

Comments on the Article entitled '*How Anekāntika is Anekānta? Some Reflections on Jain Theory of Anekāntavāda*' by Daya Krishna published in the JICPR, Vol. XVI, No. 2

The canonical literature (*āgamas*) of the Jainas forms the basis of their philosophical thoughts. The word 'anekānta' does not appear in the *āgamas*. The word was first used in the beginning of the age of philosophical writings. Probably, Siddhasena Divakara was the first to use it.

The basis of anekānta is *naya*. The Bhagavatī Sūtra deals with reality from the point of view of two *nayas*—the substantial (*dravyārthika*) and the modal (*paryāyārthika*). The two points of view (*naya*) are relative, according to Acharya Siddhasena. Their relativity is known as anekānta.<sup>1</sup>

The philosophical thoughts in India flow between absolute permanence and absolute transitoriness. The insentient element (*prakṛti*), according to *Sāṅkhya*, is permanent-cum-transitory, but the sentient element (*purusa*) is absolutely permanent, having no modifications. According to the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy, the earth is permanent as cause and transitory as effect, but soul, God and space are without any modification. The reality is momentary, according to the Buddhists—Whatever is real is momentary, just as the cloud. The concept of eternity is rejected outright in the Buddhist philosophy. In the *Vedānta*, Brahman is absolutely unchangeable and *māyā* is changeable; Brahman, being beyond reality and unreality, is unspeakable.

What has been said above proves that the concept of 'only permanence' or 'only impermanence' is not of universal application, whereas *anekānta* covers the total reality and is, therefore, of universal application. Acharya Hemchandra puts this universality in a poetic fashion—

*Ādīpamāvyomasamasvabhāvaṃ  
syādvādmudrānatibhedi vastu/  
tannityamevaikamanityamanyā-  
diti tvadājñādvīṣatām pralāpāh||  
(-Anyayogavyavacchedikā, 5)*

'The reality, not going outside the realm of *syādvāda* is of same nature, be it a lamp or the space. Some of those (philosophers) who do not obey your dictum O Lord! indiscretely declare reality to be absolutely permanent, whereas others declare it to be absolutely temporary.'

From the point of view of substance, reality neither originates nor perishes. From the point of view of mode, the mode originates and perishes. The Bhagavatī Sūtra speaks of two aspects of reality—the permanent and the temporary. The permanent part does not change, the temporary part undergoes change<sup>2</sup>—*athire palottai, thire no palottai*.

Umasvati defined reality as consisting of permanence, origination and destruction on the basis of the two viewpoints of substance and mode—*utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat* (Tattvārtha Sūtra, 5/29).

Reality has three characteristics. Therefore, it is *anekāntika*. One cannot comprehend its nature without *anekānta*. When it is said—'Reality is permanent', it is one view; when it is said Reality is 'temporary,' it is another view. Both of these views are *ekāntika* (one-sided). When it is said—'Reality is permanent-cum-temporary,' it is the *anekanta* viewpoint. What is peculiar or new about it is that it simultaneously accepts reality as possessed of both permanence as well as transitoriness.

### THE MEANING OF THE TERM ANEKĀNTA

*Anekānta* is lexically a negative term, but substantially it is not negative. *Anekānta* conveys the relativity of substance and mode. It is not possible to have existence of only substance or only mode,<sup>3</sup> that is to say, substance and mode cannot exist without each other. The very nature of reality being *anekāntika*, the term *ekānta* cannot be used to comprehend it. *Aneka* does not mean 'indefinite' or 'infinite', but it means 'more than one'. Reality having three characteristics, '*aneka*' does not mean indefinite. Also as '*aneka*'

does not designate the absolute infinity of modes, it does not mean 'infinite'. Modes are successive attributes. Infinite modes are not possible in a single substance simultaneously. For they do not originate simultaneously.<sup>4</sup>

The statement that an object has infinite attributes is available. This means that an object is capable of undergoing infinite modifications. It is only on account of this capability that without giving up its own nature, it goes on transforming in various forms.

#### WHY THERE WAS THE RISING OF ANEKĀNTA?

The reality (*sat*) or the substance (*dravya*) is object of knowledge. *Naya*, *anekānta* and *syādvāda* are essentially the forms of knowledge, which are the means to know it. Sometimes we have a propensity to know it wholly, sometimes part by part. The attempt to know the same reality through various propensities forms the basis of *nayavāda*, *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda*.

The doctrine of *naya*\* is the process of knowing the reality part by part. From substantial *naya*, the substance is a real object; the mode is an unreal object. From modal *naya*, it is the vice-versa.<sup>5</sup>

The substantial *naya* is the standpoint to comprehend the substance; the mode does not fall in its domain, but it does not mean that it denies the mode. Therefore, though *ekāntika*, such a standpoint is a valid point of view (*naya*). If the substantial standpoint denies the mode, it would become invalid (*durnaya*). Similarly the modal point of view comprehends the mode, but it does not deny the substance. Therefore, though partial, it is a valid viewpoint (*naya*). If it denies the substance, it, being absolutely *ekāntika*, would become invalid. The non-relative one-sided view has created many problems in the field of philosophical thought. Anekānta provides a solution to those problems. If substantial or modal *nayas* were to be non-relative, *anekānta* would not have arisen. The reality has an innate capacity of changing and change is thus a part and parcel of reality. Permanence and change cannot be separated totally; they cannot exist independently. It is to deny their independence that non-absolutism arose.

#### WHAT IS SYĀDVĀDA?

Anekānta took birth on the basis of interdependence of substantial and modal viewpoints. *Syādvāda* expresses that very interdependence. Anekānta has two aspects: permanent and temporary, existence and non-existence, general and particular, one and many, expressible and inexpressible. What unites these

\**Naya* is a partial viewpoint without contradicting the remaining viewpoints.

aspects is proved through *syādvāda*. Gautama is reported to ask: Is the *ratnaprabhā* earth permanent or temporary? Mahāvīra answered: It is partly permanent and partly temporary. *Syādvāda* accepts both the thesis and the antithesis. How could the contradictory attributes of permanence and transitoriness co-exist together? The question is answered by Mahāvīra: Ratnaprabhā earth is permanent from substantial point of view, temporary from modal point of view. *Naya*, *anekānta* and *syādvāda*—all these three are useful in the field of metaphysics.

### SAPTABHAṄGĪ

Existence has many modes. Three dimensions have been identified for determining the nature of each of these modes: existence, non-existence and inexpressibility. These three dimensions can express the nature of existence. For example, a duet of two atoms has two aspects: It exists in its own nature, but it does not exist from the point of view of the nature of another entity. An example of atom in modern science may be given: the hydrogen atom consists of two particles—one electron and one proton. The electron has a negative charge and the proton has a positive charge. The electron rotates in the circumference, while the proton is stationary in the nucleus. Thus both are opposite to each other. It can be said that the electron is real from the point of view of its own nature, but non-real from the point of view of the nature of proton.

Here a doubt may be raised—when it is commonplace knowledge that anything is not real from the point of view of opposite nature, why should it be propounded as a theory? For example, Professor Daya Krishna has raised the question—‘The negative characterization, however, is both too wide and too vacuous to be regarded as significant in terms of actual predication, for if, say, there is such a thing as a red rose and we are saying that “this rose is red” we are not only denying that it has other colours, but also the fact that it is an elephant or any of the other myriad things which are not meant by the term “rose” in the English language. But what could possibly be meant by saying that the object designated by the term “rose” is not any of these things? It is, of course, being assumed that the other terms are not synonymous of the term “rose”, just as it is being assumed that the term “rose”, itself a homonym designating other things, is used in different contexts.’

The question raised here can be summarily answered thus: The atoms constituting the rose flower have assumed the form of rose at present; they



were not so in the past nor will they be so in the future. Therefore, the atoms constituting the rose are rose from the point of view of present times, but they are not rose from the point of view of past or future. Svami Visuddhanandaji, the Guru of Dr Gopinath Kaviraj, is said to have the capacity to change the rose into stone and vice-versa, through the solar science. Another example is that of water. 'This is water'—this statement pertains to the present mode. It would change into oxygen and hydrogen as the process of electrolysis takes place through electricity. (If water is required, a proper process will transform the gases into water.)

In these cases the rose (or water) is real from the point of view of the present mode, but it is not real from the point of view of past or future. Therefore, positive and negative statements are made for showing the relativity of the modes of past, present and future.

A substance has two-fold powers: one is the power to hold its own self. This is the quality of *agurulaghu*, which is propounded through a positive statement. The other power is that of keeping one's existence independent of others so that an entity can exist separately, and does not lose its identity. This power is stated through a negative statement. The positive and negative statements are thus not imaginative; their usages are not redundant. A single positive statement cannot describe what it is and what it is not. The rose flower is different from that of *dhatūra*\* is a case of empirical knowledge, needing no positive-cum-negative statement. But a positive-cum-negative statement is required to show why they are different. Both of them are essentially nothing but matter (or *pudgalāstikāya*). The molecules forming the rose are different from those of the *dhatūra* flower. Therefore, the rose flower is keeping its entity separate from that of the *dhatūra*. If the molecules of both the flowers had identical mode, rose would have been *dhatūra* and *dhatūra* would have been rose. Only the positive statement could not have propounded the identity-cum-difference or unity-cum-diversity.

The rose flower is a mode of *pudgalāstikāya* (which is one of the ultimate substances) and so is the flower of *dhatūra*. At present, modes of both are different. In future, it is possible that the molecules which have taken the form of *dhatūra* flower may take the form of rose flower, and vice-versa. But, without showing the separation of molecules which have assumed the form of rose from those which have assumed the form of *dhatūra*, it would not be possible for us to identify objects—that is to say, the system of objects would become impossible. For a layman, rose and *dhatūra* are evi-

\*The *Dathura alba*, the thorn apple which is a powerful narcotic.

dently different, but for a person who knows the law of transformation, they are not absolutely different, both of them being the modifications of the molecules of matter (*pudgala*). But this modification may change also in future. From the point of view of eternity, we would like to say that as both the flowers are modifications of molecules, they are identical. But from the point of view of present, we cannot accept them as identical. Therefore, we should have the knowledge of both, the positive and the negative (i.e., what it is, and what it is not).

The third alternative of 'unspeakable' in *syādvāda* is not the same as the inexpressibility of Brahman in the Vedānta philosophy. When we have the existence of the present mode, we have the non-existence of the future mode at the same time. Both cannot be simultaneously expressed; we have, therefore, to take resort to the third alternative of unspeakability. This is the limitation of the language that though both can be known simultaneously, yet they cannot be expressed simultaneously.

### OMNISCIENT

*Anekānta* is a form of knowledge and *anekāntika* substance is the object of knowledge. The basis of *anekānta* is the nature of reality (*sat*) or substance. The nature of the substance in itself is permanent-cum-temporary. It does not make any difference if it is known by an ordinary man or an omniscient. The only difference is that a common man knows it through the sensuous knowledge whereas the omniscient knows it through the direct knowledge. The law of *anekānta* is of universal application. Substance cannot exist without mode; therefore, it applies on substance; mode cannot exist without substance; therefore, it applies on mode. The transcendental existence and empirical existence are not absolutely separate in the Jain philosophy. The mode is empirical existence and the substance is transcendental existence; but they are inseparably joined together—both of them are two aspects of the same existence and therefore, they cannot be conceived of as absolutely independent.

If existence is to be propounded even by an omniscient, he will have to use *syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgī* and similar is the case with an ordinary man. When substance in itself is permanent-cum-temporary, how can the omniscient express it in absolute terms? He will have to use the language of *syādvāda*, e.g. substance is relatively (i.e. with respect to a particular point of view) permanent and relatively temporary. A part of a molecule of three atoms is expressed from one viewpoint, while another part of the same

molecule is not expressed from that point of view. There would be no difference, whether this molecule of three atoms is expressed by an omniscient or by an ordinary man.

The methodology of *anekānta* does not admit of any difference between an omniscient and an ordinary *śrutajñānī*. The theory of *Syādvāda* is not connected with perfection or imperfection of knowledge. There is no reason to accept that the knowledge of imperfect being is *ekāntika*. *Anekānta* does not imply that the knowledge of one who knows partial truth is *ekāntika* and the knowledge of one who knows the whole truth is *anekāntika*. The basis of *anekānta* is the triplicate nature (i.e. origination, cessation and permanence) of substance and not limitation or unlimitation of knowledge (i.e. *śrutajñāna* and *kevaljñāna*). The object of knowledge of an omniscient in its entirety can be the object of the partial knowledge of *śrutajñānī* also. As already stated, omniscient knows directly the whole truth, whereas a man of partial knowledge, can know it through the statements of the omniscient, i.e. through the scriptures; therefore one cannot say that the knowledge of the man of partial knowledge is necessarily *ekāntika*.

The nature of permanence and temporary are not imposed on substance by knowledge, perfect or imperfect. Permanence and transitoriness are the objective attributes of the substance, and not of knowledge. Because the substance is intrinsically permanent-cum-temporary, it does not depend on the knowledge of the knower. As the nature of the substance is permanent-cum-temporary for the omniscient, so it is for the ordinary knower (who is endowed with only partial knowledge).

#### TRANSCENDENTAL AND EMPIRICAL TRUTHS

The theory of permanence and transitoriness being of universal application, no distinction between transcendental and empirical existence can be admitted. If this distinction is to be made at all, we may put it according to the Jain view as—substance is transcendental, whereas mode is empirical. These two are not absolutely different; therefore, existence of substance can be accepted as permanent as well as transitory without any difficulty.

#### NOTION OF POSSIBILITY

That the substance is *anekāntika* has two meanings: The first meaning is—it is of triplicate nature of origination, cessation and permanence. Therefore, it can be said to be *anekāntika*. The second meaning is that the substance

has many—innumerable or infinite—modifications: therefore it has infinite attributes.

Modifications have two varieties: the intrinsic modifications (*arthaparyāya*) and the visible modifications (*vyañjana paryāya*). The intrinsic modifications are subtle; they change with the minutest unit of time (*samaya*, the smallest unit of time, which is further indivisible). This change has twelve stages.<sup>7</sup>

The subtle modifications cannot be known through the senses. They are the object of super-sensuous consciousness. The visible modifications are gross. They are manifest and, therefore, can be known through the senses also. It is in the case of these gross modifications that we can think of both, the possible and the probable. Every modification has the possibility of changing into any other mode. A colour can change into another colour, a smell into another smell, a taste into another taste, and a touch into another touch. *Yati Bhoja* has described two types of potentialities—the potentiality which can be actualized at a distant time (*ogha śakti*) and potentiality which can be immediately actualized (*samucitā śakti*); the former is the mediate cause, while the latter is the immediate cause of change. Grass has the potentiality of becoming ghee at a distant future. Curd can change into ghee immediately. The potentialities are too many to be enumerated. Theoretically, it could be said that potentialities of an object are innumerable as far as the mediate form of potentiality is concerned. A scientist through his research can know a few of these. A person with the power of super-sensuous knowledge can know them through super-sensuous knowledge. An ordinary man can, however, know only the immediate cause or the visible modifications. We, therefore, cannot put any limitation on the possibilities or probabilities.<sup>8</sup>

The reality has five varieties, viz. *dharmāstikāya* (medium of motion), *adharmaśtikāya* (medium of rest), *ākāśāstikāya* (space), *pudgalāstikāya* (matter) and *jīvāstikāya* (soul).

They never change into one another. The soul does not change into matter and vice-versa. The reality or the ultimate substances are absolute truth. Non-absolute truths are only the modifications. Man is not an ultimate substance; he is only a modification. All visible objects are modifications of the ultimate substances, they are not the ultimate substances. Things emanating from modifications can change into each other; they are, therefore, not absolutely different. The doctrine of identity-cum-difference propounded by *Anekānt* is useful for understanding the identity as well as difference of the object. These visible objects are possessed of their own shape, qualities and characteristics and, therefore, they are different. Thus, gold is not mercury, mercury is not



gold. But at the same time both of them are modifications of the same ultimate substance, viz. *pudgala* (i.e. matter). Therefore, gold can be transformed into mercury and vice versa. They are non-different or identical from this point of view. Thus, they are neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical, but they are identical-cum-different.

The phenomenon of radioactivity accepted by modern science is a good illustration to make this point clear. The element Uranium which has the atomic number 92 gets transformed into the element Lead which has the atomic number 82, in a specific time, on account of its radioactive nature. The atomic numbers of gold and mercury are 79 and 80 respectively. When, through proper external means, the atom of mercury is made to lose one electron and one proton and two neutrons, it will change into the atom of gold.

Anekānta has its limitations; it is applicable only in the field of ontology—only to comprehend the relativity of substance and modification. The science of existence or reality is absolute; non-absolutism is not applicable to the ultimate existence of the reality. Therefore, it is not desirable to apply non-absolutism everywhere. For example, in the field of mathematics, anekānta could be applied once in a while, but it is not possible to apply it everywhere.

Eminent statistician, Professor P.C. Mahalanobis has observed that '*Syādvāda*' has the genesis of the basic foundation of the modern science of statistics.<sup>9</sup>

'I should now like to make some brief observations of my own on the connection between Indian-Jains' views and the foundations of statistical theory. I have already pointed out that the fourth category of *syādvāda*, namely, *avaktavya* or the "indeterminate" is a synthesis of three earlier categories of (1) assertion ("it is"), (2). negation ("it is not"), and (3) assertion and negation in succession. The fourth category of *syādvāda*, therefore, seems to me to be in essence the qualitative but not quantitative aspect of the modern concept of probability ...

'At the same time it is of interest to note that 1500 or 2500 years ago, *syādvāda* seems to have given the logical background of statistical theory in a qualitative form.

'Secondly, I should like to draw attention to the Jain view that "a real is a particular which possesses a generic attribute." This is very close to the concept of an individual in relation to the population to which it belongs. The Jain view in fact denies the possibility of making any predication about a

single and unique individual, which would be also true in modern statistical theory.

The third point to be mooted is the emphasis given in Jain philosophy on the relatedness of things and on the multiform aspects of reals which appear to be similar (again in a purely qualitative sense) to the basic ideas underlying the concepts of association, correlation and concomitant variation in modern statistics.

The Jain view of "existence, persistence and cessation" as the fundamental characteristics of all that is real necessarily leads to a view of reality as something relatively permanent and relatively changing which has a fervor of statistical reasoning. "A real changes every moment and at the same time continues" is a view which is somewhat sympathetic to the underlying idea of stochastic processes ...

Finally, I should draw attention to the realist and pluralist views of Jain philosophy and the continuing emphasis on the multiform and intently diversified aspects of reality which amounts to the acceptance of an "open" view of the universe with scope for unending change and discovery. For reasons explained above, it seems to me that the ancient Indian Jain philosophy has certain interesting resemblances to the probabilistic and statistical view of reality in modern times.'

### SIMULTANEITY

Anekānta does not reject the concepts like impossibility or improbability. For example, it is accepted by Anekānta that it is neither possible nor probable that the *Jīva* (soul) may possess the particular modes of atom (which is not *jīva*). Similarly, it is neither possible nor probable that the non-sentient substances (*ajīva*) may possess the modes of *jīva* (the sentient substance). It is not expected of the doctrine of Anekānta to turn impossible into possible or improbable into probable. Anekānta's job is to get rid of the internal contradictions apparent between the eternal and the non-eternal, that is, substance and mode. Seen from the point of view of fluxism, change is real and true while the eternal is unreal; whereas according to the eternalism (the doctrine of absolute permanence), permanence is real and true, while change (or impermanence) is unreal. This illusion of contrast and conflict between eternal and non-eternal is creating problems in understanding the reality (*sat*) or substance (*dravya*). Anekānta has tried to resolve this problem by asserting

that both—the eternal as well as non-eternal—can co-exist in the same substratum. (In other words they do not need separate substratum to exist in.) The substratum of both is the *sat* (reality). Therefore, we cannot comprehend *sat* by separating the permanence and creation-cessation (or impermanence). Can we separate a pot from the clay? Can we imagine a cloth different from the fibres? In the same way, can we find out a substratum of mode other than the substance itself? This is not possible at all. It is only by accepting this impossibility that Anekānta has put forth a solution to the problem.

There is a continuous flow of modes in every real (ultimate) substance. As permanence is the characteristic (nature) of ultimate substance or reality, so is the creation and cessation.

The simultaneous occurrence of substance and mode is not at all a philosophical problem. The reality has permanence at the same moment when it is possessed of creation and cessation. Therefore, the state of their simultaneity is bound by the law of concomitance (*sāhacarya*). We misunderstand all laws to be universally applicable—this idea, in fact, creates problems. It is true that two artificial (or undertaken) activities cannot be simultaneous (in the strict sense). This is the law of 'undertaken actions'. Nevertheless, natural activities can take place in any number, simultaneously, for the law of 'undertaken action' does not apply on them. For example, the destruction and creation take place in the cells of the body, continuously. There is simultaneous creation and destruction. Another example is that of a duet or a diatomic molecule. It can be a vibrating molecule and non-vibrating molecule at the same time. One of its atoms may be vibrating, while the other one may be non-vibrating. Both these properties (that of vibrating and non-vibrating) exist simultaneously in it. Thus simultaneity means the tritemporality of change.

In Jain philosophy, both the types of modes, viz. actual and potential, are accepted. Thus, in clay, the mode of pot is potential while that of clay is actual.

Let us take another example: A person is trying to recite ten verses. After having recited a verse, we can say that he has actually recited one verse, there is the probability that he would recite the remaining nine verses. As soon as he starts reciting the second verse, the words of the first verse have gone into the space-record, he is actually reciting the second verse and there is the probability that he would recite the next verse, and so on ... Now, generally we consider only the present mode as the real one; but it is not an all-

pervading rule. The universal law is that the recitation of the first verse which has passed away in the space-record is now not real in the form (or mode) of recitation, but the sound waves (or particles) in which the verse was recited are still actually existing in space, and therefore the verse is still real in the form of sound-particles (or waves). Thus we cannot imagine absolute difference between the actual and the potential mode. Thus only the conception of different-cum-identical can take us towards the reality. The Jain philosophy has explained the doctrine of simultaneity on the basis of the tri-temporal nature of substance and its transformable modes or states. Therefore, the explanation of presence and absence cannot be made merely on the basis of the sole rule of present tense.

### SPEECH

The Jain philosophy has explained the phenomenon of speech or speaking very deeply. According to it, during speaking, first of all the speaker appropriates the clusters of speech-particles and transforms them into speech and then releases them. In this process, in the first instant of time ( $t_1$ ), the speech-particles are appropriated and in the second instant of time ( $t_2$ ), they are released after conversion into speech. But at the same time-instant (i.e.  $t_2$ ), new clusters of speech-particles are also appropriated, which are then released in the third time-instant ( $t_3$ ), and so on. In this way, there is continuous and simultaneous release of the formerly appropriated speech-particles and appropriation of the new speech-particles, every moment. This shows that during the same (single) instant of time there are two actions—release as well as appropriation. It is to be noted that here the release is that of the particles appropriated in the preceding instant and the appropriation is that of new particles. It means that when set 'a' is released, set 'b' is appropriated; but one does not release and appropriate set 'a' at the same instant of time.<sup>10</sup>

### CONCLUSION

The doctrine of *anekānta* is not meant for contradicting other absolutist views. It is enunciated for finding out the nature of truth. The nature of reality (*sat*) is explained through two viewpoints (*naya*)—substantial and modal. The *naya* is essentially an absolutist view. The purpose of *anekānta* is not to contradict absolutist view. Relative absolutist view is in conformity with the doctrine of *anekānta*. It is only the non-relative absolutist view that has been reviewed by the doctrine of *anekānta*. This sort of review took place in the



middle age—the philosophical era. In the *āgama*-era, it was propounded only to describe the nature of *sat*.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. jena duve egantā vibhajjamāṇā aneganto—Sanmati Tarka, 1/14.
2. Bhagavatī Sūtra, 1/440.
3. davvaṃ pajjavaviuyam davvaviuttā ya pajjavā natthi.  
uppāya-tthii—bhamgā hamdi daviyalakhaṇam eyam.  
—Sanmati Tarka, 1/12.
4. 'ayugapadavasthāyinaḥ paryāyah'—Tattvārtha Sūtra Bhāṣyānusrinī Tikā, 5/38.
5. davvatthiyavattavvaṃ avatthu niyameṇa pajjavanayassa.  
taha pajjavavatthu avatthumeva davvatthiyanayassa.  
—Sanmati Tarka, 1/10.
6. Bhagavatī Sūtra, 12/2/8: 'āyā bhamte! dupaesie khamdhe? anṇe dupaesie khamdhe? goyamā! dupaesie khamdhe 1. siya āyā 2. siya noāyā 3. siya avattavvaṃ—āyāti ya noāyāti ya 4. siya āyā ya noāyā ya 5. siya āyā ya avattavvaṃ—āyāti ya no āyātiya 6. siya no āyā ya avattavvaṃ—āyāti ya noāyāti ya.
7. 'agarulaghuvikāra sva-bhāvaparyāyāste dvādaśadhā ṣaḍvṛddhihānirupāḥ. anantabhāgavṛddhiḥ, asaṃkhyātabhāgavṛddhiḥ, saṃkhyātabhāgavṛddhiḥ, saṃkhyātaguṇavṛddhiḥ, asaṃkhyātaguṇavṛddhiḥ, anantaguṇavṛddhiḥ, itiṣaḍvṛddhiḥ. tathā anantabhāgahāniḥ, asaṃkhyātabhāgahāniḥ, saṃkhyātabhāgahāniḥ, saṃkhyātaguṇahāniḥ, asaṃkhyātaguṇahāniḥ, anantaguṇahāniḥ, iti ṣaḍhāniḥ. evaṃ ṣaḍvṛddhihānirupāḥ, dvādaśa jñeyāḥ.' Ālāpapaddhatiḥ, Paryāyādhikāraḥ, Appendix I in the Nayacakra by Mailladhavala, p. 211, Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭh Prakāśan, 1971.
8. Dravyānuyogatakarnā, śloka 6, 7:  
'guṇaparyāyayoḥ śaktimātramodhodbhavādimā.  
āsannakāryayogyatvācchaktiḥ samucitā parā.  
jñāyamānā tṛṇatvenājyaśaktiranumānataḥ.  
kimca dugdhādibhāvena proktā lokasukhapradā.'
9. The complete article of P.C. Mahalanobis is published in 'The Foundations of Statistics', *Dialectica* Vol. VIII, No. 2, 15 June, 1954, Zurich, Switzerland.
10. Prajñāpana Vṛtti, patra 264: kaścidekasmin samaye bhāṣāpudgalān grhītvā tadanantaram mokṣasamaye anupādānam kṛtvā punastṛīye samaye grhṇātyeva na muñcati, dvitīye samaye prathamasaṃyagrhitān pudgalān muñcati anyānnādatte, athānyena prayatnaviśeṣeṇa grahaṇamanyena ca prayatnaviśeṣeṇa (ca) nisargaḥ tau ca parasparam virudhau parasparaviruddhakāryakaraṇāt tataḥ kathamekasmin samaye tau syātām? tadayuktaṃ, jīvasya hi tathāsvābhāvīyāt dvāvupayogāvekasmin samaye na syātām, ye tu kriyāviśeṣāste bahavo'pyekasmin samaye ghaṭanta eva, tathādarśanāt, tathāhi—ekāpi nartakī bhramaṇādinṛttaṃ vidadhānā ekasminnapi samaye hastapādādigatā vicitrāḥ kriyāḥ kurvati drśyate,

sarvasyāpi vastutaḥ pratyekamekasmin samaye utpādavayāvupajāyete, ekasminneva ca samaye saṅghātapariśātāvapi, tato na kaściddoṣaḥ, āha ca bhāṣyakṛt—gahaṇanisaggapayattā paropparavirohiṇo kaḥam samaye? samae de uvaogā na hojja kiriyāṇa ko doso? ||1|| iti, tṛtiye punaḥ samaye tāneva dvitīyasamayopātān pudgalān muṇcati na punaranyānādatte, utkarveṇa tvasaṅkhyeyaiḥ samayairekaṁ grahaṇaṁ manyeta tata āha—'anusamayam pratisamayam grhṇāti, tadāpi kadācidvirahitamapi vyava-hārato'nusamayamityucyeta tatastadāśaṅkya vyavacchedārthamāha—avirahitam, evaṁ nirantaram grhṇāti, tatrādye samaye grahaṇameva na nisargah, agrhitavya nisargābhāvāt, paryantasamaye ca mokṣa eva, bhāṣābhiprāyoparamata, grahaṇāsambhavāt, śeṣeṣu dvitīyādiṣu samayeṣu grahaṇanisargau yugapatkaroti sthāpanā ceyam—

A<sub>p</sub> = Appropriation  
R = Release  
X = Nil

t <sub>1</sub>	t <sub>2</sub>	t <sub>3</sub>	t <sub>4</sub>	t <sub>5</sub>	t <sub>n</sub>
A <sub>p</sub>	A <sub>p</sub>	A <sub>p</sub>	A <sub>p</sub>	A <sub>p</sub>	X
X	R	R	R	R	R

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ĀCĀRYA MAHĀPRAJÑA

### Reaction to the Article of Professor R.C. Pradhan entitled 'Persons as Minded Beings: Towards a Metaphysics of Persons' published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 3

Professor R.C. Pradhan in his article 'Persons as Minded Beings: Towards a Metaphysics of Persons' (*JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 3) attempts to build up, as professed in the title of the article, a metaphysics of persons. But despite his conscious effort to carefully distinguish his position from that of Descartes the article fails to rise above a restatement of Cartesianism. It seems that he fails to realize the unique and unitary character of the person. This failure manifests in his emphasis on the mental aspect, as distinct from the bodily one, of a person. He even goes to the extent of identifying the person with the self, thereby implicitly denying the role of the body in forming the personhood of a person.