

**Agenda for Research  
In Indian and Western Philosophy**

Under UGC, ASIHSS Programme, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

# Agenda for Research In Indian and Western Philosophy

Editor

**R.S. Bhatnagar**

(with an Introduction by Dr Yogesh Gupta)

UGC, ASIHSS Programme, Department of Philosophy,  
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## Issues and Information in Focus

### *Witzel on the Vedic Śākhās*

Michael Witzel's work on the *Śākhās* of the Veda deserves to be known more widely and paid serious attention than it has generally been done uptill now. As the texts of the Samhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads differ according to the *Śākhās* to which they belong, this simple fact not only affects the 'unity' and 'uniqueness' of the texts designated by that name, but also challenges the reader to find what is 'common' and what is 'different' between them. And, if some distinction can be made, as has been claimed, between the 'earlier' and the 'latter' within each *śākhā* text, and between the *śākhās* themselves, then one may separate these portions so that the 'development' that took place can be easily grasped and understood.

As many of these *śākhā* texts, according to Witzel, contain portions from the *Śraūta Sūtras* and the *Gṛhya Sūtras*, the relation between them and the recognized texts of the Vedic Corpus has to be explored.

In fact, as the *Śraūta sūtras*, the *Dharma sūtras* and the *Gṛhya sūtras*, collectively known as the *Kalpa sūtras*, are also different in the different *śākhās*, the same procedure has to be adopted regarding them.

Witzel's major work in this regard are the following:

1. Witzel, Michael (1987): 'On the localization of Vedic texts and schools (Materials on Vedic *Śākhās*, 7).' in: *India and the Ancient World, History, Trade and Culture Before AD 650*. (Ed.) Gilbert Pallet, Leuven: Department Orientalistiek (Orientalia Lovaniensia, Analecta, 25.), pp. 173-213.

2. Witzel, Michael (1997): 'The development of the Vedic canon and its schools: the social and political milieu (Materials on Vedic Śākhās, 8).' in: *Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts: New Approaches to the Study of the Vedas*. (Ed.) Michael Witzel. Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University; distributed by South Asia Books, Columbia, MO. (Harvard Oriental Series, Opera Minora, 2.), pp. 235-257. Also on internet:

<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/witzel/canon.pdf>.

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### Witzel on the Vedic Śākhās - 2

Attention is drawn to Michael Witzel's work on the Vedic śākhās, specially the following two articles published by him, amongst many others:

1. Witzel, Michael (1987): 'On the localization of Vedic texts and schools (Materials on Vedic Śākhās, 7).' In: *India and the Ancient World, History, Trade and Culture Before AD 650*. (Ed.) Gilbert Pallet, Leuven: Department Orientalistiek (Orientalia Lovaniensia, Analecta, 25.), pp. 173-213.

2. Witzel, Michael (1997): 'The development of the Vedic canon and its schools: the social and political milieu (Materials on Vedic Śākhās, 8).' In: *Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts: New Approaches to the Study of the Vedas*. (Ed.) Michael Witzel. Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University; distributed by South Asia Books, Columbia, MO. (Harvard Oriental Series, Opera Minora, 2.), pp. 235-257. Also on internet: <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/witzel/canon.pdf>.

The problem of the śākhās in respect of the Vedas has not been paid sufficient attention as it is generally assumed that there are only four Vedas and that all of them are like the *Rgveda* which has only one unitary text of its own.

The situation, however, is totally different in respect of the three other Vedas, *Yajurveda*, *Sāmaveda* and *Atharvaveda*. In the case of each of these, there is no one unitary text which can be called by that name. There

is, in fact, no such *Samhitā* text of any of these unqualified by the śākhā to which it exclusively belongs by names such as the *Vājasaneyī Mādhyandin Samhitā* or the *Kāṇva Samhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda*. The *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, which is different from the *Śukla Yajurveda*, faces the same problem as there is no such text as the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*. We have either the *Taittirīya Samhitā*, or the *Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā*, or the *Kāthaka Samhitā*, or even the *Kāthaka-Kapiṣṭhala Samhitā*, which are all different from one another and are said to belong to *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, and not to *Śukla Yajurveda*. The *Sāmaveda* and the *Atharvaveda* have the same problem as there is no one such text as the *Sāmaveda* or *Atharvaveda*, pure and simple. We just have the *Jaiminiya Samhitā*, or the *Rāṇāyanīa Samhitā*, or the *Kauthuma Samhitā* belonging to the *Sāmaveda*. The *Atharvaveda*, on its part, is found only either in the *Samhitā* belonging to the *Śaunaka* or the *Paippalāda* which, like those of the *Yajurveda*, are different from each other. Each of these is separate from the other and generally has its own Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka, or Upaniṣad which are known by that name. They are also separate independent texts belonging to what we call different Śākhās of the *Yajurveda*, *Sāmaveda* and *Atharvaveda*.

Professor Witzel's work examines each of these śākhās in detail as well as that of the *Rgveda* and discusses the political and geographical location of each of these along with their development as shown by the material within the text itself and, at times, the relation of this material to the *Śrauta* and the *Gṛhya Sūtras*, which also were developing within this period. Interestingly, he refers to the text and evidence pointing to the time of Parikṣita, when the floating *Rgvedic* verses were first brought together and collected in the form of the *Samhitā*. Is this the same Parikṣita of the *Mahābhārata* and the *Śrīmadbhāgavad*? If so, then the widely prevalent view is true regarding the editing and collection of the Vedas at the beginning of the *Kali* era so that the past may not be forgotten and the continuity may be preserved through the tradition by handing down this knowledge of those who had thought about things earlier may not be completely lost to this age.

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**Parārtha in Mīmāṃsā Sūtra**

The distinction between 'instrumental' and 'intrinsic' has been central to a great deal of thought concerning values in general and morality in particular. Attention is drawn to an interesting discussion on the analogous notion of 'parārtha' in *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* III.1.2 (*Seṣaḥ parārthatvāt*). The term refers to actions which are auxiliary or subsidiary in nature, the key word being *parārthatvāt*, translated by Jha as 'for the sake of another'. Kumārila has commented intensively on this in his *Tantravārtika* and explicated in detail the different meanings of the term *parārtha*. The discussion occurs in *adhyāya* III, *pāda* I, *adhikaraṇa* 2 and is available in English translation in *Śabara Bhāṣya*. (Tr. G. Jha), Vol. I, p. 337, 14.21, Satguru Publications, Allahabad.

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Mohini Mullick

**Nakamura on Mīmāṃsā**

The *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* are generally ascribed to Jaimini. However, there is almost incontrovertible evidence that such an ascription cannot be sustained in the face of the counter-evidence in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* themselves. We publish below an extract in this connection from an early study of Vedānta<sup>1</sup> by Hajime Nakamura, a well-known Japanese scholar on Indian philosophy and thought:

According to tradition, Jaimini is the author of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, and this has been accepted throughout India. However, the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* handed down to the present time was not directly written by Jaimini himself. In this *Sūtra*, the name of a scholar called Jaimini is mentioned five times, and for the author of the *Sūtra* to give his own name within a *sūtra* composed by himself would be unusual. Not only that, in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* VI.3.4, Jaimini is referred to as the supporter of the opponents and is later rejected. Consequently, the compiler of the *Sūtra* is clearly different from Jaimini, and while they respected and relied upon him as an authoritative thinker, he did not follow Jaimini's theories in all

1. *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*. Hajime Nakamura, Motilal Banarsidass, 1983, pp. 390-91.

respects, but maintained a critical attitude towards them. It is not clear to this day just who the author of this *Sūtra* is. Perhaps it was compiled as a kind of text book on ritualistic Mīmāṃsā learning by the Mīmāṃsā scholars after the time of Jaimini. Since in the extant *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* the names of a great many others besides Jaimini appear, it might be a compendium of their theories. If so, one can suppose that quite a long period of time was necessary for it to assume such a form.

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**Vaiśeṣika Sūtras 1.1.4**

*Sūtra* 1.1.4 in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* by Kaṇāda has generally been regarded as the ground for accepting the basic number of *padārthas* mentioned in this system. However, there is some strong evidence which casts doubt on this and raises the question as to whether this *Sūtra* formed an integral part of the original *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, as it does not occur in some of the important manuscripts ascribed to well-known thinkers belonging to this school. We publish below an extract from Wilhelm Halbfass's book (*On Being and What There Is*, State University of New York Press, 1992, p. 75) and would like to know what others say in this connection:

As we have noted earlier, a complete list of all six categories as well as the term *padārtha* itself is found only in one single *sūtra* of questionable authenticity. In the version of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* that forms the basis of Śaṅkaramiśra's commentary, *Upaskāra*, it appears as 1.1.4. It is missing, however, in the versions used by several apparently older commentaries, that is, Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*, Bhaṭṭavādyā's *Vārtika*, and the anonymous commentary edited by Anantalal Thakur.

What does this mean? Is it merely a textual problem, or does it have deeper historical significance? Does the absence of *Sūtra* 1.1.4 in some versions of the text reflect a stage of development at which the list of six categories (which is taken for granted not only in Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* but also by Caraka and Āryadeva) had not been finalized? The *sūtras* that follow 1.1.4 provide a systematic and coherent

presentation of substances, qualities, and motions. Universals, particularities, and inherence are introduced later, in a somewhat casual and erratic fashion. Could this be an indication that there was an earlier version of the Vaiśeṣika that dealt only with the first three of Praśast-pāda's six categories?

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### Āgama in Kaṇāda Sūtra

The grounding of the knowledge of *Dharma* on the one hand and of *Brahman* on the other is positively done in the *Śruti* or the Vedas by Jaimini in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* and Bādarāyaṇa in the *Brahma Sūtra*, respectively.

Surprisingly, the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* of Kaṇāda seems to do just the opposite. It establishes the authority of the *Śruti* on the basis of the fact that it gives us a knowledge of *Dharma* and hence has to be regarded as authoritative. The *Sūtra* reads as follows:

तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्याम् ।

It may be noted that the term used in āgama which covers not only the Vedas but also other texts deemed as authoritative by other traditions in India. The attempt to deny the exclusive authority of the Vedic texts for determining the nature of either *Dharma* or *Nihśreyasa* and *apavarga* and extend the scope of such authority to other foundational 'texts' in the tradition by the use of the term āgama seems to have been made time and again in the tradition, as is evidenced by the *Āgama Prāmāṇya* of Yāmunācārya later. But to find the term Āgama being used in the *Sūtras* of Kaṇāda is significant and one may try to find if there is any such usage earlier to the one presently discussed.

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### Vārttika on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1

Uddyotakara in his *Vārttika* on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1 has said that each *vidyā* has its own *tattvajñāna* which leads to that *nihśreyasa* which pertains specifically to its own domain. He gives examples of *Mīmāṃsā*, *Vārtā* and

Dandanīti whose specific *nihśreyasa* he mentions respectively. It is only in the case of *ātmavidyā* that the *nihśreyasa* is supposed to be *mokṣa*. However, for some reason, this meaning of *tattvajñāna* and *nihśreyasa* seems to have been completely lost sight of in the tradition. The lost insight of Uddyotakara is important as it may lead us to ask about the *nihśreyasa* of each field of knowledge that we may pursue.

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### Advaita Before Śaṅkara: A Discussion by Samantabhadra

Generally, the doctrine of Advaita is ascribed to Śaṅkara and the discussion regarding it is supposed to have occurred after him. However, as the following quotations from Samantabhadra (AD 650, Potter) and Akalanka (AD 680, Potter) two eminent Jain philosophers, conclusively prove both the doctrine and the discussion regarding it were prevalent long before Śaṅkara appeared on the scene. The attention of the readers of the *JICPR* is drawn to the following quotation from Hajime Nakamura's *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy* (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1983, pp. 284-85).

Verse 26:

'If the principle of Advaita should be established by means of reason (*hetu*), there must exist a duality (*dvaīta*) between reason and what is to be proved (*sādhya*). If (the principle of Advaita) should be established without reason, why should not dualism too be established from mere words alone?'

(*Aṣṭasāti*) What is not established (in any way) should not be adopted by those who wish to gain profit and to discard disadvantage. For example, 'the one-sided view of emptiness' (*śunyaikānta*) (the theory of the Mādhyamika school) should not be adopted. Therefore, non-dualism, that is, which cannot be established, (should not be adopted)...In this case (the fact that non-dualism cannot be established) will not become a non-established reason (*asiddha hetu*). (Reason for that will be explained). (1) If the establishment of the principle of non-duality be based upon the reason (*sādhana*), then there would exist the duality of that which is to be established and its reason. Or, in the same way as the principle of non-

duality (*advaita*) is established, how is duality not established? (2) If (although the reason does not exist) one accomplishes one's objective by merely saying it, everything would be established for all. (Accordingly, the theory of non-dualism cannot be established.)

Verse 27:

Without dualism (*dvaita*), *advaita* cannot be established, just in the same way unless reason (*hetu*) exists, fallacious reason (*ahetu*) cannot exist. Negation of anything which has a name cannot exist without (the existence of) that which should be negated.

[Astasati] The word 'non-dualism' (*advaita*) points to the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) which contradicts that which one thinks in his heart, for it is a single word to which a negative prefix is attached. It is the same case with the expression 'non-cause' (*ahetu*). In this case the range of applicability (for the negative prefix) is not too broad. (That is, if the prefix 'a' of *advaita* is a negative affix one must not assert that the range of application of the negative affix is too broad). For, the negative affix is related to the negation of a thing as something of such a nature. (Now) it must be thought that in all cases, if there is nothing to be negated, the negation of anything which has the name is not possible. (Therefore, the negation of duality must admit the existence of duality).

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### Dharmakīrti on Physical Reality

Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* refers to light and sound as a 'model' of physical reality and in case it is taken seriously, it might help us not only in understanding the Buddhist notion of reality, but also suggest a different idea of material reality than is generally found either at the commonsense or sophisticated level.

The paradigmatic example of matter is generally that of stone, a well-demarcated 'something' that occupies space, is inert and incapable of motion or any other activity on its own. Light or sound do not occupy any fixed position in space as they are continuously spreading, moving and expanding in 'waves', each wave giving rise to the next and thus

simultaneously 'ceasing to be' and giving rise to that which is homogenous and similar to it, by ceasing to be.

This, strangely, also seems to be the character of consciousness, though the continuous movement that occurs in it because of either external or internal factors, can be stopped or at least affected to some extent by its own attempt to do so. In this perhaps lie the beginnings of 'Yoga' which, of course, does not and can not stop with the achievement of just this stoppage.

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### History of Indian Philosophy

Haribhadra Sūri's *Ṣaḍadarśana Samuccaya* is a well-known work, particularly as it is perhaps the first survey of Indian philosophy written by an Indian in Sanskrit as early as the eighth century AD. Yet, some of the *Sampradāyas* mentioned in it have not attracted the attention they deserve, perhaps because they did not develop into full-fledged schools of Indian philosophy and were not regarded as such even in his time. Still, the fact that he considered them of sufficient importance to mention in his work denotes that, in his time, they must have acquired sufficient following and influence to deserve this mention. These occur almost at the very beginning of the work and are called *Ajñānavādah Vainayikavādah*, and *Lokavādah*. The first one seems to be a Jain *sampradāya* which seems to have arisen in the context of the controversy about the *Āptapurūṣa* being a *sarvajñaya* and the fact that Ācārya Samantabhadra in his *Aptamīmāṃsā* had contended that Mahāvīra alone could be regarded as such. The followers of the doctrine seem to have argued that it was impossible to determine whether Mahāvīra was actually a *sarvajñaya* or not, and that the observance of the Jain precepts did not depend on a settlement of the issue concerned.

Similarly the other two schools seem to argue that 'practical living' has little to do with theoretical contentions and hence should be detached from them. It may be noted that the third one, that is, *Lokavādah* is different from the Lokāyata which is treated by Haribhadra Sūri as a full-fledged philosophical school along with Buddhism, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Jain,



Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā which add up to seven and not six as mentioned in the title. But what is important to note is that not only is Vedānta not mentioned but also Yoga as a separate school of Indian Philosophy.

The importance of the different systems may be gauged both from the sequence in which schools have been discussed and the number of pages devoted to them.

1. Buddhism	37
2. Nyāya	76
3. Sāṃkhya	7
4. Jain	245
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Interestingly, Haribhadra Sūrī not only gives the views of these philosophical schools, but also gives picturesque details of the way they led their life. The Naiyāyikas may find the following of particular interest, and wonder whether the present-day Naiyāyikas could call themselves so, if the way of living described in his work was supposed to be an integral part of being a Naiyāyika.

ते च दण्डधराः प्रौढकौपीनपरिधानाः, कम्बलिकाप्रावृताः, जटाधारिणः, भस्मोद्भूलनपराः, यज्ञोपवीतिनः जलाधारपात्रकराः, नीरसाहाराः, प्रायो वनवासिनो दोर्मूले, तुम्बकं बिभ्राणाः, कन्दमूलफलाशिनः, आतिथ्यकर्मनिरताः, संस्त्रीकाः, निस्त्रीकाश्च । निस्त्रीकास्तेषूत्तमाः । ते च पञ्चानिसाधनपराः, करे जटादौ च प्राणलिङ्गधराश्चापि भवन्ति । उत्तमां संयमावस्थां प्राप्तास्तु नमना भ्रमन्ति ।

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### Śaḍadarśana Samuccaya on Advaita Vedānta

Śaḍadarśana Samuccaya of Haribhadra Sūrī is well known to students of philosophy and it has generally been said that it does not mention Vedānta as a school of Indian philosophy in it. This is just not correct, even though I myself had written it in a controversial paper entitled 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD', published in the JICPR Special Issue, 1996, pp. 201-7. He refers to Vedānta in his chapter on Mīmāṃsā

and calls it Uttaramīmāṃsā and designates those who subscribe to it as Vedāntins and the doctrine they propound as *Brahmādvaitavāda*. However, he does not discuss in any detail either the doctrine or the arguments in the chapter concerned, which deals primarily only with the Pūrvamīmāṃsā which is called Jaiminiya.

Surprisingly, he gives some information about the Vedāntins of those times, divided as they were, according to him, into four sects, or four stages, the two of which are still known to some extent at least. The distinction between those who are known as belonging to the category of *Hamśa* or those who belong to the category of *Paramahamśa* is familiar still, though few would know that the latter could take their food from any house, including those of the *Śūdras*. The other two were called *Kuṭicāra* and *Bahūdaka*. These two were supposed to wear *brahmasūtra* (a strange term which seems to indicate something different from the *yajñopavīta* which was supposed to be worn by those who followed pūrvamīmāṃsā) and also *Śikhā* or the tuft of hair on their head. The former two categories, that is, *Hamśa* and *Paramahamśa*, did not have the *Śikhā* or wore the *Brahmasūtra* as the other two did.

The whole text is interesting from many points of view and gives an intimate picture of the way philosophers lived at that time. A comparative study of the doctrines as propounded in the book might help to locate the developments that occurred later in the doctrines of many of these schools, a subject about which not much seems to be known as what is generally known is an ahistorical, static picture of the schools' position as if it had not internal differences or changes within it.

Interestingly, Haribhadra Sūrī knows both Kumārila and Prābhākara as he mentions them by name in his discussion of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. On the other hand, he does not seem to know Śaṃkara at all or any other thinker of the Vedānta school earlier to him.

This suggests that though Vedānta was known as Uttaramīmāṃsā and the doctrine it propounded was known as *Brahmādvaita*, it had not yet crystallized into a separate recognized school of philosophy till his time.

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### Monograph on Advaita Vedānta

Attention is drawn to a monograph on Advaita Vedānta entitled *Advaita: A Critical Investigation*, by Prof. Srinivasa Rao, published by Indian Philosophy Foundation, Jñāna Bharti, Bangalore, 1985, p. 95.

The Advaitins have always treated the rope-snake illusion as the paradigmatic example of the way the Brahman is related to the world that we experience, the former being analogous to the rope and the latter to the snake in the example. Yet, most of the Advaitins also subscribe to the notion of Brahman-realization by many persons who continue to live in this world even after they have achieved such a realization. But, 'life in the world' cannot be lived without awareness of 'difference' and multiplicity, which are the hall-mark of the world. The Brahma-realization, thus, could not have resulted in the 'disappearance' of the world in the same way as the snake is supposed to disappear after one has realized that what one was seeing as 'snake' was really a 'rope'.

The basic contradiction does not seem to have been squarely faced by the Advaitins, even though most of them hold all these positions together. Prof. Srinivasa Rao has focussed his discussion on this basic issue and suggested possible modifications in the way one might 'save' the truth of Advaita in the face of such a situation. The discussion on what he has said would thus be helpful in clearing up one of the central issues which all Advaitins must face.

The fundamental dilemma posed by Prof. Srinivasa Rao may thus be formulated in the following ways:

1. Either one must give up the rope-snake illusion as illustrating the relation between the Brahman and the world, or
2. One must give up the idea that one may continue to live in the world even after one has realized the Brahman.

It is for the Advaitins to choose, but whatever the choice, it will involve radical changes in the Advaita position as it has been understood until now.

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### Eliot Deutsch on Advaita

Attention is drawn to the book *Humanity and Divinity: An Essay in Comparative Metaphysics*<sup>2</sup> written by Eliot Deutsch, which is perhaps the most original reconstruction of the Advaitic position done by a thinker. Never before has a Western thinker so internalised a non-Western mode of thought and developed it creatively as Eliot has done the Advaitic insights in this book. Besides many other innovations, the crucial concept of 'sublation' gets a reformulation as 'subration' in this work which is described as the 'process whereby we disvalue a previously valued content of consciousness because it is contradicted by a new experience.' (p. 10).

It is further explained that 'subration' is a special mental process which involves a revision of judgment. The judging process is not a simple axiological one of the sort 'I thought X was good (valuable, important) but then felt that it wasn't'; it is rather an axio-noetic one of the sort, 'X, because of a, b, c, is to be rejected and is to be replaced by Y, where X and Y may be any content of consciousness—a concept, an existential relation, a physical object, and so forth.' (p. 11).

The book deserves a serious consideration by all those interested in Indian thought in general, and Advaitic thought in particular.

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### Adhūnika according to Udayana

Dr. Mukund Lath has drawn our attention to the following text from Udayana's *Parīśuddī*, where he self-consciously proclaims himself to be an 'ādūnika' and 'abhīnava' in contrast to Jayanta, etc. whom he considers as *jara naiyāyika*. It will be interesting to find as to what exactly are the features which he considers as distinguishing him from the 'ancients' and which, in his view, make him as 'ādūnika' naiyāyika. He has also made a five-fold distinction in the relation between *vācya* and *vācaka* which needs to be paid closer attention by contemporary philosophers in the analytical tradition.

2. *Humanity and Divinity: An Essay in Comparative Metaphysics*, by Eliot Deutsch. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1970.

अत्रोपमानस्य फले विप्रतिपद्यमानान् प्रति साशङ्कं जरत्रैयायिकजयन्त प्रभृतीनां परिहारमाह-यद्यपीति। संज्ञाकर्म संज्ञाकरणम्। मानान्तरं शब्दो वा शब्दोर्थो वा लिङ्गभूतः। तत्रलिङ्गपक्षे, उपलक्षितः। शब्दादवगतेन गोसादृश्येन प्रतिपाद्यमानः पिण्डः समानासमानजातीयेभ्यो व्यवच्छिन्नः शक्यमवगन्तुमिति संबन्धः। शब्दपक्षे तु, गोसादृश्येनोपलक्षितो विशिष्टः शब्दादवगम्यमानः पिण्डः समानासमानजातीयेभ्यो व्यवच्छिन्नः शक्योऽवगन्तुम्, गुणकर्मादिवत् सादृश्यस्यापि समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वादिति सुगमम्। गोसादृशो गवयशब्दवाच्य इति तावदस्तु। अथ गोसादृश एव क इत्याशङ्कानिवर्तनासामर्थ्यमतेः परिप्लवः। एनमेवार्थं कञ्चिद्विद्यादिना दर्शितवान्। यत्रेति विषये। तर्हि विशिष्टैव प्रतिपत्तिर्वाक्यादस्तु इत्यत आह-न चेति। प्रत्यक्षमात्रद्वयविष्यतीत्यत आ-न चेति।।

एतेन वाक्यप्रत्यक्षसमाहारेऽपिरिस्तः। स हि प्रमाणसमाहारे वा स्यात्, फलसमाहारे वाद्येऽपि प्रमाणत्वे सति समाहारः, समाहृतचयोर्वा प्रामाण्यमिति न तावत् प्रथमः, फलानेकत्वे सति समाहारानुपपत्तेः, तस्यैकफलं प्रति मरस्परधिपत्यरूपत्वात्। नापि द्वितीयः, वाक्यप्रत्यक्षयोर्भिन्नकालत्वात्। वाक्यतदर्थयोः समृतिद्वारोपनीतावपि गवयपिण्डसंबन्धेः। फलसमाहारे तु तदन्तर्भविसुमानशब्दयोरपि प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गः। तत् किं तत्फलस्य तत्प्रमाणबहिर्भाव एव, अन्तर्भवेवा कियती सीमा? तत्तदसाधारणेन्द्रियादिसाहित्यम् अस्ति तर्हि सादृश्यादिज्ञानकालेऽपि विस्फारितस्य चक्षुषो व्यापारः? न, तस्मिन् सति तस्यानुपयोगात्। उपलब्धगोसादृश्य-विशिष्टगवयपिण्डस्य वाक्यस्मृतिमतः कालान्तरेऽप्यनुसन्धानबलात् समयपरिच्छेदोपपत्तिरिति। तदेतत् जरत्रैयायिकमतमास्कन्दति- नन्विति। पूर्वं हि यथा गौस्तथेत्येव वाक्यं गवयपदेनाप्रतीतसमयेनापि प्रयोगमात्रोपयोगिना सहितं संबन्धप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः प्रतिसंबन्धिनस्तु शब्दाद् वोपलक्षणाद् वोपस्थापनमित्याहुः। आधुनिकास्तु प्रतिसंबन्ध्युपस्थितिः पूर्ववदेव, समयपरिच्छेदस्तु प्रयोगानुमानादित्याहुः।।

अवाचकप्रयोगस्य वाक्यानङ्गतयेति तद्विरहिणश्च संबन्ध्युपलक्षण-पर्यवसानादिति मन्यमाना एतदेव प्रयोगमारोप्य दर्शयन्ति-यो हीति। एतेनैव परिप्लवो निरस्तः। यदि हि संबन्धो विदितः, कः परिप्लवार्थः? अथन विदितः, किं तदुपवर्णनं? विशेषनिष्ठतया न विदित इति तत्रकाङ्क्षनुवृत्तेवमुच्यत इति चेत्- तदप्युक्तम्। न हि विशेषनिष्ठः समयः, तथा सत्यशक्यग्रहत्वात्, अपि तु किञ्चित् निमित्तीकृत्य देशकालादिविशेषविनाकृतव्यक्तिमात्रनिष्ठः। तदेव निमित्तं नावगतमिति चेत्? अवगतिरेव तर्हि संबन्धस्य संबन्धिनोऽनवगमादिति किं परिप्लुतं प्रमातुः? न चैष परमार्थः सादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डोपक्षेपे निमित्तस्याप्युपक्षेमात्। अन्यथा पिण्डोपक्षेपेऽपि निमित्तानुपक्षेपे मनोधर्मादिशब्दानां जातिशब्दत्वं न स्यात्, अवाचकत्वमेव च स्यात् तत्र जातीयानां नित्यपरोक्षत्वादिति।।

अत्रोच्यते अभिनवनैयायिकैः, पञ्चधा हि वाच्यवाचकभावव्यसस्था। निमित्तेपलक्षणरहिते शृङ्गग्राहिकया चैत्रमैत्रवत्। निर्निमित्तेऽन्तर्भूतोपलक्षणे परिभाषणिकया आकाशादिशब्दवत्। सनिमित्ते तटस्थोपलक्षण एवंप्रकारिकया पृथिव्यादिवत्। विशेषवन्निमित्ते निमित्तसङ्कोचनिकया

स्वर्गादिवदिति। तत्र प्रथमद्वितीय-योरसंभावितत्वादिह विदितवृत्तान्ततया तृतीयं प्रकारं निरस्य पञ्चमश्चतुर्थमुपयातीति चतुर्थवयवस्थापयति- न तावदिति। अविदितगवयशब्दवृत्तान्तस्य तु यद् भविष्यति, तदनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यति। तदिदमुक्तमिति। परमार्थो पस्तुगतिः ततश्च तशामूत एव पिण्डे सेबन्धो ग्राह्यो न तु सादृश्योपलक्षणोपतीते पिण्डमात्र इत्यर्थः।।

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### Nyāya Ratnam

Attention is drawn to the work entitled 'Nyāya Ratnam'<sup>3</sup> by Mani Kantha Miśra who according to Potter's Bibliography, flourished around AD 1300 and thus was perhaps slightly earlier than Gangeśa who is assigned AD 1350 in the second edition and 1320 in the third edition.

The interesting thing about the book is that it starts the discussion of the subject not with the way *padārthas* are given in the *Nyāya Sūtra* or the way and sequence in which they have been discussed in the earlier commentaries on the subject from Vātsyāyana to Udayana or even in Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña. Instead, he starts with *Tarka* which is seldom considered as an independent topic deserving a separate discussion on its own. It is followed by a discussion on *Vyāpti*, *Upadhī*, *Pakṣatā* and *Parāmarśa* which hardly were ever considered as *padārthas* either in the *Nyāya Sūtra* or in the millennium-long discussion that occurred on it. These constitute almost one half of the book covering 134 pages out of a total of 249 dealing with other topics such as *avayava*, *kathā*, *vāda*, etc.

Another important feature of the book is that it refers to *Mahāvīdyā* which generally is not known as constituting any part of Nyāya at all. The work perhaps thus indicates an unorthodox tradition in Nyāya thinking which developed between Udayana and Gangeśa and of which even Bhāsarvajña provides evidence to some extent.

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### Anumāna Khaṇḍa of Gangeśa's

Attention is drawn to the publication of the second part of the Anumāna Khaṇḍa of Gangeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, by the Kendriya Sanskrit

3. Madras Government Oriental Series No. 54, 1953.

Vidyapeetha, Tirupathi in 1999. The first part of that work was published from Tirupathi in 1982 by Ramanuja Tatacaryya from where the Pratyaksa Khandā was published in 1973. Both these have been published by Professor Ramanuja Tatacaryya.

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### Nyaya theory of knowledge

The Nyāya view of knowledge is so strange, both in psychological and epistemological aspects, that in case it was really held by them it would make not only their own analysis of knowledge impossible, but any other view of it also. Knowledge presupposes at least a relative stability and identity of the object to be known along with that of the process by which it is known. In case the analysis destroys the possibility of this at its very foundations, it cannot reasonably build the theory of knowledge which it itself has made impossible.

Nyāya seems to do just this and, what is stranger, doesn't seem to realize this. What is perhaps even more strange is that those who write on Nyāya and explain it to others do not see the contradiction involved and seem happily oblivious of the incompatibility and try to propound and defend both.

Knowledge, or 'cognition' is supposed to be 'episodic'; each momentary episode followed by another which, if true, would hardly distinguish the Nyāya position from that of the Buddhists. How can such momentary episodic knowledge-events ever give rise to the notion of an 'object' which is not only perceptually apprehended, but in which the universals or the *sāmānya* or the *jāti* is apprehended also? Not only this, the latter Nyāya also seems to contend that everything that is a *Padārtha* has to be known 'perceptually', including not only *Sāmānya* but also *Samavāya* and *abhāva*.

The Nyāya is also supposed to be concerned with the theory of *Pramāṇa* which includes *anumāna* or inference. But how can one ever establish or even conceive of the relation of *Vyāpti* on which inference is supposed to be based, if that through which it is to be apprehended is

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itself momentary and episodic character? Nyāya, logically speaking, can accept no relation except that of succession where the latter is supposed to 'destroy' the former. The use of the word 'destruction' is unwarranted as the latter, as what is 'happening', is necessitated by the analysis itself and no 'causality' is required to explain why what is happening is 'happening'.

Ultimately, the simple question is: can such a view of 'knowledge-events' be maintained without making the object of knowledge also 'momentary and episodic in character'? The distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* could also not be maintained as the *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* will have to share the same characteristic ontologically. Nor can the *vyāpti* which is the basis of *anumāna* be held because the very possibility of inference has been destroyed by the ontological analysis of knowledge as a momentary event in a process which is unending. The recourse to the Buddhist notion of *vikalpa* either at the level of perception or at the level of *anumāna* will be as unavailing unless some sort of dualism is metaphysically accepted which the analysis itself prohibits.

I think it is time that those who write on Nyāya become aware of the problem and deal directly with it and also try to tell how the Nyāya position is different from that of the Buddhist and why it doesn't share the same defects as the latter is supposed to suffer from.

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### Works on Navya Nyāya mode of analysis

Many students of philosophy look forward to finding and intelligible introduction to Navya Nyāya mode of analysis and thought about knowledge and related issues. Attention is drawn to the following works which have an outstanding quality in the presentation of Navya Nyāya mode of analysis and the problems that it raises. The interested students will find them immensely helpful in understanding this complex school of Indian Philosophy.

1. S.P., Dubey, Ed. *The Philosophy Life*, 'Navya Nyāya Technique of Analysis', by Hari Mohan Jha. (*Facets of Recent Indian Philosophy*. Vol. 4), ICPR, 1998, pp. 121-33.
2. V.N. Jha, Ed. *Viśyatāvāda of Hari Ram Tarkālamkāra*, University of Poona, 1987, Introduction, pp. XI-LVI.
3. (a) Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, Ed. *Gadādhara 's Theory of Objectivity: Viśyatāvāda*, Part I, ICPR, 1990 (Dist. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi): Introduction, pp. 3-38.
- (b) *Gangeśa Theory of Indeterminate Perception: Nirvikalpakavāda*, Part I, ICPR, 1993 (Dist. Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi).
3. J.N. Mohanty, Ed. *Gangeśa's Theory of Truth*, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visvabharati, Santiniketan, 1996. Introduction, pp. 1-79.

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***Prasthāna Ratnākara on Abādhitā Jñāna***

Attention is drawn to a philosophically important distinction between *Abādhitā Jñāna* and *Bādha-Yogya-Vyatirikta Jñāna* in the work of Sri Purshottama Pitambara entitled *Prasthāna Ratnākara*. The author belongs to the Vallabha *Sampradāya* and is said to have lived in the seventeenth century. The distinction is philosophically important as it raises the question whether the knowledge that has not been refuted or disproved is of such a nature that it can not be disproved or refuted, in principle, ever.

The exact text reads as follows:

तत्र प्रमाणशब्दो भवप्युत्पन्नोऽबाधितज्ञाने वर्तते बाधयायोग्य व्यतिरिक्ते च करण व्युत्पन्नस्तु ।

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**Bibliographical Sources Relating to Indian Philosophy**

Research in Indian philosophy is seriously hampered by lack of information about the bibliographical sources available regarding it. The following are the standard sources in the area which provide comprehensive information regarding the works published upto now:

1. *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies (Bibliography)*, Vol. 1, by Karl. H. Potter.

It contains information about all the basic texts published upto now and the papers published thereon in different languages of the world. The 3rd edition of the bibliography was published some time ago and a detailed review article on it was published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XIII, No. 3. Potter's comments on it along with a reply to it were published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1.

2. The Bibliographical reference work published by Professor Thangaswami Sharma, who passed away recently, is not so well known to scholars of Indian philosophy as it is written in Sanskrit only. However, in some ways, it is more comprehensive than Potter's bibliography although it does not contain articles published on various schools and texts in Indian philosophy. Instead, it gives detailed information regarding the author of the text, his teachers and the place to which he belonged. It also provides information about the development of school and sub-schools in different schools of Indian philosophy. The following major bibliographies in Sanskrit were published during his lifetime:

(a) *Advaita Vedānta*. Pub: University of Madras, 1980, Rs. 32.

(b) *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika*. Pub: University of Madras, 1985, Rs. 20.

(c) *Mīmāṃsā Manjarī*. Pub: ICPR, 1996, Rs. 375.

The above three volumes are collectively entitled *Darshan Manjarī*.

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**Philosophical Writing in Indian Languages**

Philosophical writing in India is generally assumed as being confined to either the English or the Sanskrit language. Normally, no one expects any significant philosophical activity to occur in any of the other Indian languages. However, a book published some 20 years ago draws the reader's attention to the existence of philosophical writing in Indian languages. Edited by Professor V.M. Bedekar, the book *Philosophical Writings in Fifteen Modern Indian Languages* is published by Continental Prakashan, Vijaynagar, Pune, 1979 (p. 342, Rs. 45). The information provided in this book covers the period upto 1975 only. The contents need

to be up-dated so that information regarding any work that has been done later in these languages is also available.

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### Books on Rebirth

Most religions believe in some sort of life after death, and religions which have originated in India believe in rebirth also. Yet, the evidence regarding these is difficult to find and even more difficult to believe. In the case of India most philosophical schools believe both in the theory of karma and the theory of rebirth which are integrally related to each other. The hypothesis is difficult to sustain in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Yet the well-authenticated counter-cases are to be collected and critically evaluated in as 'objective' a manner as possible. We give below details of the following two books in this connection:

1. *Twenty Cases: Suggestive of Reincarnation*, by Ian Stevenson, M.D., University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA, 1974.
2. *Ravindranath Ki Parlok Charcha*, published originally in Bengali by Amitabh Choudhury and translated into Hindi by Bharati Bhakt, published by Rajkamal Prakashan, New Delhi, 1998.

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### Aristotle on Truth

Aristotle in his book *De Interpretatione*<sup>4</sup> has discussed, amongst other things, the issue of 'truth' and 'falsity' and argued that these predicates can only be applied to expressions where there is a definite assertion or denial of something indicated by the verbs 'is' and 'is not'. The discussion anticipates Tarski's well-known contention that 'truth' or 'falsity' can only be predicated of sentences and not of things. The following, for example, tries to express this view in as clear a manner as one would like it to be:

Thus names and verbs by themselves—for instance 'man' or 'white' when nothing further is added—are like the thoughts that are without

4. *De Interpretatione*: J.L. Ackrill. 'The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume I, The Revised Oxford Translation'. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Bollingen Series LXXI.2. Princeton University Press, p. 25.

combination and separation; for so far they are neither true nor false. A sign of this is that even 'goat-stag' signifies something but not, as yet, anything true or false—unless 'is' or 'is not' is added (either simply or with reference to time).

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### Medieval Thought

Most Indians generally tend to assume that an integral view of things is a special peculiarity of their own tradition. But it was a general feature of all ancient civilizations and not a special feature of any one of them. We reproduce below a passage from a recently published book entitled *Medieval Thought*<sup>5</sup> which brings together, in a highly readable and informative manner, the recent investigations in this field:

'Divine reason has implanted an order which can be discovered by the use of the disciplines of human language and of mathematics by the use of poetry and music, geometry and astronomy. The ancient study of these liberal arts was thus given an ethical and religious value as part of the search in which philosophy consists. For example, the study of grammar constitutes the first stage in the passage from material things to immaterial things, as the intrinsic rationality of words is grasped and as speech is built up following the laying-down of rules. Dialectic is recommended to those who would study Scripture. The arts, therefore, are routes to truth.' (p. 12).

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### Medieval Thought on Arts

An interesting view about arts is presented by John the Scot, a medieval thinker. According to him, the arts are fully a part of man's innate cognitive and communicative powers, not merely artificial techniques useful to understanding the Scriptures. With the arts man may uncover his origins by coming to an understanding of his resemblance to

5. *Medieval Thought*, by David Luscombe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.

his creator, a resemblance that comprises the freedom, dignity, and rationality that man had enjoyed fully before the fall.<sup>6</sup> (pp. 37-38).

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### Ibn Rushd

The world of Arabic philosophy is generally a closed world to the philosophical community in India. And this has been so inspite of the long presence of Islam in this country. This is in sharp contrast to the acquaintance with Western thought, inspite of the fact that the British presence in India lasted for a much shorter period. As a first step in lessening this ignorance we would like to draw attention to a remarkable work by Ibn Rushd (Averroes) entitled *Tahafut al Tahafut*.<sup>7</sup> This is a point-by-point response to Al Ghazali's attack on philosophers in his work entitled *Tahafut al Philsafa*. The work reminds us of the great controversy between Vyāsātīrtha II and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the tradition. The work has been translated into English by Simon Van der Bergh and published quite sometime ago by the trustees of E.J.W Gibb Memorial. The work contains a detailed discussion of the notions of possibility, actuality and necessity and should be of interest to all those who are interested in the current discussion on these topics. Some of the issues discussed in the various chapters of the book are given below:

1. Eternity of the world.
2. Incorruptibility of the world and of Time and Motion.
3. God as the agent and the maker of the world.
4. Inability to prove the existence of a creator of the world.
5. Denial of attributes.
6. Is God ignorant of the individual things which are divided in time into presents past and future.
7. Is there any logical necessity between cause and effect?

6. *Medieval Thought*, by David Luscombe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.

1. *'Tahafut al Tahafut'* (Incoherence of the Incoherence) by Averroes translated from Arabic with Introduction and Notes by Simon Van den Bergh published by the Trustees of E.J.W, Gibb Memorial. Reprinted 1978 & 1987.

8. Can there be demonstrative proof that the soul is a spiritual substance?

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### Jewish and Arabic Philosophy

Jewish and Arabic philosophy are little known in this country. And, though there are books dealing with them, there has been little attempt at seeing them in the background of a comparative perspective provided by outstanding philosophical thinkers in the Western tradition. A recent book entitled *Jewish and Islamic Philosophy: Crosspollinations in the Classic Age* by Lenn E. Goodman, Professor of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee attempts to do just this and brings to our attention the names of philosophers like Muhammad Ibn Zakarya al-Razi, Saadiyah Gaon, Bahya Ibn Paquda, Avicenna, Maimonides, Ibn Khaldun, and Baruch Spinoza, unknown to us.

The contents of the book are as follows:

1. Crosspollinations
  - (1) Hearing God's voice in words
  - (2) He who knows himself knows his 'Lord'
  - (3) God's act in history
    1. Razi and Epicurus
      - (1) Perception and sensation
      - (2) Pleasure and pain
      - (3) Desire, motivation, and free will
      - (4) Razi's ethics and the ethical transparency of hedonism
    2. Bahya and Kant
      - (1) The antionomy
      - (2) Bahya's response
      - (3) The philosophical impact of Bahya's approach
    3. Maimonides and the Philosophers of Islam
      - (1) Creation
      - (2) Theophany
      4. Friendship

- (1) Friendship as reciprocated virtue
- (2) Biblical, Rabbinic, Maimonides and Qur'anic fellowship
- (3) Miskawayh on friendship
- (4) Friendship in al-Ghazali
5. Determinism and freedom in Spinoza, Maimonides and Aristotle
  - (1) Aristotle's determinism
  - (2) Maimonides' determinism
  - (3) Spinoza's determinism
  - (4) Spinoza's defense of human freedom
  - (5) Maimonides on character and freedom
  - (6) Freedom and *akrasia*
  - (7) Conclusion
6. Ibn Khaldun and Thucydides
  - (1) A science of history and civilization
  - (2) Governance in History

Vol. XVII, No. 2

Daya Krishna

#### New Translation of Critique of Pure Reason

There is a New Translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood in the Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant, Cambridge University Press, 1998 (Paperback reprint 1999-2000), p. 785.

The introduction to this new Edition and Translation is remarkable for its comprehensiveness and delineation of the successive steps in Kant's formulation of his philosophical position in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Most of the 'pre-critique' writings of Kant are mentioned in detail and their philosophical position explicated in a manner that would be of interest to most students of philosophy, particularly as they are interesting on their own account independently of the fact that Kant gave up many of these in the final formulation of his position in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

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Daya Krishna

#### Kant

The publication of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* at the end of 18th century (1781) in Germany seems to have had almost the same effect as the rise of logical positivism at the end of 19th century in the Anglo-Saxon world. Metaphysics, in both cases, was argued to be the result of a foundational misunderstanding about the nature of reason and what can strictly be called 'knowledge'. For Kant, it was the result of the application of categories to a realm where they could not be applied as their meaningful application could only be done in the realm of sense-experience. For the latter, it was the result of a foundational misconception about the cognitive use of language and what it really meant to make a 'knowledge-claim' whose 'truth-conditions' have to be specified in order to intersubjectively determine whether it was valid or not. In Germany, however, the response to Kant was a desperate attempt to reinstate metaphysics in some form or other, though taking Kant's contention seriously in this connection. The work of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger may be seen in this perspective.

On the other hand, there seems to have been no such sustained reaction in the Anglo-American world to the declaration of metaphysics as being 'literally nonsensical' as its statements could neither be shown to be true or false, and hence could not be considered as informative statements claiming cognitive status.

At a different level, metaphysics was considered as a 'disease' of the language which could only be cured by a proper linguistic analysis as the language seemed to have taken a holiday from its usual function. The following quotation from Hegel's *Science of Logic* gives a vivid picture of the unease created by Kant's work and the challenge it posed for the German thinkers of those times, particularly as it seems to have been affecting younger minds who had begun to think under Kant's influence, that whole of past philosophy was based on a fundamental mistake. The complete transformation which philosophical thought in Germany has undergone in the last twenty-five years, and the higher standpoint reached



by spirit in its awareness of itself, have had but little influence as yet on the structure of logic.

That which, prior to this period, was called metaphysics has been so to speak, extirpated root and branch, and has vanished from the ranks of the sciences. The ontology, rational psychology, cosmology, yes even natural theology, of former times—where is now to be heard any mention of them, or who would venture to mention them? Inquiries, for instance, into the immateriality of the soul, into efficient and final causes, where should these still arouse any interest? Even the former proofs of the existence of God are cited only for their historical interest or for purposes of edification and uplifting the emotions. The fact is that there no longer exists any interest either in the form or the content of metaphysics or in both together. If it is remarkable when a nation has become indifferent to its constitutional theory, to its national sentiments, its ethical customs and virtues, it is certainly no less remarkable when a nation loses its metaphysics, when the spirit which contemplates its own pure essence is no longer a present reality in the life of the nation.

The esoteric teaching of Kantian philosophy—that the understanding ought not to go beyond experience, else the cognitive faculty will become a theoretical reason which, by itself, generates nothing but fantasies of the brain—this was a justification from a philosophical quarter for the renunciation of speculative thought. In support of this popular teaching came the cry of modern educationists that the needs of the time demanded attention to immediate requirements, that just as experience was the primary factor for knowledge, so for skill in public and private life, practice and practical training generally were essential and alone necessary, theoretical insight being harmful even. Philosophy (*Wissenschaft*) and ordinary common sense thus co-operating to bring about the downfall of metaphysics, there was seen the strange spectacle of a cultured nation without metaphysics—like a temple richly ornamented in other respects but without a holy of holies. Theology, which in former times was the guardian of speculative mysteries and of metaphysics (although this was subordinate to it) had given up this science in exchange

for feelings, for what was popularly matter-of-fact, and for historical erudition. In keeping with this change, there vanished from the world those solitary souls who were sacrificed by their people and exiled from the world to the end that the eternal should be contemplated and served by lives devoted solely thereto—not for any practical gain but for the sake of blessedness; a disappearance which, in another context, can be regarded as essentially the same phenomenon as that previously mentioned. So that having got rid of the dark utterances of metaphysics, of the colourless communion of the spirit with itself, outer existence seemed to be transformed into the bright world of flowers—and there are no *black* flowers, as we know.

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Daya Krishna

#### Kant's Science of Right

Kant's *Science of Right* is perhaps the least known amongst his works, yet it provides the transition from the *Critique of Practical Reason* to his work on *Perpetual Peace* where he is concerned with the problem of transcending the state of 'nature' in which 'sovereign states' find themselves in a state of perpetual conflict towards some sort of 'living' in a 'supra-national' 'juridical' system on the pattern provided by the civil juridical system he has formed for peaceful living in a civil society.

The relation between the 'sense of duty' or 'the categorical imperative' which constituted, for Kant, the 'moral being' of man has to be translated into the notion of 'right' with the complementary notion of 'obligatoriness' in a civil society where the 'freedom' of each is conditioned by the recognition of the 'freedom' of the 'other' and, thus, creating a 'world' where the notion of 'mine' is related intrinsically to the notion of 'thine', resulting in a 'world' based on the category of 'reciprocity' under the heading of 'Relation' as given in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The essence of the relation between 'free' beings is, thus, strangely and paradoxically, seen in what has been called '*svatva*' in the Indian tradition and which Kant calls '*possessio noumenon*' (p. 407) to distinguish it both from *actual* physical possession on the one hand and 'empirical'

legal 'right' of possession on the other, which he calls '*possessio phenomenon*'. This provides the *a priori* formal precondition of the possibility of the moral being of 'man' in society and derives from the fact that both the 'sense of duty' and the 'categorical imperative' imply a reference to the 'other' whose reality, however, gets established as an independent 'free' being only through the notion of 'right' or that which is 'mine' which, in turn, cannot make sense without the acceptance on the part of the 'other' to respect it and even actively help in seeing that it is secured for me.

The following observation from *The Science of Right* may be helpful in understanding this strange and unfamiliar turn in Kant's thought in this connection:

The conception of a purely juridical possession is not an empirical conception dependent on conditions of space and time, and yet it has practical reality. As such it must be applicable to objects of experience, the knowledge of which is independent of the conditions of space and time. The rational process by which the conception of right is brought into relation to such objects so as to constitute a possible external mine and thine, is as follows. The conception of right, being contained merely in reason, cannot be *immediately* applied to objects of experience, so as to give the conception of an empirical *possession*, but must be applied directly to the mediating conception, in the understanding, of *possession* in general; so that instead of physical holding (*detentio*) as an empirical representation of possession, the formal conception or thought of *having*, abstracted from all conditions of space and time, is conceived by the mind, and only as implying that an object is in my power and at my disposal (*in potestate mea positum esse*). In this relation the term external does not signify existence in *another place* than where I am, nor my resolution and acceptance at another time than the moment in which I have the offer to a thing; it signifies only an object *different* from or other than myself. Now the practical reason by its law of right wills, that I shall think the mine and thine in application to objects, not according to sensible conditions, but apart from these and from the possession they indicate; because they refer

to determinations of the activity of the will that are in accordance with the laws of freedom. For it is only a *conception of the understanding* that can be brought under the rational conception of right. I may, therefore, say that I possess a field, although it is in quite a different place from that on which I actually find myself. For the question here is not concerning an intellectual relation to the object, but I have the thing practically in my power and at my disposal, which is a conception of possession realized by the understanding and independent of relations of space; and it is *mine*, because my will, in determining itself to any particular use of it, is not in conflict with, the law of external freedom. Now it is just in abstraction from physical possession of the object of my free-will in the sphere of sense, that the practical reason wills that a rational possession of it shall be thought, according to intellectual conceptions which are not empirical, but contain *a priori* the conditions of rational possession. Hence it is in this fact, that we found the ground of the validity of such a rational conception of possession (*possessio noumenon*) as a principle of a universally valid *legislation*. For such a legislation is implied and contained in an expression, 'This external object is *mine*', because an obligation is thereby imposed upon all others in respect of it, who would otherwise not have been obliged to abstain from the use of this 'object'<sup>8</sup> (p. 407).

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### Kant's Impure Ethics

Attention is drawn to an edited work entitled '*Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings*' by Robert B. Loudon, published by Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 254.

The work brings into focus Kant's important distinction between 'pure' and 'impure' philosophical thinking denoting by the latter any element of 'empirical' considerations, and thus suggesting that 'pure' philosophy should be bereft of all empirical elements involved therein.

8. *The Critique of Pure Reason; The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Ethical Treatises; The Critique of Judgement* by Immanuel Kant, The University of Chicago, 1952.

But the distinction seems to suggest that man *is* an 'impure' being as he is an admixture of pure reason with its 'transcendental' elements and those deriving from the 'senses', the 'desires' and even feelings of 'pleasure' and 'pain', without which it would be impossible to conceive of a human being as a 'human being'. If ethics, then, is to be 'practical' and concerned with man as he exists, it will necessarily have 'impurity' in it as, without it, it would have no meaning. It, therefore, draws attention to these elements in Kant's thought and, incidentally, also gives information regarding his varied writings and the subjects he taught at the university during his extensive teaching career.

Kant seems to have had a great knowledge of these subjects and also wrote independently on them which, unfortunately, have not drawn the attention of those who have known about him only in the context of the three *Critiques* he wrote. A list of the contents of the work is given below:

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Daya Krishna

### Dumont's on *Homo Hierarchicus*

Louis Dumont's *Homo Hierarchicus* is a work well known among sociologists in India, but it is not so equally well known amongst philosophers in this country. His other works are hardly known to scholars and thinkers in general who are concerned with the understanding of Indian civilization. The 'structuralist' approach to the understanding of civilizations is virtually unknown in this country. We are, therefore, happy to publish the following brief note on the work of Dumont by Professor T.N. Madan who has been a close student of his work and, in fact, edited a volume of essays in his honour entitled *Way of Life: King, Householder, Renouncer: Essays in Honour of Louis Dumont* (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1982).

*Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications* (1970) by Louis Dumont is by now well established as a modern classic. Originally written in French, it has been translated into a number of European languages, but is not as yet available in any Indian language. It is widely known not only among sociologists and social anthropologists but also among social scientists and humanists as well. Its location within the French intellectual tradition of rationalism (Descartes) and its French structuralist methodology (Levi-Strauss) have perhaps stood in the way of its easy accessibility in India, particularly among readers brought up on a mixture of Anglo-American empiricism and functionalism.

*Homo Hierarchicus* is an explicitly and uncompromisingly comparative work. The holistic (the parts of a complex institution have meaning only in relation to the whole) and hierarchical (a relationship of superior and

inferior elements characterized by the latter being encompassed by the former even though opposed to it, e.g. *dharma* in relation to *artha* and *kāma*) ideology of the caste is adequately understood only when seen in contrast to the individualistic and egalitarian ideology of the modern West. The caste ideology is considered representative of traditionalism and not idiosyncratic.

Since the publication of *Homo Hierarchicus* Dumont has authored three major works exploring and outlining the profile of *Homo Aequalis*. The first of these books is *From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology*, (1977). Here he argues that, speaking the language of relations (which as a structuralist he must), the transition from tradition to modernity occurred in Europe when, among other things, the primacy of the relationship of persons to one another was displaced by that of persons to things. This development freed the economic category from both morality (Mandeville, Adam Smith) and politics (Locke, Marx). Economic ideology thus emerged as, first and foremost, the ideology of modernity. Dumont called this development 'the modern revolution in values' and maintained that it was 'the central problem in the comparison of societies' (p. 9).

Dumont devoted the second book to the exploration of, as its title announced, the ideology of individualism: *Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective* (1986). The focus here has on, not the individual as an empirically given sense datum for such individuals are present in all societies, but on the elevation of the individual to the status of a value and on individualism as the global ideology of modern society. The Brahmanical ideology of renunciation also valorizes the individual, but the renouncer is located by choice outside the world of caste and family ties, although not wholly detached from it. The modern ideology by contrast affirms the secular world and promotes praxis in relation to and within it (not from outside). The primacy of the economic category and the ideology of individualism entail each other.

As in the first book the focus was on ideas and values, not as fixed substances or entities, but as configurations of relations. Thus, Dumont asks: 'how can we build a bridge between our modern ideology that

separates values and 'facts' and other ideologies that embed values in their world view? Lest our quest should appear futile, let us not forget that the problem is in a way present in the world as it is. Cultures are in fact interacting, thus communicating in a mediocre manner...We are committed to reducing the distance between our two cases, to reintegrating the modern within the general one' (p. 247). Needless to add, the task is intellectual, philosophical.

While tracing the history of individualism in Europe from its Christian beginnings (individual outside the world to individual in the world), Dumont introduced a further refinement, namely the presence of national variants (of modern ideology). The third and the most recent book in the series, *German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back* (1995), develops this theme. The focus is on the German variant. He explains that the beginnings of the divergence are traceable to the distinctiveness of the German version of the Enlightenment compared to the Western (French), for it was religious. The 'estrangement' was expressed through 'an extraordinary intellectual and artistic blossoming' between 1770 and 1830 and marked by the growth of community consciousness defined culturally.

An essential but apparently contradictory accompaniment of these developments was the ideal of 'self-cultivation' (*Bildung*). Thus, 'community holism + self-cultivating individualism' was the 'idiosyncratic formula of German ideology' (p. 20). One 'is a man through his being a German' (p. 19), but the Frenchman thinks of himself as 'a man by nature and a Frenchman by accident' (p. 3). The Enlightenment in its secular expression and the Revolution are the formative forces in France; Lutheran Pietism and the Reformation, in Germany. In its German version, individualism emerges as a cultural category *par excellence*, distanced from the socio-political domain which is crucial in France. But the political category is not wholly absent: 'the belief that the German state had a vocation to dominate the world' (p. 21) takes care of that.

The situation is complex, and the German-French contrast has ontological and epistemological significances; indeed, its ethical dimension may not be denied. Underlying it is a question of immense philosophical import. This

is how Dumont puts it: 'How, without contradiction, can we acknowledge the diversity of cultures and at the same time maintain the universal idea of truth-value? I think it can be done by resorting to a...complex model...where truth-value would figure as a 'regulative idea', in the Kantian sense' (p. 34). Such an exercise is not, however, taken up in the book.

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T.N. Madan

### Hegel

The following statement in Hegel's *Science of Logic* makes 'strange reading' and perhaps shows a strange, though paradoxical, similarity with the philosophical enterprise that occurred in the Anglo-Saxon world at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century centred around language analysis, called 'The Linguistic Turn'.

Hegel talks of the German language as being specially privileged for philosophical thinking as it contained terms which have 'opposite' meaning embedded in them, thus suggesting a direction for thought which transcends the demand of understanding for extremely precise and exclusive meaning for every term so that clear thinking may be attempted. In this, it is just the opposite of what Anglo-Saxon philosophy of language tried to do where the ideal was just to have 'one' and only one meaning for every term resulting in the demand for the construction of an 'ideal language' in which alone philosophical problems could be meaningfully discussed. Hegel's statement not only shows the profound influence that German language has exercised on philosophising in Germany, the evidence for which may be found in plenty in the work of such an outstanding thinker as Heidegger, where it is quite explicit. But it also raises the larger question of the relation between language and philosophy and whether philosophical thinking is shaped and determined by the specificities of the language in which it is done. Could the same, for example, be said in respect of philosophical thinking done in Sanskrit which has more than 2000 years of continuous tradition of thinking in this country?

The forms of thought are, in the first instance, displayed and stored in human *language*. Nowadays we cannot be too often reminded that it is *thinking* which distinguishes man from the beasts. Into all that becomes something inward for men, an image or conception as such; into all that he makes his own, language has penetrated, and everything that he has transformed into language and expresses in it contains a category—concealed, mixed with other forms or clearly determined as such, so much is logic his natural element, indeed his own peculiar *nature*. If nature as such, as the physical world, is contrasted with the spiritual sphere, then logic must certainly be said to be the supernatural element which permeates every relationship of man to nature, his sensation, intuition, desire, need, instinct, and simply by so doing transforms it into something human, even though only formally human, into ideas and purposes. It is an advantage when a language possesses an abundance of logical expressions, that is, specific and separate expressions for the thought determinations themselves; many prepositions and articles denote relationships based on thought; the Chinese language is supposed not to have developed to this stage or only to an inadequate extent. These particles, however, play quite a subordinate part having only a slightly more independent form than the prefixes and suffixes, inflections and the like. It is much more important that in a language the categories should appear in the form of substantives and verbs and thus be stamped with the form of objectivity. In this respect German has many advantages over other modern languages; some of its words even possess the further peculiarity of having not only different but opposite meanings so that one cannot fail to recognize a speculative spirit of the language in them: it can delight a thinker to come across such words and to find the union of opposites namely shown in the dictionary as one word with opposite meanings, although this result of speculative thinking is nonsensical to the understanding.

## Fichte

Fichte is a well-known thinker and yet his work has not attracted the attention it deserves. His major work *The Science of Knowledge* has recently been edited and translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs and published by the Cambridge University Press, 1982 in its *Texts on German Philosophy* series. The work is a unique and rare exercise in philosophical thinking where the 'thinking' process itself is displayed and not just the results reached through it.

The author takes off from Kant and starts from the other end, i.e. from the self or the 'I-consciousness', and tries to deduce the whole structure of knowledge, including or rather encompassing both the 'theoretical' and the 'practical', and yet remaining within the limits set by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, though not perhaps very successfully. He gives concrete demonstration at every step of the dialectical nature of philosophical thought where the analysis breaks up the concept into 'opposites' which seem philosophically incapable of being united even though they must have been held in a synthetic unity in the concept earlier. The work provides a transition to Hegel who developed dialectics in a different manner and extended its scope in a way which was unimaginable to his predecessors. It is perhaps for this reason that Fichte's thought has not been paid the attention it deserved as he comes in between two great thinkers such as Kant and Hegel who have dominated the philosophical scene since they appeared there. Yet, he is perhaps a 'purer' philosopher as he is concerned more with 'thinking' rather than the results reached through it. The First Introduction to the work provides a remarkable understanding not only of his own philosophy, but also of philosophy in general.

The second Introduction deals with the issues such as feasibility of the notion of 'thing-in-itself' or the distinction between phenomena and noumena and argues that even though they are generally regarded as integral parts of Kant's thought, they are essentially incompatible with it.

**A Bibliography of Wittgenstein's Published Writings\*\***

An exhaustive note on Wittgenstein's published works, some of which were originally written in German and then translated into English while others were directly written or spoken in English, is given below as it may prove useful to students of his work in the country.

During his lifetime only the following were published:

Review of P. Coffy's 'The Science of Logic', *Cambridge Review*, XXXIV (1913). This was written in English.

*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Routledge, 1922. This was written in German and was translated into English by C.K. Ogden. A new translation of this work was done by David Pears and B.F. McGuinness. It was published in 1961.

'Some Remarks on Logical Form', *Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society*, IX (1929). This was written in English.

*Worterbuch fur Volksschulen*, published by Holder-Pichler-Tempsky in 1926. 'Letter to the Editor', *Mind*, 42, 1933.

The following are the works of Wittgenstein which were published after his death. They have been edited by his literary executors.

*Notebooks 1914-1916*. This is written in German and contains the notes dictated by Wittgenstein to Moore in Norway. The *Notebooks* were published in 1961.

Prototractatus—*An Early Version of Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*. This is written in German and was published in 1971.

'A Lecture on Ethics', *Philosophical Review*, LXXIV (1968). The lecture was delivered in English.

*Philosophical Remarks*. This was written in German. The German edition was published in 1964; the English translation was published in 1975.

*Philosophical Grammar*. This was written in German. The German edition was published in 1969; the English translation was published in 1974.

*Philosophical Investigations*. This was written in German. The German edition and its English translation were first published in 1953. The second

and third edition were published in 1958 and 1967 respectively. **The translation is available in Hindi. Hindi translation was published in 1996.**

*Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. This was written in German. This was first published in 1956. Its revised edition was published in 1978.

*Zettle*. This was written in German. It was first published in 1967. Its revised edition was published in 1981.

*Remarks on Colour*. This was written in German. This was published in 1978.

*On Certainty*. This was written in German and was published in 1969. **Hindi translation with English version on facing pages was published in 1998.**

*Culture and Value*. This was written in German. The German edition was published in 1978. The English translation was published in 1980. The revised edition was published in 1998. **Hindi translation of the revised edition with English version on facing pages, was published in 1998.**

*Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*. These were written in German and were published in 1979.

Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I and Volume II. These were written in German and were published in 1980.

Last Writings on Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I and Volume II. These were written in German and were published in 1982.

*The Blue and Brown Books*. These were dictated to select students in English and were published in 1958.

*Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs* edited by Cyril Barrett. These are lecture notes taken by students. The lectures were delivered in English.

Besides the above there are many lecture notes published by students who attended Wittgenstein's lectures at different times. These include:

*Wittgenstein Lecture, Cambridge, 1930-32*, published in 1980.

*Wittgenstein Lecture, Cambridge, 1932-1 935*, published in 1979.

'*Wittgenstein's Lecture in 1930-1933*' published in *Mind*, Vol. 63, 1954 and Vol. 64, 1955.

'Wittgenstein's Notes for Lectures on 'Private Experience' and 'Sense Data', *Philosophical Review*, July 1968.

*Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundation of Mathematics*. Cambridge 1939, published by Harvester in 1976.

*Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-47*, published by Harvester in 1988.

The correspondence that has been published under the title *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Cambridge Letters* was mostly carried out in English:

*Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore* published in 1974.

*Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein* published in 1967.

*Letters to Ludwig von Ficker* published in 1979.

*Some Letters of Ludwig Wittgenstein*, Hermathena, 1963.

*Some Hitherto Unpublished Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Georg Hanrik von Wright*, *The Cambridge Review*, 28th February, 1983.

All the works which were in German have been translated into English and many other European languages. Most of the works are also available in Russian, Chinese, Korean and Japanese languages. Hindi translation of *Tractates Logico-Philosophicus*, *Philosophical Investigations*, *On Certainty*, *Culture and Value* are available. The English translations of all the works of Wittgenstein with the exception of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* are published by Blackwell Publishers.

I am not aware of any study which tries to compare and contrast the content of the lectures which were delivered in English and the books which were originally written in German and later translated into English.

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Ashok Vohra

### Consciousness

John R. Searle has written an interesting review of *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory* by David J. Chalmers in the *New York Review of Books*, Vol. XLI, No. 4, March 6, 1997, pp. 43-44 under the title 'Consciousness and the Philosophers'. The article is a comprehensive, fair, objective and balanced review of the current position concerning the feasibility of understanding 'consciousness' in terms which, without any

residuum, do not refer to consciousness at all. Interested readers may also see David J. Chalmers' reply to Searle in the *New York Review of Books*, Vol. XLIV, No. 8, May, 1997, p. 60.

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Daya Krishna

### Habermas on Life-world (A\*)

*Lifeworld* and *system* as conceived by Jürgen Habermas in his theory of communicative action deserve to be investigated as possibly crucial categories in a philosophy of education. As a social function, education requires not only shared meanings drawn from custom and cultural tradition to construct identities and create social solidarity (*lifeworld*), but also strategies for coordinating resources and controlling social forces (*system*). Education contributes to social evolution in a two-sided rationalization process of the *lifeworld* and the social *system* enhancing in the former reflexivity, the universalization of beliefs and the differentiation of knowledge spheres, and in the latter institutional mastery and higher levels of autonomy. Communicative, educational processes which preserve the identity of both the individual and the collective forms simultaneously should be examined as a major constituent of a philosophy of education.

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Bernd Pflug

### Habermas and Rawls

The discussion on political liberalism by Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls published some time ago in the *Journal of Philosophy*, USA, Vol. XCII, 3 March, 1995, pp. 109-80 should be of interest to many of our readers.

The debate between these two well-known Western thinkers on the subject should provide an interesting take-off point for our own thinking on the subject in the country.

The exact title of the article by Jürgen Habermas is 'Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawl's Political Liberalism', pp. 109-31, followed by John Rawl's 'Reply to Habermas', pp. 132-80.

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Daya Krishna



**Sorabji on Emotions**

Richard Sorabji's Gifford lectures entitled *'Emotions and Peace of Mind'* Pub: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, deals with a subject which has been generally neglected by philosophers who concentrate mostly on issues relating to knowledge, reality and values in their writings. Emotions have been relegated to the realm of the 'irrational' and hence considered unworthy of attention by thinkers who pride themselves on their being 'rational' beings *par excellence*. Sorabji brings to our attention the element of rationality involved in emotions as evidenced in the Stoic discussion of the subject and raises the important issue whether art/or thought can be said to engender emotions in the literal sense of the term.

Strangely, the creative role of emotions seems to have been absent from the western discussion of the subject, an aspect that was explicitly explored in the Bhakti tradition of India and which has recently been brought to attention in the Volume entitled *Philosophical Dimensions of the Bhakti Tradition in India* published by the ICPR, 1999.

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Daya Krishna

**Material Available on tapes (Western Philosophy)**

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Vol. XVII, No.2

Daya Krishna

**On Comparative Philosophy**

The awareness that there are diverse philosophical traditions, particularly the Western, the Indian and the Chinese has been haunting the philosophical consciousness for quite some time.

But 'Comparative Philosophy' as it has been called, has not yet come into its own as the three great traditions in philosophy have generally failed to be seen in a unified perspective. The difficulty is perhaps unresolvable as each has a unique singularity of its own. A significant and fruitful attempt in this direction has recently been made by Professor Ben-Ami Scharfstein in his *A Comparative History of World Philosophy from the Upanishads to Kant*, State University of New York, 1998, pp. 683. A cursory look at the title and contents of the chapters will reveal both the scope and the exercise that the author has tried to achieve in this work.

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## A Note on Similiarties between Sartre and Gandhi\*\*

There is an apparent similarity in Gandhi and Sartre who was also writing when Gandhi was struggling to find out a middle path between the pure transcendental approach of Indian Philosophy and the pure empirical or the individual approach of the west. Sartre too faced this dilemma which is solved by his two tier system; 'Being God is a value humans naturally, perfectly seek.' 'It is the very structure of my existence' (*Notebooks for an Ethics*, 1947-48, pp. 559-60), published in 1983). Accomplice or impure reflection chooses to accept this value and seeks to attain that impossible goal. Pure, non-accomplice reflection chooses to reject it and seek freedom instead.

Becoming God is the goal which Sartre wants us to keep as a regulating idea even though it is inconsistent with his earlier position in Being and Nothingness.

Secondly the idea of a cooperative society of Gandhi was sposed to be the basis of Indian psyche and individual in its relatedness is also present in Sartre who was writing about the same time though independently. 'Thus the appearance of the other's look is not an appearance *in the world* 'neither in 'mine' nor in the 'other's- and the relation which unites me to the other cannot be a relation of exteriorly inside the world. By the other's look I effect the concrete proof that there is a 'beyond the world'. The other is present to me without any intermediary as a transcendence, which *is not mine*. But this presence is not reciprocal. All of the world's density is necessary in order that I may myself be present to the other.' (*Being and Nothingness*. P. 361).

'I Cannot attain any truth whatever about myself except through the mediation of another' (*Existentialism and Humanism*.p.45) Sartre admits that individuals can be 'mystified' by those who oppress and lie to them so that they are either not aware that they are free or think they are free when they are not. Such individuals need to 'wake up', which may be extremely difficult (*Existentialism and Humanism*.p. 16.)

In Sartre one of the, if not the most, basic needs of a human being is for valuable and meaningful life; it is essential that a person receive positive evaluation from others. 'Of course, each individual can freely

choose to confer value on his or her own life and it will thereby have value. 'However, if other freedoms also recognize my value, he says, 'this will 'enrich' the solitary worth I give myself' (*Notebooks for an Ethics*, pp. 282-4, 499-500). 'It follows, then, that I should recognize (value) the freedom of others because it is the source of their valuation of me. Failure on my part to do so will mean that any value or recognition they offer me, even if positive in character, will be worthless in my eyes. (*Sartre's Two Ethics From Authenticity to Integral Humanity*, Thomas C. Anderson, Open Courth, Chicago, 1993, p. 76).

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Asha Mukerjee

#### Philosophy in China

The philosophical traditions of China are practically a *terra incognita* to most students of philosophy in this country, even though China has had as ancient a tradition of philosophizing as India has had during two and a half millennia of recorded history.

The following two works by David Hall and Roger T. Ames and A.C. Graham are remarkably lucid expositions of Chinese thought which may help in lessening our ignorance of this great tradition of philosophizing in a neighbouring civilization.

1. *Thinking Through Confucius*

State University of New York Press, 1987

2. *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China*

Open Court Publishing Company, La Salle, Illinois, 1989

Strangely, the works not only throw light on the Chinese philosophical tradition, but also help us in understanding our own tradition better.

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#### Recent work on Mass and Energy

A recent survey of the concept of mass in physics and philosophy published from the Princeton University Press in the year 2000 should be of interest to all students in general and those interested in the Philosophy of Science in particular. (Max Jammer, *Concept of Mass in Contemporary*

*Physics and Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, University of Princeton, Princeton, New Jersey, 2000).

The concept of mass is central to the very definition of what we consider as 'matter' and hence has been a foundation of what is considered as 'material reality' by common sense and philosophers alike. The foundational character of the concept, however, was questioned when Einstein established its complete translatability without a residuum in terms of energy. Is the world, then, to be conceived of in terms of 'matter' or 'energy' becomes the central question as its conception in these two frameworks leads to different pictures of the universe.

The work traces the history of thought and experimentation regarding this basic concept during the last fifty years of the twentieth century in particular and since the beginning of the century in general.

Surprisingly, the work also documents the 'questioning' regarding Einstein's famous equation concerning the equivalence of mass and energy propounded in his 1905 paper and the debate that has continued around it till almost very recent times. Where has matter disappeared; for, as modern physics contends, there are only four fundamental 'forces' in the universe; the 'gravitation', the 'electro-magnetic', the 'weak interaction' and the 'strong interaction'? This is the question left by this masterly survey which at the end even seems to suggest that perhaps the concept itself may be dispensed with, at least as far as physics is concerned. The work has been written by Max Jammer and is based not only on almost all the articles! papers dealing with the controversies around the subject, but also on Einstein's complete works including his correspondence published recently by the Princeton University Press which brings out Einstein's own changing views on the subject about it.

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#### On Mathematics and Experiments

Mathematics, from the time of Plato and Pythagoras, has been considered to be a type of knowledge which is not only 'universal' and 'necessary', but also something which is known by an exercise of pure reason *without* any reference to sense experience. It is thus supposed to be the standard

example of a 'knowledge' which is not only about 'something' which is essentially 'non-empirical' in nature but also which is necessarily true of that which is known by sense-experience just because of this fact. It is true that there is such a thing as 'applied mathematics' but, to the extent that it is so, it is also considered to be only 'approximately correct' because of its application to empirical reality. No one tries for an empirical verification of mathematical knowledge as its purely formal deductive character has been widely accepted. Even those who have argued for its character as 'social construction' do not demand empirical verification for its 'statements' as is usually the case with other sciences.

It may, therefore, come as a surprise to all those who have accepted this that 'experimental solutions' of mathematical problems have been attempted in recent times. The following is one such example:

'*Experimental Solution of Minimum Problems: Soap Film Experiments*'<sup>9</sup> (p. 385).

In many cases, when such an existence proof turns out to be more or less difficult, it is stimulating to realize the mathematical conditions of the problem by corresponding physical devices or rather, to consider the mathematical problem as an interpretation of a physical phenomenon. The existence of the physical phenomenon then represents the solution of the mathematical problem. Of course, this is only a plausibility consideration and not a mathematical proof, since the question still remains whether the mathematical interpretation of the physical event is adequate in a strict sense or whether it gives only an inadequate image of physical reality. Sometimes such experiments, even if performed only in the imagination, are convincing even to mathematicians (p. 386).

The idea of considering 'the mathematical problem as an *interpretation* of physical phenomena' is thus not as absurd as it might seem at first sight. The existence of the physical phenomenon in this perspective '*represents*' the solution of the mathematical problem.

9. *What is Mathematics? An Elementary Approach to Ideas and Methods* by Richard Courant and Herbert Robbins, revised by Ian Stewart, OUP, New York, 1996.

Here the relation between mathematics and physics or 'empirical reality' is reversed and the former is seen as merely an explicated representation of the latter. This perhaps, is a reversion to the 'original' situation in which mathematics had actually arisen in the 'measuring' and 'counting' processes from which it is supposed to have 'freed' itself long ago when the Greeks reflected on it. The wheel seems to have returned to the original position but, in the meantime, mathematics has encountered 'infinities' which it would be difficult to accept as '*actually existing*' in nature.

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### Septicism and Poetry : A Note

(Students of philosophy and literature may find it profitable to read the book entitled *Scepticism and Poetry- An Essay on Poetic Imagination* by D.G. James (George Allen and Unwin, London, first published in 1937, second impression, 1960).

We publish below a brief statement about the book received from V.Y.Kantak, the well-known scholar of English literature who was formerly Professor in the Department of English Literature, Baroda University, Baroda).

The first part has several stimulating leads: There is first of all, Coleridge's formulations regarding the functioning of the primary and the secondary imaginations, side by side with an elaboration of the seminal contribution of Kant on the synthetic activity of the mind cited in its support. Then there is the problem of the nature and influence of the scientific method and its claims in the present context. I.A. Richards' prestigious aesthetics, psychologizing the entire artistic process receives some sharp critical attention; so also the inroads of associationism of the Hartley-Condillac type...And Richards' rhetorical query: 'What *facts* verified by science are relevant to a reading of *King Lear*?' with his own answer: 'None whatever.' comes into focus. Similarly, that old question of the imaginative use of language—analogy, metaphor and so on, and the enigma of their mysterious power born of 'the torture of mind by identity and contrast in one' gets addressed. So also the problem posed by the

limitations and dangers of the moralistic and ethical attitude to life when the aid of the transcendent activity of the imagination is not available is investigated.

However, I thought that the second part of the book has the real *piece de resistance*, namely James' brilliant consideration of the three prime poets (Wordsworth, Keats, and Shakespeare) experiencing the compulsive need to evolve a mythological mode adequate for their own distinctive purposes, and their failure to do so. Wordsworth took refuge in the Christian doctrine and mythology though that seems to have turned off the original sources of his poetic vitality. Keats tried to make do with Greek mythology but left his *Endymion* and *Hyperion* more of a disaster than a dubious success! And the imperative surge to evolve a mythology that could prove adequate for the projection of 'unknown modes of being' seems to have driven Shakespeare to try out, in his last phase, a loose dramatic structure—with little in it of the Shakespearean dramatic verve and much more of the quality of its provenance—the Narrative Romance. True, after the rather clumsy effects of the three earlier plays of the last phase he achieved a notable success with the semi-human.. semi-divine *Magus* figure of Prospero. Even that proved to be only a partial success.

In and through all this, James is concerned with the allied and more fundamental question of poetic imagination and its relation to religious experience—its status as a purveyor of the truth of things...the ultimate reality.

While recognizing the supreme achievements of the poetic imagination he draws attention to the 'bafflement' it knows in the pursuit of what is beyond its reach. Which leaves one wistful about the implications of Keats's observation: 'Poetry is not so fine a thing as philosophy—for the same reason that an eagle is not so fine a thing as a truth.'

Vol.XV, No.3

V.Y. Kantak

### Philosophy and Actual Concerns of Life

In recent times philosophical thinking seems to have increasingly focused on its relationship with the actual concerns of life so that it may

become, or at least appear to be, relevant to the day-to-day business of 'living'. In classical times however, its relation to wisdom was similarly emphasized or, as in India, to mokṣa or nirvāṇa. The recent trend, however, seems to be substantially different from the earlier search for 'relevance'.

The following works may be taken as representative of a trend in this direction.

(i) *Journal*

Philosophy as a way of Life, *The MONIST*, Vol. 83, No. 4.

(ii) *Book*

*Philosophy Practice: An Alternative to Counselling and Psychotherapy*, by Shlomit C. Schuster, Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport CT 06881, USA, 1999, p. 207.

(iii) *The Proceedings of the Second International Congress on Philosophical Practice*, ed. W. van der Vlist, Doorwerth, The Netherlands: The Dutch Society for Philosophical Practice, 1997.

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### The two *Sramana* Traditions: Similarities and Differences. Some Reflections\*\*

The very starting points of the two are different. Buddha began with the problem of 'Sorrow' (not on the personal but on the cosmic scale ) and its extinction; whereas the Jain tradition begins with the problem of 'impurity' and attainment of a 'Pure' State, *Kaivalya*. The problem of Sorrow, it seems to me, must spring from the deepest sources of compassion Without compassion it is not even possible to face the problem of sorrow (at least the sorrow of others).

The attainment of state of 'purity' need not have at its base compassion at all. Even *Ahimsa* seems to have different significance in the two traditions. In the Jain tradition *Hinsa* is forbidden because it soils the primordial 'Purity', while in the Buddhist tradition it is forbidden because it causes suffering.

These are two different visions or points of view. However, it should be remembered that both of them are movements in (or of) psyche, rather than results of conceptual thinking. Psyche is much more than conceptual thought or mind, it is even more than consciousness (at least as we ordinarily experience it). Its knowledge starts from nothing mental but from experience. It proceeds to 'see' rather than 'think' the pattern of the whole as it is reflected in the parts.

Compassion is not merely a virtue in Buddhism. It is the Law. Both Hinayana and Mahayana are dominated by the All Compassionate personality of the Sakyamuni. So is the Buddhist Art. The two factors that open the way for Mahayana, I think, are compassion on the one hand and the Buddha's stress on the Middle Path on the other. Where Compassion is the Law there acceptance must be total. Rejecting of anything or anyone is simultaneously rejecting compassion. It embraces all living Creatures. Perhaps it was due to this that Nagarjun equated *Samsara* and the *Nirvana*. There is no difference, not the slightest shade of difference between the *Samsara* and the *Nirvana*. The limit of the one is the limit of the other.

As to the Middle Path; because it excludes the extremes, it can be found anywhere and in any situation, sharp though it may be as a razor's edge. The Gita called it *Samatvam* (balance) and the Greeks Temperance; Sharpness of its edge depends upon, perhaps, on the level at which it is practiced. The higher one goes, the sharper it becomes. How is one to practice treading the Middle path; the answer to this is simply by treading it. Anyway; this stress upon the Middle Path, I think, opened the way to Mahayana.

A word about *Trshna*. Perhaps it is the same which Vedic seers called 'Desire' (*Kama*) and Heracleitus 'Ever living Fire', which is the same thing as Becoming. Perhaps when 'Becoming' turns upon itself and enters its own essence, there is found Peace that, in the

words of Christ, 'Passethall understanding'. It does not depend upon understanding, in fact understanding depends upon it.

#### The Mahavira and the Buddha: Similarities and Differences. Some Reflections.

Although both Jainism and Buddhism belong to the tradition of renunciation, it seems to me there is an unbridgeable gulf between the two. Renunciation arising out of recoil or fear is not the same as renunciation springing from love. A Tirthankar's Kaivalya is totally indifferent towards helping anyone; it is least concerned with it. While the Buddha (at least in Mahayan and that is the flowering of Buddhism) still standing on the threshold of Nirvan, each morning scans the entire world with his Divine Eyes to see if anyone has lit his lamp, and to help him.

In Art we can notice this difference clearly. Throughout Jain art nowhere is a Tirthankar shown with *Abhaya Mudra* (the mudra of protection), whereas the depiction of the Buddha abounds with it. A Tirthankar's flight is 'the flight of the alone to the Alone'. Buddha's flight, it seems, is the flight of the free for the Free. And, what could be more free than Love.

Vol. XVII, No.3

Vivek Datta

#### Svaraj In Ideas

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya

1. We speak today of *Svaraj* or self-determination in politics. Man's domination over man is felt in the most tangible form in the political sphere. There is however a subtler domination exercised in the sphere of ideas by one culture on another, a domination all the more serious in the consequence, because it is not ordinarily felt. Political subjection primarily means restraint on the outer life of a people and although it tends gradually to sink into the inner life of the soul, the fact that one is conscious of it operates against the tendency. So long as one is conscious of a restraint, it is possible to resist it or to bear it as a

necessary evil and to keep free in spirit. Slavery begins when one ceases to feel the evil and it deepens when the evil is accepted as a good. Cultural subjection is ordinarily of an unconscious character and it implies slavery from the very start. When I speak of cultural subjection, I do not mean the assimilation of an alien culture. That assimilation need not be an evil, it may be positively necessary for healthy progress and in any case it does not mean a lapse of freedom. There is cultural subjection only when one's traditional cast of ideas and sentiments is superseded without comparison or competition by a new cast representing an alien culture which possesses one like a ghost. This subjection is slavery of the spirit; when a person can shake himself free from it, he feels as though the scales fell from his eyes. He experiences a rebirth, and that is what I call *Svaraj* in Ideas.

2. In these days when our political destinies are in the melting pot, one is tempted to express a doubt-till now vaguely felt but suppressed as uncultured-how far generally we have assimilated our western education and how far it has operated as an obsession. Certainly there has been some sort of assimilation- at least by some of us-but even of them it may be asked whether the alien culture has been accepted by them after a full and open-eyed struggle had been allowed to develop between it and their indigenous culture. It is admitted today-what was not sufficiently recognized in the earlier days of our western education-that we had an indigenous culture of a high degree of development, the comparative value of which cannot be said to have been yet sufficiently appraised. Under the present system we generally receive western culture in the first instance and then we sometimes try to peer into our ancient culture as a curiosity and with the attitude of foreign oriental scholars and yet we say that this ancient culture of ours is no curiosity. Many of our educated men do not know and do not care to know this indigenous nature of ours. When they seek to know, they do not feel, as they ought to feel, that they are discovering their own self.

3. There is no gainsaying the fact that this western culture- which means an entire system of ideas and sentiments-has been simply imposed upon us. I do not mean that it has been imposed on unwilling minds: we ourselves asked for this education, and we feel, and perhaps rightly, that it has been a blessing in certain ways. I mean only that it has not generally been assimilated by us in an open-eyed way with our old-world Indian mind. That Indian mind has simply lapsed in most cases for our educated men, and has subsided below the conscious level of culture. It operates still in the persisting routine of their family life and in some of their social and religious practices which have no longer, however, any vital meaning for them. It neither welcomes nor resists the ideas received through the new education. It dares not exert itself in the cultural sphere.
4. There can be no vital assimilation, in such case, of the imposed culture. And yet the new ideas are assimilated in a fashion. They are understood and imaginatively realized: they are fixed in language and in certain imposed institutions. A drill in this language and in those institutions induce certain habits of soulless thinking which appear like real thinking. Springing as these ideas do from a rich and strong life-the life of the west-they induce in us a shadow mind that functions like a real mind except in the matter of genuine creativeness. One would have a real mind except in the matter of genuine creativeness. One would have expected after a century of contact with the vivifying ideas of the west that there should be a vigorous output of Indian contribution in a distinctive Indian style to the culture and thought of the modern world-contribution specially to humane subjects like history, philosophy or literature, a contribution such as may be enjoyed by our countrymen who still happen to retain their vernacular mind and which might be recognized by others as reflecting the distinctive soul of India. Barring the contribution of a few men of genius-and genius is largely independent of the times,-there is not much evidence of such creative work done by our educated men.
5. I may refer also to more modest forms of creativeness, creativeness such as is evidenced in the daily business of our lives, e.g., in the

formation of judgements about our real position in the world. We speak of world movements and have a fair acquaintance with the principles and details of western life and thought, but we do not always sufficiently realize where we actually stand today and how to apply our bookish principles to our situation in life. We either accept or repeat the judgement passed on us by western culture, or we impotently resent them but have hardly any estimates of our own, wrung from an inward perception of the realities of our position.

6. In the field of politics, for example, we are only today beginning to realize that we have for long wrongly counted on principles that have application only to countries that are already free and already established and have not had sufficient perception of the dark thing they call 'power' which is more real than any logic or political scholarship. In the field of social reform, we have never cared to understand the inwardness of our traditional social structure and to examine how far the social principles of the west are universal in their application. We have contented ourselves either with an unthinking conservatism or with an imaginary progressiveness merely imitative of the west.
7. Then again in the field of learning, how many of us have had distinctively Indian estimates of western literature and thought? It is possible for a foreigner to appreciate the literature of a country, but it is only to be expected that his mind would react to it differently from the mind of a native of the country. A Frenchman, for example, would not, I imagine, appreciate Shakespeare just as an Englishman would do. Our education has largely been imported to us through English literature. The Indian mind is much further removed by tradition and history than the French or the German mind from the spirit of English Literature, and yet no Indian, so far as I am aware, has passed judgements on English literature that reflect his Indian mentality.
8. His judgments do not differ materially from the judgment of an English critic and that raises the suspicion whether it is his judgment at all,

whether it is not merely the mechanical thinking of the galvanic mind induced in us through our western education.

9. In philosophy hardly anything that has been written by a modern educated Indian shows that he has achieved a synthesis of Indian thought with western thought. There is nothing like a judgment on western systems from the standpoint of Indian philosophy, and although some appraisal of Indian philosophy has been attempted from the western standpoint, there appears to be no recognition yet that a criticism of the fundamental notions of either philosophy is necessary before there can be any useful comparative estimate. And yet it is in philosophy that one could look for an effective contact between Eastern and Western ideas. The most prominent contribution of ancient India to the culture of the world is in the field of Philosophy and if the Modern Indian Mind is to philosophise at all to any purpose, it has to confront Eastern thought and Western thought with one another and attempt a synthesis or a reasoned rejection of either, if that were possible. It is in philosophy, if anywhere, that the task of discovering the soul of India is imperative for the modern India; the task of achieving, if possible, the continuity of his old self with his present day self, of realizing what is nowadays called the Mission of India, if it has any Genius can unveil the soul of India in art but it is through philosophy that we can methodically attempt to discover it.
10. Our education has not so far helped us to understand ourselves, to understand the significance of our past, the realities of our present and our mission of the future. It has tended to drive our real mind into the unconscious and to replace it by a shadow mind that has no roots in our past and in our real present. Our old mind cannot be wholly driven underground and its imposed substitute cannot function effectively and productively. The result is that there is a confusion between the two minds and a hopeless Babel in the world of ideas. Our thought is hybrid through and through and inevitably sterile. Slavery has entered into our very soul.
11. The hybridization of our ideas is evidenced by the strange medley of Vernacular and English in which our educated people speak to one



another. For the expression of cultural ideas specially we find it very difficult to use the pure Vernacular medium. If I were asked; for example, to conduct today's discourse here in Bengali, I would have to make a particularly strenuous effort. One notices a laudable tendency at the present day to make such an effort. It is not that it is always successful. Perhaps, that is only to be expected in a period of transition. If the language difficulty could be surmounted, it would mean a big step towards the achievement of what I have called *Svaraj* in Ideas.

12. The hybridization of ideas brought about by our education and the impact of Western political social and economic institutions on our daily life is one of the most distressing features of present situation. It is unnatural and may be regarded with the same sentiment with which an old world Hindu looks upon *varna-samkara*. It does not simply mean a confusion in the intellectual region. All vital ideas involve ideals. They embody an entire theory and an insight into life. Thought or reason may be universal, but ideas are carved out of it differently by different cultures according to their respective genius. No idea of one cultural language can exactly be translated in another cultural language. Every culture has its distinctive 'physiognomy' which is reflected in each vital idea and ideal presented by the culture.
13. A patchwork of ideas of different cultures offends against scholarly sense just as much as patchwork of ideals offends against the spiritual sense. There is room indeed for an adjustment and synthesis, within limits of different cultures and cultural ideals. Life means adaptation to varying times and to varying ideals. But we are not always clear about the method of this adaptation. As we have to live, we have to accept facts and adapt our secular life and secular ideas to the times. We have to alter ourselves here to suit the situation. In spiritual life, however, there is no demand for compromising our ideals in order to have a smooth sailing with the times. Here, if possible and so far as lies in our power, the times have to be adapted to our life and not our life to the times.

14. But the world confronts us not only with aggressive interests but also with aggressive ideals. What response should our traditional ideals make to these imposed ideals? We may respect the new ideals without accepting them, we may attempt a synthesis without compromise, or we may accept them as the fulfillment of our ideals. Different responses may be demanded with respect to different ideals, but in any case a patchwork without adjustment or with a mechanical adjustment. If complacently accepted as a solution, is an evil, as no ideal here gets the entire devotion of the soul. Where different ideals are accepted in the prayerful hope that a synthesis will come, the patchwork is not accepted as a solution and need not be an evil.
15. We talk a little too glibly perhaps of a conflict of the ideas and ideals of the West with our traditional ideas and ideals. In many cases it is a confusion rather than a conflict and the real problem is to clear up the confusion and to make it develop in the first instance into a definite conflict. The danger is in the complacent acquiescence in the confusion. The realization of a conflict of ideals implies a deepening of the soul. There is conflict proper only when one is really serious about ideals, feels each ideal to be a matter of life and death. We sometimes sentimentally indulge in the thought of a conflict before we are really serious with either ideal.
16. We speak also a little too readily of the demand for a synthesis of the ideals of the East and the West. It is not necessary in every case that a synthesis should be attempted. The ideals of a community spring from its past history and from the soil: they have not necessarily a universal application, and they are not always self-luminous to other communities. There are ideals of the West which we may respect from a distance without recognizing any specific appeal to ourselves. Then again there are ideals that have a partial appeal to us, because they have an affinity with our own ideals, though still with a foreign complexion. What they prescribe to us is to be worshipped in our own fashion with the ceremonials of our own religion. The form of practical life in which an ideal has to be translated, has to be decided by ourselves according to the genius of our own community. A synthesis

of our ideals with western ideals is not demanded in every case. Where it is demanded, the foreign ideal is to be assimilated to our ideal and not the other way. There is no demand for the surrender of our individuality in any case : *Svadharme nidhanam śreyah paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ*.

17. There are those who take this emphasis on the individuality of a historical community to be overstrained. It appears to them to be the expression of national, communal, or racial conceit and the excuse for a perverse obscurantism. They believe in abstract self-luminous ideals for all humanity, in a single universal religion and a single universal reason.
18. There is, however, case for universalism. The progress of a community and of humanity implies a gradual simplification and unification of ideals. This is just the rationalizing movement, the emergence of a common reason. We have to distinguish, however, between two forms of rationalism, two directions of this simplifying movement. In the one, reason as born after the travail of the spirit : rationalism is here the efflux of reverence, reverence for the traditional institutions through which customary sentiments are deepened into transparent ideals. In the other form of rationalism- what is commonly meant by the name, the simplification and generalization of ideals is effected by unregenerate understanding with its mechanical separation of the essential from the inessential. The essential is judged as such here not through reverence, not through deepened spiritual insight, but through the accidental likes and dislikes of the person judging. Customs and institutions bound up with age-long sentiments are brushed aside (in the name of reason) as meaningless and dead without any imaginative effort to realize them in an attitude of humility. Decisions as to what is essential or inessential have indeed to be taken, for time carries not and mere historical sentimentalism will not avail. In practical life, one may have to move before ideals have clarified: but it is well to recognize the need of humility and patience in the adjustment of the world of ideas. Order is evolved in the world

of our ideas through infinite patience and humility. That is the right kind of rationalism: It is only in the wrong and graceless form of rationalism that brusque decisions in the practical manner are taken in the name or reason, in the world of our ideals.

19. There is then a legitimate and obligatory form of rationalism. It is wrong not to accent an ideal that is felt to be a simpler and deeper expression of our own ideas simply because it hails from a foreign country. To reject it would be to insist on individuality for the sake of individuality and would be a form of national conceit and obscurantism. The acceptance of such an ideal is really no surrender of individuality : To serve this foreign god is to serve our own god: the foreign ideal is here in our own ideal. The guru or teacher has to be accepted when he is found to be a real guru, whatever the community from which he comes. But it is not every foreign ideal that is felt to be the soul of our own ideal. Some foreign ideals have affinity with our own, and are really alternative expressions of them in a foreign idiom that has no sacredness for us and there are others which have no real application to our conditions.
20. It is sometimes forgotten by the advocates of universalism that the so-called universalism of reason or of religion is only in the making and cannot be appealed to as an actually established code of universal principles. What is universal is only the spirit, the loyalty to our own ideals and the openness to other ideals, the determination not to reject them if they are found within our ideals and not to accept them till they are so found. The only way to appraise a new ideal is to view it through our actual ideal; the only way to find a new reverence is to deepen our old reverence. Progress in the spiritual world is not achieved by a detached reason judging between an old god and a new god. The way to know facts is not the way to know values.
21. So much for the objection, which is often raised in the name of universalism, to the stress I have laid on the individuality of Indian thought and spirit, on the conservatism of the distinctive values evolved through ages of continuous historical life of Indian society. I have thought it necessary to examine universalism in some detail at the

risk of tiring the reader with abstract arguments because this appears to me to be our greatest danger. It is the inevitable result of our 'rootless' education and it stands more than anything else in the way of what I call *Svaraj* in Ideas.

22. The other danger of national conceit and the unthinking glorification of everything in our culture and depreciation of everything in other cultures appears to me, in our circumstances, to require less stressing. Not that it is less serious abstractly considered, but as a matter of fact our educated men suffer more from over-diffidence than from over-confidence, more from a 'rootless' universalism than from clinging particularism. We are more ready to accept others' judgments about us than to resent them. There is the old immemorial habit of regarding what we are taught as sacred learning imparted is the mere opinion of others-opinion about us, for example, of men who might be presumed to be presumed to be ignorant of us and unsympathetic to us. There is so much, kind or unkind, written about us and preached to us by others that raises the legitimate question if they have a sufficient perception of the inwardness of our life. Prima facie it is very difficult for a foreigner to understand the mind of a people from whom he is widely removed by tradition and history unless he has intimately participated in their life for a long time. It is only natural that the people in question should receive his judgment about them with a certain amount of mental reserve. It might lead them to selfexamination if the foreigner is not obviously ignorant and abusive; but docile acceptance is not certainly demanded in the first instance.
23. Now there is a good deal in the name of learning-history, philosophy or moral sermon-imparted to us through our education which is unconsciously or consciously of a tendentious or propagandist character. They imply a valuation of ourselves, an appraisal of our past history and present position from a foreign standard. Our attitude towards them should be one of critical reserve, and not of docile acceptance. And yet the critical attitude would in many cases be condemned by our foreign teachers and by our own educated men as

- uncultured and almost as absurdly ignorant as a hesitation to accept the truth of geometry. That is inevitable where the education of a people is undertaken by foreign rulers. There is bound in such a case to be some imposition of foreign valuation on the learner and a discouragement of the critical attitude.
24. The question of imposition does not arise in the case of certain branches of learning-mathematics and the natural sciences, for example, which have no nationality and imply no valuation. Whenever there is valuation, there is the suspicion of a particular point of view-national, communal, or racial, of the person who judges the value. A valuation of our culture by a foreigner from the standpoint of his own culture should be regarded by us as meant not for our immediate acceptance but for our critical examination. It should be a fillip to which we should react. I remember a remark of Sir John Woodroffe to this purpose. That our first impulse here should be one of self-defensive resentment is only natural and need not imply an uncultured self-conceit. Docile acceptance without criticism would mean slavery.
25. The critical attitude is demanded pre-eminently in the field of valuations of ideals. Mere acceptance here makes not only for confusion but for moral evil. But barring the concepts of the sciences even here there may be some doubt-all concepts and ideas have the distinctive character of the particular culture to which they belong. What should be our reaction to such cultural ideas? They have to be accepted, but metaphors and symbols to be translated into our own indigenous concepts. The ideas embodied in a foreign language are properly understood only when we can express them in our own way. I plead for a genuine translation of foreign ideas into our native ideas before we accept or reject them. Let us everywhere resolutely think in our own concepts. It is only thus that we can think productively on our own account.
26. In politics our educated men have been compelled to realize by the logic of facts that they have absolutely no power for good, though they have much power for evil, unless they can carry the masses with them. In other fields there is not sufficient realization of this circumstance. In

the social sphere, for example, they still believe that they can impose certain reforms on the masses- by mere preaching from without, by passing resolutions in social conferences and by legislation. In the sphere of ideas, there is hardly yet any realization that we can think effectively only when we think in terms of the indigenous ideas that pulsate in the life and mind of the masses. We condemn the caste system of our country, but we ignore the fact that we who have received Western education constitute a caste more exclusive and intolerant than any of the traditional castes. Let us resolutely break down the barriers of this new caste, let us come back to the cultural stratum of the real Indian people and evolve a culture along with them suited to the times and to our native genius. That would be to achieve *Svaraj* in Ideas.

## Queries Awaiting Answers

### Vedas

- 1+. What exactly is meant by the term *devatā* and *ṛṣi* in the *Rgveda*?
- 2+. How is it determined as to who is the *ṛṣi* and who the *devatā* of a *mantra* in the *Rgveda*?
- 3+. What is the relation between the *mantra* in a *sūkta*? Does the *sūkta* have a unity of its own, or it is just a collection of the *mantras*, having little relation to one another?
4. Does the *mantra* taken from the *Rgveda* and 'used' in the *Yajurveda* or *Sāmaveda* function there in a different way? If so, what is this difference? Does the 'meaning' of the *mantra* become irrelevant when it is used in the ritual of the *Yajurveda* or sung in the *Sāmaveda*?
5. What happens to the *Varṇāukramṇī*, *Śabdānnukramṇī* and *Svarānakramṇī* of the *mantra* in the *Rgveda* when it is sung as a song by the *Samvadin* who, perforce, has to violate it, particularly when he starts signing outside the context of the sacrificial ritual?
6. What happens to all the three Vedas, i.e. the *Rgveda*, the *Yajurveda* and the *Sāmaveda*, when the material from them is taken by Bharata in his *Nāṭya Śāstra* and calling it the fifth Veda?
7. What is the unity of the *Yajurveda*, *Sāmaveda* and the *Atharvaveda* when each of them consists of independent *Samhitās* belonging to different *Śākhās* which are so different from one another that they not only have differences among them but speak ill of each other and even prescribe *prāyāscitta*, if something prescribed in the texts of a different *Śākhā* is performed by one, as is mentioned in detail in *Śabara Bhāṣya* on the

*Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 2.4.8.\* (\*Out of these seven queries the first three queries which are marked here with the sign + are placed in chapter two as they are more or less answered by N.M.Kansara's answers of the six queries raised by Daya Krishna in volume XXI no.3)

Vol. XXI, No. 3

Daya Krishna

#### Some queries regarding the texts known as the Vedas in the tradition:

(a) What is a Vedic *mantra*? According to Sāyaṇa, no *lakṣaṇa* of a *mantra* can be given as it will suffer from an *ativyāpti* or *avyāpti doṣa*. Thus according to him, what a *yājñika* calls a *mantra*, is a *mantra*. Are then, all the *mantras* used in some Vedic ritual or other? For, in case some of the *mantras* are never used in any ritual, how would the *yājñika* come into the picture? And, if he does not, then how would we ever decide whether it is a *mantra* or not?

(b) Do the *mantras* contain the detailed specification of the ritual for the performance of the various *yajñas*?

(c) Do the Vedic *mantras* contain *vidhi vākyas* among them? If not, how can they have any authority for the Mīmāṃsaka? In case only some of them contain the *vidhi vākyas*, what happens to the authority of those which do not contain them?

(d) Are the *vidhi vākyas* divided into those which enjoin the performance of a *yajña* and those which do not? If so, what is the authority of those *vidhi vākyas* in the *mantras* that do not enjoin the performance of a *yajña* for the Mīmāṃsaka? On the other hand, if no *mantra* has the form of a *vidhi vākya*, what is its authority for the Mīmāṃsaka?

(e) Where in the Vedic texts are the various *yajñas* enjoined to be performed? In case the details of the performance of the Vedic *yajñas* are not given in the *mantras*, where are they given and wherein lies the authority for their performance?

Vol. XVI, No. 1

Daya Krishna

#### Vedic

1. What does the term '*Brāhmaṇa*' mean in the Mīmāṃsā definition of Veda which is supposed to consist of *mantra*, *brāhmaṇa* and *nāmdheya*.

Is it the same or different from the 'texts' known as '*Brāhmaṇa*' in the Vedic tradition such as, say, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*?

2. It is accepted by both Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta that the Śruti is authoritative only for that which can not be known either by *pratyakṣa* or by *anumāna*. Yet, how can it ever be established that something can not, in principle, be known by either of these, or by both of them together?

Vol. XX, No. 1

Daya Krishna

#### Advaita on Upanisads

Do the Advaitins regard the Upanisads as *apauruṣeya* or the word of God? It cannot be the latter as the Advaitins do not accept *Iswara* and regard it as a part of *Māyā*. In case it is the former, how can it be accounted for as the Upanisads are not only plural in number, but many of them are selections from the Samhitas, the Brahmanas and the Aranyakas, and the selections must have been made by some persons.

Vol. XVII, No. 2

Daya Krishna

#### The *Bhagvadgita* on the Problem of Evil

Chapters IX and X of the *Bhagvadgita* are devoted to the enumeration of the Lord's *vibhūtis*, which word may be translated as 'manifestation' of divine glories, 'attributes', 'essence', 'perfection', 'type', 'pattern', 'ideal' of all things here below. Chapter IX is entitled by Dr. Radhakrishnan as 'The Lord is more than his creation' and Chapter X as 'God is the source of All; to know Him is to know all'. The Lord is the 'seed and perfection of all that is.' This description recalls to the mind Plato's Theory of Ideas.

The Lord signifies it as his 'sovereign mystery'. Several examples are given which symbolize His divine glory more or less in an imperfect way. While He goes on recounting the manifestations of His divine glories, in verse 36 of Chapter X he makes the sovereign mystery more mystifying.

Says He: 'Of the deceitful I am the gambling' (*dyutam chalayatamasmī*) followed by 'Of the splendid I am the splendor' etc. etc.

The drift of both these chapters is that 'The cosmic process is not a complete manifestation of the Absolute (Radhakrishnan). Though gambling was a royal pastime, it is mentioned here as the supreme form of 'deceitfulness'. This characterization by the Blessed Lord of gambling as the greatest deceitfulness makes this statement fade into and overlap the ultimate question of the origin and status of Evil.

The point defying a resolution is: Since Evil is the Lord's *vibhuti*, it is coeternal and equipollent with Good and His other *vibhūtis*. It is the type and perfection abiding in the Absolute of mundane evil. In that case, can Evil, manifestation of which *vibhuti* is His nature (according to Gaudpada), be ever entirely got rid of? Is the human condition, as the Calvinists and Jansenists believe, irredeemable?

Vol. XVIII, No.2

Durgalal Mathur

#### Advaita Vedānta

Are there different types of *anirvacanīyatā* in Advaita Vedānta? If so, what is the distinction between *anirvacanīyatā* of *Māyā* on the one hand and *Avidyā* on the other, as both of these form the *anirvacanīyatā* of Brahman in case it is considered to be so.

Vol. XXI, No. 1

Daya Krishna

1. What is the distinction between *anirvacanīyatā* of Advaita Vedānta and *avaktavya* of Jain thinkers?

2. Are there three different types of *anirvacanīyatā* in Advaita Vedānta? If so, what is the distinction between *anirvacanīyatā* of *Māyā* on the one hand and *Avidyā* on the other, as both of these form the *anirvacanīyatā* of Brahman in case it is considered to be so.

Vol. XX, No. 3

Daya Krishna

#### Did Mahāvīra and Buddha Really believe in *Ahiṃsā*?

The Buddhist and the Jain traditions are supposed to be the greatest votaries of *ahiṃsā* in the Indian tradition. Yet, there are certain authentic sayings ascribed both to the Buddha and the Mahāvīra which not only go against the principles of *ahiṃsā*, but also against what will be regarded as the common moral sense of humanity.

The *Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā, Telovāda Jātaka* 246, cites the Buddha as saying, 'what to talk of other kinds of meat, even if some vile person offers as a gift the flesh of the child or wife after killing them, one who is enlightened and full of compassion and friendship to all beings does not partake of any guilt if he accepts and eats it.' (*Āgama Aur Tripīṭaka*, Vol. 1, p. 435/p. 358). The Buddha also tells the story of 'a couple who satisfied their hunger by killing and eating the flesh of their only son and thus were enabled to cross the forest. They did this only so that they may cross the forest and not because of pride or egoity or embellishment or for something else. Similarly monks, the seekers after *nirvāṇa*, do not eat out of pride or intoxication, but only for crossing the world which is like a forest.'

Surprisingly, Mahāvīra also is supposed to tell, according to the *Nāma Dhammakahāo*, a story in which some people satisfied their hunger and thirst by eating the flesh and drinking the blood of their daughter and sister and thus were able to cross the forest and reach Rājagṛha. There was no other motive in this than to cross the forest and reach Rājagṛha. Similarly, the monks also take food to achieve *mokṣa* and not for the taste, or the way it looks, or because it gives strength to the body, or because it is a nice thing, or anything else (Muni Śrī Nagarāja Ji, *Āgama Aur Tripīṭaka*, Vol. 1, p. xxv).

There is a difference between the first and the other two anecdotes, but all of them raise the same moral problems, particularly in the context of the acceptance of *ahiṃsā* as the highest virtue, which is generally claimed pre-eminently for both Buddhism and Jainism. In the story from the *Jātaka*, the person who feeds the monks the flesh of his wife and children is called '*duḥśīla*', or a vicious person, and it is not denied that he will suffer the fruits of his sinful act, or that the act is sinful, and hence

ought not to have been done. What is denied is that the virtuous monk who partakes of such flesh does not partake in any of the consequences of the sinful act that the host has committed. But it is not made clear whether it will be so even if the Buddhist monk had known what had been done and still partakes of the food offered to him. But, aware or not, does not such a statement, coming as it does from the Buddha himself, encourage the monks not to care how the meat that is offered to them has been obtained, or not to find out what sort of a person is he/she who has invited them for meals at his/her place?

The other two incidents described in the text are primarily meant to suggest that the monk partakes of food so that he/she may work on the path to *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* or *kaivalya*, and thus *cross* the jungle of the world in which he/she has got lost for some reason or other. But even if this is the purpose, why should there have been such gruesome stories, and why should the justification have been given in terms of such stories?

There is, of course, the question regarding the authenticity of these texts and their acceptance in the Buddhist and the Jain traditions. And there is the question whether these portions have even been regarded as *prakṣipta*, or interpolations, in the tradition. There is also a larger question as to how the practice of eating non-human flesh can be regarded as compatible with *ahimsā*, if it is regarded as a virtue by any system of thought or philosophy.

We may, therefore, formulate the following questions for the consideration of scholars well-versed in the subject.

1. What is the authenticity and the authority of the texts referred to by Muni Śri Nagarāja Ji in his work?
2. Does the repeated reference to the deliberate killing of near and dear ones and eating their flesh for sustaining one's own life mean that it was not only a widely prevalent practice, but also that it was not even morally condemned by anybody, including the Mahāvīra and the Buddha?
3. Is there any essential difference between eating human flesh and eating the flesh of non-human animals, from the viewpoint of *ahimsā*?

4. How is the approval by the Buddha of the eating of meat, if it was not expressly and deliberately prepared for one, compatible with his preaching of *ahimsā*?
5. Has there been any movement or debate in Buddhism about this issue?
6. Have the Jains ever allowed the eating of meat as a regular or exceptional practice for their *munis* or *śrāvakas*?

We hope scholars will throw light on these and other related issues raised by these extraordinary utterances attributed to the Mahāvīra and the Buddha by texts which, at least *prima facie*, seem to be accepted as genuine by followers of the two great religions which are supposed to believe in *ahimsā* as the highest virtue that men ought to pursue and practice in their lives.

Vol. X, No. 2

Mukund lath

#### Tattvārtha Sūtra

Do Jains accept *anekāntikatā* in the field of *ācāra* as they do in respect of knowledge and reality? In case they do not, does the term *samyaka* connote something radically different in the context of *Caritra* than it does in the case of *Darśana* and *Jñāna* in the well-known *sūtra* on the subject in Umaswati's *Tattvārtha Sūtra*?

4. कि तहि तत् त्रितयं समुदितमित्याह-सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणिमोक्षमार्गः॥

What is the difference between *Darśana* and *Jñāna* in the above *sūtra*?

Vol. XVIII, No. 3

Daya Krishna

#### Nāgārjuna

Nāgārjuna, in the various works attributed to him, criticizes the possibility of any *pramāṇa* being given to establish anything because, according to his analyses, it is intrinsically incapable of doing so. In case it is correct, one would expect that there would have been refutation of his position in the Buddhist tradition itself so that any Buddhist *pramāṇaśāstra* could be constructed. But, little is known of such refutation even though Dignāga wrote his *pramāṇasamuccaya* and Dharmakīrti a *vārtik* on it. It would be interesting, therefore, to find the post criticism of Nāgārjuna and compare them with those made in the Nyāya tradition.

Vol. XV, No. 2

Daya Krishna

**Buddhism**

What exactly is the meaning of *Kalpnāpodham* in the Buddhist definition of *Pratyakṣa*? Is it the same as is meant by the term *nirvikalpaka*? If so, what was the necessity of this characterization as what is sought to be conveyed was already done so by the term *nirvikalpaka*. On the other hand, if it means what is conveyed by the term *savikalpaka*, where was the necessity of doing so either.

The same problem arises with the addition of the characteristic *abhrāntam* by Dharmakīrti to Dignāga's characterization. If *Pratyakṣa* is *nirvikalpaka*, it can not but be *abhrānta*. On the other hand, if it is *savikalpaka* it cannot be *abhrānta* unless Buddhism is prepared to accept that something can be *savikalpaka* and still be *abhrānta*. In the Buddhist tradition, can one be mistaken about that which is 'vikalpa' or that which is an object of *Kalpanā* or *Vikalpa*?

Vol. XIX, No. 3

Daya Krishna

**Sāṃkhya**

Sāṃkhya sets before itself certain and final (*Aikāntika* and *ātyantika*) cessation of threefold suffering (*duḥkhatraya*) as its goal, and points out that the discriminative knowledge of the *Prakṛti*, its evolutes and *Puruṣa* (*vyaktāvyaktajñā vijñāna*) alone can lead to such certain and final cessation of suffering, a state of *kaivalya* in Sāṃkhya. A simple question that comes to the mind here is, even after discriminative knowledge is obtained, what would guarantee the finality of release? Surely, the same *Puruṣa* could once again be entangled by *Prakṛti*! If enjoyment and release (*bhoga* and *apavarga*) of *Puruṣa* is the goal of *Prakṛti*'s evolution, does the *bhoga* of a certain order exhaust all possible types of *bhoga* on the part of *Puruṣa*? We know from our experience that *bhoga* is inexhaustible, endless and of infinite variety. What makes Sāṃkhya so sure that *Prakṛti* would have accomplished its purpose once for all even in case of a single *Puruṣa*? What would ensure that understanding, once obtained, will never be sullied again? Is it logically impossible?

Vol. XX, No.2

G.C. Nayak

**Sāṃkhya\*\***

There is no effect without a cause and an effect, in the Sāṃkhya's theory of *Satkārya*, preexists in its cause in an unmanifested form. An effect is nothing but the manifestation of that which preexist in the cause in an unmanifested form.

Keeping in view the creation and the dissolution of the world by *prakṛti*, Sāṃkhya has given the theory of *Satkārya*. But we find two level effects in Sāṃkhya: at one level, disturbance of the harmonious state of the *prakṛti* and another level, creation of evolutes from the *prakṛti*. Now, the question is-what is the cause of disturbance of the *Prakṛti*'s equilibrium without which there is no possibility of creation?

Sāṃkhya accepts the presence of *puruṣa* as the cause of disturbance of the harmony of *Guṇas* that is *prakṛti*. Disturbing harmony of *prakṛti* is not a capacity of *akartā-puruṣa* and a cause, in Sāṃkhya, is a cause only when it produces some effect. How can the disturbance of harmony of *prakṛti* as an effect be interpreted? Is it not an effect?

Presence of *Puruṣa* is eternal and the issue of what is disturbed in eternal *prakṛti* arises only after the creation of *mahat*.

Keeping all the similes given in the books of Sāṃkhya and challenged later on by Bādarāyaṇa in his aphorism aside, it can be said that the presence of *puruṣa* like the presence of the sun that activates life in the world, disturbs the harmony of *prakṛti* but this will, perhaps, not be acceptable to Sāṃkhya for the reason that independence of *prakṛti* is endangered in that case.

If Sāṃkhya has to explain the relation between the presence of *puruṣa* and disturbance of the harmony of *prakṛti*, it is bound either to give up its theory of causation or to make contradictory statements or to accept two different theories of causation- one for explaining the effects of the *prakṛti* and another for interpreting the effect of disturbance of the harmony of *prakṛti*.

It may be said that the theory of causation is specific to the explanation of the creation of those created and all that is there in the



world are products of which the *prakṛti* is the ultimate cause. But such a view does not lessen the genuineness of the situation in which the *prakṛti* cannot create if its harmonious state is not disturbed. Is there no cause of the disturbance? Can disturbance of harmony as an effect be interpreted from the Sāṃkhyan theory of *Satkārya*?

Vol. XXI, No.4

D.N.Tiwari

### Yoga

The term 'Yoga' in the *Yoga Sūtra* is defined as योगश्चित्त वृत्ति निरोध (1.1.2) and the *vṛttis* that are to be completely stopped are enumerated as प्रमाण विपर्यय विकल्प निद्रास्मृतय (1.1.6). In case these are the *vṛttis* that have to be completely stopped and eliminated from consciousness in order to attain the end which the Yogi is supposed to pursue, then how can there be any notion of 'false knowledge', or विपर्यय if 'falsity' is to be established by a *pramāṇa*?

Also, if there is no *smṛti* or memory, then how can there be any knowledge at all including that of *dharma* which, presumably, are enumerated in the 'Yama' and 'Niyama' which are supposed to be integral parts of the *Sādhana* mentioned in the second chapter (2.30 and 2.32).

Not only this, how can there be any notion of *siddhis* mentioned in the third chapter, which are supposed to arise out of the pursuit of yoga when all movements of consciousness have been stopped, including that of '*saṅkalpa*' or 'willing' or 'desiring'?

Further, the *Yoga Sūtra* starts with *Samādhi* and ends with *Kaivalya*. Are they different or the same and, in case they are the latter, is that an unnecessary repetition or *punarukti doṣa* which is regarded as a serious defect in a text and in any case renders the fourth chapter irrelevant.

In case they are different, what is the relation between *samādhi* which is the subject of the first chapter and *Kaivalya*, which is the subject of the last chapter?

Vol. XX, No.4

Daya Krishna

### Yoga Sūtra

1. Can philosophers in India be identified with any *one* school when they have authoritatively written on more than one school and are said to have made a 'significant' contribution to it? Is Vācaspati Miśra, for example, a Naiyāyika or an Advaitin or a Sāṃkhyan, or none of these or all of them together? Does this reveal the character of Indian philosophy or of those who 'wrote' on philosophy in that culture? Was there, for them, no such thing as 'Truth' to be 'known' by *Buddhi* or 'reason'?

2. Why is the first chapter of the *Yoga Sūtras* called *Samādhi Pāda* and the last *Kaivalya Pāda*, when the complete *citta vṛtti nirodha* is supposed to be the same as *samādhi*? Is *kaivalya*, then, the 'real' *puruṣārtha* of *yoga* and not *samādhi*, either in the *savikalpaka* or *nirvikalpaka* sense?

3. What is the relation of *Yoga Sūtra* to *Abhidhamm* in the Buddhist tradition? It explicitly mentions the well-known *Sīla* in *Sūtra* 1.33 and, like it, talks of something beyond *samādhi*, i.e. *kaivalya* instead of *prajñā*.

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Daya Krishna

### Nyāya Sūtras

1. How are the *Nyāya Sūtras* 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 related to each other. The *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.1 enumerates the 16 *padarthas* and relates them to the achievement of *Nishreyas*, while the *Sūtra* 1.1.2 mentions *Duhkka Janma, Pravṛtti, Doṣa*, etc., and hence ends in *apavarga* which is supposed to be achieved through a removal of *Mithya Jñāna* regarding them. There seems to be, therefore, two unrelated, independent, themes in the *Nyāya Sūtras* which, *prima-facie*, do not seem to have any relation to each other. The Nyāya scholars may enlighten us on the issue as to how the two things have been integrated in the Nyāya tradition from the *Sūtras* onwards.

Vol. XVII, No. 2

Daya Krishna

### Nyāya

1. Is *Nyāya Pracchanna Advaitin*, even though it does not think of itself that way? [For this one can see answer of the query in XIII-3 Is Udayan a *pracchana advaitin*? in XIV-3]

2. What exactly is the notion of *manas* in Nyāya? Is it 'mind' in the Western sense of the term? Does it make 'knowledge' an 'episodic event'? If so, how does it avoid 'momentariness' on the one hand and solve the problem of 'unity' of knowledge on the other?

3. What is the role of 'Self' or *Ātman* according to Nyāya in 'knowledge' or the 'knowing activity' or the *pramāna vyāpāra* whose *phala* is said to be *pramā*?

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Daya Krishna

### Nyāya : Cognition

1. Does *buddhi* in Nyāya mean knowledge, cognition, apprehension or awareness? If yes, as stated in the *Nyāya Sūtra*, then how to distinguish between means of knowledge and the result of knowledge?

2. Will it be possible to defend the view that Nyāya is realist if this meaning of *buddhi* is accepted. Also, if so, would it be correct to hold *saṁśya* (doubt), *viparyaya* (error), *smṛti* and *svapna* (dream), as types of *buddhi* or *jñāna*.

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Shashiprabha Kumar

### Nyāya : Relations

1. What exactly is the difference between *Samyukta Samavāya*, *Samaveta Samvāya* and *Satmyukta Samaveta Samavāya*? What were the reasons for postulating these different *Samavāya*? Are these objects of perceptual apprehension as *samavāya* is supposed to be, or a matter of inference? In case it is the former, is the difference between them perceived also?

2. What is the exact difference between *pramāna* and *premeya* and *hetu* and *sādhya*? Normally the first pair is used in a wider sense, while the other is used in a narrower sense confining it to *anumāna* only. But this restriction is arbitrary, for just as *hetu* has to be different from *sādhya*, so also *pramāna* has to be different from *premeya*. Otherwise, the justification would be fallacious. But then, how can the idea of *swataḥpramāna* be valid? One can not be a *pramāna* for oneself, at least in the same context, just as *hetu* can not be its own *sādhya*.

3. *Pratyakṣa* has been accepted as a *pramāna* by all schools of Indian philosophy, and yet it is not clear how it can be a *pramāna* without being subsumed under *anumāna* as in case it is a *pramāna*, it has to function as a *hetu* for something which is *premeya* so that it may provide a ground for the latter. This, it may be said, will apply to all the *pramānas* and not just to *pratyakṣa* alone and, if so, each and all of them have to be treated as instances of *anumāna* having internal differences between them. The problem then, will be to have a *sāmānya lakṣaṇā* of *pramāna* in general and a *viśeṣa* or differentiating *lakṣaṇā* of all the different *pramānas* accepted in a system. And in case this is done, the theory of *pramānas* in the Indian tradition would have to be recast substantially.

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Daya Krishna

What exactly is meant by *Swarūpa Sambandha* and what is the difference, if any, between it and *tādātmya*? What exactly was the philosophical reason for postulating these relations. Was it the same which led to the acceptance of 'reflexive' relations in modern logic which have hardly been seen as creating any epistemological or ontological problems in the philosophical consciousness of that tradition?'

Vol. XX (1)

Daya Krishna

### Nyāya : Buddhi

1.(i) Is *buddhi* in Nyāya knowledge, cognition, apprehension or awareness? If yes, as stated in the *Nyayasutra*, then how to distinguish between the means of knowledge and the result of knowledge? In the light of this definition, the Nyāya realism is difficult to be defended.

(ii) Moreover, would it be correct to hold *saṁśaya* (Doubt), *viparyaya* (Error), *smṛti* (Memory) and *svapana* (Dream) as types of *buddhi* or *jñāna*?

(iii) Can there be no understanding without an object? If not, how can the subject be known?

(iv) Can it also become the object of *buddhi*? If yes, then how to distinguish between the subject and the object at that moment?

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Shashiprabha Kumar

**Nyāya : Pleasure & Pain**

Is it true that according to Nyāya, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion are *not* states of consciousness? J.N. Mohanty has contended, in his *Introduction to Gangeśa's 'Theory of Truth'* (Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, 1966) that it is so. He writes 'Pleasure and pain, desire and aversion then are not as such states of consciousness, though we are—or, more accurately, become—conscious of them (p. 27).

But then, what shall be a state of consciousness according to Nyāya for, if according to Mohanty 'consciousness' and '*jñāna*' are, for the Nyāya synonymous expressions', (p. 27) as *jñāna* cannot be a state of consciousness since it will be meaningless to say that consciousness is a state of consciousness?

What is the distinction between *sāmānya*, *sādṛśya* and *jāti*? Does every *sādṛśya* give rise to a *jāti* as in the example of a *gavaya* in the case of *upamanā* in Nyāya?

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Daya Krishna

**Nyāya : Viśayatā**

Does the term *viśayatā* in Nyāya epistemology refer to the object of knowledge when it becomes known and hence is a characteristic of the object in such a situation? Or, is it a characteristic of knowledge itself when it becomes the object of self-conscious analysis and is seen as a complex unity of *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāṛata* and *saṃsargatā*?

As knowledge is said to occur both at the *nirvikalpaka* stage and the *savikalpaka* stage, is *viśayatā* a characteristic which obtains at both these stages of knowledge, or it is found only at the *savikalpaka* stage? As the idea of *anuvyavasāya* or 'knowledge of knowledge' is accepted in Nyāya, will *viśayatā* also be relative, that is, when knowledge itself becomes an object of another knowledge, does it get the characteristic of *viśayatā* in relation to which it becomes an object? Also, as *viśayatā* is the correlate notion of *viśayatā*, what exactly will *viśayatā* be in these different alternatives and will it be relative in the sense that it itself can become *viśayatā* when it becomes an object of knowledge? Can Nyāya accept the

notion of an ultimate *viśayatā*, that is, a self which can never become an object but to which everything else is an object as, say, in Sāṃkhya?

Vol. XVI, No.2

Daya Krishna

**Mohanty on Nyāya**

Would it be correct to say, as pointed out by Mohanty, that according to Nyāya no relation can be explicitly mentioned as the moment it is mentioned, it ceases to be a relation and has to be treated either as a *viśeṣya* or a *prakāra*? In other words, the relation though always present in knowledge is only invisibly so. But, in case this is correct, what happens to the myriads of relations in which Nyāya analysis abounds and which are explicitly mentioned in the analysis of knowledge such as *anuyogī*, *pratiyogī*, etc.?

Pub: J.N. Mohanty, *Gangeśa's Theory of Truth*, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Santiniketan, 1966, Intrd. p. 35, f.n.16.

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Daya Krishna

**Can Navya Nyāya Analysis Make a Distinction between Sense and Reference?**

Can Navya Nyāya analysis make a distinction between sense and reference? If it cannot, should it not be regarded as idealistic *par excellence*. On the other hand, if it can, how will it do so, particularly when it does not accept the idea of an identical propositional meaning conveyed by different linguistic formulations even when the same 'fact' is supposed to render the two different 'knowledges', 'true'? Or, in other words, can Navya Nyāya analysis ever accept the 'meaning equivalence' of two *differently* formulated linguistic expressions, or in which the *anuyogī* the *pratiyogī* are different?

Vol. XIII, No. 3

Daya Krishna

**Is 'Tattvam Asī' the same type of identity statement as the 'Evening star is the same as Morning star'?**

Does the assertion of meaningful identity-statement necessarily involve a distinction between 'sense' and 'reference'? Frege's analysis seems to

imply that this is so, while the advaitic analysis of the Upaniṣadic statement *prima facie* seems to deny this.

But, if there is no distinction whatsoever between the identity statement on the one hand and the belief-distinction, however mistaken, then how can the advaitic analysis make any sense at all?

Vol. XIV, No. 3

Daya Krishna

**What is the exact difference between *ūha*, *tarka*, *yukti* and *upapatti*?**

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Daya Krishna

**Some problems regarding the Nyāya mode of analysis of sentences—**

The Navya Nyāya appears to see sentences as essentially relational in character, and as a relation is usually supposed to be between two entities, its analysis starts with a distinction between terms which are related to each other and are technically known as *anuyogin* and *pratiyogin*. The distinction is based on the way the relation is 'seen' as connecting one thing with another and hence is bound to be relative in character, depending on the way one 'sees' the relation. The distinction is bound to be relative in another sense also. There can, in principle, be no such thing as an *anuyogin* or a *pratiyogin* independent of the way the relation is thought to hold between the terms. Thus, the same term in the same sentence can be seen either as an *anuyogin* or a *pratiyogin* depending on the way the relation between them is seen. Normally, the sentence structure itself suggests the way the relation is to be seen, but there are cases in which how one should look at the situation is left open to interpretation and, if so, the distinction between the terms will become indeterminate or arbitrary in character. The 'choice' in such a situation will significantly determine the 'meaning' itself, as what is regarded as an *anuyogī* or a *pratiyogī* determines the meaning of the relational character in terms of which the sentence is to be understood. But, would not such relativity of *Śabdabodha* affect the realistic character of Nyāya substantially?

### Queries Awaiting Answers

2. What does the term '*buddhi*' mean in Nyāya? In the *Nyaya Sutra* 1.1.6. it is defined as *upalabdhi* or *jñāna*. But in case it is so, it can not be understood as intellect or the faculty of reason in the sense in which it is usually understood in the philosophical context.

However, as Nyāya accepts the notion of '*buddhyāpekṣā*' propounded in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* 1.2.3, it is not clear how it can make sense if it is not understood in the sense of intellect or reason. The phrase means that something is relative to *buddhi*, or is not 'independent' of it and if it is so, the term will have to be understood in the sense in which it is used in the other schools of Indian philosophy.

It needs to be clarified, therefore, what the term exactly means in the Nyāya tradition?

Vol. XVIII, No. 4

Daya Krishna

### Abhinava Gupta

2. How is the view of Abhinava Gupta embodied in Kashmir Shaivism different from the one that is embedded in Advaita Vedānta, Samkhya, Vigyanvada Buddhism.

Vol. XVII, No. 2

Daya Krishna

### Concept and Thinking

I would like to know if any research has been done on the concept of and thinking behind (भाव भवति इति भावः।), when it is used in conjunction with other words such as रसभाव, षड्जपञ्चमभाव, स्वभाव, etc. The implication of भाव as अस्तित्व (being or becoming) and अवस्था, स्थिति (state), as distinct from its use as a मनोवृत्तिविकार (emotion of feeling), or इच्छा [intention (whether acted upon or not)], is of considerable significance to musical thought.

Vol. XVIII, No. 3

Prabhakar Phatak

Can we significantly refer to things that are not there? Does the act of signifying put its 'performer', that is, one who utters the performance in

touch with what it signifies? How it can be denied of descriptive content if it signifies universal?

Vol. XVII, No.3

Jagatpal

### Mokṣa

Is there any concept analogous to that of *Mokṣa* in the Western Philosophical tradition? The fact that almost all the schools of Indian Philosophy accept it suggests that this concept, or something similar to this, is necessarily involved in the process of philosophical reflection itself. But its 'absence' from such a major philosophical tradition as that of the West suggests that it is purely contingent even if the Indian mind considers it otherwise. The investigation may reveal a larger 'inter-civilizational' concept comprehending the different and 'differing' insights of the two traditions and suggests, a shift in the thinking about this *puruṣārtha* in the Indian tradition.

Vol. XVIII, No.4

N. Usha Devi

Kant, in his *Critique of Practical Reason* (Liberal Arts Press, 1956, pp. 68-69), has given the following as categories of freedom:

- (1) Categories of Quantity
  - Subjective, according to maxims (intensions of the individual's will)
  - Objectives according to principles (precepts)
  - A priori* principles of freedom, both subjective and objective (laws)
- (2) Categories of Quality
  - Practical rules of commission (*praeceptivae*)
  - Practical rules of omission (*prohibitivae*)
  - Practical rules of exceptions (*exceptivae*)
- (3) Categories of Relation
  - Relation to personality
  - Relation to the condition of the person
  - Reciprocally, relation of one person to the condition of another
- (4) Categories of Modality
  - The permitted and the forbidden

Duty and that which is contrary to duty

Perfect and imperfect duty

These categories are in a sense parallel to those mentioned in the *Critique of Pure Reason* under the categories of understanding as here also they are divided into four general headings: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality with three sub-sets under each of them. The total number of categories thus, is twelve here as in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and raises the same issues as were raised in the 'Notes and Queries' section of the *JICPR* in Volume XI, No. 3, May-August, 1994, by us even though the specific titles of the categories under each of the headings are different.

What does Kant mean by 'Categories of Freedom'? Can the idea of categories be applied to 'freedom'? Or, in other words, can 'freedom' have transcendental forms in which it has necessarily to function? Does it then mean that there are transcendental forms of willing which all willing has necessarily to conform to?

Vol. XIX No.1

Daya Krishna

### Kant on Invitation and Moral Judgement\*

1. What exactly is meant by the term 'presentation' Anschauung in Kant and his successors in German Thought? Is it the same as 'sense-data' in early twentieth century British philosophy? If not, what is the difference? Also, what is its difference from 'intuition' which also plays such a significant role in Kant's thought?

2 Can 'morality' be the subject of 'theoretical understanding' and if so, shall the 'moral judgement' be subject to all those limitations to which all judgements are supposed to be in Kant's thought?

3 What is the difference in Practical Reason as evidenced in prudential action on the one hand and the one displayed in moral action?

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Daya Krishna

### Kant

Kant sees both arithmetic and geometry as examples of knowledge which is both *a priori* and synthetic in nature. This is sought to be justified by showing that both time and space which they deal with are transcendental forms of inner and outer sensibility. As transcendental they

are *a priori*, and as they are forms of 'sensitivity', they may be said to be 'synthetic' in character. Their synthetic character is further strengthened by the fact that space and time are themselves apprehended as sensuously 'given' and that the categories have to be applicable to that which is apprehended through them and sensuously given either through inner or outer sense.

But both arithmetic and geometry as 'knowledge' display a character which at least *prima facie* seems incompatible with their *a priori* nature. The 'knowledge' in these fields not only grows but changes in such a way that what was considered correct is found to be incorrect and has to be given up or radically modified taking it into account.

This, however, raises the problem not only for Kant but for the usual understanding of this kind of knowledge from Plato onwards in the Western tradition.

On the other hand, it would be equally difficult to treat them as empirical in nature in the usual sense given to that term. Would then there be some 'third' kind of knowledge which is neither 'empirical' in the accepted sense of the term nor purely *a priori* as understood in the Western tradition? But, then, what would be an example of *a priori* knowledge?

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Daya Krishna

### Kant's Doctrine of the Categories: Some Questions and problems

Kant's doctrine of categories is well known and it may seem too late in the day to raise any new problem or questions about it. Yet, the power and fecundity of a great thinker perhaps consists in that it can challenge a new and arouse the reader from the dogmatic somnambulism that is the consequence of the way he has been taught the thought of a great thinker.

Kant's doctrine of categories is not 'independent' of his doctrine of judgement. Kant, it should be remembered, articulates first his thought about the subject in his 'table' of categories. The latter, therefore, may be taken as 'founded' in the former and 'deriving' its specificity and content from the former.

The 'table of judgements', as given in the *Critique of Pure Reason* 'is the following

1. *Quantity*: Universal, Particular, Singular
2. *Quality*: Affirmative, Negative, Infinite
3. *Relation*: Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive
4. *Modality*; problematic, Assertoric, Apodeictic (p. 107)

The 'table of categories', on the other hand as given by Kant is the following:

- |                |   |   |
|----------------|---|---|
| 1. Of quantity | - | Unity, Plurality, Totality  |
| 2. Of quality  | - | Reality, negation, Limitation.  |
| 3. Of relation | - | Of Inherence and Subsistence<br>Of causality and Dependence<br>Of Community (reciprocity<br>between agent and patient). |
| 4. Of modality | - | Possibility- Impossibility<br>Existence-Non-existence<br>Necessity -Contingency (ibid.,                                 |

113)

The two may be correlated in the following way :

- |                     |   |   |
|---------------------|---|---|
| 1. Quantity         |   |   |
| Universal           | - | Unity   |
| Particular          | - | Plurality   |
| Singular            | - | Totality  |
| 2. <i>Quality</i> : |   |   |
| Affirmative         | - | Reality   |
| Negative            | - | Negation  |
| Infinite            | - | Limitation  |
| 3. Relation         |   |   |
| Categorical         | - | Of Inherence and Subsistence<br>( <i>substantial accident</i> ) |
| Hypothetical        | - | Of Causality and Dependence<br>( <i>cause and effect</i> )      |

Disjunctive - Of Community  
(reciprocity between agent and patient)

4. *Modality*

Problematic -Possibility -Impossibility  
Assertoric -Existence -Non-existence  
Apodeictic -Necessity -Contingency

A comparison of the two tables reveals problems which do not seem to have been paid sufficient attention for, if they had been attended to, serious question would have been raised about Kant's doctrine of the categories. Even a cursory glance at the two tables suggests that it is the concepts of quantity, quality, relation and modality that appear to be more fundamental as it is under these that sub-classifications have been made in both the 'table of judgements' and the 'table of categories'. *Prima facie*, it is the 'table of judgements' which is more fundamental, as in Kant's own sequence the 'table of categories' is derived from it and there seems to be some sort of correlation between the two. Yet, a closer examination reveals problems and does not, *prima facie*, sustain the notion of categories as they have usually been understood in the context of Kantian philosophy.

The Correlation between the category of 'unity' and that which is called 'universal' in the 'table of judgement', under 'quantity' is strange as even if a 'universal' judgement is taken as uniting the plurality or multiplicity under it, it does not do so either by destroying or denying the differences and is, in fact, something that sums up in an additive sense, if the term 'universal' is taken to mean that which is conveyed by the term 'all' in the context of such judgements. 'All', it should be remembered, is of two types; one, where it is the result of an enumerative induction which however large, is still denumerably, finite. The other which is a real 'infinity' suffers from all the problems of definition first and second, of induction. In both cases the 'all', as it Quantities the subject of a proposition, conveys the sense of a 'totally' and not of 'unity'. It is an

aggregate or collection of single individuals who have been unified into a class by being brought together under it.

This, it may be said, is to take an extentional view of 'all' and not to see it as determined by connotation or property by virtue of which those individuals have been brought into togetherness in the class. This, however, would be to treat the term 'universal' not as quantifying the subject in a judgement, but to treat it as something analogous to a Platonic idea or a *jāti* in the Nyāya sense where the 'universal' is more real than the individuals which illustrate' or 'imitate' or 'participate' in it. As Kant is self-consciously obtaining his 'table of categories' on the basis of his 'table of judgements' he cannot treat the universal judgement under the heading of 'quantity' in the sense in which Plato used it.

The same problem seems to arise with his category of 'totality' which is the correlate of what is termed as 'singular' in the 'table of judgements'. To think of an individual as consisting of a 'totality' is not to see him/her as an individual for, to be an individual is not to be an aggregate of parts, but to have a unity which is not only over and above these but permeates them in an essential sense.

The division under 'Quality' seems to raise a slightly different problem as, though there can hardly be any question regarding the correlation between the 'table of judgements' and the 'table of categories' in this case, there seems little justification for the nomenclature of the categories that have been given for them. There seems hardly any justification, for example, for the category of 'limitation' which itself is supposed to be correlated with what has been called in Kemp Smith's translation as 'infinite' in the 'table of judgements'. The German original for this is 'unendlich'. The term 'infinite' is very strange as it does not occur in the usual 'table of judgements'. Kant in his explication of the characterization has taken recourse to what in traditional logic was used as a technique or 'trick' for converting or changing a negative proposition into an affirmative one. His own example is, 'The soul is not-mortal' (*Critique of Pure*

*Reason*, p. 108). Kant's reason for calling it 'infinite' in his own words is as follows.

Since the mortal constitutes one part of the whole extension of possible beings, and the non-mortal the other, nothing more is said by my proposition than that the soul is one of the infinite number of things which remain over when I take away all that is mortal (*ibid* : 108).

The reason for calling the correlate category as 'limitation' under the heading 'quality' is, in Kant's own words. 'The infinite sphere of all that is possible is thereby only so far limited that the mortal is excluded from it, and the soul is located in the remaining part of its extension' (*ibid.*: 108). But a category of understanding in Kant, as usually understood, is that which *inevitably* functions in the process of understanding as the activity of 'understanding' itself is constituted by it. But if it is so, it does not seem, at least *prima facie*, that the category of 'limitation' occurs in this way in all acts of understanding as, normally, one seldom says that 'Soul is not-mortal'.

There is an additional problem in respect of what Kant has called 'Reality' which corresponds to 'affirmation' in the 'table of judgements'. If 'Reality' is the category that corresponds to 'affirmation' then it is 'unreality' that should correspond to that which is called 'negative' in the 'table of judgement'. It is the dichotomy 'real-unreal' which should correspond to that which is conveyed by 'affirmative-negative' in the 'table of judgements'. But it is not so. What corresponds to negative judgement is not 'reality' but negation in the 'table of categories'. That Kant is not averse to such dichotomous characterization is evident in his formulation of the categories under the headings of 'relation' and 'modality'. Under the former, he gives the following dichotomous divisions: substance-accidence, cause-effect, and community (reciprocity between agent and patient). Under the latter, he gives 'possibility-impossibility', 'existence-non-existence' and 'necessity-contingency'. Each of these dichotomies raises problems specific to itself, but the central issue that it raises for the notion of category is that, in case it is taken seriously,

the category itself will have to be conceived as essentially 'dichotomous' in character. This, if accepted, will affect the nature of 'understanding' or thinking which would then necessarily have to be dichotomous in character.

Kant himself, in his discussion of categories, has complicated the subject by distinguishing between categories of 'quantity' and 'quality' on the one hand, and those of 'relation' and 'modality' on the other. Not only this, he has distinguished between general and transcendental logic and has suggested that as far as the latter is concerned, it is the third category which is important as it synthesizes in itself the other two which belong to the general logic alone. This, if accepted, would result in their being *only* four categories under the four heading as the other ones will be synthesized within these. There would then only remain the categories of 'totality, limitation-reciprocity' between agent and patient or 'community' and 'necessity-contingency'.

Kant's own observations in this connection are interesting; he writes, Further, it may be observed that the third category in each class always arises from the combination of the second category with the first.

Thus *allness* or *totality* is just plurality considered as unity; *limitation* is simply reality combined with negation; *community* is the causality of substances reciprocally determining one another; lastly, *necessity* is just the existence which is given through possibility itself (*ibid.*, 116).

This reminds one of Hegel where the third term in the triad is supposed to be the synthesis of the thesis and the anti-thesis which are successive positions which thought inevitable takes in its movement. Kant, it should be remembered, also uses the term 'dynamical' to indicate the distinction between the categories under the headings of 'relation' and 'modality' from those under 'quality' and 'quantity' which he calls 'mathematical'. This division between the categories of 'quality' and 'quantity' on the one hand and those of 'relation' and 'modality' on the other plays havoc with Kant's notion of the category as, in principle, there can be no distinction between categories which renders some more important than the others. Kant, however, does not seem to have seen



this, just as he does not appear to have realized what effect his observation on the third category as combining the first two would have on the notion of category itself.

Kant writes about the above distinction in the following manner, 'The first of the considerations suggested by the table is that while it contains four classes of the concepts of understanding, it may, in the first instance, be divided into two groups, those in the first group being concerned with objects of intuition, pure as well as empirical, those in the second group with the existence of these objects, in their relation either to each other or to the understanding.'

The categories in the first group I would entitle the *mathematical*, while those in the second group, the *dynamical* (ibid., 116). Kant seems to be suggesting in this formulation that while the categories in the first group, that is, those under quantity and quality relate to the *notion* of object as such, while those in the second group are concerned with relations between objects on the one hand, and their relation to the understanding on the other. Perhaps, what he wants to suggest is that the categories under '*relation*' relate to relation between objects while those under '*modality*' are concerned with the relations which these have to the understanding itself. The category of 'cause and effect', and of 'substance' and 'accidence' are obviously concerned with the relation that obtains between two objects or events and between a substance and a property.

The third category under this heading, that is, the category of 'community' or 'reciprocity' between agent and patient does not *prima facie* seem to make sense and Kant himself seems to feel some problem about it, particularly as it seems to be correlated to the disjunctive judgement in his system. He writes, for example.

Thirdly, in the case of one category, namely, that of *community*, which is found in the third group, its accordance with the form of a disjunctive judgement-the *form* which corresponds to it in the table of logical functions-is not as evident as in the case of the others (ibid.:117).

Kant takes recourse to a strange strategy to justify the notion of the category of 'community' along with that of the disjunctive judgement with

which it is associated and which, *prima facie*, does not seem to be correct. He writes: To gain assurance that they do actually accord, we must observe that in all disjunctive judgements the sphere (that is, the multiplicity which is contained in any one judgement) is represented as a whole divided into parts (the subordinate concepts), and that since no one of them can be contained under any other, they are thought as co-ordinated with, not subordinated to, each other and so as determining each other, not in one direction only, as in a series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate-if one member of the division is posited, all the rest are excluded, and conversely (ibid., 117).

The fourth heading under '*modality*' contains the following categories under it, each of which is dichotomous in character and is related to its corresponding table of judgements given earlier. The dichotomous character of these categories seems, however, to be radically different from that which obtains under the heading of '*relation*'. There the dichotomy is not exactly a dichotomy as the two are related essentially in such a manner that both have to obtain in order that the thought may complete itself. One can not have cause without having an effect and even a substance without having a property and even in the case of community, if we accept Kant's interpretation of the disjunctive judgement, the one half without the 'other' half. As against this, the categories under '*modality*' have a different character as there one has to choose between the dichotomous pair as they can not simultaneously obtain either in thought or in respect of that which the thought is about. We can not think, in principle, that something is both possible and impossible, or that it exists and does not exist, or that it is both necessary and contingent. Nor can we think that something can have these characters simultaneously predicated of it. In fact, Kant himself does not think that the categories under the heading '*modality*' can be treated at par with those under other headings, that is, '*quality*', '*quantity*' and '*relation*'. He writes:

The *modality* of judgements is a quite peculiar function. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it contributes nothing to the content of the judgement (for, besides quantity, quality, and relation there is nothing

that constitutes the content of a judgement), but concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general (ibid., 109).

This is in straight contradiction to what Kant himself had said about the categories under the headings of relation and modality as distinct from those under the headings of quality and quantity. According to him, as quoted earlier.

Those in the first group being concerned with objects of intuition, pure as well as empirical, those in the second group (that is relation and modality) with the existence of these objects, in their relation either to each other or to the understanding (ibid., 116).

Thus besides the earlier distinction between the categories under the headings of 'quality' and 'quantity', he now makes a further distinction between those of 'relation' and the ones under 'modality'. It is not clear however, what exactly Kant means by the relation of copula to thought in general.

The situation becomes even more perplexing and strange if one remembers that, for Kant the dichotomous category of 'existence-non-existence' occurs under 'modality' and so does that of 'possibility-impossibility' and 'necessity-contingency'. But, 'necessity', strangely, is for Kant not what is usually understood by the term in philosophical literature. Rather, it is a logical relation between the conclusion, the premises and results from the apprehension that the former 'follows' from the latter. According to him:

The apodeictic proposition thinks the assertoric as determined by these laws of the understanding, and therefore as affirming *a priori*, and in this manner it expresses logical necessity. Since everything is thus incorporated in the understanding step by step in as much as we first judge something problematically, then maintain its truth assertorically, and finally affirm it as inseparably united with the understanding, that is, as necessary and apodeictic- we are justified in regarding these three functions of modality as so many moments of thought (ibid., 110).

(Der assertorische sagt von logischer Wirklichkeit oder Wahrheit, Wie etwa in einem hypothetischen, im Vernunftschluss/das Antecedens im

Obersätze problematisch, im Untersätze assertorisch vorkommt, und zeigt, an, dass der satz mit dem Verstande nach desser, Gesetzen schon verbunden sei, der apodiktische Satz denkt sich den assertorischen durch dieses Gesetze des Verstandes selbst bestimmt, und daher a priori behauptend, und druckt auf solche Weise logische Nothwendigkeit aus. Weil nun hier alles sich gradweise dem Verstande eincerleibt, so dass man zuvor etwas problematisch witeilt, darauf auch whol es assertorisch als wahr annimmt, endlich als unzertrennlich mit dem Verstande verbunden, d.i. als notwendig und apodiktisch behauptet, so kann man diese drei Funktionen der Modalitat auch so viel momente des Denkens uberhaupt nennen.)

Kant, it seems, has forgotten that in case the first premise is a hypothetical judgement and the second is assertoric in respect of the antecedent in the hypothetical judgement, the conclusion *does not* reassert the assertoric in the second premise, but the consequence that was asserted problematically in the first premise. The necessity thus is seen as belonging to the consequence *in its relation* to the antecedent which was asserted problematically in the first premise, and is now seen as a necessity, *because* of the positive assertion of the antecedent in the second premise.

Also, strangely, Kant seems to conceive of the major premise of the traditional syllogism in a hypothetical form when, traditionally, it was always conceived of as categorical in nature. This, however, anticipates the modern reformulation or translation of the universally quantified statement in terms of an 'if-then' implication which is always hypothetical in nature. The mistake, it seems, is there is Kant's original formulation itself where it is not clear whether he is referring in the conclusion to the antecedent asserted in the minor premise or the consequence asserted in the conclusion.

The problems that thus arise in respect of Kant's Doctrine of the Categories may be summarized as follows:

1. Is there a fundamental difference between the categories under 'quantity' and 'quality' on the one hand, and those under 'relation' and 'modality' on the other?
2. Is there a basic distinction between the categories under 'relation' and those under 'modality' as seems to be suggested by Kant's treatment of the later?
3. What is the exact status of the third category in each group, which seems to have been specifically added by Kant to the list enumerated earlier by Aristotle? Is it a 'synthesis' of the first two categories in the list and if so, is it to be treated as the only 'real' category under that heading. In case the latter alternative is accepted, will there be only four categories in Kant's Doctrine, that is, those of, totality, limitation, reciprocity between agent and patient and necessity-contingency?
4. Is the category of 'necessity' under "modality" to be understood as Kant wants us to understand, that is, as a relationship between the conclusion and the premises in a formal deductive system. If so, what is its relation to the category of 'causality' which is supposed to correspond with the hypothetical judgement in the 'table of judgements'?
5. What shall be the status of 'contingency' in the dichotomous pair 'necessity-contingency' under 'modality' and how is it different from 'possibility' which also has been given under 'modality'?
6. How can 'causality' be an independent category in Kant if it is only the third category which is supposed to be 'real', as it is a synthesis of the first two and, if so, it is the category of 'reciprocity between agent and patient which will be the 'real' category and not the category of 'cause and effect' which will, in this perspective, only be an abstract 'moment' in the process of thinking which proceeds from the first to the second category and then culminates in the third.
7. In case 'causality' is not an independent category what happens to the Kantian enterprise of 'saving' the enterprise of knowledge from Human skepticism which it is generally supposed to be.

8. What exactly will be the relation between 'causality' and 'necessity' which was supposed to be one of the central problems which Kant is said to have dealt with in his system?
9. What exactly is the function of by the category of 'limitation' under 'quality' and the infinite judgement which corresponds to it in the 'table judgements'?
10. What exactly does Kant mean by the category of 'reciprocity' which corresponds to the disjunctive judgement under the heading of 'relation'?
11. What exactly is the relation between the categories of 'totality', 'limitation', 'reciprocity' and necessity'? How do they constitute the process of understanding as unless this is clarified Kant's notion of categories will make hardly any sense.

Besides these, there is the additional problem which arises even in the context of the usual understanding of the doctrine of categories in Kant. These relate to two questions:<sup>1</sup>

1. Whether all the twelve categories apply simultaneously in each act of understanding, or *only* one of the categories under each of the headings is so applied?
  2. In case it is the latter, what determines the *choice* of the category to be applied in a particular act of understanding?
  3. In case it is the former, how can opposed categories be simultaneously applied in the same act of understanding of the phenomenon concerned?
- The doctrine of categories in Kant is one of the most discussed topics in the history of western philosophical thought since it was first propounded and has exercised tremendous influence inspite of the criticisms that have been leveled against it. The questions and problems raised above suggest that the doctrine needs to be examined in detail so that a fresh attempt can be made at 'understanding' it once again.

#### Notes and References

1. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith Macmillan & Co., New York, St. martin's Press, 1963, p. 107.

2. Herausgegeben Von Ingeborg Heidemann, Philipp Reclam Jun. Stuttgart. 1966, p. 145.

3. These two questions were raised in the 'Notes and Queries' section of the *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 3 and the following persons had taken part in the discussion:

Sri Kaushal Kishore Sharma

*JICPR*, Vol. XII, No.3.

Professor herert Herring

*JICPR* Vol. XII, No.3.

Dr. Rajendra Gupta

*JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No.1.

Volume XVIII-4

Daya Krishna

## Appendix

### Agenda for Research

#### What exactly is meant by *padārtha* in the Indian Philosophical Tradition?

The *Nyāya Sūtra* mentions sixteen *padārthas* and the whole of the *Nyāya* tradition is said to deal with them. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya's recent volume entitled *Development of Nyāya Philosophy and its Social Context* published by the Centre for Studies in Civilizations under its Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture programme, New Delhi, 2005 seems to centre its discussion around them and not about the problems dealt with in the *Nyāya Sūtra*. But these are totally different from the ones given in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*.

The *padārthas* of the *Nyāya Sūtra* seem to be related only to knowledge and the argumentation leading to it, while *padārtha* in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* refer so that which is there, *i.e.* substance, quality and activities.

Both the *Nyāya Sūtra* and the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* offer 'extentional', definition of what they consider *padārtha* to mean without giving any independent criterion regarding what shall be considered as *padārtha* in their system.

Strangely, the *Nyāya*, according to Sibajiban Bhattacharyya as the author of the *Nyāya Sūtra* considers *padārtha* as confined only to those mentioned in *Sūtra* 1.1.1, later seems to consider *padārtha* neither in the sense of the *Nyāya Sūtra* or the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, but as the 'meaning' or *śābdabodha*, as is clearly spelled out by Gadādhara in his *Vyutpattivādaḥ*.

V.I.I.I: शाब्दबोधे चैकपदार्येऽपरपदार्यस्य संसर्गः संसर्गमर्यादया भासते ।

The term *padārtha* here is neither the *padārtha* of the *Nyāya Sūtra* or that of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*.

The term *padārtha* is also used in other schools of Indian Philosophy as shown by Vladimir Shokin in his Article published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2.

The use of the term *padārtha* in all these contexts has to be distinguished, differentiated and systematically elucidated in order to gain an understanding of this key term in Indian Philosophy.

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### Focus

#### Derrida

1. Attention is drawn to Derrida's work entitled *Eye of the University: Right to Philosophy* published in 2004 by Stanford University Press, Stanford, California. The work focuses on Derrida's concern with philosophy and the 'teaching' of philosophy as central to university particularly in the context of the emerging situation created by far-reaching developments in science and technology on the one hand and economic and political forces on the other.

The work draws attention to the central problem emerging in the field of 'knowledge' affecting all disciplines and, thus, requiring the critical attention of concerned thinkers everywhere, be it the West or the East.

#### Gadādhara

Gadādhara is generally acknowledged to be the last great Naiyāyika of the Post-Raghunātha era and his *Vyutapattivādaḥ* is justly famous amongst his many works, as it is an independent text on a linguistic-cum-epistemological issue, and *not* a commentary on anyone else's work.

The 'originality' of the work in the well-established Sanskrit tradition may be gauged by the tribute paid to it by subsequent

thinkers who have attempted to elucidate and understand its meaning. Surprisingly, this work of the great master has challenged so many thinkers after him that those who think that the great philosophical tradition of India ceased long ago, would find it hard to come to terms with this overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Eight commentaries have already been published, starting from Kṛṣṇamabhaṭṭa, whose date as given in Potter's Bibliography is close enough to that of Gadādhara to suggest that he was already a name to reckon with in his own time, and ending with Sri Venīmādhava Śukla Śāstri. A recent edition of the text with all the commentaries has been brought out under the editorship of Achyutananda Dash, published by the New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 2004. The work is to appear in three parts, but even the first part offers a taste of what is to come. It deals with *Abhedānavya*. Bodhaprakaraṇa raises the central issue of language and meaning in Nyāya or *Śābdabodha* on which everything else rests. If 'meaning' is inextricably involved with and dependent upon the particular specificity of the linguistic construction, then how can 'meaning' ever be 'detached' from that specification, seems to be the central question addressed to in the work.

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#### Notes and Queries (QAA)

If *Samavāya* is not given the status of 'existence' or *sattā* in *Nyāya*, how can there be a real existent relation between *dravya* and *guṇa*, i.e. substance and property or *dravya* and *Karma*, i.e. substance with activity? Would not then, in reality, there would only be 'substances', 'qualities' and 'occurrences', 'events' or 'activities' without any 'real' relation between them?

In case the Nyāya distinction between that which is *buddhyāpekṣā* and that which is not, and if that which they consider as *bhāva* is regarded as *buddhyāpekṣā*, then does not

the whole 'world' 'constituted' by relations and conceived of in its terms be *buddhyāpekṣā* also?

In case we bring in the notion of *paryāpti sambandha* in terms of which they try to understand quantitative relations such as 'twoness' or 'threeness' or *dvitva* and *tritva*, then would not the Nyāya position become 'idealism' pure and simple?

In case Nyāya accepts *paryāpti* as a distinct relation different from *samavāya*, how would it be differentiated from the former?

What is the distinction between *āhārya jñāna* and *pramā* in Nyāya which seems to accept both? Do *dravya guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya* and *abhāva* not apply in the case of *āhārya jñāna* as they do in the case of *pramā*?

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#### Agenda for Research

##### Vedānga

The long tradition of the oral preservation of the Vedas gave rise to complex and intricate techniques for achieving this end. The āgamic traditions of India have also been oral and preserved it orally as the Vedic tradition. The same is the problem in respect of *Vedic exegetics* giving rise to *Nirukta*, *Vyākaraṇa* and *Śikṣā* included in the Vedānga around which all the later problems in respect of the tradition have revolved from the beginning and neither the *śikṣā* nor the mīmāṃsā procedures of interpretations have helped in the matter. The problems of interpretations of language in the āgamic tradition of India have not been much explored, but the diversity of 'schools' with their conflicting interpretations attest to the fact that the situation in respect of these could not be very different.

The problem is a wider one as language is everywhere but the interpretations and the intersubjectively 'lived' experience in terms of which it is interpreted are always in contexts that are independent of those that were implicitly presupposed in the understanding at the time when it was written.

The successive interpretations then may be seen as reflecting more the times when they were made than as attempting at an approximation to the truth of what the text is supposed to have said at the time when it was composed.

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#### Focus

##### *Bṛhaddevatā*

Attention is drawn to an outstanding study entitled *Myth as Argument: The Bṛhaddevatā as Canonical Commentary* by Laurie I. Patton published by Walter D. Gruytern, New York, 1996

It is the most comprehensive and detailed analysis of this ancient text which tries to deal with all the problems relating to the *Rgveda* and focuses those which the tradition has tried to come to terms with what had arisen in respect of this most paradoxical and authoritative text in the orthodox tradition of India. The strategies adopted to explain that which seems, *prima facie*, inexplicable, deserve special notice as they provide a clue to the way India's orthodox tradition has tried to come to terms with and make sense of what, according to its own norms, was unacceptable.

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#### Notes and Queries (QAA)

1. What is the relation between *Śābdabodha* and *Śabda Pramāṇa*? Does the latter presuppose the former? Is the *pramāṇatva* of the two different and, if so, will doubts raised about the one affect the 'certainty' of the other?

2. The authority of the Śruti or the āgama is dependent on the way one understands its meaning. But there are disputes about the meaning of the Veda and the āgamic texts of the Buddhists and the Jain tradition and the understanding of those depends on some way of settling these disputes.

Besides these, there has also been the attempt to bring in the mythical context for the understanding of the puzzling portions of the *Rgvedas*, say, in the *Bṛhaddevata*.

Did the same situation prevail in respect of the Buddhist and the Jain traditions and the development of hermeneutic strategies developed in these traditions to 'understand' the words of the Founders as had happened in the Vedic tradition? Is, in other words, the difference and the disputes between different schools of Buddhism and Jainism, based on their differing and divergent interpretations of their basic texts as, say, in the different schools of Vedānta in the Upaniṣadic traditions, including that of the *Brahma Sūtra* and the *Gīta*?

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#### Agenda for Research

##### Russell on Material Conditional

The radical transformation and articulation of logic associated with the name of Russell and Whitehead informed by the vision of deriving the whole of mathematics from logic is well known. So also is the attempt by Wittgenstein to develop a truth-functional logic in place of the traditional logic associated with the name of Aristotle, which is now designated as 'modern logic', and taught everywhere. But the relation between the two has not been explored, although both Wittgenstein and Russell and their early work together at Cambridge is well known.

Russell was already talking of 'material implication' which is nothing but the 'truth-table' version of the logical connective in sentential logic known as 'implication', and symbolized as  $\subset$ . Russell also showed awareness of the paradox arising from this interpretation of the logical relation of implication and, for some strange reason, called it 'material implication', when it was nothing of that kind since there was nothing 'material' involved in it.

The fact that such a formal consequence of the new understanding of the notion of 'implication', so central to logical and philosophical thinking from ancient times, followed from the new understanding does not seem to have 'mattered' either to Russell or to Wittgenstein who were busy creating the edifice of modern logic. Both did not notice the fact that a false proposition 'implies' every other proposition and that a true proposition is implied by every other proposition makes 'thinking' practically impossible.

True, this absurd and paradoxical conclusion justifies and explains the traditional fallacy called 'affirming the consequent' and 'denying the antecedent' as they were grounded on it. It also destroyed any relation between 'logical thinking' and what that 'thinking' was about as logic had nothing to do with what 'if, then' is supposed to mean in empirical contexts. There has perhaps been no greater disruption of the relation of logic, that was essential to thinking, and empirical reality which the 'thinking' was supposed to 'think' about.

The far-reaching consequences of this development by Russell and Wittgenstein need to be further explored and the relation between them investigated with the consequences they had for philosophy after them.

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#### Focus

##### Sūktas

Attention is drawn to *Sūkta* 164 of the first *Maṇḍala* attributed to Dīrghatamaśa Aucathya. This *sūkta* consists of 52 mantras and although it is well known to Vedic scholars, it has not been paid as much attention as, say, the *Puruṣa Sūkta* 10.90 or the *Nāsadiya Sūkta* 10.129. The *Sūkta* 164 shows a more concrete awareness of the movement of time—yearly, seasonally, monthly and also the day-and-night cycle. The *Samvatsara Kāla*

*Cakra*, which is understood in this way, seems to envelop the whole of reality.

Also, the *sūkta* shows the awareness of that which, though being the basis of the cycle, is also beyond it. In fact, it talks of the two birds sitting on one tree; one only looks on while the other tastes the fruit of the tree (*Mantra* 208). These lines are well known from the Upaniṣad, but that they originally occur in the *sūkta* is not so commonly known. But, surprisingly, the next *mantra* talks of a large number of birds sitting on the tree, singing together perhaps of that which is not there.

The transition becomes clearer when the *sūkta* distinguishes between the mortal and the immortal and suggests that both have a common origin.

Language, according to it, has four levels, three of which are hidden and only the fourth is heard in the speech of men which, surprisingly, is called *turiya* in the *sūkta*.

The fourfold distinction reminds one of Bhartṛhari's four levels of *Vāk*, that is, *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*, the last being that which one hears when it is spoken (45).

The *sūkta* also relates *Vāk* to *Chanda* and explicates its relation even though it does not talk of *Nāda* (Brahman) there. The *sūkta* moves forward and suggests through its famous statement 'ॐ, एकं सद विप्राः बहुधा वदन्ति', saying that Indra, Marut, Agni, etc., are 'names' of that which is called by different names (46).

In fact, important *sūktas* of the *Rgveda* dealing with philosophical subjects need to be brought together in a collection with a new commentary on them so that *Rgvedic* thought becomes available to teachers and students of philosophy alike, as also to ordinary readers interested in the same.

The Query raised by Professor Daya Krishna on the issue of *Turiya* in Bhartṛhari In XXII-4:

'May I draw your attention to the *Rgveda Sūkta* 1.164, *Mantra* 41 to 45 which deals with *Vāk* in *Mantra* 45, it is said that there are four levels of *Vāk*, out of which three are 'hidden' and only the fourth deals with that which human beings speak and it is called *Turiya*.

This reminds one of the four levels of *Vāk* in Bhartṛhari and needs to be paid attention to, as it would be interesting to find if Bhartṛhari got the idea from the *Rgveda* itself. According to Satvalekara, the first three are supposed to be located in *Mulādhāra*, the heart and *Buddhi*, respectively, while the fourth is called *Turiya*.

How did the transformation of the term *Turiya* occur in the tradition when in the text of the *Vākyapadīya*, it means something like *Parā* or that which is radically different from all the other three?'

#### Reply

Bhartṛhari has quoted the *Rgvedic* verse (1/164/45) in his *Vṛtti* on the verse 1/142 of *Vākyapadīya*. The verse reads as follows 'Vaikharyā madhyamāyāśca paśyantīyāśca itadadbhutam, Anekatīrthabhedāyāstrayyā vācaḥ paraman padam'. The verse can be translated as follows: 'That it (*Vyākaraṇa*) is an excellent means or stairs of landing place of the three levels of speech—the *Vaikharī*, the *Madhyamā* and the *Paśyantī* residing in different places. Specifying the different levels of speeches, the commentary *Ambākarī* quotes a verse that reads, 'parā vari mūlacakrasthā paśyantī nābhi sansthitā, hṛdisthā madhyamā jñeyā vaikhari kanthadeśagā', according to which, *Parā* is to be located in *Mūlacakra*, *Paśyantī* in the navel, the *madhyamā* is known to be residing in the heart and *Vaikharī* is to be located in the throat. Bhartṛhari, neither in the verse nor in his commentary of



the verse, has mentioned about those specific seats of the levels of speech. In his commentary, Bhartṛhari has not accepted *Parā*, as a level of speech.

However, he has very clearly mentioned different kinds of *Vaikhari* (four kinds), *Madhyamā* (three kinds) and at least ten kinds of *Paśyantī*. He comments *Saiśā trayī vāk caitanyagranthi vivartavadanākhayeparimāṇā turīyeṇa manuśyeṣu pratyavabhāṣate*) that these three levels of speech, like the consciousness that illumines in forms of all beings (deity, human and non-human beings), gets diversified in enumerable transformations and in the human beings. Only through the *Vaikhari*, the fourth of all the parts (*turīyeṇa*), they are illuminated. Even in the fourth part of speech, only some of it are in practice while others are transcendental or beyond our use. In the context of clarifying this issue, Bhartṛhari has quoted the *Rgvedic Mantra (Turīyam vāco manuśyā vadanti—(1/164/45)*.

Bhartṛhari does not accept the fourth level of *vāk* and he has not referred to *Parā* by the use of the term *Turīya*. *Turīya* means 'Fourth' of the third in the descending order from subtle to gross.

Satvakeara's interpretation of the *Rgvedic* verse (1/164/45) is not up to the mark but it is also not incorrect. The fourth, different from the first three, is called *Turīya*, the gross level and not the *Parā* level. *Turīya* formed by 'catur=catvār+cha' the beginning letter of which is removed, stands for a quarter, a fourth part that, in Vedānta philosophy, is used to indicate the culminating state of the *Jīva*, in which it realizes one with supreme spirit or Brahman, in the uses like *Turīya varṇa*, it means a man belonging to the fourth caste or *śūdra* and in the uses like '*Turīyam vāco manuśyā vadanti*'? (1/164/45), it stands for the quarter of the levels of which first three are subtle and imperceptible while the fourth quarter is the gross and perceptible *Vaikhari*.

There is controversy among the interpreters of Bhartṛhari on the issue of *parā-vāk* as one of the levels of speech. According to

the philosophy of Tantra and Vedānta, *Parā* is the subtlest form of speech, even subtler than *paśyantī*. The commentator, Helārāja has not distinguished *Parā* from *paśyantī*. According to him, *paśyantī* itself, being pure unity and undivided consciousness, is called by the word *Parā*. Bhartṛhari has himself enumerated only three levels of speech—*paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikhari*.

It is striking to note as to why Bhartṛhari, a philosopher well versed in the Vedic and Tāntrika traditions, has not enumerated *Parā* as one of the levels of speech. He might have observed some insoluble difficulties that may creep into the philosophy of grammar if *Parā* is taken as a level of speech. It would, perhaps, not be a necessary content of *Vyākaraṇa* or it would be a thing beyond the limit of cognition revealed by *madhyamā* in the mind to which our cognition and reflections are confined or there would be no use of it in the explanation of the world of communication, i.e. the world of words and their meanings. Following Sāyana, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, while interpreting the quoted verse of *Rgveda* 'and with influence of *Tantrāgama*, accepts four levels of speech of which first three are hidden but he does not seem justified because there is no occasion for cognizing any such division in *Parā*, even by Yogins, it is not enumerated as a level of speech.' (*Yoginām tu tatrāpi prakṛtipratyayavibhāgāvagatirasti, Laghumanjuśvākhya kalā*, p. 182, Chowkhamba Sanskrit series, 46, see also *Mahābhāṣyaudyota Paspasāhanika*). Kaiyaṭa takes *Nāma*, *Akhyāt*, *Upasarga* and *Nipātas* by the term *catvāri*. Helārāja has not observed such a reason for considering *Parā* as a level of speech. He has identified *Parā* as one with *paśyantī*.

In my opinion, *Parā* beyond *paśyantī*, can't be distinguished as a level of speech. Leveling of speech in consequential sequence of gross, subtle and subtlest is not applicable to *Parā* because that may logically lead to infinite regression. There is no logical need for explaining the substratum of different levels of speech as one of the levels also and even if it is accepted as a

level of speech, it being untouched by words, may hardly be of any importance to the philosophy of grammar. It may be a subject or realization but then its existence cannot be justified cognitively and epistemologically.

*Vaikhari* is a perceived entity and *madhyamā* is cognized directly as revealed by itself after the manifestation of it through *vaikhari*. Even *paśyantī*, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is accepted as that known by implication as the substratum of cognition revealed in the mind but there is no ground on the basis of which the existence of *Parā* may also be accepted by implication as the substratum of *paśyantī*. It will lead to infinite regress and, hence, unfounded logic. Implication of something by that which it is implicated is a miserable logic. Implication requires a veridical cognition as a base of it, if otherwise, it would be an imagination and might cause confusion if applied for the inference of some existence. These are, perhaps, the reason that Bhartṛhari has not enumerated *Parā* as one among the levels of speech. However, he in his *vṛtti* and his commentators have accepted *parā* as a kind of *Paśyantī* that is *Para paśyantī*.

The position of middle (*madhyamā*) might be justified only when three of the aforesaid levels are present. In case of a fourth, it will be difficult to decide the mid-one (*madhyamā*). It may be added that *vaikhari* as instrument of manifesting meaning-revealing-language, *madhyamā* as meaning-revealing unit revealed in the mind and *paśyantī* as known by implication (made on the basis of cognition of the meaning-revealing unit) as ontic substratum of *Madhyamā* are accepted reasonably as levels of speech. There is no need to accept the fourth (*Parā*) as a level of speech for the explanation of the world of cognition by language. Logically, middle is one that occupies a position in between a lower and a higher. *Madhyamā* is called so because it occupies the mid position. However, other reasons may also be given but it seems true to say that Bhartṛhari accepts only three levels of speech; he has not accepted *Parā* as a fourth level. But for

consciousness, knowledge is not possible. *Paśyantī*, as consciousness itself, is a pre-requisite of cognition by language. Epistemologically, it is known by implication as the substratum of cognition revealed by language *madhyamā* in the mind in usual communication.

Conclusively, Bhartṛhari does not accept four levels of speech for the aforementioned reasons. However, he is influenced by the Vedic verse to an extent that he quotes the verse in his commentary and accepts the Vedic spirit of *Turiyam vāco Manusyā vadanti*. *Turiya* in all case, stands for a quarter part. In case of Vedāntic concept of *Svapna*, *Jāgrata*, *Suśupti* and *Turiya*, it stands for the upward stage where the stage is one with *Parā*, the supreme and in case of levels of speech, it stands for the down quarter part of gross level (*vaikhari*) which is spoken, written and learnt by men.

Vol. XXII, No. 4

D.N. Tiwari

### Agenda for Research

#### *Puruṣa Sūkta*

The *Puruṣa Sūkta* is one of the most oft-quoted *Sūkta* from the *Rgveda*. Yet, it is little known that there are *other Puruṣa Sūktas* in the other Vedas deriving from it and further enlarging on it. Both the *Vājasaneyī Mādhyandin Samhitā* and the *Kāṇva Samhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* also have the *Puruṣa Sūkta* which significantly adds and enlarges upon the *Puruṣa Sūkta* as given in the 90th *Sūkta* of the Tenth *Maṇḍala* of the *Rgveda* ascribed to a ṛṣi called Nārāyaṇa who strangely is represented in the whole of the *Rgveda* by this *sūkta* only.

The *Adhyāya* 31 of the *Vājasaneyī Mādhyandin Samhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* has six more stanzas added to the original, while the *Kāṇva Samhitā* adds another thirty-two to five in its *adhyāya* 35.

A study of these additions is urgently required to present a different picture of the *actual* relation obtaining between the

different Vedas and that between the different *Śākhās* of the same Veda in the tradition.

The *Rgveda*, then, was *not* considered so sacrosanct that nothing could be altered or added to it. Nor was the text of a particular *śākhā* treated in a different way, as is shown by the *Kāṇvā Samhitā* in the manner in which it deals with the treatment of the *Puruṣa Sūkta* in the *Vājasneyī Samhitā* of its own Veda, i.e. the *Śukla Yajurveda*.

What is even more surprising is to find the same theme treated in the *ādhyāyas* 30 and 32 of the *Vājasaneyī Samhitā* and *ādhyāyas* 34 and 36 of the *Kāṇva Samhitā*. Technically speaking, these are not considered to be *Puruṣa Sūkta* but as they are concerned with the same theme, they may be regarded as such and their treatment contrasted with that found in the original *Puruṣa Sūkta* of the *Rgveda*. In fact, the 30<sup>th</sup> *Ādhyāya* of the *Vājasaneyī Samhitā* concludes with *ābrāhmaṇā asūdrāḥ prājāpatyāḥ* implying that no part of humanity could be excluded because of the fourfold *varṇa* system propounded in the *Rgvedic Puruṣa Sūkta*, perhaps because of a misunderstanding and ignoring the clear message conveyed in the very opening lines of the *Sūkta* which said

" पुरुष एवद् सर्व यद् भूतम् यच्च भव्यम् "

Surprisingly, the *Atharva Veda* also has *Puruṣa Sūkta* in it. The *Śaunaka Samhitā* of the *Atharva Veda* has this *Puruṣa Sūkta* as No: 6 in *Adhyāya* XIX, while the *Paippālada Samhitā* has this a *Sūkta* 5 in its *adhyāya* IX and has two *mantras* less than the *mantra* in the *Rgveda* while the *Paippālada Samhitā* has the same number as those in the *Rgveda*, that is, XVI.

A comparative study of the *Puruṣa Sūkta* in all these *Samhitās* needs to be undertaken and the question why this *sūkta* alone amongst the philosophical-cum-speculative *sūkta* of the *Rgveda* is found in practically all the *Samhitās* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* and

the *Atharva Veda* that we have with us and not, say the *Nāsadiya Sūkta*.

It has to be further investigated whether this *Sūkta* occurs in the *samhitās* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* that we have with us, i.e. the *Taittirīya*, the *Maitrāyaṇī*, the *Kāthaka* and the *Khāṭaka-Kapiṣṭhala* and, if not, why not.

Vol. XXII, No. 3

Daya Krishna

### Focus

#### Epistemology in Sanskrit

Arindam Chakravarti's lectures on Western Epistemology in Sanskrit given at Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati and published under the title "आधुनिक प्रतीच्य प्रमाण मीमांसा" are not only a path breaking exercise in this regard which should be of interest to all philosophers trained in the traditional Sanskrit traditions in this country, but also to all those who know Sanskrit and are interested in philosophy.

This work needs to be translated into English and other regional languages in order to become available to a wider audience in this country.

Vol. XXII, No. 3

Daya Krishna

### Notes and Queries (QAA)

1. Is *Vyāpti* a relation? In case it is so, what is its relation to *Samavāya* which is the only relation accepted in Nyāya?

Would it have to be accepted as a new independent relation in the Nyāya scheme if it cannot be accommodated within *Samavāya*, the only relation accepted in Nyāya at present?

How and in what way would this new relation, if accepted, affect the system?

2. Is *Vyāpti* a transitive relation? If there is a *Vyāpti Sambandha* between, say, *dhūma* and *agni* and *agni* and *uṣṇatā*, would not then there be one between *dhūma* and *uṣṇatā*? This

would entitle us to say 'त्र यत्र धूमः तत्र तत्र उष्णता' which obviously is correct.

Vol. XXII, No. 3

Sapna Gupta

### Agenda for Research

#### Philosophy and Language

'Language' has been the centre of philosophical reflection in recent philosophy, both Anglo-American and Continental. Yet the two approaches have been so different that it is difficult to believe whether they are 'talking' about the same thing. Carnap and Heidegger are two 'extremes' but Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* and the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations* perhaps represent the same contrast coexisting in the same individual.

The 'language of physics' and the 'language of Poetry' are again, perhaps, two extremes. But then, where shall one place the 'language of mathematics' or the 'language or languages of Art' which communicate without words?

Furthermore, what about the 'language of philosophy'? Is Derrida, or any other post-modernist, 'writing' the same way as, say, Russell or Quine or Ryle or Austin or Moore? Are philosophers 'doing' what literary writers did earlier; A Joyce or A kafka; the author of *Finhegan's Wake* or *THE TRIAL*.

And, what has been the centre of attention, 'parole' or 'langue', the 'spoken' or the 'written' word?

The Hermeneutic approach to 'language' is different from all of these and deserves to be contrasted, compared and understood in relation to them.

Does 'language' have a 'hidden' dimension? And does its 'reality' appear in 'conversation', as Rorty and some others have said? Or in 'Dialogue', as perhaps Buber might have said? Or in 'discussion' as Plato might have said?

The Indian 'thinking' on the subject is so vast that it is time to bring the different strands of contemporary thinkers in relation to one another and the 'thinking' that was done in India since Yāska and Pāṇini from the earliest times.

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Daya Krishna

### Focus

#### Saptaṛṣis

*Saptaṛṣis* are well known in the Indian tradition. Yet, their 'story' and the dispute as to who is to be counted and who should be excluded, is hardly known to anybody.

*Traditions of the Seven Ṛṣis* by John Michiner 2000, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, does just this. The tradition, as the book argues, is not one, but many and, at times, even conflicting.

The earliest mention of the seven ṛṣis occurs in the *Rgveda* 9.107 and 10.137. But the manner in which they develop in the *Śrauta Sūtras*, the Brāhmaṇa text, the Epics, the Purānas and the Smṛti texts is little known, or even suspected.

The above book does all this and brings material to light that will surprise even a well-read scholar on the subject. Who would imagine, for example, that there was a persistent and deliberate attempt to bring Bhṛgu, Āngirasa and Agastya into the group? What is even more surprising is to find a tribal ṛṣi named Gungu being brought into the group, if the evidence of the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* (1.2.8) is to be believed.

A different picture of the Vedic period, the ṛṣis and the inter-relationships between them will emerge after a study of this book rather than the one that has been commonly accepted up till now.

The crucial question whether the *saptaṛṣis* are *individuals* or just family lineages, seems not even to have been raised, let alone answered. The problem occurs in the very first formulation in the *Rgveda*. The *sūkta* 9.107 gives the name of individual ṛṣis, the *sūkta* 10.137 gives just the family name, forgetting how *all*

the members of a family known by that name could belong to the group of seven *ṛsis*.

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Daya Krishna

### Notes and Queries

#### *Yoga-sūtra* and *anuyogī-pratīyogī*

1. *Yoga-sūtra* 4.33 uses the term, 'क्षणप्रतियोगी' and seems to say that 'क्रमः' is the 'प्रतियोगी' क्षण '.

What does this exactly mean?

The use of the term 'प्रतियोगी' reminds one of Nyāya and, if it is used in the technical sense, it would mean that the '*anuyogī-pratīyogī*' mode of analysis of verbal cognition is much 'older' than is generally accepted. The date of the *Yoga-Sūtra* is much, much earlier than Udayan with whom Navya Nyāya is now said to begin.

2. Can a '*anuyogī*' have many '*pratīyogī*' and, conversely, can a '*pratīyogī*' have many '*anuyogī*'?

3. Can anything function as a '*pratīyogī*' of everything or there are limits? And, if that is the case, what are the reasons or the criteria on the basis of which 'limits' one imposed. Also, what is the epistemological and ontological significance of this?

4. Conversely, can a '*pratīyogī*' have anything as an '*anuyogī*'? And in case this is not so, what bearing would it have on the Navya Nyāya mode of analysis of sentential meaning or *Śabda-bodha*?

## II

*Sūtra* 4.34, the last of the *Yoga-Sūtra* gives two alternative meanings of कैवल्यं स्वरूपतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति This *destroys* the very foundation of Sāṃkhya as the pure *puruṣa* would have to be accepted as having *śakti* in it, something which may be akin to Kashmir śaivism, but not to Sāṃkhya or Advaita Vedānta?

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Daya Krishna

### Query raised by Prof. Daya Krishna in Discussion Discussion on *Vyāpti* and *Sāmānādhikarāṇya*

I clearly remember your question about *Vyāpti* when I met you at Jaipur. It was about the means of apprehending *Vyāpti*. I also remember that I explained you the Nyāya position. The Nyāya holds that it is the non-apprehension of *Vyabhicāra* irregularity of the connection between the *sādhya* and the *hetu*) associated with the apprehension of co-existence of the two terms. Vishwanatha states: 'व्यभिचारस्याग्रहो ऽथ सहचारगहस्तथा । हेतुव्यासंसिग्रहे .....'

व्यभिचारस्याग्रहो ऽथ सहचारगहस्तथा । हेतुव्यासंसिग्रहे .....'

In case, the doubt about the *Vyabhicāra* continues to haunt then *Tarka* would help the person to ascertain the *Vyāpti*

... तर्कः व्वचित् शडाक्वित्तकः । —*Muktavali Kā* - 137

With regard to *Sāmānādhikarāṇya* of the terms, the Nyāya is of the view that it should be there, invariably. The final definition of *Vyāpti*, formulated by Gaṅgeśa includes *Sāmānādhikarāṇya* in the body of the definition of *Vyāpti*.

'प्रतियोग्यसमानाधिकरणयत्समानाधिकरणाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नं यन्न भवति तेन समं तस्य सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिः ।

However, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Dvaita Vedānta school of Shri Madhva does not include सामानाधिकरण्य in the definition of *Vyāpti*. It contends that the two terms, though not existing in a common locus, can have the relation of *Vyāpti*. Accordingly, it defines *Vyāpti* differently so as to cover ever व्यधिकरण terms.

Vol. XXIII, No. 1

D.Prahlada Char

### Some Notes on *Vyāpti* and *Anekāntavāda*

The question raised is: What is the status of *Vyāpti*, given the theory of *Anekāntavāda*? I have the following comments on the question:

1. I find that the Jaina theory of inference, similar to some other Jaina theories of knowledge, is an *independent* theory, not subject to the scrutiny of *Anekāntavāda*. This is because inference is a *pramāṇa* and all *pramāṇas* deal with the right knowledge of a many-sided thing. [*Pramāṇas* are distinguished from *nayas*] Many-sidedness has already been included in the definition of *Pramāṇa* and, hence, there is no need for a further reference to it in any Jaina theory of perception, inference, *tarka*, etc.

2. Inference is the knowledge of *Sādhyā* through the instrumentality of *Sādhana*. The *vyāpti* is a necessary and universal relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhyā*. In the absence of *Sādhyā* (fire, for example), there is an absence of *Sādhana* (smoke, for example). The non-existence of smoke in the absence of fire is a *necessary* universal relation of *inseparability*, i.e. invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*). *Vyāpti* is a universal necessary relation. It expresses a necessity in the sense of 'must'. Hemacandra defines *Vyāpti* as universal concomitance consisting in the universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events. [It is interesting to note that such propositions relating to definitions of means of knowledge are never prefixed by the word *syāt*.] *Vyāpti* is not acquired by either inference or perception. It is acquired with the help of *tarka*. In discussing the nature of *Vyāpti*, *Anekāntavāda* is not applied by the Jaina logicians to assess the rival positions.

3. Dharmakīrti recognizes only two types of necessary *Vyāpti* relations—causality and essential identity. The Nyāya thinkers regard necessary connections as innumerable and inexhaustible. For example, the rise of the sun on the following morning is necessarily inferred on the basis of its rise on the previous day. [Hume would have been amused by this view.] There are many invariable sequences *not* founded on causality and many relations of simultaneity *not* founded on essential identity. (See Nagin Shah, *Akalanka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy*, 1967.)

4. According to Nagin Shah, the Jaina logicians recognize the following four types of relations in a *Vyāpti*

- Relations of simultaneity based on essential identity.
- Relations of simultaneity which is necessary without any apparent reason.
- Relations of sequence based on causality.
- Relations of sequence which is necessary without any apparent reason. The Jaina view against the Buddhist view is that there can be *non-causal* necessity.

5. In a study of *Syādvāda*, the term *eva* is used in some of the formulae (e.g., *syād asti eva ghataḥ*). If you say, 'The shell is only white' the indicator *eva* here shows that the shell is *invariably* possessed of whiteness. It is similar to *Anvaya-Vyāpti* of Nyāya system. The class of shell is pervaded by the class of things white. [See Nagin Shah; Ed. *Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth*, Delhi, 2000, Chapter 3.]

6. Any Indian theory of necessity is always expressed in ontological proposition. Intuition, *tarka*, etc. are treated as cognitive sources of *real necessity* expressed in *Vyāpti*. The Nyāya and the Jaina thinkers have a wider view of real necessity compared to the Buddhists, who restrict *Vyāpti* to causality or essential identity.

7. For Dharmakīrti, necessary relations are *apriori*. They are due to the mind (*vikalpa-buddhi*). It is not that external things are necessarily related. Only their concepts are related thus.

8. I find that the difficulties related to *Vyāpti* are not due to *Syādvāda*, but due to the Humean problem of Induction. Indians had their own justification of induction *in the absence of a formal theory of deductive validity and also in the absence of a statistical theory of probability*. Rational theory of deductive validity and also in the absence of a statistical justification of *Vyāpti* in the absence of causality or essential identity is a difficult problem, both for the Nyāya thinkers as well for the Jaina thinkers. Some Nyāya thinkers as also some Jaina thinkers posit some

extraordinary experiences in order to grasp necessary connections.

9. Jainas believe that *Vyāpti* is not the result of *anumāna*, but it is established through *tarka*—hypothetical reasoning—which is a valid means of knowledge. If it is false that 'wherever there is smoke there is fire', then it follows that 'there are places where there may be smoke without fire'. This means that there can be effect without cause. If there can be effect without cause, then why should any person who desires smoke seek fire?

10. I distinguish between the *first-order* substantive many-sided Jaina theories and the *second-order* Jaina *meta*-theories. B.K. Matilal considers such a meta-theory as a meta-Metaphysical theory. I would include *Anekāntavāda* and *Nayavāda*, in one sense, as the *meta*-theories applicable *only* to non-Jaina theories. Of course, they are also substantive ontological Jaina theories of *things* when it is claimed that a thing has infinite qualities-aspects and the scheme of seven-fold judgement can be applied to each of these infinite attributes. For example, to say that a thing (a jar) exists with reference to itself or that it does not exist with reference to other things and so on, reveals that all the one-sided claims about the *thing* concerned are inadequate, but the total truth about the things is possible through the famous seven-fold judgments. This is not *relativism* but *collectivism* regarding the truth.

11. *Anekāntavāda* and *Nayavāda*, thus, have a *dual* nature. For example, when you apply *Syādvāda* to thing (e.g., a pot exists from a standpoint x) and say that a *thing is many-sided*, then that claim is a *substantive ontological theory of things*. But if you say that a particular *theory* of causality is true from a certain standpoint, then you have a *theory about theory*—a *meta-theory*. *Kālavāda*, *Niyativāda*, *Swabhavavāda*, *Adṛstavāda* and *Puruṣavāda* are false, if all of the five are taken singly (*Sanmati Tarka*, Chapter 3, Verse 53). They attain perfection only when they are *accommodated, adjusted and arranged* on common grounds of

synthesis. (Gopani, Tr. *Sanmati Tarka*, 2000, Chapter 3, p. 126). Again, it has been claimed that when *Sadvāda* and *Asadvāda* are *adjusted* according to *Anekānta*, the *result* is *Samyag-Darśhana* (*Sanmati Tarka*, Chapter 3, Verse 51).

12. I believe on the basis of such claims that that mostly *Anekāntavāda* and *Nayavāda* function as Jaina second-level cognitive-*processing structures* which transform the *inputs* in the form of the first-level *non-Jaina one-sided substantive theories* into *outputs* in the form of *Jaina many-sided substantive theories*. The output then does not require any *further* processing because it is many-sided and versatile. *Anekāntavāda* is a criterion of evaluating non-Jaina theories. It is a synthesis of partial truths. The whole point of processing was to reject the one-sided theories about the *ontological nature of things*. *Once the ontological nature of things is specified as many-sided, the processing is over*. All *other* Jaina theories regarding perception, *inference, Vyāpti*, Varbal Authority, etc., are straightforward first-order substantive theories applicable within the scope of a many-sided reality. There is no need to say that from a certain standpoint this is *Vyāpti* comprising necessary connection and from another stand-point that this is not so. There is no relativity here. There is also no skepticism or agnosticism, or any doubt or uncertainty. So long as *Vyāpti* operates within ontology of many-sided things, it is valid. No Jaina means of valid knowledge require the scrutiny by the *Anekāntavāda* so long as they corresponds to the many-sided nature of things.

13. In Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarka*, and Abhayadev's commentary on it (as well as in Samantbhadra's *Āptamimāṃsā*), we find many non-Jaina theories listed as one-sided. I refer only to three theories of causation as an example from *Sanmati Tarka*: (1) *Ārambhavāda*; (2) *Pariṇāmavāda*; and (3) Negation of all causality by the absolute monists. These *non-Jaina Ekanta (partially true) theories* are processed through the *meta*-theories of *Nayavāda* and *Syādvāda* and the *resultant substantial* Jaina

theory then says that from a certain standpoint, the effect is definitely pre-existent in its cause and from a certain standpoint the effect is certainly new creation. As per the Jaina many-sided view, Kapila's philosophy is a representation of *Dravyāstika Naya* (viewpoint of substance) and the Buddhist philosophy is an exposition of *pariyāyāstika naya* (the view-point of modes) [*Nayas* are the limited ways of looking at the things.] This type of *intervening meta-theoretical processing* leading to *synthesis* is a standard Jaina procedure of converting some of the *pre-Jaina one-sided theories into particular many-sided Jaina theories*. In such a case, they do not require any further application of *Anekāntavāda*. The Jaina theories themselves need not be further processed through *Anekānta*, because their own *Samyak* theories are not vitiated by one-sidedness. The Jaina theory of *Vyāpti* [or inference or perception] is, therefore, not undermined by its theory of many-sidedness. The Jaina theory of omniscience is not a relative theory at all. There is a *neutral cognitive free-space within Jainism* for a number of theories *autonomous of syādvāda*. The theory of *Vyāpti* is one of them.

14. I believe that *Anekāntavāda* as a *meta-metaphysical* theory is appealed to only when some partial truths of the rival theories have to be accommodated. A theory of the *knowledge* of objects is different from a theory of the *nature* of objects. It has been claimed that non-Jaina theories of the nature of things or the nature of causation are partly true because a thing is *always* many-sided. 'The province of *Anekāntavāda* is to examine the fundamental nature of things, ... the doctrine is mainly directed toward discussing the nature of things and towards bringing out the fundamental characteristics of things' [*Sanmati Tarka*, Tr. Gopāni, pp. 114-15]. Hemacandra defines *pramāṇa* in his *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* as that which is the instrument of authentic cognition—*samyag arthanirṇayaḥ pramāṇam*. He does not even refer to *Anekāntavāda* in his discussion of perception or inference in his *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*. He discusses other non-Jaina definition

of *Pramāṇa*, but he does not refute them with the help of *Anekāntavāda*. Hemacandra says, '*pramāṇasya viṣayo dravyaparyāyāmakam vastu*.' Now here the many-sided nature of reality (*dravyaparyāyātmakam vastu*) as an object of knowledge is stated clearly and that is the end of the matter. In any further analysis of the nature of knowledge, Hemacandra does not bring in *Anekāntavāda* at all. *It would, therefore, imply that the Jaina thinkers are not bound to bring in Anekāntavāda all the time as a method of evaluating all the non-Jaina theories*. Initially, therefore, I would like to maintain that *there is a scope in Jainism for independent Jaina theories which do not have to synthesize partial truths of other systems through Anekāntavāda*. It would be too much to claim that all these theories have some truth in it. A non-Jaina theory of non-many-sided reality, for example, would be totally false. A non-Jaina theory denying omniscience or Jaina *karmavāda* or accepting a traditional creator God cannot be true from a certain viewpoint and false from a certain other viewpoint. Jains have to reject any such theories totally. *Anekāntavāda*, thus, operates *only* when we are considering whether Reality is one or many, eternal or non-eternal, general or particular, etc. There are, thus, two methods of dealing with non-Jaina theories:

- A. Accommodate partly true viewpoints of non-Jaina theories of things *through the application of Anekāntavāda*.
- B. Present the specific Jaina theories and *refute in normal manner* those theories which are not even partially true. Jaina theory of necessary connection in *Vyāpti* is, therefore, not threatened by *Anekāntavāda* because the theory of *Vyāpti* is not a theory of the nature of things but of the nature of relation between things.



## Agenda for Research

### Computer technology

Recent advances in computer technology and 'decoding' of the 'genetic code' raise fundamental questions about the nature of language, a subject on which philosophers have thought since almost the beginning of philosophy.

The translation of languages into a common symbolic code raises the question about 'universals' of language in a new setting.

As these codes are supposed to be applicable not only to actual languages but also to all possible languages, this should result in a reflection on the idea of language itself and what constitutes its essential feature and its relation to the structure of the sound-producing mechanism at the human level and the limits it poses on the production of sounds in which language is necessarily embedded.

Decoding of the genetic code also raises questions of a different sort as it extends the notion of 'language' to something in 'nature' itself; if 'genes' in a living organism are considered to be a part of 'nature'.

What will be the effect of all this on our understanding of the notion of language and meaning, specially as the 'genetic code', is said to 'determine' the maturation and growth of the biological organism with all its diverse qualities that appear, or 'get actualized' in temporal succession as per the 'instructions' that are 'encoded' there.

The larger question—whether everything in nature which is generally identified with is usually called 'matter'—has something analogous to the 'genetic code' in its constitution, if asked would result in a radical rethinking in our understanding of the concept of 'causality' as now it will have to be understood in terms of a 'determinate potentiality' which 'unfolds' itself in time and, hence, 'causality' could only be understood retrospectively by the unfoldment of the actualization that occurs.

This is not exactly a 'return' to Aristotelian teleology but time will also not be 'causality' the way science seems to have understood it after Galileo and Newton.

All this needs to be thought and worked on by all those interested in the nature of 'language' and 'causality' in the light of the 'new' work in these fields.

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Daya Krishna

### Focus

#### Recent works on mathematics and physics

The situation in knowledge is changing so fast that most philosophical thinking which was based on earlier understanding of such foundational areas as mathematics and physics is almost completely obsolete.

Two recent publications—one on mathematics and the other on physics—give evidence of this and, hence, should be of interest to philosophers whose thinking is based on their usual understanding of their fields of knowledge.

The first is *Recent Revolutions in Mathematics* by Albert Stwertka Pub. Franklin Watts, New York, 1987.

The second is *The Constants of Nature* by John D. Barrow, Pub. Vintage Books, New York. 2003.

The commencement of the current understanding of the nature of mathematics arises not only from the acceptance of non-Euclidian geometrics, but also of the idea of 'actuality' of infinity in arithmetic, as articulated in the work of Cantor but at a deeper level—in the increasing obliteration of the distinction between the empirical and the non-empirical in these domains, particularly as geometry reveals the nature of 'formed space' with which all physical objects have to be identical to some extent and hence have its properties as their properties.

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Daya Krishna

## Notes and Queries (QAA)

1. What exactly is meant by a *Śākha* of the Veda? Has each *Śākha* and equal authority, and if there is a conflict, how shall one decide between them?
2. What is the relation between different *Saṁhitās* of the same *Veda*?
3. The *Yajurveda* is supposed to have two main *Śākhās*, the *Śukla Yajurveda* and the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*. But the *Śukla Yajurveda* also has two different *Śākhās* called *Vājasaneyi Madhyāndin Saṁhita* and *The Kanva Saṁhita*. The *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* has at least four *Śākhās* called the *Taittiriya Saṁhita*, the *Kāthaka Saṁhitā*, the *Maitreyāni Saṁhitā* and *Katha Kapisthala Saṁhitā*.

What is the relation between these different *śākha* texts to the *Rgveda*, of which we have only one *sākha* text available with us at present?

What is the authority of the *Rgveda* for these other Vedas? The *Purūṣa Śukta* (10.90), for example, is repeated in the other Vedas with addition and/or modification. *Vājasneyi Saṁhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda*, for example, has six more *mantrās* added to the *Purūṣa Śukta* of the *Rgveda* while the *Kānva Saṁhitā* has another thirty two added to those of the *Vājasneyi saṁhitā* in it.

The *Atharvaveda*, both in its *Śaunka* and *Paippalāda Śākhās*, also has the *Purūṣa Śukta*, but with some modification in it.

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Response to the Query Published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XXIII, No.1

I. क्षण प्रतियोगि -

1. As per the *Vārtikakāra* (Vijñānabhikṣu) of *Yogabhāṣya*, प्रतियोगि means the opponent. As such क्षण प्रतियोगि means that which opposes, i.e., which is uninterrupted even by a moment. The chain of changes, which is uninterrupted even by a moment, is called.

(क्षणप्रतियोगि - क्षणस्य अवसरस्य विरोधी क्षणेनाप्यन्तरित इति यावत्। एवं रूपोऽत्र क्रमः विवक्षितः न पौर्वापर्यमात्रम् )

2. As per Bhoja, क्षणप्रतियोगि means something other than क्षण (क्षण विलक्षणः). The sequence lies on a chain of moments, and will be known after the last stage of *Parinama* [change]. Here the word प्रतियोगि can be interpreted as आधेय as per convention 'आधाराः अनुयोगिनः आधेयाः प्रतियोगिनः' - Here the क्षण is आधार and the क्रम is आधेय as such क्रम is प्रतियोगि of क्षण. It is to be noted here that the क्षण means not only one moment, but a group of moments (क्षण प्रचय).

II. There is no such restriction on number of अनुयोगि and-प्रतियोगि one अनुयोगि can have many प्रतियोगि and vice versa, for example, या कुन्देन्दु तुषार हार धवला - here कुन्द, इन्दु, तुषार, हार all प्रतियोगि here and सरस्वती is अनुयोगि-

III. When two objects are cognized as related, with a connection element, then one will be called as प्रतियोगि and the other one will be called as अनुयोगि. In other words, one is निरूपक and the other one is आश्रय for that connecting element, for example, take सादृश्य (similarity). The *Upamāna* is प्रतियोगि and *Upameya* is अनुयोगि.

## Sutra-4-34 of the Yoga Sūtra

पुरुषार्थयशून्यानाम् गुणानाम् प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यम्। कृतकर्तव्यतया अर्थात् कर्तव्यस्य निशेषतया पुरुषार्थशून्यताः प्राप्तानां कार्यकारणात्मकानां गुणानां सांख्यमतेन महदादि प्रकृतिकृतीनां प्रतिप्रसवः यथाक्रम अव्यक्ते विलयः ततश्च प्रकृते केवलत्वेनावस्थानं कैवल्यम्।

Due to accomplishing what is to be done, the instruments of the activity of *Prakṛti* are absorbed in one's own cause. Then *Prakṛti* is isolated. This isolation of *Pradhāna* is called कैवल्य.

As per the above description, the कैवल्य is not in *puruṣa*, but is in *prakṛti*. Then the question arises: what is the form of *Puruṣa* then?

The answer is 'स्वरूप प्रतिष्ठा चित्तिशक्ति' The power of consciousness stay in its own form, due to lack of relation with बुद्धि This is called कैवल्य of पुरुष.

In this *sūtra*, two types of कैवल्य are mentioned. One is related to प्रकृति and another one related to *Puruṣa* : the कैवल्य of प्रकृति remains isolated. The कैवल्य of पुरुष गुणा of is the consciousness in its own form, due to non-relation with गुणो or प्रकृति.

As per the above description, it is to be noted that the *Śakti* is *puruṣa* and not *Śakti* is in *puruṣa*. So, there is no clash with any other tradition.

There is another reading for this *sutra*, i.e., स्वरूप प्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तेः This reading is accepted by Bhoja. It is made clear that *purusa* is nothing then consciousness in its own form, which is called the कैवल्य.

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K.V. Ramkrishnanacharya

### Agenda for Research

#### Computer language and universal language

The indefinite multiplicity of language and their relation to what may be called 'language in general' or 'universal language' has always been a problem for philosophers and linguists alike.

The recent development of Computer-language that tries to translate all languages into a common base suggests a possible answer to the problem which seems almost impossible, that is, of finding its solution in the traditional framework of thinking on the subject.

The nature of this translatability has to be extensively investigated in order to find whether the success of the translation is confined to mathematical and scientific language alone or it extends to all language something which seems *prima facie* impossible as it would mean that the analogical, 'symbolic', metaphorical and innovative aspect of language can also be successfully translated into a common language.

There is also the question of the impossibility of translation raised by Quine in his *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* and also the

contention that the 'sense' of different expressions, even in the same language, remains essentially different even when their reference is identical—a contention associated with the name of Frege in recent philosophy.

There is also the problem of quantification without which, strictly speaking, a sentence cannot have 'truth-value' as it is only a 'sentential function' and not a proper sentence, according to modern logic.

There is also the problem of 'completeness' and 'consistency' of any system of 'signs' which demands a special 'openness' of all systems, rendering their claim to be a 'system', only 'apparent' and not 'real'.

The development of computer language or languages, thus, challenges philosophers to think about language in a new way and move beyond the way language has been thought about in the Anglo-American or continental philosophy upto now.

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Daya Krishna

### Focus

#### Post-modernism

Post-modernism is in fashion these days and has been so far quite some time, yet most people trained in philosophical thinking, as it has been done in the past, find it difficult to 'understand' or make 'sense' of it as it seems that, according to it, there can be no such thing as 'understanding', for there cannot be a 'thing' with 'self identify', if time is accepted as 'real'. And, if there is no identity, there can be 'nothing' to understand either.

Two recent books may be of great help in making 'sense' of this philosophical movement with some success in spite of the 'seeming impossibility' of the task as, according to post-modernism, and claim to understand is bound to be mistaken, if there can be no understanding, in principle, if there is, and can be, 'nothing' to understand.

The first book, entitled *Post-modernism A Very Short Introduction* by Charitopher Butler, Oxford University Press. Now Delhi, 2006, pp.142, Rs. 150, tries to draw attention to the history and the phenomenon of post-modernism and its relation to developments in art and literature in the twentieth century, especially as it developed in France during this period.

The larger volume *Companion to Foucault* edited by Gary Gutting, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, pp.465, tries to define the same picture from a different angle which highlights the concern with 'unreason', or the 'irrational' or the 'anti-rational' in human reality and suggests that this is perhaps as important, or even more so than its understanding in term of 'pure reason' as philosophers have tried to do for more than two millennia uptil now.

It attacks the centrality of Logos or Reason perhaps in a more fundamental manner, as it shifts out focus not only on the phenomena of madness, violence, violation of legal and moral norms but also on sexuality where not Logos, but Eros reigns supreme.

Reason, as Freud said, is 'rationalization' or, as Marx said, 'The ruling ideas of civilization are the ideas of its ruling class',  
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Daya Krishna

### Notes and Queries (QAA)

- A.1. Is Husserl's notion of the non-sensuous intuition of 'Eidatic Essences' compatible with his contention that all that is apprehended as 'object' or as 'objective' is to be seen as 'constituted' by the 'intending acts' of the 'Transcendental Ego'?
2. Is the 'phenomenological reduction' or 'bracketing' a 'suspension' of the 'natural-empirical' attitude or 'denial' of it?
3. Is the 'phenomenological reduction' or 'bracketing' in Husserl's phenomenology only of the 'natural' empirical

'attitude', or does it extend to any and every 'object' seen and felt as objectively given and as 'independent' of the consciousness that apprehends it to be so?

4. Is the transcendent subject also 'bracketed' along with the 'transcendent object' and, if so, why is 'transcendental subjectivity' alone found in Husserl's thought and not 'transcendental objectivity', particularly as consciousness, for Husserl, is always an intending consciousness where 'what is intended', should in principle be as important and "equal" in status' as that which 'intends', if 'intends', if the reduction has to have reciprocity and symmetry in it.
- B. The distinction between *bhoga-yoni* and *karma-yoni* is central to the doctrine of *karma* in the Indian belief about action. But, in case it is so, the *bhogyā-yonis*-including those of the gods-living being and 'beings of all the other world' would have had to come into being later than 'human beings' as they alone are said to be born in them to 'reap' the 'fruits' of the good or the bad deed which they committed as 'human beings' in the human world.

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Daya Krihshna

### Reply to Notes and Queries in XXXIII-1

#### Reply 2

#### *Ksana-pratiyogi*

I looked again into Vācaspati's commentary on Vyāsa concerning the expression *kṣaṇa-pratiyogi*. I had thought, as I had told you, that Vāchaspati can be understood as trying to accommodate here the use of the word *pratiyogi* in the Nyāya sense of the *pratiyogi* of an *abhāva*. Looking again at Vācaspati, I found that this was not so. Vācaspati understands *pratiyogi* as *pratisambandhi*, taking *yoga* in the sense of connection: The *upasarga, prati*, seems to indicate a series of connections, such as a sequence, a *krama*, which is an aggregate of *kṣaṇas, kṣaṇa-dracava*, requires.

Let me quote Vācaspati himself. On *sūtra*, 4,33 of the *Pātañjalayogasūtrāni* which, reads, *kṣaṇapratiyogī pariṇāma-parantanirgrahyah kramah*, Vācaspati (on the basis of Vyāsa), says *pariṇāmākramah kṣaṇapratiyogī kṣaṇah pratisambandhi yāsyā sā tathoktah. kṣaṇapracayāśraya ityārtha*. What is said here by Vācaspati may be translated as follows: 'A sequence-leading to parināma or an end-effect, is a series consisting of one *kṣaṇa* interconnected with another (literally : where a *ksana* is a *pratiyogī*, that is a *pratisamabandhi*, of depends on an aggregate-*pratiyogī*, that is a *pratisamabandi*, of another). The meaning is that a sequence leading to *pariṇām* depends on an aggregate-*prachaya*-of *ksanas*.

The passage quoted here shows that *pratiyogī* and its equivalent *pratisambandī* stand for a series of interdependent connections. There is no suggestion hear (or further in Vācaspati's comments on the *sūtra*) of the Nyāya use of *pratiyogī*, as related to *abhāva*. Earlier in *sūtra*, 3,17, we find the word *pratiyogī* used (by Vyāsa) in a similar sense. The context is the connection between *varṇās* (syllables or phonemes) in a sequence that forms a *padā* (a word). Here, to, Vācaspati translates *pratiyogī* as *pratisamabandī* (I refer to Ānandāśrama Granthāvalī, granthāṅka 47, an edition of the *Yogasutrās* published in 1987).

However, let me outline for you the possible meaning that I had earlier thought, as suggested by Vācaspati. A past *kṣaṇa* is no longer there. as I know it, it is already past. It is there as an *abhāva*. But it exists in my awareness, otherwise I could not speak of a *kṣaṇa*. Therefore, I could say that the *kṣaṇa* in my awareness of it is the *pratiyogī* of an *abhāva*. And it is with such *pratiyogis* that I am able to speak of sequence of *kṣaṇas* and to collect them into a *krama*. In fact, if a *kṣaṇa* can be known to exist, it can only exist in this manner: as the *pratiyogī* of an *abhāva*.

This is what I had thought that Vācaspati suggests as an alternative meaning of *pratiyogī* in the context. But he does not. I can still say that this is a possible meaning, whether Vācaspati suggests it or not. But I am not sure if this small *kṣaṇika* thought can be made into anything significant. What it implies is an understanding of the world in an entirely *abhāva* oriented sense in terms of *pratiyogīs* that exist in *jñāna* alone. This goes totally against the spirit of Nyāya. And, personally also, I am unable to see how this can lead thought in any new meaningful direction.

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Mukund Lath

### Agenda for Research

#### History of Human Knowledge

Knowledge-human knowledge-is *not* something 'given', something that has always been there, something eternally 'true', the same as it ever *was* and is, and *will be*. Nor is there any such thing as just 'knowledge' but rather, as everyone knows, knowledge is always of something, of 'this' or 'that' and, what is perhaps even more important, does not consist of isolated, atomic statements 'mirroring' atomic facts, but instead, forms a 'system' and is thus systematic in character.

The 'system' however, is not 'pre-give' but 'created' by man at some time in the past. Each systematic body of knowledge of some particular class of objects, claiming to be such has, thus, a *history* and to be 'seen' in this perspective. A 'historical product', a 'creation' of the collective effort of generations over time, and yet still only half-built, waiting and demanding to be built, extended modified, changed and renewed further.

What we need, therefore, *is not an Archaeology of knowledge, but a History of the Knowledge-enterprises of mankind*, their genesis, formation, maturation, diversification, proliferation, saturation, senescence and disappearance or just kept as *Mummified Presence* for record and curiosity.

Formation of disciplines, discourse, sastra are historical events of epoch-making importance just as is the event of their 'disappearing' and the 'rising' of *New Ones*.

The present seems to be an *Age of Transition* when strange New Disciplines are staking their claims to capture the centre-stage of knowledge. The formation of 'disciplines' during the last three hundred years or so, and their 'struggle' for achieving the prestigious status of being considered as 'science' and 'officially' accepted as such in the major 'established' centers of Learning such as Oxford or Cambridge In England is conveniently forgotten. The problem of 'status-recognition', however, still haunts the 'new' disciplines, or at least those which like to claim themselves as such. Commerce is an obvious example, sharing the same problems as the 'Social Sciences' did earlier. The emerging fields of Artificial Intelligence, cognitive Sciences, Cyberology and Computer Science repeat the same story, just as do the multi-disciplinary, inter-disciplinary, cross-disciplinary studies 'questioning' not just the notion of 'discipline' but *also* the idea of 'knowledge' *enshrined and embodied* in the notion of 'discipline' or 'science' or *sastra itself*.

Engineering and technology institutes, in a certain sense, had already done this. But *now* the tables are turned and that which was 'secondary' had become primary and what is perhaps even worse, is overtaken and surpassed in prestige and status by some thing which has never been considered as 'knowledge', that is 'administration' or 'management' be it 'business' or public, or otherwise.

The ideas and ideals of 'discipline' *sastra* and 'knowledge' are at stake, and so also is the notion of 'Truth' by which Man has lived uptill now. It is time that those who are supposed to 'think', about this and 'write' and involve others in 'thinking' consideration of 'things' that are happening around them and that, at least *prima-facie*, seem to endanger all that man has cherished and 'built' till now.

## Focus

## K.C. Bhattacharyya

K.C. Bhattacharyya is a well-known name amongst philosophers who have thought 'originally' within the Indian tradition at the beginning of the twentieth century and yet there has hardly been a full-length study of his work, except perhaps that of Dr. K.L. Sharma of the University of Rajasthan whose Dissertation entitled '*Subjectivity and Absolute*' was published in the year 1986. Pub. Alekh Prakashan, M.I. JAIPUR

But the most comprehensive and detailed study of K.C. Bhattacharyya's thought, as it developed during the entire period of his long life, has been attempted in detail in an Introduction by George Bosworth Burch in a volume '*Search for the Absolute in Neo-Vedanta*' published by the University press of Hawaii, Honolulu, in 1976.

The *Introduction* deserves to be noticed for continuity and development of K.C. Bhattacharyya's thought, including some radical changes in it as it developed from *The Subject as Freedom* to '*The Absolute and It's Alternative Forms*' to '*The Concept of Philosophy*' and even later.

Burch writes about the three phases of K.C. Bhattacharyya's thought. 'Philosophical reflection', K.C. Bhattacharyya said, begins with the existence of what is given in experience. By logic we discover interpretations of the given, recognized as possibilities and from these other possibilities are derived. In the realm of possibility, which is the domain of logic, there is no affirmation. The basic logical category is negation, including double, triple, and quadruple negation, by which novel possibilities are developed equally possible but incompatible. Any possibility may become actual, but conflict among actuals is resolved by recognizing them as alternatively actual. Possibility and actuality are themselves alternative attitudes. Underlying such

dialectic is the linguistic analysis of the common structure of the possibilities, a study which analyzes the 'mere forms' of semantic thought and the 'pure forms' of syntactic thought. Both the logical and the linguistic analyses were elaborated in an involved dialectic, but neither was systematized. (P.51)

In this later period Bhattacharyya seems to have thought not only of the negation of the 'transcendental subjectivity' (indicated by the word 'I') by the *Brahman*, but also of other negations leading to other alternatives.

The Introduction also mentions Kalidas Bhattacharyya's own development of K.C. Bhattacharyya's thought in a different direction in his well-known work 'Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy'. But he does not do only this, but also reports about a further development in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's thought where he talks of 'Cross alternation'.

Kalidas Bhattacharyya seems to have extended the idea of alternation even further in an Article entitled 'Alternative Forms of Politics'. (*Calcutta Review*, 3rd Series 86 (1943), 37.

The Introduction, thus, opens a whole new dimension of K.C. Bhattacharyya and Kalidas Bhattacharyya's thought which has hardly been paid attention uptill now and needs to be developed further.

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Daya Krishna

## Notes and Queries

### Reply 3

Reply to Query by Daya Krishna on *anuyogi* and *pratiyogi* published in *JICPR XXIII* No. 1. With regard to your queries about '*pratiyogi* and *anuyogi*,' I have to say the following:

1. The terms *Pratiyogin* has been variously translated into English as counter-positive, counter-entity, absentee, and adjunct. Among these, I feel the word counter-entity is more appropriate. Any relational object has a *pratiyogin*. Absence (*abhāva*), similarity (*sādṛśya*), conjunction (*samyoga*) and such

other relations, sequences (*Krama*), etc., are such relational entities (*sa-sambandhika-padārtha*). Hence, all these objects have a *pratiyogi* without the awareness of which, the relational entity cannot be cognized. For instance, if somebody states 'there is an absence here', the question 'absence of what?' would naturally arise. In the same manner, *sādṛśya samyoga*, etc., relational entities also are necessarily *sapratyogika* i.e., they have a *pratiyogi*. *Candra-sādṛśya* (similarity with the moon) has the moon as its *pratiyogi* and *Ghata-samyoga* (conjunction with the jar) has the jar as its *pratiyogin*.

Now, it is obvious that only relational entities such as the mentioned above, have a counter-entity and non-relational entity does not possess the same. Cognition of a non relational entity does not necessarily need the awareness of something else. We can have perceptual, inferential or verbal cognition of jar which unlike absence or similarity, etc., is a non-relational entity.

The term *anuyogi*, on the other hand, has two meanings. One meaning in *āśarya* (locus). Thus, for the absence of jar (*ghatābhāva*), while *ghata* is the *pratiyogin*, the locus of it, for instance *bhūtala*, is the *anuyogin*. Similarly, *Candra-sādṛśya* has the moon as its *pratiyogin* and the locus of it, 'the face', as its *anuyogin*. According to the other meaning which is more technical, the object which has a *pratiyogi*, itself is *anuyogi*. Thus, in the case of *ghatābhāva*, *ghata* is the *pratiyogi* and the *abhāva* itself is the *anuyogi*. Similarly, in the case of *Candra-sādṛśya*, *Candra* is the *pratiyogin* and the *sādṛśya* is the *anuyogin*.

Thus, the Nyaya ontology recognizes certain terms such as *pratiyogī-anuyogi* which are required to explain relational entities (*sa-sambandhika-padārtha*). They do not have any epistemological significance. Just as we make use of these terms while analyzing a verbal cognition of *ghatābhāva*, we may also make use of the same terms to analyze the perceptual or inferential cognition of *ghatābhāva*.

2. When we refer to the absence of a single jar, then the absence which is the *anuyogī*, has that single jar only as its *pratiyogī*. On the other hand, if the reference is to the absence of all the jars, all the jars are the *pratiyogins* of that single absence. Thus, one *anuyogin* can have depending upon the context only one as its *pratiyogin* or many. The other question was : Whether many *anuyogins* can have a single *pratiyogī*? If we consider the case of an absence, for instance, 'The absence of jar', the answer is no. For, according to the Naiyāyika, the absence of a thing, present in different loci, is not different. The absence of a particular jar, present in different places, is one and the same. For there is no evidence to hold that it is different in each of its locus. 'Adhikāraṇabhēdena abhāvabhēde pramāṇabhāvāt.' Thus, in the case of an absence, irrespective of the situation of its *pratiyogī* being many or single, the absence-the *anuyogī* is always one. However, we cannot generalize that in all the cases of *pratiyogī-anuyogī* mode, *anuyogin* is one. Because in the instances of *sadrśya* where *pratiyogī-anuyogī* mode exists; it may be the case that one object is the *pratiyogin* of many *anuyogins*. For example, suppose one finds many faces, say ten, resembling the moon, then all the ten faces have the *sādrśya* of the single moon. Thus *pratiyogin*, the moon, in this case, is only one. But the *anuyogī*-the *sādrśya*, present in these ten faces-cannot be, as per the Naiyāyika, held as the same one. For, *sādrśya* being of the nature of certain features-*tadgata-bhuyodharmavattva*-has to be accepted as different, in each of its locus. It cannot be the case that the same certain features exist in different places. Thus, the moon-the *pratiyogī* of the *sādrśya* while is one, the *anuyogin*-the *sādrśya* present in many places-are different. Thus, *sādrśya* is a case of *pratiyogī-anuyogī* mode, wherein one single *pratiyogī* has many *anuyogins*.

3. In the *Yogasūtra Kṣaṇapratyogī pariṇamāparant-anirgrāhyah kramah*-*krama* is defined. *Krama* is sequence. For instance, mud has different states occurring in a sequence. First, it was a lump.

Then it took the shape of a jar. When it broke into two pieces, it is its *Kapalāvastha*. Further, when it was further crushed, it attained the state of being very small pieces-*Cūrṇāvasthā*. This *krama* of the various *pariṇamās* modifications in the mud, the *yogasūtra* says-can be realized only by that person who was able to grasp the two extreme ends, *pūrvānta* and *aparānta*, the two moments in which *pindāvasthā* and *cūrṇāvasthā* take place. Here, the two moments are called *pratiyogī*, rather in a different sense. The commentary, here explains the term *pratiyogī* as *nirūpaka* i.e., that which facilitates the understanding. Since, the awareness of the two moments at the extreme ends facilitate the understanding of the *krama*, the *krama* is considered as *kṣaṇa pratiyogī*-having the *kṣaṇās* as *pratiyogins*-the *nirūpakas*.

I hope this explanation will clarify the points that you have raised.

Vol. XXIII, No.4

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D.Prañcada Char

### Agenda for Research

#### Globalization, Post-modernism and World Peace

Globalization is phenomenon, economic, political, technological and both militant and 'militaristic', affecting every country and 'people' in the world today.

Post-modernism is the 'intellectual fashion' of the day, the 'brand' name that distinguishes those who are young and 'with' it, and 'in' it, from those who are not.

Yet, the relation between the two remains unexplored and unexamined. If everything 'universal' and 'objective' is out; if all 'reason' meta-narrative and 'value' are 'suspect', then what else shall this 'force' be? The arbitrator between groups, nations, cultures and civilizations?

Is 'Post-modernism' an invitation to abdicate all 'responsibility' for 'thought' and 'action' in the face of the 'New Imperialism' of 'Globalization' or a challenge to think and deal with it in a different way?.



At another level, what is the relation of post-modernism to problems of peace? Or does it have no relation to them?

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Daya Krishna

### Notes and Queries (QAA)

1. Is there a difference between *Upapatti* and *anumāna* in Indian thinking on inference?

In case there is, what is the ground for this difference? Ramānuja uses the term *anuppatti* in his *Saptavidhā Anuppatti*, wherein he has argued against Advaitic arguments and urged that the arguments fail to establish what they try to establish.

2. Does the *Nyāya Sūtra* give arguments to prove the existence of the *Śarira*, the *indriyās*, the *manas*, the *buddhi* and the *ātman*? In case it does, what is that which it assumes as 'Unproved' for proving these, and what is the *pramāṇa* it uses to prove them?

3. What is the relation between different *pramāṇās* accepted by Nyāya? Are they independent of one another, or do some of them presuppose others?

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Daya Krishna

### Appendix 2

#### *Purusa Sukta*—An Analysis

An attempt is made here for students and young researchers to see how in one of the ways the issues raised by Prof. Daya Krishna in the item of *Agenda for Research* of Vol. XXII(3) related to *Purusa Sukta (Purusa-sukta)*, which was later on reformulated by him in the form of queries in *Notes and Queries* of Vol. XXIII(2), and other volume of *JICPR* can be further explored, expanded and answered. This is an attempt to see how the discussion of item of the above-mentioned sections of the *Journal* can be developed further by extending the different dimensions of the issues raised, enhanced further by exploring the possible answer and by adding some relevant references, making some observations, giving comparisons, citing similar views or raising parallel issues so that the analysis given here may be helpful in answering the queries and expanding the wisdom underlined in the item of *Agenda for Research* and of *Notes and Queries*. In Section I of this Appendix attention of researchers is drawn to the contention of the item of *Agenda for Research* of Vol. XXII (3). The major contentions of it is given in number (i) to (vii) by citing quotations. Section II deals in brief with the issue expressed in above-mentioned quotation number (vii). In section III of this Appendix an elaborate analysis is given to substantiate and further explore the issues involved in the first half of the contention of (i) and (iv). For this, observation and comparative discussion and analysis, including citing quotations from other relevant resources, are given. The further references and analysis given in this section may also give a clue to partial answer to the issues raised in the contentions of the second half of the quotation of (i) and (iv).

(i) "The *Purusa Sukta* is one of the most oft-quoted *Sukta* from the *Rgveda* (*Rg-Veda*). Yet, it is little known that there are other *Purusa Suktas* in the other Vedas deriving from it and further enlarging on it."

(ii) "The *Adhyaya* 31 of the *Vajasaneyi Madhyandin Samhita* of the *Shukla Yajurveda* has six more stanzas added to the original, while the *Kanva Samhita* adds another thirty-two to five in its *Addhyaya* 35."

(iii) "A study of these additions is urgently required to present a different picture of the *actual* relation obtaining between the different Vedas and that between the different *Sakhas* of the same Veda in the tradition."

(iv) "The *Rgveda*, then, was *not* considered so sacrosanct that nothing could be altered or added to it. Nor was the text of a particular *sakha* treated in a different way, as is shown by the *Kanva Samhita* in the manner in which it deals with the treatment of the *Purusa* in the *Vajasaneyi Samhita* of its own Veda i.e., the *Sukla Yajurveda*."

(v) "A comparative study of the *Purusa Sukta* in all the *Samhitas* needs to be undertaken and the question why this *sukta* alone amongst the philosophical-cum-speculative *sukta* of the *Rgveda* is found in practically all the *Samhitas* of the *Shukla Yajurveda* and the *Atharva Veda* that we have with us and not, say the *Nasadiya Sukta*."

(vi) "It has to be further investigated whether this *sukta* occurs in the *samhitas* of the *Krishna Yajurveda* that we have with us i.e. the *Taittiriya the Maitrayani*, the *Kathaka* and the *Kathaka-Kapisthala* and, if not, why not "

(vii) "What is even more surprising is to find the same theme treated in the *adhyayas* 30 and 32 of the *Vajasaneyi Samhita* and *adhyayas* 34 and 36 of the *Kanva Samhita*. Technically speaking, these are not considered to be *Purusa Sukta* but as they are concerned with the same theme, they may be regarded as such and

their treatment contrasted with that found in the original *Purusa Sukta* of the *Rgveda*."

## II

The issue raised in (vii) regarding the contrast between the words used in *mantra* 22, the last *mantra*, of *Shukla Yajurveda's Vajasaneyi Madhyandin (V.M)* of Chapter 30, and the *mantra* 11 of *Purusa Sukta* of *Kanva* and *Vajasaneyi Madhyandin Samhita* ( which is the *mantra* 6 of the same *Sukta* of *Atharvaveda (Atharva-Veda) Samhita* and *mantra* 12 of *X/90 of Rgveda (Rg-Veda) Samhita* ) has not been focused here in detail as it deals with a much discussed issue relating to Indian Vedic social thoughts and needs a separate monograph. However, research students if interested in Vedic roots of Indian sociological thoughts can consider last *mantra* of *V.M* of Chapter 30, and analysis of few points given here in brief. Firstly, it seems that the preceding and the succeeding *Adhyayas* of the *Purusa Sukta adhyaya* of both the recensions of *Samhitas* other than *Suklayajurveda (Shukla-Yajurveda)* are not directly dealing with the same theme as it deals with the themes in *adhyayas* 30 and 32 of the *Vajasaneyi Samhita* and *adhyayas* 34 and 36 of the *Kanva Samhita*. Secondly, it seems that the contrast in the views of the words "*Asudra Abrahmanastei Prajapatyaha*" expressed in the end of the last *mantra of the Adhyayas* which is preceding *Adhyayas* of the *Purusa Sukta adhyaya* of both the recensions of *Suklayajurveda*, and the views expressed in the *mantra* "X/90/12" is apparent. The former be understood in the light of the context of the group of words "*magadha, punschallye kitabah, klibah*", occurred subsequently after "*Asudra Abrahmanastei Prajapatyaha*". It seems that the socio-cultural consequences which are result of misunderstanding of *Purusa Sukta mantra* of 12 of *X/90* relating to genesis of social thought of *Varna genesis* may have led the *rsi* to compile this *mantra* as the last *mantra* of Chapter 30. The *mantra* 12 of *X/90*, which is developed later in Vedic literature in *Dharma-Sutra* and *Smrti* text like *Manusmrti*, as every one knows suggests a way of maintaining order for proper functioning of society. The seeming

hierarchy expressed here among human beings is based on the skill/efficiency/aptitude of a person in accordance with which the individuals can choose a profession. The above-mentioned *Asudra Abrahmanastei Prajapatyaha* words of *mantra 22* of *Adhyaya 30* on the contrary seems to be a value based distinction of opposites of superiority-inferiority based on not performing or performing one's duties in a required way. One can say that the distinction is based in terms of a person's virtuous - vicious actions. Thus a *Brahman* may become a *Abrahman*, if does not discharge his assigned duties in a required way. In both the contexts the basic insights of *Purusa-Sukta*, expressed in *mantra 2* of the *Purusa Sukta: Purusa Evedam Sarvam* ..., remains intact as *mantra 2* is a statement about the basic metaphysical identity among all existing things of past, present or future while the contention of *mantra X/90/12* ( occurred as *mantra 11 Adhyayas 31 and 35*, and as *mantra 6 of 9.5 and of 19* ), and the words or class concepts "*Asudra Abrahmanastei* " used in the *mantra 22* of *Suklayajurveda* are made at the empirico- socio - psychological level. If so one can think that the compilation of *Suklayajurveda Samhita* is even later to the compilation of *X/90* of *Rgveda Samhita*. However, one can also think that this picture of society or Indian thought in general is counter to the upholders of the thesis of rational, metaphysico-socio-moral evolutionism. Researchers can explore the similar views regarding division of the work for maintaining and regulating society in the writings of *Suttapitaka* or in *angas-upanga* of the *Sramana* tradition, and can compare them with the Vedic views of chapter 30 of *Suklayajurveda Samhita*. Students can also compare the basic vision of society of *Samhita* with the current picture, of the professions with innumerable specializations and the corresponding division of the work, of a multi-national high-tech societies in general and of India in particular.

## III

With regard to the issue raised in (i) regarding the frequently quoted *Purusa Sukta* of *Rgveda Samhita*, it seems that it is probably from *Sakal* recension of the *Rgveda Samhita*, and is given in the

*mandal X, Adhyaya 7th, sukta 90* with the total numbers of the *mantra* (stanza /verse) as 16. In one of the compilations of these *mantras* of *Rgveda* they are not given in *mandal X* but are given in the *astaka* mode and divided in the following three *Varga* :

*Saptadaso* (17), *Astadaso* (18), and *Ekovinsho* (19) where the *Varga 17* consists of the *X/90 Purusa Sukta mantras 1-5*, *Varga 18* consists of *Purusa Sukta mantra 6 -10*, and *Varga 19* consists of the *mantras 11-16*, and are given below in an hand written mode:

॥अथत्रकसंहिताप्रथमाष्टकप्रारंभ॥

सहस्रशीर्षेतिपोळशचौष्टंसूक्तं नारायणःपुरुषोनुष्टुबंत्याष्टिप् ॥

सहस्रशीर्षापुरुषःसहस्राक्षःसहस्रपात् ।

सभूमिविश्वतोवृत्तात्यतिष्ठदृशांगुलं ॥

पुरुषऽएवेदंसर्वयद्भूतंयच्चभवं ।

उतामृतत्वस्येशानोयदन्नेनातिरोहति ॥

एतावानस्यमहिमतोज्यायांश्चपुरुषः ।

पादो स्यविश्वाश्रूतानिऋषादस्यामृतदिवि ॥

ऋषादूर्ध्वऽउदैत्पुरुषः पादोस्येहाश्रवत्पुनः ।

ततोविष्वङ्कामत्साशनानशनेऽअश्रि ॥

तस्माद्दिरालजायतविराजोऽअधिपुरुषः ।

सजातोऽअत्यरिच्यतपश्चाद्भूमिमथोपुरः ॥17 ॥

यत्पुरुषेणहविषादेवायज्ञमतन्वत ।

वसंतोऽअस्यासीदाज्यंघ्रीष्मऽइधमःशरद्भुविः ॥

तंयज्ञंबर्हिषिप्रौक्षन्पुरुषंजातमग्रतः ।

तेनदेवाऽअयजंतसाव्याऽऋषयश्चये ॥

तस्माद्यज्ञात्सर्वहुतः सश्रुतंपृषदाज्यं ।

पशूतांश्चकेवायव्यानारण्यान्ग्राम्याश्चये ॥

तस्माद्यज्ञात्सर्वहुतऽऋचः सामोनिजज्ञिरे ।

छंदांसिजज्ञिरेतस्माद्यजुस्तस्मादजायत ॥  
 तस्मादश्वाऽअजायंतयेकेचोश्रयादतः ।  
 गावोहजज्ञिरेतस्मात्तस्माज्जाताऽअजावयः ॥118 ॥  
 यत्पुरुषं व्यदधुः कविधाव्यकल्पयन् ।  
 मुखं किमस्य कौबाहूकाऽऊरूपादाऽउच्येते ॥  
 ब्राह्मणोस्य मुखमासीद्ब्राह्मण्यः कृतः ।  
 ऊरूतदस्यद्वैश्वः पद्भ्यांशूद्रोऽअजायत ॥  
 चंद्रमामनसो जातश्चक्षुः सूर्योऽअजायत ।  
 मुखादिंद्रश्चाग्निश्च प्राणाग्निश्च जायत ॥  
 नाभ्यांऽआसीदंतरिक्षं शीर्ष्णोऽघौ सममवर्तत ।  
 पद्भ्याभूमिर्दिशः श्रोत्रात्तथालोकाऽअकल्पयन् ॥  
 सप्तास्यास न्परिधयस्त्रिःसप्तमसमिधः कृताः ।  
 देवायद्यज्ञं तन्वानाऽअबध्नन्पुरुषं पशुं ॥  
 यज्ञेन यज्ञमयजंत देवास्तानि धर्माणि प्रथमान्यासन् ।  
 तेहनाकमहिमानः सचंत यत्र पूर्वसाध्याः संति देवाः ॥119 ॥  
 इति दशमे मंडले सप्तमोऽनुवाकः ॥

Regarding the contentions of ( ii ), and ( v ) relating to the *Yajurveda Samhita* the following can be taken into consideration : *Purusa Sukta* is available, as is widely known, in both the available recensions of *Yajurveda* : *Sukla* and *Krisna*. The former has two recensions which are available and are known as *Vajasaneyi-Madhyanadini Samhita (V.M.)* and *Kanva Samita (K.S.)*. The *Purusa Sukta* of *Kanva Samhita* is given in chapter 35 with 55 *mantras* while in V.M. it is given in chapter 31 with 22 *mantras*. In one of the compilations of *Yajurveda Samhita* these 22 *mantras* of the *Purusa Sukta* are given under the heading *Purusamedha*. The term *purusamedha* is a name for the sacrifice (*yajna*) for purification, where a man gives his all as a token of his spirit of renunciation. About understanding the meaning of the word *Purusamedha* sacrifice

the following few excerpts from *Thinking with the Yajurveda* by G. Desai, [Asia Publishing House, 1967] would be helpful: "The *Purusamedha Yajana*, therefore, can, at best, be understood as a sacrifice symbolising the highest sense of renunciation and self-extinction -- [pp. 107]." Further, "This *Yajna*, in other words, is only the quality of renunciation or self-sacrifice metaphorically represented and we approach it as such [pp. 109]"

The *Purusa Sukta mantras* of *Rgveda* X / 90 are given in both these recensions of *Shukla-Yajurveda (S.Y.)* with minor differences in the *mantra* order and content of the *mantras*. The following tables will give a comparative view of ordering of *mantras* in *S. Y.* with reference to the *Rgveda mantras* serial order:

TABLE - 1

Serial order of <i>Rgveda</i> <i>mantra</i>	<i>Yajurveda (V.M. &amp; Kanva) mantra</i> serial order with regard to <i>Rgveda</i>	Serial order of V.M and <i>Kanva mantra</i>	<i>Rgveda mantra</i> order with regard to V.M. and <i>Kanva</i>
1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	14	6	8
7	9	7	9
8	6	8	10