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Review Article

DAYA KRISHNA: '*The Nyāya Sūtras: A New Commentary on an Old Text*', Published by Sri Satguru Publications, a Division of Indian Books Centre, 40/5, Shakti Nagar, Delhi-110 007, India.

'India's Philosophical Tradition presents a baffling and also insoluble problem to those who try to understand them nowadays', Professor Daya Krishna begins his book with this statement. This statement is not only true for the scholars who are not well acquainted with *Saṃskṛta*, the language in which almost all the treasure of Indian philosophical tradition is kept, but also for those who have a deep knowledge of *Saṃskṛta* and are trained in Indian philosophical tradition. The scholars, who have studied the original *Saṃskṛta* texts, are also not very well aware of the history of Indian philosophical tradition. They have, in fact, a little knowledge of the process of development of thought. Actually, in the way Indian philosophical tradition has been developed, this is very complicated problem to solve. If we compare it with Western philosophical tradition, the difference comes on the surface. We can know of the contribution of each philosopher exactly in Western philosophical tradition. We can know very well that what Plato was doing and what Aristotle was doing and so on. However, if we try to demarcate it in Indian philosophical tradition, we could say only that that book is written by that author and so on. This is not the sense of history. The books are not the contribution in philosophical tradition but the thoughts. We are not aware of that. We know very well what are *Nyāya* philosophy and *Vāiśeṣika* philosophy and so on, but we have little knowledge about the philosophy of a particular philosopher. If we take the case of *Nyāya* philosophy, Gautama is the founder of *Nyāya*-school but there are other very eminent scholars like Vātsyāyana, Udyotakara, Udayana, Jayanta Bhatt, etc. And, if anybody asks the question what is the philosophy of Vātsyāyana, Udyotakara, Udayana or Jayanta Bhatta, we are left speechless. We would say that they all are *Naiyāyikas*. However, it would not be

an appropriate answer. These all are very eminent scholars; they must have contributed for *Nyāya* tradition; and it is actually not good that we do not know proper contributions of them. This situation troubles a serious philosopher who wants to understand it systematically. The development of Indian philosophical tradition also makes it difficult to understand. In Western philosophical tradition, there are not any such type of commentaries written and, if the commentaries are written, they are not taken seriously, the commentators are not known as philosophers but translators. In contrast to it, in Indian tradition, if the commentators were not accepted philosopher, we would be left with only a handful of philosophers. Here are scholars like Vācaspati Miśra, who have not written a single original book, but without them, our philosophical tradition would be empty. Therefore, it is necessary to demarcate it in Indian tradition in a different manner. But, the question is: how? Here we cannot know clearly which school developed earlier and which later. However, we can know the development of each school separately, but to know it, it is very necessary that we were aware of the contribution of each scholar exactly in the development of the particular school. The present work of Daya Krishna is aimed at this point. He asks, 'What was the *sūtra* text doing, and what are the commentaries doing, is the question that has to be raised in order that we may have some idea of what the philosophical enterprises of India was about, and this is what this work sets about to do in respect of one such foundational text of the tradition that is, the *Nyāyasūtra*.' (pp. 2-3). In this way, we can see that the aim of this book is very important, and Daya Krishna found, in his own words, 'The long engagement with this foundational text revealed that the usual views held about them, if not entirely false, are almost totally so'. We wish to examine that whether this book is doing it honestly, what it claims to do.

The book *The Nyāya Sūtras: A New Commentary on an Old Text* contains six chapters along with introduction and three appendixes. Amongst them, first appendix comprises four sub-appendices. Introduction deals with the question, what made the author write this book. It is actually a declaration of the purport of the book. Chapter 1, as the title of this chapter suggests, tries to map the structure of *Nyāyasūtras*. The second chapter is titled 'Questions

and Problems pertaining to the sūtras: A Dialogue with the text and development of a new methodology for understanding the Sūtras'. In this chapter, the author is struggling to explore a new way to understand Sūtras'. The third chapter is titled 'Some Further Reflections on the Sūtras after reading the commentaries on it, particularly those of Vātsyāyana, Udyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana. In this chapter, the author portrays his novel new thoughts. Chapter 4 is dedicated to a short note on Jayanta Bhatta and Bhāsarvajña. Chapter 5 is titled 'The Possible Extension of the Methodology for the Understanding of Other Texts in the India Tradition'. Chapter 6 is dedicated to the conclusion. As Appendix 1, the author is attaching an article entitled '*The Text of Nyāya-Sūtras: Some Problems*'. The Sub-Appendices of appendix 1 are four. All of them show that which Sūtras are missing in which *Vṛtti* (Commentaries of Sūtras are called *Vṛtti*). Appendix 2 is a catalogue where the author explains that what topics are discussed in which Sūtras. In Appendix 3 the author has attached *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* of Vācaspati Miśra I. Here the first thing which I wish to mention is that wherever something is printed in *Devanāgarī* script, it looks as if the proof has not been checked. The mistakes cannot be pardoned. Many times, in a single line there are five to six mistakes. *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* of Vācaspati Miśra I is printed in such a way that it is hardly legible.

The main intention of author is to develop a methodology to understand the text. This has been clearly explained by the author in introduction. The author wants to convey that these original texts should be studied in their own light; they should not be studied in the light of commentaries, as they are being studied yet. He says, 'This, as everybody knows, has been because those who have translated the texts have invariably done so in the light of the commentaries written on it and, generally, with the accompanying translations of the commentaries which go with them. The Sūtra-texts have, therefore, never been seen in their own light and studied for what is contained in them' (pp. 3). The author, therefore, thinks that it would be better to have a dialogue with the text, in order to find what are the questions the text intends to answer. Perhaps, in this way we can learn the original author's view points. By the way, in my opinion, it would be a matter of doubt that

whether there is any possibility of dialogue with the *Sūtrakāra* or not. Because to have a dialogue with any one, it is very necessary that one understands his intention first without an interpreter, and if one needs an interpreter, without the interpreter the dialogue would not be possible. Daya Krishna may say that he is able to understand the intention of the *Sūtrakāra*, but at many places, he confesses saying that the intention of *Sūtrakāra* is not clear. In many places he himself is puzzled. Actually, the problems are manifold. The *Sūtras* were written about two thousand years ago. Language changes very soon. This is a long time and in such a long time, there can be a lot of changes. Therefore, there can be ambiguity in understanding the text. Here I would like to show two examples. On dealing the topic *doṣa*, *Nyāyasūtra* enumerates *moha* as a *doṣa* along with *rāga* and *dveṣa*. Daya Krishna wonders *moha* can be different from *rāga*. He says, 'But it does seem clear as to how *moha* is different from *rāga* as one cannot have *moha* without *rāga*, though there certainly can be *rāga* without *moha*' (p. 137). The problem here is that in Hindi and present day *Samṣkrta*, *moha* word is used to refer to infatuation. *Rāga* is also used in the same sense. But, in *Samṣkrta*, this word had a different meaning totally irrelevant to it. There is a verb *muh* in *Samṣkrta*; it means to be foolish. *Moha* etymologically has a relation to this verb. *Mūḍha* word is also related to this verb; it means idiot. Therefore, the meaning of *moha* is idiocy, i.e., *doṣa*. Now it becomes very clear that *moha* has a very different meaning from *rāga*. The author is well aware of his ignorance and confesses, 'The translation of *moha* as infatuation does not seem correct' (p. 138). In the same way, *abhimāna* word has a meaning misconception and, in this sense, the *Sūtrakāra* has used this word many times; but nowadays this word is used in a completely different sense. Other cases also can be found in the text. Another problem there in having a dialogue with *Sūtrakāra* is the ignorance of the background, keeping which in mind the *sūtras* are written.

In the first chapter, the author gives a list of topics and the number of *sūtras* which deal them. In the opinion of Daya Krishna, 'The *Nyāya-Sūtras* has two different purposes combined into one text and hence shows an inner conflict and tension in the thinking of the author of the work' (p. 15) and these two *prayojanas* are

Niḥśeyasa and *Apavarga*. In the traditional understanding of *Nyāyasūtras*, only one *prayojana* is accepted, i.e., *Niḥśeyasa* or *Apavarga*, because these are simply accepted as synonyms. Daya Krishna does not accept these as synonyms.

In the tradition of *Sūtras*, *Nyāyasūtras* are different in style and in their intention. *Pramāṇa-Śāstra*, as said in *Nyāyabhāṣya* by *Vātsyāyana*, it is a lamp for all *Vidyās*. It has played a vital role of it. The path shown by *Nyāya* philosophy is followed by other schools. Actually, *Nyāya* has developed a way for organizing and explaining the concept. It is explained by *Vātsyāyana* in *Nyāyabhāṣya*. He said 'त्रिविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः, उद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति' (*Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.1). This way of organizing text was so impressive that not only in *Nyāya* tradition but in other traditions also this style was adapted. Here it follows that Daya Krishna is making a mistake; it seems that he confuses *Uddeśa* with *Uddyēśya*. He says that *Nyāyasūtras* is divided into three parts. In first part, a clear statement is given of the *prayojanas*. In second, *lakṣaṇas* are given of the basic terms used in the construction of *śāstra*. In the third, there is an examination of the adequacy of definitions. This is the proper division of text to explain the concepts (p. 16), without giving *uddeśa* (not *Uddyēśya*) of *tattvas*, how they could be defined. *Uddeśa* is the first step of definition. *Uddeśa* means, as accepted in tradition, only enumerating the objects with the names of them. As said नाममात्रेण वस्तुसङ्कीर्तनमुद्देशः After *Uddeśa*, there is definition. This is the usual style of philosophers in Indian tradition. It seems that Daya Krishna wants to turn the table, saying that there be first *Uddyēśya* that is *prayojana* or purpose. *Prayojana* or purpose is given but it is not the part of the scientific arrangement of text; it has nothing to do with understanding the text. The text can be understood without it. It is customary that the *prayojana* is uttered because if *prayojana* is not given, who will be interested in study of the work?

Daya Krishna has organized the total number of *sūtras* dealing with topics one by one. It is indeed helpful in understanding the main intention of *Sūtrakara*, and the author has exactly pointed out that the basic aim of *Sūtrakara* is to explain *pramāṇa*. However, when we checked, we found the numbering given to one by one topic is not correct. Daya Krishna says that the total number dedicated to *pramāṇa* is 145 but I could hardly find 75 *sūtras* dedicated

to this topic. The author says that the total number dedicated to *ātman* is 114 and we could find only 27. If we add the 24 *sūtras* which are dealing with the question whether *buddhi* is a quality of *ātman* or body, and we add 10 *sūtras* which deal with the answer that why *buddhi* is not a quality of body and, again, we add 13 *sūtras* dedicated to non-eternity of *buddhi*, even then the number reaches only 74. Not only this, Daya Krishna, in this organization, totally ignores *jāti*. He says that the number dedicated to *Chhala* and *jāti* is only eight but actually 8 *sūtras* are dedicated to explain only *Chhala* and there are 44 *sūtras* which are dealing with *jāti*. The author says that the number of *sūtras* are dedicated to *Hetvābhāsā* are 47 but actually there are only 6 *sūtras* dealing with *Hetvābhāsa*. The other numberings are also not exactly correct. The reader might be confused regarding the basic considerations, based on which Daya Krishna is making the chart. Many other important topics are also ignored for some unknown reason. For example, many *sūtras* deal with great importance *Avayavī*, *Traikāhya*, power of words, refutation of theory of momentaryness and refutation of external objects, these are given much importance in *sūtras*. But, there is no mention of these topics in the list. It seems that the *sūtras* dealing with these topics, have been included anywhere else for some unknown reason. Here, another thing raises doubt, Daya Krishna says that 30 *sūtras* dedicated to the explanation of *Jagat* but which are these *sūtras* is very difficult to know. Had he given exhaustive list of all the topics and all the *sūtras*, it would have been better for the purpose of understanding.

Daya Krishna is quite aware that if he tries to understand the *Sūtras* in the light of commentaries, the development of thoughts in commentaries would be mingled with the thoughts of *Sūtrakāra*, and it would not be possible then to understand the thoughts of *Sūtrakara* separately. Therefore, he thought that without taking help of commentaries he would try to understand the text. This has been greatly difficult. It is, indeed a great difficulty to understand that why the *Sūtrakara* has mentioned sixteen *tattavas* in his first *Sūtra*. Why the *Sūtrakāra* has mentioned 14 more *tattvas* beginning from *saṁśaya*, if *Pramāṇa* and *Prameya* were sufficient to mention. *Samśaya*, *Prayojana*, etc., all are *Prameyas*, then what is the need of mentioning them again. The answer given in commentar-

ies. Daya Krishna would not like to digest and theorizes. First is doubt, which troubles him. The question strikes in his mind that what is the use of mentioning doubt here. He answers it and finds pseudo-logic to defend it. He finds a line of *Vācaspati Miśra*, according to which *saṁśaya* is *pūrvānga* of *Nyāya* or *kathā*, and concludes, in his own words 'The term *pūrvānga*, strangely, refers to doubt which in this characterization is regarded as a necessary pre-condition of the process of self-conscious search for validation to start. Thus, in the opinion of Gautama, those who do not doubt cannot embark on the enterprise of knowledge, at least as self-conscious human beings. If doubt is the pre-condition of all cognitive activity then, according to the *Nyāyasūtra*, the resolution of the doubt is the end of the cognitive activity' (p. 17). In addition, in second chapter again, the author asks that why *saṁśaya* is not mentioned first if it is a pre-condition of every cognitive activity (p. 47). This is a false conclusion, which actually provides the basis for other false conclusions. In the view of Gautama, doubt cannot be pre-condition of all cognitive activities and this is not the goal of *Vācaspati Miśra* too. Daya Krishna could not understand the intention of *Vācaspati Miśra*; nor he could of Gautama. On *parīkṣa* of doubt, *Vācaspati Miśra* clearly says निर्णयः सर्वः संशयपूर्वः, विचारः सर्व एव संशयपूर्वः (*Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparyā-Tikā* 2.1.1). Daya Krishna thinks that doubt is a pre-condition of all cognitive activities, but how can it be possible? Our perceptual cognitive activities do not require doubt as a pre-condition and *Naiyāyikas* accept perception as a *pramāṇa*. It is only possible if we hold the Cartesian view, which uses doubt as watching method for knowledge.

In fact, Daya Krishna is all this through the eyes of Descartes. Therefore, on dealing with each topic, he expects that there first be the proofs to establish the existence of that thing and after that, there be something else; and he gets disappointed. One example I would like here to mention, on enumeration of *duḥkha* in *prameyas*, he says, 'The inclusion of *duḥkha* as a *prameya* seems strange, for why should one need to have a *pramāṇa* for establishing the reality of *duḥkha* for there can be no *saṁśaya* about it when it occurs' (p. 53). He forgets that the situations are not the same; this is the basic difference between Western and Indian philosophies that, on the one hand, in Western tradition there is incredulity towards sense

perception; and on the other hand, in Indian tradition there is a strong belief in perception. Therefore, it is possible for Descartes to hold the view that all knowledge begins with a doubt; but for a Naiyāyika it would not be appropriate to accept. On the concept of doubt, Daya Krishna further discusses two types of doubts and concluding the topic he says, 'The contention seems to be that this kind of doubt about the nature of consciousness or self or *ātman* cannot be removed by any *pramāṇavyāpāra* or the exercise of the theoretical reason' (p. 21). In my opinion, here also, he is mistaken. If it were the intention of the *Sūtrakāra*, he would not have given any *pramāṇa* to establish the existence of *ātman*; and he has given such *pramāṇas*. Actually, the existence of *ātman* is not the point of doubt in *Nyāya* tradition. There is no doubt about the existence of *ātman*, there is only doubt of the type whether *ātman* is different from body, *indriyas*, *manas* or not. Therefore, Gautam has put forward many grounds to establish the *ātman* as different from body, *indriyas*, *manas* and their union. Here, we wish to clarify Gutama's situation. The aim of *Gautama* was to establish *ātman* against *The Buddhist*, who accept everything momentary and do not accept *ātman* different from *manas*, *indriyas* and body. Therefore, *Gautama* has provided grounds to prove that *ātman* is not momentary nor the same as *manas*, *indriyas* and body. Because, Daya Krishna thinks that existence of *ātman* is inferred and there is no perception of *ātman*, then how can we infer on the grounds given by *Gautama*. He asks what type of inference is possible here, because *ātman* is not perceptible. In his own words, 'Can there be a *vyāpti* between experienced and non-experienced objects which is supposed to be the basis of *ānumāna* in *Nyāya* tradition' (p. 36). The fact is that there can be a *vyāpti* between experienced and non-experienced objects, there would be no objection at all, but there would be a question as to how it would be possible to know the *vyāpti* between experienced and non-experienced objects. Here, as commentators have pointed out, the argument is twofold: how can there be an *Ichhā* if one does not know something, without knowledge of something there can be no *icchā*. Therefore, it is necessary to accept that the knower is not different from wisher. One has to accept that both are not same, if one holds the *Buddhist* view. If everything is momentary how can the wisher be the same

as the knower? For this reason, it is necessary to postulate *ātman* who is knower and wisher. It leads to non-momentary-ness of *ātman*. In this way *dveṣa*, *prayatna*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, etc. become a ground for inferring the *ātman*. Here, it can be asked again that, in terms of *Gautama*, what type of inference it would be; *Gautama* has classified inference in three classes *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. Here, it can be a matter of doubt, because *Gautama* has not explained these terms, and if we depend on commentators, as we have to depend, these terms are explained in different ways; and it seems that hardly it would be possible to include this type of inference in one of these. The question of Daya Krishna makes to think of it. This is indeed a point of doubt, because on this issue nothing is said clearly. Actually, this is *arthāpatti*, as we infer that *Devadatta* eats in night in case we see that he does not take even a morsel in whole day and in spite of it, he is becoming fat. *Arthāpatti* is included in inference by *Naiyāyikas*. The inference to prove the existence of *ātman* is also this type of inference. In this way, we could say that this is *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* type of inference. There is another way to infer the *ātman* that is also *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* type of inference. This is shown by *Vātsyāyana* and explained by *Uddyotakara*, *Vācaspati Miśra* and *Udayana*. However, I do not agree with *Vātsyāyana* here, this does not seem the intention of *Sūtrakāra*. The form of inference is 'Ichchha, *dveṣa*, etc. must have a substratum because they are qualities, whatever is a quality has a substratum to stay in' in this way, when a substratum is established, whatever you may say the substratum is called *ātman*. (See *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya*, *Vārtika*, *Tātparyatīkā* and *Parīṣuddhi* on *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1.1.10).

Here again, the accepted *Nyāya* view between *ātman* and *buddhi*, i.e., cognition is that *ātman* is eternal (*nitya*) but *buddhi* (cognition) is non-eternal (*anitya*); and Daya Krishna asks that how *buddhi*, which is *anitya*, can be a quality of *ātman* that is *nitya*? 'But, in that case, if the *buddhi* as an *anitya* property, is accepted a quality of the *nitya* *ātman*, *buddhi*'s *anityatā* will affect the *nityatā* of *ātman*, and it will no longer remain a *nitya* entity as unchanging' (p. 43). This is a very strange question. *Naiyāyikas* see no problem accepting *anitya* properties of *nitya* *ātman*. The properties of *ātman* are *anitya* but *ātman* is *nitya*. There is no problem. How could one come to this generalization that what is *anitya* cannot be a property of a *Nitya*.

Here, there is another question about the relationship between object and cognition. Daya Krishna asks 'But how can knowledge which itself is *anitya* have all these as its objects even though they are all *anitya*?' (p. 43). This question is not answered in *Nyāya Sūtras* but we should not expect from *Sūtrakāra* to answer all these types of question, because he was actually writing a *Sutra*-text. The answer of this question is also straightforward. *Naiyāyikas* see no incompatibility in this. In this connection, one thing more I would like to show for the purpose of clarification. Prof. Daya Krishna is saying' ...as *ākāśa* is supposed to be a *nitya padārtha* in *Nyāya* and as it is presumably the object of senses, there will arise the problem as to how something that is *nitya* can be apprehended by something that is *anitya*' (p. 43). This is not the matter of fact that *ākāśa* is the object of sense in *Nyāya* school. *Ākāśa* can be an object of sense but only through *jñānalakṣaṣa-sannikarṣa* that means it is actually not the object of external senses; and if it were an object of senses, I think there would be no problem to apprehend it through senses due to its *nityatā*. A *nitya* object also can become an object of senses. According to *Nyāya* theory of perception, if there were sense object contact that means *indriyārthasannikrṣa*, *udbhūtarūpa* and ability to be perceived in the object, the object would be perceived through our optical sense organ. And, so are criteria to perceive things by other sense organs too. The eternity or non-eternity of the object has to play little role in perception. Actually, eternity and non-eternity or not related to this question anyhow. One more thing in this connection, Daya Krishna asks that if we accept that *ātman* is apprehended by *manas* 'But, even in that case, the *ātman* cannot be said to be an object of *pratyakṣa* as it does not appear as a *viṣaya* in the sense in which all objects of internal perception appear to be so' (p. 38). The question is incompatible in *Nyāya*'s framework of perception. *Ātman* is accepted *viṣaya* of internal perception in the same sense. Hardly could we say that *ātman* is known as *viśeṣya* in internal perception and cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. are known as *prakāra*. But, this also is not a rule, there is also a cognition, possible whose object as *prakāra* could be *ātman* and *viśeṣya* could be cognition, pleasure pain, etc. The intention of author seems, in the way *Vedāntins* say, the knower is not the object of perception or of cognition; in the same way as

cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. are object of internal perception. This problem is faced by *Sāṃkhyas* also, because in their framework also it is not quite possible that the knower and the pleasure, pain, etc. could become objects of cognition in the same way. However, this is not the problem of *Naiyāyikas*.

In dealing with other *prameyas* he asks many questions which are answered by Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra. Here, dealing with the concept of validity of *Vedas*, he gives very strange remark, Says 'In fact the *Āyurveda* is not counted amongst what are called *upaveda* or even the *Vedāṅgas*' (p. 26). However, the fact is contrary to it. *Āyurveda* is counted in *Upavedas*, it is a well-known fact. (See p. 461, The Practical Sanskrita English Dictionary by Vaman Shivaram Apte).

The second chapter is named '*Questions and Problems pertaining to the sūtras: A Dialogue with the text and development of a new methodology for understanding the Sūtras*'. In this chapter the author again begins with first sūtra. Here are many questions in the mind of Daya Krishna. He asks about the use of mentioning *Prayojana* and *Dr̥ṣṭānta*. He says, 'The insertion of the topic of example or *dr̥ṣṭānta* here does not seem to make any sense at all' (p. 47). Again, when he sees *udāharaṇa* in *avayavas*, he gets more confused 'Strangely, *dr̥ṣṭānta* which has been mentioned earlier in the sūtra, is a part of the so-called elements of the *anumāna*, which are collectively called the name of *avayava*' (p. 48). When the author turns to *nirṇaya*, he again gets puzzled 'The term *nirṇaya* seems to be again irrelevant as normally it should be taken to mean the same as *siddhānta*' (p. 49). However, in my opinion these questions should have been asked and answered in first chapter which is dedicated to the structure of *Nyāya-Sūtras*, because the answers of these questions play very important role in understanding the structure and key concepts of the text. First of all *dr̥ṣṭānta*, it is mentioned here because our every *anumān* and *āgama* is dependent on *dr̥ṣṭānta*. The *Sūtrakāra* wants to convey that philosophy begins with perception; our every knowledge has its root in perception. Therefore, *dr̥ṣṭānta* is enumerated. In *Nyāya-Vārtika* Uddyotakara says 'सति च तस्मिन्नुमानागमौ स्याताम्, असति च न स्यातामिति। पूर्वप्रत्यक्षमर्थमनुमिमीते। पूर्वज्ञातं चार्था परस्मायाचष्टे' (*Nyāya-Bhāṣya-Vārtika*, p. 16). This is the reason of enumeration of *dr̥ṣṭānta*. Why *prayojana* is there? There is a proverb in

Samskrta 'प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते'. It means without an aim not even an idiot does anything. Therefore, it is customary to say about *prayojana*. The mentioning of *Udaharāṇa* is also not aimless. There is a basic difference between *Dr̥ṣṭānta* and *udāharāṇa*. *Udaharāṇa* is a special type of sentence and used in only *parārthānumāna* to make the listener aware of *vyāpti*. *Dr̥ṣṭānta* is not a sentence, it is rather a place or a thing whose concept is not different in the view of a common man and of a scholar. In *Nyāya-Vārtikam*, *Uddyotakara* has explained this all. He asks that what would be the difference among *Upmāna*, *dr̥ṣṭānta*, and *udāharāṇa*, because these three look very similar. In these three cases similarity is involved. Thus, how to differentiate these? The answer given by *Uddyotakara*, is 'कस्मात् त्रयस्याप्यपरिज्ञानात्। एवं ब्रुवता न दृष्टान्तो नोपमानं नोदाहरणं विज्ञातमिति। सारूप्यव्युत्पत्त्यर्थं तावदुपमानं न भवतीति वर्णितम्। दृष्टान्तः सारूप्यव्युत्पत्त्यर्थः। असिद्धसाधनार्थो वा दृष्टान्तो न भवति। उदाहरणार्थमुदाहरणं वर्णयिष्यन्तो वक्ष्याम इति।' (p. 498, *Nyāya-Vārtikam*). Here again, the term *nirṇaya* is not *siddhānta*. *Siddhānta* could be a knowledge achieved by any *pramāṇa* but *nirṇaya* cannot be so, it must be achieved through inferential process. Here I would like to show the structure of *Nyāya-Sūtras*. In *Nyāyabhāṣya*, *Vātsyāyana* begins his commentary explaining this and in *Nyāya-Vārtikam*, *Uddyotakara* also begins with the same topic. *Vācaspati Miśra* and *Udayana* are also not exceptions. Actually, all of these scholars ask the question here asked by *Daya Krishna*, and they have given the answer of it. *Pramāṇa* is mentioned first because everything would be proved based on this. *Prameya* is mentioned second because this is to be established. Then comes doubt, it is not a pre-condition of every cognitive activity but only of *anumāna*; perception does not require a doubt as a condition. There are four *pramāṇas* but *Naiyāyikas* do not give preference to *śabda pramāṇa*, and the scope of *upmāṇa* is very little. We can know only meaning of a word through it. More than this cannot be known by *upmāṇa pramāṇa*. *Śabda pramāṇa* can be used only if the reliability of speaker is not in doubt. Perception can be applied only a few things. Therefore, the field of *anumāna* is more far-reaching than any other *pramāṇa*. This *pramāṇa* is two-fold *svārthānumān* and *parārthānumāna*. Doubt is a precondition of both types of inferences, but there is long debate and modification on this concept. *Navya-Naiyāyikas* do not accept doubt as a precondition of inference too. *Prayojana* and *dr̥ṣṭānta* are also required

before an *anumāna*. Thus, these are called *pūrvāṅga* of *Nyaya*. *Siddhānta* many times can be a matter of doubt, so it is uttered here. *Avayava* is used in *parārthānumāna*. *Tarka* is useful in both types of inferences, but it is not required every time we infer. For this reason, *tarka* is mentioned after *avayava*. *Avayava* and *tarka* are useful in inferential process, this is the reason they are mentioned after *saṁśaya*, *prayojana*, *dr̥ṣṭānta* and *siddhanata*. *Nirṇaya* is the product of inferential process, for this reason, at this time it is mentioned. *Parārthānumāna* is used in discourses called *kathā*, which is three types of *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitandā*. If there is no *vāda*, *jalpa* or *vitandā*, in that situation also *parārthānumāna* can be brought into play. For this reason, after mentioning of *nirṇaya*, *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitandā* are enumerated. In a discourse, *hetvābhāsa*, *chhala*, *jati* and *nigrahasthāna* are employed; this is the reason they are mentioned last. If one is not aware of this structure, he would certainly draw some false conclusions. Prof. Daya Krishna's intention is to explore a new path for *Nyāyā* philosophy; therefore, he does not wish to accept the views of old commentators. But, in this way problems are many. Everybody is free to make a new understanding of *Sūtra* text and it is frequently done in *Vedānta* tradition. Āchārya Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Pūrṇaprajña, Vallabha have given fresh understanding of *Vedānta-Sūtra*, but they were very well aware of criticism and they have commented on *Vedānta-Sūtra* in such a way that contradictions in *Sūtra* text did not arise. Daya Krishna wants to understand the *Sūtra* text in such a way that many contradictions in *Sūtra* text would have to arise. This makes the attempt of Daya Krishna questionable.

In this second chapter, the *sūtras* are translated and sometimes some fresh questions and some strange conclusions. One by one all *sūtras* are given a look. Writing on second *sūtra* Daya Krishna finds the place of second *sūtra* in question. In his own words 'The whole of the second *sūtra* seems to occupy a dubious place in the sequence of the *sūtras* in *Nyāya-sūtra*' (p. 50). He makes the intention of *Sūtrakāra* in question on commenting second *sūtra*. Second *sūtra* is दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः (*Nyāya-Sūtra* 1-1-2). In this *sūtra* *Gautama* wants to convey that *tattvajñāna* removes *mithyājñana*, if *mithyājñāna* is removed *doṣa* will be removed, if *doṣa* is removed *pravṛtti* will be removed, if *pravṛtti* is removed *janma* will

not happen, if *janma* is not there, there will be no *duhkha*. Here Daya Krishna says 'Illusory knowledge can give rise to happiness while the knowledge of truth can also make one unhappy' (p. 49). Actually, Daya Krishna does not wish to accept the common understanding of this *sūtra* and first *sūtra*. He has translated first *sūtra* and second in such a way that there be a difference between *nihśreyasa* and *mokṣa* or *apavarga*. *Apavarga* is known as absolute absence of *duhkha*. Here he wants to raise a question. Actually, the *Sūtrakāra* does not wish to convey that illusory cognition cannot give rise to happiness, but rather he wants to say that absolute absence of pain cannot be achieved through *mithyājñāna*.

Dealing with perception, the author again raises many questions. The fourth *sūtra* which is the definition of perception, actually has many ambiguities. The traditional understanding of this *sūtra* is also not free from paradoxes. The intention of *Sūtrakāra*, *Bhāṣyakāra*, *Vārtikakāra* and *Ṭīkākāra*, look different. Here also the questions raised by Daya Krishna are irrelevant. He says 'The fourth *sūtra* gives the definition of *pratyakṣa*, which is very strange indeed for, it enumerates four characteristics of *pratyakṣa*, which are equally necessary to make it a *pramāṇa*' (p. 50). It is not actually a matter of fact. Amongst four characteristics, one is *avyapadeśyatva* which cannot be applied to other cognitions except perception. In fact, in the view of *Naiyāyikas* beginning from Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, not every perception is *avyapadeśya* but only *nirvikalpaka* perception is *avyapadeśya*. And, again how every cognition can be *Indriyārthasannikarṣajanya*. Only perception is produced through *indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*. Dealing with the same topic, Daya Krishna again draws strange conclusion, that accepting the definition of perception given by *Sūtrakāra* it would hardly be possible to accept *alaukika pratyakṣa*, accepted by later *Naiyāyikas* (p. 51). It is actually a misconception of Daya Krishna, *Naiyāyikās* call it *alaukika pratyakṣa* because there is no *laukika* (ordinary) *indriyārthasannikarṣa*. Because it is produced through *alaukika sannikarṣa*, this is the reason it is called *alaukika pratyakṣa*. Related to this definition of perception the author raises one difficulty, which looks serious. He says 'There is another problem to which much attention has not been paid in the *Nyāya* literature. This is that the ascription of '*abhidheyatva*' as a necessary characteristic of all reality is opposed

to the *avyapadeśya* character ascribed to perception or perceptual reality. If reality is essentially 'nameable' or in other words, graspable by language, then perception can not be said to give us a knowledge of reality if it is essentially *avyapadeśya*, as is mentioned in *sūtra* (p. 178). Actually, there is no contradiction between *abhidheyatva* and *avyapadeśyatva*. When it is said that everything is nameable, it only suggests that reality can be ascribed a name, we can ascribe a name to *nirvikalpaka* perception too. Do we not give the name *nirvikalpaka* to those types of cognitions? *avyapadeśyatva* word is used to denote the meaning 'being devoid of name and *jāti*', here it must be taken in mind that the cognition does not recognize the object with its name and *jāti*, therefore, it is called *avyapadeśya* or *nirvikalpaka avyapadeśya* word is not used in its etymological sense, hence, it is not contrary to *abhidheya*. To give knowledge of reality it is not necessary that it must give knowledge of every aspect of an object.

On dealing the topic *apavarga*, the author again asks strange questions. 'But, firstly this is a negative definition and does not positively indicate what *apavarga* is. Secondly, if *apavarga* is treated as an *abhāva*, whose *pratiyogī* is *duḥkha*, then one would not only have to have first *duḥkha*, then have its *abhāva* in order to get *apavarga*....But, then would not the memory of *duḥkha* create some *duḥkha* in consciousness' (p. 58). This all is construction of Daya Krishna. It is true that the definition of *apavarga* is a negative definition, but what can one do if the state of *apavarga* is endowed with only negative qualifications. No special quality is accepted in *ātman* in the state of *apavarga*, so how it would be possible to give a positive definition at all. And what Daya Krishna is saying about in the state of *apavarga* there would be *duḥkha* or memory of *duḥkha* is also not logical. In the view of *Gautama* or *Naiyāyikas*, in the state of *apavarga*, there is no cognition, no memory, no *sukha* or *duḥkha*. *Duḥkhābhāva* (absence of *duḥkha*) is accepted in the state of *apavarga* not the knowledge of *duḥkhābhāva*. For this reason all discussion here done by Daya Krishna is irrelevant.

On dealing *siddhānta*, the author also gives strange remark; he could not understand the concept of *abhyupagama siddhānta*. He says 'Similarly, the idea of *abhyupagama siddhānta* explained in *sūtra* thirty one is not quite clear as it seems to suggest that an

abhyupagama siddhānta is the result of the critical examination of an *abhyupagama* which was not critically examined before' (p. 60). It is not right, actually *abhyupagama siddhānta* means, as the *sūtra* 'अपरीक्षिताभ्युपमात्तद्विशेषपरीक्षणमभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः' (*Nyāya-Sūtra* 1-1-31) suggests, accepted concept only for the purpose of examination.

In this chapter, there are much more things propounded by Daya Krishna, which need thoroughly critical examination. A few we will deal with here. Doubt is a loving topic of Daya Krishna; he wishes to understand the difference between doubt accepted by *Naiyāyikas* and Cartesian doubt, which is existential. Actually, in the view of *Naiyāyikas* there is no difference between these two types of doubts. The Cartesian doubt is also produced by the same conditions, the difference lies in their assumption. Descartes believes that existence is a feature of substance. Seeing that there are a few things, which are perceived but they have no existence, the existential doubt is produced. *Naiyāyikas* see it more critically and their views are more analytical. They say that it is not possible to negate something as a whole, because the qualificand cannot be negated, only a qualifier or a feature can be negated. Contrary to it, Descartes negates something as a whole; he does not make a distinction between qualifier and qualificand when he thinks of doubt, *Nyāya-Sūtras* said that the doubt is produced in such a situation when there is a perception or cognition of contrary features. However, Daya Krishna has more doubt about doubt. He says 'Also it is not clear what difference obtains between the *lakṣaṇa* of *saṃśaya* as given in the *sūtra* 1.1.23 and 2.1.1 and 2.1.1' (p. 65). Actually, the *Sūtrakāra* is not giving the definition of *saṃśaya* at both places, but, rather in *sūtra* 1.1.23, he gives the definition of *saṃśaya* and in *sūtras* starting from 2.1.1 to 2.1.7 explains and tries to answer the question raised by *The Buddhist* and skeptic philosophers. Here *Sūtrakāra* gives detailed explanation that why their philosophy does not end with a doubt.

On injunction of *Vedic Vākyas*, Daya Krishna has in his mind the *Mīmāṃsaka*'s stand and for this reason he says 'Furthermore, the answer concedes that an injunctive statement can be true or false, while in reality questions of truth and falsity cannot be raised with respect to all imperative sentences' (p. 76). This is also an invalid objection and false understanding. In order to raise objection against

Naiyāyikas, it is necessarily required that one first understands the concept of injunction according to *Nyāya*. It is said that Daya Krishna is not doing it. *Naiyāyikas* say that injunction does not say something to perform, but in the view of *Nyāya* it conveys *iṣṭasādhanatā*. *Iṣṭasādhanatā* means 'being an instrument to achieve what is desirable'. That means if it is said in *Vedas* that 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः' then it means that performing *agnihotra* is an instrument for achieving *svarga* for the person who wants to achieve *svarga*. Keeping it in mind, now it is clear that the truth and falsity could be applied to all sentences, according to *Naiyāyikas*; the imperative sentences are also not an exception.

In this chapter, there are other problems too. Commenting on first section of fifth chapter of *Nyāya-Sūtras*, Daya Krishna makes a blunder. First section of fifth chapter is dedicated to the explanation of *jāti*, and he thinks that this is dedicated to the classification and explanation of *kāryasama* (p. 158). He does not try to take pain to find out what *kāryasama* is. If *kāryasama* is not mentioned in sixteen *tattvas*, then why *Sūtrakara* is taking pain to explain *kāryasama*. Without understanding the text, he proclaims 'It is fairly clear in many of these examples that neither the objection nor the reply are very clear. Even the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* do not seem to grasp the issue or analyze it clearly' (p. 162). It is true that the issue is very complicated, but to say that *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* do not seem to grasp the issue is too much. Again, he comments 'It seems prima facie to be a total waste of effort on the part of a logician, and the commentators do not seem to clarify the issue in any way. In fact, they seem to confuse it even further by suggesting that the whole discussion is centered around the eternity and non-eternity of sound which had been discussed threadbare earlier in so many *sūtras*, where also it is not clear why so much attention was being wasted on the issue' (p. 166). Actually, neither the *Bhāṣyakāra* is confused nor the *Vārtikakāra*, only Daya Krishna is confused here. This chapter is dealing with *jāti*, which is a special type of erroneous reply, to make it comprehensible it is necessary to give examples; and examples also to be such type of which could be grasped easily. For this reason, *Bhāṣyakāra* and *Vārtikakāra* have given the examples related to the eternity and non-eternity of sound; they are discussed many times and can be grasped easily. Seeing these examples, Daya Krishna thinks that the whole section deals with the

eternity and non-eternity of sound. The fact is contrary to it. Had he kept it in his mind, he would not have been confused.

Next chapter is titled 'Some Further Reflections on the *Sūtras* after reading the commentaries on it, particularly those of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana'. This is also a chapter written in his style. Here are also some thought-provoking concepts and some conclusions very heavy to digest.

The next chapter is very small chapter and is a short note on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Bhāsarvajña and after this, there is next chapter entitled 'The Possible Extension of the Methodology for understanding of other texts in the Indian Tradition'. This is also a very small chapter. In this chapter, Daya Krishna suggests that the methodology developed here should be applied to other texts too.

The sixth chapter is 'conclusion'. In this chapter, we can see it very clearly that what Prof. Daya Krishna wants to establish. The novelty of his ideas is seen in other chapters also, but here that comes on the surface. Actually, he wants to establish that the *Nyāya* tradition is not realistic tradition but it is rather idealistic. To establish it, he first wishes to introduce the concept of Reason (*Buddhi*) in the same sense, accepted very well in Western philosophy. His intention comes in front of us many times in this book. In his own words, 'There is a deeper problem about *Nyāya* which stems from *Gautama* himself and which seems to have hardly been seen by the *Naiyāyikas* who seems to feel that the tradition of *Nyāya* has solved all problems and that they are only to present it as the realist system par excellence to contemporary students of the subject' (p. 235). After this, he says 'The term *buddhi*, as used in the *Nyāya* sūtras is so misleading as to make it impossible for even sophisticated student of the subject to see that what is being talked about is not 'reason' or 'intellect' which is usually taken to mean in its philosophical usage in the *Sanskrit* language, even though it may have overtones which are not usually associated with the term in the English language' (p. 235). In other places also he wants to establish reason (*buddhi*). On page 100; he says 'However, besides the sense objects, there are also abstract entities which are apprehended by the *buddhi* and hence *buddhi* again would have to be postulated as being essentially deferent on the analogy of the senses' and on page 235, he says 'It is surprising that no *Naiyāyika* since *Gautama*'s time has asked himself the simple question as to how

one can have *anumāna* as a *pramāṇa* if there is no such thing as *buddhi* in usual sense of term'. However, he does not provide any satisfactory ground for this type of acceptance. In *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* also he wants to establish the concept of reason in the same style. Actually, he is influenced by Western philosophical tradition. There is a long acceptance of reason as a faculty which provides ground for inference. But, there are no such types of entities in *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school and there is no need of *buddhi* to accept *anumāna* as a *pramāṇa* in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* framework.

In *Nyāya-Sūtras* *buddhi* word is used only in 10 *sūtras*. There are no more *sūtras* where *buddhi* is talked about. If we observe these only 10 *sūtras* it would be very clear that what does the term *buddhi* connote. First *sūtra* is 'आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम्' 1.1.9 where *buddhi* is mentioned. Again the next *sūtra* where *buddhi* is mentioned is 'बुद्धिरूपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्' (1.1.15). Does it mean any sense? Before going to discussion on the topic *buddhi*, the *Sūtrakāra* clearly states that what *buddhi* is. Actually, there is no point of doubt in this case. *Sūtrakāra* was well aware of the fact that this word is used in different sense in other schools; hence he first wanted to make it clear. There are many other words, which are used in different schools in very different senses. For example, the term *Svayamprakāśa* is used in many philosophical school; but does not connote the same meaning in every school. The concept of *Svayamprakāśatā* is different in *Bauddha*, *Mīmāṃsaka* and *Vedānta* school. This is the case with *buddhi* also. In *Nyāya* school there is actually no scope for the concept of reason as accepted in Western tradition and Daya Krishna wants to establish. Only one *sūtra* 'प्रवृत्तिर्वाबुद्धिशरीरारम्भः' (1.1.17) is in the *Nyāya-Sūtras* where it can be a matter of doubt that what the word is meant. On commenting this *sūtra* *Vātsyāyana* says 'मनोत्र बुद्धिरित्यभिप्रेतम्' except it nowhere else the meaning of this word is doubtful. Daya Krishna tries to take advantage of this. Actually, cognition cannot begin without the use of *manas*, therefore, to say about *manas*, *Sūtrakāra* used the word *buddhi*. We could say that the *Sūtrakāra* should not have said in such a way; but to say that everywhere *buddhi* is meant reason would be too heavy to digest. Daya Krishna, commenting on the *sūtra* 'न-बुद्धिलक्षणाधिष्ठानगत्याकृतिजातिपञ्चत्वैभ्यः' (3.1.58, p. 116) whatever discusses is totally irrelevant. He says here 'The theory seems interesting but is not very clear'. Here also the objection and the reply

are not clear to the author. Actually, *Sūtrakāra* wants to say that *buddhi*, i.e., cognition is *lakṣana* (*chihna* that is mark) of *indriyas*. We cannot know of *indriyas* (sense organs) through perception. We can see eyes but we cannot the optical sense organ. There is a long debate in *Nyāya-Sūtras* on this topic (3.1.7-14). Therefore, it is accepted that we cannot know the sense organs via perception but we infer them; and in this process, the cognition becomes ground for inference. Hence, the word '*buddhilakṣaṇa*' is used here. The intention is straightforward that because there are five types of cognition, there are five types of *adhiṣṭhāna*, i.e., places of sense organs, there are five types of *gati*, i.e., grasping of objects, there are five types of *ākṛti*, i.e., magnitude and there are five types of *jāti*, i.e., causes, hence, there must be five types of sense organs. In other *sūtras* there is not any place for doubt. In *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* also there is not any scope of *buddhi* as propounded by Daya Krishna. There are also only eight *sūtras* where *buddhi* is mentioned. We can very clearly know about *buddhi* only by understanding the meaning of these *sūtras*. Here *buddhi* is accepted as a quality, the role of qualities are explained in *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* very well. In general *Samśkrta* also the word *buddhi* is used to denote cognition. It is very clear in sentences like 'बुद्धियुक्तो जहातीह उभे सुकृतदुष्कृते' *Gītā*, etc. Therefore, it also cannot be said that the term is used always in different sense in general *Samśkrta*. Here it would be not possible to deal these topics in detail, but these concepts propounded by Daya Krishna are rather groundless. As a faculty, *buddhi* cannot be established in *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* tradition. In fact, this type of concept of *buddhi* is very alien to Indian philosophical tradition, Daya Krishna wants to introduce.

In the appendix, his very useful and brilliant article entitled *The Text of the Nyāya Sūtras: Some Problems* is attached. It is indeed a very thought-provoking. In appendix, other things are also useful.

Concluding this review, we would like to say that as the name of this book suggests, contrary to that, this book is not a commentary of *Nyāya-Sūtras* in the way there are other commentaries written. The commentaries are written in two styles. First types of commentaries are written to make the text easily apprehensible, and for a greater surprise this type of commentaries are rare in Indian tradition. Second types of commentaries are those who aim at making

the points more clear and logical. However, these both types of commentaries have one thing common that they always try to defend the position of original text. Daya Krishna's commentary is very different in such a way that it cannot be counted in either group. It does not defend the position of *Sūtrakāra*, but rather attacks it. Hence, we cannot call it commentary in usual connotation of this word. It provides some fresh questions in the sense that these topics are not dealt and discussed by present day philosophers. To understand *Nyāya-Sūtras* without taking help of commentaries, it is very necessary that one takes into account the early *Buddhist* standpoint and studies the text to have a sound knowledge of the background of philosophical thinking in India at the time of *Sūtrakāra*. D.N. Shastri had done this in his very good book *Critique of Indian Realism*, which is absent in present book. It makes this book weak in its interpretation. Daya Krishna could not make a good dialogue with *Sūtrakāra* but this exercise would provide a fresh and important motive to engage the scholars to learn Indian philosophical tradition through the *sūtras* and original texts. The intention of Daya Krishna is very good; but through the way, he wants to know the philosophical enterprises of India, would be difficult to know exactly. However, it would be known if he makes some modification in his attitude. He tries to begin with a pre-suppositionless attitude, which is hardly possible to do, and the pre-suppositions of Western philosophical thinking govern his attitude and make him driven away from the path. In spite of these limitations, Daya Krishna's attempt deserves appreciation and thanks, because he tried to demarcate the development of changing thoughts; and in our opinion, this is an attempt to untie the Gordian knot of Indian philosophical tradition.

References of *Nyāyabhāṣya*, *Nyāyavārtika*, *Tatparyatīkā* and *Pañcoddhi*, are given in this review from *Nyāyadarśanam* with *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, Edited by Prof. Ananta Lal Thakur, published from Mithila Research Institute, Darbhanga, 1967.

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