

## Anumana

The theory on anumana which is the second pramana accepted in the Nyaya tradition is dealt with in a strange way. For the first time Gangesa enumerates the topics to be dealt with in this section, perhaps implying thereby that these are the essential constituents for understanding the idea of inference and that each of them perhaps is equally necessary as its component so that it may be grasped in its complete complexity. One strange thing that Gangesa seeks to discuss and clarify is the sequence of the discussion and argues that the inference as a pramana has to be discussed after perception as a pramana and before upamana as a pramana. This is strange in a sense as, in the Nyaya-sutra it is sabda, which comes after anumana and not upamana. The prakarana mentioned at the beginning of the discussion are the following : (1) anumiti, (2) the pramana of anumana, (3) vyapti, (4) vyadhikarana, (5) purvapaksa of vyapti, (6) siddhanta of vyapti, (7) objections against the siddhanta, (8) abhava of samanya, (9) the four-fold character of abhava, (10) tarka, (11) anubandha, (12) upadhi, (13) paksta, (14)

paramarsa, (15) nimnakaranata, (16) kevalvyatireki, (17) arthapatti, (18) avayava.

The sequence is not very clear. In any case the important topic that seem to be there are vypati, samanyabhava varka, upadhi, paksta, paramarsa, lingakaranata and avayava. Amongst these Manishankar Misra in his Nyaya-ratnam started with tarka and has discussed vyapti, upadhi, paksta and paramarsa suggesting that these had become the important topics for discussion in Nyaya in the context of anumana or inference. Gangesa seems to add lingakaranata and abhava to them. The latter he had already discussed in the context of pratyaksa and it will be interesting to see what is the difference in his discussion of the same topic or knowledge of the same padartha through two different pramanas. Besides this, he specifically discusses vyadhikarana as a separate issue and brings in the problem of kevalvyatikreki as an important subject even for formulating the issue of inference on understanding it, which had not engaged the attention of Manishankar Misra who is a close contemporary. Perhaps the issue of kevalnyatireki is closely linked to that of abhava as the former is defined as that which is always absent and hence plays a role in questioning all the

definitions that had earlier been given of vyapti in the tradition. In fact, what exactly is the difference between kevalvyatireki and atyantabhava should be of interest and Gangesa seems to have discussed this in these chapters dealing with the issue. In fact, he raised the added problem whether atyantabhava can be an object of perception or even of an inference and in case it can't be known by any of the pramanas, what exactly can be its status as a padartha.

Its equally intriguing to find that Gangesa has not mentioned kevalanvyayi in the list of topics to be discussed even though most of the usual discussion on the subject mentions both kevananvyayi and kevalvyatiriki as raising insoluble problems for the definition of vyapti which requires both presence and absence of examples to corroborate it.

The general problem raised by something that is ever present and something that is always absent has not been discussed in the western tradition. The usual establishment of the causal relation on which inference is supposed to be based is reached though the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference but none of the persons who have been concerned

with them have asked themselves the question what will happen if something is always absent or if something is always present. This may seem trivial as most of the knowledge about empirical relations are based on the Method of Agreement and Difference but, as Whitehead pointed out, if something is universally true then it must always be instantiated or exhibitively and, if so, it would be impossible to discover if its absence forms a necessary condition of its knowledge. It is surprising that despite of Whitehead's clear statement in his 'Process and Reality' no thinker seems to have paid attention to the inner contradiction that the demand for absolute universality of truth is in direct conflict with the requirement for its finding the first chapter concerned with anumiti starts with discussion as to what is the relevance of the discussion of anumana after pratyaksa than it goes on to give laksana of anumiti. The concept of paksadharmata is introduced and that of vyapti visista paksadharmata.

Gangesa raises the issue that when perception after a doubt has occurred then should the perception be regarded as a part of the process of inference. In this connection Gangesa refers to earlier views on the subject including that of Vacaspati Misra and Upadhyaya. The problem is continued further

where perception itself is treated as a hetu or a ground for the removal of doubt which is now considered as a sadhya. He introduces the notion of vivaksa. He discusses the view of yajnapati in this connection.

Gangesa makes a distinction between anumana and anumiti and perhaps suggests that anumana is the process of which the inferential cognition is the result and hence the two have to be distinguished. But in case the two have to be distinguished they have to be given a differentiating definition which would apply to the one and not to the other.

One of the problems which Gangesa seems to be concerned with is with seeing the different "*processes*" of inference as producing result and thus affecting substantially each of the elements involved in the process of inference. The point seems to be that if something is a process then this process itself has different steps each of which modifies or affects the other and hence has to be seen not as something static but as essentially dynamic in nature. In fact Gangesa's way of treating the problem itself creates new problems in thinking about inference as a pramana. For example, for him, the moment one sees something as involved in the process of inference it acquires a property which it did not have before.

To take \_\_\_\_\_ does not remain a \_\_\_\_\_ any more but functioning as a variable to use the modern term having the paksadharmata in it. In other words it is that which is now qualified by the property of being that in respect of which something is to be proved. Similarly, the smoke does not remain a smoke but acquires the property of being a hetu or a sadhana, which obviously it does not naturally have.

This ultimately will give rise to a whole \_\_\_\_\_ of new properties which come into being because of the process of thinking itself and that too, thinking in a certain manner. The history of navya-nyaya may be seen in this perspective and perhaps become intelligible only when seen like this. Gangesa gives five laksanas of vyapti and then discusses them at length in this chapter. The next chapter is concerned with an important logical \_\_\_\_\_ in the tradition to deal with the problem exposed by kevalanvyayi and kevalanvyatireki for the formulation of the definition of vyapti. It is called vyadhikarana prakarana. The chapter opens with the refutation of vyadhikarana-dharma-vachinnabhava. The notion of vyadhi-karana-vachinnabhava which may Naiyayiks seem to consider a specific contribution of Gangesa himself. It appears from the title of the discussion

that the notion must have been introduced or innovated by others before him and that he wants to refute it. The discussion moves to a very strange issue which only a Naiyayika could have imagined. The problem raised is regarding the "hare's horn of a cow". Normally, the former is given as an example of something that is impossible by its very nature and is said to be of the same type as a barren woman's son. Now the problem which seems to be raised is something like this – a cow has horns. Now supposing somebody ascribes the hare's horn to a cow, would this assumption be as meaningless or as the phrase hare's horn. Perhaps another construal of the problem may be seen in this way. Hare's horn is absent absolutely as it is impossible in principle. The horn of a cow is not only possible but actual and actuality \_\_\_\_\_ an absolute impossibility be said to characterize that which is actual. The problem is a problem that may perhaps be understood better in the perspective of the contention in modern logic that a \_\_\_\_\_ glass is included in every red glass or \_\_\_\_\_ a false \_\_\_\_\_ only the concepts of a null class and of a false proposition are not explicated further. It is not made clear whether a proposition that is false is only accidentally so or essentially or that null class is empty contingently or necessarily. The

problem relates to the notion of a "impossibility" or that which is self contradictory and hence incapable in principle of being either true or having as any member of it ever. The Indian thinker seems to at least prima facie clearer as he is dealing with what he considers to be an impossibility though, as far as we know, he does not seem to have made a distinction between logical and empirical in his discussion. There is such a thing as a "vadatovyaghato" but it is not clear whether the distinction involved is really grasped and worked upon further. Gangesa discusses once again the view of Yajnapati and Pragalabha and Jayadeva in this connection. Three thinkers whose name one hardly knows and yet who must have occurred before him in the context of this important logico epistemological \_\_\_\_\_.

Next chapter is called purvapaksa vyapti prakarana. The whole chapter seems to be concerned with the definition of vyapti which Gangesa does not accept. The concepts introduced are samanadhikarana. This is perhaps one of the most intriguing concepts introduced by the Nyaya analyst. It stated simply, it seems to mean that both the hetu and the sadhya or that which is to be proved and that on the ground of which is to be proved must be ascribable or must co-exist,

or belong to the same object speaking \_\_\_\_\_ the mountain has to be have both the smoke and the fire, otherwise the inference from smoke to the fire will be unmeaningful as there will be no point in inferring fire somewhere else than the place where there is a smoke. Logically, what is being suggested is that both that which is to be proved and the ground of that \_\_\_\_\_ must by a logical necessity belong to the same subject. But then, the subject will have to be conceived in a complex manner, when for some reason only one property is being apprehended and not the other even though the two are related by a relation which necessitates that if the former is present the latter must \_\_\_\_\_.

There is a problem here which perhaps has not been discussed in the tradition and this relates to the question whether both of the properties have to be essentially perceptible in character. This issue occurs or recurs in the context of the notion of 'adhyasa' in Shankar's though where it has been explicitly rejected by him in the very opening discussion on the subject. For Shankar's example raises a strange question as while one of the property is perceptible the other is not, the other is not as it is the result of an

inferential necessity for ascribing another property to something else implying thereby that through inference we can postulate an entity which is required to account for perception but which is not perceptible in nature. Shankar's talking of Malintanaya akasa where malinta is seen and ascribed to akasa which itself is not perceived in nature but is postulated so that there may be a sub-\_\_\_\_\_ in which sound may be heard. Shankar does not discuss the issue further, but it will be interesting to find Gangesa does who occurred after almost 600 years later than Shankara.

Gangesa further qualifies the notion of samanadhikarana by prefixing self to it calling it sva-samanadhikarana. This will later result in a proliferation of reflexive relations and reflexive properties whose importance has not been seen in western logical or epistemological thinking on the subject. Normally, the western tradition confines itself to the concepts of identity, equality, similarity in this context. But the Indian discussion on the other hand has to postulate almost all properties as having this dimension because ultimately things have to be described to themselves, at least for logical purpose. As the definition of vyapti is supposed to involve necessarily in its definition the notion of absence or abhava.

Gangesa deals with atyantabhava and anyonyabhava in this connection. The mention of anyonyabhava is necessary as there must be a distinction between, that which is to be proved and that which is alleged to be the ground of its proof, an argument has been used powerfully by Samantabhadra in his refutation of the Advaitic position where he has argued that if the Advaitin wants to establish his position through argument then he has to admit the reality of at least one difference, i.e., between hetu and sadhya for in case he does not do so, not only his argument will be fallacious but he is merely saying that you accept my argument because I am giving it. On the latter case, Samantabhadra jokingly retorts that what I say will then be as valid as that you say. In the discussion Gangesa refers to the view of Vardhamana who obviously cannot be the person known by that name and that his son already had become famous enough or important enough to be referred to by him. The other person whose views are mentioned is Kartsneya. Some other strange definitions of vyapti are mentioned and refuted. Some of them are interesting. One of them is that it is that which does not have an upadhi in it. The second tries to argue that any relation whatsoever can be seen in terms of what is called vyapti or a ground for inferring. This is interesting as what seems to

have been ascertained is that the very notion of relation implies that in case the relation obtains then one of the elements of the relation exists or is found then one can easily infer the existence of the reality of the other. Perhaps the idea is to dissociate the idea of universal from the relationship and not see inference grounded on the universal of the relationship but in the fact of the relationship itself. Gangesa of course does not accept it but, I think the view needs to be explored further. If, for example, there were to be no relations, there would be no inference either. And if so, being related is a necessary condition for the process of inference to occur even if it were not to be a sufficient condition. But what is this universality; what is this notion of being related? And why is the occurrence of a relation itself is an instantiation of the universal then one \_\_\_\_\_ that universality be deemed to be absent from it. The problem is faced in modern logic in a strange manner in what is called existential generalization where the existential instantiation is taken as a sufficient condition for existential generalization. Not only this, the inter-changeability or intertranslability of the existential quantifier into the universal quantifier and vice versa ensures that the so called existential quantifier would be translated into the language of

what is called universal \_\_\_\_\_. This problem is not only face din modern logic but also in traditional logic where all affirmative judgements can be translated into negative judgements raising analogously the same property. Gangesa also discusses kevalanvyayi and kevalvyatireki in this connection.

The next chapter is concerned with siddhanta vyapti and for the first time he specifies the technical terminology for giving his own definition of the relation on which alone inference can be validly based. The technical terms introduced and defined are anochedakatra, pratiyogitva, samanadhikarana of the pratiyogi, atyantabhava as a padartha, samvaya, anugata. One strange notion that is introduced not as a technicality but perhaps as an additional necessity for formulating the notion of vyapti is the notion of a double asraya or something that is simultaneously a support or a substratum of two different properties. The idea obviously is that that in which something is proved on the ground of something else has to have simultaneously both the ground and that which is to be accepted on its basis. This was already involved in the notion of samanadhikarana. But now what is sought to be clarified is that this samanadhikarana of hetu and sadhya should be seen

in a differentiating manner as the asraya of the hetu cannot be as the asraya of the sadhya even though they are to be ascribed to the same substance.

The next chapter is concerned with samanyabhava. The sequence of the chapter is not clear and the notion of a samanyabhava or the universality of absence or the relevance of the notion of a universal absence in the context of the discussion of vyapti. Also, as the final definition is already been given, what is the point in discussing the notion. In case it had been relevant it should have been discussed earlier.

Gangesa tries to establish the necessity of accepting the reality of a samanyabhava independently of the particular absences that we encounter in experience. The idea perhaps is that just as in other cases we have to accept the reality of the universal we should accept its reality in this case also. But Gangesa seems to have forgotten that every property need not necessarily have a universal corresponding to it. Udayana has already discussed this question and introduced the concept of a pseudo universal and given the criterion to determine and distinguish between a genuine and a pseudo

universal. It will be interesting to find whether Gangesa is aware of this and whether he accepts the discussion or not. He once again discusses the view of Upadhyaya in this connection and refutes it. He also raises a question whether in the perceiving of the specific absence we simultaneously apprehend the universal absence in it and discusses the view of Upadhyaya in this connection. He seems to discuss a strange issue – whether this universality of absence can ever function for inferring anything and discusses the view of Jayadeva in this connection. There is also a presentation and discussion of some Churamani who has discussed the issue of samanyabhava indicating that the problem was very much alive amongst Naiyayiks before the \_\_\_\_\_ of Gangesa and that he had introduced this section primarily to discuss the problem independently of its role in the discussion of anumana or the definition of vyapti which is the main concern of the book. The next chapter is concerned with specific or particular vyaptis. One does not understand why this is necessary. He introduces in this connection once again the notion of atyantabhava, anyonyabhava, avyapyavrtti, anupadhikta, svarupasambandha etc. The point perhaps is that in the understanding of the specific vyaptis which may be of different kinds one will have to differentiate them on

the basis of these different abhavas in a vyapti which is based on anyonyabhava is bound to differ from that which is based on atyantabhava. One interesting thing to note is that he once again refers to the view of Jayadeva in this connection.

The next chapter is titled strangely. It merely should mean four topics which are to be discussed but \_\_\_\_\_ as \_\_\_\_\_ which does not make any sense. This is a chapter consisting only of five pages and seems to expound or explicate the views of Prabhakara and others on some specific problems.

The next chapter is interesting as it is concerned with the real issue as to how to get hold of this relation on which all inference is based. This is the real problem of induction as to how to get a veredical generalization on the basis of which inference can be made. Interestingly Gangesa rejects the common idea that you can get hold of this relationship by repeated observation. The next view that he rejects is repeated observation associated with what he calls tarka which gives you the knowledge of the relationship. He refers once again to the views of Upadhyaya and seems to suggest

that it is not correct. He propounds his own views by introducing a notion of *sahacara darsana* instead of *bhuyadarsana*. The distinction between the two perhaps relates to the fact that the former refers to a relation while the latter does not explicitly do so. What is to be seen is the togetherness along with what he calls absence in any \_\_\_\_\_ whatsoever which is supposed to get at the *vyapti* relation, but it is not clear how this is different from saying the same thing in another language and secondly how is it different from the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference. The crucial problem is as to what is the specific differentia of the relation which is supposed to be the basis of the *vyapti*; a point which does not seem to be made clear in the text. There is an attempt to meet the objection as to how the so-called *sahacara darsana* or observance of concomitance without exception can provide a ground for the assertion of *vyapti* when this itself will have to assume the relation as without it, it can not be asserted. The topic which is discussed in the next chapter concerns *tarka* itself. Here *tarka* is seen in a way in which generally it is not seen i.e. as an integral part of the inferential process which is supposed to remove the doubt concerning the possible defects or exceptions to the relationship that is being established. The

term used is vyabhucarasan-kanivantaka. Here again the views of Upadhyaya, Jayadeva are presented. The interesting point here is that in respect of the view of Upadhyaya, Gangesa uses the term vivecana while in Jayadeva he uses vimarsa. What exactly is the difference is not clear. There is another writer whose views are rejected and he is called Kandakar which is a strange name.

The interesting point about the chapter on tarka is that Gangesa is quite clear that tarka even though it is not \_\_\_\_\_ by it as inference is a necessary part of the inference process without which one cannot reach the vyapti relation. He thus clearly seems to grasp the importance of tarka in the process of anumana, a point which seems to have been missed by all those who considered that traditional theory of anumana only consisted of avayana and ignored the fact that the \_\_\_\_\_ of the text mentions tarka after avayava and before nirnaya.

This reminds one of Manishankar Misra the author of Nyayaratnam who explicitly starts with tarka and also relates

it to the removal of doubt and then goes on to discuss the relation of vyapti.

The next chapter is concerned with the idea of anugama in the context of vyapti which certainly, is a new notion not found in thinkers before him. This is a strange chapter and perhaps wants to continue the discussion on vyapti in a differentiated manner. What perhaps is he attempting to do is to suggest that there is not one kind of vyapti but many kinds depending upon the type of negation on which they are based or on the basis of which they arise. The crucial point perhaps is that if there are 4 different kinds of negation there have to be 4 different kinds of vyapti. The simplest is the vyapti that is based on the existence of mutual difference or negation of each by the other is called anyonyabhava. Unless there is a difference there can not be a relationship of absolute negation! this has been discussed already and it is not clear why Gangesa is discussing it again. One of the intriguing and puzzling thing in the discussion is reference to a person called Manikar which generally is the name of Gangesa himself. This implies that there must have been some other work also called Manikar and that Gangesa is refuting his own views. Perhaps the work has been referred to by

Jayadeva whose views have been mentioned earlier. In any case there is again the mention of Upadhyaya and another person called Prakasakrta. One interesting innovation seems to be that Gangesa tries to treat jointly both mutual difference and absolute absence or negation together in the discussion of a possible view as the absolute negation has to be present everywhere. Also, for the first time he refers to both upadhi and hetrabhasa in relation to it without having first established or discussed the two notions which should itself be defective. The next chapter called samanyalaksana prakarna. In his connection the views of Mimansa are mentioned and refuted. Here again the views of Prakasakrta, Upadhyaya are mentioned and discussed. The concept of samanyalaksana pratyasatya is introduced and one interesting notion introduced is the problem created by the desire for knowledge itself which perhaps is a pre-condition for knowing anything at all. And does the occurrence of this desire affect the knowledge of an inferential relation.

Perhaps the deeper question is that the desire for knowledge is for what purpose and hence of which kind of knowledge. Knowledge is not of one kind or of one time and if so the so-called inferential relation would also be different in these

different kinds of knowledge. At a deeper level as most knowledge is sought for purpose other than itself which has nothing to do with knowledge the purpose itself will affect the knowledge whether perceptual or inferential. It is not clear whether Gangesa has discussed this aspect for the matter but some of the discussion on later Nyaya seem certainly to presuppose it if not directly, indirectly.

Perhaps the real problem relates to the question whether without the element of universality there can be any inferential knowledge at all as the basis of inference is that 'universal' relation which obtains between the particulars and it is perhaps because of this that the Nyaya thinker has to emphasize both the reality of the 'jati' and the 'samanyalaksana' without which the concept of the jati would not make sense.

Gangesa in this context seems to discuss a number of views of previous thinkers, including perhaps of Manishankar Misra, if so it would be interesting to find how he views the position of a thinker who was so near to the times when he wrote. Besides the others already mentioned he also discusses

the views of Upadhyaya and tries to correct the defect pointed out by him earlier.

The next chapter is entitled anupadhi. Here again Gangesa tries to point out the defects in the earlier definitions, but does not state clearly what was the necessity of bringing in the notion of upadhi into the discussion of anumana. It seems that the concept of upadhi presupposes the concept of pakṣa and to the existence of those properties in it which might make it difficult or even impossible for the inferential relation which is supposed to be based on vyapti to function effectively. But, if so the upadhis can, in principle be unlimited in number as one would never know what is an upadhi except experientially and its 'absence' would be judged only if the vyapti operates that is, if one does not only infer the sadhya from the hetu but finds it actually there. Thus, in a strange sense, the absence of upadhi or upadhis will only be known when the anumana is successful. It would be something like the anupalabhi hetu of Dharmakīrti, i.e., if the upadhi had been there fire would not have been seen even if there were smoke as the fire is seen the upadhi must not be there. It would be interesting to find how the concept of upadhi came into being and how the discussion developed in

the Nyaya tradition in the context of anumana and the vyapti on which it is based.

Surprisingly, the concept of upadhi in the Indian tradition has been associated more with the Advaitin who treats almost everything as an upadhi in relation to consciousness, and it will be interesting to find if there is any commonality as discussed in Advaita Vedanta and in Nyaya.

Gangesa discusses in this chapter once again the views of Prakasakrta or Churamanikar. It is interesting to find that Gangesa seems to classify upadhi's into two different categories, i.e. those about which there is a doubt and others in respect of which there is no doubt at all. The introduction of the former category or class is strange as if once one admits that there can be a doubt whether something is upadhi or not now will one be ever able to establish whether there is definitely a vyapti relation or not. The discussion on this issue on page 318 should be looked into a little more closely. Similarly, it would be desirable to see the discussion in page 323 where Gangesa seems to discuss the real roots of upadhi, how it arises.

Strangely, the next chapter is entitled paksta which normally should have occurred earlier if upadhi has to presuppose the notion of paksta in its own definition. In the discussion on this issue Gangesa introduces the notion of Sisadhayisa. Here again Gangesa tries to discuss the notions of his predecessors particularly Upadhyaya and Jayadeva and interestingly raises the issue whether the notion of paksta can be there before paramarsa has taken place.

The discussion on paramarsa occurs just after the discussion on paksta. One of the interesting points that emerges from Gangesa's discussion that almost on each of the issue, Mimansa had definite positions of its own, indicating thereby the Mimansa had developed its own powerful theory of pramanas in general and inference in particular. But, surprisingly Mimansa position on these is not generally highlighted which is strange as at least in Gangesa Mimansa seems to be the main adversary. In the discussion on paramarsa, there is a strange reference to two kinds of knowledge which is supposed to be involved in the concept of paramarsa itself and is said to form an integral part and thus may be said to be an integral part of anumana which presupposes paramarsa for its coming into being. There is an

interesting reference to sabda-jnana in a discussion on page 371. It may be looked into to find how sabda jnana comes into the picture and if it comes then how can anumana be considered as separate, independent pramana not involved in other pramanas. The same perhaps will be true of pratyaksa as not only the smoke is perceived, but also the fire has to be perceived if the anumana is correct. Not only this, in any case the Nyaya view regarding the perception of universals is accepted, then the relation between universals would also have to be perceived and not inferred as an anumana ultimately, the problem is the relation between two or more universals or between that which is regarded as an essential nature or svabhava of an object. Does this essential nature or svabhava include its relationship to others or all relationships are accidental i.e. some sort of superimposition or upadhi on the svarupa or svabhava of \_\_\_\_\_.

Next chapter is called lingakaranata prakarana. The term linga most probably means the hetu or that which is the sign of something else. If so, how can it be 'causal' in nature. Or, even if it is in some cases, i.e. it is a sign of something else because of its being a case of it, it need not be so in all cases. Thus, the relation between being a linga and being a karana is

not necessary unless the term 'karanta' is itself being used in a non-causal sense.

The discussion here seems to relate to the question what exactly is the 'cause' of inferential knowledge, an issue that, as far as we know has not been raised in the western discussion of the subject. Interestingly, Gangesa seems to raise an almost absurd contention and tries to refute it, implying thereby that somebody must have actually raised it. The issue relates to the coming into being of the smoke itself and as Nyaya accept the reality of prior absence of that which has come into being the opponents say even this absence should be taken seriously into account as the course of inference from smoke to fire, for unless the object itself would have been destroyed the smoke could not have been the hetu or linga, of fire. Another interesting issue that is raised is what is the role of paramarsa in inference. Is it Karana. In this connection Gangesa discusses the views of Alokka and Prakasakrta.

The next chapter is concerned with kevananvyayi and starts with giving a definition of kevalakya. In the discussion

Gangesa brings in the strangest example which perhaps no one could ever thought of something being ever present i.e. of atyantabhava. I do not think anybody has ever thought of this. The concept of impossibility that which is impossible is always negatively present and can ever been removed. The next example is not as absurd but certainly intriguing as that too has not been seriously thought of in the western tradition. In fact, in most discussion of the Method of Agreement and Difference these issues have never been seriously raised and as it is assumed that both Agreement and Difference always operate with respect to all objects whose relationship we want to establish or ascertain.

The second chapter is that of akasa or space. Space is something which is always present. If one adds time to it one will have an example of kevalanvyayi which one will not know what to do with it. In this connection he discusses the views of Jayadeva. Gangesa's own definition of kevalanvyayi is very strange as he brings in the notion of anyonyabhava and seems to treat it as the pratyogi of anyonyabhava i.e. where there is no other to be differentiated from. This definition would or should, lead to an Advaitic conclusion for if there is no one to be differentiated from, there can be no

difference and that is the central contention of Advaitin only, the Advaitin somehow brings in consciousness and knowledge into the picture which at least is not necessary for the denial of the reality of the notion of difference for which knowledge may, to some extent, presuppose it, consciousness does not. Perhaps, it is self consciousness that involves the reality of difference and not consciousness.

The final long definition on page 434 uses both atyantabhava whose pratiyogi is supposed to be kevalanvyayi and anyonyabhava which should be a subject of close examination and discussion. The next chapter concerns kevalvyatireki and starts with the discussion that kevalvyatireki cannot be considered as inference. An interesting argument seems to be given that in case it were an inference then there will be some sort of a positive relation of vyapti between it and something else and this something else will have to be positively posited as well as the relation \_\_\_\_\_ that which is kevalvyatireki and that which is supposed to be the ground for believing in it. The problem is two-fold. Can kevalanvyayi and kevalvyatireki may be object of an inference and if not how can their reality be established for obviously they cannot be objects perception, or sabda or

pramana or upamana and hence what shall be the ground for accepting that such things are there. Some interesting concrete examples are discussed in this connection they relate to the relation between earth and smell and between the body and the self and jiva and life. There is also a discussion of desire, and its relationship between the eight dravyas. One of the theoretically interesting discussions seems to relate to the attempt to show that it is different from both atyantabhava and anyonyabhava. Jayadeva's views are given in this connection and discussed. There is also a discussion of the character of true knowledge as that which is capable of leading to successful action. Perhaps the problem is if there is a true knowledge about something which is kevalvyatireki then how can it lead to successful action. The next chapter is concerned with arthapatti. The discussion on arthapatti is strange as normally the Naiyayikas are not supposed to accept it as an independent pramana. In case the discussion is meant to show that it is not an independent pramana, then the same thing should have been done in respect of other pramanas accepted by other schools of Indian philosophy. In fact, there is a reference to this, and some discussion on it in the Nyaya sutra itself and hence it is not clear why there is discussion only on arthapatti and not other pramanas.

The discussion primarily seems to centre around the issue whether arthapatti can be subsumed under anumana and what exactly is the significance of the essential presence of 'difference' in it.

There seems to be a strange example which prima facie does not seem to make sense as it refers to a peacock dancing in a place other than a mountain and from this one is supposed to infer that the peacock dance only in a mountain. This seems too strange. All and all the discussion is \_\_\_\_\_ and seems to be taking just for formalities sake as Gangesa does not seem to be interested in it.

The next chapter is concerned with avayava, the heart anumana in the Nyaya thinking. It starts with giving a laksana of Nyaya avayava, pratijna, hetu, udharana, upanaya. He introduces a strange notion of vipasa and also discusses the illusions of udaharana. He also gives the laksana of nigamsana and discusses the necessity of nigamana as a separate independent step. The whole thing does not seem either interesting or exciting. The anumana khanda of Tattvacintamani seems to end here. Perhaps this is only the

first part and the second part will deal with something else. The only things that remain to be discussed are the topics mentioned in the Nyaya sutra from avayava onwards. But as tarka had already been discussed, what remains is the discussion from nirnaya, including vada, jalpa, vitanda, hetvabhasa, chala, jati, nigrahasthava which, presumably deal with issues relating to debate or argumentation between two opponents than with the pramana proper. But, even there remains the question as to why Gangesa has chosen to discuss tarka before avayava when the Nyaya sutra mentions after it and has neglected to discuss nirnaya where the first list of topics of the Nyaya sutra end. The simple \_\_\_\_\_ of the topics in the Nyaya sutras is from sansaya to nirnaya i.e. the process of reasoning and justification and proof arises in the context of doubts that has arisen and stops when the doubt has been removed.

The rest of the topics of Nyaya sutras are concerned with winning a debate or how it should be conducted. The topic of hetvabhasa should have been a part of the earlier section dealing with proof and justification, but it seems rather to form a part dealing with discussion and debate as one would win an argument by pointing out the defects in the opponents.

Whatever the problem in the discussion of Gangesa on anumana, we have to wait to find whether there is a first part of anumana khanda or this is the only part published uptill now. The other two pramanas which Gangesa deals with are sabda and upamana and it will be interesting to see what philosophical issues he raises in respect of them.

All in all the discussion on the pratyaksa-khanda seems to be philosophically more interesting than the anumana-khanda though Gangesa's reputation primarily rests on the innovations he made in this discussion of the anumana-khanda.