

Under UGC, ASIHSS Programme, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

Agenda for Research In Indian and Western Philosophy

A Word with the Researcher

Introduction / Yogesh Gupta

1. Agenda for Research

2. Contact with Agencies

Editor

R.S. Bhatnagar

(with an Introduction by Dr Yogesh Gupta)

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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

Editor : Daya Krishna

0-19A, 4th Floor, H.D.F.C.Enclave

Ashok Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur

19-4-2006

Dear Dr. Yogesh Gupta,

Thanks a lot for your letter dated 10th April, 2006.

You have my permission to publish the 'Agenda for Research', 'Focus' and 'Notes and Queries' published in the *JICPR*.

In fact, we ourselves have been thinking of publishing these for the benefit of students and teachers alike but, for some reason, the idea has not been realised.

Now that you have taken the initiative on behalf of the UGC. ASIHSS Programme of the University of Rajasthan, this important material will become available to students and teachers in this country.

There is only one thing: the material has to be rearranged so that it may form a coherent sequence dealing with issues in Indian and Western philosophy. I think Prof. R.S.Bhatnagar will be the best person to help in the matter as he has been associated from the very beginning with the preparation of subject and Author Index of the *JICPR*.

You may include the material published in the volume of the *Journal* after Volume XX. Also, I will bring this to the notice of Prof. Bhatnagar who has prepared the Cumulative Subject and Author Index of the *JICPR* upto Vol. XX.

I think it would be an important service you would be rendering to students and teachers of philosophy in the country.

With Regards,

Your Sincerely,

Daya Krishna

Dr. Yogesh Gupta

Head, Department of Philosophy

University of Rajasthan , Jaipur

Preface

Readers acquainted with the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research (JICPR)* may be familiar with the regular features entitled 'Agenda for Research', 'Focus' and 'Notes and Queries' appearing in that *Journal*. Items published under these headings are of great interest for those who want to carry on research in philosophy. We have been able to collect material upto the volume 21. By the time the script was to go to print volume 22-24 also appeared. Hence, material from volumes 22-24 and onward is placed in an appendix. For the queries still awaiting answers, readers are requested to keep abreast with the coming issues of the journal.

I am thankful to Dr. Yogesh Gupta, Co-ordinator ASIHSS, Head, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan for entrusting the work of editing this volume to me. I am further grateful to her for writing a comprehensive introduction in this volume helping me in going through the whole script. We are also grateful to (late)Dr. Daya Krishna, Editor of *JICPR* for permitting us to use the material from the *Journal* for this work. It is our ill luck that the book was not ready while he lived.

Shri D.D.Mathur helped me with most of the material used here. Shri Sapan Khandelwal of Literary Circle is bringing out this volume and we thank him for his interest.

I hope that the researchers would find this presentation useful.

10/558, Kaveri Path
Mansarovar, Jaipur-302 020
email: bhrajendra@yahoo.com

Sept. 25, 2007

R.S. Bhatnagar

Retired Professor of Philosophy

A Word with the Researcher

A few remarks about the research in philosophy will not be out of place in a book like this. Most of the fresh aspirants for research have little idea as to what topic or theme would be appropriate for them to choose for their proposed research. Most of these candidates treat the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as yet another degree in the career and would love to depend mostly, if not entirely, on their peers or teachers for total guidance. Obviously the significance and the nature of the task is either not understood or ignored.

Lets try to find out what research in philosophy possibly means. So far as the formal requirement for a research degree is concerned, we are told that the thesis must present an original idea or theory or an original interpretation of some given position or theory or the discovery of some new fact. Such a requirement as is evident, is fulfilled, in rare cases. But lets not worry about what actually passes for the fulfilment of the formal requirements. instead lets consider as to what according to such a requirement is possible in philosophy.

In a sense, a researcher in philosophy is better placed as compared to one placed in some other discipline. In subjects other than philosophy there are more or less established or generally accepted positions which are treated as point of departure for further research work. On the contrary, there is hardly any position or thesis in philosophy which is beyond question and which cannot be re-opened for fresh investigation. What philosophers have actually written or stated exemplifies this but when they state their own position they assume that their investigation has arrived at a final culmination. The names of Kant and Hegel come to mind. But history of philosophy has shaken that belief.

Weary about the so-called problems and solutions, some philosophers adopted a different strategy. They wondered as to what do the philosophers say. Famous British philosopher G.E. Moore declared, that his interest was in knowing as to what the philosophers meant by what they said and wrote and whether that would hold water. This move led to investigation into the nature of philosophical language and the question relating to the notion of meaning itself. The issues generated are still being discussed.

There are problems which arise because two different and opposed positions are held and maintained though they were intended to answer more or less the same set of questions. The two well known positions in the history of philosophy-idealism and realism, illustrate such an opposition. Both these positions deal with almost the same set of epistemological questions but are incompatible with each other. It needed a Kant to resolve the opposition yet as is well known Kantian solution was not acceptable to later philosophers.

Still more interesting and enigmatic thing that strikes a student of philosophy is the scandalous fact that it is not clear as to what constitutes a problem or rather a genuine problem. The issue involves subjective inclination and preference of a thinker on the one hand and also a sincere desire to find out what really is the case on the other. The positivists in the first quarter of the 20th century, when struck with the puzzles left over by the earlier philosophers, thought that they were chasing 'a black cat in a dark night where it did not exist?' In other words the problems with which the earlier philosophers were busy were not genuine problems. They were pseudo-problems! Earlier philosophers thought that through rational investigation it was possible to solve the mysteries of existence and one could discover what was the ultimate substance or being. Positivists thought, on the contrary, that philosophy could not add to our knowledge of what there is or can be. That was a job for the scientist to find out. So what remained for the philosopher to do? He could, to begin with, demonstrate his claim and that required an understanding of meaning, syntax and logic of philosophical discourse. Besides philosophers could investigate the nature of discourse in various disciplines, identify the conceptual structures, determine the logic of language and so on.

While the analytic techniques became endemic to philosophical method generally, the intensity of sceptical approach to ontological questions gradually diminished. Philosophical trends in Europe and elsewhere were not radically discontinuous with the earlier traditions and interest in the earlier philosophers and their concerns continue to occupy attention of most philosophers.

This brief description points to an important fact. While philosophers dealt with all kinds of problems they were also concerned with the approach and method of investigation. As is well known what is 'rational' approach itself became a problem for thought. This reflects the self-reflective aspect of the philosophical discipline.

In our country, many philosophers do philosophy under the influence of western analytic approach. In fact, in a broad sense, analysis is intrinsic to philosophical method. Because of differential emphasis, it assumes different forms. One may be inclined to use formal logic while the other may emphasise conceptual analysis. Still others may choose to rely on linguistic analysis. Some time it may be difficult to keep these different approaches exclusive to each other.

The larger segment of thinkers in India continue to follow the indigenous method which, of course, is not devoid of argument but which is dominated by the traditional concerns of philosophy as relating to ontology, ethics, aesthetics and epistemology.

It is interesting and timely that philosophers are now also concerned with problems which earlier thinkers may have relegated to mundane domain. Such problems arise as a consequence of awareness to what goes on around us. Human relationship at micro and macro levels, relation of human beings to nature and other living beings, pose problems which effect quality of life in several ways and which ultimately require clarity about certain basic concepts and their mutual relationship. The concepts of 'person', 'dignity', 'right', justice, 'equality', 'development', 'progress', 'health', 'personality', 'humanness', 'environment', 'terrorism', 'secularism', 'democracy', 'freedom', 'globalism', 'feminism', 'market', 'media', 'technology', etc. are getting into focus of philosophical attention.

A researcher finds himself bewildered as confronted with such a varied, pluralistic and open ended realm of cognitive enterprise. Looked at from a different angle the situation can be visualized as opening vast horizon of possibilities. Fortunately by the time an aspirant reaches at the stage where he can take up a research project he or she has already acquired a perspective, developed ideas, gained certain interests and some direction which are likely to help her or him to move further. Following material may be of some help in this respect.

Introduction

If one goes through any of the writings of the late Prof. Daya Krishna (September 17, 1924 October 5, 2007), and recalls an informal discussion with him or any of the lectures given by him, one can prepare a list of themes for research in the subject in addition to those writings which he had published under the three sections *AGENDA FOR RESEARCH, FOCUS, NOTES AND QUERIES (ARFNQ)* of the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research (JICPR)*. The present work *Agenda for Research In Indian and Western Philosophy* is a compilation of his complete writings published under the above mentioned sections/headings, which were introduced by him in his editorship of the *Journal*. He worked for *JICPR* as an editor till the last day of his life, which showed his unparalleled commitment to the *Journal*. The Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur is indebted to Prof. Daya Krishna, who was one of the builders of the Department and made it known in the realm of philosophy in the country and outside country. The Department was fortunate to receive his consent-letter, placed here, to re-publish the writings appeared in the *Journal* under the above mentioned headings.

The present work, which is the second publication of Prof. Daya Krishna writings from this Department, was planned to be published on the occasion of the Diamond Jubilee year of the University of Rajasthan (2007-2008) under the UGC's X Plan Programme of Assistance for Strengthening of Infrastructure for Humanities and Social Sciences (ASIHSS). The Department received this programme for a period of three years (2004-2007) under the Headship of Prof. V.S. Shekhawat and the Vice-chancellorship of Prof. K.L. Sharma. But the work could not be published on that occasion due to some technical reasons. However, the

work is being published in the Diamond jubilee year of the establishment of the Department of philosophy in Rajasthan and in the Golden jubilee year of the establishment of the same in Jaipur. The First publication of Prof. Daya Krishna writing under this UGC programme was published in an academic year 2006-2007 as a collection of Prof. Daya Krishna's published and unpublished articles written in Hindi in a book form entitled *Bharatiya Evam Pashchatya Darsanic Paramparaein*. The present book *Agenda for Research In Indian and Western Philosophy* initially was conceived as a compilation of the material appeared in volume X (1) (Vol. X, No.1), (Sep-Dec., 1992) of the *Journal* to the complete issues of volume XXI (Sep-Dec, 2004), appeared in 2006, in the main text of the book as from Volume X(1), (Sep.-Dec., 1992) of the *Journal* the first section *Notes and Queries* was introduced. The material of the two issues of the next volume i.e., Vol. XXII, which appeared during 2006-2007, was intended, by me, to be given in Appendix 1 as the way they are given in *Journal*. Meanwhile, remaining issues of Vol. XXII with completed issues of Vol. XXIII, and Vol. XXIV (1) have also appeared. The related contents from these volumes too had to be added in Appendix 1. However, besides some minor changes regarding the additions of the contents, from missing back volumes of the *Journal* and the material scattered in sections other than *ARFNQ* sections, in the four chapters the structure of the present work which now consisting of : introduction, preface, a word with the researchers, and 4 chapters with two appendices, as planned in the beginning, remained same. The material appeared in volume X to XXI under *ARFNQ*, as initially planned by Dr R.S.Bhatnagar are rearranged into four chapters and form the main text of the present work. These four chapters are titled as: Agenda for Research; Queries with Answers; Issues and Information in Focus and Queries Awaiting Answers. Here the items appeared in the *Journal* under the section *NQ* are splitted in two chapters; chapter two and chapter four. Similarly, few items appeared under *Agenda for Research* or under other sections of the *Journal* are placed under different sections and chapters according to the contents. These changes, with other changes, are marked in this work with the signs such as [A*], *, **, ***, +; ; QAA(Queries Awaiting Answers).

The Appendix 1 of the present work consists of the material appeared in *ARFNQ* in the Vols. XXII to XXIV (1) of the *Journal*. Here, the items given under these headings *ARFNQ* are placed in the way they are given in the *Journal* except those items which are replies of the queries raised in Vol. X to XXI are placed with the queries in Chapter 2 : Queries With Answers with a mark of three asterisks ***. Besides few printing corrections, for the convenience of the general readers and for the students and young researchers, the items under the headings *ARFNQ* of this Appendix are also given as far as possible with the appropriate titles as they are given in chapter one and three of the present work. The titles which are given in the *Journal* for the items of *Notes and Queries* are retained in the present work as they are given in the *Journal*. Appendix 2 consists of an elaborate analysis in respect of *Purusa-Sukta*, and a list of contributor's addresses, which are taken from the *Journal* as and when occurred there, are given in the end of the present work.

The first issue of this *Journal* was published in autumn 1983 under the founder editorship of Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, and from volume VII,(1),1990 onwards Prof. Daya Krishna became the editor of the *Journal*. The section on *Notes and Queries* was introduced by him in Vol.X (1), September-December, 1992, which was a special issue of the *Journal* dedicated to Prof. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya. This section started with the following remarks.

"With this issue, we are starting a new section entitled *Notes and Queries* in the *JICPR*. Most students of the subject have always some problems with what they read, or will like something to be clarified about which they are in doubt as to whether what they understand is correct or not. The section will provide a forum for all such queries and it is hoped that eminent scholars of the subject will help in elucidating and clarifying the issues so raised. Readers are invited to take advantage of this new forum in the *JICPR*"— Editor (Vol.X (1), 1992, pp.197).

About the meaningfulness of the section on *Notes and Queries* Prof. Daya Krishna's observation should be noticed. He says : " These queries evoked a number of responses from various persons and provided some clarification regarding the issues that were raised. However, they

themselves brought to light not only deep differences in the understanding of what was sought to be clarified, but also raised new issues which have not yet been highlighted or become the focus of further discussion" [From the Editor's Desk, Vol. XV, No. (1) 1997].

The Sections *Focus* and *Agenda for Research*, were introduced by him in Vol. XV (1). About these sections he says :

"We are introducing two new sections with this issue of the *JICPR* entitled 'Focus' and 'Agenda for Research'. We hope our readers will find both interesting".

Up to Vol. XVI (3) these special sections were given in the order : *FOCUS, AGENDA FOR RESEARCH, NOTES AND QUERIES*. From Volume XVII (1) to Vol. XXIII (3) the sequence was given in the order : *AGENDA FOR RESEARCH, FOCUS, NOTES AND QUERIES (ARFNQ)*. In the present work these sections will be written as *Agenda for Research, Focus, and Notes and Queries*. The Other sections of the *Journal*, wherever mention in the present work, are also given in Italics except sections of Appendix I which consists of these sections from volume XXIII(1) to XXIV (1). Professor R.C.Pradhan assisted Professor Daya Krishna (Editor) as Associate Editor of Vol. XVIII (1) to XXII (1), (2), (3). From Vol. XXIII (2) to Vol. XXIV (1) Professor G.Mishra assisted Prof. Daya Krishna as Executive Editor Volume XXIII (4) was the last issue of the *Journal* containing all the three headings and also has the last entry under the section *Focus*. The sections on *Agenda for Research* and *Notes and Queries* have their last appearance in Vol. XXIV (1) (January-March 2007), received in July, 2009. Prof. Godabarisha Mishra was the Executive Editor, with the editorship of Prof. Daya Krishna, of the Vol. XXIII (2), (3) and (4) of this *Journal*. The Vol. XXIII(3)&(4) appeared after Prof. Daya Krishna's demise. From Vol. XXIV (1) Prof. Godabarisha Mishra became the editor of the *Journal* and the Department received a letter of permission from him, for republishing the material relating to *ARFNQ* from the volume XXIV (1), in 2010. Although the materials from the most of the volume X to volume XXII were made available and prepared before the demise of Prof. Daya Krishna, but due to the delay relating to compiling of all relevant materials of the missing volumes from XI to XXII, including placing of the material at the appropriate place with appropriate titles, and

also due to searching the material related to the issues of the items of *ARFNQ* which were scattered in other sections of the *Journal* such as *Discussion and Comments, and Notes and discussion, the work which was scheduled to be published a month before his demise, could not be sent for publication in scheduled time.*

The section *Discussion and Comments*, of the *Journal* was introduced under the founder editorship of Prof.D.P.Chattopadhyaya. Except Vol.XIX (4), the section *Discussion and Comments* has become a regular feature from Vol X (2) to XXIV (1) of the *Journal*. The most of the writings appeared under this section are in the form of brief notes, comment, discussion, responses or re-responses on Prof. Daya Krishna's articles or on the issues discussed under the section *ARFNQ*. Such writings can be consulted by the research students. Only a few items from the section *Discussion and Comments*, which are in the form of replies, observations or comments on the issue raised under *ARFNQ* are given under chapter 2. At most of the places the items are marked with double asterisk **. For example, the item related to *Sramana* traditions of XVII-3, given under *Discussion and Comments*, has been given in the present work with a mark of double asterisks** in chapter 3 : Issues and Information in *Focus*. In this context researchers can consult 'A Note on the Idea of Human Rights' by Prof.M.Miri and 'Comments on the Note entitled The Idea of Human Rights by Mrinal Miri' by Prof. B.H. Boruah appeared under the section *Discussion and Comments* in Vol. XVII (2). Both are insightful for students of any discipline working in this area but can also be considered as a paradigm of philosophical analysis to an emerging issue of general concern like Human Rights and Rights in general. Also, the issue of transformative education appeared under the section *Discussion and Comments*, is a issue of general concern and of contemporary relevance. Students interested in this discussion can see the article of Daniel Raveh 'Transformative Education:Sankara and Krishnamurti on the Encounter Between Teacher and Student' in Vol. XXII(3), and comments on it by N.Srikanta, with the response to these comments. Both of these appeared in *JICPR* under *Discussion and Comments* in Vol. XXII (3). Researchers can also go through the following articles of Prof. Daya Krishna, which appeared in the

Journal during the past one decade, and were responded by the great scholars. Most of them have appeared under the section *Discussion and Comments*. They can be seen as an extension of Chapter 2 : Queries with Answers. Some of the references of such few selected articles of Prof. Daya Krishna and responses to them are given below for researchers. For example, one can see the response of Acharyya Mahaprajna's Comments on the Article entitled 'How *Anekantika* is *Anekanta*? Some Reflections on Jain Theory of *Anekantavada* by Daya Krishna' in Vol. XVIII(1) on Prof. Daya Krishna's article 'How *Anekantika* is *Anekanta*?' appeared in Vol. XVI (2) ; a response of Prof. Radhavallabh Tripathi's 'Is *Rasa* the Bane of Indian Aesthetics?' in Vol. XXII(4) on Prof. Daya Krishna 's article '*Rasa*—The Bane of Indian Aesthetics ' appeared in Vol. XXI (3) ; responses of Nityanand Mishra's 'Noticing the Illusoriness of the Illusion of I-Centricity' in Vol. XXIII(1) and A Response of Noa Eliasaf in Vol. XXIII(2) on Prof. Daya Krishna's article 'Freeing Philosophy from the 'Prison-house' of 'I-centricity' ' appeared in Vol. XX (3), and a response of Sachchidanand Mishra's 'What do the terms '*Murta*' and '*Amurta*' exactly mean in '*Padarthadharmasangraha*' ?' in Vol. XXIII(3) on Prof. Daya Krishna's article 'Prasastapada's Mapping of the Realm of Qualities : A Neglected Chapter in Indian Philosophy ' appeared in Vol. XX (1). On some of these articles of Prof. Daya Krishna, the responses of other eminent scholars have also appeared. For example, students interested in *Anekantavada* can also see Prof. T.K.Sarkar's response and Prof. Ramakanta Sinari's response appeared in Vol. XVII (3). An article by Prof. Madhusudan Baxi's '*Anekantavada* and *Pramanas* : Limits of Synthesis in Jaina Logic' in Vol. XXIII(1), which was a response to the issue raised by Prof. Daya Krishna in personal communication to Prof. Baxi, can also be seen by researchers. Researchers, if interested, in Indian Aesthetics, can also see Comments by Viveka Datta On the Article '*Rasa*—The Bane of Indian Aesthetics' in XXII(2). Discussion by A. Kelkar on 'Natural Language and Computer Language' and 'Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (KCB) on *Swaraj* in Ideas : Some Problems and Reflections' by R. Ghosh, appeared under the *Discussion and Comments*, can also be consulted by the researchers. The former, appeared in Vol. XXIII(4), can be seen as a partial response to the issues raised in the section *Agenda for Research* in

Vol. XXIII (2) and (3), while the latter, appeared in Vol. XVIII (4), can be seen as a partial substantiation of the spirit expressed by the editor of the *Journal* for introducing the Section *Agenda for Research* in Vol. XV. Keeping this spirit alive, Prof. KCB's view on '*Swaraj* in Ideas', which appeared in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* Vol. XI (4), has been given in the present work at the end of the chapter 3 with a mark of a single asterisk*.

All the entries of Vol. X to XXI appeared under the Sections *ARFNQ* are rearranged in the manner that the topics related to Indian philosophy are placed before the topics related to Western philosophy. In Indian philosophy also the topics are broadly arranged in the order of Vedic Samhitas, Upanishads, Smrti texts, philosophical schools of Indian philosophy, and topics related to Western philosophy are placed more or less in the temporal order of the thinkers. Under each of the headings of *ARFNQ* if more than one issue or item is given and if they are dealing with different topics then in some places they are rearranged according to the content of the items. For example, *Focus* of Vol. XVIII (4) which has four items in the *Journal* are rearranged here at different places under the same chapter according to the nature of the content of an item. Similarly, under the heading *Notes and Queries*, if queries are in a single question form and may be dealt with different issues, they are given in the way it is given in the *Journal* ; otherwise, they are rearranged according to the nature of the content of the query and its answer. In the former case one can see *Notes and Queries* of Vol. XXI (2) while for the latter case the same section of Vol. XIX (3). The query related to *aharya jnana* is perhaps the only query which is greater in length than its responses as the latter consists of not more than six pages while the query is given in the form of an article of more than ten pages. As stated above the entries under the section *Notes and Queries* are further rearranged in the present compilation in two chapters : Chapter 2 : Queries With Answers, and Chapter 4 : Queries Awaiting Answers. The queries if appeared in the earlier Volumes i.e., in X to XXI, and if their answer appeared in Vols. XXII, XXIII, and XXIV(1), then these answers are given in chapter 2 along with their queries. Answer to such queries are marked with triple asterisk ***. For example, the

second query of the chapter 2 consists of set of six query in XXI (3). One of its response which is given by Prof. N.M. Kansara in XXII (2) has not been given in appendix but placed in chapter 2 with a triple mark of asterisks*** with queries. Among these answers the answer no. 1, 5, & 6 can partly be seen as answers of the queries no. 3, 1 & 2 respectively of the queries from another set of seven queries given by Prof. Daya Krishna in the same volume in which the set of six queries are given. This set of seven queries are given as first item of chapter four. (QAA) of this work. The name of the author of the six queries, which are answered by N.M. Kansara, is not given in the *Journal*. In the present work such unnamed items, which are very few in numbers, are given under Daya Krishna's name. For example, one of the items of *Focus* of XVI(1); XVI(2); of *Notes and Queries* of XV(1) and XVI (2), and of *Agenda for Research* of XV(3) and XVI(2) are some of such cases. Those queries of Appendix which are awaiting for answers are marked with QAA.

Chapter 1 *Agenda for Research* which is a compilation of the material appeared under section *Agenda for Research* has the total 36 entries in the *Journal*. In chapter 1 only 33 entries are placed which are given by Prof. Daya Krishna, and the items of the Vol. XVIII (4) by Usha Devi, of Vol. XX (2) by G.C. Nayak, and of Vol. XVI (3) by Bernd Pflug are placed in different chapters of the present work. Among these three entries, the entries of the Vol. XVIII (4) and of XX (2) are placed under chapter 4, and the entry of Vol. XVI (3) is placed under chapter 3 as the former two items are more of a character of queries, and are awaiting for answers, while the latter is a sort of information to be focussed and thus is placed in Chapter 4. The above three entries, which are given in the *Journal* under the section *Agenda for Research* are given in the present work with a mark (A*) (*Agenda**). Similarly, the issue given in any of the section of *ARFNQ* of the *Journal*, and if changed and placed under different section of *ARFNQ*, at few places they are given in the present work, with a mark of double asterisk**. For example, item 8 of *NQ* of XX (2) and of XVIII (1) are now placed under chapter 3 with a mark of double asterisk**. The former is on 'Sartre & Gandhi' while the latter deals with Wittgenstein's bibliography. Similarly, some of the items of *Focus* where the issues underlined in them if answered then such items of *Focus* have also been

placed, as a query, in the present work with a mark of double asterisks**, in chapter 2 along with its answer. For this one can see *Focus* of XIX (3) and XX(1). The former is on 'Beauty as the symbol of morality' and is now placed in chapter 2 with its reply appeared in XXI (1) under the section *Discussion and comments*. The latter is on, 'Kant on Perpetual Peace' appeared in XX(1) is now placed in the present work with its reply in chapter 2. The reply of this item has also appeared under the section *Discussion and comment* of XXI (1). Item of the *Focus* on 'war and philosophy' from XXI (4) is placed with a mark of triple asterisks*** in chapter 2 along with its answer which has appeared in material of Appendix 1.

In chapter 2 *Queries With Answers*, if a query is answered by more than one respondents they are all placed at one place irrespective of the differences of the volume and the section under which they appeared in the *Journal*. Here one can see how while answering a philosophical query the query is interpreted and approached by different scholars from distinct perspectives by raising different dimensions of the query and thus answered from a perspective of respondent or in the same perspective with a different mode of expressions. This can be seen at various places in Chapter 2. For example, one can see the first query and the last query of this chapter. The former deals with the meaning of the word *Samhita* while the latter deals with the issue relating to Philosophy of Science. Besides, if the queries raised under the heading *Notes and Queries*, *Focus* or even under *Discussion and Comments* and if the replies of these queries are given under a different section of the *Journal* such as *Discussion and Comments* or *Notes and discussions* then they are compiled in the present work along with the query in Chapter 2. For example, the reply to the issue underlined in the item of *Focus* of Vol. XX(1) though given in the *Journal* under the section *Discussion and Comments* of Vol. XXI (1), is given in the present work in Chapter 2. Similarly, an item of *Focus* of XVII (3) answered by three respondents in XVIII (2) though given under *NQ* are now placed in the present work in this chapter with query. As mentioned above, except a few items, only writings which are replies or re-replies to the queries raised by Prof. Daya Krishna and are initially given under the section *Notes and Queries* are compiled in the present

work in Chapter 2 even though these replies are given in the *Journal* under a different sections. Some of the examples of this can be seen in the series of reply and re-reply to the query related to Nyaya's Realism in XII (1), and the query on Kant's Categories in XI (3). The former query: 'Is Nyaya Realist?' is perhaps the largest item amongst all items of queries with answers as it consist of the series of replies, re-replies or re-joinder and titled with second round; third round; a supplementary note; a brief note or a long note. Most of them, though, have appeared under the Section *Discussion and Comments* or *Notes and Discussions*, are placed in this work under chapter 2. These replies and re-replies are not only an illustration of how one can extend discussion on a issue for research in philosophy but is also an illustration of modern version of the ancient Indian debate, that is, a soft form of debate, and not a hard form of debate (*Shastratha*) manifested in navya-nyaya terminology on *bheda-abheda* or on *vyapti laksana* etc.. Here, one can see how in answering a query in the discipline one creatively preserve the identifying features of a school of Indian philosophy and philosophically explore the expansion of a school in the light of the issues raised in western philosophical systems. In fact, it was also one of the unique contributions of Prof. Daya Krishna in Philosophy, which is manifested in the seminar or group discussions initiated by him or organized by others in which he was present. Those who have attended such seminar and discussion may also have noticed as to how generously he used to re-formulate the contention or a comment or a query of a participant in a philosophically excellent way. This rare quality with the qualities of initiating a discussion and furthering the discussion in a meaningful/creative way by giving space to the alternative lines of thought or articulating a counter-position or perspective can be seen in his writing on Indian Philosophy besides his following two books, which are compilation of the discussions in seminars he initiated or directed. *Samvada : A Dialogue Between Two Philosophical Traditions*, (eds.) Daya Krishna M.P.Rege, R.C.Dwivedi, Mukund Lath, ICPR with MLBD, Delhi, 1991, and *Bhakti: A Contemporary Discussion (Philosophical Explorations In the Indian Bhakti Tradition)*, (eds.) Daya Krishna, Mukund Lath, Francine E.Krishna, ICPR, Delhi, 2000.

Some of the queries which are raised under the heading *Notes and Queries*, and have generated a long debate amongst the great scholars of the nation have already been published in the book entitled : *DISCUSSION and DEBATE in INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Issues in Vedanta, Mimamsa and Nyaya* (ed.) Daya Krishna, ICPR, New Delhi, 2004. 'Is "Tattvamasi" The Same Type of Identity Statement as "The Morning Star is the Evening Star" ?', 'Can Navya-nyaya Analysis make a Distinction between Sense and Reference'?, 'Analysis of *Adhyasa* ', and 'The nature of Shock-proof, Evidence-proof, Argument-proof' are the queries raised by Prof. Daya Krishna and are given in chapter 2 with answers. Later on Prof. Daya Krishna himself had given extended reformulation of these queries in a mode of partial replies. For this, one can see his book: *New Perspective in Indian Philosophy*, Rawat Publications, Jaipur, 2001.

The query on Kant's Categories raised by Prof. Daya Krishna in XI (3) and replied by the three respondents is further expanded in the light of these responses by Prof. Daya Krishna in the form of an article in Vol. XVIII (4) 'Kant's Doctrine of Category : Some Questions and Problems'. The article consists of a series of queries related to Kant's categories, thus, is placed at the end of chapter 4: *Queries Awaiting Answers with a mark*. An article relevant to this issue on 'Kant on Category : Forward and Backward' by Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, appeared in the same issue of the *Journal* can also be seen by researchers. Researchers interested in the debate on Categories of Kant can also see Volumes XVIII(4), XIX(3) & (4), XX(3)&(4), and XXI (2) of the *Journal* along with A.Kanthamani's Notes appeared under the section *Notes and Queries* of XX(2) entitled 'On Flagging Kant'.

In Chapter 3 : *Issues and Information in Focus*, mainly those items are compiled which are given in the *Journal* under the heading *Focus*. Some changes have been made regarding placement of the items under this chapter. If in the section *Notes and Queries* a query is more of a form of informatory note, it is placed here as an item of *Issues and Information in Focus*. Such items are marked, at most of the places, with double asterisks **. For this one can see item with the title *A Bibliography of Wittgenstein's Published Writings* given in *Journal* under *Notes and*

Queries of Volume XVIII(1) and also item 8 of *Notes and Queries* of XX (2).

In Chapter 4: Queries Awaiting Answers those queries are compiled which appeared in Vol. X to Vol. XXI and which are not yet answered. Such queries appeared in Appendix are marked with QAA. The first item, as stated earlier, of chapter four consist of a set of seven queries relating to vedic samhita. In this set of seven queries the first three queries are placed with queries given in beginning of chapter two with a mark of + at both the places, that is, in chapter two and in chapter four. The first three queries 1,2,3, of Volume XXI (3) are similar in content to queries no.1,5,6, of set of six queries of the same volume that is XXI (3). The later set of six queries are answered by Prof. Kansara in XXII (2).

As the title of the present book *Agenda for Research* In Indian and Western Philosophy suggests, all the issues whether appeared under any of the sections *ARFNQ* are illustrations of the Agenda for Research Thus one may see that in the *Journal* the classification of the issues under the above-mentioned three headings of *ARFNQ* are not water-tight as items of Agenda for Research can be considered as item of focus or vice-versa or both can be considered as items of queries. Prof. Daya Krishna himself has re-expressed the contention of *Agenda For Research* of Vol. XXII (3) relating to *Purusa Sukta* in *Vedic Samhitas* in the form of queries appeared under the section *Notes and Queries* of Vol. XXIII (3). Item relating to similar issues have also been given by him under Focus of Volume XXI(2) & (3), and Agenda for Research of XXI (4).

In chapter 1 the total topics are 34 in which 22 are relating to Indian philosophy and 12 to Western philosophy. In Chapter 2, the total queries are nearly 42 in which the queries related to Indian Philosophy are 32 and queries related Western Philosophy are 10. In Chapter 3 almost equal items are given of Indian and Western philosophy. Here the total item are 49 in which 24 item are related to Indian Philosophy and 25 items to Western Philosophy. In chapter 4 nearly more than 40 queries are related to Indian Philosophy and 8 queries are related to Western Philosophy in which most of them are focusing on Kant. This shows how items related to Indian philosophy, amongst which most of them are given by Prof. Daya Krishna himself, are more than the items relating to Western philosophy.

As stated above if we look at the comparative importance of the systems of Indian Philosophy given in these headings, we will find that those issues related to Indian Philosophy are greater in number than those related to Western Philosophy. Amongst Indian philosophy too the issues related to *Veda-vedanga*, Nyaya and Mimamsa are greater in number than the issues related to other schools of philosophy. For example, amongst items related to Indian Philosophy under *Afr*, 6 items are on Veda-upanisads, 7 on mimamsa, *purva* and *uttar*, 10 on nyaya, and 1 on non-*advaitic* vedant. But if we look at the number of entries under the section *Notes and Queries* we will, find as shown above, the number of queries, answered or unanswered, related to Indian is three times greater than the numbers of queries related to western philosophy. Here one can see irrelevance of Prof. Karl H. Potter's question 'Can't Daya be happy being an Indian philosopher who is not an Indian philosopher?' [Vol. II (2), *Notes and discussions*, pp.149] Moreover, the following views of Prof. Daya Krishna will also be seen as reply to this question and shows his concern about proliferation of research areas with new perspectives in the key areas of Indian Philosophical thinking. Following excerpts, from item under *Agenda for Research* in Vol. XV. (1) of the *Journal*, can be seen as his concern for introducing the section :

"Agenda for research even in the field of philosophy are being increasingly set by international agencies which look at the world from primarily the Western point of view though they speak in the name of the whole of humanity."... Further, he says, " I think it is time that the philosophers of the non-Western world present a counter-agenda for study and research of ethical issues relating to the developed countries".

Furthermore, if one looks at the contents of the items of *Agenda for Research* or *Queries* related to Indian philosophy given by Prof. Daya Krishna, one will find that these writings still favour the position which he held more than four decades ago in the context of the three myths of Indian philosophy : [a] Indian philosophy is spiritual in character, [b] it has fixed, closed schools, and that [c] it is based on the authority of the Vedas. 'Three Myths about Indian Philosophy' [Diogenes, 1966] The items of the sections of *ARFNQ* hardly show the spiritual character of Indian

philosophy. Rather, most of the items reiterate his view that "Indian philosophical tradition is as philosophical [rational /ratiocinative character] as Western philosophical tradition is supposed to be". [*Diogenes*, 1966]

One can also see some of his books on Indian philosophy besides his writings under the sections *ARFNQ* of the *Journal : Indian Philosophy - A Counter Perspective*, OUP, 1991 which is a collection of his articles published from 1965 to 1986-later reprinted in Oxford India paper back in 1996 and which is again published with a new revised and enlarged edition with the same title in 2006, IBC, Delhi. The last two prints of them are dedicated to the memory of the late Pt. Badrinath Shukla; *Indian Philosophy A New Approach*, IBC, Delhi, 1997 a book dedicated to Dr. Francine Ellison Krishna ; *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*, Rawat, Jaipur, 2001 ; *Developments in Indian Philosophy From Eighteenth Century Onwards : Classical and Western*, PHISPC, Vol.X, Part I, Delhi 2001 (a work *in memoriam* of Francine Ellison Krishna (1931-1999)); and *Bhartiya Darsan : Ek Nayi Drasti*, Rawat, Jaipur 2004.

These writings and the title of the books also show that in his views Indian Philosophy is not closed or fixed but open ended or unfinished in nature. Also, the debate given in Chapter 2 of the present work itself is an illustration of how the key issues of a system of Indian Philosophy can be further explored for future research where every answer demands a new interpretation and raises a new series of question-answer process. For example, the query : 'Is Nyaya Realist' ? raised in this *Journal* under the section *Notes and Queries* can be seen not only as an illustration of one of the features of Indian philosophy which differentiates it from other disciplines but is also an illustration against the above-mentioned second myth that schools of Indian philosophy are closed or stable. Regarding the third myth it seems that instead of questioning the myth of authority of the Vedas he seems to favour the Vedas (*vedic-samhita*) indirectly as his approach regarding *Vedic samhita* and its related concepts, like recensions of *Vedic Samhita* (*shakha*), *rsi*, *mandals*, *mantra*, *daivata sukta* etc., do not question the treasure of wisdom in the Vedas or classical texts but drew attention of the scholars to the need of re-look; re-understanding and re-compile *Samhita* works. Appendix 2 *Purusa Sukta— An Analysis*, may also be seen as an attempt to substantiate the possibility of re-compiling, re-

interpreting, and reiterating the vision underlined in the *Vedic Samhita* and other texts of compilatory in character in Indian Philosophical Tradition.

As the title of Appendix, Agenda for Research, Focus and Notes and Queries in Vols. XXII, XXIII, and XXIV (1) suggests, it gives the total items appeared in the *Journal* under the above-mentioned sections *ARFNQ*. Under the section Agenda for Research issues dealt with are: The concept of *Padartha* in Indian philosophy in XXII(1) ; a comparative study of the *Sruti* and *Agam exegetic* and nature of language, entitled as 'Vedanga', in XXII(2) ; *Purusa sukta* in *Rg*, *Yajus*, and *Atharvaveda* in XXII(3) ; the relation of logic and logical thinking to the empirical reality entitled as 'Russell on Material Conditional' in XXII(4). Similarly, The nature of language of physics to philosophy, Anglo-American to Continental, and from Indian Vedic to the post-modernist period of the Western tradition entitled 'Philosophy and Language' in XXIII (1); issues related to the Advances in Computer technology, such as the decoding of the genetic code; universals of language for translation of languages into a common code; structure of the sound producing human mechanism and new concept of causality other than Aristotelian and Newtonian, entitled here as 'Computer Technology', in XXIII (2) ; the problem of the relation between indefinite multiplicity of language and universal language in the light of Quine-Frege views on the language and incompleteness of language of symbols in XXIII (3); the need of reformulation of the nature, genesis, proliferation, maturation, decline and disappearance which displays that the ideals of cognitive disciplines are at stake as knowledge is not something given eternally but is created by the mankind entitled here as 'History of Human Knowledge' in XXIII (4), and the nature and inter relationship among Globalization; Post-modernism and World Peace in XXIV (1). This was the last item of the Agenda for Research published in the *Journal* as after this issue of the *Journal* this section alongwith the section NQ were abolished.

Under the section Focus, attention is drawn to the following : 'Derrida's work entitled *Eye of the University; Right to Philosophy and Gadadhar's Vyutpattivada* ' in XXII (1); 'Laurie I Pattons *Myth as Argument; The Brahaddevata as canonical commentary*' in XXII (2) ; Arindam Chakravarti's *Adhunikā Pratichya Pramāna Mimamsa* entitled

'Epistemology in Sanskrit' in XXII (3), and the *sukta* 164 of the first *mandal* of *Rgveda* alongwith two others *suktas* in XXII (4) entitled '*Suktas*'. The issue related with *Saptarsis* as to who should be listed among them and who should be excluded in XXIII (1); the changing knowledge situation in Mathematics and Physics which were considered as the foundational areas of knowledge entitled as 'Recent works on Mathematic and Physics' in XXIII (2); the need for understanding the philosophical movement of post-modernism in XXIII (3), and the need for developing further and fully paying attention the writings of contemporary Indian thinker Prof. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya in XXIII (4). Prof. Daya Krishna mentioned that "Dr. K.L. Sharma of the University of Rajasthan published his work on Subjectivity and Absolute from Jaipur and Dr. G.B. Burch published his work on Search on the Absolute in Neo-Vedanta from Hawaii are among the few works which are based on the full-length study of KCB's works". It is a coincidence that the first publication under the heading *Notes and Queries* started from special issues of the *Journal* dedicated to KCB while the last entry of the section on the *Focus* was also on his thought.

Under the section on Notes and Queries the following items are dealt with: Nyaya on *satta*, *samvaya*, *aharya jnana*, and *budhyapeksa* etc. in XXII (1); answers to queries raised earlier regarding Veda and its recensions and a query related to *sabdabodha* and *sabdapramana* in XXII (2); query on *Vyapti* relation in XXII (3), and answer of two queries: one on the meaning of identity of *abheda* and other on *turiya* in Bhartrhari in XXII (4); the nature of *kshna pratiyogi* in *Yoga-sutra* 4.33 and queries relating to *Yoga-sutra* 4.34, and reply relating to the concept of *Vyapti* under the title 'Discussion on *Vyapti* and *Samanadhikarna*' and 'Some Notes on *Vyapti* and *Anekantavada*' are given in Vol. XXIII(1). The latter are treated also as answer to the queries Prof. Daya Krishna might have raised in a personal communication with the respondent and of the two queries on the same given in Vol. XXII (3). Two items are given in XXIII (2): first, the query re-raised regarding *Sakhas* (recensions) of the *Samhitas*, which are raised earlier in *NQ* of Vol. XXI (3), and also replied in *NQ* of Vol. XXII (2), and second is a response to the query on *ksana pratiyogi* of Vol. XXIII (1). Volume XXIII (3) has two items: the first one deals with concepts of

Husserl's Philosophy and the second one is a second reply to *ksana - pratiyogi*. Vol. XXIII (4) is a third reply to the query raised in Vol. XXIII (1). In this way amongst the two queries raised in XXIII(1), the first query relating to *ksana pratiyogi* is answered by three scholars; by K.V.Ramakrishnamacharyya in XXIII(2), by Mukund Lath in XXIII(3), and by D. Prahaladachar in XXIII(4) while the second query related to *Yoga-sutra* 4-34 of the same volume has a reply by K.V.Ramakrishnamacharyya in XXIII(2).

The difference between *upapatti* and *anumana*, the relationship between the *pramanas*, and the nature of *pramanas* in Nyaya for proving body, *indriyas*, *manas*, *buddhi*, and *atman* are the queries given in XXIV (1). This was the last entry under the section *Notes and Queries* given in the *Journal*. One can see that the queries raised in XXIII(1),(2),(3), the queries relating Husserl's Phenomenology in XXIII(3), the queries relating to Ramanuja's *anupatti*, and the issues and concepts in *Nyaya sutra* in XXIV [1] are some of the illustrations of queries in Appendix I which are still awaiting answers and are marked with QAA.

Students can see following few references of some of the articles as a partial answer of the queries raised in earlier Volumes. For example, for the query on *anirvacniyata* in Advaita, which has appeared twice in the Volumes XX(3) and XXI(1), one can see the article by Usha Devi in XXIII(2). Similarly, for the issue raised in *Focus* on Ibn Rushd one can see articles in XVIII(1)&XXI(2) on Arabic Philosophy. Also, in Vol. XXIII(3) under *Notes and Queries* two types of queries are given in which one is related to *bhoga-yoni* and *karma-yoni*. Students for this can see the article entitled 'Is the Doctrine of *Karma*, Generally Known As the law of *Karma*, Scientific?' in XXIII(3). For the query, which has been answered by Richard Sorabij in XV (2), related to *Logos* and *Nous*, one can see Prof. Daya Krishna's Article 'Eros, Nomos and Logos' in XXII(2) and can also consult *Discussion And Comments* in XX(3) entitled 'How Secular Logos turned into Theological Word?'. Similarly, for the query regarding Kant's Beauty as a symbol for morality in Critique of Judgement, one can see an article in XIX(3). Also for a query related to the issue of *Brahman-Realization* given in the chapter 2, researchers can consult an article in XIV(2) and *Discussion and Comments* of XV (2).

One can see that in contrast to the works like; *The Philosopher's Index*, Philosopher's Information Centre, USA and the *Research Dissertation Abstracts International*, U.S.A published only the summaries or the abstracts of some of the Ph.D. thesis submitted, the writings compiled in the present work give glimpses of areas to be focussed more on for further research for a growth of a discipline. The topics given under the headings *ARFNQ* are those which are either less explored and need attention of the scholars or are of crucial nature and thus need to be constantly reiterated, carried forward, reinterpreted or made relevant in the present situation. As stated in the beginning of this work besides the issues underlined in the *ARFNQ* a list of further issues for research can be prepared from Prof. Daya Krishna's articles, talks, lectures, book reviews or from his books published from elsewhere. In fact a long list of the Agenda for Research underlined in the above-mentioned sources can be prepared into a monograph form. For example, if a researcher wants to work on any of the systems of classical Indian philosophy such as the *Vedic Samhitas*; Indian Aesthetics: *Rasa, Bhakti, Bhava*, or on the History of Indian or Western philosophy one should keep in mind the thought provoking issues raised by Prof. Daya Krishna in the articles and books related to these topics. A researcher can also see the parallel approaches or analysis taken in European or non-European philosophy on the issue raised in the context of Indian philosophy under *ARFNQ*. On this dimension, one can see items of *Focus* of XVI (3), XVII (2) and XIX (1) which are dealing with the issue related to comparative philosophy. The further elaboration of the issues raised in each of the items of the *Agenda for Research* or of *ARFNQ* also need a separate project. One can see for example for following few items of *ARFNQ*; (i) the *Agenda for Research* of Vol. XXII (1) draws attention of the researchers to the concept of *padartha* which can also be viewed from a wide perspective where a researcher from the perspectives of the concept of *tattva* can see how the concepts of *bhakti, sarnagati, bhava, rasa, anand* [sublime bliss], *prkriti, apurva, mantra* etc. are to be considered? Are they be called *padartha* or *tattva* or both? One can also compare views of philosophical schools on *padartha* [signified] vis-a-vis *tattva* in Indian philosophy with the views expressed in Western philosophy, and can also see the perspectives of science,

technology, mathematics, and fine arts on both these terms. As the term *padartha* at the first sight seems to be used as a kind of term assumes a fixed relationship between world-word, or extra-linguistic phenomena and linguistic utterances and thus does not include the non-verbal expressions expressed in dance, music and other visual / performing arts including expressions of poetry. In these contexts referent of a term is not always univocal or fixed but most of the time is created in the very act of communication or in performing expressions on this issue one can also consult the issue raised by Prof. Daya Krishna in item of the concept of Being of chapter 1st of this work and given in *Journal* in XVIII (2). (ii) issue raised in Volume XXII (2) can be further extended in the light of a comparative view of *Vedic and Agamic exegetics* and also on the nature and ontological status of language [vak]. The *Vedic* literature and language are not only richer to the Western tradition and to *Vedic* Agams on language and literature but can also be compared to the language and literature of the non-*vedic* schools and of *lok-bhasa* traditions. The richness of the *Vedic* thinking on language can be seen in the fact that out of the six *Vedangas* four are related to language : *nirukta* [etymology], *chhanda* [meter], *vyakarana* [grammar], and *shiksha* [phonetics]. While working on these issues a researcher can also consider Prof. Daya Krishna's article 'Sign, Sense and Reference; Reflection on Philosophy of Language' in XIX (2), *Agenda for Research* of Volumes XIX(1), XIX(4), XXII(2), XXIII (1), (2) and XXIII(3), and the *Discussion and Comments* of the Vol. XXIII(4).

(iii), the issue raised in Vol. XXII (4) regarding a disparity between logical principles of western formal logic regarding material implication and empirical reality, students can see this issue in the light of the introduction and development of strict implication and the counter-factual conditionals which took place in west during 1940-1990. As a counter-perspective to it, one can compare the nature and characterization of *Vyapti* in ancient Indian systems of Logic. In this context researchers can consult Prof. B. Pahi's articles 'Formal Logic in Ancient India and Greece' in Volume 1 Part 4, PHISPC, New Delhi 2007, and also *Studies in Logic*, Volume 15, *Logic, Navya-Nyaya, & Applications*, College Publications, UK, 2008. (iv) The issue raised in query under *Notes and Queries* in XIX

(2) regarding division of ancient Indian text in the context of the use of the word *Brahmana* as internal division of *Bṛhadaranyakopaniṣad* can be further extended in terms of the question of the relevance of the internal division of the texts of the list of the following terms : *Prapathak, Valli, Mundak, Skandha, Pada, Khanda, Anuvaka, Adhyaya, Samuddesya, Annihika, Prakarana, Sarga, Kandica, Karika, Lahari, Uddyota, Prakarana Stabaka* etc..(v) Similarly, the issues raised regarding categories in Western tradition and especially in Kant under *Agenda for Research, Focus*, and in the *Notes and Queries* can be extended further in the light of the related articles appeared in Volumes XVIII(4),XIX(3)&(4),XX(2),XXI(2) etc., of the *Journal*, and also in the light of the views on philosophical psychology relating to *bhava*[state of consciousness] of *buddhi* [intellect/ mind], *chitta, samskara* etc. in Sāṃkhya school and in the tradition of Indian Philosophical schools of Aesthetics. (vi) In the same way the issue raised in *Notes and Queries* in Vol. XV(3) and replied in Vol. XVII(3) by Ujjwala Panse can also be expanded further in the light of the meaning and use of the word *karma* in the *Geeta* and in *sutra* texts of schools of philosophy. It seems that the issue raised by Prof. Daya Krishna can be raised more pertinently with regard to *Bṛhadaranyaka* of *Sukla Yajurveda* as well as with regard to the other Upaniṣads of the *Krishna Yajurveda* recensions e.g., *Kathopaniṣad* and *Taittiriyopaniṣad* etc.. Here students can also focus on the writings of this *Journal* on *Niskama Karma* and *Discussion and Comments* by Y. Krishan in XVIII(1),XXI(3) including the book reviews of the books by Indian or Western writer on this topic.

Attention of the students can also be drawn to some new issues or topics of research relating to the literature of the *Vedic Samhitas; Vedic exegesis* including systems of Indian philosophy, and of the diaspora, besides the issues raised under the headings *Agenda for Research, Focus, Notes and Queries*. For example, (i) a team of researchers can focus their research on creating or constructing a complete system or the philosophy of each of the *Vedic Samhita*. For this, they can base their work on a full-length study of any one of the *Vedic Samhita* with its *Upveda* or on any one of recensions of the *samhita* with its *Brahmana, Uprahmana, Aranyaka*, and the texts of the *Kalpa Sūtras*. This would provide a complete and an integral metaphysico-epistemological; axiologico-poetical;

politico-moral-legal-social and scientific vision underlined in the *Vedic Samhita*, which will provide Vedic grounds of the issues prevalent in the areas of study known today as emerging trends. (ii) They can also confine themselves to a limited task where one can focus only on a study of the *Brahmanas* and the *Upanisadic* texts of one of the *Vedic Samhitas* and can give a systematic view of philosophy of *Sama Samhita* or *Rg* or *Yajur Samhita* (*Sama-Darsan* or *Rg-Darsan* or *Yajur-Atharva-Darsan*). (iii) One can also focus on those works, commentaries or sub-commentaries on which much attention has not been paid and which are either in Samskrit or are in other regional languages or in writings of those Indian thinkers living and writing outside India in European-non-european languages (the diaspora). This may also include the interpretative or explanatory works on the *Vedic* literature of some *Vaisnava acharyyas* in the Samskrit language or works of saints in regional languages. (iv) the team of research scholars can also highlight the vision of the *Vedic rsis* as an illustration of Philosophy of the individual philosophers /thinkers (*Rsi*) of the *Vedic* period. For this one can systematize the Philosophy of the *Rsis* such as Philosophy (*Darsan*) of Vasistha, Yajnavalkya, Kanva, Visvamisra, Bhardwaja, Narada, Shandilya, Badarayana, Atri, Kashyapa, Maitrai, Lopmudra & Vaikhanas etc. on the basis of their views which are scattered either in the various texts or even in the same text at different places e.g., in different *mandals* of the *suktas* in the case of the *Rg vedic samhita* itself. (v) Researchers can also make an attempt to reveal the meaninglessness of the cliches or the misconceptions made against the Vedic vision or the post vedic- literature including on the nature of Indian perspective on mathematics, science-technologies, literature and fine-arts through re-reading and re-focussing the basic vision underlying in the primary-texts and commentaries of logico-philosophical or mystico-spiritual in character relating to these areas. Here, the researchers can work on some of the key issues on culture such as : Culture and Nature; Cultural identity, and Culture and historical consciousness with special reference to Indian philosophico-intellectual thought etc.. In this context students can also focus on Prof. Daya Krishna's views on culture in general and history or *new picture* of Indian philosophy in particular including his questioning of accepted picture of Indian philosophy with his proposal of a

counter perspective of it. Here, researchers, at globe level, can see and compare Indian views to ethics and metaphysics of the asian, african, and europeans views as an illustration of one of the dimensions of cultural studies. (vi) Students can also critically examine the mode of writings given in the vedic—upnisadic *mantras*; the mode of writings in narratives trends (*akhyan-upakhyaana*) of fable-parable mode a mode prevalent before 4b.c., and were considered as parallel to the mode of thinking and writing in Indian mode of theoretical rationality or the researchers can enhance the former as theoretically at par with the writings given in *Katha/shastrarth* (debate) form in Indian epistemology and metaphysics. In this context students can theoretically examine the assumption that the former mode is prevalent in *Samveda* form and expressed the moral- spiritual wisdom only, while the latter is prevalent in the *sutra-bhasya* (*shastrarth*) texts of Indian philosophical systems. Also, the former is sometimes expressed in the folklores and regional languages or in metaphorical symbolic-suggestive way (*pratikatamaka*) while the latter expressed the subtle abstract issues of philosophy in an aphoristic way.

The future of a discipline is not restricted or closed by giving Agenda for Research as a Guidelines of research topics in a discipline. In fact no developedment of human knowledge can be predicted precisely or should be made so for a creative growth of a subject. Yet, providing various issues in form of *Agenda for Researches* or issues to be focussed in future for the research in a discipline, if given by key-persons of the subject, do play a crucial role in shaping the future of knowledge of a subject partially. Glimpses of this can be seen in the light of the UGC recommendations 2001 for incorporating in UG and PG syllabus the Indian perspectives in the core and optional areas of philosophy. It had a nation wide impact and awareness of the Indian contribution in the subject at the class room teaching which has been lacking since the discipline has been introduced as an autonomous subject for teaching and research in all universities of the country.

The present book like the first publication *Bharatiya Evam Pashchatya Darshanik Paramaparacin* hopefully will be equally beneficial for the research students of the discipline and also to the researchers of the other related disciplines too. It will also make the subject philosophy more

beneficial to the society and to the well-being of mankind in terms of preserving and creatively enhancing the roots of the nation's ancient philosophico-intellectual and religio-spiritual vision in theory and in praxis.

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Agenda For Research

Vedic Samhitā Texts

The fact that there are different *samhitās* of the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda* and the *Atharvaveda* has not been seen as questioning the fundamental 'unity' of the Veda itself. There can be no 'unity' if the foundational *Samhitā* texts themselves are different and, if so, one has to find the differences between these different texts of the three Vedas which we have at present with us.

The question whether these differences are important or of little significance can only be determined *after* a close examination of the text itself.

The similarities and differences that may emerge from the examination of these texts would reveal the commonality, or the central core from which the *Samhitās* may be said to have developed in different directions.

The idea of the 'original' or the 'Ur-texts' of these three Vedas has been there, but any reconstruction of this can only be possible if similarities and differences are articulated as clearly as possible.

The problem perhaps is far more complex as the *Yajurveda* with its centrality for the performance of Vedic sacrifices is itself divided into two major branches, the *śukla* and the *Kṛṣṇa*, each having different, independent *Samhitās* of its own.

The understanding of the Vedic Corpus, therefore, demands that such a preliminary exercise be undertaken in respect of the texts that are available at present.

Once this preliminary exercise is done, the way would be open for more significant and deeper questions in respect of the Vedic Corpus,

including not only the *Samhitās*, the *Brāhmaṇās*, the *Āraṇyakās* and the *Upaniṣads*, but also the *Śrauta*, the *Gṛahya* and the *Dharma Sūtras*, the *Nirukta*, the *Śikṣā*, the *Chandas*, the *Prātiśākhya*, texts dealing with the understanding of each of the different Vedas themselves.

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Daya Krishna

Upaniṣads

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad is a well-known work. Yet it has hardly been noticed that it calls its chapters as *Brāhmaṇa* which, normally, refers to those parts of the Vedic Corpus which are supposed to be completely separated from the portions called the *Samhitā*, the *Āraṇyaka* and the *Upaniṣad*. The *Samhitā* part is supposed to consist of *Mantras* alone while the *Brāhmaṇās* are supposed to deal exclusively with the correct procedure for the performance of the different Vedic sacrifices. *Īsopaniṣad* is an obvious exception as it forms an integral part of the *Śūkla Yajurveda*. The use of the term 'Brāhmaṇa' in the context of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* needs an explanation as it questions the usual understanding of the term 'Brāhmaṇa' in the tradition.

There is another aspect of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* which does not seem to have been noticed as it raises a basic question regarding the tradition of knowledge about the Brahman before Śamkara in the Indian tradition. Śamkara himself starts the *Bhāṣya* by saying:

ॐ नमो ब्रह्मा दिभ्यो ब्रह्म विद्या सम्प्रदाय

कर्तृभ्यो वेश ऋषिभ्यो नमो गुरुभ्यः।

This means that there was a *Brahma Vidyā Sampradāya* to which Śamkara belonged and which existed before Śamkara. The history of the *Sampradāya* needs to be explored and note taken of the fact that it considers itself as a *Sampradāya* amongst other *Sampradāyas* and was regarded as such by others, in the tradition.

Strangely, Śamkara does not say anything at the beginning of his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma Sūtra* about this *Sampradāya* and, what is stranger still, starts the *Bhāṣya* not by talking about *Brahman* or about *Ātman* but about *Asmat-Yuṣmat* between which there is supposed to be a fallacious

identification which he considers to be the paradigmatic example of *adhyāsa* in his philosophical framework. The above-mentioned discrepancy would suggest that the *Bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* was perhaps written earlier than the *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma Sūtra* as at that time Śamkara considered himself to belong to the *Brahma Vidyā Sampradāya* which he later gave up for *Ātma Vidyā Sampradāya*. The term *Ātma Vidyā* was used earlier than Śamkara and is mentioned by Uddyotakara in his *Vārtitka* on the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana on the *Nyāya Sūtras*, and its *Niḥsreyasa* was regarded as *Mokṣa*. But as far as we know, the term *Brahma Vidyā* does not seem to have been widely prevalent in the tradition, even though the *Brahma Sūtra* was explicitly written on the topic concerned. This may perhaps explain why we have no *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma Sūtra* prior to Śamkara as what the philosophers in the non-Buddhistic tradition were interested in was in establishing the independent reality of *Ātman* and not that of *Brāhmaṇa* or even of the *Īswara*. The *Nyāya Sūtras* are a classic example of this and also the other schools of Indian philosophy which never talk about Brahman but do talk in some sense or other of the *Ātman*. Still, the explicit mention of a *Brahma Vidyā Sampradāya* by Śamkara suggests that there was such a *Sampradāya*, though not perhaps as popular amongst the philosophers.

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Daya Krishna

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is a well-known work, and so also the discussion and debate at Janaka's court where after the great sacrifice a discussion and debate ensued testing Yājñavalkya's implied claim that he has the knowledge of the *Brahman* as he had asked his student to take away the gold and the cows which were to be his who knew it. But, no detailed study seems to have been made of the questions that Yājñavalkya was asked and the sequence in which they were asked and the answers that he gave. Nor has the relation of these questions to the knowledge of *Brahman* been examined.

A critical examination of the nature and the sequence of these questions, and the answers given by Yājñavalkya to them would perhaps result in a micro-investigation into this and the other texts which, as far as we know, has generally not been done.

There is also a problem as, perhaps alone, amongst the Upaniṣads, the work, though called '*Bṛahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*', consists of chapters called *Brāhmaṇa* and not *Āraṇyaka* or Upaniṣad. This raises the question as to what exactly was meant when a particular text was designated as a *Brāhmaṇa* or and *Upaniṣad* or an *Āraṇyaka*. A close investigation into this might help in freeing us of many delusions created by the 'meaning' of the texts which seems *prima facie* to be arbitrary in nature.

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Daya Krishna

Comparative Study of *Brahmā Sūtras* and *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*

The talk of Śruti and its authority has been a matter of unquestioned acceptance in the philosophical tradition tracing its lineage from the Vedas in this country. Yet, a close look at the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* and the *Brahma Sūtras* which alone seem to literally accept the authority of the Śruti develop in opposite directions. Not only this, even a cursory look at these texts strikes the blindest person that this so-called Śruti whose authority is supposed to be of such final and fundamental importance for the tradition, is not only continuously contested in respect of its interpretation but also that it consists of a complex of statements scattered all over the Vedic corpus which have to be understood in a coherent manner as *prima facie* they conflict with one another.

Mīmāṃsā and the *Brahma sūtras* try to provide a perspective to the Vedic corpus which deserves close attention. The *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* which are clear in respect of the 'purpose' or *prayojana* of the Śruti have no problem in respect of the Upaniṣadic portion of the text as it is not regarded by them as important. The *Brahma Sūtra*, on the other hand, have a real task before them as they can not refuse the genuineness of the texts on which the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* are based. But, somehow, they want to treat them as secondary in character and not having that primary

importance as the Upaniṣadic text with which they are concerned. They thus display a more ambiguous attitude which is hardly there in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* which are supposed to have been composed a little earlier.

What is perhaps more surprising is that both in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* and the *Brahma Sūtras* there is sufficient evidence for the fact that the final interpretation adopted by the author of the *sūtras* was a subject of controversy in the earlier tradition as names of a number of persons have been given and their opinion mentioned in the *Sūtras* themselves. Many of these persons occur in both the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Brahma Sūtras* suggesting that there was a common scholarly world interested in the issues that these two sūtra texts raise and that they were knowledgeable about the details of the text in the context of which the questions are being asked. The names Bādari, Ātreya, Kārsanājini seem to be common to both the *sūtras* along with those of Bādarāyaṇa and Jamini which occur surprisingly both in the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta Sūtras* not just once but a number of times. There are, of course, persons who are referred to in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* but not in the *Vedānta Sūtras* and vice-versa. The following comparative list of the names which occur in the two *sūtras* may be of interest to the reader interested in the subject and may help in a comparative study of these two *Sūtra* texts from a perception different from the one that has been accepted up till now.

<i>Brahma Sūtra:</i>	<i>Mīmāṃsā Sūtra:</i>
1. Jaimini 1.2.28, 1.3.31, 1.4.18, 3.2.40, 3.4.2, 3.4.17, 3.4.40, 4.3.12, 4.4.5, and 4.4.11 (10)	1. Jaimini 3.1.4, 6.3.4, 8.3.7, 9.2.39, 12.1.7 (5)
2. Bādari 1.2.30, 3.1.11, 4.3.7, 4.4.10 (4)	2. Bādari 3.1.3, 6.1.27, 8.3.6, and 9.2.33 (4)
3. Bādarāyaṇa 1.3.26, 1.3.33, 3.2.41, 3.4.1, 3.4.7, 3.4.18, 4.3.15, 4.4.7,	3. Bādarāyaṇa 1.1.5, 5.2.19, 6.1.8, 10.8.44, 11.1.64 (5)

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| 4. Kārsnajaṇin
3.1.9 (1) | 4. Kārsadnajini
4.3.17, 6.7.36 (2) |
| 5. Audulomi
1.4.21, 3.4.44, 4.4.6 (3) and
not (4) | 5. Ātraya
4.3.18, 6.1.26 (2) |
| 6. Asmarathya
1.2.29, 1.4.20 (2) | 6. Aitisayana
6.1.6, 6.7.36 (2) |
| 7. Karsakrtsna
1.4.22 (1) | 7. Lavukayana
6.7.38 (1) |

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Daya Krishna

Sūtra texts on Rights

The availability of the Veda to women and *sūdra* is supposed to have been denied from the very beginning on the authority of the Veda itself. Yet, the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 6.1.4 not only opens with the declaration 'फलार्थत्वात् कर्मणः शास्त्रं सर्वाधिकारं स्यात्' and *Sūtra* 6.3.8 specifically controverts the view of Aitiśāyanah given in *Sūtra* 6.1.6 that only men are entitled to this, and *Sūtra* 6.1.27 gives the opinion of Sage Bādari in the context of the right of the Vedic *karma* to all the four *varṇas* that 'निमित्तार्थेन बादरिः, तस्मात् सर्वाधिकारः स्यात्' This, of course, is not accepted by the author of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, even though he had earlier accepted the position of Bādarāyaṇa in respect of the rights of women in *Sūtra* 6.1.8.

The *Brahma Sūtra* does not discuss the 'rights' of women, but does discuss the question relating to the 'rights' of *sūdra* to *Brahma Vidyā* (1.3.34-38). It denies them the right in its discussion on these *sūtra* as given in *Śamkara's Bhāṣya* on it. He does discuss the objection based on the Jānaśruti episode in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* but does not discuss the Satyakāma Jābāla episode in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*.

It has, therefore, to be founds as to when in the development of the *Śruti*, the denial of these 'rights' became crystallized and began to be treated as 'orthodox' and 'authoritative' by others.

Vol XXI, No. 2

Daya Krishna

Advaita Vedānta

Śamkara, in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma Sūtras* criticized almost all the schools of philosophy known in India during his time. As most of these schools continued to flourish after Śamkara, it is important to find their replies to his criticism of their position. This would also show the extent of their awareness of Śamkara's criticism as well as the period when they took serious note about what he had said about their positions. The Buddhists, for example, continued to flourish till almost 1200 A.D., that is, for almost five hundred years after Śamkara. Yet, except for Jnānaśri Mitra (1025 A.D.) who had written a work entitled *Advaitabindu* which presumably discusses Śamkara's argument against *vijñānavāda*, no one else is Similarly, it would be interesting to find when the Jains, the Sāmkhyans or the Vaiśeṣikas took note of Śamkara's criticism. This would give us some idea of the gradual penetration of the awareness of Śamkara's thought among the different philosophical schools of India and their reactions to what he had said. It will also be interesting to find whether the Advaitic thinkers took note of these objections and replied to them and, if so, when? In fact, while the debate between the Advaitins and the non-Advaitic Vedāntins is fairly well-known, as is also the debate between the Advaitins and the Naiyāyikas after Śamkara Miśra, the debate between the Advaitins and other schools of Indian philosophy has been given very little attention up till now. It is time that this gap in our information is filled and the different dimensions of the debate compared, evaluated and critically examined.

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Daya Krishna

Adhyāsa

Śamkara in his discussion on *Adhyāsa* in the *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtras* clearly states that there is no such rule which says that *Adhyāsa* in Advaita can *only* occur between one perceptual object and another. The original reads as follows:

न चायमस्ति नियमः पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यसि तन्व्यमिति, अप्रतत्य षोडपिद्वाकाशे बालास्तल मतिनताद्यदय स्यन्ति। It will be interesting to know if this observation

of Śamkara has been accepted in the Advaitic tradition, starting from Vācaspati Miśra's commentary on the *Bhāṣya* of Śamkara. Also, in case Śamkara's statement is taken seriously, what effect will it have on the ontological status of the world?

Vol XVII, No2

Daya Krishna

Mīmāṃsā

The relevance of the distinctive position of Kumārila and Prābhākara for the performance of Vedic *yajña* needs investigation. This is important particularly if it is accepted that the main function of Mīmāṃsā is to formulate the correct *vidhi* for the performance of a Vedic *yajña* and if both Kumārila and Prābhākara are regarded as Mīmāṃsākās in this sense of the term.

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Daya Krishna

Mīmāṃsā on Meaning

The debate between *abhitānavayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhānavāda* is generally supposed to start with Kumārila and Prābhākara. Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapādiya* had already distinguished between *padāvādins* and his *akhaṇḍapakṣavādin* theory.

It needs to be investigated whether there is an earlier discussion on the subject and how is Bhartṛhari's discussion related to it. Similarly, it needs to be explored as to what is the relation between Bhartṛhari's discussion on the subject and the subsequent discussion on it in the various philosophical schools of India. For example, Bhartṛhari's notion of *akhaṇḍāvākya* is the same as notion of *ekavākyatā* which is used by many thinkers in the tradition.

Similarly, one needs to explore as to how this discussion is related to the discussion between *saṃsargatāvāda* and *prakārtavāda* in the Nyāya tradition and what is the philosophical significance of these discussions.

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Daya Krishna

Pratyakṣa in Nyāya Sūtra

The definition of *pratyakṣa* seems to have changed at the hands of successive thinkers in the Nyāya tradition after it was first formulated by Gautama in his *Nyāya Sūtras*. However, little is known about the details of these changes and the reasons given for them. The subject needs investigation as it would throw light on the discussion about the adequacy of the definition given in the foundational text of the Nyāya system whose authority is supposed to be accepted by all the Naiyāyikas.

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Daya Krishna

Śabda Pramāṇa as Āptopadeśaḥ Śabdaḥ in Gautama's Nyāya Sūtra

Gautama in his *Nyāya Sūtra* defines *Śabda Pramāṇa* as *Āptopadeśaḥ Śabdaḥ*. The definition questions the *Apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda and suggests that only the *Upadeśa* of *Āpta Puruṣa* can be regarded as authentic. But, then, the question arises as to who is an *Āpta Puruṣa*. He cannot be equated with *Īswara* as there will be little point in calling him 'Āpta'.

The issue is taken up for discussion in Samanta Bhadra's *Āpta Mīmāṃsā*, a Jain work, where it is subjected to a detailed analysis which has not been paid sufficient attention up till now.

The issue regarding the definition of *Āpta* in the Nyāya tradition thus needs to be explored in detail and the reply that was given to Samant Bhadra's observations by subsequent Nyāya thinkers needs to be pursued further by those who are interested in this aspect of the Nyāya Philosophy. Also, it needs to be found, as to when the doctrine of the God's authorship of the Vedas was formulated in Nyāya and how this was made to accord with the definition of the *Śabda Pramāṇa* as given in the *Nyāya Sūtras*.

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Daya Krishna

Vaidalya Sūtra and the Nyāya Sūtra

The relation between the *Vaidalya Sūtra* and the *Nyāya Sūtra* needs to be studied in detail, as the two works seem to be integrally related to each other in such a way that the one clearly attempts to refute the contentions

of the other. It is not clearly established as to which is prior and, though the former is usually ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the ascription has recently been questioned by Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti in their work entitled Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Logic: Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*. Also, generally Nāgārjuna is ascribed to a date slightly later than that of the author the *Nyāya Sūtra*. But, chronology apart, it would be interesting to examine the arguments and the counter-arguments of both the works in detail as, while the one questions the very possibility of there being any *pramāṇa-śāstra*, the other tries to establish, point-by-point, not only its possibility but shows how it can actually be established.

It would be interesting to find out whether the Mādhyamika denial of the possibility of knowledge emanates from its non-acceptance of the structural limits imposed on the exercise of human reason by the very character of its being 'human', and whether the author of the *Nyāya Sūtra* is arguing for the 'acceptance' of the human conditions for the search of the validity of knowledge within the conditions imposed by the term 'human situation' which no human being can possibly overcome.

Vol. XVII, No.1

Daya Krishna

Pravṛtti, Karma and Doṣa

The Indian philosophical thinking has centered around the notions of *Pravṛtti*, *Karma* and *Doṣa*. Each of these needs a close analysis and the interrelationship between them mapped in detail so that a clearer picture may emerge of the way different philosophical traditions dealt with them. The notion of *Karma*, for example, differs widely in the Mīmāṃsā, Vaiśeṣika and the Jain traditions. So also is the case with Advaita Vedānta where even *Upāsanā* is treated as a *Karma*. On the other hand, the notion of *Karma* in the Bhagwad Gita is treated primarily as concerned with the socio-political realm. Sāṃkhya seem to treat both *Pravṛtti* and *Karma* as essentially divided into the *Sāttvika*, *Rājasika* and *Tāmasika*.

The different concepts and insights developed in this context have to be articulated and developed independently of the context in which they

arose and their relation to consciousness and language explored in such a way as to bring out the presuppositions involved in them.

Indian thinkers who have developed the theory of knowledge, action and feeling (primarily in the context of *Alamkāra Śāstra*), have to be brought together into one focus so that a unified theory of consciousness may be developed and made available to the contemporary thought in this regard.

Vol. XVII, No.3

Daya Krishna

Upodghāta in Nyāya Bhāṣya

How is Vātsyāyana's discussion in the *Upodghāta* to his *Bhāṣya* of the *Nyāya Sūtra* carried on by Uddyotkara, Jayanta Bhatt, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana. Vātsyāyana starts his *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya Sūtras* with an Introductory Note entitled *Upodghāta* wherein he extends the notion of *Pramāṇa Vyāpāra* to apply to all living beings, as they all seek pleasure and avoid pain. This is the exact meaning of *Artha* according to him and *Karma* in the sense of *Pravṛtti-Sāmarthya* which is supposed to attain them. The original reads as follows:

प्रमाणतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तौ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यादर्थवत् प्रमाणम्। प्रमाणमन्तरेण नार्थप्रतिपत्तिः। नार्थप्रतिपत्तिमन्तरेण प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यम्। प्रमाणेन खल्वयं ज्ञाताऽर्थमुपलभ्य¹ तमीप्सति वा जिहासति वा। तस्येप्साजिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य समीहा प्रवृत्तिरित्युच्यते। सामर्थ्यं पुनरस्याः फलेनाभिसम्बन्धः। समीहमानस्तमर्थमभीप्सन् जिहासन् वा² तमर्थमाप्नोति जहाति वा। अर्थस्तु सुखं सुखहेतुरश्च, दुःखं दुःखहेतुरश्च³। सोऽयं प्रमाणार्थोऽपरिसंख्येयः प्राणभृद्भेदेस्यापरिसंख्येयत्वात्।

अर्थवति च प्रमाणे प्रमाता प्रमेयं प्रमितिरित्यर्थवन्ति भवन्ति। कस्मात्? अन्यतमापायेऽर्थस्यानुपपत्तेः। तत्र यस्येप्साजिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य प्रवृत्तिः, स प्रमाता। स येनार्थ

1. तमर्थमभीप्स TC.

2. मभीप्सन् जिहासन् वा जा ग.

3. सोऽयं प्राणभृन्मात्रस्य व्यवहारः, प्रमाणेनार्थमुपलभमानस्तमर्थमभीप्सन् वा जिहासन् वा समीहमानस्तमर्थमाप्नोति वा जहाति वा added J.

प्रमिणोति विज्ञानाति⁴ तत्प्रमाणम्। योऽर्थः प्रमीयते ज्ञायते तत्प्रमेयम्। यत्तदर्थविज्ञानं सा प्रमितिरिति। चतसृषु चैवंविधासु तत्त्वं⁵ परिसमाप्यते।

किं पुनस्तत्त्वम्? सतश्च सद्भावोऽसतश्चासद्भाव इति। सत् सदिति गृह्यमाणं यथाभूतमविपरीतं तत्त्वं भवति। कथं पुनरुत्तरस्य प्रमाणेनोपलब्धिरिति? सत्युपलभ्यमाने तद्वदुपलब्धेः प्रदीपवत्। यथा दर्शकेन प्रदीपेन दृश्ये गृह्यमाणे तदिव यत्र गृह्यते तत्रास्ति। यद्यभविष्यदिदमिव व्यज्ञास्यत, विज्ञानाभावान्नासतीति। एवं प्रमाणेन सति गृह्यमाणे तदिव यत्र गृह्यते तत्रास्ति। यद्यभविष्यादिदमिव व्यज्ञास्यत। विज्ञानाभावान्नास्तीति। तदेवं सतः प्रकाशकं प्रमाणमसदपि प्रकाशयतीति। सच्च खलु षोडशधा व्यूहमुपदेक्ष्यते।

How does this affect our understanding of the *Pramāṇa Vyāpāra* in the context of Nyāya? In this connection it will be interesting to find whether Uddyotkara, Jayanta Bhaṭṭ, Vācaspati Mīśra I, and Udayana show any awareness of this contention in Vatsyāyana's work and, in case they do so, how do they deal with it.

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Daya Krishna

Vācaspati Mīśra

Vācaspati Mīśra I who is supposed to have flourished around AD 960 was perhaps the first person to write authoritatively on Nyāya, Advaita and Sāṃkhya and to give new directions of interpretation of those schools for later times. He also wrote on Mīmāṃsā and Yoga. However, most of these schools held diametrically opposite positions on many issues and used arguments to refute the objections that were raised against their position by the opponents. It is unlikely that Vācaspati Mīśra I in his exposition of the doctrines of these various schools did not give arguments for controverting the various *pūrvapakṣas* against them. But how could he have done so without contradicting what he himself had said in the exposition of rival schools on which he also wrote with authority? A comparative study of these three major works and the arguments given in them is thus a desideratum for exploring how he could have achieved the important feat

4. विज्ञानाति J.

5. अर्थतत्त्वमिति बहुन्; तत्त्वं प्रमाणवातिकभाष्ये, पृ. 401।

of being the originator of new interpretations in the field of Nyāya, Advaita Vedānta and Sāṃkhya, respectively.

It would also be interesting to learn how his interpretation of Śaṅkara's position differs from that of Padmapāda and Sureśvara who were the immediate disciples of Śaṅkara and may be regarded as having known his position more intimately.

The differences between Padmapāda and Sureśvara may also be a subject of intensive investigation and it may be asked as to why the issue of their different interpretations of the master's views has not been the focus of attention in the subsequent Advaitic tradition.

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Daya Krishna

Udayana on Universals

Udayana's attempt to develop criteria for distinguishing between universals and pseudo-universals is well known. However, there has been little attempt to trace the history of this distinction in later times and see as to how it was modified by later Naiyāyikas. As late as the eighteenth century, we find works devoted specifically to this subject. The subject needs intensive investigation as it is of relevance to western thought also where there is a mention of this problem in Plato's *Dialogues* themselves. It may also be desirable to investigate whether other schools besides Nyāya have tried to tackle this problem.

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Daya Krishna

Śabdakhanda of Gaṅgeśa

The largest part of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa comprises of Śabdakhanda consisting of two parts, the first part containing 525 pages, the second containing 860, totalling 1391 in the Chaukhamba Edition, Varanasi 1990 (reprinted from the earlier Asiatic Society Edition published from Kolkata). As against this, Pratyakṣakhanda comprises 925 pages and Anumānakhanda only 650 pages. The latter two parts have been computed on the basis of the Tirupati edition which alone is with us, while the former is from the Chaukhamba Edition published recently. Even if one

allows for some difference in comparing the Chaukhamba with the Tirupati edition there can be little doubt that the Śabdakhaṇḍa occupies a significantly substantial portion of the text known by that title.

What, however, is strange is that at least on a *prima facie* view it seems to be more concerned with the Mīmāṃsā discussion of the subject than the way it was defined and discussed in the *Nyāya Sūtras* or the subsequent discussions on it in Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra-I and Udayana. The second part of the *khaṇḍa* deals almost exclusively with the issues discussed in the Mīmāṃsā tradition on the subject. The very first chapter in this part is on *Vidhivādaḥ*, an issue which reminds one of Mandana Miśra's well-known Mīmāṃsā text on the subject. This is followed by *Apūrvāvādaḥ* (p. 163), *Śaktivādaḥ* and *Jātiśaktivādaḥ* (p. 266), *Samāsavādaḥ* (p. 92), *Ākhyātavādaḥ* (p. 28), *Dhātuvādaḥ* (p. 7), *Upsargavādaḥ* (p. 6), and *Pramāṇa Catuṣṭaya Prāmāṇyavādaḥ* (p. 6). Perhaps he should have started with the last one in case he discusses the issue of the *pramāṇatva* of *Śabda* and its place among the other four *pramāṇas* accepted by Nyāya.

The list of the topics suggests that Gangeśa is primarily concerned with the Mīmāṃsā discussion of the subject on the one hand and the Grammarian's discussion on them on the other. The issues raised by Gautama in the *Nyāya Sūtras* are discussed in the part I devoted to the subject. It, however, does not seem to be concerned with the notion of the *āptapurūṣa* which occupies such a central place in Gautama's definition of *Śabdapramāṇa* and on which Ācārya Samantabhadra wrote a full book called *Āptamīmāṃsā* later. He also does not seem to be concerned with the distinction between *svara* and *varṇa* which plays a significant role in the discussion in the *Nyāya Sūtra*.

Gangeśa, in fact, discards Gautama's definition altogether and substitutes his own for it. It reads as (प्रयोगहेतुभूतार्थतत्त्वज्ञानजन्यः शब्दः प्रमाणम्). The views on the topic that are discussed are those of Buddhist, old Mīmāṃsā and Prabhākara. Besides these, he discusses only the issues

relating to *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyata*, *āsatti*, *tātparya* and *śabdānityatā* in Part I of his work.⁶

Gangeśa's treatment of *Śabdapramāṇa*, therefore, needs an intensive study to find how far his discussion departs from the discussion on the subject from Vātsyāyana to Udayana. In case Gangeśa has significantly departed from the tradition in the discussion of this *pramāṇa*, the same should be highlighted and its influence on the later thinkers including both the Naiyayikas and the Mīmāṃsakas should be a matter of interest and study. The two key questions which need to be answered in this context will be:

1. How did the Nyāya thinkers after Gangeśa react to his formulations and try to reconcile them with the earlier discussion on the subject, and
2. How did Mīmāṃsakas reply to the attack of Gangeśa on their position?

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Daya Krishna

Udayana and Gangeśa

Gangeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is regarded by common consent, as the most outstanding work on epistemological issues relating to the problem of knowledge in the Indian tradition. Yet, as far as I know, there is no clear formulation of his contributions to the field of philosophy, or even the way he saw the problems relating to the issues he raised. What is even more surprising is the fact that in spite of the numerous references by name to the earlier thinkers whose views he explicitly mentions or refutes, there is almost complete ignorance about the development of Nyāya between Udayana and Gangeśa which should by now have attracted the attention of scholars, particularly as there is supposed to have been the most radical break in the philosophical tradition of India during this period. Amongst his predecessors, Gangeśa mentions the following names in the Pratyakṣa and Anumāna Khaṇḍa respectively:⁷

6. *षडदर्शन समुच्चय*, Bharitya Gyanpeeth, Varanasi, 1970, p.76.

7. The references to thinkers in the Pratyakṣa and Anumāna Khaṇḍa of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* have been taken from the content pages of the volumes published

Name	No. of times mentioned
Pratyakṣa Khaṇḍa	
1. Rucidatta	1
2. Āloka Kāra	2
3. Pragalabha	2
4. Mīśra (Vācaspati)	1
5. Maṇikāra	2
6. Vācaspati (Mīśra)	2
7. Kusumāñjali (Udayana)	2
8. Prābhākara	5
9. Navya Prābhākara	1
Anumāna Khaṇḍa	
10. Upādhyāya	8
11. Yajñapati	3
12. Jayadeva	6
13. Cudāmaṇikāra	1
14. Prakāśakṛd	7
15. Khaṇḍanakāra	1
16. Maṇikāra	1
17. Cudāmani Kāra	1

Amongst the Naiyāyikas well-known in the tradition, only Vācaspati Mīśra and the author of *Kusumāñjali* are mentioned. The latter's view is explicitly refuted, while the former's is further explicated and defended. The mention of Navya Prābhākara is strange as generally no one seems to know about it.

There is another problem regarding the mention of Maṇikāra whose views are explicitly refuted. It must have been an earlier work, as in the tradition the term *Maṇi* and Maṇikāra refer only to *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and Gaṅgeśa respectively. A similar problem arises with reference to Prakāśakṛd, the author of *Prakāśa*, whose views are refuted a number of

by the Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Tirupati in 1973 and 1982 respectively. It is not clear whether all these references occur in the main text of Gaṅgeśa or in the commentary thereon published along with the original text in these volumes.

times in the Anumāna Khaṇḍa. The reference to *khaṇḍanakāra* most probably refers to Śrī Harśa who wrote *Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādyā*. A different problem arises in respect of the views of Upādhyāya whose full name is not given. Generally the term is taken as referring to the work of his son Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, but obviously this could not be the case here. There must have been some other Upādhyāya whose views have been refuted by Gaṅgeśa.

Perhaps one could reconstruct the position of these thinkers on the various issues on the basis of Gaṅgeśa's mention of them and his refutation of their position in his work. This might provide a clue to the lost history of Nyāya between Udayana and Gaṅgeśa giving us an idea of the continuity of development instead of what we generally see as a sudden break which seems inexplicable in terms of what went before. As the work of Maṇikanṭha Mīśra, that is, '*Tarkaratnam*', *JICPR*, Vol. IX, No. 1, is already available we might also take it into account to reconstruct the history of Nyāya after Udayana and before Gaṅgeśa.

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Daya Krishna

Interaction between advaitin and non-advaitin traditions

The philosophical traditions in India have developed in continuous interaction with one another, and hence, no philosophical text can be understood without taking into account the previous state of discussion regarding the various philosophical issues which it deals within the counsel of its discussion of the subject. It not only takes off from the point where the earlier thinker in its own tradition left, but also takes into account the objections that were raised against what that thinker had said by thinkers belonging to other schools or traditions of philosophizing. Thus, there is both an internal and an external debate in which the text engages itself and without taking into account these two contexts, it can neither be understood, nor can its contribution to the development of the ongoing debate be appreciated.

The Buddhists were the main opponents in the first millennium AD while the debates between the Advaitins and the non-Advaitins dominated

the second millennium A.D. This debate was triangular in the sense that it occurred between the Advaitins and Naiyāyikas on the one hand and the Advaitins and the non-Advaitic-Vedāntins, on the other. The long debate regarding the reality of 'difference' in which the Advaitins engaged on these two fronts needs to be explored in terms of the arguments and the counter-arguments given on both the sides and the course of the controversy mapped as it developed thinker by thinker.

The debate between the Advaitins and the Naiyāyikas, may be said to start with Śaṅkara Mīśra's *Bheda-ratnam*, and the controversy seems to have a long history with the following main participation on both the sides:

Nyāya	Advaita
Śaṅkara Mīśra (1430 AD)	Mallanārāyanācārya (1490 AD)
<i>Bhedratnamā</i>	<i>Abhedaratnamā</i>
	(VS. Śaṅkara Mīśra)
Viśvanatha Pañcānana	Narsimghāśrama (1555 AD)
Bhattachārya (1640)	<i>Bhedadhikkāra</i>
<i>Bhedasiddhī</i>	(vs. Śaṅkara Mīśra)
Rākhāladāsa. <i>Nyāyaratna</i>	Madhusūdana Sarasvatī
(1890 AD)	(1570 AD)
<i>Advaitavāda Khandana</i>	<i>Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa</i>
Pañcānana Bhattachārya	Rāma Subramanyama Śāstri
(1906 AD)	(1927)
<i>Dvaitoptiratnamāla</i>	

The debate between the Advaitins and the non-Advaitic-Vedāntins may be divided into two main branches, (i) between the Advaitins and the followers of Rāmānuja on the one hand and (ii) those of Madhva on the other. The first may be said to start with *Vedāntadeśika*, while the second is generally said to start with Vyāsātīrtha II. The main participants on both sides are the following.⁸

8. The authors mentioned in the above controversies on both the sides are only the most important ones that have come to our notice. There may be many others whose work has escaped our notice. We shall be thankful to all those who may know of any work that has not been mentioned by us and bring it to our notice.

Viśiṣṭādvaita	Advaita
Vedāntadeśika (1330 AD)	Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śāstri (1946 AD)
<i>Śatdūṣaṇī</i>	<i>Śatbhūṣaṇī</i>
K.S. Varadacārya (1959 AD)	(vs. Vedāntadeśika)
<i>Tattvasudhā</i>	
(vs. Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śāstri's	
<i>Śatbhūṣaṇī</i>	
Dvaita	Advaita
Vyāsātīrtha II (1570 AD)	Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (1570 AD)
<i>Nyāyāmṛta</i>	<i>Advaitasiddhī</i> (vs. Vyāsātīrtha II)
Anneya Pandita (1750 AD)	
<i>Vyāsātīrthaparyā Nirṇaya</i>	Kapiṣṭhālam Deśikācārya
	(1911 AD)
Jalīhāla Śrinivāsācārya (1961 AD)	<i>Vyāsasiddhāntamanthan</i>
<i>Nyāyamṛtārṇava</i>	Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śāstri (1946 AD)
(vs. Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śāstri)	<i>Advaitatattvasudhā</i>
<i>Nyāyasudhākantakodhāra</i>	(vs. Jayātīrtha's (1370 AD
(vs. Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śāstri)	<i>Nyāyasudhā</i>)
Satyapramoda Tīrtha (1961 AD)	
<i>Nyāyasudhākantakodhāra</i>	
(vs. Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śāstri)	
Vidyamāyā Tīrtha (1961 AD)	
<i>Advaitatattvasudhāsamīkṣā</i>	
(vs. Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śāstri)	

The work is difficult to undertake and hence may be done in phases without taking sides in the controversy and highlighting only the important arguments by both the sides and focusing attention upon any new arguments that may have occurred as the controversy developed further.

Vol. XVI, No.2

Daya Krishna

Arts in India

The reflection on Arts in India has not been the subject of philosophical attention as it deserves to be. Nor has it been seen in the

context of the change and development that it underwent at the hands of successive thinkers during the long period of its history. Even those who have written on the subject have primarily confined themselves to what has been called the *Alamkāra Śāstra* which has almost exclusively dealt with what has been called *Kāvya* in the tradition. The reflection on the other arts and their relation to what has been called the *Alamkāra Śāstra* has hardly been paid any attention. Nor has the reflection on the individual arts found the place it deserves, as perhaps they themselves lacked conceptual formulation in the texts devoted to them. The *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* is an exception in this regard as it not only deals with each of the arts in their autonomy, but also in their relationship with one another. There is also an awareness of their relation to the larger purposes of man which have been called the *puruṣārthas* in the Indian tradition.

The *Tīrtiyakhaṇḍa* of the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* should be of intensive interest and study to all those who are interested in the thinking about arts in this country. It opens with a declaration about the interdependence of the arts and then discusses literature, music, dance, painting, sculpture and architecture successively in that order.

Vol. XIX, No.1

Daya Krishna

Indian Thinking About Art

Indian thinking about art has generally not found any place in what is usually designated as Indian Philosophy. Even the thinking of the Neo-Naiyāyikas in the *alamkāra śāstra* has remained confined to the students of *alamkāra śāstra* only. The same has been true of the long reflection on the subject of such outstanding thinkers as Abhinavagupta, Rājāsekhara and others. The same seems to be the case with the concepts relating to painting, music, dance or architecture or the conceptual structures built to understand them, or the epistemological and ontological problems they have given rise to. It is time that Indian philosophical thinking breaks this isolation and deals with the concerned philosophical issues in a manner that brings into one focus all these strands together so that each may gain and benefit from the other. The concept of *āhārya jānāna* tries to do

something of this sort, but it remains undeveloped and may perhaps provide a clue to the understanding not just of what man creates but also of human reality which is shaped and constituted by what it imagines and, through 'imagining', brings it into being.

Vol. XX, No. 2

Daya Krishna

Banaras Experiment

Attention is drawn to a unique experiment that was done at Banaras during the second half of the nineteenth century. After the establishment of Sanskrit College there it was felt that one of the best ways of making the classical Indian tradition of philosophy 'alive' once more would be to have a continuous 'living' interaction between Western and Indian philosophical traditions through the translation of the classical texts of each into the languages of the other. Thus, a massive enterprise of the translation of various philosophical texts into English and of some of the major works of the British Empiricists into Sanskrit was undertaken. A *Journal* entitled *Pandit* was launched in whose pages such translation were to be published regularly. In the course of this enterprise the following portions of works from Locke and Berkeley were translated into Sanskrit and published in the Journal.

Locke: Volume X

- (a) pp. 54-59, June, 1877
- (b) pp. 103-109, July, 1877
- (c) pp. 167-176, August, 1877 Volume XI
- (a) pp. 231-257, September, 1877 (b) pp. 359-363, November, 1877.

Berkeley: Volume VII

- (a) pp. 22-23, June, 1875
- (b) pp. 67-69, August, 1875
- (c) pp. 135-137, November, 1875
- (d) pp. 163-165 April, 1876

For some reason the translation of these works stopped, as no other portions from these works are found in the pages of the Journal. It will be

interesting to see the response of modern Sanskrit scholars in the field of Indian Philosophy, who do not know the English language to these translated portions of the well-known works of Locke and Berkeley.

In addition to this the journal contains other interesting articles. The whole set is a rich mine for investigating the intellectual climate of those times and may prove immensely rewarding to anyone who undertakes its study seriously.

Vol. XVII, No.3

Daya Krishna

Concept of Being

The concept of 'being' is perhaps one of the most fundamental concepts which has engaged the attention of philosophers since the very beginning of philosophy and deserves serious in-depth exploration right from the Greeks onwards. Aristotle's distinction between Being-qua-Being and Being-as-Substance and Being-as-Quality deserves notice in this connection. So does the idea of the 'being' of a 'process' or 'activity' or 'motion' which necessarily involve 'time' and 'change' in them. Besides these, 'being' of 'thought', of 'imagination', of 'memory' and of the processes underlying them, that is, 'thinking', 'imagining', 'remembering' needs to be explored, linked and compared with those that obtain in what is usually called the external world.

And, at another level, what one would like to understand is the 'being' of theoretical entities postulated for understanding 'reality', 'entities' that are proliferating continuously in all realms of science these days.

Vol. XVIII, No.2

Daya Krishna

Idea as God

The idea of God has been central to most of the western philosophical thinkers at least since Aristotle who talked of him as the 'unmoved mover'. In fact, the idea became so central that almost all of western philosophy after the coming of Christianity began to be known as Theology. Even in the modern period which is supposed to start with Descartes the concern with God has always assumed a central place till almost the beginning of

the 20th century. Descartes had to find a way out of the 'closed circle' of the Cogito and this he did through the idea of God whose reality he established through his famous ontological argument which simultaneously ensured the reality of the world. In Spinoza 'substance' takes the place of god and, by definition, becomes the source of everything mental or physical, which follows from it with a 'necessity' as necessary as that of the theorems that follow from the axioms. For Leibnitz, God is the only reality as he is not only the 'monad of monads', but one which is 'pure activity' and which has the clearest representation of them all. In Kant, 'God' is necessary as he alone can ensure the relation between morality and happiness demanded by the moral consciousness of man. As for the British philosophers, both Locke and Berkeley are well-known for the centrality of God in their system. It is only Hume who is a sceptic, but then he is supposed to be sceptical about everything else. As for post-Kantian thinkers, they substituted the term 'Absolute' for God, but it plays the same role as the latter. But something happens when Nietzsche who died in 1900 proclaimed that 'God was dead'.

The real absence of God from philosophy seems to have started from the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. None of the great thinkers seems to be concerned with it. What exactly has happened to the philosophical enterprise of the west needs to be explored in this context. How could such a long tradition with a history of more than 2000 years suddenly cease from the consciousness of thinkers deserves investigation. The theologians, both Protestant and Catholic are, of course, still around, as everybody knows. But they hardly have any 'presence' in the philosophical consciousness of the times.

Vol. XIX, No.1

Daya Krishna

Kant and Categories

Kant's discussion of the categories and their relation to the table of judgement needs to be closely looked at once again as such a study will reveal unbelievable gaps or even downright mistakes in our understanding of the nature of categories in Kant's system.

Attention is specially drawn to the category of 'limitation' which is a correlate of the 'infinite' judgement under the heading of *Quality* and the category of 'reciprocity' which is a correlate of the disjunctive judgement in Kant.

The whole discussion from page 104 to page 119 in Norman Kemp Smith's translation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, should be seen in this connection.

XVIII, No.3

Daya Krishna

Categories

The doctrine of categories seems central to western philosophical thought and deserves to be studied in detail from Plato onwards. The relation between the categories of Plato as given in the 'SOPHIST' and those of Aristotle as given both in *Categoriae* and *Metaphysics*, and of subsequent thinkers such as Kant and, later, Ryle and others in modern times, needs thorough-going study.

Vol. XVIII, No.4

Daya Krishna

Human Knowledge

The well-known works of British empiricists are all entitled in such a way as to restrict their analysis to what they called 'human knowledge'. Locke's famous work is entitled *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, while Berkeley calls his work *Principles of Human Knowledge*. As for Hume, the title of his two major works are *A Treatise on Human Nature* and *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

What exactly does the term 'human' mean in these expressions? Does it imply that there is such a thing as 'non-human' or 'trans-human' knowledge? In case knowledge is supposed to occur at animal level, then it shall have to be understood as 'sub-human' knowledge. And, if it may occur at the level of beings superior to human beings, if there are any, it will have to be regarded as 'super-human knowledge'.

Kant, as is well-known, confined 'human' knowledge to that realm alone where the senses provided the 'material' and the intellect provided

the category or the formal structure for the understanding which shapes that material and gives it a form which makes it human. Was Kant then merely extricating what was involved in the term 'human' when used in the context of human knowledge? Did Kant then imply that the sensory knowledge possessed by animals was 'sub-human' or 'non-human' because it lacked structuralization in terms of the formal categories of understanding which human beings alone possess. But then what was that which unified the disparate multiple sensations at the animal level? In other words, what was the transcendental unity of apperception at the animal level and how were the transcendental forms of sensibility operating there?

Kant also accepted the *possibility* of pure 'intellectual intuition', but denied its actuality at the human level. Would trans-human knowledge then be the knowledge that did not require the sensory material which was necessary at both human and the animal level. But, if so, how would it be validated or its validity ascertained?

These are some of the issues which require detailed investigation and reflection. For if human knowledge is to be necessarily 'human' and it cannot be otherwise, then how can its structural limitation ever be avoided? And, in case it is so, how can 'essentialism' deriving from this source be ever avoided?

Vol. XVII, No.1

Daya Krishna

Hegel : sublation

Hegel, in his *Science of Logic*, uses the term 'sublation' which, as far as we know, was never used in philosophical thinking in the Western tradition before, or even after, his work. The term is well known in the Advaitic thought in the Indian tradition. And, it would be interesting to find whether Hegel got the term from any of the Indian works available to him at that time.

Hegel's use of the term, of course, is different from the one usually associated with the term in the Advaitic tradition as, for him, what is 'sublated' had already been negated and thus *preserved*, though in a

subterranean manner. It does not become a pure 'non-being', but rather, through negation or suppression it *affects* that which replaces it.

Perhaps, one may get a new insight into the notion of 'sublation' in the Advaitic thinking from the way Hegel understood it, or even into the way the non-Advaitic Vedāntins understood it, leading to the important differences between them.

The following excerpt from *Science of Logic* may help the reader in this connection.

Sublation of Becoming

The resultant equilibrium of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be is, in the first place, *becoming* itself. But this equally settles into a stable unity. Being and nothing are, in this unity, only in the form of vanishing moments; yet becoming as such *is* only through their distinguishedness. Their vanishing, therefore, is the vanishing of becoming or the vanishing of the vanishing itself. Becoming is an unstable unrest which settles into a stable result.

This could also be expressed thus: becoming is the vanishing of being in nothing and nothing in being and the vanishing of being and nothing generally; but at the same time it rests on the distinction between them. It is, therefore, inherently self-contradictory, because the determinations it unites within itself are opposed to each other; but such a union destroys itself.

This results in the vanishedness of becoming, but it is not *nothing*, as such it would only be a relapse into one of the already sublated determinations, not the resultant of *nothing and being*. It is the unity of being and nothing which has settled into a stable oneness. But this stable oneness is being, yet no longer as a determination on its own but as a determination of the whole.

Becoming, as this transition into the unity of being and nothing, a unity which is in the form of being or has the form of the one-sided *immediate* unity of these moments, is *determinate being*.

Remark: The Expression 'To Sublate'

To *sublate* and *sublated* (that which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially, distinguished from *nothing*. What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing. Nothing is *immediate*; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of *mediation*, it is a non-being but as a *result* which had its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in *itself* the *determinateness* from which it originates.

'To *sublate*' has twofold meaning in the language; on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus, what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not, on that account, annihilated. The two definitions of 'to sublate' which we have given can be quoted as two dictionary *meanings* of this word. But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one and the same word for two opposite meanings. It is a delight to speculative thought to find in the language words which have in themselves a speculative meaning—the German language has a number of such examples. The double meaning of the Latin *tollere* (which has become famous through the Ciceronian pun; *tollendum est Octavium*) does not go far; its affirmative determination signifies only a lifting up. Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this more particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a *moment*. In the case of the lever, weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments on account of the sameness of their effect, in spite of the contrast otherwise between something real, such as a weight, and something ideal, such as a mere

spatial determination, a line.⁹ We shall often have occasion to notice that the technical language of philosophy employs Latin terms for reflected termination, either because the mother tongue has no words for them or if it has, as here, because its expression calls to mind more what is immediate, whereas the foreign language suggests more what is reflected.

The more precise meaning and expression which being and nothing receive—now that they are *moments*—is to be ascertained from the consideration of determinate being as the unity in which they are preserved. Being is being, and nothing is nothing, only in their contradistinction from each other; but in their truth, in their unity, they have vanished as these determinations and are now something else. Being and nothing are the same; *but just because they are the same they are no longer being and nothing*, but now have a different significance. In becoming they were coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be; in determinate being, a differently determined unity, they are again differently determined moments. This unity now remains their base from which they do not again emerge in the abstract significance of being and nothing.¹⁰

Vol. XXI, No. 1

Daya Krishna

Hegel: Phenomenology

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a well-known work but not his *Science of Logic*, even though both concern the same theme and develop the same idea. Like the former, the later also develops dialectically from a discussion of the development of the categories of *Being*, 'Essence', and *Notion*. Yet, there seems to be a substantive difference between Hegel's treatment in the *Phenomenology* and the one that obtains in the *Science of Logic*.

A comparative study of the two will not only reveal the development in Hegel's thought, but also the differences in his treatment of the issues with which Kant was concerned in the three *Critiques* that he wrote.

9. See Encyclopaedia re edition, Section 261, Remark.

10. Hegel's *Science of Logic*, Translated by A.V. Miller, Humanity Books, New York, 1999, pp. 106-108.

A comparison with Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* would be equally rewarding as both develop a phenomenological dialectic starting from a radically opposed beginning. Hegel starts with '*Being*' while Fichte begins with the fact of 'self consciousness' or, as he puts it, 'I am'. Hegel, in fact, asks at the very beginning, 'With what must then science begin?' and answers that it should begin with the most general and universal category underlying anything and everything that can be said or thought of. Fichte, on the other hand, starts with the fact of consciousness, but not with Descartes' '*I think*', but '*I am*' as 'thought' has to be thought of something while 'I am' is just 'self-consciousness' having no 'object', not even itself as it has no 'predicates' predicated of itself.

Vol. XXI, No. 1

Daya Krishna

Concept

Many of the concepts talked about, discussed and used in philosophy function at a level of abstraction which not only take them out of all their varied contexts by treating them primarily as concepts rather than as 'this' or 'that' concept but also treat them in total isolation from one another. This is one reason why philosophers encounter the same problem, no matter what they are trying to discuss. In case this is realized, philosophical discussion might take a clearer shape as then one would realize that one is not discussing the specific concept but rather the problem arising from the conceptual nature of the concept itself.

But as there are problems relating to the specificity of the concept which need to be discussed and debated, it would be fruitful to be aware of this and take discussions at this level in a different direction. Here the applicability of the concept becomes a crucial factor as many disciplines dealing with a 'subject-matter' relating to these disciplines organize themselves around a cluster of concepts the way they are actually used therein and this may provide a substantial clue to find what these concepts really stand for and the way they are related to other concepts and the manner in which they function in the organization of knowledge in that field.

There is, however, a history of the knowledge enterprise in different fields and the application of concepts along with their interrelation and interaction with other concepts over a period of time, thus indicating something which is ignored in most discussion of these concepts by theoreticians and philosophers alike.

It would, therefore, be an interesting undertaking to choose a few concepts and study their application in a particular field of knowledge and the interrelationship with other concepts in that field of study as a process occurring over a period of historical time. In case the reasons for the change are investigated it would give us some idea about the 'necessities' determining our understanding of the problem and the influences which bring about change in that understanding.

Vol. XIX, No.4

Daya Krishna

Law

The demand for 'practicality' and 'usefulness' is there everywhere these days and so in order to be accepted one has to have an 'applied' dimension to philosophy and thus 'prove' that is as 'relevant' and 'useful' as other fields of knowledge which generally do not have to 'prove' their usefulness in the contemporary context.

One of the promising areas in this regard would be to study the interaction between the theoretical study of ethics in general and values in particular and 'actual' legal enactment and practices on the other.

Law is as 'applied' as anything can be, and the changes in it can be 'seen' as reflecting the value-apprehensions of a particular society in time. The same could be attempted in respect of written constitutions which have 'constituted' politics and a comparative study in this regard of the presuppositions involved in the constitutions could be revealing about the thinkers of those societies which have constituted their polity according to them.

The amendments in the constitutions over time and the discussion and debate regarding them in the legislatures and at the apex court could provide rich material in this regard.

Vol. XX, No.3

Daya Krishna

Actions of Groups

Questions of morality are generally discussed in respect of actions of an individual, and not of groups or institutions or political entities such as nation-states. There is, of course, some sort of a value judgement on the actions of groups and institutions and an attempt to regulate their behavior as they function within the jurisdiction of a polity which has control over them. The relation between politics, however, is not usually governed in such a way as they are supposed to be sovereign in character.

The emerging political reality at the global level, however, has already brought into being a multitude of supra-national legal orders which yet are not enforceable because of the fact that nation-states treat themselves, and are treated by others, as 'sovereign' in character.

The problem of moral values and norms that should govern this relationship between a plurality of equally sovereign and independent states deserves exploration, particularly in the light of the global situation emerging today.

Vol. XVIII, No.1

Daya Krishna

Ethics and Armament

Agenda for research even in the field of philosophy are being increasingly set by international agencies which look at the world from primarily the western point of view though they speak in the name of the whole of humanity. One such example is the plea for research on 'Development ethics' by the International Development Ethics Association and its possible adoption at the World Philosophers' Conference at Boston, USA, for being included in the philosophical curricula of all the developing countries. I think it is time that the philosophers of the non-western world present a counter-agenda for study and research of ethical issues relating to the developed countries. The following are suggested as possible areas which may be investigated by concerned philosophers in both the 'developing' and the 'developed' countries:

(a) The ethics of nuclear monopoly or nuclear oligopoly versus the ethics of nuclear proliferation.

(b) The ethics of armament manufacture and their sale by the 'developed' countries of the world to the developing and under developed countries.

(c) The ethical basis of the terms of trade between the 'developed' and 'non-developed' world.

These are only given as examples and the readers of the *JICPR* are invited to suggest others which would focus attention upon the ethical issues resulting from a basic asymmetry in power relations between the developed and non-developed world in the contemporary global situation.

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Daya Krishna

Index of the Journals

The Indian Council of Philosophical Research has published a subject and author index of the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, *The Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy*, *The Philosophical Annual* and the *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*.

These give relevant information about what has been written on various philosophical topics during the last thirty or forty years and thus provide a rich area for research in what has been thought in these various fields by Indian thinkers for scholars/ students in this country.

Vol. XV, No.1

Daya Krishna

2

Queries with Answers

Meaning of Vedic Samhitā

What does the term 'Samhitā', mean in the context of the 'Veda' such as the Ṛgveda Samhitā, the Yajurveda Samhitā or the Sāmaveda Samhitā? Does it mean the *Samhitā pāṭha*, as has been suggested by some, or something else?

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Daya Krishna

Reply 1

The word Samhitā, is applied to the collection of Sūktās like *Rksamhitā* (*Ṛgveda*) etc. on one hand and euphonic combination of uttered sounds in the grammatical tradition on the other. Possibly the initial *pravṛttinimitta* (original application of the word to a particular meaning) was only one and that was 'euphonic combination of uttered sounds'. It probably was synonymous to *Samhanana/Samghāta* etc. (used by Yāska). One of the definitions reads as *varṇānām eka-prāḍna-yogaḥ samhitā*, which means morphophonemic combinations of sounds. In the Vedic context, Samhitā is applied to the collection (*Samāhṛta*—used by Yāska) of *Mantrās/Sūktās* on account of the oral tradition of Vedic learning like *Samhitā-pāṭha* (combined and continued utterance of sound; and in this sense Pāṇini's rule—P.1.4.109: *paraḥ sannikarṣaḥ samhitā* becomes justifiable) and *pada-pāṭha* etc. The standard principles of *samhitā* (euphonic combination) are given in the following *kārikā*: '*Samhitāikapade nityā nityā dhātūpasargayoḥ/Nityā samāse vākye tu sā vivakṣām apekṣate*'.

It means the euphonic combination is *regular* in (i) a single-word-formation (*ekapada*), (ii) between the combination of prefixes and verbal-roots (*dhātu* and *upasarga*), and (iii) in compound formation; however it is left to the choice of the speaker in sentence formation. The other definition of *Samhitā* (that stands for 'a sentence') namely '*pada-prakṛtiḥ Samhitā*' (*Rk-Prātisākhya* 2) has been explained in two ways. Naiyāyikas (*padavādins*) explain it with *bahuvrīhi-samāsa* taking it in the sense that the words are the base of 'a sentence'; whereas the grammarians (*Vākyavādins*) take it to be *Tatpuruṣa* taking it to mean that the sentence is the base of *pada*. In the latter sense Bhartṛhari's *apoddhāra-pakṣa* becomes justifiable. Any way, we have to accept the application of the word *samhitā* in both the senses.

Vol. XX, No.2

Achutananda Dash

Reply 2

Traditionally, there was only one Veda, i.e. the body of eternal knowledge calculated to conduce to the welfare here and hereafter for the human beings, and it was revealed by Lord Brahmā and handed down since ages through a continuous series of teachers and students. Having noticed that the intellectual and spiritual faculties of the successive generations of the Vedic reciters, by about the end of *Dvāpara Age*, after the end of the *Mahābhārata* war, were degenerating thousands years ago, Bhagavān Veda Vyāsa edited the Vedas and classified the hymns into four *Samhitās*, called the *Rgveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda* and the *Atharvaveda*, and handed them down each to his four disciples, wherefrom the traditions of the four Vedic *Samhitās* commenced.

Due to the location and residence of the line of disciples of these traditions of the Vedic reciters, each of the *Samhitās* branched off into different recensions, called the *Śākhās*. Thus, during the times of Patañjali, the great commentator of the Paninian grammar (about 350 BC), there were 11 *śākhās* of the *Rgveda*, 100 *Śākhās* of the *Yajurveda*, 1000 *Śākhās* of the *Sāmaveda*, and 9 *Śākhās* of the *Atharvaveda*. The *śākhā* was generated due to the regional proclivities of the pronunciation of different reciters in different parts of our country.

Queries with Answers

Now as per the traditional information, the five recently known *Śākhās* of the *Rgveda* were the *Śākala*, the *Bāṣkala*, the *Āśvalāyana*, the *Śāṅkhāyana*, and the *Māndūkyā*. The *Yajurveda* was handed down in two main recensions, viz., *Sukla* and *Kṛṣṇa*; the *Śākhās* of the former were the *Vājasaneyī Mādhyandina* and the *Kāṇva*, while those of the latter were the *Kāthaka*, the *Maitrāyaṇi*, and the *Taittirīya*. The three *Śākhās* of the *Sāmaveda* were the *Kauthumā*, the *Jaiminīya*, and the *Rāṇāyaṇīya*. Further, the two *Śākhās* of the *Atharvaveda* were the *Śaunaka* and the *Paippalāda*.

However, at present, only the following *Śākhās* of the respective Vedas are extant: *Śākala* of the *Rgveda*, the *Mādhyandina* of the *Yajurveda*, the *Kauthumā* of the *Sāmaveda*, and the *Śaunaka* of the *Atharvaveda*. And, the answer to your query is that these *Śākhās* of the respective *Samhitās* are known currently by the names of their respective Vedas.

Thus, at present, there are only a very few Vedicists who recite the respective Veda orally, and even rarer are the ones who can perform the Vedic sacrifices!

Vol. XXI, No. 2

M. Kansara

Reply to the Queries raised by Professor Daya Krishna

Q1. Whether we have any *samhitā* text independent of *śākhās*. And, in case there is none, what are the differences between them?

R. Though any *Samhitā* is not found without a *śākhā*, the former is the original and the latter an adaptation of the former brought in application by a *Śākhā*. *Śākhā* is the traditional recension of the Veda, a traditional text followed by a school and *samhitā* is a continuous hymnical text of the Veda with the phonetic changes incurred by the uses of different *śākhās* or schools. The changes incurred in the application of a *mantra* by different *śākhās* are due to the time, space, situation and other contexts in which the *samhitā* is adopted in use for an act. We do not find a *samhitā* independently of a *śākhā* because the former came in application only through the latter.

Q.2 What exactly do using the term *Rgveda*, etc., mean, without mentioning the *śākhā* to which the text belongs?

R. The use of the term *Rgveda*, etc., without mention of a *Śākhā* is to refer to the original *samhita*, i.e. the commandments and injunctions of which all *śākhās* are in accord. No *śākhā* differs on this duty. They may differ on the application of the *samhitā* for some or the other duty. There may be cases of differing, even conflicting, injunctions (*vidhi*) prescribed for the same sacrifice in different *śākhās*. In that case, Mīmāṃsā and Vaiyākaraṇas have given certain specific and general laws to understand which part is injunction and which part is *arthavāda*, that is, added by that particular *śākhās*. There is no conflict in an injunction as such in any of the *śākhās*. Different *śākhās* apply the same injunction for different duties in a sacrifice. The same injunction in some *śākhās* is applied for some duty in a sacrifice and for some other duty in another *śākhās* that may appear conflicting if the use context of the injunction is overlooked, Mīmāṃsā and Vaiyākaraṇa accept that any of the two conflicting uses adopted as option (*vikalpa*):

Q.3. The name of the sacrifice cannot be mentioned independently of *śākhā* texts and hence the sacrifice as mentioned in different *śākhā* has to be treated as different from one another.

R. Here in, I want to furnish an account of Bhṛtṛhari's discussion on the issue and I hope that this account will be of some importance in meeting with your queries. *Śabdabhedavāda*, in connection with the Vedas, is accepted. The same *mantras* with the difference of their application to duty or duties, are taken to be different (Vp 2/263).

The difference in the *mantra* is also accepted in cases of a single *mantra* if it is employed for different duties. Let us discuss this further.

(i) *Śabdaekatvavāda*

This theory accepts the unity or non-difference of the word in spite of its different uses for different meanings. The word is not changed even if it is used to convey numerous meanings. The unity of the word is original or primary and its separateness resulting from different uses is

artificial or unreal. For example, the word 'cow', the expresser of cowness, does not differ from the word 'cow' when used for a cowherd (*Gaurabāhika*). The cowness by some similarity is imposed on cowherd and thus the word 'cow' secondarily denotes it.

(ii) *Śabda Nānātvavāda*

In this theory, the word is different if it is used for different meanings. Unlike the former view, any change of the word used for different meanings, in this view, is original, and the oneness or sameness is imaginary or unreal. As no verbal cognition or communication is possible without the identical cognition revealed by a word, *nānātvavādin*s also give place to unity of word used for different meanings, but, for them, unity is merely imagined and, hence, unreal. For example, the word 'cow' used for cowness (meaning) is different from the word 'cow' used for 'cowherd'. As these words are same and alike, they are taken as the same by resemblance.

(i) *Vaiyākaraṇas view*

Vaiyākaraṇas attach importance to both of the above views to explain the meaning of a word acquired by grammatical analysis of an expression. *Vārttikāra Kātyāyana* has written the *Vārtika ekatvādakarasya siddham* in favour of unity of a word if it is used for different meanings on one hand and the *Vārttika Anyabhābyam tu kāla Śabdavyasvāyāt* in support of plurality of word on the other hand. In order to illustrate the significance of theories of *śabdaekatvavāda* and *śabda nānātvavāda*, respectively, in the interpretation of Vedic injunctions, Bhṛtṛhari has given an instance of *Sāmīdheni hymns* which, in some *śākhās*, are thirteen (13) and in some other *śākhās* they are eleven (11) of which the first and last verses (*rchāyen*) are recited repeatedly three times, because of which, they are numbered seventeen or fifteen in total in respective *śākhās*. It may be asked, if the same hymn, in its repeated recitations, is taken to be different, can the repeated hymn be accepted as an original (Vedic) hymn? These hymns are called *Sāmīdheni*. Repeated hymns are considered

original; they function independently of other *Sāmidhenis* involved in *Sāmidheni* sacrifices (V.2/260).

Clarifying the position of *nānāvavādins*, Bhartṛhari says that the meaning of a hymn is its recitation and in each recitation hymn is a different word, revealing a different meaning. For example, the hymns of the deity sun (Savitā) apparently appear to be one but originally they are different, i.e. one is employed for sanctification, another for praying to the deity 'Sun' and still another is employed for *Jāpa* (muttering in a contemplating manner). As the hymns are similar and alike, the unity among them is obvious, but the hymn is a different expresser (*Vācaka*) if used for a different expressed (*Vācya*). Because of the popular and unpopular uses of the hymn, its primary and secondary meanings are distinguished.

Vol XXI, No.2

D.N.Tiwari

Some issues relating to *Rgveda****

1. What exactly is the status of *sūkta* in the *Rgveda*? *Mantras* are always collected and organized in the form of a *sūkta* and one *sūkta* is distinguished from the other? Thus, it is *not* the *mantra* which is central to the *Rgveda* as is generally supposed, but the *sūkta*. Which, then, is the unit of forming the collections *mantra* or the *sūkta*?

+ What is the relation between the *mantras* in a *sūkta*? Does the *sūkta* have a unity of its own, or it is just a collection of the *Mantras*, having little relation to one another?

2. What is the relation between the successive *sūkta* in a *maṇḍala*? Is the relation haphazard, accidental or has it some 'inner' meaning resulting from the sequential development of the *sūktas* themselves?

3. What is the relation between *maṇḍalas* which collectively form the *Rgveda*? In other words, does the *Rgveda* have a unity of *maṇḍalas* or *Ekvākyatā*, to use the Indian term in this regard?

4. What is the exact relation between the *chanda* or meter and the *mantra*? Does a *mantra* have a *chanda* of its own and, if it does so, what exactly is the meaning of the sequences of *mantras* in a *sūkta*, particularly

when the *mantras* in a *sūkta* have a different *chanda*. Ascription of a *chanda* to a sequence of *mantra* would, then, be meaningless and, if so, what exactly would be meant by a *chanda* of the whole sequence?

5. What exactly is meant by the term *devatā* in the *Rgveda* and how is it known that the *mantra* is related to one particular *devatā* and not to another?

The problem becomes obvious when in a *sūkta mantras* are addressed to different *devatās* and thus the sequence of *mantra* does not form a 'unity' given to them by the fact that they are addressed to the same *devatā*.

+ What exactly is meant by the term *devatā* and *ṛṣi* in the *Rigveda*?

6. How is it known that the *mantra* or the sequence of *mantras* is related to the *ṛṣi* who is supposed to be the *dr̥ṣṭā*? The problem becomes obvious in the case of those *sūktas* where different *ṛṣis* are supposed to be responsible for different *mantras* addressed to the same or different *devatās*. In fact the problem becomes even more insistent in the case of those *mantras* or *sūktas* where there is either no attribution to a *ṛṣi* or the attribution is ambiguous. If it cannot be determined who is the *ṛṣi* to whom the *sūkta* or *mantra* is to be attributed, then how is it known or determined that this particular *ṛṣi* is one to whom the *mantra* or the *sūkta* has to be unambiguously attributed. The problem may be seen to be even more complicated in the case where a large number of *ṛṣis* whose individual proper name and 'family' or 'clan' or 'school' name remains the same. There are, for example, too many *ṛṣis* having the same surname as Kāṇva, Āngirasa, Ātreya, Viśvāmitra in the text. It is imperative, therefore, to find the basis on which this distinction is made. If there is something in the *mantra* that proclaims its authorship then it would be something like a 'signature' in the text itself. But, then, why the ambiguity and why are alternative attributions being made?

+ How is it determined as to who is the *ṛṣi* and who the *devatā* of a *mantra* in the *Rgveda*?

Vol. XXI, No.3

Daya Krishna

+ In the volume XXI no.3 also a separate set of seven queries related with the *vedic saṃhita* are given by Daya Krishna in which the last four queries that is no.

4-7 are placed under chapter four: Queries Awaiting Answer while first three queries are given above with a mark + Where query no. 1 placed with query 5; Query no. 2 placed with no. 6 and query no. 3 is placed with query no.1 with mark+.

Reply *** (to Professor Daya Krishna's query published in the *JICPR*, Volume XXI, Number 3)

Traditionally, there was only one Veda *i.e.* the body of eternal knowledge calculated to conduce to the welfare here and hereafter for the human beings. This was revealed by Lord Brahma and handed down since ages through a continuous series of teachers and students. Having noticed that the intellectual and spiritual faculties of the successive generations of the Vedic reciters by about the end of *Dvāpara* Age, after the end of the *Mahābhārata* War, were degenerating thousand years ago, Bhagavan Veda Vyāsa edited the Veda and classified the hymns into four *Samhitās*, called the *Rgveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda* and the *Atharvaveda*, and handed them down each to his four disciples, wherefrom the traditions of the four Vedic *Samhitās* commenced.

Due to the location and residence of the line of disciples of these traditions of the Vedic reciters, each of the *Samhitā* branched off into different recensions, called the *Śākhās*. Thus, during the times of Patañjali, the great commentator of the Paṇinian Grammar (about 350 BC), there were 11 *Śākhās* of the *Rgveda*, 100 *Śākhās* of the *Yajurveda*, 1000 *Śākhās* of the *Sāmaveda*, and 9 *Śākhās* of the *Atharvaveda*. The *Śākhās* were generated due to the regional proclivities of the pronunciation of different reciters of different parts of our country.

Now, as per the traditional information, the five recent known *Śākhās* of the *Rgveda* were the *Śākala*, the *Bāṣkala*, the *Āśvalāyana*, the *Śāṅkhāyana*, and the *Māṇḍūkya*. The *Yajurveda* was handed down in two main recensions, *viz.* *Śukla* and *Kṛṣṇa*; the *Śākhās* of the former were the *Vājasaneyi Madhyandina* and the *Kāpva*, while those of the latter were the *Kāthaka*, the *Maitrāyaṇī*, and the *Taitirīya*. The three *Śākhās* of the *Sāmaveda* were the *Kauthumī*, the *Jaiminīya*, and the *Rāṇāyaṇīya*. And, the two *Śākhās* of the *Atharvaveda* were the *Saunaka* and the *Paippalada*.

'However, at present only the following *Śākhās* of the respective Vedas are extant: *Śākala* of the *Rgveda*, the *Mādhyandina* of the *Yajurveda*, the *Kauthumī* of the *Sāmaveda*, and the *Saunaka* of the *Atharvaveda*. And, the answer to your query is that these *Śākhās* of the respective *Samhitās* are known currently by the names of their respective Vedas.'

Furthermore, at present, there are only a very few Vedicists who recite the respective Veda orally, and even rarer are those who can perform the Vedic sacrifices!

Mantra

A *mantra* is an utterance of a Vedic seer supposed to have been heard by him in his state of trance, and protects him when he meditates on it (*Mananāt trāyate iti mantraḥ*). All the verses comprising the Vedas are called *mantras*, because they are believed to be the holy spiritual utterances, and are effective at both the material and astral levels. From the poetical or literary point of view a *mantra* is like a stanza. But, a *mantra* may be in prose or verse, while a stanza is invariably in verse, while in prose it would be called a paragraph. *Mantra* is, thus, the primary, basic and central unit in the Veda.

Sūkta

A *Sūkta* is defined as a group of the *Mantras* propounding some particular matter pertaining to the same *Devatā* (*Viśiṣṭaikārtha-pratipādake eka-devatyai veda-mantra-samudāye ca*). The word *sūkta* literally means well (*su*) said (*ukta*), and signifies an utterance of some good thought. Thus, the *Rgvedic sūktas* are generally devoted to the praise of a prayer of particular deity, *viz.*, Agni, Indra, Varuṇa, Aśvinas, and others, or all of them in a single *sūkta*. It is equivalent to a sort of a poem comprising one or more stanzas.

Maṇḍala and Aṣṭaka in the Rgveda

The *Rgveda* is divided into ten *Maṇḍalas* containing 1028 (=1017+11) *sūktas* (191+43+62+58+87+75+104+92+114+191 (+ 11 *Vālakhilyas*), each *Maṇḍala* is further subdivided into *Anuvākas*, each containing several

Sūktas and each *Sūkta* contains one or more *Mantras*. Of these the *Maṇḍalas*, the First and the Tenth contain the collection of the *sūktas* of several seers addressed to several deities, while the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth are called the family books (*vaṃṣa-maṇḍala*) and contain the several such *sūktas* seen, i.e. authored by a particular seer and his sons, viz., Grtsamada, Viśvāmitra, Vāmadeva, Atri, Bharadvāja, Vasiṣṭha, Kaṇva/Aṅgiras, while the Ninth is a collection of the *Sūktas* of several seers devoted to Soma, the deified form of the creeper from which the intoxicating juice was extracted for the holy drink during the sacrifice. This division of the *Rgveda* into *Maṇḍalas* was effected by Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, alias Veda Vyāsa (about 3,500 BC), the traditionally celebrated author of the *Mahabhārata* and the *Purāṇas*. There is no special logic for this division into *Maṇḍalas*, except its being a very ancient tradition.

For the convenience of recitation aloud, and to that effect as an aid to the Vedic disciple committing the entire *Rgveda*, containing all the 1028 *Sūktas*, to memory, the *Mantras*, irrespective of the *Sūktas*, is divided into eight parts, each of which is called an *Aṣṭaka*, each of which contains eight *Adhyāyas*. Thus, the entire *Rgveda* is divided into 64 *Adhyāyas*, each containing several *Vargas*, i.e. groups of *Mantras*, although generally a *Varga* contains five to nine *Mantras*.

2

There is a definite relation between the successive *sūktas*, in so far as the hymns of the same seer are put together in the family books. It is surely neither haphazard nor accidental.

3

The arrangement of the hymns (*sūktas*) in the family books of the *Rgveda* is systematic in so far as the hymns in them authored by various seers follow definitely the same fixed order of the seers of the family book, perhaps chronological, of the seers who have visualized the hymns, rather than the deities to whom the hymns are addressed, such as Indra, Bṛhaspati, Ādityāh, Varuṇa, Viśvedevāh, Dyāvapṛthivī, Rudra, Marut,

Apāmnāpāt, and others. On this point we can say that there is a collective unity (*eka-vākyatā*) among the family books, as also among the hymns contained in the *Maṇḍalas*.

4

Meter (*chandas*) is based on the numbers and the types of the syllables contained in a particular verse. For instance, the *Triṣṭubh* meter has three quarters comprising eight syllables each; *Anuṣṭubh* meter contains four quarters of eight syllables each. The *mantra* is the body of the person and the meter is, so to say, the dress in which he presents himself. Generally, the *mantras* in the same hymns are in the same meter, but occasionally they may be in more than one meter, as for instance in RV.VI.75. One and the same idea could be presented in verses composed in different meters, just in the same way as one and the same song can be sung in different octaves and different musical sequences or melodies. A *mantra*, being in the form of a verse, is expressed in some meter of other, since it has to be invariably metrical. Ascription of a *chanda* to a *mantra* is meaningful in view of its comprising a particular number of syllables in a particular sequence.

5

The term *devatā* is defined as the deity to whom the hymn or the verse that is addressed (*yā tenocyate sā devatā*). They are clearly natural powers like the Sun (*sūrya*), Fire (*agnī*), Wind (*vāyu*), or the brave persons or powerful kings like Indra, or the moral concepts like Mitra, Varuṇa, or highly helpful physicians like Aśvinas, or the rivers like Gaṅgā, Śutudrī, Paruṣṇī, and others, or even the forest (*aranya*), of course personified. It is similar to our conception of God who is omnipresent, omniscient, luminescent, all pervading, and as yet personified as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, and others personified in human form. Different *mantras* of the same hymn may have different deities to whom they are addressed. One can know from the name of the deity mentioned in that *mantra* as belonging to it.

In spite of the different deities addressed to in different *mantras* of the same *sūkta*, the 'unity' comprises in their being the prayer to, or eulogy of

them, for in the whole of the *R̥gveda* the central theme is the prayer to god (*devatā-stuti*). So there is really no problem at all. None of the Veda-pundits have so far faced such a problem pertaining to sequential unity in the Vedas.

6

The sequence of the *mantras*, as related to a particular seer (*ṛṣi*) is known from the printed text as edited by Pt. Shripad Damodar Satavalekar, Svadhyay-mandal, Pardi, and (Dist. Surat, South Gujarat), wherein the details regarding the seer and the meters of every hymn have been printed in black and white. Even in the case of a hymn containing the *mantras* of different seers and addressed to different deities and composed in different meters, the details are given at the outset before the hymn proper starts. So there is no problem at all. Without a seer there is nobody to visualize the *mantra*. As to the problem about the large number of seers (*ṛṣis*) whose individual proper name and 'family' or 'clan' remains the same, as for instance, Kaṇva, Viśvāmitra, Vasiṣṭha, one can know that they belong to a particular seer mythical or historical, and the names Kāṇva, Vaiśvāmitri, Vāsiṣṭhī, belong to their disciples, sons, or grandsons, about whom one can have some information from the well-known work titled '*Bhārata-varṣiya Prācīna Caritra-Kośa*' by M.M. Siddheshwar Shastri Chitrav, published by Bharatya Charittrakish Mandal, Pune-4 (1964, reprinted). There is nothing like 'signature', as *bāī mirām kahe or narasaiyo bhane* in the devotional songs popular in Gujarat and elsewhere.

Vol. XXII, No. 2

N.M. Kansara

Brahman : A statement on *Atreya Brāhman*

Dr Mukund Lath has drawn our attention to the following extract from the *Aitreyā Brāhmana* (original Sanskrit text and its English translation) which may prove of interest to our readers as it reflects ambivalence and the conflict involved in the "ritual killing" of animals in the Vedic sacrifice. The long debate on the *himśā* involved in the Vedic sacrifice in the Indian tradition may be seen as having its roots in the

Brāhmana text itself, particularly as it was in conflict with the Vedic injunction which unconditionally asked for its avoidance.

*paśurvai niyamānaḥ sa mṛtyum prāpaśyat sa
devānnānavakāmayata aitum, tam' devā abruvannehi
svargam vai tvā lokam gamiśyāma iti, sa
tathetyabravittasya vai me yuśmākamekaḥ
purastādaitviti, tatheti tasyāgniḥ
purastādaitso'gnimanupracyavat iti...anvnam'
mātā manyatāmanu pitā'nu bhrātā sagarbhyo'nu sakhā
sayūthya iti, janitraivenam'
tatsamanumatamālabhante iti.*

(*Aitareya Brāhmana*, 6th *khaṇḍa* of the 6th *adhyaīya*,
pp. 163-4, part 1 of the Anandashram edition)

As it was being led, the (sacrifice) the animal saw death around it. He did not want to go to the gods. The gods asked him to come to them (saying), 'come we will lead you to heaven.' The animal agreed, saying, 'let one of you walk before me.' Agni walked before it and it followed Agni...Let its mother (allow the animal to go); let its father and its brother, born of the same mother (allow him), let its friend, who is from the same herd, (allow him). It is to be taken with the permission of those related to it by birth.

In another context, another passage from the same *Brāhmana* makes a point, which is perhaps even more radical. *Yajñā*, as is well-known, was central to Vedic life, thought and culture. For the *Brāhmana* texts, central to the *yajñā* was the correct performance of ritual, a creed, which found its logical culmination in *Mīmāṃsā*. The presence of the right and knowledgeable Brahman priests was essential for the correct performance of ritual in its specific details. Yet, here we have a passage from a well-known *Brāhmana* text belonging to the *R̥gvedic* priests, which disclaims the idea of the 'correctness' of ritual, denying also the necessity of a presiding Brahman priest. The interested reader is also invited to look up *Sāyaṇa* to see how a *Mīmāṃsaka* tried to get around the passage, which is unambiguous in its meaning:

*saiṣā svargyāhutiriyadagnyāhutiriyadi ha vā
apyabrāhmaṇokto yadi duruktokto yajate'tha
haiṣāhutirgacchatyeva devānna pāpmanā samśrjyate iti.*

(*Aitareya Brahmaṇa*, Anandashram ed., 3, 5)

The offering of agni to agni is a heavenly offering (āhuti). Even though it be made without relying on the utterance of a brāhmaṇa (meaning, as Sāyaṇa says, both a Brahmaṇa priest and a Brāhmaṇa text), or be made with an utterance not rightly formed, yet it surely reaches out to the gods; it remains untouched by sin.

Vol. XVII, No.1

Daya Krishna

Reply to Query raised by Dr. Mukund Lath on the statement on *Atreya Brāhmaṇa* published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 1.

Re: Flexibility/Freedom in Performance of Rituals

The Mīmāṃsā school accepts the whole of the Vedas as valid with certain riders. They have divided the vedic sentences. into four categories, viz. *Vidhi*, *Arthavāda*, *Mantra* and *Nāmadheya*. The validity of these four categories is to be ascertained depending upon their ability in teaching a *Vidhi* (an act to be performed) or a *pratisheda* (an act to be desisted from). This amounts to saying that only those sentences which propound a *vidhi* or a *pratisheda* are valid and all the other sentences, viz. *Arthavāda*, *Mantra* and *Nāmadheya* etc., though a part of Veda and though they convey some meaning by themselves, are not valid in so far as they do not teach us that an act is productive of *Dharma* or *Adharma*. The validity of vedic sentences depends on their import of conveying an unknown thing, i.e. not known through other means of knowledge. Vedas will become redundant if they are meant to teach us those things which are known or can be known through other means of knowledge. Therefore, those sentences which directly prescribe a *Vidhi* or *pratisheda* and those other sentences which convey the other details like what are (the results) to be achieved, which are the means for achieving them and in what manner they are to be achieved are valid only when they are taken together with the *vidhi vākya* or *pratisheda-vākya* and not independently.

The very definition of *Dharma* in *Mīmāṃsā* is that it is a means which is not known by temporal knowledge as a means to attain a result called *Śreyas*. That an act is a means to attain *Dharma* is not known by sense perception, inference etc. It is known only through the vedic sentences and hence the vedas are a separate. source of valid knowledge; not otherwise. At the same time, those sentences which do not convey a *vidhi* or a *pratisheda* cannot be dismissed as useless; in that case they become invalid and such a situation is not desirable. Hence they are classified as auxiliary sentences to the *vidhi* and *pratisheda* sentences; in that case, they become valid in combination with those sentences conveying a *vidhi* or *pratisheda*. Vedic sentences other than *vidhi-vākyas*, i.e. *Arthavāda*, *Mantra* and *Nāmadheya* do not convey a *vidhi* or *pratisheda* and they are not meant for conveying a means for attaining a *śreyas*, i.e. *Dharma*. All the words and sentences do convey some meaning and when they are analysed to decide their purport it is to be concluded that a particular sentence is in praise of an act or derides an act. Thus *stuti* or a *nindā* encourages or discourages a person to undertake an act of ritual and hence the sentence, forming a *mahāvākya* alongwith, *vidhi-vākya*, becomes valid. Now, the present sentence quoted by Dr. Mukund Lath from *Atreya Brāhmaṇa* says that the *Āhuti* to *Agni* is a heavenly offering, i.e. heaven-producing offering. Therefore, whether it is ordered by a Brāhmaṇa or not (generally *vidhi-vākyas* are from Brāhmaṇa portions of the vedas); or, whether it is uttered by a non-brahmin (only *brahmins* are eligible to act as *ritviks*); or even if it is uttered by a *ritvik* improperly, it reaches the particular god to whom it was intended and there is no sin incurred due to a lacuna. This is clearly a praising of the ritual, inducing the doer to perform it.

In the second sūtra of second *pāda* of first *adhyāya* of *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (1-2-2)=*Shāstradrshṭa Virodhācca*, Jaimini has raised this question, i.e. there is *shāstra virodha* in certain sentences; and there is *pratyaksha virodha* in some other sentences. Then, how can these sentences be accepted as valid? This is called *Arthavāda Adhikaraṇa* where there are six sūtras in *pūrvapaksha* and the *siddhānta* from seventh sūtra—where it is said that praising words help the performer by inducing him in the

performance of the ritual. Where there appears a contradiction in *Shāstraic* sentences, there the conveyed meanings of the words are not intended but only praise of the ritual and therefore, there is no contradiction. However, in these instances, the denoted meanings of the words are not taken as telling something but simply meaning praise. This kind of overlooking the conveyed meanings is not a defect as long as the *vidhi* in the *Mahāvākya*, i.e. group of sentences conveying one meaning is maintained. The whole of the *pāda* two of first *Adhyāya* in *Mīmāṃsā Shāstra* deals with this subject from different angles and concludes that one *vidhi* is to be accepted as main and all the other sentences in that *prakaraṇa* are to be treated as supporting that *vidhi* in various ways so that no sentence is invalid or redundant. If this position is not accepted then there arise numerous objections and the premiss that the entire veda is valid will fall apart as a house of cards.

Vol. XVII, No.3

Sampat Narayan

Vedas and Upaniṣads as part of Śruti

How can the Vedas and the Upaniṣads be both regarded as a part of the *Śruti*, when the latter relegates the former to the status of *Vidyās* that cannot lead to the realization of *Mokṣa*?

Vol. XVII, No.1

Daya Krishna

Reply

We can make an effective attempt to appreciate the '*Śruti*' in the light of following fundamental facts based on texts:

The Upaniṣada are not metaphysical speculations but precious manuals of *Sādhanā* of the ancient *Ṛṣi*. We hear of many *Vidyās* in them and of the spiritual disciplines or *Sādhanās* by which one sets out to realize and live the truth envisaged and taught to him by the seer, his teacher, the *Acharya*. Thus these are not only books of knowledge, but also of *Upāsana* or the way by which one may attain and realize what is theoretically known in one's own being and consciousness.

It was Jaimini who propounded the theory that though Mantra and Brāhmaṇa together form the *Veda*, the former has value in so far as it

subverses the purpose of the ritual for which the Brāhmaṇa are the sole supreme eternal authority. Thus, the Upaniṣads which form part of the Brāhmaṇas, are treated by the Mīmāṃsā-school only as a supplement or subsidiary to the Brāhmaṇas. The Mīmāṃsākās, therefore, use the word *śruti* only to mean the Brāhmaṇas, while to the later teachers of the Vedānta, the term means the Upaniṣads. This is the position that has been in vogue for many centuries now.

Although *Śruti* and *Smṛti* are related Vedic terms, the former denotes the inspirational, spiritual audience, the latter intuitive discovery on what has been heard by the mystical subtle hearing. That is why *Smṛti* or Dharmśāstra is supposed to be a discovery of the sense of the '*Śruti*' which was lost to the direct hearing.

In fact the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣada are the record of a powerful revival which took the sacred texts and ritual as a starting point for the new statement of spiritual thought and expression. If the Brāhmaṇas represent the conservation of forms, the Upaniṣads represent the revelation of the Soul of the Veda.

Vol. XVII, No.3

Dharmanand

Meaning of Brahman in Śaṅkara

What exactly does the word 'Brahman' signify according to Śaṅkara? Does it signify an individual or a universal or both? If it signifies an individual, is it devoid of descriptive content? If it signifies a universal, what is it? Is it a mere generic form, a generic characteristic or a generic idea? What is its logical status?

Is it illegitimate to ask, what exactly does the word

'Brahman' mean when it is beyond all the linguistic categories ?

Does every word form Samkara mean a "'Universal'"? If Brahman is devoid of descriptive contents, how it is to be identified ?

Can we significantly refer to things that are not there? Does the act of signifying put its 'performer', that is, one who utters the performance in

touch with what it signifies? How it can be denied of descriptive content if it signifies universal?

Vol. XVII, No.3

Jagpatpal

Reply

The principle of Brahman in Advaita Vedānta is the inner consciousness of everyone and the universe itself. It is devoid of deterioration as well as sorrows and pluralities which are mere superimpositions. Everything in the world is existence factor in all things including our body and is termed Brahman. The principle Brahman can be realized through its derivative meaning too. Sankara points out that the root ब्रह् (Brh) denotes the omnipresent nature along with the eternal, pure, conscious and liberated nature. Brahman in Advaita should not be realized in its positive sense as set forth by Upaniṣadic sentences like 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' and 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' for such a knowledge will lead the knower to know Brahman with worldly attributes. That is to say, when Brahman is described 'eternal' it is to be realized as something different from non-eternal, otherwise eternality will be the attribute of Brahman. In the same way 'conscious' means that which is different from inert objects, 'pure' means that which is different from impure objects that are ignorance-ridden, 'liberated means that which is free from all kinds of bondages. This negative type of understanding avoids all attributes from Brahman and helps one to imagine Brahman as devoid of qualities that are commonly attributed to it. It is said:

'यदा पञ्चैव लीयन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह।

बुद्धिर्ध नेङ्गते तत्र परमात्मानमश्नुते ॥'

(One can attain the ब्रह्मभाव when one's five sense-organs, mind and intellect become stable.)

However, Advaita is a state of mind that is to be acquired through one's own genuine interest and effort. The preceptors of the Upaniṣadic period selected students by severe tests. Naciketas and the six friends of *Prasnopanisad* are some of the students subjected to severe experiments. This fact proves the status of Advaita Vedānta as higher to mere

Queries with Answers

intellectual exercise. It is the supreme goal and shelter of everyone, 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' scriptures like these help to arrive at a clue regarding Brahman which is nothing other than our own self, as pointed out by Śankara. He stresses this point in his *sutrabhasya* that if there was not self in people, no one can ever be aware of 'I' consciousness. Śankara clarifies that the scriptures like 'आत्मावाऽऽरे दृष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' serve as advice to help people withdraw from their ordinary routine of actions.

Brahman cannot be universal or an individual. These terms signify the objects of the world as perceived in Nyāya Philosophy. The definition given for 'universal' in Nyāya is totally different from the Advaitic standpoint of the universe. That is to say, 'universal' is defined in Nyāya as 'eternal' (नित्यं) 'singular' (एक) and inherent in many (अनेकानुगतं). There are a lot of universals like घटत्वं, गोत्वं, अश्वत्वं, etc. which is the common attribute in all those individuals. But contrary to such a view, Advaita recognizes no eternal and non-dual principle apart from Brahman. Moreover, अनेकानुगतत्व or अनेकसमवेतत्व cannot be conceived by Advaita, for समवाय or inherence is totally rejected in this system. Advaita cannot stand for a permanent relation (inherence) because relation always denotes the significance of more than one object and it will be quite irrelevant in the view of Advaita.

Brahman cannot be mere generic form, a generic characteristic or generic idea, for, these words fail to describe it. The greatest universal advocated by Nyāya—सत्ता—Existence (सत्तासामान्यं परसामान्यम्—कारिकावली) can be described with such terms. Brahman is the inner essence of everyone, beyond all categories of universe. With regard to logic, as Professor Daya Krishna wrote in an essay in a book *Contemporary Indian Philosophy—II series*, Edited by Mrs. Margaret Chatterjee, the distinction between pure and applied logic is remarked in the case of mathematics by Einstein—"To the extent it can be applied, it is not exact and to the extent it is exact, it cannot be applied". Here the application (with the help of language, calculation or experimentation) is revealed as not designating the exactness of anything, and at the same time, the exactness cannot be revealed

through any kind of application. This view is equally agreeable in Advaita Vedanta which strives to describe Brahman which is the essence and 'Being' in everyone Scriptures like नेति, नेति, (not this, not this), अशब्द अस्पर्श अरूपव्यम् (devoid of sound, touch, form and mortality), यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अग्राप्य मनसा सह (from where the words with the mind withdraw themselves) also put forth this view. Advaitic Brahman is to be experienced as oneself. Being different from all 'isms' or technical 'schools of philosophy' Advaita inspires man to explore his inner essence and attain the supreme bliss which is the goal of everyone in his life.

It is not illegitimate to ask the meaning of the word 'Brahman' even if it is beyond all linguistic categories. But this reveals the unpreparedness to go deep into Indian philosophical (advaitic) vision. In the empirical life also, common man sometimes meets with experiences beyond description with the help of language. It may be joy, fear, sorrow or such feelings. Though language cannot express them fully, the experience gives a full picture of it. Similarly, Brahman beyond barriers of language also can be understood through experience of it as one's own self. This needs great concentration of mind in the concepts of Advaita and preparedness to keep it aloof from all worldly bondages and objects which, no doubt, disturb the restraint of the mind.

Śankara does not consider any word universal: He considers words as applicable to empirical life itself. 'नानुध्यायाद्बहन् निवर्तन्ते, यद्वाचानभ्युदितम् शब्दान्वाचो निगल्लापनं हि तत्' such scriptures were familiar to Śankara. He was aware of the incapability of words to signify the ultimate Reality. The divisions of anything as universal or individual is relevant in the empirical realm itself. Being devoid of descriptive content, Brahman is to be identified as one's own self through experience itself. If Brahman is devoid of descriptive content, there may arise the doubt of the relevance of various upanisads which contain numerous sentences. Śankara clarifies that upanisads are not proposed to define Brahman, on the other hand, they help to ward off all false notions inside themselves created by ignorance. The scriptures like 'परं दर्शयति भगवान् सनत्कुमारः' reveal this fact.

If the question is put forth against Advaita, there can be these solutions. We cannot refer to things that are not there or that are 'not felt' there. Otherwise we have to refer to the absence of those things with the valid knowledge—अनुपलब्धि or non-apprehension. But Advaita does not deny the empirical existence of this universe and the objects in it.

The act of signifying will occur only when a performer is aware of what it signifies. There exists the subject-object relation (कर्तृकर्मभाव). It cannot be and need not be denied of descriptive content even if it signifies a universal or an individual. It will be of descriptive content when comparatively lower degree of knowledge (अपरा विद्या) exists in man. But it can be referred to as nothing (mere appearance), that is to say, there will never be subject-object relation and it will be devoid of descriptive content when the supreme Reality is experienced. This is the Advaitic concept.

Vol. XVIII, No. 2

N. Usha Devi

Meaning of Brahman

Is it illegitimate to ask, what exactly does the word 'Brahman' mean when it is beyond all the linguistic categories?

Does every word from Śaṅkara mean a 'Universal'? If Brahman is devoid of descriptive contents, how it is to be identified?

Vol. XVII, No. 3

Jagatpal

Reply

The question 'what does the word 'Brahman' signify?' is similar to the question relating to the signification of words on which there are a number of theories discussed in Indian and Western philosophical systems. A word signifies individual for some, universal for some others and an aggregate of the individual and universal for still others.

The word 'Brahman', like other words, signifies universal, the meaning of the word. An individual, according to Śaṅkara Vedānta, is known consequently by association of the universals known by the words first. The problem arises only when we take that words have the sole function of referring. What does the word 'Brahman' refer to? 'Brahman', in the philosophy of Śaṅkara is an ontological reality. Ontological beings are

generally taken either as universal or as individual. They are objects of knowledge and are referred to by language.

Is *Brahman* universal or individual? It, in the philosophy of Śāṅkara, is not an object—neither external nor internal, neither objective nor subjective, neither individual nor universal. It is knowledge itself. He makes a difference between the objects of knowledge, the knowledge of the object and the knowledge itself. Knowledge is knowledge of an object but itself, being foundational to all sorts of knowledge acquired through the processes of knowing, is not an object in the knowledge. Knowledge itself may be the svarūpa of Brahman but it may be characterized only by proxy as existence, consciousness and bliss. Any description of it through experiences in waking, dreaming and sleeping, allegories, myths, analogies and other experiential and linguistic categories is description by proxy as it transcends all categories of knowledge by means.

The word '*Brahman*' signifies an ontological being of a knower (*Vijñātā*, *Jñātā*, or *draṣṭā*) because a knower is always relational to the knowledge and to what it knows. Śāṅkara's *Brahman* is beyond these categories. It is not right to understand the self in the manner we understand the external objects. Similarly, it is not proper to understand the spirit-itself in the manner we understand the self as it, unlike the external objects and the internal self, is never an object. It is the awareness of the awarenesses of them (*jñāna*, *dr̥ṣṭi*).

The question of meaning of a word, say *Brahman*, is legitimate as it is a cognitive problem par excellence. The knowledge itself is not only trans-experience but also excelling all the categories of objects and it is, perhaps, the meaning for denoting which the word '*Brahman*' is used in the metaphysical scheme of Śāṅkara. As the meaning of a word, in Śāṅkara Vedānta, is indivisible, the exercise of interpreting the indivisible, by analysis and interpretation, for the understanding of ignorant, is philosophically legitimate.

The case of identification of Brahman, as an ontological being, does not arise, as it is not an object, neither individual nor universal. It is not referred to directly by words but, indirectly all words referred to it.

However, it cannot be denied, as self-veridical illuminating principle or witness of the identification cases also. Not only that but the meaning of the word '*Brahman*', as it is revealed in the mind by the word '*Brahman*', is well identified on account of which we know it different from the meaning conveyed by other words.

A transcendental-signified cannot significantly be referred to, as the referring function of a word is dependent on external or internal things and their empirical experiences. If we do not accept that the function of language is confined only to referring and if expressiveness of it is also taken for granted, we can safely accept that the language expresses the meaning non-differently. As the meaning is universal, in his philosophy, it, for the understanding of ignorant, is made understandable through piecemeal scheme.

Vol. XX, No.2

D.N. Tiwari

Isopaniṣad And Yajña

What was the Mimāṃsaka's reply to Śāṅkara's contention in his commentary on the *Isopaniṣad* that, though it forms an integral part of the *Śukla Yajurveda*, it does not prescribe any ritual or procedure for the performance of any *yajña*?

Vol. XV, No.3

Daya Krishna

Reply

It is true that mimāṃsaka's dear contention is that the whole Veda is meant for including a human being into some action or the other. But it is just a partial view of the truth.

Two points may be taken into consideration:

(i) When we use the convenient short form, namely, 'mimāṃsa' what we are significantly missing is the adjective namely, *pūrva* which is very important.

Pūrvamimāṃsa, while interpreting the Veda, primarily concerns itself with the *pūrva* or prior part of the Veda, i.e. mainly up to the Āraṇyakas excluding the Upaniṣadas. It is true that some upaniṣadas form an integral part of the Saṁhitās, some that of the Brāhmaṇas and others some of

Āraṇyakas. But it is also equally important to remember that, here, perhaps, the term 'upaniṣadā' is applicable to those portions of the Veda which do not as it were, prescribe any ritual of yoga but rather discuss matters like the nature of soul, salvation and how to realize it and so on and so forth. And hence, it is indirectly accepted that the consideration of the interpretation of the upaniṣadas is the area of *uttara-mīmāṃsā* and not that of the *pūrvamīmāṃsā*. In other words, the Veda is divided into two sections: *Karma*-section and *Jñāna*-section. *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* deals with *Karma*-section and *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* with the *Jñāna* section. Hence, *mīmāṃsakas* are not at all disturbed with the interpretations put forth by *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*. Sankara, being one of the great pioneers of the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*, is no exception to this.

(ii) If one seeks an answer to the above query from the system itself then: The system has divided the whole Veda into five different types of sentences. It is well accepted in the system that though the entire Veda aims at some activity or the other, it is not the case that each and every sentence of the Veda is prescriptive. There are some descriptive sentences also in the Veda, nevertheless, they do have some connection with some action or the other. Thus, the significance and validity of *arthavādas* or narrative sentences and also of the *mantrās* or incantations to be recited in the rituals are established. Thus, upaniṣadic sentences which are not prescriptive may fall under the category of either of the two mentioned above namely, *mantra* or *arthavād*. Nevertheless, there are sentences like *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ Śrotavyo mantavyaḥ...*(*Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad*) which prescribe the act of knowing the self. Some *mīmāṃsakas* add the point here that whatever is performed with full knowledge is more effective. Thus, if one performs a ritual after having 'knowledge' of the self as prescribed by the upaniṣada he will be a greater gainer. One can also have a prescription (of course, an inferred one) from the upaniṣadic passages where no explicit ritual is seen.

To conclude, one may also remember that the line, 'a person should desire to live 100 years on this earth by performing various activities' कुर्वन्ने वेह कर्माणि जिजी विषेत् शतं समाः is very much from the same *Īśāvāsya upaniṣad*

while commenting on which Śankara has had, as it were, a difficult time and explains it as follows: 'this passage is meant for a person who is incapable of *ātmajñāna*.'

In fact this is the contention of Śankara regarding all rituals and sacrifices that all these activities are meant for those who are just beginners on the path of the ultimate goal. These activities help these people purify their minds which is a necessary requisite on the path of knowledge.

Vol. XVII, No.3

Ujjwala Panse Jha

Mahavira on Mokṣa : Is mokṣa sānta or ananta?

Muni Śrī Nagarāja Ji in his monumental work entitled *Āgama Aur, Tripīṭaka* reports an incident where Mahāvīra is supposed to answer the question whether *mokṣa* or liberation has also an end or is endless. The answer is tantalizing in the extreme, as it says that from the viewpoint of substantiality and spatiality, it has an end, while from the point of view of temporality and existence, it has no end. Furthermore, the answer gives the exact extent of the space which *mokṣa* is supposed to occupy. This would make *mokṣa* spatial in character and hence as, necessarily, having parts of itself and divisible in nature, if space is regarded as necessarily so. Also, as *mokṣa* is being considered from the viewpoint of being a substance which occupies space and time and has states of itself (if the term '*bhāva*' is interpreted in this sense), then it would be an object like any other object.

Moreover, as the same approach is adopted in answering other questions which have been troubling Skandaka for a long time, it will follow that all entities have to be understood in terms of *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva* (being or existence). and there can be no entities which can be conceived independently of any of these or all of them together. It will also be interesting to know if there are any other entities which have the same characteristics as *mokṣa* and if so, how is it distinguished from them.

The exact statement as given in Muni Śrī Nagarāja Ji's book is the following:

Mahāvīra—Oh Skandaka, you also asked yourself if *mokṣa* has also an end or not. This question too will have to be considered from the point of view of *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (area or space), *kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (being or existence). From the point of view of *dravya*, *mokṣa* is one and it has an end. From the point of view of *kṣetra*, it has a length and breadth¹ of forty-five lakh *yojana*. and its *paridhi* or total area is a little more than one crore, forty-two lakh, thirty thousand and two hundred and forty-nine *yojanas*, and it has an end. From the point of view of time, it cannot be said that there *was* a time when there *was* no *mokṣa*, or that there *is* a time when there *is* no *mokṣa* or that there *will* be a time when there *will* be no *mokṣa*. From the point of *bhāva* also, *mokṣa* has no end. And so *mokṣa* has an end from the point of view of *dravya* and *kṣetra*, but has no end from the point of view of *kāla* and *bhāva*². (English translation of original Hindi version which is based, according to the author himself, on *Bhagavati Śa. 2 ua. 1*)³

The way Mahāvīra is supposed to present the temporal perspective on *mokṣa* would imply that it is *nityasiddha* and hence cannot be an object of *sādhnā*. Nor can it be not available to anybody in principle. Both these implications seem to go against the positions which are usually ascribed to Jain thinkers by most people who have written on the subject.

The following issues that arise in this connection, therefore, need to be clarified:

1. What is the authority of the text in the Jain canon on the basis of which this statement is attributed to Mahāvīra in the book by Śrī Nagarāja Jī?
2. Is this the generally accepted position of Jain thinkers on the subject?
3. Is *mokṣa* and *sarvajñatā* of the *kevalin* the same? If so, will the *sarvajñatā* also be limited by the *kṣetra*, as *mokṣa* is said to be by Mahāvīra in this quotation?

¹ The exact word used is '*āyama-viskaṃbha*'. I am not sure how it should be translated. Or, how it should be distinguished from *paridhi* which is mentioned later, and how the two are related

² Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī, *Āgama Aur Tripīṭaka* (Hindi), New Delhi, Concept Publishing Company, second revised edition, 1987, p. 189

³ *Ibid.* See footnote on p. 190

4. Can the *kṣetra* be larger than the amount mentioned by Mahāvīra in the context of *mokṣa*? If so, is it finite or infinite?
5. What is the difference between the *paridhi* and the *āyama-viskaṃbha* mentioned in the quotation?
6. What is meant by saying that there was never a time when there was *no mokṣa*, as is asserted in the statement?
7. Does the statement imply that, according to the Jain theory, there are no entities which are non-spatio-temporal in nature? If so, how would they account for the spatial character of, say numbers or reason?

Vol. X, No. 1

Daya Krishna

Some comments on the extract from the Bhagavati Sūtra Did Mahāvīra Really Talk About Mokṣa?

Some comments on the extract from the Bhagavati Sūtra as given by Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī in his Āgama Aur Tripīṭaka as reproduced in English translation in the Notes and Queries section of JICPR, Vol. X, No. 1, PP. 197-98.

Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī's passage concerning what Mahāvīra has to say on *mokṣa* in the *Bhagavati Sūtra* (*Āgama Aur Tripīṭaka: Ek Anuśīlana*, Vol. I, p. 189) is bound to strike any reader as bizarre. I looked up the *Bhagavati Sūtra* to check the original. The word translated as '*mokṣa*' is '*siddhi*'. It is of course, possible to translate '*siddhi*' as '*mokṣa*' but that is plainly incongruous in the context. Other more cogent translations are possible and available.

I have before me the translation of K.C. Lalwani (Jain Bhavan, Calcutta, 1973). Lalwani renders '*siddhi*' as 'the abode of *siddhas*'. This obviously provides a more satisfactory translation but it also raises the question: 'how is the addition 'abode of' to be justified?' K.C. Lalwani has, as he says, relied on Abhayadeva's commentary for his renderings. Presumably, his translation of '*siddhi*' as 'the abode of *siddhas*' is based on Abhayadeva. I have not been able to see Abhayadeva's commentary.

But there is another consideration that provides a clue. Besides the mention of '*siddhi*' in the *Bhagavati Sūtra* in the passage being discussed there is an earlier mention of the term. (Lalwani notes both passages, the

earlier and the one under consideration, under 'siddhi' in his index.) The earlier passage is at the beginning of the text and starts with a eulogy of Mahāvīra where many phrases occur as laudatory epithets. One of these is: 'siddhigai nāmadheyarī thānatrī sampāvīkāme'. This, Lalwani renders as: 'intent on attaining the sphere of liberated souls'. A literal translation more useful for our purpose here would be: 'desirous of attaining the place—'abode', 'sphere', named *siddhigai* (the goal of *siddhi* or liberation)'. *Siddhi*, short for *siddhigai*, here is the name of a place. The association of the word with a place is, apparently, carried over to the later passage which is being discussed here. Indeed, what Mahāvīra has to say about *siddhi* in the passage under consideration assumes that it is a place. Let us quote Lalwani's translation:

And then, O Skandaka, you have in mind...whether the abode of the perfected souls is with limit or without limit. On this I ordain, O Skandaka, that the abode of the perfected souls is to be viewed from four angles viz. substance, place, time and *bhāva*. As to substance, this abode of the perfected souls extends over an area of 45,00,000 *yojanas* in length and so also in breadth and with a circumference which is 142,30,249 hundred thousand *yojanas* more or less but still with a limit. As to time, there was no time, nor there will be any, when the abode of the perfected souls did not, does not and will not, exist. As to *bhāva* the same as with the spheres. So you see, the abode of the perfected souls is as to substance, with limit: a place, with limit; as to time, without limit; and as to *bhāva* (also) without limit.

I must confess, however, that though this rendering makes more immediate sense of the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* passage than the rendering of Nagarāja Jī, the whole idea still remains odd and incongruous. What has the notion of a special location with spatial boundaries to do with the perfection of the soul, however ethereal, *sūkṣma* or non-material the place might be? Is it a station from where the perfected soul which has shed its *karma* can 'see' everything and thus be a *kevalī*? But why should such a place be necessary? And could Mahāvīra be a *kevalī* when he was not in such a place? And if he was already there, in what sense was he there?

Is *Mokṣa Sānta* or *Ananta*?

A comment on the excerpt from the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* from Muni Śrī Nāgarāja Jī's book *Agama Aur Tripitaka*, along with a brief comment on Dr. Mukund Lath's comment on the same published in Vol. X No. 1.

Reply

The *Vyākhyāprajñapti (Bhagavatī)*, the fifth *aṅga āgama*, is a voluminous treatise on the Jain philosophy of the canonical age. Therein, we come across an allusion to one wanderer-ascetic, Skandaka, who approached Bhagavān Mahāvīra, and asked him five questions. The first four of them were related to finiteness and infiniteness, viz. 'whether the universe (*loka*), soul (*jīva*), *siddhi* and *siddha* were finite or infinite'. Mahāvīra gave reply to these questions in the context of the doctrine of *Anekānta*. There are four fundamental viewpoints of *Anekānta*, viz. *dravya* (substance) *kṣetra* (space), *kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (mode or state). Thus, according to Bhagavān Mahāvīra:

	<i>Substantially</i>	<i>Spatially</i>	<i>Temporally</i>	<i>Modewise/ Statewise</i>
<i>Joka</i> (universe)	finite	finite	Infinite	infinite
<i>jīva</i> (soul)	one soul, finite	finite, because it occupies only innumerable space points	Infinite	infinite
<i>siddhi</i> (abode of <i>siddhas</i>)	finite	finite	Infinite	infinite
<i>siddhas</i> (liberated souls)	one liberated soul, finite	finite, because it occupies only innumerable space points	has a beginning but is endless, infinite	infinite

Now, in *the JICPR*, some issues have been raised with regard to the above allusion. The main cause of all these issues are the differences in the philosophical concepts of soul and liberation in Jain philosophy and others.

(1) The Naiyāyika and other philosophies believe soul to be all-pervading, whereas, according to the Jain philosophy, soul is co-extensive with the physical body, that is, its spatial extension is the same as that of the body.

(2) According to the Jain philosophy, soul is a *pracya* (continuum, whole) of an uncountable number of atomically small points called *pradeśa*, which are inseparable parts of the soul. They are indivisible also.

(3) After becoming liberated, the soul does not spread in the whole universe (*i.e.*, does not become ubiquitous), but the space occupied by it is in a certain proportion (2:3) of the last body.

(4) The space is classified into two types:

(a) Cosmic space (*lokākāśa*)

(b) supra-cosmic space (*alokākāśa*)

No other substance can move or stay in the *alokākāśa*. All substances are confined to the *lokākāśa*.

These four are the fundamental beliefs of Jain metaphysics.

Now, if one reviews the answers given by Bhagāvan Mahāvīra to the questions of Skandaka in the context of the beliefs of other philosophies such as the soul is ubiquitous and there is no supra-cosmic space, he is sure to consider the Jain views as bizarre. Likewise, the beliefs that the soul exists but is not a continuum of *pradeśas* appears quite strange to the Jains. They cannot conceive soul as something different from this.

According to the jains, a single soul consists of so many of *pradeśas* that it can spread in the whole universe, but because it remains confined to the physical body, its extension is also equivalent to that of the body. After becoming liberated, there is no cause to make the soul ubiquitous, and hence it occupies only a limited space.

The term *siddhi* used in the present text denotes a particular place or earth. Actually the liberated or the perfect soul does not reside on *siddhi*

but the position of the space where the liberated souls stay is near to an earth called '*īśat prāgbhāra*' and hence the latter is also called '*siddhi*'.

There is no need of any place for the liberated or perfect souls to stay, but they do require space to exist in. '*No substance can exist without space*'; none can stay outside the space. The same law applies even to the liberated souls.

Souls become liberated only in the 'human world' which measures 45 lakh *yojanas* in length and breadth. After becoming liberated here, the liberated soul soars upwards and reaches the upper end of the universe (cosmic space) through its natural motion (which is inherent in itself). It cannot go beyond the cosmic space, because there is no media of motion and rest in the supra-cosmic space. Thus it becomes fixed there forever. It does not require any other physical support because it is not corporeal.

The following verse from the *Uttarādhyāyana Sūtra* makes this clear:

aloe padihayā siddhā

loyagge ya paiṭṭhiyā

There is no difficulty in believing the liberated soul as a 'substance' and 'consisting of parts'. On the other hand, if soul is not consisting of parts, it is difficult to explain it. The argument put forward by other philosophers against the view believing the soul to be consisting of parts is that whatever consists of parts must be transient. But, for *anekānta*, transitoriness is no problem. According to it, no substance is absolutely eternal; both permanence and transitoriness are natural attributes of substance.

The law that whatever consists of parts must be divisible is also not absolutely true. It applies only to physical order of existence—*pudgala*, and not to non-physical substances. Therefore, the ultimate indivisible part of *pudgala* is called atom (*paramāṇu*), while that of all non-physical (noncorporeal) substances like soul is called *pradeśa*.

The theory of *astikāya* which means 'a homogeneous continuum' is a very fundamental and unique theory of the Jains. The Jain ontology presents the theory of five *astikāyas*, according to which each ultimate

reality or substance is a homogeneous continuum of *pradeśas*, each *pradeśa* being the indivisible and inseparable part of the substance.


In the fourfold aspects of *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva* (mentioned above), *dravya* (substance) and *paryāya* (modes/states) represent the first and the fourth respectively. The second, i.e. *kṣetra* denotes the space (*ākāśastikāya*) and the third, i.e. *kāla* denotes the time, which however is not an ultimate reality or substance, but a phenomenon causing the modification or transformation of substances. The entire nature of the five *astikāyas* can be clearly understood only if they are comprehended through the four aspects of *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva*.

Jīva (soul) and *pudgala* (physical order of existence or matter)—both are *astikāyas*. *Siddhi* is an 'earth' and is also *pudgala*, not the *jīva*. *Siddha* is a liberated soul and hence it is *jīva*.

Now, in the context of this discussion, let us try to understand the text of the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, under discussion.

Siddhi is called 'finite' from a substantial aspect, because the earth (*īṣat prāgbhāra*) is a physical substance or a thing. It is only one and therefore finite.

Siddhi is called 'finite' from a spatial aspect, because it occupies a finite space. The text itself describes it (*siddhi*) to be of 45 lakh *yojanas* length and breadth (or diameter)—*āyāma* and *viśakambha*. These are two dimensions. Its circumference' (*paridhi*) is 1,42,30,249 *yojanas*. (This is according to Mathematics expressed by $Oce = TLd$. Here the value of TL is taken to be $\sqrt{10}$.



From the temporal aspect, *siddhi* is said to be infinite. It is described that *siddhi* (the earth) is perpetual (*dhruva*), constant (*niyata*), eternal (*śāśvata*), indestructible (*akṣaya*), unperishable (*avyaya*), fixed (*avasthita*) and permanent (*nitya*), for there, was no time when it did not exist, there is no time when it does not exist and there will be no time when it will not exist.

This statement should be comprehended in the context of the doctrine of universe (*loka*) of the jains. The *loka* is the whole universe or the cosmic space; it has a definite shape and size and some of its stellar bodies or structures also have an eternal existence, one of which is the earth. 'īṣat Prāgbhāra' or *siddhi* therefore is beginningless and endless, from the temporal point of view.

Modewise/Statewise—*Siddhi*, being a kind of physical structure, belongs to *pudgalāstikāya*. Hence, from the point of view of modes, it is possessed of infinite number of modes of colour, infinite number of modes of smell, infinite number of modes of taste, infinite number of modes of touch, because, in all *pudgalas*, these four qualities and their modes are essentially present. Besides them, an infinite number of modes of shapes, heaviness—lightness, non-heaviness—non-lightness, are also found in *siddhi*. Thus, modewise, the *siddhi* is infinite.

When we consider *siddha* from the four aspects of *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva*, then since *siddha* is *jīva*, we have to consider it in that context.

Substantially, a *siddha* is finite; spatially, a *siddha* consists of an uncountable number of *pradeśas* and also occupies an uncountable number of space-points, the maximum height of a *siddha* is 1 *hasta* and 8 *anṅulas* (which is equivalent to 53 centimeters approximately) and the maximum height is 333 *dhanuṣya* + 1 *hasta* and 8 *anṅulas* (which is equivalent to 528 meters approximately).⁴ Thus, spatially, a *siddha* is finite.

4. The height of a *siddha* is two-thirds the height of the last body left before liberation. The minimum and maximum heights of human beings who can attain liberation are 2 *hasta* and 500 *dhanuṣya* respectively.

Temporally, a *siddha* has a beginning but no end; therefore it is infinite. In the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* it is very clearly mentioned that when one particular *siddha* is considered, 'it is with beginning but endless'; and when all *siddhas* are considered, then 'they are beginningless and endless'. But when we say 'beginningless', it does not mean that they are 'nityasiddha', because any soul which has attained the state of *siddha* even an infinity ago must have done so only through the *sādhana*. Once the state of *siddha* is attained, it lasts forever.

Modewise, a *siddha* is said to be possessed of infinite number of modes of knowledge, infinite number of modes of perception, and infinite number of modes of non-heaviness and non-lightness. Thus, modewise, a *siddha* is infinite.

Now, we consider the issues raised in the *Journal* in the context of the above discussion:

First of all, the implication of the text (from *Bhagavatī*) under discussion that '*siddhi*, i.e. *mokṣa*, is *nitya-siddha*, and hence cannot be an object of *sādhana*', as not consistent. For, when it is said that *siddhi* is *śāśvata*, it means that the place where the *siddhas* stay is eternal and not that *mokṣa* is eternal nor that there is no need for *sādhana*.

Now, we consider, one by one, the seven issues raised:

(1) The *Bhagavatī Sūtra* (*Vyākhyāprajñapti*) is the fifth *aṅga* which is one of the most important and authoritative Jain canonical texts.

(2) It, (the view given in the *Bhagavatī*), is generally accepted by almost all Jain thinkers. For example, see—


Uttarādhyayana Sūtra, 36/55-67.

Tattvārtha Sūtra, Ch.X.

(3) A *kevalin* attains omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) in the 13th stage of development called *guṇasthāna*, but attains *mokṣa* only after the 14th stage. A *kevalin* is he who has destroyed the four destructive *karmans* and has attained omniscience. The remaining four (non-destructive) *karmans* persist in the *kevalin*. When the *kevalin* annihilates these four *karmans* (after the 14th stage), he attains the *mokṣa*, or the state of *siddha* and reaches the *siddhi* (i.e. the place for staying) at the upper end of the

universe to stay there forever. By remaining confined to a definite (finite) place the omniscience of the *siddhas* does not become limited; actually, it persists as before in the form of the knowledge of all substances and all modes of all space and all time.

(4) The *kṣetra*, i.e. the dimensions of the *siddhi* (or the *siddha-kṣetra*) remains always the same as mentioned in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*. The reason is that the total area or the size of the *siddhi* is the same as that of the human world and only human beings belonging to the human world can attain liberation. Actually, the place of *siddhi* is exactly parallel to the *kṣetra* of human beings situated in the middle world.



(5) *Āyāma-ṽṣkambha* means length and breadth or the diameter. The *paridhi* is the circumference which is always nearly three times the diameter.

According to mathematics—

$$\text{Circumference} = \pi d$$

(where d is diameter, $\pi = 3.14$;

in Jain works, however, the value of $\pi = \sqrt{10}$

which is taken as 3.16.

(6) The statement that there was never a time when there was no *siddhi* means that the *siddhi* is situated near the upper end of the universe for eternal time—it is existing from beginningless time and will exist for infinite (endless) time.

(7) According to Jain philosophy, all *astikāyas* are related with the spatio-temporal aspects. As far as numbers or reason are concerned, they are not *astikāyas*. And, hence, spatio-temporal aspects do not necessarily apply to them. The Jain canonical literature elaborately deals with the concepts of numbers and reason.²

A Comment On the Views of Dr Mukund Lath

Although Dr. Lath has correctly interpreted the text given in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, he, it seems, has not considered the issue in its totality. A special location or a particular place has no direct connection with the liberation of the soul. But because human beings are confined to the human world only, and can become liberated from there, it can relatively be said that particular place has some relation to the attainment of *mokṣa*.

Actually, whenever a soul becomes free from the bondage of all the *karmas*, it becomes liberated there and then. After attaining *mokṣa* in the human world, the soul soars up through its natural motion and gets freed at the top of the cosmic space. Bhagavān Mahāvira had attained omniscience during his lifetime and not after attaining *mokṣa*.

Notes and References

1. The height of a *siddha* is two thirds the height of the last body left before liberation. The minimum and maximum heights of human beings who can attain liberation are 2 *hasta* and 500 *dhanusya* respectively.

2. See, for example, *Anuyogadvara Sutra*

Vol. X, No.3

Sri Yuvacarya Mahaprajnya

'Does Mīmāṃsā Treat the Theory of *Karma* as a *Pūrva-pakṣa*?' :

The *Sūtra* 3.7.18 raises the issue whether all such sacrifices which are done for the sake of heaven should be performed entirely by the 'sacrificer' himself, or need he do only the act of dedication, that is *dotsarga*, and the rest may be done either by himself or others, or only others who have been hired for the purpose. The reason given for the first *pūrva pakṣa*, that it is the

sacrificer alone who should do everything, is, 'because, as a matter of fact, *the result of an action accrues to a person only when he performs the act of himself*. This, obviously is a fair formulation of the theory of *karma* and is given as the reason why the sacrifice should be performed by the sacrificer himself. The problem is again raised in the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* 3.8.25, 3.8.28 and 3.8.29. The issue in the *sūtras* relates to the question 'whether reward that is asked for accrues to the priest or to the sacrificer'. The issue is resolved in diverse ways in *sūtras* 26, 28 and 29 respectively. *Sūtra* 3.8.28 resolves it in favour of the sacrificer as it is for his sake that the action is performed. *Sūtra* 3.8.28 argues, according to Śabara, that 'in some cases, the result spoken of accrues to the priest-i.e. in those cases where the result in question is helpful in the performance..'. *sūtra* 3.8.29 argues that in case 'there is a direct assertion to that effect, the result is to be taken as accruing to the priests.'

Thus, Jaimini does not seem to accept the objection raised by the *pūrva pakṣa* which is so obviously grounded in the theory of *karma* understood in a certain way. Does, then, Jaimini have a different theory of *karma* than the one propounded in *sūtras* 3.7.18 ? Or, does he have no theory at all in the matter?

Vol XI, No. 2

Daya Krishna

Two Responses to the Query

(We publish below two responses received to the issue raised in the 'Notes and Queries' section of *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No.2, entitled "Does Mīmāṃsā Treat the Theory of *Karma* as a *Pūrvapakṣa*? Sri Ram Śarma's original response was received in Sanskrit. It was translated by Mrs Shyama Bhatnagar of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur with some minor corrections and editing by me — Ed.)

Reply 1

Before answering the question, I must explain the word *karma* and the various senses it conveys. *Karma* means (1) an action, a transitory

movement, lasting as much time as the action, actually taking place and (2) the subtle effect left by such an action lasting for a longer time—say, up to the moment the effect or reaction is experienced by the doer of the action. This is called *apūrva*; it is of several kinds. It is analogous to *dharma* and *adharma* or *punya* and *pāpa* of other systems. It is a non-matter, which needs a matter as substratum to inhere in. *Ātmā* is the substratum for it, of the doer. 'Doership' is of two kinds—direct and indirect. Normally, all such effects produced by actions reside in the *ātmā* of the doer, but in the case of, actions which were *caused* by another, the effects go to the *ātman* of the person who *caused* that action to be done. The actual doer was just an instrument in the hands of the causal agent. He did not perform that action on his own volition. The performer was purchased for the purpose and he did not also desire the resultant effect. *Vedic injunctions* say that specific actions are to be performed by specific persons to obtain one consolidated effect. There are some intermediary effects which go to the actual performer. Here the deciding factor is the injunction.

The third chapter of *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* with *aṅga karma*-auxiliary rites—most of which are performed by *ṛtviks* for the *yajamāna*. Therefore, the actual affects go to the *yajamāna*, who pays for the services. There are some specific auxiliary rites which not only help the *pradhāna karma*, but also produce intermediary results. These intermediary results are of two kinds—those which go to the *yajamāna* and those which go to the *ṛtvika*. Here too the *Vedic injunction* is the first requisite for taking up the performance. If a *ṛtvika* is entitled to desire a certain fruit of a particular sacrifice, either singly or along with the *yajamāna*, then that *phala* goes to him.

Thus we can see that there are three kinds of *phalas*—*pradhāna karma phala*, *aṅga karma phala*, independent of *pradhāna phala*, which goes to both the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtvika*; and those which go to the *ṛtvika* alone, and those that go to the *yajamāna* alone.

Therefore, no generalization can be made with regard to *phala* in general. They should be particularized and the rules applied accordingly.

Therefore, there is no room to conclude that Jaimini held two views about the *karma* theory. A warrior fights for the king and wins a war, and the king enjoys the kingdom, not the warrior, '*Mana eva kārāṇam manuṣyāṇām bandha mokṣayon*'. This clarifies the position. The motive with which one does an action is the deciding factor.

Vol. XII, No. 1

Sampat Narayana

Reply 2

The question 'Does Mīmāṃsā Treat the Theory of *Karma* as a *Pūrvapakṣa*?' refers to three *adhikaraṇas* in order to show that they involve a contradiction. The *adhikaraṇas* are, first, 3.7.8, *sūtra* 18; second, 3.8.25/26; and third, 3.8.28/29. In 3.7.8 the *bhāṣya* is 'parts of the action (*aṅgānām*) can be performed by someone else (that is, other than the agent); and the *vārtika* asserts; 'the agent can be other than the *yajamāna*'. In the same way, in 3.8.25/26, the *bhāṣya* says, 'one should expect for the *swamīphala* in the *karaṇamantras*'. The *vārtika* is the fruit expressed in the *karaṇamantras* belongs to the *yajamāna*'. In 3.8.28/29, 'the fruit for which the *karma* is undertaken in *karaṇamantra* belongs to *ṛtvija*' says the *bhāṣya*; and the *vārtika* establishes, 'the fruit expressed in the *karaṇamantra*, being instrumental for the action, belongs to *ṛtvija*'.

Now, a doubt arises: 3.7.18 says, 'being the *kartā* in the *yajña* one is to get the fruit; being the *kartā* in the part of process (*sāṅga*) one obtains the fruit; one who works for oneself gets the fruit'. 'Therefore, the *ṛtvija* is entitled to expect the fruit.' 'I shall be powerful', says the *adhvaryu*—thus he would be zealous'

In 3.8.28, '*ṛtvija* is entitled to expect fruits', 'sometimes *ṛtvijas* are also entitled to expect fruits.' In 3.8.29, 'Therefore, *adhvaryu* should expect fruit.' In these statements from the *Bhāṣya*, it is stated that the *yajamāna* gets the fruits. At one place it is said that the *ṛtvijas* get the fruit', this is *karma-siddhānta*. 'How can the two go together? Did Jaimini assert this? Is there a tenet of this sort in Mīmāṃsā or not?

In this context it should be understood that in the three *adhikaraṇas* the matter dealt with is different and it is so in this way. In 3.7.8

adhikaraṇa, *sūtra* 18, the fruit of the action prescribed by the *śāstra* will be available only to the agent. 'Swargakāmo yajet', etc., says that one who desires *swarga* has to perform the *yajña* in order to obtain the desired fruit. Thus the principle that one who is the agent is the one who obtains the fruit. If one thinks that there can be only one agent then this is not so. To be an agent is to do the action for oneself or to have it performed by paying for it to a *ṛtvija*. The *vārtikakāra* illustrates this by mentioning *darśapūrṇamāsa*, etc., as example of an action in which the performer is paid for. This is said about the main action. In this, one who is the *kartā* obtains the fruit. This is the principle, Such a doctrine is generally known as *karma-siddhānta*.

In 3.8.25/26 *adhikaraṇa* in the *karaṇamantra*, utters the *adhvaryu*, 'Oh, Agni, may I get the power (varcah) in *yajña*'. The question is, for whom is the fruit of the power being elicited? Using the word 'mama', a declension of 'asmad', suggests that the fruit would go to the *adhvaryu* who utters the *mantra*. This, however, is the *pūrvapakṣa*. As the *adhvaryu* is serving against payment, the fruit should go to the *yajamāna*. That proves the same principle. In the *bhāṣya*, an example of a *śruti* is also given in this context. 'The blessings desired by the *ṛtvijas* go to the *yajamāna*.' This *adhikaraṇa* is related with the intermediary fruit which is mentioned in the *karaṇamantras* or the auxiliary *mantras* involved.

In 3.8.28/29 *adhikaraṇa*, in the *karaṇamantras* themselves it is mentioned that the fruit is obtained by both the *adhvaryu* and the *yajamāna*, that is, the *yajamāna* and the *adhvaryu* spread their hands in the center of their bellies and grasping each other's hands, the *yajamānas*, enquires, 'what is there in it, *adhvaryu*'; The *adhvaryu* answers, 'well being'. Then, first the *yajamāna* declares 'that is for me' and then the *yajamāna* asks a second time, 'what is it here?' and the *adhvaryu* answers, 'well-being'. Then the *yajamāna* says, 'that the well-being is for us together'. Obviously, in situations like these the *śruti* clearly declares the fruit for both. Therefore, the fruit goes to both. This is the principle. However, this example relates to the intermediate fruit only. It is not concerned with the main fruit, such as *swarga*, etc.

Thus, in this connection, there are several *adhikaraṇas* in which, at some places, fruit is mentioned in relation to the *yajamāna* alone, and at other places in relation to both the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtvija*. But this does not lead to any contradiction as they are concerned with different subject matters. The fundamental points here are as follows.

1. The fruit relating to the main action belongs to the *yajamāna* alone who performs the action. As it is ordained by the Veda that the services of the *ṛtvija* can be purchased, the action can be performed by someone other than the *yajamāna*. But such an action can only be performed by the *ṛtvija*, on payment and by no one else.
2. The fruit of the auxiliary action, even though aspired to by the *ṛtvija*, goes to the *yajamāna* alone.
3. Where, because of the utterance, the fruit of the intermediary action goes to the *ṛtvija* and as even that leads to effectiveness in the action relating to the *yajña*, it too, being a part of the *yajña*, would go to the *yajamāna*.
4. And where the fruit of the auxiliary action is available for both, that is so because it is what the Veda says in the matter. Apart from the effectiveness, etc., that sort of fruit is available to *ṛtvijas* just as it is available to the *yajamāna*.

This does not demolish the *karma siddhānta*. Examples of such behaviour are found in worldly affairs also, as in the tilling of land. The landlord, with the help of money which he pays to the labourers, gets the proper action performed by them appropriate to the expected crop, without himself touching anything and yet is known as a peasant and is also the owner of the fruit. Similarly, if some labourers eat a few mangoes in the garden, they are not called the ones who get the fruit. The *yajamāna* alone owns the fruit.

Another example of this may be seen in textile factories. The workers may get something additional to their usual wages such as bonus but that is not the main fruit. It is not the consumption of the main fruit. Nor does that create a claim on the part of the workers regarding the ownership of

the factory. The consumption of the intermediary fruit constitutes no barrier for the *yajamāna* in obtaining and enjoying the main fruit.

Such is the case in respect of *karma* here. In fact, the sanction of śruti has permitted the bonus to be paid to the workers. This does not damage the doctrine of *karma*: the fruit goes to the doer.

However, the principle of fruit being enjoyed by the agent alone has some exceptions.

1. For example, 'the father should name the newborn son on the tenth day'. Further, there is this injunction: 'in the *jātyeṣṭi yajña* which is performed on the birth of a son, the fact of naming enables him to be addressed and the *yajña* promises him a bright future; these fruits here are enjoyed by the son and not by the *yajamāna*' who performs the *yajña*.

2. Similarly, the *pañcīka karma* performed for the dead, has for its consequence getting a better place, *uttama loka*, for them and this fruit is enjoyed by the dead and not by the *yajamāna*.

Yet in these cases the Veda commands the *yajamānas* that 'he should do so'. In case he disobeys the command, the *yajamānas* will suffer. Here the reason for performing the action is by itself the fruit, and the fruits consequent on *jātyeṣṭi yajña* and *pañcīkas karma* are enjoyed by the son or by the dead father, though the *yajamāna* initiates the *karma* as a *kartā*. This is so because the action is commanded by the Veda for him to be performed. By initiating that action, therefore, the *yajamāna's* fruit is the achievement of a state or situation which is free from obstacles. The naming and bright, *abhyudaya*, and the fruit of obtaining a state of well-being, *sadgati*, would go to the newly-born son and the dead person respectively. Except for these two instances, the *kartā* himself is the enjoyer of the main fruit. This is the principle.

It should, however, be clearly understood that there is no independent doctrine of *karma* which may be regarded as the *Mīmāṃsā* principle. Neither the *bhāṣyakāra* nor the *vārtikakāra*, nor even Jaimini have any doctrine of their own. They only gave a consistent meaning to the various *Veda-vākyas*.

Except the earlier mentioned exceptions, everywhere else this is the *Mīmāṃsā* principle. The *kartā* alone is the enjoyer of the fruit. Hence, one should never doubt thinking that there is a self-contradiction or mutual opposition in the *adhikāraṇas* or the lack of any principle in the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra*, for all these together are called śāstra. Such a usage is generally accepted in practice also.

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Śrī Ram Sharma

Reply 3

Comments on 'Does *Mīmāṃsā* treat the theory of *karma* as *purva pakṣa*'

[In *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 2, January-April 1994, a query was raised entitled 'Does *Mīmāṃsā* treat the theory of *karma* as *purva pakṣa*?' The issue raised in the query was summarized in Sanskrit at Tirupati and circulated amongst eminent *Mīmāṃsā* scholars in the tradition. Replies were received from Dr. N.S.R. Tatacharyaswami, Shri Surya Prakash Shastri, Shri E.S. Varadacharya, Shri L. Laxminarayan Murti Sharma, Shri N.K. Ramanuja Tatacharya and Shri N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. The replies received from them were translated from the original Sanskrit into English by Pt. Kalanath Shastri of Jaipur. The same are published herewith along with the English translation of the summary in Sanskrit sent to these scholars by Professor S.B. Raghunathacharya, the Vice-Chancellor of the Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati. The Sanskrit originals will be published in the next issue of *JICPR*, so that concerned scholars may judge for themselves the adequacy of the translation into English and point out the deficiencies, if any—Editor.

Vol. XII, No.3

Daya Krishna

A Gist-(Essence) of Prof. Daya Krishna's Query

Jaimini establishes the rule that one who does the *karma*, gets its *phala*. Then he raises the question regarding *yajamāna* and *ṛtvikas* and then expounds the theory that since a *yajamāna* is not able to do the whole *karma* other than *utsarga* (Release of the *dravya* for the gods) and *dakṣiṇādāna* (defraying the fees of *ṛtvika*). The *yajamāna* does these two *karmas*—*utsarga* and *dakṣiṇādāna* which are his *karma*.

But in different section Jaimini raises the question—who will get the desired *phala*? Will the *phala* go to the *yajamāna* or the *adhvaryu*? In the first *adhikaraṇa* he propounds the theory that the *phala* is to be prayed for the *yajamāna* alone. Elsewhere, in a different section, he says the *phala* is to be prayed for the *adhvaryu* if the apportionment of the *phala* to *adhvaryu* contributes some benefit to the *karma* as such. Again, in a different section he says 'If there is a specific mention that the *phala* will go to *adhvaryu*—then it is only to be prayed for *adhvaryu*.'

Here the doubt arises whether Jaimini accepts the principle that whoever does the *karma*, its *phala* goes to him only.

Comments

1. Jaimini accepts the theory that whoever does the *karma* gets the *phala*. Now, if the *yajamāna* is unable to do the whole *karma* himself; he hires the *ṛtvikas* who help him in the *karma*. Thus, in the main *karma*, the *yajamāna* is the doer (*kartā*), in its accessories, the *ṛtvikas*. This difference, of course, exists. But the doership (*kartṛtva*) applies to the *yajamāna* also, although it may be one of the two kinds, the actual (or main: *mukhya*) doership and the causer-doership: *prayojaka kartṛtva*. Therefore, if the *phala* goes to the *yajamāna*, there is no contradiction.

Now, there may be the doubt—why in a different section the *phala* is mentioned for the *adhvaryu*? There we say that if in a *karma* which is auxiliary or accessory—the *phala* is denoted or attributed to *adhvaryu* or alternatively, by a common dual number the *phala* is attributed or apportioned to both—there alone the *phala* is said to go to the *adhvaryu*. Nowhere else does the *phala* go to the hired *adhvaryu*. It goes only to the *yajamāna*. The *karmas* of hired *adhvaryus* reap fruit not to them but to *yajamāna*.

N.S.R. Tatacharyaswami

2. One may raise a doubt that if the *ṛtvikas* do the *karma* but the *phala* goes to the *yajamāna*—how the doership and the readership exist in two different agents? In that case the *phala* should not go to the *yajamāna*. But his is not the case. The *bhāṣya* clearly says that since the *yajamāna* does the *utsarga*, by that deed he does the whole thing. Therefore, we cannot

say that the *yajamāna* is not the doer. There is not *kartṛtva's abhāva* in the *yajamāna*. This is the *samādhāna*.

Surya Prakāś Śāstri

3. The doubt is said to be—when the hired *ṛtvikas* do the different auxiliary partial *karma kalāpās*—but the *yajamāna* who is the causer or sponsor (*prayojaka*) *kartā* gets the *phala*. Applying the same logic we can ask—in a prayer to *Agni* and *Viṣṇu* which is offered by the *adhvaryu* that the *Agni* and *Viṣṇu* should not be furious with him nor should *Agni* burn or scorch him, why its *phala* also not go to the *yajamāna* who is the sponsor? Wherever the *phala* is said to go to *adhvaryu*, why that also should not go to the *yajamāna* since he is the sponsor? The *samādhāna* is that the *phala* of the whole *karma* goes to the *yajamāna* but not of the contributory *karmas* which are auxiliary for the completion of the *karma* itself. Now, the prayer is only regarding not scorching the *adhvaryu* while he is doing the *karma*. Hence, there is no contradiction. As regards the doubt as to why should the *yajamāna* do only the *utsarga* and all the other works are to be done by the *ṛtvikas*, these doubts have been settled by the *sūtrakāra* himself in the two *sūtras*—3-7-19 and 3-7-20.

E.S. Varadacharya

4. A. *Kartā* is defined in two ways by *Śāstras*, '*Svatanttra Kartā*' that is the doer *per se* and also *tatprayojaka hetuśca*—the cause which gets the doer to do the *karma* can also be called *kartā*. Hence the *kartṛtva* lies in the causer also.

B. Now, the doubt may arise why is there the use of *ātmanepada* in '*yajeta*'—(which connotes direct result accruing to the doer). This can be settled by explaining that the doer himself and the causer, both are *kartās*, hence if the *karma phala* is going to either of them or to both, there is no contradiction. It can also be understood in the way that '*phala* should not go to the non-doer'; this was the intention, therefore *ātmanepada* is used.

C. It is obvious that the *yajamāna* cannot be the direct doer in all the *karmas*. '*ṛtvijo vṛaṇīte*' ordains that the *yajamāna* will hire (or select) the *ṛtvikas* and will also present *dakṣiṇā* to them. If the *yajamāna* were

to be the only and direct doer of all *karmas*, this ordaining *sūtra* would get infructuous.

Laxminarayan Murti Sharma

5. The point in question is 'tannosaha' ('the goodwill accrue to both of us together') is spoken by the *yajamāna*. How will one explain this? This can be settled in this way. The *phalas* of auxiliary or accessory (*aṅga*) *karmas* are also mentioned somewhere at times and they also are purported to be the *phalas* (but not therefore, the *phalas* of the principal *karma*). This is only *arthavāda*, and does not form the main *vidhi* because the auxiliary *karmas* do not yield any independent result. In the auxiliaries the *ṛtvikas* and in the principal the *kartā* directly gets the *phala* of *swargagamana*, etc. This is the distribution in the case of the principal and the auxiliary doers.

N.K. Ramanujatacharya

6. In the third *adhyāya*, 7th *pāda*, 7th *adhikaraṇa* of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* there are 3 *sūtras* which provide for a '*kartā* other than the *yajamāna*'. The first *sūtra* 93-7-180 reads—'Śāstra phalām, etc.' Śāstra ordains the *phala* for the performer since that is the principle—therefore, he should do the performance (approximate meaning of the *sūtra*). Here a doubt arises—whether the *yajamāna* himself will do all the works—*karmas* of *darśa* and *pūrṇamāsa yāga*, etc., including the principal *karma* and all auxiliary *karmas*? Or the *yajamāna* should be the *kartā*. in *haviṣṭasa* (release of the performance material) and *dakṣiṇādāna* (defraying of fees)—which is called *dravyotsarga* and in other works there should not be a hard and fast rule as to the *kartā*, that is, they may be done either by the *yajamāna* himself or, alternatively, by either the *yajamāna* or by others. Still another alternative is that such a strict rule is intended that in *dravyotsarga* only the *yajamāna* should be the *kartā* and in all other *karmas* only others should be *kartās*. On this a *pūrvapakṣa* is given—the *phala* intended by the *sūtra* '*swargakāmo yajeta*' (*yajāna* should be performed by one who wishes to go to *swarga*) goes to the doer who does the total *karma*, that is the principal and its accessory *karmas*. Why? Because it is provided. *Phala* is the result of the total performance which consists of the

pradhāna (principal *karma*) comprising auxiliaries. *Swargakāmo yajeta* epitomizes the triple idea of *aṅga*, *pradhāna* and *phala*. And, since the doer of the total whole (the principal *karma* supported by the accessories) is purported to reap the fruit, the *yajamāna* should be the *kartā* in the whole *karma* comprising the '*pradhāna* with the *aṅgabhūta* (auxiliary) *karmas*'. So far as the defraying of fees ordained by the *sūtra* '*ṛtvikebhyoḥ dakṣiṇām dadāti*' is concerned, it can be understood 'as not required' by explaining through *adrṣtakartā* as in '*atreyaya hiraṇyam dadāti*'. Therefore, the *yajamāna* himself will assume the title of *hotā*, *adhvaryu* etc., as and when he performs these rules. The following *sūtra* supports the second postulate—'*Utsarge na*' (as the *utsarga* or the release of money and material is the principal *karma*, therefore for doing the other auxiliary works there may be others (helpers) or he himself may do them. The principal *karma* is the release of material for the gods; therefore, the *yajamāna* is the *kartā* of this principal *karma*. As to the other accessory *karmas* they can be done by the *ṛtvikas* or by the *yajamāna* himself—there is no specific restriction. Hiring of *ṛtvikas* by giving fees is done only if you require the help of others. Now, help is required in the world only when one is unable to do it oneself. If there is no inability (there is ability), then the *yajamāna* should do everything himself. If there is inability then the auxiliaries should be got done by others. Only in that case the hiring and the fees will apply.

Now, one can argue that if there is inability in the *dravyotsarga* (release of material : the principal *karma*) also, then he can get it done by others. To settle this we shall forward the same answer—'*utsargetu pradhānatva—utsarga* is the principal *karma* and therefore release of material and defraying of fees is to be done by the *yajamāna* himself. Why? Because he is the *pradhāna*—the owner—therefore, he can give his material to others. One cannot give somebody else's property to others. This is provided by the *sūtra*—'*anyo vā syāta*' ('Or there may be another as there is provision of hiring, prohibiting the possibility of direct self'). Here *vā* means *aivam i.e.*, 'or' means 'only'—which transpires into saying that others only will be the doers (not he himself). Even if he is able to do

everything, and there is no inability, still the *yajamāna* will be *kartā* in *dravyotsarga* only. In all auxiliary works, only others will be *kartās*. Why? Because there is a mention of hiring. Hiring (*parikraya*) is employing of an employee by money. Defraying of fees is done for hiring. Such a hiring or giving of money is not possible for self. Why? Because it would be contradictory. How can one give fees to oneself. Giving requires cessation of ownership of self (the giver) and creation of ownership in the other (taker). Nor can you say that such a giving is prescribed only in case of inability of the *yajamāna*—because it is only in other-worldly affairs that in cases of inability other's help or hiring is required. But in the case of the *yajñā* the authority is the *śāstra* which gives clear understanding that the hiring ceremony is necessarily required. Since the *parikraya* (hiring) is ordained as a rule, the auxiliary *karmas* are to be performed by the hired persons alone.

Thus, it is proved that in *dravyotsarga* only the *yajamāna* is the principal *kartā*; in all other works he is only the causer *kartā*—and the commandment that one who wishes for *swarga* should perform *yajñā* contemplates both types of performership—that of direct or principal *kartā* and also that of indirect or causer *kartā*. Therefore, Jaimini's principle is: *Yajamāna* is the *kartā* in the principal *karma*, *ṛtvikas* are *kartās* in auxiliary *karmas*.

Now, some may doubt that Jaimini appears to have said something against this principle in the *sūtras* 25th to 29th of the 8th *Pāda* of the third *adhyaīya*. In order to set aside their doubt let us discuss the meanings of these *sūtras*.

'*Ṛtvika phalam...*' (Jaimini *sūtra* 3-8-25) [*Ṛtvika* gets the *phala* in contributory work if that is so ordained']. There are certain works which are prescribed for the *adhvaryu*. Hence kindling of *āhvaniya* fire and the *mantra* which is chanted at that time '*Mamāgne varcoḥ*', etc., are the *karma* of the *adhvaryu* and the prayer for that *karma*. Now, in this *karma* the *phala* prayed for by the *adhvaryu* should go to the *adhvaryu* himself as there is first person (*mama*) used by *adhvaryu* which means 'I should emerge virtuous'. This is the *pūrvapakṣa*. To ward off such interpretations

Jaimini gives another *sūtra* '*Svāmīno vā tadarthvyatu*'. ['There prayers should yield *phala* for the *swami*']. Here '*vā*' means '*aivam*' i.e., the *phala* prayed for should go to the *swami* 'alone' (not either-or). The *phala* is understood to be going to the *yajamāna* in spite of the fact that *ātmanepada* is used in '*yajeta*'. Therefore, here when *adhvaryu* says '*mama*', he virtually means—'to my *yajamāna*'. Just as the soldiers fight for the king, when they become victorious, the victory belongs to the king but the soldiers also say 'we have become victorious'; in the same way the first person here means the *yajamāna*. And this arrangement is approved by the Vedas also. Therefore, Jaimini says *lingdisichha*. (Jaimini *Sūtra* 3-8-27). When prayer is offered by *ṛtvikas* in the *yajñā* it is for *yajamāna* only. This interpretation clearly proves that in all such circumstances, the *phala* is purported to belong to the *yajamāna*.

This portion comprising three *sūtras* is devoted to establish that whatever *phalas* other than the principal *karma phalas* are mentioned or prayed, also go to the *yajamāna* in spite of being the *phalas* of auxiliary *karma*.

Now, we find that in a later portion the *phala* acquired by the supporting or auxiliary *mantras* is prescribed to be going to the *ṛtvikas*. For instance in *darśa* and *pūrnāmāsa* there is *dakṣiṇātikramaṇa mantra* '*agnaviṣṇu...*' etc., which means 'O Agni and O Viṣṇu (*agni—āhvaniya agni* and *Viṣṇu—yajña*, but here by the word *yajña—only havi*, the material of oblation is expressed)—let me not overtake or encroach you, Do not be enraged, and do not scorch me when I pass through the intermediate path which is between you both'. Here the *phala* of [the prayer of 'not scorching' is required to go to the *yajamāna* or to himself? This is the *śānkā*. On this according to the tradition described in the earlier sections, it should be explained as going to the *yajamāna*. This becomes the *pūrvapakṣa*. But it is not so. Therefore, he establishes the final principle—'*karmayam nu*'—[*sūtra* 3-8-28]. Here *nu* expresses exception.

He says that in such auxiliary *mantra*—conventionally the *phala* should be explained to be going to the *yajamāna* but looking to the prayer the *phala* should go to the *ṛtvikas* and not to the *yajamāna*. Why? 'For the

performance'. Absence of scorching, etc. is required only for the completion of the performance. If you get scorched, performance will not be completed. Therefore, according to the law, of property, the *ṛtvikas* must be praying for the *phala* to themselves. Now, 'you may question 'why then is. the *ātmanepada* used in *yajet* which indicates that the *phala* should go to the *kartā*.' To answer this he says that the main *yajamāna*, also prays that the *phala* should go to *ṛtvikas*. Because the *ṛtvikas* are doing the *karma* for *yajamāna*, therefore, the *yajamāna* prays that fire should not scorch his *ṛtvikas*. Hence, there is no contradiction in *ātmanepada*.

This proves that the *phala* prayed for is applied in a performance which is contributory, accessory or auxiliary then the *phala* can be explained as going to *ṛtvikas* also.

Then there is a *sūtra* 'Vyapadeśāstra' (3-8-29).

In *Jyotiṣtoma* there are four receptacles below the right receptacle for oblation material. In this the *yajamāna* places his hand and asks the *adhvaryu* 'O *Adhvaryu* what do you find here'. *Adhvaryu* replies 'Everything good'. Then the *yajamāna* says 'Let that good go to both of us'.

Here the *phala* should be supposed to go to the *yajamāna* alone because here it is not an auxiliary or accessory performance prayer which should be purported to be going to the *ṛtvikas* also. The dual number (both of us) is only formal and it really means singular. This is the *pūrvapakṣa*. But it is not acceptable. Therefore, he propounds the final principle '*Vyapdessauhh*'.

Here the 'good' is wished for both the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtvika* and hence it should go to both and not the *yajamāna* alone because there is a specific provision made here by the dual number. In other cases like '*mamgne varchh*', one may take recourse to *lakṣaṇa* but here the *ātmanepada* is expected by *divacana* which overrules *ātmanepada*. Therefore, because of the dual number the *phala* is explained as going to both.

Thus, finally it can be established that as a rule the *phala* goes to the *yajamāna* alone but as an exception, where the *phala* is only intermediary

or required to be effective for the auxiliary performance only—there the *phala* is explained to be going to *ṛtvika* also. And where an unequivocal and clear dual number, etc., clearly prescribe the *phala* for both, there the *phala* is explained as going to both. This is the intention of Jaimini. And, there is no contradiction.

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N.S.Ramanuja Tatacharya

Reply in the Sanskrit Original

श्री दयाकृष्णमहाभागानां प्रश्नस्य सारः

जैमिनिः कश्चित् कर्म करोति चेदेव फलं प्राप्नोति इति नियमं आश्रित्य पूर्वपक्षं प्रस्तूय यजमानस्य सर्वकर्माङ्गजातम् कर्तुमशक्तत्वात् परिक्रीतैः ऋत्विग्भिः उत्सर्गदक्षिणादानव्यतिरिक्तकर्मकरणं, उत्सर्गदक्षिणादाने च तत्कर्तव्ये इति सिद्धान्तितावान्।

परन्तु प्रकरणान्तरे स एव उद्दिष्टं आशासनीयं फलं यजमानस्याध्वर्योर्वा भवति इति शङ्कित्वा यजमानस्यैव फलमाशासनीयम् इति प्रथमेऽधिकरणे सिद्धान्तं कृतवान्। तदुपरि अधिकरणे अध्वर्योः फलमाशासनीयम्, यदि अध्वर्योः फलभागेन कर्मणो भवति उपकारः इति आह। अनन्तराधिकरणे यदि साक्षात् व्यपदेशः तदा अध्वर्योः फलमाशासनीयम् इति जगाद।

इदानीं संशयः—यः कर्म करोति तस्यैव फलमिति नियमः जैमिनिना स्वीकृतो वा न वेति।

डा. एन्. एस्. आर. तातचार्यस्वामि

यः कर्म करोति तस्यैव फलमिति जैमिनिना स्वीकृतमेव। यजमानस्य सर्वाङ्गकरणाशक्तेः ऋत्विजः परिक्रीताः तस्य साहाय्यं कुर्वन्ति। प्रधाने यजमानः कर्ता, अङ्गजाते ऋत्विज इति भेदेऽपि यजमानस्य सर्वस्मिन् कार्ये मुख्यप्रयोजककर्तृत्वयोरन्यतरस्य कर्तृत्वस्य सत्त्वात् तस्यैव फलमित्यत्र न विरोधः।

एवं चेत् प्रकरणान्तरे कथं अध्वर्योः फलं श्रूयते इति चेत् कर्मनिष्पत्त्यौपायिकं अध्वर्युफलं श्रूयते चेत्, अनन्यथासिद्धद्विचनादिना उभयोः फलं श्रूयते चेत्, तत्राध्वर्योः फलं स्वीक्रियते अन्यत्र कुत्रापि परिक्रीताध्वर्युकृतकर्मणां स्वफलार्थत्वं नास्ति, किन्तु यजमानफलार्थत्वमेवेति।

श्रीमन्तः सूर्यप्रकाशशस्त्रिणः

ऋत्विग्भिः कर्मकरणे यजमानेन फलभागे च फलभोक्तृत्वसमानाधिकरणकर्तृरूपाधिकारित्वं यजमानस्य न स्यादिति शङ्कया उत्सर्गमात्रं

कुर्वतापि यजमानेन सर्वकृतं भवतीति भाष्ये उक्तत्वात् न यजमानस्य कर्तृत्वाभाव इति समाधानम्।

श्रीमन्तः ई.एस्. वरदाचार्याः

योऽयं संशयः-परिक्रीतैः ऋत्विग्भिः यजमानस्य प्रयोजककर्तृत्वात् तस्य फलं भवितुमर्हति चेत्, अग्राविष्णू मावामवक्रमिषं इत्यादौ अध्वर्युकृतप्रार्थनायाः कथं तदीयफलजनकत्वं स्यात्? अन्येषु अध्वर्युकृतकर्मस्विव यजमानगामिफलजनकत्वं कुतो न स्यात् इति, तत्र समाधानम् कर्मजन्यफलमेव यजमानस्यैव नाध्वर्योः इति कथितम्। एतत्प्रार्थनायाः फलं तु कर्मसंपत्यर्थमसंतापरूपम्। इति न विरोधः। किमर्थं यजमानेनोत्सर्गमात्रं कर्तव्यम्। अन्यत् सर्वं ऋत्विग्भिरिति नियम इति शङ्का तु सूत्रकारेणैव समाहिता 3-7-19, 3-7-20 सूत्राभ्याम्।

श्रीमन्तः स. लक्ष्मीनारायणमूर्तिशर्माणः

- 1 स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता इति वत् तत्प्रयोजको हेतुश्चेति शास्त्रेण प्रयोजकस्यापि कर्तृत्वसिद्धिः।
- 2 न च यजेतेत्यात्मनेपदविरुद्धयते इति वाच्यम् तस्य साक्षात्प्रयोजकसाधारण्येन अकर्तारि फलप्रतिषेधकत्वेन वोपपत्तेः।
- 3 न च सर्वकर्मसु यजमानस्य साक्षात्कर्तृत्वं संभवि, 'ऋत्विजो वृणीते' इत्युक्त ऋत्विग्वरणस्य दक्षिणादानस्य च श्रौतस्य वैयर्थ्यापत्तेः।

श्रीमन्तः ना. कृ. रामानुजताताचार्याः

'तन्नो सहे' त्यत्र यत् अध्वर्योः फलं कथितं तत् कथं संगच्छते इति प्रश्नः। अत्रेदं समाधानम्-अङ्गफलकीर्तनस्य तत्त्वेन न तात्पर्यम्, किन्तु अर्थवादत्वमेव, अङ्गानां स्वातन्त्र्येण फलाभावात्। अत्र अङ्गेषु ऋत्विक्-द्वारा, प्रधाने तु स्वयमेवेति साङ्गप्रधानकर्तुः स्वर्गादिफलभोक्तृत्वमिति।

एन्. एस्. रामानुजताताचार्यः

पूर्वमीमांसायां तृतीयाध्याये सप्तमे पादे सप्तमेऽधिकरणे (यजमानभिन्नकर्त्रन्तर प्रतिपादनपरि) त्रीणि सूत्राणि। तत्र प्रथमं सूत्रं- 3-7-18

"शास्त्रपुत्रं प्रयोक्तारि तल्लक्षणत्वात् तस्मात् स्वयं प्रयोगे स्यात्" इति। तत्रैवं संशयः दर्शपूर्णमासादिकं कर्म किं साङ्गप्रधानं सर्वयजमानेन कर्तव्यम्? उत हविस्त्याग-दक्षिणादानात्मके द्रव्योत्सर्गे यजमानः कर्ता, अन्यत्र यजमानोऽन्यो वेत्यनियमः, किं वा द्रव्योत्सर्गे यजमानः कर्ता, अन्यत्र त्वन्य एवेति नियमः इति। तत्र पूर्वपक्षः-

'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इति शास्त्रगम्यं फलं प्रयोक्तारि - साङ्गकर्मकुर्वाणे भवति। कुतः तल्लक्षणत्वात्- फलस्य साङ्गप्रधानानुष्ठाननिमित्तकत्वात्। 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इति साङ्गप्रधानभावनायाः व्यंशयाः फले निधानात्। यतश्च साङ्गप्रधानकर्तुरिव फलमवगतम्, तस्माद्धेतोः स्वयं यजमान एव साङ्गप्रधानानुष्ठाने कर्ता स्यात्।

"ऋत्विग्यो दक्षिणां ददाति इति दानविधिस्तु आत्रेयाय हिरण्यं ददाति" इतिवत् अदृष्टार्थतयाप्युपपद्यते यजमानस्यैव होता अध्वर्युः इत्यादिसमाख्या तत्तत् कर्मनिमित्तिका भविष्यति।

अथ द्वितीयपक्षप्रतिपादकं सूत्रम्-"उत्सर्गे तु प्रधानत्वात् शेषकारी प्रधानस्य तस्मादन्यः स्वयं वा स्यात्" यजमानस्य देवतोद्देश्यकद्रव्योत्सर्गात्मके भाग एव कर्तृत्वस्य मुख्यत्वात् प्रधानस्य शेषकारी- अङ्गानां कर्ता तस्मात्- यजमानात् अन्यः ऋत्विक् स्वयं वा- यजमानो वा स्यात् इत्यनियमः। ऋत्विजां दक्षिणया परिक्रयो हि सहायार्थमन्यापेक्षायां भवति। सहायापेक्षा नाशक्तावेव लोके दृष्टा। ततश्च शक्तौ सत्यां यजमान एवं सर्वं साङ्गप्रधानं करोति। अशक्तौ तु अन्येनाङ्गानि कारयितव्यानि। परिक्रयाविधिश्च तत्रैव दृष्टोर्थो भविष्यति।

ननु तर्हि अशक्तौ सत्यां द्रव्योत्सर्गेऽप्यन्यस्य कर्तृत्वं स्वादित्यत्राप्येतदेवोत्तरम्- उत्सर्गे तु प्रधानत्वात् इति। उत्सर्गे तु देवतोद्देश्यकद्रव्यत्यागे दक्षिणादाने च यजमान एव कर्ता स्यात् प्रधानत्वात् स्वामित्वात्। न ह्यन्यदीयं द्रव्यमन्यस्मा उत्सृष्टुं शक्नुयात्।

अथ सिद्धान्तसूत्रम्- "अन्यो वा स्यात् परिक्रयसामानानाप्रतिषेधात्।" वाशब्द एवार्थः। सत्यामपि शक्तौ द्रव्योत्सर्ग एव यजमानः कर्ता। अन्यत्र तु अङ्गजातेऽन्य एव कर्ता। कुतः? परिक्रयामानात्। परिक्रयो नाम द्रव्यदानेन भृत्यस्मीकरणम्। तदर्थं दक्षिणादानविधानादित्यर्थः। तत्र दक्षिणादानं प्रत्यगात्मनि- स्वस्मिन् न संभवति। कुतः? विप्रतिषेधात्-विरोधात्। न हि स्वस्मै स्वयमेव दातुं प्रभवति, दानस्य स्वस्वत्वपरित्यागपूर्वकपरस्वत्वापादनार्थकत्वात्। न च परिक्रयविधिः अशक्तयजमानविषयक इति वक्तुं युक्तम्। लोके प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणवशात् अशक्तौ सत्यां अन्यस्य परिक्रयेऽपिमानान्तरागोरस्यभागस्य नित्यच्छुत्परिक्रयविधिबलेन नित्यमेव परिक्रीतपुरुषकर्तृकाङ्गसाध्यत्वावगमात्।

तथा चैतत् सिद्ध द्रव्योत्सर्गे यजमानस्य मुख्यकर्तृत्वम्, तदितरत्र तु अङ्गजाते प्रयोजककर्तृत्वम्। उभयसाधारणकर्तृत्वमेव च स्वर्गकामवाक्यादवगम्यत इति। प्रधाने यजमानः कर्ता, अङ्गजाते ऋत्विजः कर्तारः इति जैमिनीसिद्धान्तः।

एतत्सिद्धान्तविरुद्धतया जैमिनिः तृतीयाध्यायाष्टमपादे 25 तः 29 पर्यन्तेषु सूत्रेषु किमप्युक्तवानिव दृश्यते इति केचित् आशङ्कन्ते । तन्निराकरणाय तेषु सूत्रेषूक्तं विषयं प्रथमतः पश्यामः।

सू. ऋत्विक्फलं करणेष्वर्थवत्त्वात् (जै. सू. 3-8-25) आध्वर्यमिति समाख्याबलात् ऋत्विक्कर्तृकं यत् समित्प्रक्षेपेण आहवनीयाग्निप्रज्वालनरूपमन्याधानं तत्करणतया “ममाग्ने वर्चो विद्वेष्वस्तु वंशं त्वेन्धानास्तनुवं पुषेमेति पूर्वमग्निं गृह्णति” इति वाक्येन विनियुक्तो यो ममाग्ने वर्चः इत्यादिमन्त्रः तत्प्रकाशं वर्चः प्रभृतिफलं ऋत्विजः एव मन्त्रस्यैव मम इत्यस्मच्छब्देन तस्यैव मुख्यवृत्त्या बाधनात् इति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तः।

स्वामिना वा तदर्थत्वात्। (जै. सू. 3-8-26) इति। वाशब्दोऽवधारणे। मन्त्रप्रयोक्त्रा अध्वर्युणा वर्चः प्रभृति फलं स्वामिनः यजमानस्यैव आशासितव्यम्। तदर्थत्वात्-यजेत इत्यात्मनेपदश्रुत्या साङ्गप्रधानभावनाविषयाङ्गफस्यापि यजमानगामित्वावगमात्। तथा च मन्त्रस्थस्य ममेति शब्दस्य मदीयस्य यजमानस्येत्यर्थः। यथा राजनि वर्तमानं जयं अस्माकमिति वदन्ति सैनिकाः तथायं मम देशः।

वेदसंमतश्चायं न्यायः इत्याह- लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च (जै.सू. 3-8-27) वाक्ये शेषादित्यर्थः। “यां वै कांचन यज्ञे ऋत्विज आशिषमाशासते यजमानस्यैव सा” इति वाक्यशेषो यजमानफलमेव एवं जातीयकेषु सिद्धवत् दर्शयति, वैशब्दस्य प्रसिद्धिद्विधोक्तत्वात्। अतोऽपि याजमानमेव फलमिह विवक्षितम्।

त्रिसूत्रेणानेनाधिकरणे क्वचित्करणमन्त्रप्रकाशितं फलम् ऋत्विज एव इति स्थापितम्। तथा हि- अस्ति दर्शपूर्णमासयोः दक्षिणातिक्रमणमन्त्रः- “अग्नाविष्णु मा वामवक्रमिषं विजिहायां मा मा संतामम्” इति। अग्निः आहवनीयाग्निः। विष्णुर्यज्ञः। “यज्ञो वै विष्णुः” इति श्रुतेः। यज्ञसाधनं वेद्यामासन्नं हविरिह विवक्षितम् । हे अग्नाविष्ण आहवनीयहविषी। वां- युवाम्, मावक्रमिषं नाक्रमेयम्। विजिहायां-मयि कोपं त्यजतम्। मा-मां युवयोरन्तरा दक्षिणा अतिक्रामन्तं मा संतापतम्-न संतापयतमित्यर्थः। अत्रासंतापलक्षणं फलं किमध्वर्युणा यजमानगतमाशासनीयम् उत स्वगतम्।? इति संशये पूर्वाधिकरणन्यायेन यजमानगामि फलमेव आशास्यमिति प्राप्ते सिद्धान्तयति- कर्मार्थं तु फलं तेषां स्वामिनं प्रत्यर्थवत्त्वात् सू.3-8-28 तुशब्दः वैष्ये। “ममाग्ने वर्चः” इत्येवंजातीयकेषु करणमन्त्रेषु याजमानस्यैव फलस्य आशास्यत्वेऽपि “मा संतामम्” इत्येवंजातीयकेषु करणमन्त्रेषु तेषां- ऋत्विजामेव संबंधि असंतापलक्षणं फलमाशास्यं न तु यजमानगामि। कुतः? यतः कर्मार्थम्- असंतापादिलक्षणं हि फलं कर्मसिद्धयौपयिकम्। न हि

संतापादिदोषग्रस्ताः कर्म कर्तुं शक्नुवन्ति। ततः सामर्थ्यात् ऋत्विग्भिः स्वात्मन्येवासंतापादिलक्षणं फलम् आशासनीयम्। नन्वेवं सति यजेत इत्यात्मनेपदश्रुतिविरोध इत्यत आह-स्वामिनं प्रत्यर्थत्वात् इति। अर्थ्यते प्रार्थ्यत इत्यर्थः कर्मणि घञ। प्रार्थनीयत्वात् इत्यर्थः। ऋत्विग्गतस्यैव असंतापादिरूपफलस्य स्वकीयकर्माविघातार्थं स्वामिना यजमानेन प्रार्थनीयत्वात् नात्मनेपदश्रुतिविरोधः।

अनेन यजमानकर्तृकर्मसिद्धयोपयिकं चेत् ऋत्विग्गतमपि फलं स्वीक्रियत इति सूत्रितम्।

अनन्तरसूत्रं- व्यपदेशाच्च (सू.3-8-29) इति। ज्योतिष्टोमे दक्षिणस्य हविर्धानशकटस्य अधस्तात् चत्वारः उपरवाख्याः अवटाः। तत्र मिथो हस्तौ निवेश्य अध्वर्युं यजमानः पृच्छति- ‘अध्वर्यो किमत्र’ इति। “भद्रम्” इत्यध्वर्युः प्रतिवक्ति। ततः “तन्नौ सह” इति यजमान आह। तत्-पूर्वमन्त्रप्रस्तुतं भद्रं नौ आवयोः अध्वर्युयजमानयोः व्यासक्तं भवतु इत्यर्थः।

अत्र भद्ररूपफलस्य असंतापादिवत् कर्मसिद्धयनौपयिकतया अध्वर्युगामित्वेन रूपेण यजमानेन प्रार्थनीयत्वाभावात् यजेत इत्यात्मनेपदानुरोधाच्च यजमानगाम्येव भद्राख्यं फलं विवक्षितम्। नौ इति द्विवचनमेकत्वे लाक्षणिकमिति पूर्वपक्षे प्राप्ते सिद्धान्तयति व्यपदेशाच्च इति।

चः भिन्नक्रमः। भद्रलक्षमिदं फलं यजमानस्य अध्वर्योश्च ह विवक्षितम्। कुतः ? व्यपदेशात्-नौ इति विचनेन विशिष्य उभयनिर्देशात्। “ममाग्ने वर्चः” इत्यादौ अजहत्स्वार्थलक्षणया मम इत्यस्य अस्मदीयस्वामिनः इत्यर्थाश्रयणात् स्वार्थत्यागाभावात् युक्तमात्मनेपदश्रुत्या लिङ्गबोधनम्। इह द्विवचनस्य एकत्वे लक्षणाभ्युपगमे स्वार्थस्य द्वित्वस्य अत्यन्तबाधप्रसंगात्। आत्मनेपदश्रुतेरेव द्विवचनं बाधकम्। अतश्च द्विवचनबलात् ऋत्विग्यजमानोभयगाम्येव फलम् आशास्यमिति सिद्धम्।

एवं च उत्सर्गतः यजमानगाम्येव फलम्। कर्मनिष्पत्त्यौपयिकत्वे श्रूयमाणं चेत् त्रिविगतमपि फलमभ्युपगम्यते। यत्र तु अनन्यथासिद्धाविचनानि उभयोः फलं श्रुतं तत् तथैत्रं अङ्गीक्रियते इति व्यवस्था जैमिनेरभिमतम्। नात्र कोऽपि पूर्वापरिविरोधः।

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Can a *Niṣkāma Karma* have really no effects?

By almost all modern writers on classical Indian Philosophy, it has been taken as an axiomatic or an almost axiomatic truth that an action done with absolutely no desire for any consequence of it (a *niṣkāma*

karma) does not produce any effect, good, bad or good-bad, to experience which its doer would have to be reborn after his physical death. It would be like a fried seed which does not germinate to grow into a plant. Let us call a rebirth-causing effect a moral effect. It is also admitted, however, that a *nişkāma karma* would still be a cause which would produce an empirical effect, as a *sakāma karma*, an action done with a desire to produce a particular effect, would. Let us call this kind of effect naturalistic. Assuming that Arjuna fights the *Mahābhārata* war in a *nişkāma* way, his arrow hits unarméd Karna's neck, cuts off his head, and kills him as a *sakāma* act of targeting him by the great archer Arjuna would have done. But Kṛṣṇa would say it would not have any moral effect requiring Arjuna to be reborn because he has killed him in a *nişkāma* way. But why does a *nişkāma karma* not have a moral effect, does not seem to have been raised in the Indian Philosophical tradition, what to speak of its having been satisfactorily, or even half-satisfactorily, answered.

Secondly, a desire is a feature of the psychology of a person, of that of the agent in the case of an action. Therefore, only he knows, and none else, whether or not he has one is doing an action.

Thirdly, in the case of an unconscious desire, or of self-deception, even the agent may not know that he has a desire to get a particular result by doing an action. Therefore, as a general case, no outsider, and in the latter cases, not even the agent himself, would be able to authentically know that an action of his is *nişkāma*. This means that neither the concept of *nişkāma karma*, nor a *nişkāma karma* is instantiable with certitude, making the prescription of *nişkāma karma* unusable or inapplicable. A prescription which cannot be acted upon, since 'ought' implies 'can' would naturally become void or defunct.

Vol. XVIII, No. 1

Rajendra Prasad

Reply : On Notes by Professor Rajendra Prasad: Can a *Niškāma Karma* Have Reality No Effect?

Apparently Professor Prasad's Notes on 'Can a *Niškāma Karma* have really no effect', appears relevant but if we view the concept of *nişkāma*

karma in the constitution of the *Gitā*, several questions arise against Professor Prasad's observation made in his notes. Let me first summarize Professor Prasad's basic assumptions for further observation.

1. That *nişkāma karma* is a cause and, thus, would produce an empirical effect and, hence, it can not be taken different from moral actions.
2. That desire is subjective and there is no proof to know that ones action is *nişkāma* (desireless).
3. That it is a prescription and a prescription that cannot be acted upon would naturally become defunct.

According to the *Gitā*, *nişkāma karma* (disinterested actions) can be performed in two ways. First, by considering oneself as a divine agent unconcerned with fruits which are not assigned to him (*nimittamātra bhavārjunah*). Secondly, by spontaneity, of the wise or realize, which is assigned as ones own true nature. Taking the former, in view, the issues raised there in Professor Prasad's notes seem worth considering while from the latter view it seems right to say that these assumptions of Professor Prasad are the result of his infatuation with moral cause-effect theory and can be reverted by placing the true position of the concept of *nişkāma karma*.

To begin with the former view it can be said that it is easier to practice desire less actions by putting oneself in a position of an agent but for that reason his actions cannot be included among those causes effectuating moral effects because desires for such effects or such effects themselves are not the motivating factor in that case. Even the desire for practicing desireless actions may be taken as the motivating factor but for that reason desireless action may not be accepted as producing some moral effect because such a motivation is not for a moral effect.

In this presentation I have emphasized the latter view of *nişkāma karma* for which the *Gitā* is a philosophy of realization of all is spirit and *nişkāma karma* is the action of spirit and that is the only way for a doer to free himself from the circle of birth and death earned by desirous actions consequential to merits and demerits. With the preliminary note let us examine Professor Prasad's assumptions.

So far as the first assumption is concerned, as we say that there is no harm if we try to understand the concept of *niṣkāma karma* in view of cause-effect relation. In that case it may be accepted as a cause- a distinguished cause effectuating a distinguished effect. The *Gītā* means to say that *niṣkāma karma* leads to redemption from the bonds of birth and death. But can we take *niṣkāma karma* as a cause similar to one effectuating moral effects and can redemption be taken as the effect similar to moral effects? Absolutely not. Because neither is *niṣkāma karma* a *karma* similar to an ordinary *karma* prompted by a desire and effort that effectuate an effect, moral or religious, nor is the liberation a position that requires desires and efforts for actions. Spontaneity is recommended by the text as the nature of the action of a liberated (*sthitaprajñya*) Spontaneous actions are defined as those in which there is involvement neither of any desire nor of any effort but as natural flow of consciousness. Of a *Niṣkāma Karma/sthitaprajñya*. As both of the concepts of the *niṣkāma karma* and of the doer neither of the two can be put in the same category of moral actions and their doer respectively. All desirous actions produce result, good or bad, to be enjoyed by the doer in this life and the life-after. According to the *Gītā* if one performs meritorious actions one earns merit on the basis of which one enjoys heaven and in case of evil one gets demerit and accordingly enjoys hell. Ultimately, after enjoying merits/ demerits in heaven/ hell, one has to be back in this world of birth and death (*kṣiṇe puṇye martyalokamaviśanti, Gītā 9/21*).

Unlike desirous actions there is no fear of earning merit or demerit by *karma* because of the reason that there is neither any desire nor any effort involved in those actions which according to the *Gītā* are neither an action of an unconscious person or unconscious action itself not an effortful purposive action producing merits or demerits, but are natural flow (*vaibhavam*) of the spirit.

So far as the second assumption of Professor Prasad is concerned, it may well be mentioned here that the consciousness of a liberated one, for whom the *niṣkāma karma* is assigned as nature of soul, is beyond the subjective and objective, world of ours and that to whom the question of

subjective and objective, which is applicable only to test the validity of our empirical knowledge, is not applicable properly. The knowledge is self-veridical and one can test their validity by observing the nature of their actions different from his own also. The *Gītā* maintains the difference of the knowledge and action of a person with the sense of duality and desires and that of with a sense of unity and desirelessness in which the former is the case of moral-world with rational justifications and proofs while the latter transcends the bonds of morality. Here, it is necessary to clarify that the *Gītā* does not mean that a *niṣkāma karmi* overlooks the merits of moral and immoral actions but that his actions, being natural flow of spirit, cannot be estimated by the criteria of being moral and immoral. These flows may be interpreted as moral or immoral but for the greater cause of establishing spontaneity as the nature operating creation, preservation and destruction as the universe, they are sports of the disinterested Krishan for the well-being of the universe (*Na me pārthā asti kartavyam triśulokeṣu kincana. Nānavāptamavāptavyam varteva ca karmaṇi Gītā 3/22; see also 3/25*).

The question as to how do we know that a person is non-desirous in his performances can significantly be asked. A Person is known to be desirous by the action he performs. Here the desire-ness is inferred on the basis of perception of action done according to the desire. This is not the case with the actions performed by one who transcends the world of desire and non-desire. The question of differentiating, male and female and others implied, does not arise for those who have transcended the difference of bodies and realize the same spirit in all. Professor Prasad is right in saying that only he can know and not others about the desirelessness of his actions but his statement has superficially to do with correct position of verity of omniscience. However one can very well infer desirelessness of a *niṣkāma karmi* by observing the luminosity (*karmaṣu kauśalam*) of truth and beauty flowing from his soul as dynamism of spirit, the all-pervading. Being. As these actions are determined neither by any desire, interest, purpose nor by other determinants, there is no fear of dropping off those actions in any adverse circumstances (*pratyavāyo na*

vidyate, *Gītā* 2/40). Not only that but what a *niṣkāma karmī* does is followed up by the world as a proven way to the welfare (*sa yatpramānamkurute lokastadanuvartate, Gītā* 3/21).

In view of the third and the last assumption of Professor Prasad it can be said that *niṣkāma-karma* is not a prescription that cannot be acted upon and hence defunct but it, in the *Gītā*, is a spontaneous flow or overwhelming of the spirit of a *niṣkāma karmī* and, hence, it is natural action assigned to the spirit and not purposive. It is important here to note that the *Gītā*, unlike Śāṅkara-Vedānta, accepts natural/ spontaneous actions of a *Jivana mukta* (liberated self) as its very nature and thus provides dynamism with the concept of it. It is dynamic and not static. As a *Jivanamukta*, in the *Gītā*, is *āptakāma, ātmārāma* and *Parama niṣkāma*, the question of any desire, to be fulfilled by actions motivated by those desires, does not arise in its case. Conclusively it can be said that *niṣkāma karma* is not a *karma*, as it is ordinarily taken, but natural flow of the spirit. As there is no desire, no purpose to be fulfilled by efforts, the question of 'ought implies can' does not arise significantly in case of the concept of *niṣkāma karmī* and for that reason *niṣkāma karma* cannot be taken void. *Niṣkāma karma* is the natural flow of the *niṣkāma karmī* and this flow is not motivated by desire or by any effect and, hence, not only the charge of it as void is void but any attempt to include it in the field of morality is also void.

Vol. XIX, No.1

D.N.Tiwari

Reply to Dr. Rajendra Prasad's Note Entitled 'Can a Nishkāma Karma Have Really No Effects'? In *JICPR*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, January-March 2001, p. 242

A Little bit of hermeneutical exercise and a correlation between two dominant theories of 'Cosmic vision' (*vishvarupadarsana*) and 'motiveless action' (*nishkāma karma*) would be inevitable if one were to meet the challenge which Dr. Rajendra-Prasad has posed to modern writers on classical Indian philosophy. The theory of *vishvarupa*, which Krishna wants Arjuna to capture in the *Bhagavadgita* and which is deterministic in its

essence, maintains that the entire cosmic process has for its dynamics and organization Krishan, *Purushottama* or God himself. Nothing in the cosmic process would therefore fall outside the ultimate and absolute divine agency, transcendental to and engineering each one of its constituents. *Vishvarupa darsana* is delivered by Krishna to Arjuna in order to convey to the latter that he (Arjuna) is a tool or an instrument of *Brahman* (the total Reality), which Krishna personifies. Arjuna, like any individual, lies embedded in the cosmic system which is pre-set and pre-determined by Brahman. So far as the self-expression of *Brahman* is concerned, one has to watch it in the unfolding of cosmic history, the unfolding of the cosmos in history, the spirit of the history being Krishna or God himself.

The deterministic philosophy implicit in the metaphor of cosmic vision in the *Bhagavadgītā* is like the deterministic view put forth in the physicalist and materialist theory of human consciousness so widely prevalent in the so-called 'Consciousness Studies' today. This deterministic philosophy, upheld by some of the eminent neuroscientists in the study of consciousness (such as, Daniel Dennett, Patricia Smith Churchland, Bernard Baars, Francis Crick, B.Libet, to name a few), states that the micro units of our brain-the neurons-possess chemical, physiological, biological properties which have been thrown up by the whole cosmic evolutionary process over which the only control that prevails is of the laws of nature. We are thus the products of this evolutionary drama and our decision-making, thinking, perceiving, imagining, feeling, desiring, and all other so-called 'mental' acts are given rise to by the basic neuronal networks within our brain.. This 'scientific' knowledge is commensurate to the *Brahmanjnāna* (the knowledge of Reality) Krishna offers to Arjuna. Thus Arjuna is told that whatever his actions, motivated (*sakāma*) or motiveless (*nishkāma*), their real source or *raison d'être* is not he (Arjuna) himself but Krishna or God or *Brahman* (the creator of Time, History, Matter and Consciousness). There is no reason, Krishna appears to convey to Arjuna by means of the deterministic philosophy of *vishvarupadarsana*, why the latter should be tied to the 'moral effect' of his acts. The real authorship of Arjuna's acts, Krishan

suggests to him, does not go to him (Arjuna) but to omniscient Krishna. Why should Arjuna's heart, Krishna seems to argue, carry the burden of having done right or wrong when he is made to do what he does by the ultimate and absolute divine power (by the 'neuronal firings' or 'neuronal oscillations' to use physicalists' terminology) and be responsible for the fruits of his acts which may emerge in this life or in the next life?

Vishvarupadarsana is, in the physicalist and materialist language of some of the pioneer researchers in 'Consciousness Studies', the vision one can be expected to have about the functioning of the neuronal networks at the foundation of human (mental) behaviour, all of these networks are not fully mapped out so far. This does not indeed mean that Arjuna is not aware of his freedom to fight or not to fight, but this awareness, Krishna tries to convince him, results from his *abhimāna*, i.e., his self-esteem, which for Krishna is the consequence of his naivete or lack of *Brahmanjñāna*. Even this self-esteem, or/and naivete, would result from certain types of neuronal firings.

Hermeneutically speaking, Krishna wants Arjuna to develop an attitude toward himself, toward his role in the *Mahabhārata* war, and realize the fact that it is not he (Arjuna) who is the final maker of history. Arjuna is told by Krishna (God) that he is just an 'occasion' (*nimittamātra*) devised by Krishna for the fulfillment of a schema whose creator and energizer is Krishna himself.

Dr. Prasad's retort 'why does a *nishkama karma* not have a moral effect, does not seem to have been raised in the Indian philosophical tradition, what to speak of its having been satisfactorily, or even half-satisfactorily, answered' would lose its sharpness when one would observe that only a free action would invite a moral effect, and that the *Brahmanjñāna* which Krishna delivers to Arjuna would expect him to realize that as a part and parcel of the divine schema he is bound to act, not out of freedom but out of some sort of supernatural order. 'You are not the originator of history Arjuna. You should abandon the pride that you are able to make it or unmake it. Do not be gleeful if the results of your acts take place as anticipated by you and do not be sorrowful if they

go against your anticipations,' Krishna's advice to Arjuna, who according to Krishna a know-nothing like any one of us, would be.

Dr. Prasad's second and third points may overtly appear to be of psychological nature but they are discernible from the notion of cosmic vision (*vishvarupadarsana*). Surely, so far as the psychological truth is concerned, it is difficult to imagine that there could be a 'desireless' or 'motiveless' action. As Dr. Prasad points out, a desire in certain cases would be unconscious, or unknown to the agent of the action, or the agent could dwell in self-deception. However, whatever the status of the desire, if the agent who has developed the attitude of interpreting himself and his existence in the world as a result of his having captured the cosmic vision, or from the deterministic paradigm emanating from his adherence to physicalism or materialism according to which all the neuronal networks must be unfolded if one were to comprehend oneself and one's decisions, he would be convinced of his instrumentality in relation to the order of nature. With such knowledge, one would have to only surrender to the circumstances (as Krishna would advise Arjuna to surrender to the divine order) without being pre-occupied with the desire or motive or goal of his actions. He should thus be called a *niskāma karmī*, because with the death of his *abhimāna*, or of the sense of authorship, or of the ego, he would act with the desire of motive in him lying absolutely still. This is an ideal state (called by the *Bhagavadgīta* the *sthita-prajña state*) that would result from a person's being convinced that he is merely a speck in the entire cosmic wheel, or, to use the language of physicalists and materialists in 'Consciousness Studies', a system neurophysiologically, neurobiologically and neurochemically pre-set by nature and its laws.

Arjuna is not free not to fight the war, just as any given person is not free to conduct himself in a way which is not prescribed by the neuronal make-up of his. The *Bhagavadgīta* has extremely thoughtfully woven within it a determinism which is anchored in theism; the physicalists, materialists and naturalists have woven within their study of the neuronal chart of human beings a determinism whose final frame of reference is the complexity of nature.

Mithyātvā in Advaitā

If there were no snake at all, would it still be possible to mistake a rope for a snake?

Reply

First of all, let me say that such a question will be relevant if the question was re-written into this form—'If there were no snake at all in this universe...'

This question aims at the theory of मिथ्यात्व posited by Advaitins. The word मिथ्या is pathetically mistaken by almost all the opponents of Advaita. It is generally mistaken into the meaning of अत्यन्तासत् non-existent. This fact is clearly explained in the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusudana-Saraswati. A thing can be मिथ्या or false when it is wrongly felt in another substratum. Advaita vedanta cannot be synonymous with *shunyavada* (in its literal sense) or *Atyantasattva vada*, which alone can consider the universe around them as non-existent. That thing can be असत् which cannot be felt in any substratum. Snake is not such a non-existent thing according to Advaita. The whole world is considered as existent in the substratum known as Brahman. When this substratum is identified as one's own essence, one can negate all worldly objects as false and can experience the unlimited bliss in oneself.

Philosophical thoughts and theories are to be formed by living in this world itself. But Advaita teaches that this world cannot be the last resort of men due to its impermanent nature. No one in this world can be regarded as a born Advaitin. By restricting the actions of mind, body and senses one can reach the eternal nature of one's own. It is in fact a state to be identified as one's own self when the ignorance in one's mind disappears.

However, this identified knowledge of all-pervaded consciousness and 'I' is not attained, there remains the knowledge of this world and worldly things as more significant. The Advaita philosopher can merely explain the

things as false but he cannot experience their falsity. For, such an experience needs genuine interest and renunciation from the world.

It was never possible to mistake a rope for a snake, if the snake was either unknown to him or non-existent. Foreseeing the possibility of the occurrence of such mistaken knowledge in common man, Advaita put forth such empirical examples to reveal the status of world and *Brahman*. In the course of empirical livelihood, people have to consider worldly affairs around them as true. *Vedanta Paribhasa* makes this view clear:

देहात्म प्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन निश्चितः

लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणत्वाऽऽत्म निश्चयात्।

(The common man does not differentiate body from *ātman*. Likewise, till the origin of the doubtless knowledge of Brahman, the worldly affairs are to be considered as true.)

The 'I' concept and the concept of indefinable consciousness, bliss and nature of knowledge are the experience of every man beyond contradictions. 'Who am I?' is a question very difficult to answer. Advaita goes into the depth of this question. Though it can be philosophized in this way, the real Advaitin has to keep aloof from snakes and ropes and nacre and silver and has to strive for the attainment of the self-effulgent nature of *Brahman*, as his own nature.

For the sake of clearing the doubts of opponents and to make the philosophical standpoints more clear, Advaita does not consider it a crime to recognize the empirical existence of the world with its objects. Moreover, misunderstanding in vivid forms is common in the world around us. Every man, including the opponent of Advaita, cannot escape from being subject to any kind of misunderstanding in his life. Hence these kinds of common experiences are put forth as examples.

The above-said facts reveal the relative existence of the world and various experiences in it. Therefore, the absence of snake in rope in three tenses does not mean the absence of it being felt in the rope.

On realization of Brahman

Suppose Mr. X realizes the Advaitic Brahman, will he be able to make that claim (not just speak etc.) by making the statement *aham brahmāsmi*? Will he be able to tell Mr. Y '*tat tvam asi*' and '*saṅgam khalvidam brahma*'?

Vol. XVII, No.3

U.A. Vinay Kumar

Reply

The query is concerned with identification and the identifying claim of a realizer of *Brahman* in *Advaita Vedānta*. We know that the case of identification is applicable to the field of individuals and universals that are the objects of knowledge and is significant only for the individuals who know a thing through the knowing process. *Advaitic Brahman* is not an object of knowledge, rather it, for them, is the knowledge itself, which is transcended witness of all the knowledge of the objects. The question of making a claim of '*Aham Brahmāsmi*' and providing justification in the favour of such a claim are significantly possible on the plane of reason and the realizer of *Brahman* transcends that plane. Any such claim and justification are neither logically possible nor required at the level of the realizer. There is no such purpose, for him, to be fulfilled by such claims as his state is *Āptakāma paramaniṣkāma*. His state is beyond all the linguistic categories. Realization means realization of wholeness. Discriminations and distinctions from others, individuals and universals, do not arise at that plane. The moment we accept that realization is not a state of knowledge, discriminative and distinctive in nature, we will be in a position to know that questions regarding claim of identification of '*Ahambrahmāsmi*' and justification in its favour do not properly arise at the level of the realizer as his is a state beyond the epistemological and linguistic categories.

However, there is no logical need for such an identification of a realizer. This does not mean that the state of the realizer is a state of any kind of disability in any way. It is a state of perfection. It is not denied, in *Vedānta*, that a realizer by proxy can preach '*Tattvamasi*' and '*Sarvam*

Queries with Answers

khalvidam, Brahman' for the welfare of the human communities. He can express his realization of '*Ahambrahmāsmi*' also, not as a part of his egoity but as a simple expression of the state.

Nonetheless, one, by observing his activities based on the sense of non-duality and perfection or by imagination based on text regarding that state, can very well claim the truth of those statements and can furnish justifications and evidences in their favour.

Vol. XVIII, No.2

D.N. Tiwari

I***Brahmasatyam Jagganmithya****Ślokārdhana pravakṣyāmi yad uktam granthakotibaḥ**Brahmasatyam Jagganmithya Brahmajīvaiva Nāparaḥ*

Who said this and in which book it is said?

Vol. XIV, No.3

Sanghamitra Dasgupta

Reply

The off-quoted verse, attributed to Ādi Śaṅkara, occurs in *Brahma Jñānavalmīlā*, verse 20. Professor S. Sankaranarayanan quotes a part of this verse in his *Śri Śaṅkara* (The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1955), p. 156. Another reading of this verse is:

*Brahma satyam jaganmithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ I**anena vedyam sacchāstram iti vedāntaḍḍimāḥ II*

See '*Brahmajñānavalmīlā*, Vol. 20, *Vedānta-sandarbhā (Advaita Grantha Ratna Manjusha-32*, Mahesh Research Institute, Varanasi, 1989), p. 378. Yet another reading of this verse occurs in *Vedāntaḍḍimāḥ V*. 66 in *Vedānta-sandarbhā*. It is as follows:

*Brahma satyam jaganmithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ I**jūvanmuktastu tadvidvān iti vedāntaḍḍimāḥ II*

Vol. XV, No.3

R. Balasubramanian

What is the exact word connoting the idea of identity in Sanskrit language ? Does the word *abheda* or *tādātmya* or *abhinna* connote the same idea ? If not what do they mean?***

Vol. XIX, No.3

Daya Krishna

Notes and Queries

Reply to a Query on the meaning of 'Identity' or *Abheda* in JICPR, Vol. XIX, No. 3, July-September 2002***

The apt word connoting the idea of *Identity* in Sanskrit language is *Abheda* or *tādātmya*. *Abhinna* is the adjective form of the word *abheda*. Though here ends the precise answer of the query, the purpose of it will not be served until the answer is interpreted in terms of philosophy of language.

The notion of Identity or *Abheda* is highly significant in Advaita Vedānta. This is to be realized in a discriminative way with an undeterred outlook. Does this problem of Identity involve difference in itself which is nothing but presumed to be *Consciousness* alone? *Consciousness* does never imply *change* as the unchangeable infinite is the *Consciousness* or the Supreme Being. However, it is to be remembered here that all kinds of thinking, including philosophical speculation, are happening in the empirical world and, hence, they have empirical validity only. The *knowledge* resulting from the acts of the mind and senses together will no doubt arrive on empirical notions. In the same way, 'I am Brahman' is a *knowledge* when empirically conceived, inclusive of a 'change' brought about to the unchanging *Consciousness* in its false representation. This change is *Anirvacaniya* to Sri Sankara and 'Somehow' to Kant. This is an extremely unique implication for the term 'Identity' or the so-called *Abhedabhava* (अभेदेन भवतीति अभेदभावः) in Advaita Vedānta. '*Abhedadarśana*' actually denotes '*tādātmya*', the knowledge that 'I am Brahman' and not the complete Identity. In a subtler observation, this state represents a state of Identity-in-Difference, which differs from the inevitable Identity that is Brahman. Moreover, it is to be acknowledged that identity requires annihilation of body-mind complex either in its gross form or in its essential subtlety. This '*Abhedadarśana*' results in the

Consciousness that is deciphered in the sense of '*consciousness of something*' which actually it is not. This is properly defined as *Pratyagātman* by Sarvajñātman, the renowned scholar of Advaita Vedānta and author of *Sanksepaśāstraka*. According to him, the failure to distinguish between the *Ādhāra* (support) and *Adhiṣṭhāna* (substratum) in their true purport results in the false perception of *Ādhāra* as *Adhiṣṭhāna* and *vice versa*. *Adhāra* is described as *Pratyagātman*, the highest cognizable aspect of *Consciousness* and *Adhiṣṭhāna* is the *Absolute Brahman* described in negative terms as '*Neti Neti*' in scriptures. Therefore, *Pratyagātman* is the *Abheda* experienced at the empirical level. Annulment of spatio-temporal differences in *Consciousness* and unification with it, without destroying the notion of *Consciousness of something* is, thus, implied in the *Abhedadarśana* or *tādātmya*. This is '*Brahmabhāva*' and not the true Identity.

An important contention in Advaita philosophy is that '*to know*' is '*to be*' itself which implies *tādātmya* in its utmost sense. It would be impossible to know or realize the *Absolute* in its true nature since there is nothing existing apart from it. The *knowledge* occurring through words is revelatory and, therefore, merely *indicative*. How can the ineffable and unconceivable *Reality* be revealed by thought? The appropriate way to gain real knowledge is by *indirect indications* such as 'not this, not this', as rightly pointed out by Sankara. The *Absolute* can never be known or conceptualized by any means prevalent in the empirical realm. Hence, the knowledge of oneness pertains solely to the highest cognizable being and not the *Absolute Brahman* beyond all descriptions.

The question of '*Simultaneity*' of Identity in *Tādātmyatā* is against the true Advaitic contention regarding *Reality*. *Simultaneity* requires annihilation of spatio-temporal relations in their natural sense. Whatever reality claimed in this type of knowledge is this sense of *tādātmyatā* where the spatio-temporal aspects are not annihilated. Therefore, this state is only *identity-in-difference* where the knowledge '*I am Brahman*' exists in a person of body-mind complex. In the true identified state with *Brahman*,

the distinction of knower-known-knowledge relations do not persist because of the non-dual existence—*Prajñānaghanam*.

Thus, Identity rooted in *Consciousness* unmanifested but inclusive of all, is revealed to human mind in the form of *Pratyagātman* in its highest cognizable capacity. This alone is known to our comprehending level of mental mode or that which is posited to be the *tādātmya* with the Absolute implying *Identity-in-difference*. It can be concluded that Identity is at the *Consciousness* level which is never possible in the human level. One has to transcend this level where nothing else except *Brahman* exists to reveal the Identity. This is the reason why Indian philosophy requires its own method of interpretations and should not be diverted for discursive language or Westernization.

Vol. XXII, No. 4

N. Usha Devi

Different Forms of Advaita: What do They Mean?

What is the exact difference between the following: Advaita, dvaitādvaita, acintyabhedābheda, anubhavādvaita, Kāśmīra Śaivism, Śaiva Siddhānta, Vīra Śaivism, and Viśiṣṭaśaivādvaita and Śaiva Vedānta.

Vol. XII, No.3

Daya Krishna

Reply

Under the above heading Professor Daya Krishna has asked for an explanation of the distinction amongst different forms of Advaitism like Advaita, Dvaitādvaita, Śaivism, etc., that are in vogue in Indian philosophy. Since each of these Advaitisms represents a full-fledged school of philosophy only a brief account of the basic tenets of each of these schools can be given in this note. It may be mentioned first that some of the schools listed by Daya Krishna like Kāśmīra Śaivism or Vīra Śaivism are not traditionally characterized as Advaitism although they have some of its distinctive features. We start the explanation with the 'Advaitism' of Śāṅkara which is in a sense the forerunner of all other. Advaitisms which are of the nature of diverse philosophical reactions to the former and are propounded by the great ācāryas like Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Chaitanya,

Jivagoswami, etc. It may be mentioned here that 'anubhavādvaita' referred to by Daya Krishna is not the name of any well-known school of Advaitic philosophy, although the word happens to be used by Udayana, and perhaps some other authors too, to describe the Vijñānavāda or the idealistic standpoint of the Yogācāra Buddhists. The word has been used in some contexts in other senses too. Such is also the case with Viśiṣṭaśaivasiddhānta, listed as a kind of Advaitism by Daya Krishna. According to Śāṅkara, the first propounder of Advaitism, reality is absolute, nondual, infinite and it excludes all differences. There being nothing other than it which is similar or dissimilar to it. Even within it there are no differences of part and whole, qualified and qualifier, etc. All differences are mere appearances of the absolute and they are the projections of *māyā*, the cosmic illusion. The possibility of such a projection is illustrated by our dream reality experiences in which we, the dreamers, project our own selves as all kinds of things other than ourselves and experience them as such. The apparent and *ad hoc* reality of the dream-objects is not intrinsic to them as it is our own reality appearing as belonging to them. Even we ourselves are the projections of the basic absolute reality. This apparent reality is inexplicable as it is not absolutely affirmable or totally deniable. The realization of the absolute nature of the ultimate reality dissipates all this illusion leaving behind nothing but the absolute reality. So we can even say that the world is the illusory content of the dream being consciously dreamt by Brahman, this being the basic difference between our dreams and the dream of Brahman, which as absolute consciousness may be likened to bright light containing all the different spectra of colours within it.

'Dvaitādvaita' is-as the very etymology of the word suggests-a kind of Advaitism which does not militate against Dvaitism. It admits their co-existence which in a way is supported by common experience. We commonly distinguish for example a thing and its qualities and yet we so often refer to them as identical with each other. We say that 'the claypot is a material object' and that 'red is the colour quality of this object'. This does not prevent us from expressing their identity by making a true

statement like 'The clay-pot is red'. The pluralist philosophers take the word red, in its indirect sense, namely, 'That which has redness' instead of its literal sense. But there is no need to take recourse to such uncommonsensual interpretation of a common word only to maintain the nonexistent radical opposition between duality and non-duality. In a certain respect, two or more things can be identical and in some other respect can be different too from each other. So God, the self and the world are related with each other according to Dvaitādvaita both through identity and diversity. The various details concerning such a view—like God's powers of controlling, enjoying, etc. are not of much philosophical significance. In relation to Advaitism what needs to be noted is the basic principle that identity does not exclude diversity for Bhaṭṭa Bhaṣkara and others who uphold the Dvaitādvaita doctrine.

The Acintyabhedābheda variety of Advaitism owes its origin to Jivagoswāmi's (of sixteenth century A.D.) writings has much affinity to Dvaitādvaita but the difference-cum-non-difference relation holding between God, the soul and the world is considered by this school as non-conceptualizable. These three basic entities being of quite different intrinsic natures, the relation between them cannot be adequately formulated. Unlike Rāmānuja who regards the sentient self and the insentient matter as the infinite attributes of God, the above school treats these latter as just manifestations of God's energy. The insentient matter or Prakṛti and the God-dependent self cannot actually characterize God's infinite and infinitely sentient being as this would delimit God's nature. Rāmānuja foreseeing this difficulty has invested even God's attributes with infinity. In this respect the qualified non-dualism of Rāmānuja comes very close to Spinoza's substance attribute philosophy, the only significant difference between these two being that according to Rāmānuja divine attributes are infinitely benevolent while Spinoza does not say anything like this about mind and matter which are the two infinite attributes of the infinite substance in his view.

Śaiva Siddhānta, a creed very popular mainly in South India and having followers and scholars devoted to its study almost all over the world to-day has not much in common with what is known as Kāśmīr Śaivism otherwise known as the Pratyabhiñā school. The main doctrines of this school are these: God Śiva, who is beginningless, omniscient and

omnipotent is the supreme reality. He is described as Saccidānanda which is taken to imply that He possesses the attributes of self-existence, essential purity, intrinsic wisdom, infinite intelligence, freedom from all bonds, infinite grace, and infinite bliss. Śiva, though possessing all these attributes, is not the sole creator, of the world which is real and devoid of consciousness. Śiva with the cooperation of His Śakti creates the world. The principle of Karuṇā which determines the empirical and spiritual career of each self, is also the instrument of God's operation. Śakti is the link between Śiva, the pure consciousness and the unconscious world. About the nature of the relationship between God, the soul and the world, nothing very original has been said by Śaiva Siddhānta which the other Vedāntic schools have not said. It will be more appropriate to treat this school as theology, rather than philosophy.

Vīra Śaivism is out and out theology. Not much theorising of philosophical significance is traceable in the writings of this school. It may be called a kind of Advaitism only by courtesy (Śiva being the supreme reality according to it).

Kāśmīr Śaivism is, however, an important form of Advaitism. Śiva, the infinite consciousness which is absolutely unrestricted and independent, is the sole reality of the world. The world exists within the infinite consciousness as an *independent* existent. Unlike in other Advaitic schools, the existence of an instrumental cause like *māyā* or *prakṛti* for the creation of the world is not admitted by this school. God creates everything (absolutely everything) by the force of his will or energy. God makes the world which has its being within Him to appear as if it is outside Him and other than Him. By His own power God manifests Himself as the innumerable selves enjoying the world. It is obvious from this brief account that the God of this school is not much different from the Brahman of Advaita Vedānta, which maintains that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world. But unlike in Advaita the energy of God is supposed to be endowed with aspects like intelligence, *ānanda* or bliss, will and *kriyā*.

The above is just a bare account of the various Advaitisms unsupported by any reason adduced by their respective advocates.

Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist?

Nyāya is usually described as a realist system by most people who write about it in the English language. In fact, many consider it as a realist system *par excellence*, and even identify the one with the other so completely that the two terms seem interchangeable to them. But, is it really so?

Nyāya is supposed to maintain that everything that is real is knowable and nameable. If we keep aside the issue of 'nameability' for the present and confine our attention to 'knowability' alone, then the contention that 'to be real' is 'to be knowable' seems suspiciously close to the idealist contention that '*esse*' is '*percipi*'. 'To be, is to be perceived' is the well-known Berkeleyan formulation in the western tradition. 'To be perceived' of course means 'to be known' in this context. However, as Berkeley's discussion of the problem is in the context of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities on the one hand, and their inherence in a substance which is 'known' only as their substrate and is expressly designated as a 'know-not-what' outside this reference to its being the 'support' for the qualities that inhere in it, it may appear that the 'qualities' about which both Locke and Berkeley are talking are the sort of qualities that can be apprehended through perception, and perception alone. But if there are qualities which need not be known through perception, or which cannot be known through sense perception, then the Berkeleyan formulation is obviously inadequate and the Nyāya formulation in terms of knowledge superior to that of Berkeley.

'To be known', however, is different from 'to be knowable' and the Nyāya position is supposed to be the latter rather than the former. But a reformulation of Berkeley's position in terms of 'the perceivable' rather than 'the perceived' would bring it closer to the Nyāya formulation. The distinction will become even less if we remember that for Berkeley, God's '*percipi*' cannot be 'sense perception' and that his '*percipi*', therefore, has to be understood as 'knowledge' rather than 'perception'. 'To be', thus, would either be 'to be known' or 'to be knowable'. The latter, of course, would be true only for finite minds like those of human beings. In the case of God, the distinction between 'known' and 'knowable' is irrelevant as

everything is supposed to be 'known' by Him. It is only in the case of human beings that this distinction may be said to make any sense.

It is not clear whether God plays any such analogous role in Nyāya as it does in Berkeley's system. Perhaps the issue did not engage the attention of the Nyaya thinkers not only because they did not see the problems posed by the distinction between 'knowing' and 'knowability', but also because the issue of the 'independence' of the object of 'knowing' from the 'act of knowing' does not seem to have been focally raised in the tradition, as it was by Locke in the context of 'secondary qualities' in the British empiricist tradition. The notion of '*buddhyāpekṣā*', which comes closest to Locke's distinction, does not appear to have triggered the same set of problems as it did in the western tradition. But if the notion of '*buddhyāpekṣā*' is accepted in respect of some qualities, then at least in respect of those qualities Nyāya could not be regarded as holding a 'realist' position.

Moreover, even the contention of the essential 'knowability' of 'reality' in the Nyāya context implies that the structure of 'knowing' and the structure of 'reality' be isomorphic in the sense that the *sattā* must be of the nature of *dravya* which is related to *guṇa* and *karma* by *samavāya*. The 'real', thus, has to be 'rational', and as Nyāya does not accept the notion of an 'unknowable thing-in-itself', there is no distinction between 'phenomena' and 'reality' or noumenon, as in Kant's case. If this is not out-and-out 'idealism', what else is it?

The terms 'idealism' and 'realism' had arisen in the context of western philosophizing to describe certain philosophical positions which make sense in the perspective of questions that were being debated in that tradition. In traditions where this sort of questions did not trouble the thinkers, it may not be illuminating to describe their position in those terms. But as the term 'realism' has been used to describe the Nyāya position by almost everybody who has written on it in the English language, it may not be remiss to raise a question about its adequacy in describing the position which is usually ascribed to Nyāya thinkers in the Indian tradition.

The following issues, therefore, need to be clarified before any reasonable answer may be attempted to the question regarding the adequacy of the characterization of the Nyāya tradition of philosophical thought in India as 'realist'.

1. Is it correct to say that Nyāya holds that anything which is 'real' is also 'knowable' and 'nameable'?
2. If so, what exactly is meant by the terms 'knowable' and 'nameable' in this connection?
3. Are the two terms 'knowable' and 'nameable' independent of each other? In other words, can something be 'knowable' without being 'nameable' and *vice-versa*?
4. If all that is 'real' is 'knowable' and 'nameable', then is that which is 'unreal', 'unknowable' and 'unnameable'?
5. Is the relation between that which is 'real' and that which is 'knowable' and 'nameable' symmetrical? In other words, is everything that is 'knowable' and 'nameable' also 'real' by virtue of that very fact?
6. In case there is complete symmetry between them, are they just different words with the same semantic import and thus synonymous with each other except in their pragmatic associations and visual or auditory identities?
7. In case the 'nameability' condition is essential to 'reality' for Nyāya, how will this be compatible with the definition of perceptual knowledge as given in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1.1.4, if *avyapadeśya* is understood as that which cannot be 'named'?
8. Is the idea of *avyapadeśya* the same as that of *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*? If so, what is meant by treating it as 'knowledge'?
9. What exactly is meant by '*buddhyāpekṣā*'? Does Nyāya accept this notion in the context of some qualities, and not of others? What is the ground of the distinction? And, in case it does accept the notion, does it not affect its so-called 'realist' position in the sense of 'independence' of the object 'known' from the 'act of knowing'?

10. What exactly is meant by this 'independence' on which the usual claim for Nyāya being a 'realist' system is generally based?

These are some of the issues that need to be clarified before we may meaningfully characterize Nyāya as an 'idealist' or 'realist' system.

Vol. XII, No. 1

Daya Krishna

Reply 1

We have been happily branding the Nyāya standpoint in metaphysics 'a realist standpoint'. Professor Matilal even called it 'Naive Realism'—with some reservations, when he began his book *Perception* with the pregnant remark: 'Naive Realism is not all that naive.' Yet, if the hallmark of realism is the thesis that truth is independent of the mind, then Nyāya can be shown to be non-Realist by the following straight forward argument.

- A. Truth or *yāthārthya* is a property of cognitions in Nyāya.
- B. The definition of truth is—'*Tadvati tatprakāratvam*'—(Being true consists in ascribing that qualifier to an object which actually belongs to it).
- C. Now *prakāratā*—which is an essential component of this definition is a kind of *viśayatā*.
- D. A *viśayatā* cannot exist independently of the cognition which confers this objecthood on individuals, characteristics and relations. And of course cognitions cannot exist independently of the self, or some one's self.

E. Therefore, truth *cannot* exist independently of someone's cognition.

Apart from the use of 'truth' as an abstract noun standing for the property of beliefs, (or statements etc.) there is another use of that word in western philosophy; to mean the bearers of truth and falsity, or propositions. The fact that grass *is* green is a truth in this sense. That Nyāya does not and *need not* have any room for mind-independent propositions hanging in a Fregean third realm, I think, has been established beyond doubt (see 'Propositions' by Badrinath Shukla in *Samvāda: A Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions*, ed., Daya Krishna, ICPR, 1991). So, even in this sense Nyāya does not believe that there is any

truth, i.e., any objective content like *that a is F* waiting to be apprehended by us—but existing independently of our cognition or recognition of them.

Thus, even if Nyāya is not realist regarding truth or propositions, is it not realist regarding concrete particulars and universals and—most importantly—about the tie or relation of exemplification called inherence (*samavāya*)? The answer seems to be unquestionably affirmative. Just notice, as unmistakable evidence, Udayana's long refutation of Buddhist Idealism in the second part of *Ātma Tattva Viveka*. This part is called: 'Refuting the view that there exists nothing *outside* cognition', hence its conclusion must be: Things *outside* awareness do exist. From the first sentence of this second part of *ATV* it looks as if Nyāya's realism goes to the extreme of claiming that even the self cannot exist unless the external world exists ('As long as the idealist *vijñānavādin* is awake, i.e. unvanquished, there is nothing *outside*, so how can there be a self?'). What could be the meaning of 'outside' (*bāhya*) here? The commentaries unanimously say: '*bāhya*' or 'outside' means distinct from and not of the nature of awareness' (*jñānabhinnam* (Raghunātha) or *jñānanātmakam* (Śaṅkara Mīra). Even the Nyāya self is not *essentially* conscious of the nature of awareness. Even the self can exist independently of cognition and that is why if, as the *vijñānavādin* insists, nothing can exist independently or outside of cognition then the self's existence is threatened. That the self can exist without consciousness or cognition is shown by the notorious doctrine of classical Nyāya that in the liberated stage the self sheds all awareness. An awareness inheres in the self and makes an external object its intentional target. But neither its seat (the self) nor its structure-giving object (the external object) is made of or dependent upon awareness. They remain outside awareness.

The crucial element of Nyāya realism, as I have already hinted in the previous paragraph, is its insistence on inherence as an objective cognition-independent entity. Although Nyāya does not believe in *facts* as distinct from qualified or property-possessing rich particulars, the cement of the universe for Nyāya is this relation between universals and their exemplifiers, as well as between wholes and their parts etc. Not only do

particular things like apples and non-particular things like their fruitness exist outside anybody's awareness, even the cement between the single apple and the universal fruitness exists outside. We are very tempted to say that the *fact that this is an apple* or the *fact that the apple is red* exists independently of the mind. We should resist that temptation because of the Tractarian association with the word '*Fact*'. The Nyāya world is very much a totality of *things* rather than facts; but those things include the relation of *being-in*—which exists outside cognition.

Even after this, the general Nyāya dictum that 'Whatever is, is knowable' (*astitva* and *prameyatva* are coextensive) may mislead us to doubt that Nyāya is thing-realist. These two reminders should keep us away from that doubt. First, to be knowable is not to be *known*. Second, even when something is an object of knowledge it retains, according to Nyāya, its independence of and distinctness from knowledge.

It is true that unlike Buddhism and Advaita, Nyāya leaves no room for the distinction between phenomena or empirical transactional reality and noumena or transcendental reality. But why should drawing such a distinction be a necessary condition for being a realist? True, Locke draws such a distinction, establishing thereby a tradition of Scientific Realism which insists upon a sharp distinction between the commonsense 'manifest image' and the 'scientific image' of things as they imperceptibly are in themselves. But drawing this distinction is surely not a *sufficient* condition of being a realist, for otherwise Kant, Śaṅkara and Dignāga would all be countable as realists. It is equally unclear why this distinction should be a necessary condition of being a realist about physical objects. To be known or to be an object—even a *direct* object—of awareness is not to be dependent upon or made out of that awareness. Being-an-object- of could easily be an *extrinsic* relation. This is precisely what it is in Nyāya. The awareness *in itself* is formless (*nirākāra*) or neutral. The object is not an inherent part of awareness because when two pieces of phenomenologically distinct cognitions like a visual and tactual perception or a perceptual and an inferential cognition grasp the same object, 'the object remains strictly the same'. Thus, realism is maintained through the

doctrines of *Pramāṇa samplava* (various cognitions grasping the same object) and *nirākāra-jñāna-vāda* (formlessness of awareness) and *not* through some scepticism-tinted conjecture of an unknown cause of sense-data.

Is there any engagement in *Nyāya* with the issue of God's knowledge of objects when they exist unnoticed by us? Of course there is. In an elementary text like *Siddhānta Muktaṅgalī*, Viśvanātha discusses the issue as a gloss to verse 13 of *Bhāṣāpariccheda* which says that knowability, nameability (and *Dinkarī* says, existence or *astitva*) are common properties of all seven sorts of entities. Notice here that the modal notion involved in 'knowable' when understood in a western way cannot strictly find a place in *Nyāya*. Therefore, 'Everything that is, is knowable' has to be interpreted as 'Everything that is, is actually known by God' ('knowability is the property of being an object of knowledge. This property is in everything because being the object of God's knowledge is an omnipresent property'—*īśvarajñānaviśayatayā kevalānvayitvāt*). It is interesting in this respect that the *Dinkarī* defines 'is-ness' or existence as 'relatedness to time' (*astitvam kātasambandhitvam*).

There is no contradiction between the adjective 'non-verbal' (*avyapadeśyam*) as part of the definition of perception and the claim that everything can be given a name. As Jayanta (who spends an enormous amount of critical reflection on this adjective) explains—this adjective only means that perceptual knowledge—even when it is verbalizable and judgemental—is not word-generated like knowledge by testimony. Even *nirvikalpaka* perception which cannot be expressed in words does not pose a counter-example to the thesis 'All that exists is nameable'. There is the cognition itself which could be called by a word (e.g. the word '*nirvikalpaka*'). There is its object—either the bare qualifier or the bare particular or both which also could be called 'jarness', 'jar' or 'jar and jarness'. We must recall here that the bare object is the same as the qualified object. This is a basic *Nyāya* principle. A cloaked entity is not other than the same entity when it is denuded. What *cannot* be verbalized is, for instance, jarness *as it is cognized in a nirvikalpaka awareness*. But

jarness as it is so cognized and jarness as it is cognized in a judgemental predicative awareness are not two objects. They are exactly the same—just as the cup which is seen and the cup as it is touched are the *same* cup. So neither *nirvikalpaka* perceptions nor their objects pose any exception to the rule: *whatever is, is nameable*.

In spite of these obvious responses to Prof. Daya Krishna's worries—and we did not go into how numbers could be dependent upon counting-cognition and yet be objective qualities—there is one genuine point that emerges out of his searching questions. The canonical western characterization of realism as the thesis that objects exist mind-independently is difficult to apply to *Nyāya*. The notion of mind-independence involves the notion of *possibility*: An object of awareness is mind-independent if it *can* or *could* exist without awareness even if it actually is always the object of some awareness (e.g. God's). *Nyāya* metaphysics cannot make sense of this empty 'can' or 'could', because nowhere in *Nyāya* do we find any trace of the idea of possible worlds. But *Nyāya* still would be resolutely realist in the sense that even constant actual *relatedness* to awareness would not make the object *merge* into awareness. Things, even if all of them are actually known, are not of the nature of knowledge. They are distinct. What is central to this realism is the rejection of the Buddhist idealist rule: If two things are always cognized together, then they are identical (*Sahopalambhaniyamādabhedah*).

Vol. XII, No. 2

Arimdam Chakraborty

Reply 2

The *Nyāya* puts forward the thesis which predicates that 'existence' (*astitva*), 'knowability' (*jñeyatva*) and 'nameability' (*vācyatva*), are coextensive, meaning that whatever exists is also knowable and nameable. It would also follow that only what exists is knowable. It would also follow—but is it true?—that whatever is nameable exists. What about Pegasus?

The issue raised by Daya is: if existence and knowability are universally co-present, *i.e.* if whatever exists must be knowable then the

attribution of realism to the Nyāya is seriously compromised. There are many other side issues, e.g. with regard to the so-called epistemic entities, *jñānīyapadārthas* such as *viśayatā*. There is no reason why a realistic ontology shall not admit entities that are either purely mental or 'hybrid'.

Let me focus on the *vyāpti* between existence and knowability. Note that for the Nyāya, the *vyāpti* is reversible; whatever is knowable exists. The latter thesis requires that the object of false cognition is also a real entity, that there is no false, non-existent, object. In the thesis 'whatever exists is knowable', 'knowledge' or *jñāna* must be first taken in the broad sense to include *a-pramā*, but then one can add, legitimately I think, that whatever is an object of *a-pramā* is also a possible object of *pramā*, so that everything that exists (the addition of the phrase 'that exists' is redundant, for there are, in the Nyāya view, no non-existent things) is a possible object of *pramā*.

Another point to note is that the *vyāpti* obtains, not between existence and being-an-object-of-knowledge, *jñānaviśayatva*, but rather between existence and knowability. But there is an asymmetry in this thesis, which is hardly noticed. 'Knowability' is a modalized concept, 'existence' is not. It is not being said that whatever is capable of existing, is capable of being known. What is being said is that whatever exists is so capable. There is, as a matter of fact, no equivalent modalized concept with regard to 'existence' in the Nyāya system.

The idealist thesis '*esse est percipi*' asserts the identity between 'existing' and 'being perceived'. The Nyāya thesis asserts, not identity, but *invariable co-occurrence* of the two properties: such invariable co-occurrence requires that the two properties be different. However, granted that what we have is a universal coexistence of the two properties, one still has to look closer into the nature of this universality. I will, in this context, draw attention to only two aspects of the thesis. First, *vyāpti*, on the Nyāya view, is an extensional relation. In the celebrated case of smoke and fire, the *vyāpti* is not to be understood intentionally as a necessary relation, but rather extensionally as a relation of mere co-presence. To say that there is *vyāpti* between S(smoke) and F(fire) is *not* to say 'It is impossible that

there is a locus of S, in which F is absent', but rather to say 'It is not the case that F is absent in a locus of S'. When the Nyāya holds that whatever exists is capable of being known, what it means to assert is not a logically necessary relation, but a factual relation of co-presence. Whatever exists is knowable, but *not necessarily so*.

Secondly, what is asserted in saying 'whatever exists is knowable' is this: if the causal conditions for knowing an object exist, then it will be known, i.e. it will be the object of appropriate cognitive state which, however, *need not be perceptual*. As a matter of fact, in many cases it may be inferential. Berkeley spoke of 'being perceived'. Idealism needs this in order to reduce the putative external object to an idea in the mind. That idea must be a mental picture and that is so in the case of perceptual cognition. Nyāya speaks of *jñeyatva*, which does not mean 'capable of being perceived'.

Note that for Nyāya, cognition, even *pramā*, is an occurrence *caused* by various causal conditions, amongst which *its* object is one. The cognition of O is produced, amongst others, by O, then O must be independent of that cognition. But—it may be asked—does not a cognition have a cause even in the Yogācāra Buddhist theory which countenances no mind-independent external object? Amongst the four-fold causes of a cognitive event, on the Yogācāra theory, one is the *ālambanapratyaya*—each of the four being a *pratyaya*: this is an attempt to incorporate the entire causal story into an idealistic framework.

To see, then, the basis of Nyāya realism, one needs to consider not only the causal story, but also the nature of a cognition as the Nyāya understands it. As regards the latter, the decisive point is that on the Nyāya theory, a cognition is *nirākāra*, 'form'-less. I need not go into the arguments in support of this thesis, but let us focus on its consequences: if a cognition is *nirākāra*, then any *ākāra* or form which appears in cognition must fall outside it, and cannot be *in* it (as its immanent content or structure). Add to this the further thesis that a cognition is not self-revealing: what follows, as a consequence, is that what, in the first instance, is presented could not be a form of the cognition but only a form

which is other than the cognition, namely the object. These two theses combined constitute the most forceful argument for realism. There are other arguments—*e.g.* the one deriving from the theory *Pramāṇa samplava*—which I will not expound on this occasion.

The thesis then that everything is a possible object of consciousness, does not lead to a presumption against realism—not as long as by 'everything' is meant all that exists, *and* as long as 'existence' is construed as a real predicate (which the Yogācāra denies).

The Advaita Vedānta, especially the Vivaraṇa school advances an interesting thesis which resembles the Nyāya thesis, and it would be instructive to compare them. On the Vivaraṇa school view, all things are objects of the witness-consciousness either as known or as unknown (*'sarvam vastu jñātatayā ajñātatayā vā sāḥścicaitanvasya viśaya eva'*). This thesis makes room for things that I do not know of: they are still objects of consciousness but as yet unknown. Those which are objects of consciousness as known, i.e. as manifested by an *antaḥakāraṇa pramāṇi*, logically have *had* unknown existence. Thus a realism is preserved, but brought under an overarching idealism. The Nyāya does not have these resources and its realism is not provisional but final.

Vol. XIII, No. I

J.N. Mohanty

Reply 3

That Professor Daya Krishna, a distinguished philosopher, who had been instrumental in establishing effective academic communication between Nyāya scholars and modern Indian philosophers should seriously ask the question, 'Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist?' is rather puzzling. No indigenously-trained student of Nyāya would ever entertain the slightest doubt about the realistic character of Nyāya. Certain confusions seem to have engendered this doubt in Daya Krishna's mind. To sustain the doubt a few questions also have been set forth by Daya Krishna. We take up these questions first for discussion.

The first question asks whether in the Nyāya view anything that is real is also 'knowable' and 'nameable'? The answer to the question is an

unqualified 'yes'. The Sanskrit terms standing respectively for the real, the knowable and the nameable (more precisely, 'the denotable'), viz. '*sat*', '*prameya*' and '*abhidhēya*' are supposed to have identical denotations, namely 'everything in the universe'. The connotations of these words however, differ from each other.

The second question following from the first is, 'what exactly is meant by the terms 'knowable' and 'nameable' to which the answer is as follows:

The knowable or '*prameya*' in Sanskrit is that which can be the object of a true cognition. Even if an object is not already known the possibility of its being known is always there. An unknown object may not be known in its particularity yet as an object belonging to any one of the seven established categories of reals, it can certainly be known. That there are and can be only seven categories or types of reals is determined by means of valid arguments.

The 'nameable' can be defined as 'that which can be the denotation of a word'. If a thing is knowable even as a thing of a certain type, say as a substance or a quality, etc., the word for the substance or the quality, etc. can denote the thing.

The third question asks if knowability and nameability can exclude each other partially? The answer to this question is an emphatic 'No.' Every knowable is a nameable and every nameable is a knowable. The reason for this equivalence is this. To know a thing is to have a determinate cognition of it as 'such and such'. The knower on the basis of such a determinate cognition of the thing can refer to it by using the term denoting it. If the conventional denotative term is not known to the knower of the thing some other term can be used for it by him or her. It is however not necessary that there should be a user of such a term or terms. It is enough that there are such terms having the capacity to denote the things known.

The fourth question is about the unreal. It asks whether the unreal is unknowable and unnameable. Yes, the unreal is neither real nor even knowable or nameable. As the great Nyāya philosopher Udayana says in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*, 'when some person of perverted intellect discourses

about the unreal (hare's horn, barren women's son, etc.) a sober, knowledgeable person cannot but remain silent.'

The fifth question, 'Are the above terms symmetrical?' is materially the same as the third question and so it does not call for a separate reply.

The sixth question is partly answered by the answer to the first question. As stated in the answer, the denotations of the three terms mentioned are exactly the same but their connotations are quite different from each other. Knowability is one kind of property, nameability and reality are quite other kinds of properties and these respectively determine the denotedness pertaining to the terms and characterize everything in the world denoted by them. Daya Krishna refers here to 'the semantic imports' of the terms. Are there non-semantic imports too from which Daya Krishna wants to distinguish imports that are (in his view) only semantic? It is not clear what is meant by this expression.

In the second part of the question it is asked if the above terms are 'synonymous although their pragmatic associations and visual or auditory identities are different?'. The answer to the first part of the question is that in the usual sense of the word 'synonymous' the terms are synonymous (with identical denotation but differing connotations). In the second part of the question it is first asked if the pragmatic associations of the words are 'different. What does Daya Krishna mean by the pragmatic associations of words? Does he mean 'suggestions of some kinds of action that the utterance of a word in a certain context may make'? For example, if a person utters the word 'door' pointing to a door in the presence of his hearer then the word may be supposed to suggest the word 'shut' or 'open' and through it the activity of shutting or opening the door. But none of these suggestible actions enter the meaning of the word 'door'. All schools of Indian philosophy share the same view on this point. Only the aestheticians hold the view that even suggested entities can form part of the meaning of a word, but they too do not regard actions alone as the suggested meanings. Nyāya simply discards such a view. What made Daya Krishna suspect such a thing about Nyāya is beyond comprehension.

But more incomprehensible is the suggested association of the above terms with 'visual and auditory identities'. What are these identities and how can the above terms be supposed to be associated with the identities? Perhaps Daya Krishna is suggesting here that all visual objects are meant by one or more of these terms and all auditory objects are meant by the other term or terms. But such a classification of objects cannot be comprehensive. Supersensible and even some sensible objects would be excluded from this classification. It is extremely surprising how terms recognized by all Indian philosophers to be universal in their denotations and expressly stated to be so by Nyāya are suspected to be of such limited denotation by Daya Krishna.

The next question is an important one and deserves some serious thought. It is asked that if nameability is a universal property residing in every object—perceptual and non-perceptual, then the qualification '*avyapadeśya*' meaning 'that which cannot be named' introduced into the definition of perception in the Nyāya aphorism would be rendered inconsistent. It should be particularly noted here that in the said aphorism we are concerned with the definition of perceptual cognition and not the perceptual object. The above-mentioned qualification is introduced into the definition in order to specify the form under which the perceived object appears in the perceptual cognition. There is the view of the philosophy of grammar expressed in the following verse of Bhartr̥hari, the author of *Vākyapadīya*

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके

यः शब्दानुगमाद्गते ।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं

सर्वं शब्देन सर्वदा ॥

which says that 'there is no cognition whatever which does not have the word as its (essential) constituent because every cognition is always determined by words.' According to this grammatical view, the determinate perception of a thing must apprehend its object as the bearer of the name by which it is named. The aphorism of Gotama refutes this view by using the above-mentioned qualification to qualify the perceptual

object. (Perceptual cognition does not apprehend the name of the object perceived as its identifier or determinant.) The percipient while perceiving the object may recollect its name but the recollected name does not become the object of perception.

From this clarification, it would be obvious that the nameability of all things is not in the least affected by the exclusion of the name from the perceptual cognition. A thing may be endowed by a large number of properties but this does not entail that all these properties or a particular one of these properties should be invariably perceived when the thing is perceived. A man is a rational animal as also a laughing animal. But to perceive or know a certain man is not to perceive or know him as both a rational and a laughing animal.

To the eighth question which asks whether '*avyapadeśya*' is the same as *nirvikalpaka* the answer is an emphatic 'No!' Words aren't involved in either determinate or indeterminate perception according to Nyāya. But the two kinds of perception differ radically from each other. Whether to call or not to call the *Nirvikalpaka* perception as 'knowledge' is a question of terminology. If knowledge is defined as determinate and true cognition then *nirvikalpaka* does not qualify to be called knowledge as it is neither determinate nor true. But if it is not true it is not false either. It is neither true nor false simply because it is a purely referential or discrete cognition of the individual, its genus and the relation joining them. It is a non-judgemental cognition.

In the ninth question it is asked, 'What is '*Buddhyapekṣa*? is and 'If certain qualities are *Buddhyapekṣa*' does this not affect their status as objects independent of knowing?' To answer these questions it is necessary to clarify the precise meaning of the above Sanskrit word. The correct meaning of the word is 'dependent upon cognition for its genesis as any effect depends upon its cause for its genesis'. In Nyāya's view numbers other than unity are the products of the enumerative cognition. If enumeration is not made numbers like two, three, etc., it cannot come into being. The origination of all numbers above unity is caused by

enumerative cognitions. In Nyāya's view, the effect is not the same as the cause despite its dependence upon the cause.

Daya Krishna could have strengthened his case by referring to a different kind of dependence of things upon cognition. It is the dependence of the object of cognition upon the cognition. If the cognition is not there, there is no object of cognition. For example, if I perceive a tree then the tree as the object of my perception will be there. But if I do not perceive the tree it will not cease to be a tree although it will not be a perceptual object during the absence of the perception. This clarification takes care even of the last question posed by Daya Krishna.

Now, we turn to the earlier part of Daya Krishna's critique of Nyāya realism. Referring to a reformulation of the Berkeleyan principle '*Esse est percipi*' in terms of the knowability of real, Daya Krishna says '...a reformulation of Berkeley's position in terms of the 'perceivable'; ...would bring it closer to the Nyāya formulation'. A serious student of Nyāya would be shocked to read such a statement.

In the Nyāya view things are sometimes known and sometimes not; when they are not known they are knowable because the possibility of their being known is not ruled out. Such is not the case with things in Berkeley's view. According to it, it is not enough for the reality of a thing that there should be a possibility of its being known. According to Berkeley the essence of things consists in their being actually known. Thus, things are totally dependent upon knowing for being real. But for Nyāya *knowness* is an adventitious property of things.

Proceeding further in his comparison of Nyāya's with Berkeleyan and Lockeyan thinking on knowing and knowability Daya Krishna says that '...the issue of the 'independence' of the object of 'knowing' from the 'act of knowing' does not seem to have been focally raised in the (Nyāya) tradition as it was by Locke in the context of 'secondary qualities'.

This is another very shocking statement in Daya Krishna's small note. Even a beginner in Nyāya would know that the object of knowledge is independent of knowledge so far as its being is concerned, simply because an object is not known always. Even things like qualities which are

dependent upon substances which are their substrates throughout their existence are not supposed to be dependent upon the latter for their *being*.

The passage coming next to the above is simply mind-boggling. There Daya Krishna says that 'even the essential 'knowability of reality' in the Nyāya context implies that the structure of knowing and the structure of 'reality be isomorphic in the sense that the '*sattā*' must be of the nature of *dravya* which is related to *guṇa* and *karma* by *samavāya*.' The 'real thus has to be 'rational'...' It has already been explained that things are always knowable but knownness does not constitute their very nature. So, there is no isomorphism between knowing and the structure or nature of reality. One may perhaps say that there is isomorphism (if the use of such a diffuse term in the Nyāya context be permitted) between 'knowability' and the 'nature of reality'. But, even granting per impossible the kind of isomorphism. Daya Krishna speaks of, how can he draw the conclusion that he does from the said isomorphism?, Is '*sattā*' the same as *dravya* in Nyāya? If it is so what are *guṇas* and *karmanas*? Are they other than *sattā*? If all these are *sattā* and not '*sat*' what of the four remaining categories? And how all of a sudden the 'rational' creeps in here to determine the nature of *sattā* which is the same as *dravya* for Daya Krishna.

In the end we would like to urge that while discussing the views of Indian philosophy and specially those of Nyāya one has to be very careful in the use of words—both technical and non-technical. Nyāya lays the greatest stress on this in the interest of arriving at correct conclusions. It is very regrettable that Daya Krishna should take so much liberty with technical words like *sattā*, *budhyapeksa*, etc. and try to base his arbitrary version of certain Nyāya views on his interpretation of the words.

A few words are called for by way of providing broad definitions of different possible versions of idealism so as to make it clear that Nyāya does not fall under any of the definitions. There is first the Buddhist idealism, according to which consciousness, which is a purely subjective entity, projects itself as objects in the world and assumes different objective forms (or objects are no other than different forms of consciousness). In the idealism of *Advaita* there is no reality outside

consciousness. Unlike the Buddhist view this view does not admit consciousness to be endowed with objective forms. Berkleyan idealism regards the being or the essence of reality to consist in its objectivity or its objective relation to consciousness (or idea). This means that the real is essentially related to consciousness. Then there is Kantian idealism according to which the (empirical) real is a composite of certain ideal forms or categories and non-ideal matter. Hegelian idealism maintains that the real is rational which means that the real is constituted by reason itself in the form of concepts. Nyāya's view of the object does not accord with any of these versions of idealism. When things are cognized they are endowed with the cognitive relation and become cognitive objects. But even as cognitive objects things do not forfeit their cognition-independent nature. In the absence of this relation things remain unknown. But even in the condition of their unknownness the possibility of their being known by a—subsequent episode of cognition cannot be ruled out. There is nothing intrinsically obstructive of this possibility. This is why knowability, not knownness is regarded by Nyāya as a universal property of things. If knownness were regarded as such a property then Daya Krishna would have had some ground to foist idealism on Nyāya.

It may here be asked, 'what can it be in things that makes them knowable except some kind of affinity they may have to knowledge or consciousness?' The answer to the question is that no special property (or relation to consciousness) in a thing need be assumed which may make it knowable. If mere relation of a thing to consciousness is made into a ground to treat it as dependent upon consciousness then on the same ground consciousness too can be treated as dependent upon things. Consciousness cannot be the consciousness of a thing unless it is supposed to depend upon it. But such a dependence is really the dependence of a relational entity upon the relation that gives rise to it.