maker. But in that case one would also have to develop a measure of the relationship between the interests articulated and the interests aggregated, for it would be naïve to assume that the aggregating structures would have taken into account the largest possible number of articulated interests and reconciled them in the most efficient manner possible. For, if it were really so, one wonders what would remain for the final decision-making authority to do except perhaps to look after its own vested interests which it might have considered impolitic to articulate publicly. But if those occupying the decision-making position can have a vested interest of their own, so can those who are given the task of interest aggregation. Besides this, they occupy a strategic situation where they may accentuate or underplay any interest or group of interests in such a way as to bring them to the attention of the decision-maker or to keep them away from it. It would become imperative, therefore, for the decision-making authorities to keep a critical watch on the aggregating authorities and to judge their performance in relation to the interests that have been articulated. But if they have to be aware of the articulated interests, there seems no reason why they should not directly take them into account in their rule-making function and let it therefore be judged in relation to that.

Perhaps the only reasons why they may try to avoid doing this may lie in their desire to have all the possible alternative ways of aggregating the articulated interests spelt out for them along with their respective costs and benefits so that they may be able to make some sort of rational choice between

them. But in that case it is difficult to see how political parties and the usual type of bureaucratic structures could perform the task of aggregation, as the authors appear to think. Perhaps, the government would have to establish independent, autonomous structures specifically entrusted with the task of aggregating the articulated interests in as many diverse ways as possible. But even then the problem of unarticulated interests would remain, and there seems little reason to justify the ignoring of an interest on the ground that it has not been articulated. The capacity to articulate is itself a function of many factors which may not be available to large masses of people in a society. In most underdeveloped societies illiteracy and poverty combine to render a vast majority of people inarticulate. It would be an act of utter irresponsibility on the part of decision-makers in these societies, therefore, to pay attention only to those interests that have been articulated and to ignore the rest. If they are to take into account the unarticulated interests, they would have first to face the problem of how to locate them. An articulated interest may at least be presumed to be the interest of those who have articulated it, but the same can hardly be said of interests that have not even been articulated. They are ascribed to people in the conviction that in case they were able to articulate their interests, they would do so in that manner.

The problem of unarticulated interests which are ascribed to people by the decision-making authority raises not only the question of the correctness of such an ascription and the possible weightage that it should be given in relation to the interests that have been articulated, but also the whole issue of what may be called the apparent *vs.* real interests. If decision-makers can decide about these interests, this can only be because they have some criteria for judging the matter. But if some criteria are available for deciding about the real interests of the people, there seems little reason for not applying them in those cases where some group or groups have articulated their own interests. The criteria claim a universality and objectivity which makes it irrelevant whether people have articulated their interests or not, and makes equally irrelevant the content of what they have articulated, in case they have done so.

However, if this be admitted, the whole attempt at articulation and aggregation of interests would be an exercise in futility,

and it would be meaningless to judge of the contents of the rules that have been made in the context of the interests that have been articulated or aggregated. Rather, the rules would have to be judged in the light of criteria on the basis of which the needs of the people are determined. It would, then, be the extent to which the ideal structure of needs, as determined by the criteria, is embodied in the rules made by the decision-makers that would determine how far a polity can be considered politically developed or not. The extent of embodiment would be an index of political development and the dispute, if any, would relate only to the criteria on the basis of which the real interests of the people are calculated and determined. Even here it is possible to argue that any *a priori* determination of interests is not necessary, as the type of interests that rule-making can fulfil may belong only to groups and not to any particular individual, and hence are capable of extrapolation to analogous groups which have not been able to articulate their interests for some reason or other. Along with this, a persistent attempt could be undertaken to provide opportunities for articulation to all those who have been deprived of them, and to elicit their opinion on those which have been ascribed to them, not on any *a priori* grounds, but on the ground of their presumed similarity to groups which have articulated their interests.

The rules, it should be remembered, are not made once and for all; nor, for that matter, are the interests so articulated. There is a continuous interaction between the articulated and aggregated interests, on the one hand, and the rules that are made to satisfy them, on the other. The interests themselves may change over a period of time or the rules made to satisfy a particular set of interests at one time may result in the creation of new problems which demand rectification by new rules. It would be difficult, therefore, in such a situation to judge whether the contents of a particular set of rules are designed to satisfy a new set of interests, which have emerged because of a change in the situation, or to meet problems created by the promulgation of rules in the past, or because of an inadequacy in the past rules revealed by the way they have been found to work in practice.

The disentangling of these three factors is necessary for both theoretical and practical purposes, as the concept of political

development is essentially comparative in character and thus requires for its application the comparability of the present situation with the past in relevant respects. In case, therefore, the interests which are sought to be satisfied by rule-enactment in the present have themselves arisen because of changed circumstances, the rule-content cannot be relevantly compared with the rules in the past to determine whether any development has occurred in the political field or not. All the rules, for example, that have had to be enacted because of the introduction of the automobile and the aeroplane can hardly bear comparison with the laws, or their absence, relating to vehicles in the past. Similarly, if the laws enacted merely try to rectify the problems created by the laws made in the past, they cannot be treated as a sign of political development in the same way as those that try to fulfil the same interests in a more comprehensive and better manner. In fact, the problems created by the enactment of a law should be placed on the debit side of the evaluation of that law. However, as this can only be known after the enacted law has functioned for some time, the evaluation of all rules in terms of their content would have an in-built error difficult to compute at the time of their promulgation or even soon after.

The comparative assessment of political development in terms of rule-making seems, thus, a most hazardous undertaking unlikely to achieve definite results in any meaningful sense of the term. If it is the number of rules enacted that are taken as a measure of the political development of a country, it would be the easiest thing for a polity to score on this count as there is nothing easier than the enactment of rules by any authority empowered to make them. On the other hand, if content is to be taken into account, the criteria in terms of which the judgement about the content has to be made have to be spelt out and justified. In case the criteria are treated as trans-temporal in character, in terms of which each polity at any time of its existence can be measured and compared with every other, the essential time-bound character of rules which are formulated in specific situations to meet particular problems would be lost sight of. On the other hand, if they are judged in respect of the articulated and aggregated interests of a particular people, there will not only be all the difficulties we have

mentioned earlier, but also those relating to a comparative assessment of political development between different polities and between different stages of the same polity.

The difficulties in the latter case emanate from the fact that the amount and diversity of articulated interests would hardly be the same in any two cases, thus vitiating the comparison at its very foundations. In fact, wherever the relationship computed is a ratio between two quantities, the larger the denominator, the larger the numerator has also to be. But, in terms of ratios, the relationship may remain the same, even though the two quantities may increase enormously, and thus hardly show any development. Further, if political modernization entails an increase in interest articulation, as is usually thought by most thinkers, it would put an increasingly greater strain on the rule-making function and, in most cases, it can be said with fair confidence that it is likely to lag behind. But if this is true, then a decline in political development would be almost in-built into the criteria of political modernization, a consequence that would scarcely be welcome to those who have thought and written on the subject.

A deeper objection to taking rule-making as an index of political development consists in the contention that the exact content of the rules cannot be determined without reference to the way the rules have been given a concrete interpretation by the courts. As courts are the final adjudicators with respect to what the law means, it is meaningless to judge them without reference to it. Cardozo⁵⁵ argued the point forcefully a long time back. But as judicial interpretation never ends, we would, on this view, be left with nothing but provisional interpretations of the rules for purposes of comparative evaluation. However, as a detailed discussion of rule-adjudication as a criterion of political development is to be undertaken in section (5), as also the relationship between the different conversion-functions in section (8), it would be best to discuss the point in those contexts.

Another, and perhaps even more fundamental objection to taking rule-making too seriously as a criterion of political development, relates to the fact that rules by themselves do not indicate anything except perhaps the intentions of the decision-maker. It can be taken seriously only if they are not merely

enacted and placed on the statute book, but also implemented and enforced in actual practice. This, however, leads directly to the discussion of rule-application as a criterion of political development, and hence we will discuss it in the next section.

(4) *The Criterion as Rule-Application*

There can be little doubt that unless the rules enacted by the decision-making authorities are applied and actually obeyed and observed, they remain mere ritual gestures on the part of the ruling élite, proclaiming at best their intentions to do something. But as 'to rule' means 'to be able to enforce one's will', the non-implementation of a rule also proclaims, to a certain extent, the ineffectiveness of the rulers to rule. The rules, of course, may be enacted merely to proclaim the intention of the ruler or even to deceive people into thinking that something is intended to be done, but in most cases it may be presumed that it is not so and that the authorities really mean to fulfil what they have enacted.

Yet even if it be conceded that rule-application is at the heart of the matter, it is still not quite clear how to find the extent to which rules have been effective in fulfilling their purpose, for this is the meaning of rule-application. But if this is the meaning, then it is not merely the rules whose effective application is to be judged, but rather the purpose which their enactment was designed to achieve. As the rules have been made in the context of interest articulation and interest aggregation, it is obvious that the purposes they are intended to fulfil relate to the satisfaction primarily of those articulated and aggregated interests and, perhaps, secondarily, of those which have remained unarticulated for some reason or other, but deserve satisfaction in the judgement of the authorities who have to take a decision in the matter. However, in such a situation it is not the individual rule which would have to be judged in the context of the interests that it is supposed to fulfil, but rather the totality of rules in relation to the totality of interests. The rules, then, should not be taken in an isolated, atomic manner, but rather as constituting an interrelated whole which in its totality tries to realize the interrelated totality of interests which is judged to be both feasible and worth realizing. This,

it should be obvious, applies equally to rule-making and rule-application. With rule adjudication, the presupposition is brought into the open, as the courts in exercising their judicial function have to treat the whole set of laws as constituting an organic whole possessing a coherent structure. Each seeming incoherence is smoothed out by a clever and subtle interpretation, for the presupposition always is that the existing body of laws can never be incoherent.

We need not go further into details regarding rule-adjudication here as we propose to devote section (5) to its consideration later in this chapter. But as far as rule-making and rule-application are concerned, the issues raised by the proposal that it is the totality of rules that should be taken into account and not the individual rules alone, have to be discussed here. The first and foremost of the issues raised by this perspective relates to the time-span which should form the unit for consideration of the totality of rules enacted within that period. The problem arises because rules are continuously enacted by the decision-making authorities, and any delimitation in such a situation is bound to appear arbitrary, unless some criteria are given which may reasonably be justified. The situation gets additionally complicated by the fact that, as the totality is supposed to be organic in character, any addition to it is bound to change its character. This, however, would arise primarily in relation to the rules as they are enacted by the decision-making authority. As far as the issue of rule-application is concerned, it is further complicated by the fact that a certain time-interval would have to be posited between rule-enactment and rule-application so that the latter's effectiveness could be judged. However, as all the rules are not made simultaneously, the time-interval required for judging the efficacy of rule-application cannot but vary for different rules that have been enacted at different times.

The problem can perhaps be more clearly stated in the following manner. As the rules are enacted at different times, the time-interval after which they are to be judged in terms of the efficacy of their application cannot be the same for all of them, unless they are treated either atomistically or divided into units determined by the time of their enactment. Both the alternatives have difficulties of their own. The first not only

gives up the notion of organic totality, but also flies in the face of the fact that many laws tend to form clusters and that a law is enacted, not in a vacuum, but in the context of other laws on the same subject. The second alternative would make the laws under the unit a complete jumble of disparate laws, but in that case the choice of the unit in terms of the time when the laws have been enacted would have only pragmatic justification in its favour. The unit of time could perhaps be a particular session of the legislature and the time-interval for evaluation could perhaps be the period during which fresh elections are held to decide who shall be the decision-makers in a polity. But this would confine the criterion only to those polities which have an electoral system and hold periodic elections to decide who shall constitute their ruling élite for a limited period. Perhaps one could have different time-intervals for different polities depending on the nature of their political systems. Not merely this, one could also take into account the level of the development of the communication system to decide on the probable time-interval for judging the effectiveness of the implementation of any enacted law or sets of laws. It is obvious that it would be unfair to have the same time-interval for societies at different levels of communication systems.

At a still more sophisticated level, one could distinguish between the contents of enacted laws and place them in different categories so that the time-interval may be allowed to vary with relevance to the probable time that one may regard as necessary for the purposes embodied in the different contents to be fulfilled. There obviously are ends which, due to their very nature, take a longer time to fulfil than others. Anything that tries to make a change in the socio-cultural habits of a people, for example, may be expected to take a long time to be even moderately effective. The same may safely be hazarded for any change that is supposed to affect the totality of the population, or even a large majority of it. The difficulties in the process of effective implementation in the first case are derived from the nature of the changes that are sought to be made, while in the case of the latter they derive primarily from the numbers that are supposed to be affected by the change.

There is also a third category which relates to what has come to be called 'the vested interests' of the ruling élite of a country.

These 'vested interests' do not relate so much to the socio-cultural behavioural patterns rooted in the historic past of a people, as to the economic and power structure of a society where particular classes, individuals or groups of people enjoy certain privileged positions which they try to defend at all costs against attempts to oust them. Rules tending to adversely affect their position are usually rendered ineffective by various means at the disposal of these power groups themselves. The nullification of these rules in the process of their implementation is derived, therefore, not from the deep-rooted psycho-cultural habits of a people or because of the largeness of the numbers involved, as in the first two cases, but because of the structural position of the rule-makers themselves.

It may appear strange that rule-makers should frustrate the implementation of those very rules which they themselves have made. For, one might well ask, if they did not want the rules to be implemented, why should they have enacted them in the first place? Unless we assume some masochistic perversity on their part, there would seem little reason to believe that they would indulge in such a fruitless exercise. But such a doubt, however seemingly legitimate, rests on assumptions which themselves are extremely dubitable. First, it is assumed that the ruling class is unified in terms of its interests, and that, hence, there can be no discrepancy of interests between those who enact the laws and those who try to frustrate their effective implementation. Secondly, it is assumed that the ruling élite is static in its composition and structure. The third assumption may be said to relate to the genuineness of the motives of the rule-making authorities. It is naïvely believed that rules are always made to be implemented.

All three assumptions are, in fact, highly questionable. The ruling class is always divided within itself, and the rules are frequently enacted to harm the interests of other sections of the ruling class which, then, try to frustrate their actual implementation by all the overt and covert means at their disposal. On the other hand, as new claimants are always arising to enter the ruling class through factors over which there is little control, there is always an attempt at accommodation and compromise by taking the edge off their resentment and providing limited entry at some level in the hierarchical structure of the ruling

strata. Many laws can be understood in this light. However, as the ruling élite is always reluctant to part with power as far as possible, it tries to deceive the clamouring claimants with the illusion that something is being done while, in fact, it does not really intend to do anything in the matter. Perhaps most of the socio-economic legislation which seeks to effect any serious redistribution of power and resources tends to be a compromise between these two approaches. The first attempt usually is to create the illusion of giving with the understanding that if the illusion does not succeed in deluding, some minimal concessions may actually be given. Even this is usually sought to be done at the expense of that section of the power élite which is opposed to those who actually occupy the seats of power.

The problems created by a differentiated consideration of the contents of rules for purposes of evaluating the effectiveness of their application are, thus, enormous. It is, therefore, surprising to find an almost complete absence of any discussion concerning these issues in the writings of most thinkers who have addressed themselves to the problem of political development. Even Almond and Powell who have introduced the notion of 'conversion-functions' of which rule-application is a part, and who have devoted a whole section to its discussion in Chapter VI of *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, show hardly any awareness of the issues involved. They seem to be primarily concerned with the differentiation of rule-application structures and a delineation of their major types, particularly in the context of a bureaucracy as discussed by Weber and Fainsod in their works. The focus of their attention, therefore, is not on the content of rules made and how the diversity in content may set problems for judging the effectiveness of rule-application as required by the search for criteria of political development. The reason for this lies in the assumption that the differentiation of rule-application structures would enhance the performatory capabilities of the political system. According to them 'the presence of differentiated and well-developed structures for rule application greatly expands the capability of a political system to manipulate its environment'.⁵⁶

This, of course, is merely a particular application of the generalized contention that the differentiation of structures and functions leads inevitably to enhanced capability and

development, and has already been discussed in detail earlier. The sinister tones of the phrase 'to manipulate its environment' are perhaps unconscious, though shades of the biological theory of evolution as popularly understood lie too clearly to be entirely neglected. As the manipulative view of environment is writ large on the predominantly technological understanding of modern science, its acceptance by political science need not occasion any surprise. But what should cause some concern is the fact that political thought in countries which claim to be devoted to the cause of political liberties is so fascinated by considerations of efficiency and power. However, as we have already discussed in detail the criterion in terms of 'capabilities', we need not discuss the matter once again. Still, the role that bureaucracy is supposed to play in the enhancement of 'capabilities' and the modernization of political systems needs some discussion. But before we do this, we shall pay some attention to other parameters which are also regarded as relevant to the consideration of rule-application as a criterion of political development.

The differentiated structures created to discharge the function of rule-application may do so with varying effectiveness, and in significantly different styles. As Almond and Powell point out, 'Needless to say, not all the differentiated rule-application structures which can be found in primitive and modern political systems operate with the same style and level of effectiveness'⁵⁷; 'they may differ in complexity, in hierarchical structure, in degree of autonomy, and in impartiality of rule enforcement'.⁵⁸ But though the authors have mentioned these aspects in which the differentiated structures devoted to the task of rule-application may differ, they have neither discussed them in detail nor indicated how they are to be evaluated in the context of political development. Nothing, for example, is said about the different styles in which the differentiated rule-application structures may operate, and which, if any, may be treated as indicators of political development. Presumably the authors did not want to repeat what they had already said about styles in the context of their discussion about interest articulation and interest aggregation. But even the enumeration of styles in these two cases is not the same, and it is not clear which we are

supposed to transpose to the case of rule-making structures. In the case of interest articulation, the differences in style are articulated in terms of the Parsonian pattern-variables, while in the case of interest aggregation they are articulated primarily in terms of the pragmatic-absolute dichotomy. Both have already been discussed at length in the sections relating to interest articulation and interest aggregation respectively. But whatever the difficulties found in those contexts, the problem in relation to rule-application is, which of the two is to be considered relevant in this context? Should we say, for example, following the interest articulation model, that the performance of the rule-application function 'may be manifest or latent, specific or diffuse, general or particular, instrumental or affective in style'?⁵⁹ Or should we follow the interest aggregation model, and say that the three styles in which the rule-application function may be performed are 'pragmatic bargaining, absolute-value oriented, and traditionalistic'?⁶⁰ But the two classifications are so far apart that it is not clear which should be chosen in the context of rule-application, and on what grounds. The 'traditionalistic' style, of course, may be said to be overlapping, as the pattern-variable classification itself is supposed to be made in terms of tradition and modernity. But it is difficult to understand what exactly could be meant by 'traditionalism' in the context of rule-application. Further, there seems little reason to think that differences in style would be confined only to the classificatory types elaborated by the authors in the context of interest articulation and interest aggregation. However, as the authors themselves have said little in the matter, it is difficult to judge its relevance as a criterion in the context of our discussion on political development.

On the other hand, even though Almond and Powell have not said much about the other differences in terms of complexity, hierarchical structure, degree of autonomy and impartiality of rule-enforcement, it is easy to guess how they would treat them as indicators of political development. Perhaps the more complex, the more hierarchical, the more autonomous, the more impartial a differentiated structure devoted to rule-application is, the more politically developed it is likely to be considered by the authors. But even here the situation is not clear. One is not quite sure if complexity and hierarchy are to

be regarded as positively correlated to political development. Perhaps the more complex a structure is the more difficult it is for it to discharge its functions. Also, if too pronounced a hierarchy is considered incompatible with democratic values, it may not be palatable to those who consider *Homo Hierarchicus*⁶¹ to be a characteristic of decadent Asian, or rather, specifically Hindu, civilization. Not only this, an elaborate hierarchy can interfere with the efficient functioning of any institution, as is well known in India where almost all functions are subdivided and correlated to a hierarchical ranking in terms of the status of those who perform those functions. The subdivision can be carried on almost indefinitely, as any task can be divided in such a manner that each part is performed by different persons, making each dependent on the other. The so-called division of labour, when linked to status considerations on the one hand and to employment considerations on the other, may lead to increasingly inefficient performance instead of what was so glowingly ascribed to it by Adam Smith.

Complexity and hierarchy, thus, cannot be treated without reservations as positive indicators of political development. As for the autonomy and impartiality of rule-enforcement, they are perhaps stronger candidates for being treated as positive indicators. Yet even in their case, there seem to be some limitations. Autonomy, for example, cannot be treated as unaccountability and is at least *prima facie* incompatible with the demand for impartiality of rule-enforcement. For if impartiality of rule-enforcement is itself to be enforced, there has to be a curtailment of the autonomy of the differentiated structures entrusted with the task of rule-application. In fact, the more differentiated and autonomous the rule-application structures become, the more do they develop vested interests of their own. The issue is discussed by Almond and Powell in the context of bureaucracy, but they have not related it to the issues of autonomy or impartiality of rule-enforcement, nor, for that matter, to those of hierarchy and complexity.

Bureaucracy, in fact, is a generalized name for all differentiated structures performing the rule-application function. The importance of bureaucracy as an indication both of modernization and political development is well known to students of the social sciences since Max Weber brought it to

their attention. His linking of bureaucratic structures with formal-rational authority, as distinguished from traditional and charismatic authority, made it the pivotal point in all thought about modernization which is equated with rationality on the one hand and impersonal, rule-determined behaviour, on the other. We need not discuss in detail the adequacy of Weber's conception of bureaucracy or even of the later attempts of, say, Simon⁶² and Parsons⁶³ in this regard. The important point in the context of our discussion is not how bureaucracy is to be conceived or characterized, or even whether Weber's emphasis on formal rationality was misplaced as it 'led him to overestimate the efficiency of formal rationality and to underestimate the extent to which patrimonial features can help to overcome bureaucratic pathologies'.⁶⁴ What is of greater significance is the fact that this differentiated structure which is given the task of rule-application begins to have interests of its own and to use its power for its own ends. As Almond and Powell argue, 'bureaucracies tend to *monopolize* outputs', as 'only bureaucrats enforce laws, policies, or decisions'.⁶⁵ But if such is the situation, then it is difficult to see how the differentiation of structure has really helped the situation. Rather, it has created an additional problem of seeing that the newly created differentiated structure does not begin to subvert the purposes for which it has been created.

The authors appear to consider this aspect of the problem to be so important that they are even prepared to assert that 'political development subsequent to the Age of Absolutism in Western Europe may be viewed in part as a process of growth of agencies intended to direct, control, or limit central bureaucracy'.⁶⁶ And further that, 'the art of modern rulership consists not only in the prudent search for appropriate goals and policies, but also in learning how to interact with this massive and complex set of instrumentalities, and in knowing how and when to press it and coerce it, how and when to flatter it and reward it, how to teach it, and how to learn from it'.⁶⁷ Yet, if this is the situation, one may legitimately wonder who is the master and who the servant in the situation, or even whether it is correct to say that it is a differentiated structure devoted to the task of rule-application. In fact, if we remember that 'in addition to having this monopoly of rule-enforcement,

bureaucracies are typically of great importance in the processes of rule-making'⁶⁸ and that 'the decisions made by political élites, whether they be executives or legislators, are also based in considerable part on the kind of information which they are able to get from administrative agencies',⁶⁹ then we begin to understand why 'political scientists *quail* before the task of generalizing about the importance of bureaucracy',⁷⁰ which 'is a technical-instrumental monster'.⁷¹ The authors do not seem to have noticed the contradiction between the so-called 'technical-instrumental' nature of bureaucracy and its supposedly essential role not merely in rule-making, but also in interest articulation as 'interest groups, political parties, and the public are dependent on information transmitted by administrative officials'.⁷² If the role of bureaucracy is crucial at the stage of both interest articulation and rule-making, it is difficult to see how the institution of bureaucracy is differentiated with respect to the performance of its function which is supposed to be the reason for considering it an index of political development.

It may be suggested that we should distinguish between the primary and secondary functions of any institution, and that if we do so we would discover that the primary function of bureaucracy is still rule-application, while all the other functions happen to be merely secondary. Also, the tendency of any differentiated institution to develop vested interests of its own and even to usurp functions not belonging to itself, is too generalized to be considered a specific peculiarity of bureaucracy alone. Yet, even if all this be admitted it does not help us at all in knowing whether a particular polity is developed or not. Are we supposed to accept the fact that the development of bureaucracy *per se* is a sign of political development? If this were so, there would seem little point in the authors saying that 'the art of modern rulership consists . . . in knowing how and when to *press* it and *coerce* it, how and when to flatter it and reward it',⁷³ and that 'political development . . . may be viewed in part as a process of growth of agencies intended to *direct*, control, or *limit* central bureaucracy'.⁷⁴ This is so obviously an obstructionist view of bureaucracy that one wonders how, within the perspective, it could ever come to be regarded as constituting development *per se*. Rather, it is apprehended as

something that naturally tends to get out of hand, to develop purposes of its own, to thwart and obstruct what it is asked to do—something in the nature of a necessary evil which one wishes one could do without, but which cannot be eliminated because of the way the world is constituted.

Perhaps the criteria in terms of which bureaucracy may be viewed as an indicator of political development may be found in Fainsod's typology regarding bureaucracies, which Almond and Powell have discussed at some length in their book. According to them, 'Fainsod's classification is based upon different relationship patterns between bureaucracies and the political agencies. He suggests five patterns: (1) representative bureaucracies; (2) party-State bureaucracies; (3) military-dominated bureaucracies; (4) ruler-dominated bureaucracies; and (5) ruling bureaucracies.'⁷⁵ The first type is characteristic of a political system 'in which the ultimate political authority is determined by a *competitive* political process',⁷⁶ while the second 'is characteristic of totalitarian régimes and other one-party-dominated political systems'.⁷⁷ The second type is 'characterized by the superimposition of a political bureaucracy upon a functionally differentiated and technically competent governmental bureaucracy'.⁷⁸ The third type 'describes systems in which one component of the bureaucracy—members of the officer corps—takes control over the civilian bureaucracy'.⁷⁹ The fourth type coincides with Eisenstadt's 'bureaucratic empires'.⁸⁰ The reference is to classical empires which were maintained by autocratic rulers through the instrument of a bureaucracy. The fifth and final category is one 'in which the bureaucracy itself provides the ruling element in the political system'.⁸¹ The difference between this and the military-dominated bureaucracy is that here a 'civil bureaucratic clique possesses the authority', while in the former it is the military group which dominates the scene.

Fainsod's scheme is primarily classificatory and one may only surmise its relationship to political development. It is obvious that the last three types can hardly be considered to be positive indicators of political development. The ruling bureaucracies and military-dominated bureaucracies destroy the differentiated role of bureaucracy altogether, while the ruler-dominated bureaucracies may be ruled out as royalty seems to

be out of favour with contemporary thinkers on political development. Out of the two remaining claimants, it is obvious that representative bureaucracies would be considered more likely candidates than party-state bureaucracies, as the former allow a greater competitiveness in the political process, thus permitting the conflicting interests to come into the open. However, this is basically the perspective of interest articulation, and intrinsically it cannot be regarded as a criterion of political development arising immanently from the field of bureaucracy itself. In fact, as a differentiated structure devoted to the performance of the rule-application function, it is not clear why party-state bureaucracies may not be considered as more efficient, specially as the superimposition of a political bureaucracy on the so-called technical bureaucracy may be taken to ensure not only that it functions effectively but also that it does not develop any illegitimate vested interests of its own. The necessity of some such control of governmental bureaucracies is admitted by Almond and Powell, and they even concede that 'there are similar tendencies in democratic systems'.⁸² They point out, for example, that, 'in recent decades in the development of the American political system, it has been found that the only way in which the executive and legislative branches can exercise relatively effective control over the bureaucracy is through the development of their own specialized bureaucracies'.⁸³ But once the necessity of political control of the bureaucracy is accepted, it is difficult to set any limits to it unless some reasons are given which prescribe when and why those limits are to be drawn. The development of a political bureaucracy to control other sectors of the bureaucracy is analogous to military-dominated bureaucracies on the one hand and ruling bureaucracies on the other. In all three, a particular sector of the bureaucracy controls the others, and bureaucracy as a whole tends to monopolize all the political functions. On the other hand, it is difficult to see why the ruler-dominated bureaucracies should be considered less politically developed than representative bureaucracies, unless one wants to bring the criterion of representation into the picture. Also, if the criterion of competitive representativeness is given up, there would be little to differentiate between ruler-dominated bureaucracies and party-dominated bureaucracies, as all

totalitarian parties are ruled by a single person whether he be called a comrade or Führer. Nor can the claim to represent the real interests of the people be considered the sole privilege of totalitarian dictators, as the same claim is made by rulers of the traditional type also. Nor, for that matter, can the mode of succession be taken as a relevant differentiating factor, as the struggle for succession may and, in fact, did occur in the case of traditional rulers, just as modern totalitarisms are not immune from attempts at hereditary succession, specially in their Asian setting.

Fainsod's typology of various kinds of bureaucracies is, thus, of little help in finding the criteria of political development. Basically, there seems to have been little discussion about this aspect of the matter. What appears to have engaged the attention of Almond and Powell is the necessity of a bureaucracy for any political development whatsoever. But this only makes it a necessary condition in the technical sense that, without it, no political development is possible. However, as is well known, a necessary condition is not a sufficient condition and hence its presence cannot be taken as an indicator of political development. It is merely a precondition which, by itself, cannot ensure anything one way or the other. And, in any case, as bureaucracy is only a generalized name for all rule-application structures, the issues that we have raised earlier with respect to rule-application as a criterion of political development still remain relevant. After a rule has been made, it may be said that the relevant thing is to determine whether it has actually been applied in practice or not. In other words, the central question is whether the rule or rules so formulated are obeyed or not, and in case they are not obeyed, what is done in the matter. However, as everybody knows, this is not the task of the rule-application structures. Rather, it is the task of those who adjudicate and impose sanctions in case the rules are not obeyed and exemplified in conduct. The clue to political development thus may be found not in rule-making or rule-application, but rather in rule-adjudication which may be taken simultaneously to determine what the rule specifically means and also whether it has been observed in a particular case or not.

(5) *The Criterion as Rule-Adjudication*

As a rule which is enacted has to be applied in order to serve the function of rule-making, so also is it necessary to judge whether the rule has been correctly applied or not, whether it has been applied at all or just ignored or even violated in actual practice. The adjudicative function thus may be regarded as the most important and central in any consideration of rules which have to be observed in order that they may presumably fulfil the purpose or purposes for which they were enacted. In a formal sense, what the rule really prescribes can only be decided by the adjudicating authority. But if the issue is not brought before the adjudicating authority, it is usually presumed that the way those entrusted with the task of rule-application are interpreting them in practice is the way in which the adjudicating authorities would uphold them also. However, once the issue is brought before the adjudicating authority and the interpretation disputed, the presumption is broken and it is clear that the rule means what the judges hold it to mean.

On the other hand, judges can only pronounce a judgment; they cannot carry it out or ensure that it is carried out. In times of political crisis, it is well known that the judiciary tends to lose its independence and becomes increasingly an instrument of those who wield actual power. Yet, once the crisis has passed, one has to revert again to the restitution of the adjudicating mechanisms and ensure that judgments enjoy both independence and effectiveness to some extent.

The independence and effectiveness of the adjudicating structures in a polity, thus, may be taken as a criterion of political development. The differentiation of such structures and the respect, autonomy and effectivity that they are granted would thus be an indicator of the extent to which a society may be regarded as governed by law rather than by brute and naked force. The taming of force is a perennial task of all civil society, and this is perhaps best achieved by developing a rule of law which defines what is to count as a *legitimate* exercise of power and what as its blatant abuse. The notion of legitimacy is closely allied or perhaps even derived from the notion of 'lawful' and thus shows the central importance of the adjudicating function in a civil polity.

But, however much we may accept the importance and centrality of the adjudicating function, it is difficult to see how it can be treated as an indicator of political development. Shall we say that, if there are differentiated structures devoted to the task of rule-adjudication, it may be taken as a sign of the polity being developed in the positive sense of the word? But this may be deduced from the generalized criterion of development as differentiation of structures and functions which we have already discussed at length elsewhere. Or, shall we look into the form of its functioning or the contents of its decisions to judge whether it is developed or not? The form of its functioning is, in a sense, determined by the law of the land along with what has come to be called the civic or political culture of a society. A judgment on the contents of judicial decisions, on the other hand, would raise the whole question of values in terms of which development has to be understood or defined.

It is perhaps advisable to turn away from these formal and material criteria and concentrate on the sheer quantity and volume of cases brought before the courts and adjudicated by them within a given period of time. An increase in the number of cases brought before the judiciary could then be taken as an index of political development. All the sophistication which has been developed in connection with the measurement of quantitative indices in other fields could be transferred and applied to this domain also. We could thus devise methods to find out per capita litigation rates for different countries and judge their comparative political development in these terms. It is, of course, not clear from the literature in the field whether an increase or decrease in the litigation rates would be taken as a sign of political development. Lucian Pye, for example, asserts that 'by 1900 one Bengali out of every seventy-four was engaged in some form of litigation', and that 'in Java after the Western impact it appears that the rate of litigation not only kept pace with, but indeed exceeded, the rate of population growth.'⁸⁴ Similarly, 'in Rangoon before World War II, interest in the working of law took on a sporting quality. Asian business houses customarily set aside each year surplus funds that were invested in energetic searches for profitable lawsuits.'⁸⁵

Now, neither India nor Indonesia or Burma are usually considered by writers on political development to be politically developed. Hence it is unlikely that an increase in litigation rates is being regarded by Lucian Pye as an indicator of positive political development. But if increasing recourse to legal adjudication through differentiated formal structures created for that very purpose is not treated as a sign of development, it can only be because an increase in conflict of interests is treated as a counter-indicator of development. But if that be the situation, it would be difficult to hold any increase in interest articulation or interest aggregation as indicating political development also. For, in most cases, interests happen to conflict and that is why they have to be aggregated or adjudicated. The only difference between adjudication and aggregation in this respect is that, while the former tries to reconcile diverse interests to the maximum possible extent, the latter tries to determine the rightness or wrongness of the conflicting claims and pronounces on their legitimacy or illegitimacy in terms of the prevailing legal rights in the society to which the conflicting parties appeal. Also, an increasing recourse to rule-adjudication may be taken as a sign of increasing awareness on the part of the people of their rights and of a willingness on their part to settle conflicts through formal-legal procedures rather than resort to violence. At a deeper level it may even be taken to indicate a faith in the system rather than alienation from it and, if so, it would have to be taken as a positive indicator of development.

The ambivalence with regard to all the indices of political development and the double standards employed in their application is perhaps nowhere more evident than in Lucian Pye's remarks about the quality and patterns of lawsuits in Burma. To quote in full, he writes: 'Asian business houses customarily set aside each year surplus funds that were invested in energetic searches for profitable lawsuits. Young solicitors were employed to rack their brains and dream up ingenious suits, and older rogues with scheming minds would, for a customary commission, assist in spotting likely targets for such suits.'⁸⁶ Now, it is difficult to believe that Pye does not know that such a situation obtains in the United States, specially in the fields of medicine and insurance. It is well known that claims for damages under the law of torts have been carried to

such an extreme as to jeopardize the healthy functioning of many professions in western countries. Yet, in their case it is interpreted as an indication of the individual's consciousness of his rights and thus a positive indicator of political development. The absence of cases under the law of torts, on the other hand, in a country such as India is usually taken as a counter-indicator of civic development, for it is interpreted to mean lack of consciousness on the part of the citizens of their rights against others. But when a different phenomenon is observed in the case of Burma, Pye, instead of being happy with the situation, prefers to lapse into a satirical vein and suggest that there is something radically wrong with Asian peoples who cannot work western institutions as they were meant to be worked.

In fact, the contention becomes explicit when Pye writes about the fallacious assumptions which lie behind the western approach to law, and whose fallaciousness became explicit only when transplanted to Asian soil. According to him,

the underlying assumption of the Westernized and codified legal system was that all possible problems could be classified according to categories, that the examination of the data would reveal which category was appropriate to the particular case or issue, and that, once category and data were so clarified, a standardized process of reasoning and interpretation would bring anyone versed in the ways of the law to the proper judgment. The fallacies in these Western assumptions about the process of adjudication were readily manifest once codified legal systems were introduced into Asian and African societies.⁸⁷

But if the assumptions are fallacious, it is difficult to see why they should not be fallacious in western countries also. If it is an illusion 'that all possible categories of problems could be initially defined to prevent the need for any *ex post facto* judgments, and that the data or facts could "speak for themselves" in the sense that once brought to light they would somehow automatically inform all under what category of the law they should be properly classified',⁸⁸ then it is difficult to believe that it would not vitiate every action based on such an illusion. One wonders what illusions Pye entertains about the legal system as it operates in western countries. Surely, neither in science nor in law do facts 'speak for themselves', nor is it true that any set of facts could be categorized in only *one* way. If that were so,

the legal profession would have ceased to be attractive and lucrative long ago. It is *because* there is no *unique* category of law under which any human action has inevitably to be considered that legal disputes arise and that, even after all the debate and discussion has occurred and the evidence recorded, no one knows what the judge's decision in the case will be.

The deeper source of the trouble, however, seems to be that the issue of political development is treated primarily as a problem of non-western countries or even of countries other than the United States of America. There appears to be an implicit *a priori* assumption underlying the writings of most authors on political development that as far as western countries are concerned there is no *problem* of political development. Or, in case there is, it pertains only to such countries as Italy or France or Spain, that is, those countries of western Europe which have not yet achieved the maturity of the U.K. or the U.S.A. As the U.K. in any case has lost its economic supremacy, the mantle of economic and political maturity has fallen on the United States, and as most writers on political development happen to belong to that country it is perhaps natural for them to look for issues surrounding the problem of political development in countries other than their own. But the best way to understand a problem in the social or human sphere is to discover an analogue in one's own experience, as that alone can supply the clue to that inner understanding without which external dissimilarities may lead one to posit a difference where there may be none, or perhaps even a difference of a totally different kind.

However, the situation is even more intriguing. Not only is there no dearth of intellectuals in the United States who are hypercritical of their own country, but also the normal norms of scientific investigation demand that anyone proposing a criterion for anything should treat it as a culture-invariant, that is, as an indicator of the same phenomenon wherever it be found, whether in one culture or another. A culture, of course, may be treated as an organic whole but in that case it would perhaps be impossible to compare different cultures in terms of isolated elements with regard to which they may be compared and judged. The only way this could be done would be to compare the functions which the elements perform in different

cultures, but this assumes that in terms of function most cultures would be the same or at least similar in essential respects. Most writers on political development tend to assume this, and hence even if they subscribe to the organic totalistic view of society or culture, there is no reason why they should fail to see the same phenomena in their own country which they find in countries they deem to be politically undeveloped.

Perhaps the difference may relate to the *weightage* given to a particular factor in the total assessment of a polity. But, if so, the problem of weightage has to be brought into the open and it has to be shown how the indicators of a negative kind are cancelled by the presence of other positive factors. Or, if it be maintained that the very negativity of the factors is affected by the contexts in which they occur, and that it is meaningless to talk of positive and negative indicators in isolation, then it is incumbent on those who argue this way to specify the contexts in which an indicator would be interpreted as positive or negative in nature. Nothing of the kind has been done by any of these thinkers. In fact, they are as far off from the organic theory of society as anybody can be. Yet, even if they were to be organic in their view of society—and functionalism of a sort can perhaps lead in that direction—, they would have to face the equally baffling problem of how to compare two societies conceived as organic wholes except by positing a concept of some ideal society which transcends them both and in terms of which they may be judged.

Any comparative judgment regarding different legal structures leads straight into the baffling problem of legal positivism. If we agree with the legal positivists that there is a radical difference between 'law as it is' and 'law as it ought to be', then it is obvious that two existing legal structures cannot be significantly compared as *qua* existing they have both to be conceded the status of laws. It would then be only in the external context of moral considerations that the two legal structures could be judged. On the other hand, if we accept Fuller's concept of the so-called 'inner morality of law', we could perhaps judge between two existing legal structures with respect to the extent to which they have realized this 'inner morality' which is immanent within the notion of a 'legal system' itself. The classic controversy on this issue between H. L. A. Hart and

Lon L. Fuller is too well known to be repeated here.⁸⁹ What may, however, be pointed out is that the issue is at least as old as Plato and relates, at least at the philosophical level, to all comparisons between any two objects or sets of objects, rather than to the specific sphere of law alone. Every entity in order to be that entity must possess the properties that entitle it to be considered that entity. Thus, in a sense, hardly any entity could be compared with any other of its own class, provided it has been correctly classified in terms of the essential properties on the basis of which it is supposed to belong to that class. In other words, the comparison may only be done in terms of accidental or adventitious qualities, and never in terms of essential qualities. On the other hand, if even the essential qualities are supposed to be embodied more or less, as Plato seems to hold, then it would follow that no object could be correctly classified as none could exemplify or embody the ideal completely. Not only this, a more difficult problem would relate to the apprehension of the ideal in terms of which the particular exemplifications are to be judged. Unless some special faculty of rational intuition be postulated or one accepts the Platonic notion of remembering, one would have only the concrete embodiments to intuit the ideal, and in this one would always be on hazardous ground, as not only is there no certainty that the concretely encountered instances would point unmistakably to *one* ideal *alone*, but also because they would always form an infinitely small part of what will be encountered in the future. The recourse to the well-known law of large numbers in the field of statistical theory would perhaps be of little avail; it is not only questionable on philosophical grounds, but a significant difference may also be presumed between the apprehension of an ideal through its concrete exemplifications and the apprehension of a law, even if it be conceived in a statistical manner.

On the other hand, even if we refuse to accept the Platonic assimilation of the natural world to that in which values or ideals may be said to inhere in the very apprehension of reality, law by its very nature would seem to belong to the latter category. Yet, even if this be admitted and the claim of Fuller to the necessary existence of some 'inner morality of law' be conceded, there remains the problem of the relation of the so-