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+ see discussion (A. N. Ghose + Shah's response)  
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## Philosophy, religion, morality, spirituality: some issues\*

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Can Indian philosophy be called philosophy? Or is it religion? Or is it both? Is Hinduism religion? These and such other questions have raised considerable controversy and much greater confusion, and it is in this area that I propose to do something in this paper. I shall try to do this by considering the nature of the Sāṅkhya system, and shall start with presenting an outline of my understanding of it.

It is already known that, according to Sāṅkhya, Prakṛti-Puruṣa *viveka* (discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa) is the goal of man. I want to suggest that it has three aspects: *anubhava* (experience or knowledge), *vicāra* (thought or reasoning) and *ācara* (conduct or morality). All these together constitute the human goal. Anyone of the aspects, apart from the other two, is an abstraction, though in the attainment of the goal one or the other aspect may be central and the other two subsidiary (consider the case of the exemplars).

But is this understanding of the Sāṅkhya a legitimate understanding or only an understanding which I read into the text? In this paper I shall try to show that it is a legitimate understanding by considering its relation to the text, and also by relating it to an understanding of the *prasthānatrayī* (the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma-Sūtras* and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*), some exemplars, and the theory of *puruṣārthas*.

### THE SĀṅKHYA SYSTEM

According to the Sāṅkhya system of thought, the goal of human life is to discriminate between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. But what is there to discriminate between Puruṣa and Prakṛti? The answer to this question is not a simple one; one could distinguish three answers which are interrelated, or one could say that there is one answer with three aspects. What are the three interrelated answers or aspects?

First, one might say that the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is ordinarily understood as a matter of understanding the elements of the Sāṅkhya system and their interrelationship—Prakṛti with its various elements and Puruṣa. Secondly, the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is a

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matter of experience/knowledge. (*anubhava* is usually translated as experience, and is thought of as a mystic experience. However, *anubhava* is not merely a flash of experience, but involves knowledge of one's self.) In the Sāṅkhya thought, there is no clear account of this experience. However, the sort of account given in, say, *Kārikā* 64, 'I do not exist, naught is mine, I am not', may be taken as a description of this experience/knowledge. Thirdly, it is a matter of an aggregate of dispositions which brings about or consists in the three attainments of *pramoda*, *mudita* and *modamāna*. These attainments together or the last one (*modamāna*) refers to the suppression of three kinds of misery.

Of these three answers, the first two are very often spoken of, but not so often the third. I should, therefore, like to explain my inclusion of this third answer.

Sāṅkhya distinguishes eight intellectual dispositions: four of the *sāttvika* variety—virtue, wisdom, non-attachment and the possession of lordly powers; and four of the *tāmasika* variety which are the opposite of the four of *sāttvika* variety, viz. vice, ignorance, attachment and the absence of lordly powers. Besides the eight dispositions, there are the effects of these dispositions.

Through virtue (comes about) departure upwards and through vice departure down below; through wisdom is release (acquired), and bondage through ignorance. From non-attachment (results) merger in Primal Nature, migration from passionate attachment, from power (comes about) non-obstruction and the opposite thereof, from the contrary (*The Sāṅkhya-kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, Kārikā* 45).

The dispositions and the resulting consequences form an aggregate. Accordingly, as the elements are combined in different quantities, there are different aggregates. These are classified under four main heads: (a) ignorance (*viparaya*); (b) infirmity (*aśakti*); (c) complacency (*tuṣṭi*) and (d) attainment (*siddhi*). The further subdivision of these gives us five types of ignorance, twenty-eight types of infirmity, nine types of complacency and eight types of attainments, thus giving us altogether fifty types of aggregates (*Kārikās* 47-48). Of these, the three attainments—*pramoda*, *mudita* and *modamāna*—are the suppression of the three kinds of misery. I could not get quite clear about the meanings of the three terms. Is each of these concerned with a particular type of misery? Or is each of them concerned with all the three types of misery representing a stage in the suppression of all the three kinds of misery? However, what is important is that the highest attainment is also an aggregate of the dispositions and their consequences. It is an aggregate which brings about or which is the suppression of the three kinds of misery. It is an aggregate in which the consequences of the dispositions like virtue, vice, non-attachment, attachment, attainment of powers and absence of powers are transcended as is described in *Kārikā* 67.

Virtue and the rest having ceased to function as causes, because of the attainment of perfect wisdom, (the Spirit) remains invested with the body, because of the force of past impressions, like the whirl of the (potter's) wheel (which persists for a while by virtue of the momentum imparted by a prior impulse).

It is true that even at this stage Puruṣa's association with Prakṛti has not ended. However, it has ended all but in name: only the previous *saṃskāras* are working out, and there is no question of turning back. It is possible to call this stage the concrete expression of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

In order to consider whether we have three answers here which are inter-related or one answer which has three aspects, we must take into account the interrelationship between these three answers. I shall consider this by asking whether anyone of these three by itself could justify the claim that one has attained discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. For example, could one attain such discrimination in experience/knowledge without attaining it in thought and conduct?

Suppose, discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa could be merely a matter of experience/knowledge. In that case, one can have such discrimination even when the aggregate of dispositions one has attained is not of *pramoda*, *mudita* or *modamāna*. Nor would it be necessary that one should have an intellectual grasp, more or less sophisticated, of the discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. If this were to be so, would not the experience of such discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa be a matter merely of a sensation? Surely, to attain such sensation cannot be the ultimate human goal. Only when it is accomplished by the appropriate conduct and a theoretical understanding (it is important to emphasize that the theoretical understanding could be more or less sophisticated), the experience/knowledge becomes not merely a sensation but knowledge of such discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, and, therefore, a matter of the knowledge of the self.

Now we shall consider the view that the discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is a matter of mere intellectual understanding of the relationship between the *vyakta*, the *avyakta* and the knower, between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. But how can such intellectual understanding be anything other than a verbal or a formal game unless it is related to the understanding of reality enabling one to distinguish between one who has such discrimination and one who does not have it? However, this would only enable one to understand others in terms of discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Only in so far as one has oneself attained the aggregates of *pramoda*, *mudita* or *modamāna* would one be able to say that it is a matter of experience/knowledge or thought for oneself.

Nor is it possible for one to say that discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is a matter merely of conduct. The conduct is not understood as merely physical activity; it is to be understood in the context of an intellectual frame-

work, and it will be necessary to distinguish between conduct which shows discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa and that which does not show such discrimination. And when one has attained conduct which shows that discrimination, one would have experience or knowledge of such discrimination, and, therefore, knowledge of self.

If one is right in the foregoing account, then anyone of the three answers by itself cannot justify a claim to discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The three answers are not independent answers but three aspects of one answer. However, in actuality, the answers have a certain independence: in any actual case, one or the other aspect may be central and the other two aspects subsidiary. But then it may be asked: am I not reading too much into the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, reading into it what I want to? Though all these aspects are present in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, they are not distinguished, and there is no mention or consideration of their mutual relationship.

Let me now consider the doubt expressed at the end of the last paragraph: one reason why the different answers and their mutual relationship are not mentioned may be that they are taken for granted and there is no need to mention them. The need to mention them arises, because there has been a tendency to overemphasize one or the other answer and devalue, if not ignore, the other two aspects. Under the influence of modern Western philosophy, the theoretical or the intellectual part only is overemphasized; the other two aspects are ignored; they are an embarrassment (to philosophy).

Further, we can see that there is no reading into the text of what is not there, if we consider a wider context—the wider context is provided by the concept of the *prasthantrayī*—the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma-Sūtras*, and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. These give a further support to the view that here we have an answer with three interrelated aspects. We might say that the Upaniṣads are *anubhavapradhāna*, and in them experience or knowledge is at the centre, and thought or conduct do not occupy that central a place; they are understood in the framework of knowledge. The *Brahma-Sūtras* are *vicārapradhāna*, have intellectual considerations or thought at the centre, and knowledge and conduct do not occupy that central a place; they are understood in the framework of thought. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* is *ācārapradhāna* and in it considerations of conduct are at the centre, and knowledge and thought are understood in the framework of conduct.

It will help us to understand this kind of difference, if we consider particular examples of each kind. Could we possibly say that, even in this century, Ramakrishna Paramahansa and Ramana Maharshi are examples of *anubhavapradhāna* individuals? Sri Aurobindo an example of a *vicārapradhāna* individual? And Gandhi an example of an *ācārapradhāna* individual? A consideration of these examples will show that a particular factor in them is only central, while the other two factors are not absent. In the Sāṅkhya system, the aspect of thought is central, but knowledge and conduct are not absent from consideration.

## SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

To examine the nature of the foregoing thought, it will be helpful if we put forward some further considerations. We have presented the Sāṅkhya system in terms of *anubhava*, *vicāra* and *ācāra*. Other systems of Indian thought can also be presented in a similar manner. However, the description or account of *anubhava*, *vicāra* and *ācāra* will vary with each system. Though these differences are there, all the systems accept an account of the goal which is the same for all the systems, and this account is in terms of the *puruṣārthas*—the four human goals—*dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. This raises many questions: how is it that in spite of differences in the description of *anubhava*, etc. different systems accept a common account in terms of *puruṣārthas*? What is the relationship of the account to the systems? And how can the one goal of the system and the four goals of *puruṣārthas* be reconciled?

Let us start with considering the last question. Some people say that there are not four goals; there are only three goals, *mokṣa* being a later addition. On the other hand, some others say that the three goals are not really goals, they are means to the ultimate goal of *mokṣa*—freedom from the pursuit of the other goals. I do not want to go into the historical considerations (though my 'memory' of discussions at Tirupathi tells me that there is good evidence in favour of the four *puruṣārthas* including *mokṣa*, though the word *mokṣa* may not have been used at some time in the distant past). I should like to mention that four *puruṣārthas* are mentioned in *Manusmṛti*, Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, *Mahābhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, etc. But are these not later interpolations?

However, interpolations may be only explications, if we realize that *dharma* and *mokṣa* are not independent of each other, rather they are closely and necessarily interrelated and complement each other. One can say that *dharma*, the code of conduct, disciplines our relationship with others in the pursuit of *artha* and *kāma*, and at the same time it disciplines our emotions. It is this disciplining of our emotions that is related to *mokṣa*. When that discipline is complete, one attains *mokṣa*, and becomes a *sthitaprajña* in the terminology of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. On the other hand, any direct training of the emotions through meditation, *tapas*, etc. not only helps us to perfect internal discipline but also to discipline our relationship to others in the pursuit of *artha* and *kāma*. If this is so, the theory of four *puruṣārthas* need not be replaced by any of these two views. Not only that. The four *puruṣārthas* together constitute one goal—*mokṣa* which perfects and is perfected by *dharma*, and *dharma* which disciplines our pursuit of *artha* and *kāma*.

Now we see how the four goals of *puruṣārtha* are reconciled with one goal of the system. The four goals together give us self-realization, a single goal; and the goal of the system is also self-realization, e.g. described as Prakṛti-Puruṣa *viveka*.

This is true not only in the case of the Sāṅkhya system but also in the case

of the other systems—Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika, etc. Even though the description of the goal is different, it involves self-realization—*ātmabrahma-aikya*, or *kaivalya* and so on. That is why all the systems accept the theory of *puruṣārthas*.

But, then, why do we have the different systems? Why should we not have only the theory of *puruṣārthas*? The theory of the *puruṣārthas* emphasizes the unity of the individual, and of the individual and the society. The systems emphasize the unity of all reality and the place of the self in it. The systems do it differently, because it can be done differently; because different persons are troubled by different problems, different doubts.

It is interesting to note that the *Arthasāstra* mentions three systems expressing this unity: Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. Very often I have felt that here we have three different bases of unity: Sāṅkhya accepts transcendence but not God, Yoga accepts both transcendence and God, Lokāyata accepts neither transcendence, nor God. Thus, the theoretical metaphysical structures may be very varied, and yet the goal can remain the same: the realization of the self. This is not good-natured tolerance but a hard theoretical understanding of the Hindus. It is at least as sound as the rigidity of the theoretical-metaphysical beliefs of the Semitic thought.

Before I close this section, I shall give some references which support the foregoing understanding of the Sāṅkhya system and of Indian thought. First, let me quote from Kauṭilya's *Arthasāstra* (I, ii, 2-B):

The followers of Manu say that the Sciences are only Trayī, Vartta and Dandanīti, and Anvikṣiki is only a special aspect of the Trayī.

The followers of Bṛhaspati say that Vartta and Daṇḍanīti are the only sciences; Trayī is only a summary of the principles to one who knows the affairs of the World.

The followers of Ushanas say that the only science is Daṇḍanīti, it is the beginning and the end of all sciences.

This account of the relation between sciences shows also the close relationship between *artha* and *kāma*, *dharma* and *mokṣa*. It is further brought out by the following (*Arthasāstra*, I, vii, 3-5):

...that he [the king] should not be without pleasures, but he should enjoy pleasures which are not against Dharma and Artha (consistently with the pursuit of Dharma and Artha). Or he should pursue the three equally which are bound up with one another. If any one is pursued in excess, it harms itself and the other two.

Here what is said about the king holds true of everyone.

Now a quotation from Manu (*Manusmṛti*, II, 224):

Some declare that the chief good consists in Dharma and Artha, others place it in Kāma and Artha, others in Dharma alone or Artha alone, but the decision is that it consists in the aggregate of all the three.

The foregoing references do not support a simple hierarchical understanding of the *puruṣārthas*, rather they represent a matrix of interacting goals.\*

#### DISCUSSION REGARDING THE NATURE OF THIS THOUGHT

What is the nature of this thought? Is it moral? Is it spiritual? Is it religious? Is it philosophical? As we shall see in the following, there is no clear-cut answer to these questions. One could say that it is none of these (if one kept to the understanding of these in terms of Western thought); or that it is all of these (if one took into account not the technical definitions of these but the functions performed by them).

One might say that in part it is moral thought, but it is so only in part. It does not concern itself only with what one ought to do (*dharma*?) but also with what one ought to be (*mokṣa*). (See the explanation of the Sāṅkhya system). What one ought to do and what one ought to be are not independent of each other; in fact, each is a necessary condition, though not a sufficient condition, for the complete attainment of the other.

Is this thought spiritual thought? As one saw in the last paragraph, it is spiritual—it is concerned with what one ought to be; but it is not merely a matter of a state of being, it is related to what one ought to do. But is it religious? In so far as spirituality is an element of religion, it is also religious. But in so far as religion is a matter of belief in God or a book or prophet or even a definite metaphysical point of view, it is not; because the spiritual element is related not only to the metaphysics of the Sāṅkhya system but also to the metaphysics of other systems such as Nyāya, Advaita, etc.

Is the thought philosophical? Once again, the thought, though not merely that, is philosophical. The Sāṅkhya account articulates the intellectual structure of matter, life, mind, intellect/discrimination, morality and spirituality. This account establishes the existence and nature of the self, the realization of which in experience/knowledge and conduct is the goal. The intellectual structure and the practical life *mutually* support one another. May I suggest that this could be looked upon as giving the necessary conditions of the possibility of discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti (involving matter, life, mind, intellect or discrimination, morality and spirituality and their interrelations). Could I possibly say that Kant was in search of such a comprehensive account, but he could get only a fragmented account of the necessary conditions of the possibility of science and mathematics, of morality, of beauty and of religion within the bounds of reason but not of all three put together?

\*See my 'Artha and Arthasāstra' in T. N. Madan (ed.), *The Way of Life*.

If I am right, then it will be misleading to characterize Sāṅkhya as anyone or the other of morality, spirituality, etc. It is all of these put together. Perhaps it will better to call it an *anvikṣiki* or an 'enquiry' or a *darśana*. But to say, on this account, that there is neither philosophy, nor spirituality, nor religion, nor moral theory in Indian thought is too legalistic an attitude, especially when such two different traditions are under consideration. As I said earlier, all the functions of these various disciplines are performed by Indian thought.

#### CONSIDERATION OF FURTHER DIFFICULTIES

As I said at the beginning, I have given here one understanding of Indian thought. But it is no more personal or subjective than any other. It is one kind of understanding supported by text and examples. This understanding, by being different, meets a number of questions raised by Professor Daya Krishna. I shall, however, consider here a few of them discussed in detail and at length by him.

Is *mokṣa* that which belongs to practical philosophy or that which forms a part of cognitive philosophy? Obviously, the question arises from considering the various disciplines as independent of one another. But in the light of the account I have presented of the Sāṅkhya system and its relationship to the theory of *puruṣārthas* hinted at, *mokṣa* is closely related to *dharma* and is, therefore, a matter of practical philosophy. But it has a cognitive aspect that finds expression in *anubhava* (experience/knowledge) by which one knows the self through the discrimination of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. Again, this aspect is expressed in its being a part of the metaphysical understanding of reality as a whole.

But is not the self *nityasiddha*? I must say that this is a controversial issue, but it does not rule out the possibility of the kind of understanding that is presented in the last paragraph.

If our understanding of the relationship between *dharma* and *mokṣa* is correct, then *mokṣa* does clearly belong to practical philosophy, but it also belongs to cognitive philosophy in so far as both *dharma* and *mokṣa* lead to the knowledge of the self. But is not the self *nityasiddha*? Yes, but its knowledge is not *nityasiddha*. In knowledge, there is confusion, because of *Prakṛti*, *avidyā*, *māyā*. And it is the removal of this confusion or misunderstanding that leads to the knowledge of the self. But then how can it be *nityasiddha*? Does it mean that entanglement does not injure it in its essential aspect?

But what is it to come to know the self? Does it mean that its connection with the body ceases forthwith? Or would it not be enough if its connection with the body changes its nature? Is this not what is supposed to be the case in the account of a *sthītaprajña* that is given in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*? I think the understanding of *mokṣa* in terms of a *sthītaprajña* and a *jīvanmukta* is as much a part of Indian thought as anything else, and perhaps it may be a truer understanding if one looks at the exemplars.

However, it seems that sometimes Professor Daya Krishna wants to insist that there should be and could be only one understanding of *mokṣa*, and, therefore, it alone could be or should be the goal of all Indian (philosophical) thought. I think it would be all right, if one strand of philosophical thought could be understood in that way.

But there is another way. I have tried to argue how *mokṣa*, though described in various ways, is in substance the attainment of the highest spiritual discipline, and, however differently described, it leads to the knowledge of the self even in *Lokāyata* (consider the meaning of *anvikṣiki*).

However, Professor Daya Krishna wants also to say that there are systems of thought which do not have *mokṣa* as a goal, and he argues that this is so in the case of *Nyāya*. Professor Daya Krishna argues that the very first and second *sūtras* of *Nyāya* could be interpreted to show that *mokṣa* is not the goal of *Nyāya*; and that the interest of *Nyāya* lies in argument and reasoning.

But one can also argue the other way (and, therefore, the evidence in favour of the interpretation of the second *sūtra* is not strong at all; in any case, it is not as strong as it is claimed to be). Because why is the interest in reasoning? To this question, even if one answer is that it is reasoning itself, there can be another answer that it is not only reasoning itself, but also the realization of the highest human goal—*mokṣa*, *kaivalya* (here the understanding of *Bhārṅhari* regarding the relation of intuition and reason is important). But, surely, one does not attain *mokṣa* by intellectual argument. I should like to present the following considerations. I think that it is not merely as a matter of lip-service that in the Indian tradition the various disciplines claim to help, if not bring about, the attainment of *mokṣa*. The point is that any activity which is a part of the total activity of living—language, ritual, *artha*, *kāma*, reasoning—if performed properly, would lead to *mokṣa*, because only in the context of such a life could the performance of any of these activities be said to be proper. Therefore, it is said that even if one could use one word properly (not only mean in the syntax of a sentence but in the syntax of life), then one could attain *mokṣa*. (It must be remembered also that in Indian thinking logic is not merely a theory of validity but a theory of truth.)

Another issue which is emphasized in the discussion of Professor Daya Krishna is that of the significance of God in modern Western philosophy. He says that, in spite of such significance, we do not call the modern Western philosophy spiritual, because to be spiritual all reality must be understood in terms of spirit. But what is the significance of God? In the case of most modern philosophers also, the reality and truth of every thing is derived from the reality and truth of God. The philosophical system presents a theoretical foundation for this view. But what is its relation to spirituality which is a characteristic of human life? Is it life according to God's Will that makes it spiritual? But if spiritual life is made a ground of God's existence, then the argument will be circular. Not only that. The argument which is part of a philosophical system and the argument from spiritual life are held to be in-

dependent of each other. This also is one important reason why the Western philosophy is not called spiritual.

Another issue that Professor Daya Krishna discusses in detail is that of *puruṣārthas*. It is right that he does so in view of the importance of *puruṣārthas* in the context of Indian philosophical thought. Professor Daya Krishna rightly thinks that, if his understanding of Indian philosophy is to be upheld, the theory of *puruṣārthas* should be rejected.

One of the first questions raised is about the meaning of the terms that designate the human goals—*dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. I shall discuss the terms with reference to the treatises which treat them.

*Arthaśāstra*—the *śāstra* of *artha*—concerns itself with the acquisition and maintenance of land. Though *Arthaśāstra* talks of these in relation to the king, the acquisition and maintenance of land by the king is also the condition of such acquisition and maintenance by citizens. And, though only land is mentioned, it includes all kinds of material wealth.

*Kāma* is the enjoyment of appropriate objects by the five senses of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling assisted by the mind together with the soul. The ingredient in this is a peculiar contact between the organ of sense and its object, and the consciousness of pleasure that arises from that contact is called *Kāma*. (Burton's translation of *Kāma-Sūtra*.)

This is what one might call the aesthetic pleasures in the mildest sense of the term.

*Dharma* has many senses, but in this context it refers to the code of conduct derived from Śruti and Smṛti, *sadācāra* and *ātmatuṣṭi*. The code of conduct is described in terms of *sādhāraṇa dharma*, *viśeṣa dharma* (*varṇa* and *āśrama dharma* in their *nitya*, *naimittika* and *kāmya* form). (This will also include the rituals.) *Dharma* regulates one's behaviour in relation to others in the pursuit of *artha* and *kāma*.

*Mokṣa*, as we have seen, is theoretically described in many ways, but in concrete terms it means self-realization, a complete internal self-discipline which is helped by external discipline as also by internal discipline such as meditation, *tapas*, etc.

Thus, these four goals are distinguishable, but they are closely and necessarily related. And this creates confusion about their very nature.

- (i) It might be said that *artha* is a means, whereas *kāma* is an end. But one might say that the pursuit of *artha* may itself be an enjoyment, according to the manner in which the activity is performed. So the same activity may be pursuit of both *artha* and *kāma*.
- (ii) It may be said that *dharma* is a means and *mokṣa* is an end. But this is to pose a sharp distinction between the two which, as we have seen, does not exist.

- (iii) Sometimes a sharp distinction is made between *artha* and *kāma* on the one hand and *dharma* and *mokṣa* on the other, so that *artha* and *kāma* become secular ends whereas *dharma* and *mokṣa* become the spiritual end. But, even in the case of this distinction, if *artha* and *kāma* are pursued not according to *dharma* and, therefore, also not according to *mokṣa*, then they cease to be *puruṣārthas* or the goals of human beings. They become greed and lust.

And equally, if *dharma* and *mokṣa* are not related to *artha* and *kāma*, they become ritualism and escapism. Thus, any activity is associated with all the *puruṣārthas*. Any activity is not specific to a *puruṣārtha*, except apparently. The *puruṣārtha* followed by the activity is a matter of the character of the individual as a whole.

But could not all the *puruṣārthas* be reduced to *kāma*? If this is done, there will be no hierarchy of desires. But the hierarchy of desires is posited when there is a conflict. Though no goal is to be sacrificed totally in such a conflict, the goals of *artha* and *kāma* may have to be sacrificed totally in case the possibility of self-realization is for ever jeopardized.\*

But is not self-realization a matter of freely developing oneself without reference to others and other aspects of oneself? Here, too, there is not one way of understanding freedom and development. The traditional Indian thought considers freedom and development with reference to others and other aspects of oneself; the modern thought does so only in so far as it helps one's own idea of freedom and development.

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

In presenting this understanding, have I done any injustice to the meanings of the term philosophy or to that of the term religion? I do not think so. But I think that this way of looking at the two traditions gives us a better understanding of them than by drawing the sharp distinctions between the two.

It might be said that I want to say this, because I want Indian thought to have the credit of being grounded on philosophy and religion, and also because I want to argue for the tradition. If I wanted to argue for the tradition, I would have said that the Indian thought is not less of philosophy or less of religion because of its structuring; that it is rather more of both philosophy and religion; that and it is the Western thought which is less of philosophy and less of religion because of their structuring and sharp separation. But I do not want to do any such thing. What I want to bring out are the possibilities and limitations of both the traditions.

I am sure that Professor Daya Krishna and many others would disapprove of my approach as a whole. They would call it illegitimate and an attempt to

\*See Charles Malmond, in T.N. Madan (ed.), *The Way of Life*.

confuse issues. I think I have done sufficiently in terms of explanation and results to ward off such a charge. If it is said that I have not done my work well enough or that I have not done it in sufficient detail, I must agree but plead both lack of ability and lack of serious response, except from Professor Daya Krishna. I would state that I have done enough to make a meaningful debate possible. And if a certain historical perspective is to be added to the theoretical one, mine may be treated as preliminary work in that direction.

## The text of the Nyāya-Sūtras: some problems\*

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The Indian intellectual and literary traditions are not known for any special concern for finding the authentic originals of their texts. In fact, normally the question itself does not arise and hence the problem of additions, modifications, deletions, interpolations, etc. is not even seen as a problem which needs to be tackled. The recent search for the so-called *Ur-texts* and their reconstruction on the basis of diverse criteria is distinctly due to the demands which Western scholarship has imposed in the field of all classical studies, including those relating to India. It is surprising, therefore, to find that even in classical times there were attempts to fix the authoritative text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, the foundational work for *Nyāya* in the Indian tradition. Up till now little thought has been given to these attempts or to ascertain their reason or assess their significance, if any.

The exercise in fixing the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* becomes even more intriguing if we remember that *Nyāya* has had a more continuous and sustained tradition of thought and discussion than any other philosophical school not only in India but, perhaps, elsewhere also. From Gautama to Gadādhara or Baccā Jhā<sup>1</sup> or Badrināth Śukla<sup>2</sup> is certainly a long period of sustained intellectual inquiry to be found anywhere else in the world. The text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* was first attempted to be settled by no less a person than Vācaspati Miśra I who, in his *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, not only fixed the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* but also divided them in proper order. This fact is well known to scholars, yet no one seems to have asked himself the simple question why Vācaspati Miśra I felt the necessity of fixing the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, specially when sensitivity to textual purity does not seem to have been a distinctive characteristic of traditional Indian scholarship, either then or now. Vācaspati Miśra

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