

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

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PREFACE

Chance and necessity, as Monod argued, seem to be interwoven in the very fabric of life and, presumably, in whatever living beings create as well. The genesis of this work seems almost a predesigned illustration of Monod's thesis. It was a chance encounter with a colleague¹ who talked about a new paperback edition of an important book² in political science which tempted me to borrow it and thus unwittingly take the first step which finally led to the writing of this book. A casual reading of the first chapter of Huntington's work had already implanted the idea that the subject deserved close critical attention; this soon crystallized when an invitation arrived from the East-West Center, Hawaii, asking me to be a consultant for their proposed Humanities Institute and for a research proposal for the Senior Fellowship of the East-West Center.

The first two chapters of this work, along with the Introduction, were written during the stay at the East-West Center where discussions with some friends in the department of political science, particularly Phillip Jacob who had worked on a number of inter-cultural and inter-national projects in political science, suggested that the critical issues raised were at least of some interest to practising political scientists also. In fact, news of my work at the Center reached Joseph Fischer in California who was then engaged in editing a volume on the response of the intellectuals of developing countries to the idea of political development as elaborated by political scientists of

¹ C. P. Bhambari, formerly Reader in Political Science, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. Currently, Professor of Political Science, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi.

² Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968).

the developed countries. The result was that the first longish note which I had written as a preliminary response to my reading in the field was published in the volume he edited.³ A shorter response of a different kind was published in *Quest*.⁴

This period of writing had overlapped with teaching assignments at Carleton College, Minnesota, and at the University of Hawaii on subjects which had little to do with the field I was working in. On returning to India, the same story was repeated with the added problem of work responsibilities of an academic-administrative nature. Time-bound commitments to write for friends who were editing books or journals or directing projects delayed the completion of the work, though the grant of a Visiting Fellowship at the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Simla for a Summer month helped in expediting the already much delayed writing of this book.

Now that the work is completed, I would like to thank all those who by chance or design have helped in the process, including research institutes such as the East-West Center, Hawaii and the Institute of Advanced Studies, Simla, friends who are always part of one's own being, and innumerable others without whom even little things are impossible to achieve. The staff at the East-West Center was always most helpful, specially Mrs Miriam Gould who not only typed the early chapters but also corrected them so carefully and with such seemingly infallible accuracy that I began to wonder how she could express my thoughts more clearly than I. The same must be said of my editor at the Oxford University Press who worked over the final draft of the manuscript and pointed out its weaknesses, both stylistic and substantive, with an almost unerring eye.

A word about the book. The issues that it discusses are of wider interest and larger relevance than the simple one of political development with which it is ostensibly concerned. It is the relevance of the idea of development or progress for the understanding of human reality in its deepest dimensions with

³ 'Concept of Political Development in American Political Science in the Sixties', in Joseph Fischer, ed., *Foreign Values and South-East Asian Scholarship* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1973).

⁴ 'Political Thought in the U.S.: A case study of Academic Escapism', *Quest*, Sept-Oct. 1978, pp. 35-40.

which this work is centrally concerned. Every student of art, religion, philosophy, culture or civilizations finds himself seriously troubled about the question at one time or another. The realm of science which appeared immune from such questioning has ceased to be so after Kuhn's work⁵ in particular and work on the history of science in general. The dilemma may not appear to those who suffer from what may only be called the 'present-centric consciousness' in these fields or to those who have decided about the finality of some past revelation or achievement. To everybody else, however, it is obvious that in many of these fields the past achievements not only stand alongside those of the present but in many cases are even superior to them. Yet, notwithstanding this fact, there is also the inescapable awareness that even the greatest achievements of the past did not contain everything in them, that it has not been merely a sorry spectacle of stale repetition of what was once achieved in the creative glory of the past, but that each succeeding generation has added a richness and variety to the creative contribution of man and given it a flavour and a nuance which never was before.

The last chapter tries to explore these issues in some depth and explicates the need for the formulation of some concept different from those of progress and development which may do justice to the facts as found in these domains. The work, therefore, strikes a larger theme and raises the question as to how man is to understand his own creations, including those which not only enmesh him all around but make him what he is.⁶ Yet, the question of understanding man's creations inevitably leads to the question of understanding man himself, a question to which this book leads but which it does not discuss in any great detail. But is there only one way of understanding man and his creations? And if not, what shall we do with the situation? Perhaps there is no answer to the question. But can there be any doubt that an awareness of the question leads to the making of a different man—a man more humble, more appre-

⁵ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962).

⁶ Some of these issues are discussed in an article by the author entitled 'Culture as a field of interdisciplinary study', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. XXI, No. 4, 1977.

ciative of difference, more aware of the limited, circumscribed nature of his own achievement as also that of his culture, his times and his nation? Perhaps such an awareness will mitigate the arrogance of power, of wealth and of knowledge that lurks beneath the surface of so much intellectual life in the West today.

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INTRODUCTION

There can be little doubt that the concept of political development has become the central pivot around which most of the recent thought in political science tends to organize itself. This may bespeak a certain development in the field of political science itself or in that with which the study of political science is concerned, viz. the realm of politics itself. Both seem to be the case. The imperial responsibilities of the United States after the Second World War, coupled with its competitive role on a global scale against a country with a different political system, led American political scientists almost inevitably to view their field in comparative perspective. And once things begin to be viewed in that way, specially from the vantage point of a superpower with global responsibilities for client and protégé states, the distinction between the 'developed' *we* and the 'underdeveloped' *they* gets built into the way issues are seen, questions are asked, and theories formulated. The political scientist almost inevitably identifies himself with the polity of which he happens to be a member, and that to some extent determines the way he sees the phenomena he wants to study scientifically, that is, with detachment and objectivity.

The epistemological problems raised by this determination of the social perception of social scientists in general and political scientists in particular have seldom been the subject of focal attention by these scientists themselves or by philosophers concerned with the social sciences. To some extent, anthropologists in their study of so-called primitive, non-literate cultures have been aware of these problems, along with historians who have studied literate cultures other than their own. And it is generally amongst practitioners of anthropology and history that the concept of development as it was applied to their fields came to be seriously questioned. The sociologist and the poli-

tical scientist, however, generally look on the study of man and society as embodied in history and anthropology as not being scientific in the sense that they are not concerned with the discovery of laws of the phenomena they study, but only with their description which at best is sought to be made intelligible in terms of meanings which they embody or purposes they fulfil. The historian and the anthropologist are supposed merely to provide the *data* against which the social scientist may test his theories. And, if they do attempt to formulate laws, they quickly become oriented to the same type of concerns and perspectives which the sociologist or the political scientist entertains.

The early search for comparative methodology had some such purpose in mind. It was to do what lack of experimentation precluded or appeared to preclude in the social sciences. The diversity of cultures and civilizations was supposed to provide that variety of conditions and combinations which the theorist in the social sciences would require to test his hypotheses. The *Human Relations Area Files* attempt to provide such data, and the early work of Malinowski, Roheim, Margaret Mead, and Herskovits tries to do something like this for psychoanalytic and economic theories. The work of Whiting and Child on child-training and personality development is another good example of this type of use of cross-cultural material.

However, comparative studies do not remain confined for long to what may be called the testing of hypotheses, and they begin to ask whether the same functions are being performed well or ill in different settings and thus to *judge* societies comparatively and find whether one is better than the other, at least in those respects in which they are being compared. The cognitive enterprise thus subtly turns into an evaluative enterprise, without explicitly declaring itself to be such. One reason for the subterfuge may possibly lie in the fear that the effectiveness of the evaluation may be jeopardized if it were to be explicitly declared as such. Another, and perhaps more subtle, reason may lie in the feeling that the cognitive and the evaluative elements are so intermixed in the situation that to test a hypothesis is inevitably to make an evaluative judgement also.

The two directions of the cognitive interest, however, are not merely different but also opposed to each other. The search

for laws which have universal validity goes counter to the idea that there are better or worse ways of exemplifying those laws. It would be strange to hear someone say that the law of gravitation is better exemplified by one phenomenon than by another. Such a statement may be true in some educational context where the task is to make somebody understand what exactly is meant by the law concerned. But there are no intrinsic differences in exemplification, and once one has understood what a law means, one also understands that the example used by the teacher exemplifies it in no special, pre-eminent sense. Also, the law, in so far as it is a law, cannot but be exemplified, and thus in the purely cognitive perspective, the distinctions of better and worse can only be treated as something illusory or the result of the intrusion of non-cognitive interests in a field where they do not belong.

On the other hand, the intrusion of the category of 'function' with its correlate notion of 'efficient performance' brings the idea of 'purpose' into the heart of the social sciences—an idea whose banishment from nature was supposed to have been responsible for the triumph of the natural sciences. But once we begin to talk in terms of 'functions' and their more or less 'efficient' fulfilment, we generally assume that everything that we are comparing is trying to fulfil the *same* function and that the notion of efficiency that we employ happens to be the *same* everywhere. But once diversity in functions and differences amongst criteria of efficiency are admitted, the whole purpose for which the comparative approach was being used fails to make sense.

It may be urged that the developmental perspective can be relevantly built into the strictly cognitive enterprise, if reality is seen as dynamic rather than static in nature. The opening of the evolutionary perspective in biology has taught us to do just that. Everything in the world, and the world itself, may be understood only when seen in the perspective of time and in the context of the question 'how has it come to be what it is today?' But this assumes that 'temporal', 'changing', 'dynamic', 'evolutionary', 'developmental' all mean the same thing, which they obviously do not. To change is not necessarily to evolve, and to evolve is not necessarily to develop. Change, for example, may be mere fluctuation or even mere movement, a change of posi-

tion with respect to certain other co-ordinates. And evolution may just be a patterning of change in a particular direction, as, for example, when we talk of the evolution of the solar system.

Also, to talk of reality as dynamic does not solve the problem posed by the so-called static perspective, as it is usually thought to do. If there is a law that governs the dynamics of change or, in less anthropomorphic language, if the change is in accordance with a law that can be discerned, then the change is only apparent, since it is already known what the situation is going to change into or, in other words, what change is going to occur. If the trouble with a static system was that the laws could not but be exemplified by whatever happened to be, the situation remains the same even when we make our system dynamic. Only now laws are exemplified not so much by whatever *is* but rather by whatever *occurs*. The shift from things to processes does not change the situation in any essential respect.

Neither the functional nor the dynamic perspective, thus, seems to necessitate a developmental perspective such as came into favour in the political sciences in the United States in the sixties. Nor does the comparative method require it in any significant way. What could then be the possible reasons for its emergence and almost uncontested dominance for more than two decades amongst intellectual circles in that country?

The reasons given are of many kinds. But the two most often found in literature concerned with this subject relate to the desire to escape the parochial limitations of the earlier state of political science in the United States which was, by and large, confined to the American political experience alone, and to the failure of U.S. economic aid in fostering economic development in countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The latter reason is, perhaps, more important as it continues to be repeated in almost every work on political development, while the former has almost dropped out of sight.

However, it is not easy to determine the exact role of the failure of economic development in countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the elaboration of the concept of political development by political scientists in the United States. One wonders to what extent it was a part of or, for that matter, implication or even a cause of political interventionism, which

may be considered to be some sort of political aid on the analogy of economic aid. In any case, if political development is a precondition of economic development, it needs to be articulated and studied in its own right. But if it is treated only in the context of economic development, then wherever there is economic development we would be justified in assuming that political development has also occurred.

It is not always made clear in discussions whether political development is treated as both a necessary and a sufficient condition of economic development or merely as a necessary condition. As the lament is that economic development is not occurring for political reasons, it may be taken that it is undoubtedly considered a necessary condition and perhaps both a sufficient and a necessary condition of economic development.

The phenomenon of economic development is, however, itself varied and diverse in character. It not only continuously fluctuates even in the so-called developed economies but even has sharp and prolonged periods of depression in many of them. Also, the relative economic growth rates of different countries vary over different periods of time, as do the growth rates of the countries themselves. But if changes in the political sphere were to be theoretically required as necessary preconditions for change in the economic sphere, we would have to assume correlate precedent changes in the political sphere without which the changes in the economic sphere would become unintelligible. It would be, so to say, the fluctuation or decline in political growth rate which would be shown in the fluctuation or decline in the economic growth rate. This would, however, bring into question the autonomy of the economic realm and the immanent causality which may be said to obtain therein.

This interpretation might appear to some readers to be a gross misunderstanding of the relations between the political and the economic realms as argued by the writers on political development. It may be argued that what was actually suggested is that there are certain political prerequisites to economic development without which no economic development can take place. But this is precisely what is meant by calling political development a necessary condition and nothing is gained by calling it a prerequisite, for both mean the same thing and raise the same problem.

If, on the other hand, both the political and economic realms are treated as relatively autonomous and independent of each other with the possibility that either may grow and develop independently of the other, then the question of independent criteria for the growth of both may be raised and investigated. But, then, the failure of the so-called underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to make good economically, even if true, could not be taken as a sign of their political underdevelopment. Nor, for that matter, could the economic development of the so-called developed countries of North America and Western Europe be taken as a sign of their political development. The two could vary independently and thus would have to be judged and established independently also.

The search for independent criteria for political development has taken place, though not in a clear-cut way. Hardly anyone has faced the question what it would mean for a polity to be developed even if its economy were stagnating or declining. On the other hand, the problem of a developing economy with an underdeveloped polity has been discussed to a certain extent, especially in the context of totalitarian societies. To consider or not to consider the Soviet Union as a developed polity has been the perennial dilemma of Western writers on political development. Those who are inclined to treat the achievement of democracy as a criterion of political development tend to deny the Soviet Union the claim of being a developed polity. On the other hand, those who think in terms of power or in terms of industrialization tend to treat it as highly developed.

The situation becomes even more complicated because of the persistent tendency to bring in notions of modernization and social development which themselves are neither clearly defined nor demarcated from what is usually regarded as economic or political development. One is not quite clear whether 'modernization' is the same as 'social development' and 'social development' the same as 'economic and political development', assuming the two to be different. It is surprising that sociologists who continuously talk of 'modernization' and 'social development' do not make their distinctiveness from economic and political development fairly clear. Perhaps they too feel that if a society is achieving economic development then it must also be achieving social development. But, if so, we would have the

same problems as we had earlier with political development.

To cap all this, the notion of 'social evolution' has been brought in to buttress the concept of development in all these fields, as if it could not be sustained by itself. It is interesting in this respect to note that the notion of evolution has not been much applied to the domain of economics where the idea of development is perhaps most securely entrenched. In fact, one hardly hears of 'economic evolution' though 'social evolution' is a fairly common term these days and 'political evolution' is slowly coming into its own. It is tacitly assumed that, 'to be evolved' is 'to be developed' and 'to be developed' is 'to be better' and 'what is better' is one's own society. Along with this is the belief that there is something in evolution which necessitates it to be so. But if it were really so, then, first, there would not be much virtue in being what one is and, secondly, there would be no point in lamenting that others have not made good. What the idea of evolution perhaps does for its proponents is to ensure that there will be no sliding back for those who have arrived. But even this could not ensure that they themselves would be the bearers of the next evolutionary thrust, unless they chose to believe that evolution had stopped with them. In fact, if past experience is to be believed, the greater likelihood is that it would be some other group which would break into the next phase of evolution, if any. But, as evolution is supposed to be both inevitable and involuntary, there does not seem much point in lamenting or lauding it either way.

The questions with respect to political development, thus, have on the one hand to be separated from the larger questions of development in general and, on the other hand, to be distinguished from development in other domains. We propose to do this by examining in detail the proposed explications of the concept of political development and the criteria suggested for assessing and measuring it in diverse ways. Along with this, we also propose to discuss the larger question regarding what exactly is meant by the concept of development and what are the conditions of its relevant applicability to a domain.

I

THE SEARCH FOR CRITERIA THE CRITERION AS PARTICIPATION

If one is to discuss political development and compare different polities to find which are developed and which are not, then obviously one has to find some criterion or set of criteria in terms of which one can make the comparison. Many have been the criteria offered, and as the concept itself has been elaborated primarily in the United States, it would be natural to expect most of these criteria to be idealized versions of what prevails or is supposed to prevail in the political system of that country. The criteria, in order to serve the purpose for which they are intended, must be measurable directly or indirectly. Also, they should, to a large extent, be quantitatively variable, as otherwise a characteristic would either be present or absent and thus show a country to be either completely undeveloped or completely developed politically. Quantitative variability, on the other hand, would make it a matter of 'more or less', that is, a matter of relative degree. Also, if the criteria are multiple in character, they would have to be given relative weightage with respect to each other so that some generalized judgement might be reached in cases where they diverge from one another.

The criteria, it should be remembered, are for purposes of determining the degree of political development that a particular society may be said to have achieved, especially when compared with other societies or even with past stages of its own history. Further, if the concept of political development is to be treated as even relatively autonomous, then the criteria for it should at least to some extent be different from those that are supposed to measure, say, economic or social or cultural

development. This would raise the question of the relationship between these different realms and whether development in any of them presupposes at least some development in the others also. If, however, the concept of 'autonomous realms' itself be questioned, then we would either have one set of criteria for measuring all development or development in one sector would be taken as indicating development in other domains as it is treated as determining them. The attempt to understand 'social development', for example, poses this problem. Is 'social development' merely a summation of development in all other fields, or does it have any distinctive characteristics of its own? If the former, then obviously to talk of 'social development' is also to talk of all the other kinds of development which are encompassed in it. On the other hand, if it is something over and above all of them, then either it has to be treated as itself sectoral in character or as something emergent from the inter-relationships between what may be called parts or subsectors of itself.

Many of these questions have not been faced by writers on political development. In fact, the relation of sociology to other disciplines which deal with specific sectors of society has never been clearly articulated. Besides the Marxists who have been the most prominent and influential amongst those who have signalled one particular substructure as foundational and ultimately determining for all the rest, Parsons is perhaps the only person who has systematically tried to articulate these relationships. Within the fourfold task of adaptation, goal attainment, latent tension management, and pattern maintenance and integration, the political system is primarily supposed to be concerned with goal attainment only, while the economic system is supposed to be concerned with adaptation and the cultural system with pattern maintenance and latent tension management. The task of integrating all of these is supposed to be the speciality of the social system, but what exactly the social system is, apart from the political, cultural, and economic systems, is not clearly indicated. Also, it is not quite clear as to who sets the goals which the political system is supposed to try to attain. And why could adaptation not be treated as some sort of goal in itself? Similarly, it is difficult to see why pattern maintenance and tension management do not perform the integrative func-

tion which the social system alone is specifically supposed to do. It may be said that these are just analytic categories which characterize any action and the so-called concrete subsystems are differentiated by the predominance of one category rather than another. But even if this were granted, it does not blunt the edge of the objections raised. For analytic categories themselves should be kept distinct, and it would be difficult for Parsons to maintain that pattern maintenance and tension management could be separated, even analytically, from integrative or even adaptive functions.

In considering the problem of any subsector development, therefore, one has inevitably to face the question as to how it is related to developments in other sectors. To the extent that the sector has autonomy, it is bound to have some immanent goals of its own in terms of which development or lack of development may be said to occur. Also, as the very concept of autonomy implies some sort of immanent determination of the system, the development or lack of development has to a large extent to be explicated and understood in its own terms. However, as the system is actually a subsystem, the autonomy is bound to be relative in character, and thus determination from the outside, at least at the margins, has always to be taken into account. Yet, exactly what the immanent goal of the political system is and what the immanent causality which operates therein seems to be nowhere explicitly stated by most writers who are concerned pre-eminently with the notion of political development. Or, if it is suspected or even explicitly recognized that there is perhaps more than one goal immanent to the system, then what the relationship is between the goals themselves is hardly ever explicated by these writers.

The trouble, therefore, with the concept of political development is that we do not quite know what is supposed to develop or whose development we are supposed to discern. Unless this fundamental point is clarified, the search for criteria is bound to be diffused and vague, as one would not know what one was looking for. In a certain sense, we would find this true of most of the criteria that have been offered by writers in this field. They are usually so general as to have hardly anything to do specifically or exclusively with the realm of politics. Perhaps they are general descriptions of what these writers consider

desirable in their society or even in any society. This reaction is understandable, as the concern with political development arose primarily in the context of the failure of many of the new nations which emerged after the Second World War to achieve political stability and economic growth.

II

The political system, though a subsystem of the society, is supposed to perform the overall and overriding function of looking after the society and managing it to the extent that this can be done at a conscious, corporate level. The first criterion that comes to mind is, therefore, the extent to which members of any society participate in the exercise of this function. Certain groups may be legally or actually deprived of the right to participate in this process, while even many who have the right to participate may not choose to do so unless it be made mandatory for them. The extent of the formal right of participation in the political process which is concerned with the total whole, the actual facilitation of the exercise of such a right, and the actual exercise of the right, then, may be taken as determining the degree of political development which a society has achieved when compared to other societies or to itself in a former stage. In fact, most writers on political development have used participation as a basic criterion for judging and measuring political development. But exactly what participation in the political process is, is seldom directly discussed. Perhaps it is assumed that the relevant discussion has already occurred in the debate about democratic and representative political institutions. But if that is the end of the matter, there should be no uneasiness about the populist type of participation in the political process. Nor, for that matter, should the unbelievably large turnouts in the Soviet and Nazi-style patterns of election cause such dismay among the democratic theorists of Western countries.

Deeper than this, however, are the questions relating to the fact that if the criterion of participation were to be accepted, then most polities in human history would have to be characterized as undeveloped for the simple reason that not only has it always been a minority which *actually* participated in the

political process, but also because the majority generally were not supposed to participate in it. As most of the existent polities in the world have been, so to say, non-democratic in the past, it would be impossible to judge them on the basis of this criterion and say which is more and which is less developed even among themselves. They are lumped together and thrown into the limbo of development where nothing relevant can be said about them as far as political development is concerned.

In a certain perspective, this may not be considered something to be deeply worried about, as in the process of socio-political evolution fundamental breakthroughs may naturally be expected to occur. And, in fact, as we shall see later on, it has actually been argued that modernity is such a breakthrough in the process of social evolution. But whatever may be meant by evolution in this field—and we will have occasion to examine this in detail later on—this would tend to show that ‘participation’ is hardly something immanent to the field of politics, since otherwise it would have been its central concern wherever it obtained. Rather, it becomes such a concern only when a certain level of development is achieved, and this is perhaps more a result of certain technological breakthroughs, if ‘modernization’ is seen as integrally related to ‘industrialization’ even if not identical with it.

There are other problems in treating ‘participation’ as a criterion of political development. The first and foremost relates to the fact that it is doubtful whether a majority of the people can ever *actually* participate in the political process except in a marginal or symbolic manner. Any society, in order to function, has to perform functions other than the political one. And most of these functions are fairly time-consuming. The Greek polis, where the male citizens lived what Hannah Arendt has called ‘the public life’, had women and slaves to perform the other functions. Today when we do not believe that there ought to be slaves in a society, the question is whether all can live ‘the public life’ lived by a minority in the Greek polis and described so eloquently in Arendt’s book *On Revolution*.¹ Perhaps automation will permit the slaves and free human beings to engage in the full-time public activity about which she writes. But even then, there may be economic prerequisites of political activity which everyone may not possess,

and there may be large numbers of people who may not want to devote all or even most of their time to political activity.

This point has seldom been seriously discussed by those political scientists who have treated ‘increasing participation in the political process’ as a criterion of political development. They seem to write as if there were no economic costs to politics, as if all the obstacles to people’s participation lay either in legal disabilities or obstruction by those who did not want any effective participation by certain groups, ethnic or otherwise. Also, there seems to be the unstated assumption that if people had the legal right, the actual facilities, and perhaps the economic resources, then they would engage in political activity, even to the exclusion of other activity if a choice had to be made.² But these assumptions are not true. There *are* substantial economic costs to political activity and, automation or no automation, people both have to and prefer to engage in other activities. Full-time political activity can be engaged in only by those who either have independent means, or are supported by somebody else, or are provided for by the party of which they are members and for which they work. In the last case, the party itself must have control over economic resources, and this can come only by having direct command of them or by serving, to some extent at least, the interests of those who have such command. In the former case, there is bound to be an erosion of distinction between party and government and a tendency towards some sort of one-party totalitarian control of the state.

The second point is equally important. Most people, at least in non-crisis situations, have little interest in political activity. And this for the simple reason that time is a scarce commodity and if one engages in something, then one cannot engage in something else as fully. The whole idea of an engaged or committed consciousness does not merely absolutize the moral perspective but, what is perhaps even more important, politicizes it also. The assumption is that moral action is nothing but political action and that the moral point of view is itself nothing but a political point of view which, if genuine, must result in political action. The total politicization of life, thus, is the demand not merely of populist totalitarians, as has generally been thought, but also of all those who have identified

the moral with the political and, at least implicitly, of those who urge 'participation in the political process' as a criterion of 'political development'.

There is still another implication of the 'participation' criterion hardly noticed by those who have propounded it so often. And that is the non-differentiation or at least the non-professionalization of political activity as against most other activities in the system. Obviously, if everyone can participate and in fact is expected to participate in political activity, then there could hardly be any prerequisites required for engaging in that activity. This is anomalous, especially in the light of the fact that most thinkers who treat 'participation in the political process' as a sign of 'political development' also treat 'differentiation' as a sign of development in general. Yet, if it is a sign of social development that the realm of politics becomes differentiated from other realms, then it would also obviously follow that everybody cannot engage in it to the same extent, unless, of course, 'differentiation' were merely to mean 'differentiation' in the time devoted to it and not the specialized cultivation of skills for the pursuit of that activity. There is, so to say, a denial of the need for 'professionalization' for the achievement of efficiency or expertise in political activity. Yet, the virtues of 'differentiation', as we shall see later, are supposed to lie in its contribution to greater efficiency. But if this is not true for any one domain, then one wonders why 'differentiation' *per se* should be regarded as desirable or necessary.

The objection is bound to be made that we are misinterpreting the notion of 'participation' as used in the current discussion about political development. 'Participation', in this context, does not mean actual participation in the decision-making processes of the polity. This would be almost impossible in any large community, as not everybody can be a legislator or a member of a group that collectively legislates. And if executive and judicial functions are also regarded as political functions, then it is perhaps even more obvious that everyone, whether the society be large or small, cannot be involved in a participatory manner in the performance of political functions. It is at least theoretically conceivable that technology could permit the participation of all members of a society in the discussion and decision on any issue that came before them for

collective consideration. But it would be difficult to think of ways in which all could be involved in the discharge of executive and judicial functions. That perhaps is the reason why the political function is so pre-eminently identified with the enactment of laws and the authority to do so. Even those who have tried to argue that there is an inalienable political element in both the executive and the judiciary have generally done so on the ground that there is an element of rule-making involved in the exercise of their functions. Cardozo's is one of the best-known discussions with respect to the judiciary in this context.³

'Participation', then, should not be taken to mean *actual* participation in the 'law adjudicating' and 'law enforcing' processes which are generally thought to be important elements of the total political process. As for the 'law formulating' process, the thinkers writing on 'political development' have seldom seriously considered *actual* participation as a criterion for its determination, even though there now seems no intrinsic reason why, in the light of new technological innovations in communication and computerized calculation, this should not be regarded as feasible. Perhaps their framework of thought is still determined by the older situation where the practice of direct democracy was thought to be intrinsically impossible because of the large numbers involved, and have not yet caught up with the possibilities offered by new technological breakthroughs.

There may, however, be another reason for this neglect. The 'participation' envisaged may not be so much for the purpose of ensuring that everybody has a say in the decision-making processes which concern the group as a whole but to ensure that those who make such decisions do not do so to their own special or sectional advantage. The right to vote is, so to say, the right to refuse to re-elect those who have exercised the function of making the laws and done so poorly in the opinion of those who are choosing to cast the adverse vote. It is the right to say 'no' and, by doing so in sufficiently large numbers, to remove from office those who presumably misused the mandate to rule wisely and in the interest of the whole. Thus, it should be seen more in negative than in positive forms. It is in insuring against the possibility of tyranny in the system that the real significance of

'participation' through the right to vote lies. The primary purpose of 'participation', thus, consists of ensuring and strengthening 'political liberty' which may be regarded as a value immanent to the political realm.

But, surprising as it may seem, the concept of 'political liberty' plays hardly any role in discussions about political development. Lucian Pye, who has made a supposedly exhaustive survey of all the definitions offered for political development in his well-known work *Aspects of Political Development*, barely mentions it. The closest that he comes to it is perhaps in the definition of political development as the building of democracy. But that democracy in this context is hardly concerned directly with the issue of 'political liberty' is revealed by the fact that neither the words 'freedom' or 'liberty' nor the phrases 'political freedom' or 'political liberty' are to be found in the index to this book. The whole notion of 'public liberties' around which the great debate between totalitarianism and democracy raged seems to have lost all interest for students of political science concerned with questions of political development. In fact, even those who have tried to develop some measurable criteria of what may be called indicators for political development have hardly concerned themselves with the issue of 'public liberties' in devising their indicators.

The suspicion that 'participation' is not being used by these thinkers in what we have called the negative or 'public liberties' sense of the term is confirmed by Pye's statement that 'participation may be either democratic or a form of totalitarian mobilization.'⁴ But if it can take either of the forms, then obviously it cannot be linked in any essential way to the notion of 'political liberty', for the contrast between democracy and totalitarianism is supposed to lie in this very domain. However, as already pointed out, as far as Pye is concerned, the differentiation of democracy does not seem to lie in the realm of what may be called institutional safeguards against the possibility of tyranny. Rather, he, along with many others, seems to be concerned with what has come to be called in the recent literature of political science, 'interest articulation' and 'interest aggregation'. Perhaps it is in the open and almost unlimited opportunity for 'interest articulation' that the distinguishing characteristic of democracy lies in this framework. It is hopefully

assumed that this unlimited opportunity would facilitate the achievement of 'interest aggregation' also.

That 'participation' is used in the positive sense can further be gathered from the fact that many writers have considered it, to some extent, to be antagonistic to the achievement of effective capacity or capabilities on the part of the political system. Riggs has developed a whole thesis out of the supposed dialectical conflict between participation and capacity and sees in it the clue to the immanent force determining the development of any political system.⁵ And Huntington has seen in the tension between participation and what he calls 'political institutionalization' the clue to both political order and political decay.⁶

We will have occasion later to discuss in detail the contentions of these thinkers, but it should be of interest here to note that, even though the relation is supposed to be antagonistic, 'participation' is still treated as a criterion of political development *per se*. But if there is a negative correlation between participation and capacity, and if development is regarded as enhancement of capacity, then how can participation be regarded as a criterion of development? Presumably, as in Riggs, it may be regarded as such because it provides that negative source of tension which results, at least sometimes, in a higher stage of development. But then it could not be regarded by itself as a sign of development. Rather, what is a sign of development is enhanced capacity, and 'participation' in the political process becomes one only by virtue of the fact that it produces tensions which *may* result in even greater enhancement of capacity. Thus, in this perspective, it has only an instrumental value as far as political development is concerned. And in case it fails to achieve this enhancement of capacity or, as is even more likely if Huntington's analysis is to be believed, results in a decline in capacity, then it can only be treated either as neutral or as counter-development, depending on which of the alternatives actually takes place.

The criterion in terms of 'capacities' or 'capabilities' will be the subject of detailed discussion later on in this work. Here, however, we would like only to point out the incompatibility between holding 'participation' as an independent criterion of 'political development' on the one hand, and simultaneously considering it as a key factor obstructing 'political develop-

ment', on the other. If it is one, then it cannot be the other also. Yet, most writers tend to argue as if it were both at the same time, without in any significant way trying to bridge the apparent incompatibility between the two.

The positive interpretation of the notion of 'participation', then, may be accepted in the context of its discussion as a criterion for 'political development'. Yet 'participation', even in the positive sense, can be of different types, as has recently been argued by Verba, Ahmed, and Bhatt in their book *Caste, Race, and Politics*.⁷ According to them, 'participation is, in our view, not a single, undifferentiated entity. There are alternative modes of participation that differ significantly in the ways in which they relate the citizen to his government.'⁸ Besides voting, which is accepted almost without exception as the standard political act, they mention three other modes: 'Campaign activity', 'co-operative activity', and 'citizen-initiated contacts'.⁹ 'Campaign activity' obviously refers 'to activity in political campaigns beyond the act of voting',¹⁰ or, rather, before the act of voting. Both voting and campaign activity are, in a sense, direct political acts, assuming a political system which requires at least some sort of electoral process for the legitimation of those who wield political authority in the system.

The other two modes, however, seem basically different in character. The first, that is, 'co-operative activity', is defined as activity 'in which the individual works with others—either informal groups or formal organizations—to deal with the problems of his community'.¹¹ The term 'his community' in this definition is perhaps not meant to be interpreted too strictly, for otherwise it would exclude activity concerned with causes which relate to a community that is abstract in character. On the other hand, if it is loosely interpreted, it would include activity which transcends national boundaries and thus is, to that extent, transpolitical in character. Perhaps, therefore, such exclusion is implied in the definition and only the community of which one is directly and immediately a member is meant. In fact, the questions asked to ascertain the respondents' participation in co-operative activities, as given in appendices B and C of *Caste, Race, and Politics*, tend to confirm this interpretation.¹² Yet, whatever be specifically meant by the term 'community'

in this context, it tends to blur the distinction between social and political activity.

The fourth form of 'political participation' which the authors have discussed relates to what they call 'citizen-initiated contacts'. By these they mean 'contacts with government officials initiated by individuals'.¹³ This category is supposed to provide an index of 'participation' in the sense that the citizens show by their actions not only an awareness of the political system and their expectations from it, but also their initiative in realizing those expectations from the system. The authors have not made any relevant distinction between 'citizen-initiated contacts' at a group level and those at an individual level. Nor have they considered differences in the content of the citizen's needs in the context of which the contact with government officials is made. Nor have they made any distinction between the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the purposes for the fulfilment of which the contact is made. The emphasis presumably is on individual needs as the question is asked in the context of a person's apprehension of the government as the solver of personal problems. This is related to some extent to the focus of the study, which is concerned 'with the way in which deprived groups use politics to attempt to overcome their deprivation'.¹⁴ But however natural in the context of the authors' study, it is obvious that 'citizen-initiated contact' by a group or its representative for the amelioration of collective needs is far more a political act than an individual initiating a contact on his own for the fulfilment of his own needs. If the earlier category of 'co-operative activity' tends to blur the line between the political and the social, the present one tends to do so between the political and the personal.

The category of 'citizen-initiated contacts' can, conceivably, be regarded as an instance of what in the literature of political science has come to be called 'politicization'. It would be difficult, however, for 'co-operative activity' to be regarded as such. It would be such only if its purpose was either to make demands on the political system or to play some effective role in the selection of its personnel. In the latter case, it would be something like 'campaign activity', though far, far wider than what Verba, Ahmed, and Bhatt mean by the term. In the former case, on the other hand, it would be very much akin to

what is called 'interest articulation' in the literature of political science.

Even in the positive sense, then, the concept of 'participation' can be treated in a wide variety of ways. In fact, the use of the term 'politicization' has opened the doors wide to almost any type of relationship with the system being regarded as some sort of 'participation'. Any awareness of the polity in the cognitive domain and any active relationship with it, whether of a positive or negative character, can then be interpreted as some sort of 'politicization' and, thus, some sort of 'participation' also. It is in this sense that reading newspapers, watching TV and listening to radio, become as much indices of 'participation' as membership in political parties, turnout at political rallies, the percentage of people voting, etc. But through this extension, the term loses its direct, specific sense of participation for positive effectiveness in the decision-making process of a polity. However, even in this specific sense there is some sort of implicit assumption of legitimacy which makes it seem odd to say that people taking part in violent or non-violent demonstrations against the system and going to prison or dying in the process are 'participating' in the political processes of the system. Yet there is a large class of political scientists who treat all evidence of activity which is concerned in any way with politics as evidence of 'politicization'. In fact, many of them have a special name for it—'inverse articulation by anomic groups'.¹⁵

The term 'interest articulation' is in many of its uses very close to what in certain other contexts is denoted by 'politicization' and in still other contexts by 'participation'. It has itself been used as a criterion of 'political development', and we will have occasion to discuss it in that context. But, as far as I am aware, there has been little systematic attempt to differentiate 'participation', 'politicization', and 'interest articulation', and delineate the interrelationships between them. Most authors tend to use these terms interchangeably, depending upon the context they are emphasizing. Yet it would be useful if the differences between them are kept in mind. There seems little point in taking 'interest articulation' as 'participation' in the political process unless it happens to be what may be called 'structured articulation' required by the system itself. Similarly,

all 'structured participation' need not be treated as 'politicization'. It may be better if the term 'politicization' is reserved for areas in which the category of the 'political' dominates all others in social life, thought, and action.

But whatever be one's feelings about the way these terms are or ought to be used, there should be little dispute over the fact that if they are treated as criteria of 'political development', then an increase or decrease in each category should be taken as an increase or decrease in political development also. Yet an awareness of this point seems to be absent from the writings of most of those who show a concern for the problems of political development. Most of the so-called new nations which emerged after the Second World War, and in whose context the discussions about political development originated, started with universal franchise and have given effect to it in large measure in their countries. Yet this has seldom been treated as a reason for considering these countries politically developed. In fact, the consensus, if any, seems to be that such an enlarged political participation is one of the root causes of many of the problems these countries face with respect to their political development. Huntington goes so far as to relate political instability directly to political participation and inversely to what he calls 'political institutionalization'.¹⁶ Assuming that political instability is a sign of political decay, it would follow that the less there is of political participation, the less chance there will be for political instability in a country. Of course, Huntington treats political instability as a ratio between political participation and political institutionalization, but as in most cases institutionalization may be expected to take a far longer time than it ever takes for political participation to occur, it may be taken as axiomatic that if a polity seeks both, it would be far easier for it to achieve the latter rather than the former and thus ensure the impossibility of its own political development.

A detailed discussion of Huntington's thesis along with a consideration of stability as a criterion of 'political development' will be undertaken later on. Here we only want to note that if an increase in 'political participation' results in political decay, then it obviously cannot be taken, at least not without any ifs and buts, as a criterion of political development. But if 'participation' is considered as a value *per se* which immanently

belongs to the realm of politics, then its increase should be regarded as a sign of political development even if it is considered undesirable on other grounds. And this should be true even when one extends the notion of 'participation' to mean 'politicization' in the sense in which violent protests are supposed to imply some sort of 'participation' in politics on the part of citizens. Perhaps the only relevant distinction on this count will be the one between 'structured' and 'unstructured' participation, and political development will then consist of the conversion of the latter into the former. Different polities, then, could be compared on the basis of the extent, range, intensity, and quality of this participation, and be determined to be politically more or less developed. Perhaps a participation index could be developed and the polities ranked in its terms. But it would not be reasonable then to express dissatisfaction with a polity on political grounds even when it was doing well on the basis of the criterion for determining whether it was politically developed or not.

The objection may be made that we are taking the term 'political development' in too evaluative a sense of the word. Basically, the term is value-neutral in the sense in which it is usually employed in the literature dealing with the field. Almond and Powell, for example, suggest the possibility of 'negative development' when they write that a 'decline in the magnitude or a significant change in the content of the flow of inputs may result in "development" in the negative or regressive sense. The capabilities of the political system may decline or be overloaded; roles and structures may atrophy; the culture may regress to a more traditional pattern of orientation.'¹⁷ Similarly, talking even more explicitly concerning 'hang-ups about evaluation', Almond writes, 'It is symptomatic of the primitive state of theoretical work in the field that we should be so anxious about the words we use and the definitions of our concepts. Biologists and psychologists speak of the growth and development of organisms, of human growth and development, assuming that the concept of development includes breakdowns, decay, decline, even the death of the organism. The literature on economic growth and development is not embarrassed by the fact that economies fluctuate in national product, that some stagnate, and some decline. We are not bound

by the connotations of the words we use to label our concepts. These should be viewed as open terms which acquire content as we use them to order and explain reality.'¹⁸

Now it is not very clear what Almond is trying to say through all this. If he means that any characteristic or set of characteristics which is considered as a criterion of political development is capable of increase or decrease and thus includes in itself indications both of political growth and political decay, then obviously one can have little quarrel with what he is saying. Any theory of political development would obviously be also a theory of political decline or decay. But, equally obviously, a theory is different from the criterion or criteria of development. True, economists are not embarrassed by facts of fluctuation, stagnation, and decline in national product; nor are biologists by the decay and death of organisms. But it is equally true that they are not in much doubt as to whether an economy is growing or declining or remaining static or whether an organism is ill or healthy. The same, unfortunately, can hardly be said about political scientists and the political development about which they write so continuously and voluminously. The day Almond or anybody else achieves this, the controversy about the concept would cease. However, the situation with respect to the concept of political development is that nobody seems to know what constitutes 'political development'. Does, for example, an increase in 'political participation' constitute positive political development? Supposing somebody answers 'yes', then he would not be justified in holding any polity to be undergoing negative political development if 'political participation' is increasing in that polity. Also, if there is more 'political participation' in one polity than in another, then the first would necessarily have to be considered politically more developed than the other. There could also be differing rates of growth in 'political participation' in different countries, and these would determine the rates of political development also. The same obviously would be true of any other criteria which may be offered for political development.

Yet almost all the criteria which political scientists offer for 'political development' suffer from the defect that their presence or absence or increase or decrease is seldom uniquely correlated with what is considered to be either 'positive' or 'negative'

development. Let this situation be clarified and then we will know where a country stands with respect to what the author considers a 'positive' or 'negative' political development. Yet this is what one seldom finds. Almond talks of economic development and suggests that the concept of political development is equally viable. Yet, if this were so, why is it that we have no quarterly, half-yearly, or yearly reports on the rate of 'positive' or 'negative' political development, say, of the United States? Has any political scientist concerned with political development tried, for example, to determine whether the 1960-70 decade was a period of 'negative', 'positive', or 'static' growth in relation to political development for the United States or, for that matter, any other Western country? Even if the conclusion be thought so self-evident as not to require any investigation, the rates of growth may still decline or vary between different countries. There seems something pathological in the almost exclusive concentration of attention on the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America among thinkers concerned with political development. Would it not be strange if economists concerned with economic development had nothing to say about the economic growth in their own countries?

Almond compares the concept of political development not only to that of economic development, but also to that of biological and psychological growth, ignoring the important differences between the two. One wonders what biological growth could mean, outside the evolutionary context, except what is generally known as maturation on the one hand and health on the other. Maturation, to a great extent, is an almost inevitable process inherently determined and containing in it the future seeds of decline and death also. I hope Almond does not mean anything analogous with respect to the concept of political development. We will have occasion later to examine the biological analogy in greater detail in connection with the notion of evolution as applied to social and political fields. But even here it seems clear that 'political development' is not being seen on the model of an almost inevitable maturation immanently determined, as the complaint usually seems to be that so many societies fail to make good politically. It is not that they are stillborn or that they die when young, but that they do survive and yet somehow fail to mature, which in the bio-

logical realm would be regarded as almost an impossibility.

The analogy with health, on the other hand, creates problems of a different kind. One surely does not get healthier and healthier and healthier, just as one may get richer and richer and richer. And, while there are hundreds of ways of getting ill, there is only one way in which one may be healthy. It is not that the phrase 'one is getting healthier' has no application, but that it has relevance only in the context of recovering from illness. It would be odd to say 'I am getting healthier' when I had not felt ill or weak earlier. Health is not the same kind of thing as wealth, and Almond does not make clear whether he conceives of political development on the model of one or the other. The very fact that he refers to both health and wealth without showing any awareness of the significant differences between them may be taken as a sign that he has not reflected upon the *kind* of development which 'political development' is. The same criticism, of course, may be made of all the others who have written on the subject. They have not even asked whether 'political development' is the sort of development that is capable of *indefinite*, incremental growth. Sometimes they *seem* to ask this question or something analogous to it. Yet the fact that they do not stop and seek an answer before moving forward suggests that, though the question appears to have been asked, its significance was not perceived at all. Lucian Pye, for example, asks, 'What is the meaning of "political development" and what characterizes "modernization" in the realm of politics? In politics is there the same distinction as in economics between "developed" and "underdeveloped"? Are there certain forms and conditions of politics that are necessary to support, or at least not inhibit other forms of social and economic development?'¹⁹ Yet, as far as I know, he has nowhere tried to come to terms with these questions. In fact, he does not seem to have even reflected upon the implications of the questions asked.

The first question, for example, involves a distinction between 'political modernization' and 'political development' which seems to have hardly ever been clarified by Pye or anybody else. Similarly, the second question raises in a crucial way the fundamental problem of whether the concept of 'political development' is analogous in essential respects to that of 'economic

development' or radically different from it. And, if the latter, then what is the nature of this radical difference? Are there, then, different *kinds* of development, with almost typical differences between them? If so, the first task should have been the analysis, delineation, and classification of different kinds of development, since only then could it be determined to which type 'political development' belonged. Yet there is nothing of the kind in Pye or any of the other political scientists who have written on 'political development'.

The third question raises doubts about the autonomy of 'political development'. If political forms are to be judged as 'developed' or 'undeveloped' *only* by the fact that they are or are not conducive to 'social and economic development', then there is no such thing as 'political development' *per se*. Rather, it is to be understood in purely instrumental terms. But then, many different kinds of instrumentalities may achieve the same goal, particularly if the goal itself is not too precisely defined. Also, it is not quite clear as to what exactly is meant by 'social development' as distinct from 'economic development'. Is it implied that the two may occur independently of each other, or that one is a precondition of the other, or that there is some sort of an inverse relation between them?

To ask these questions and try to find answers to them is to become aware that the literature on political development is silent about them. Lucian Pye raises them, but does not even attempt any answer. Almond tries to escape these questions by calling the concepts used in the discussion of 'political development' 'open terms which acquire content as we use them to order and explain reality'. But does this solve any problem? Fuzziness, ambiguity, lack of clear thought, imprecision in the formulation of questions cannot be brushed away merely by calling the terms 'open'. In a sense, all terms having empirical referents are 'open', but that does not mean that all objections against any of their specific formulations can be brushed aside merely by saying that they are 'open'.

The term 'development', then, may be 'open' as Almond contends, and may even be treated as value-neutral as he wants us to treat it. But, even then, none of the troubling questions that we have been raising would cease to exist. After all, if 'development' is treated as a neutral term—and Almond is at

liberty to do so—it becomes something like 'change'. But would not the same problems arise with respect to 'positive development' and 'negative development'? The search for criteria for 'political development' obviously does not relate merely to finding out whether something labelled 'political' has changed. This presumably would not be very difficult to do. The problems basically relate to what is to count as positive 'political development' and what as negative. Usually, the term 'development' itself was assumed to have the term 'positive' implied in it, and almost all the literature on 'political development' testifies to this. But even if it were to be disinfected and made value-neutral as Almond wants, the problems would reappear with respect to what he himself chooses to call 'positive' or 'negative' 'political development'.

The same is true with respect to Huntington's claim to have given up the concept of 'political development'. He writes, 'In my 1968 book, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, which otherwise builds extensively on the 1965 article, the concept of political development was quietly dropped. I focus instead on what I conceive to be the critical relationship between political participation and political institutionalization without worrying about the issue of which should be labelled "political development".'²⁰ Now, one may not worry about what is to be called 'political development', just as one may choose to cut out the positive implication involved in the term 'development', but the obligation to spell out what one considers the positive direction of change in the realm of politics can hardly be given up so easily. Though Huntington may not talk of 'political development', he talks of 'political decay' all right. In fact, the first chapter of his 1968 book is entitled 'Political Order and Political Decay' in contrast to the 1965 article which was entitled, 'Political Development and Political Decay'. The only change, thus, is in the replacement of the term 'order' for the term 'development', which presumably provides only a more specific content to what was meant more generally in the earlier title. He almost admits as much when he observes in the Preface, 'Economists who write about economic development presumably favor it, and this book originates in parallel concern which I have for political stability.'²¹ Political stability, then, is perhaps the same as political order, and provides for Huntington

the criterion for what he considers 'political development'. In his 1971 article, he says, 'The concept of political development thus serves in effect as a sign of scholarly preferences rather than as a tool for analytical purposes.'²² His own preference for order is fairly clear as he chooses to call the reverse 'political decay'.

Some of Huntington's arguments against the notion of 'political development' are important and, to some extent, we ourselves will use them in various parts of our discussion in this work. But the impression which he tries to create of having given up the concept of 'political development' is not quite accurate. Only it is now conceived of as a *relationship* between two variables, rather than being singly determined by either of them. He himself has given the basic equation as

$$\frac{\text{Political Participation}}{\text{Political Institutionalization}} = \text{Political Instability}^{23}$$

Assuming that political instability is the opposite of political order, it would follow that

$$\text{Political Order} = \frac{\text{Political Institutionalization}}{\text{Political Participation}}$$

Further, if 'political decay' is the same as 'political instability', then it is obvious that for Huntington 'political institutionalization' is positively and directly correlated with whatever is the opposite of 'political decay'. The correlation of 'political participation', on the other hand, is negative, and thus he was not very wrong in titling his 1965 article 'Political Development and Political Decay'. Only now the dynamic thrust is seen as coming from the negative factor, that is, 'political participation', and whether it results in political decay or political order depends upon the capacity of political institutions to absorb it and, in the process, adapt to each other. Riggs has developed a slightly more sophisticated and generalized theory out of this, but at least he has admitted that what he is talking about is 'developmental conflict'.²⁴ There seems no reason to think that Huntington is talking about something which is different in any essential respect from what Riggs is talking about. We will have occasion later to discuss in detail the contentions of both with respect to what they regard as 'political development', but

there seems no reason to think that Huntington does not believe in something which others call 'political development' and which he seems afraid to designate as such.

'Participation', then, has been regarded as a criterion of positive political development by most political scientists. However, there are some like Huntington who regard it primarily as a negative factor, while others like Riggs regard it as that negative element in the dialectics of development which makes it possible to reach higher levels of political synthesis. But whether positive or negative, and whether creatively negative or just negative, it has always played a key role in all thought concerned with political development. Yet if there is such diversity in the ways in which it can be understood as a criterion, ranging from the purely positive to the purely negative, it is obvious that, apart from the purely subjective idiosyncrasies of the authors, there must be something besides participation itself which tends to make some relate it positively and others negatively to what they regard as 'political development'.

The reason why 'participation' is regarded as a positive sign relates to the fact that it is only through participation that one can make known what one thinks or feels or wants with respect to the system, and that one can play some part in shaping it nearer not only to the desire of one's heart but also to the judgement of one's head. But for this reason, it is also felt—to use a phrase of Almond—that 'the capabilities of a system may be overloaded', and that the proverbial too many cooks can indeed spoil the broth. The point obviously is that if 'participation' is seen in terms of 'demands' upon the system, then too many demands may break the system. On the other hand, if it is seen in terms of 'counselling and taking part in the decision-making process', then too many counsels and too many decision-makers may frustrate the process itself. The former is usually known in the literature as 'interest articulation', while the latter has been given no specific, distinctive name, though 'interest aggregation' and 'capabilities' refer to some of its aspects. We will discuss each of these in detail later on.

The notion of 'participation' has recently been modified by some thinkers. Brunner and Brewer, for example, suggest that a more useful conceptualization of political participation may be

found in 'the capacity of a group or section to respond to changes in its life situation by giving or withholding support for the government'. And, 'more generally, participation is the extent to which stimuli or felt needs can be converted into meaningful responses at the aggregate level'.²⁵ This is close to what Almond calls 'interest articulation'. But it seems a little strange to define 'participation' in terms of 'capacity' which is basically something dispositional rather than actual. Also it seems odd that the definition, if taken literally, would exclude any political concern or response that was related not to changes in the group's *own* life situation but to issues of concern to other groups in the same polity or even in other countries. This would make all idealistic involvement in politics non-participatory by definition. The authors, further, fail to see that if 'political participation' is defined in terms of the capacity to give or withhold support to the government, then it is only a minority which can ever, even potentially, participate in the political process, as it is only a minority which possesses this *capacity* in any significant or substantial degree. Not only this, it would, on this analysis, be in the interest of each group to see that others do not get this capacity. This may occur. But if, in such a circumstance, 'participation' is still treated as a criterion of 'positive political development', then the latter can only be achieved by an egalitarian distribution of all that contributes to such a capacity. Yet, as such distribution would not be to the *interest* of any *specific* group, and as unselfish participation is ruled out by definition, it would follow that positive political development in the sense of enlargement of participation would happen only rarely and then too by accident. The hope in such a situation may perhaps be seen to lie in the possible conflict amongst those who have this capacity and in their attempts to augment their capacity by trying to win over those with little or no capacity of their own except numbers.

It is interesting, however, to see why the authors consider it necessary to view the notion of 'participation' in this manner. The reason lies in the fact that they found voting turnout rates in Turkey and the Philippines too high for their taste. These countries, after all, have to be regarded as politically underdeveloped, and if they show high levels of political participation as measured by voting turnout, then either 'participation' is not

a criterion of 'political development' or voting turnout is not a measure of 'participation'. The authors chose the latter alternative. They write, 'In many countries that are still considered relatively underdeveloped there are already very high levels of voting turnout. In Turkey, for example, the turnout rates were 89%, 89%, and 77% of the eligible electorate in the general elections of 1950, 1954, and 1957, respectively. The Philippine presidential elections of 1946, 1949, 1953, 1957 and 1961 had turnout rates of 89.6%, 67.7%, 77.2%, 75.5% and 79.4% of the registered electorate. If the phenomenon called participation is increasing in the less developed countries, then turnout rates are not an accurate measure of it.'²⁶ But why not? They may not be an *accurate* measure, but they certainly are some measure of it.

The trouble with most criteria of political development, as we shall see later on, is that they either turn countries which are presumably 'politically developed' into being politically underdeveloped or *vice versa* or both. The only criterion which seems an exception to this is the criterion of economic growth. But if that criterion be accepted, then there remains no real need for thinking about 'political development' in any specific, separate sense of the term. 'Participation' is a case in point. If voting turnout, especially in democratic countries, is accepted as at least one of the key measures of 'political participation', then the United States appears woefully underdeveloped politically. 'The number of eligible Americans who have actually voted in presidential elections since World War II has ranged from 51.5 per cent in 1948 to 63.8 per cent in 1960.'²⁷ If one compares these figures with those for Turkey and the Philippines given earlier, one sees the degree of 'political underdevelopment' which the United States suffers in contemporary times. Unfortunately, this conclusion is not very acceptable to writers on 'political development', as not only do most of them happen to be U.S. citizens but also, if they were to accept it, they would find little to make a country such as Turkey or the Philippines interesting as examples of emulation for 'political development'.

But it is not only the 'so-called' 'underdeveloped' countries which have a higher voter turnout than the U.S.A. Most Western European countries seem to enjoy the same advantage. For example, 'Turnout in Italy and Belgium in the years since

World War II has approximated 90 per cent; in Denmark, West Germany, and Great Britain, 80–85 per cent; and in Canada, Norway, Finland, and Japan, 70–80 per cent.²⁸ Yet, it seems difficult for any political scientist to conclude on the basis of these figures that the U.S. is far, far more 'politically underdeveloped' than these countries. The writer, of course, goes on to say that 'The few cross-national studies conducted so far indicate, however, that despite the low turnout, other indexes of participation—political interest and awareness, expressed party affiliation, sense of political competence, etc.—tend to be higher in the United States than in many other countries, such as France and Italy.'²⁹ He does not give any judgement as to the relative weightage of all these factors *vis-à-vis* voter turnout, nor does he give any explanation as to why politics which score high on other indices should be low on voter turnout, when perhaps that is the area where citizens can be most effective in the political system.

The deeper problem with respect to 'participation', however, relates to the fact that so few people who can participate in the political process actually do so to any great extent. As Bryce observed, 'only a small group gives constant attention to politics, a slightly larger group is interested but comparatively passive, while the mass of men are largely indifferent'.³⁰ The only alternative in such a situation seems to be to force people to 'participate' in politics, to make participation involuntary rather than voluntary—not a matter of choice, but of compulsion. This, to a great extent, has been the tendency of totalitarian polities. Yet there are very few persons who would consider such 'enforced participation' a sign of 'political development'. The very fact that participation has to be forced shows that it is not desired and that if the enforcement were to be removed, in all likelihood non-participation would increase tremendously.

It may be that large-scale participation in the political process is a sign not of health but of disease in the body politic. When the polity is healthy, people can take it for granted and pursue other interests which they regard as worthwhile. It is only when they find it impossible to take it for granted, as it becomes increasingly difficult for them to pursue ends which they regard as worthwhile, that they begin more and more to

concern themselves with politics. The body politic may be something like the human body, in that the less you are aware of it as a problem, the healthier you are. There are obvious exceptions to this, but on the whole it is a fair description of the situation.

The 'participation' criterion of political development, thus, appears to run into difficulties for which there seem no very adequate answers in the literature concerning the subject. First, it is not quite clear whether it is a sign of positive or negative political development. Though generally it is treated as a positive indicator, many of the political problems that plague the so-called developing countries are usually attributed to it also. Second, it is not quite clear whether 'participation' is to be voluntary or involuntary in order to be counted a criterion of 'political development'. If voluntary, it is not quite clear whether an increase indicates the sorry state of affairs in the polity or just a growing sense of responsibility and a desire for self-determination in the populace. If involuntary, on the other hand, it is not very clear whether it is only formal participation which is to be obligatory or whether even the direction which one's participation is to take is to be prescribed. At an even more fundamental level, it is seldom made clear what exactly is meant by 'participation'. Also, as there is a limit to participation, there would have to be one to political development also. The voting age, for example, can be reduced, but not indefinitely. The franchise can be extended and legal disabilities removed. But obviously there is a point beyond which one cannot go. There is such a thing as universal franchise, and it is not difficult of achievement either. The obstructions in the way of the exercise of franchise could also be removed, and thus complete political development could be achieved on the basis of this criterion.

Is 'political development', then, a sort of development which can be completely achieved? If 'participation' be the criterion and if it be understood in the usual sense, then there seems no reason why this should not be so. But then, 'political development' would not be the indefinitely incremental sort of thing we usually tend to think all 'development' to be. Perhaps that is the reason why most thinking concerning 'political development' tends to concentrate on the countries of Asia, Africa, and

Latin America, as the U.S. and most countries of Western Europe may be assumed to have reached the goal already. Development, of course, need not be conceived of as just incremental in character. Instead, it may be conceived of as involving radical breaks between one level and another. The movement from one level to another and the relationship between the levels may be thought of in dialectical terms, but this is not necessary. Yet, whether it is conceived of dialectically or not, the idea of development in terms of radical breaks does not escape the problem raised by the denial of the possibility of indefinite incremental growth with respect to 'political development'. The advocates of socialist or communist notions of 'political development' find themselves in the same dilemma as those who espouse what are usually called democratic conceptions. One's ideal paradigm may be the Soviet Union or Maoist China, just as the paradigm of democratic political development may be the United States of America or Great Britain or any other country of Western Europe. But the issue as to what 'political development' means for such a country remains the same. The advocates of each pattern could easily spell out what it would mean for a polity of the other type to develop politically. But what development would mean in their own case they could hardly tell. To admit the possibility of 'political development', except in a very, very marginal sense, is to admit that one has not achieved the polity one wanted to achieve. What would it mean for revolution to occur, say, in the Soviet Union or Maoist China? The question when posed in terms of 'revolution' brings the dilemma into the open. But 'revolution' is merely another name for 'political development' in this context. What can occur, for those who accept these nations as paradigms of communist polities, is only 'counter-revolution'. The situation is the same on the other side, though few appear to regard it as such. But that is primarily because most writers on such matters tend to accept communist countries as paradigmatic examples of developed polities. It is, however, not difficult to find explicit statements on the other side. Eugene Kamenka writes, for example: 'The concept of universality has been exhausted for all practical purposes, in the attaining of representative government and reasonable economic affluence. The revolution of the future in advanced,

democratic, industrialized society could only be counter-revolution, a seizure of power by a group intent on re-establishing despotic rule and a status society.'³¹

The term 'development', in fact, is used in many senses and does not always connote the possibility of indefinite growth. Perhaps 'political development' is a development of the sort where this connotation is not made. But if this is so, then this is the first thing to be clarified. Normally, it is discussed, debated, and written about on the analogy of economic development. But if it does not permit of indefinite growth in principle, it is different from economic development in certain fundamental and essential respects, and the analogy then becomes very misleading.

On the other hand, if it is treated as an ideal which societies only asymptotically approximate and which they may approach but never completely realize, and if 'participation' is conceived of as defining what this development consists in, then 'participation' itself has to be thought of in such a way that it could be indefinitely approximated to but never completely actualized. In such a situation, it obviously has to go beyond voter turnout and even beyond the other so-called indices such as political interest and awareness, expressed party affiliation, sense of political competence, etc., which McClosky mentions in his article, cited earlier. But if the sense of 'participation' is extended beyond what is involved in the notion of 'representative' government based on universal suffrage, we run up against what we have earlier called the difficulty of 'involuntary vs. voluntary participation', and, at a deeper level still, against the basic asymmetry involved in all power relations themselves.

It may be correct, as Dahl observes, that 'even today what one ordinarily calls democracies are, as we all know, a very long way from being fully democratized political systems.'³² But if 'the plateau on which the democracies repose is . . . a long way from what a reasonable observer might regard as the summit of political democracy', because 'it is obvious that political influence is distributed with great unevenness',³³ then 'participation' in the sense of 'democratization' would seem to mean equal distribution of political influence or, in other words, equal distribution of political power. But can power be equally distributed? And even if, by some miracle, someone were to

distribute it equally—whatever may be meant by that term—would it remain so distributed for long?

The basic asymmetry which is involved in all power relationships has seldom been the object of sustained reflection on the part of those who have conceived of 'political development' in terms of equality of political power. But if political power is distinguished from other kinds of power by its ultimate command over instruments of physical coercion, then equal distribution becomes even more difficult in its case. The relation between different kinds of power has seldom been clarified, but if the political realm claims a certain foundational primacy because of its control over means of legitimate coercion, then it is obvious that such a control could not be distributed equally. Further, if a certain positive relationship be accepted between other kinds of power and political power in the sense of exercise of political influence, then it is intrinsically impossible that political influence could ever be evenly distributed amongst all members of a polity. The situation could perhaps be retrieved theoretically if we were to postulate that each individual has supremacy in one particular type of power and if all types of power were to be treated as equivalent in strength or influence. This, however, would run against the primacy of political power over all other powers and against the possibility of some people combining and thus forming a more powerful combination against others. The latter possibility is presumably taken care of by the democratic principle of majority rule, but it reinstates to some extent the asymmetry between those who command the majority and those who do not.

Yet, however intractable may be the problem raised by the asymmetrical character of power relationships, the hoped-for amelioration through extension of participation in the political process reveals at least one of its essential purposes. It mitigates to some extent the unevenness in the distribution of political influence. And, to the extent that the capacity for political influence is itself a function of other kinds of inequalities, it works for their amelioration also. But the type of inequalities whose amelioration may be sought has to be such that mitigation is possible. In other words, they have to be man-made, that is, social or institutional in origin. Yet this very origin suggests the difficulties in the way of their removal. There are vested

interests in the perpetuation of existing inequalities, and it is the task of those who want to remove them to articulate and attempt to secure their counter-interests. Political development, then, may be seen as an increase in 'interest articulation', and the latter may be treated as another criterion in terms of which political development may be articulated and judged.

The concept of 'participant citizenship' has been articulated by Inkeles in terms of freedom from traditional authority, interest in public affairs, and political rationality. He suggests that there is a participant citizenship syndrome which consists of five factors. It 'includes identification with an allegiance to supra-local and non-parochial public authority; interest in civic affairs; information about political figures; participation in public organizations; and adherence to rational organizational rules as a basis for running government affairs'.³⁴ It is not quite clear whether he would take an increase in this syndrome as a sign of political development, but as he takes it as almost a *sine qua non* of modernity and as, presumably, to be modern is to be politically developed, it may be assumed that he would take it as such also. Yet, whether the so-called syndrome be an empirical fact or not, it is fairly obvious that he has not even raised the questions we have been concerned with, let alone made any attempt to answer them. In fact, the continuous confusion between 'modernization' and 'development' seldom permits most writers on the subject to come clearly to grips with the problem and to tackle the fundamental issues related to it.

Inkeles' study, for example, is concerned with the empirical establishment of what he calls the 'participant citizenship syndrome' and its specific relation to what may be considered some sort of 'modernity scale' on which various polities may be ranked. The notion of 'modernity' is generally tied up with temporal considerations in such a way as to make it impossible for any country or civilization in the past to be considered 'modern'. On the other hand, it is identified with certain characteristics which were supposed to be *first* exhibited in countries of Western Europe and then taken over elsewhere by other countries also. It is not made quite clear whether these characteristics, once acquired either by some process of creative innovation or by imitation, would last forever, or whether they

could possibly slip away once again. Is the possession of 'modernity', in other words, a permanent possession? Or can it be got hold of and lost, like other things in life? Or is it the sort of thing with respect to which possession may fluctuate? There can always be, so to say, 'more' or 'less' modernity, and there are no reasons why a particular polity may not move forward or slide back, as the case may be. But to admit the possibility of sliding back is to admit that time is not the essence of the matter, for a country which is not 'modern' today could very well have been so in the past. Yet once this is admitted there seems no intrinsic reason why polities in ancient times could not have been 'modern' in comparison to many that exist today. Also, by the same logic, those that are modern today could cease to be so tomorrow.³⁵

In fact, it is a little strange to find someone seriously implying that the five factors constituting 'participant citizenship' can only be found in the so-called 'modern societies' in modern times. It is difficult to believe that someone could be seriously contending that interest in civic affairs, or identification with supra-local, non-parochial public authority, or participation in public organizations, or adherence to rational organizational rules as a basis for running government affairs, or information about political figures could individually or collectively be significantly absent from any large, complex polity at any time, whether present or past. If it is suggested that it is all a matter of quantitative mix and significant proportions, then the author concerned should make clear what he considers to be the exact critical minimum which would constitute 'modernity'. Yet this is seldom even attempted. As we have already pointed out, the voter turnout proportions for the United States, for example, would make it relatively undeveloped in relation to many so-called undeveloped countries.

Inkeles' study, thus, suffers from the basic defect of not even having raised certain crucial questions, and it is therefore mostly irrelevant to the issue we are discussing. Even on the empirical plane, one must conclude that something is seriously wrong with the study, as at least one of its findings seems completely mistaken in the light of later developments. According to him, 'only in East Pakistan does the observed pattern support the unitary conception of the modern political man. There,

those who are active citizens are also *consistently* more benevolent toward other groups and *more satisfied with* the government's performance.'³⁶ One wonders what is meant by 'active citizens' in this context. Everyone who had anything to do with East Pakistan knew of the deep dissatisfaction felt by the people there against a government which was controlled mainly by people in West Pakistan—a dissatisfaction so widespread and deep-rooted that it later resulted in a civil war leading to the dismemberment of Pakistan and the establishment of an independent country, Bangla Desh, out of what was formerly known as East Pakistan. Yet this empirical study, scientifically conducted with liberal funds, technical expertise, and sophisticated methodology, came to an opposite conclusion which, if true, would have rendered impossible what is already a fact of history. If such studies can go so far wrong in understanding present societies, one wonders how far they can be relied upon for characterizations of societies that are past. One should, perhaps, take what they say not merely with a pinch, but rather, a ton of salt.*

* Professor Inkeles in a personal discussion pointed out that my criticism was misplaced as in the study mentioned he was 'not making generalizations to the national populations' (p. 1120). But then we may legitimately wonder what is the significance of his findings regarding the exemplification of 'the unitary conception of modern political man' in East Pakistan or of those relating to the 'active citizens' in that country. The reader may judge the matter for himself, as presumably the presence of these findings would not only suggest the relative modernity of East Pakistan in the light of the criteria mentioned but also be regarded as favourable for the chances of political stability in that country.

NOTES

1. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973).
2. For an interesting discussion of this, see Robert A. Dahl, *After the Revolution?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).
3. Benjamin N. Cardozo, *The Nature of the Judicial Process* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921).
4. Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 45.
5. Fred W. Riggs, 'The Dialectics of Developmental Conflict', *Comparative Political Studies*, I (July 1968).

6. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
7. Sydney Verba, Bashiruddin Ahmed, and Anil Bhatt, *Caste, Race, and Politics* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971).
8. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 29–32.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 255, 262.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
15. Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Boston: M.I.T. Press, 1963).
16. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 55. Also, 'The Change to Change', *Comparative Politics*, April 1971, p. 314.
17. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 34.
18. Gabriel A. Almond, 'Political Development: Analytical and Normative perspectives', in *Comparative Political Studies*, 1969, p. 458.
19. Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 4.
20. Huntington, 'The Change to Change', pp. 304–5.
21. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. vii.
22. Huntington, 'The Change to Change', p. 304.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
24. Riggs, 'The Dialectics of Developmental Conflict', p. 197.
25. Ronald D. Brunner and Garry D. Brewer, *Organized Complexity* (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 11.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11.
27. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1965, p. 384, quoted by Herbert McClosky in the article 'Political Participation', in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12, p. 254.
28. McClosky, p. 255.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, p. 254.
31. Eugene Kamenka, 'The Concept of a Political Revolution', in *Revolution*, ed. Carl T. Friedrich (*Nomos VIII*, New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 134.
32. Dahl, *After the Revolution?*, pp. 4–5.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
34. Alex Inkeles, 'Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries', *The American Political Science Review*, 63 (Dec. 1969), p. 1139.
35. Some of the issues raised here are closely related to the question whether there is any such thing as political evolution. We will discuss this in detail later in connection (see pp. 47–65) with the so-called evolutionistic perspective in the discussion on political development.
36. Inkeles, 'Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries', p. 1129. Italics mine.

2

THE CRITERION AS
DIFFERENTIATION(1) *Differentiation*

'Participation' may be said to be immanently embedded in the domain of the political itself. And, though we have pointed out the intrinsic conflict caused by the asymmetrical character of power, which also belongs inalienably to the domain of the political, one may yet concede participation to be a moral demand that arises from and belongs to the realm itself. The same, however, can hardly be said of the other criterion most commonly offered by writers in this field. 'Differentiation' is so often offered as a criterion of 'political development', and by writers of such different persuasions, that it will not be amiss to examine it in some detail at this stage. And the first thing to note about differentiation is that it has nothing to do *specifically* with political development. Rather, it is regarded as a criterion of development in general, and therefore political development, as a type of development, may be expected to show this characteristic also. The political character of development, then, may be considered as determining the fact that differentiation in this domain lies in the realm of institutions and functions which are specifically political in character.

Normally, differentiation is taken as a sign of development (and by 'development' from now on we will always mean 'positive development') because it is supposed to contribute to the efficient functioning of the system. But it may also be implied that unless differentiation has occurred, an entity will not have come into being, and without this one could not even talk of development or non-development or underdevelopment. Differentiation, in this perspective, would be a precondition for

the emergence of a separate, distinctive entity. But by the same logic it would not be a sign of development unless it be the development of the undifferentiated entity from which or within which it has been differentiated. Yet if the latter alternative is accepted, the differentiated entity would still be seen in terms of that within which it has been differentiated and not in terms of its own separate, distinctive identity. The function which differentiation was supposed to perform, thus, gets nullified in this perspective. Further, if differentiation is supposed to be a development of the undifferentiated, then the differentiated, in order to develop itself, must become further differentiated, and so on *ad infinitum*. Also, in the undifferentiated stage the differentiations must, to some extent, have been implicit. Riggs has used the terms 'fused' and 'refracted' for these notions.

These two dimensions in the notion of 'differentiation' as a criterion of political development are themselves fused in the writings of most political scientists on the subject. The separation of the 'political realm' itself is taken as a sign of social development, and the further differentiation of the political realm into specialized institutions concerned with specific functions is taken as a sign of political development. It is not clearly indicated whether a further differentiation of these specialized institutions with their specific functions would be regarded as development and, if so, of what. Presumably, on the previous analogy, it would be a development directly of these institutions and their functions, and indirectly of the political realm, and still more indirectly, of society as a whole. Following this logic, it may and perhaps will be said that ultimately it is a development of the whole human race, and, in fact, of the whole cosmos itself.

The presupposition that structures and functions are capable of infinite analysis is writ large on this way of conceiving the notion of development. The analysis is not to be merely conceptual in nature. Rather, it is an actual process of subdivision which perhaps can be carried on *ad infinitum*. This possibility of unlimited subdivision is, in fact, the ground of the possibility of infinite development which otherwise would find its necessary limitation in the limits to the possibility of differentiation itself. Most thinkers, however, have not concerned themselves with

the problems raised by this requirement of a perpetual possibility of differentiation as a precondition for the existence of a permanent possibility of development. If, for any reason, further differentiation could not be conceived, or, if conceived, were not actually feasible, then, in this perspective, development would not be possible either.

Differentiation, thus, may be seen either as the coming into being of something distinctive with an independent separate being of its own, or as a process which, when it takes place within an entity, provides for a more efficient performance of the function attributed to that entity. In the former case, the notion of development does not make sense unless interpreted in the purely quantitative sense of an increase in the number of entities in the world. In the second sense, however, one would have to integrate the function of the differentiated structure to that of the one within which the differentiation has taken place. This integration may presumably be effected by some other differentiated structure which specifically performs the integrative function, or it may be brought about by the interrelation between different structures which occurs, perhaps, automatically. The first alternative would probably be regarded as an example of greater development by those who accept the idea of differentiation *per se* as a criterion of development. But in whatever manner the integrative function be performed, the necessity for it arises because of the fact that differentiation has taken place. On the other hand, if the so-called integrated differentiation is to succeed, then the function of both entities or structures have to be in balance with each other. But, in that case, there seems little reason to call one rather than another a criterion of development.

There are other difficulties in the notion which have hardly engaged the attention of those who have sought to find in it a clue to the secret of what development really consists in. If, for example, integration is necessitated by the fact of differentiation, then differentiation *per se* could not be a criterion of development, political or otherwise. Rather, it would be a sort of negative indication, for whatever it brings into being has somehow to be balanced by integrative forces or mechanisms which must be able to cope with it. If this is not done, then differentiation may be just another name for dissolution. Yet, once the

possibility of there being too much differentiation is admitted, it would follow that differentiation *per se* could not be taken as a criterion of development. Rather, the criterion would be some sort of a ratio between integration and differentiation, where each tends to be balanced by the other. But, as everybody knows, a ratio is a function of two numbers and the more we would have of differentiation, the more we would need of integration, and even though the two numbers may change the ratio could still be the same. There is no difference, for example, between 2/4 and 4/8. Therefore, if development be treated as a ratio between integration and differentiation, then, even though there may be an ostensible increase in both, it would be illusory to think that there has been any real development.*

The notion of integration, if brought into a discussion of the problem of development, raises problems of its own. If it is supposed to occur automatically, it raises the question whether there can be any such thing as disintegration. The relevance of the question may be seen if we ask what it would mean for the universe, meaning by that the totality of all that is, to lack integration. In a fundamental sense, whatever is, must by that very fact be assumed to be integrated, since if it were not so integrated, it would just not be. In the context of a larger totality, then, there would always be integration, whether there occurs any differentiation or not.

On the other hand, if integration itself is the function of the differentiated structure, then the whole co-ordinated system with its differentiated structures along with their differentiated functions would be a sign of development. But if one asks 'development of what?' then one would have difficulty in finding an answer. It could not be a development of itself, for 'development' is a comparative term, and the whole differentiated system is a *sign* of the development of something which was undeveloped before. But if the whole system, including the integrating structure, has differentiated itself into an autonomous entity, then how can it be considered a development of anything else?

The issue may perhaps gain a little more clarity if we ask

* The problems related to development conceived as a relationship between two or more factors will be discussed in Chapter 4, section (8), pp. 160-78.

ourselves whether the coming into being of any entity is in itself a sign of development. This could only be so when it is taken as a sign of something else, whether quantitatively or qualitatively or both. In itself, it could not be considered in a developmental perspective, though development could be conceived of with respect to it or even in relation to entities other than itself. Thus, the concept of development may be said to be applied to an entity either in relation to its own previous states or in relation to other entities having some property or set of properties in respect of which they may be regarded as relevantly comparable.

Now, in none of these senses can differentiation *per se* be considered a sign of development. It may well be such a sign, but it does not have to be such. Whether with respect to an entity's own past or with respect to a relevant comparison with some other entity, there seems no surety that the mere fact of differentiation by itself would ensure development. In bureaucratic structures, differentiation may simply be a sign of what has been called Parkinson's Law. In the case of a political entity like an empire or a nation, it may just be a sign of the weakening of central authority, or even of an increasing questioning of its basic legitimacy. In a social structure, it may be a sign of alienation or even of an increase in parochial, self-centred interests.*

The objection may be made that these are not the types of differentiation which are meant when it is offered as a criterion of development. But there would then be different types of differentiation, and it would have to be specified as to what type is to be taken as a criterion of development. Unfortunately, the literature on the subject offers little help in this connection. It talks only of differentiation and does not seem to distinguish between those types that are a sign of positive development, and those that are not.

Basically, differentiation is supposed to result in a more efficient functioning of the system and is, therefore, accepted as a sign of development. But, viewed in this manner, it would be such a sign only indirectly. The direct sign would be the

* The criterion of political development in terms of interest articulation will be discussed in Chapter 4, section (1), pp. 84-94.

efficiency of the performance itself. Yet, unless it be assumed that differentiation always results in an increase in the efficiency of performance, it would be difficult to hold that it is always a sign of development. But, though this assumption seems most difficult to establish, it is taken as almost axiomatic in most literature on the subject. There seems hardly any attempt to establish empirically that it is so. The facts of evolution and the social and economic benefits associated with the division of labour are apparently supposed to make the exercise unnecessary. But even if the evidence were as decisive as it is usually thought to be, this would still not settle the issue. It is quite possible that the functions we expect from a living organism or from an economic system are of such a type that they are best accomplished by a differentiating process wherein each subsystem performs its own specialized function. But it does not follow from this that all functions need necessarily be of this type. Or, even that these functions provide some pre-eminent paradigm which ought to be accepted till the case for a radical distinction with respect to some other functions is securely established. One does not find the functions which a political system is supposed to perform delineated very clearly in the literature on the subject.* Nor does there seem to be any attempt to establish that they would be better performed if there were to be a differentiation of structures and functions. And, it does not seem even to be asked whether there is such a thing as an unlimited possibility of differentiation of both structures and functions. Further, the ideal of a one-to-one correlation between structure and function tends to be implicitly assumed, even though according to many of the same writers the two are almost invariably mixed up in actually existing institutions. Yet, if there are such mix-ups, and if it is true that even when institutions are specially set up to perform a particular function they tend to take on other functions also, then it should be a matter for reflection as to why this happens to be so. If, in fact, the distinction between manifest and latent functions is taken seriously, and it is also accepted that these two kinds of functions are found everywhere and are usually

* Those which have been suggested will be discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 4.

different, then the very notion of a one-to-one correlation between structure and function is jeopardized at its very core. For it would then be impossible in principle to have a structure perform just *one* function, since besides carrying out the so-called manifest function, it would also be performing a latent function which is different from the first.

The criterion of differentiation, then, to say the least, is an ill-thought-out notion. Yet, as its strength is derived from its base in evolutionary theory, and as the concept of development itself is supposed to be grounded in evolution, it will not be amiss to examine this foundation itself.

(2) *The Theory of Evolution as a Ground for the Criterion as Differentiation*

Evolution means many things to many people. For some, it takes the place of religion in that it provides a grounding for the belief that there is something inherent in the universe which makes for progressive development. Darwin himself tried to make evolution do what was supposed to be a function of the biblical god, that is, the creation of species. Since then, many other people with great reputations have tried to discover all the divine functions in evolution. We need hardly refer to Teilhard de Chardin's *Phenomenon of Man* or Sri Aurobindo's *The Life Divine*, when we have a supreme example in Sir Julian Huxley, the eminent biologist, who is surcharged with a lyrical passion for what he himself has called 'the evolutionary vision'.¹ According to Huxley, 'the evolutionary vision . . . illuminates our existence in a simple, but almost overwhelming, way. It exemplifies the truth that truth is great and will prevail, and the greater truth that truth will set us free. Evolutionary truth frees us from subservient fear of the unknown and supernatural and exhorts us to face this new freedom with courage tempered with wisdom and hope tempered with knowledge. It shows us our destiny and our duty. It shows mind enthroned above matter, quantity subordinate to quality.'²

Now anything that can do all this must be *miraculous* indeed. And perhaps Sir Julian intends it to be taken in just that way. After all, he is an eminent scientist and would not use his words in too loose a fashion. Yet, it was he who insisted all through

the Chicago Conference on 'Evolution After Darwin' to celebrate the Centennial of the *Origin of Species* that evolution was 'no longer a theory, but a fact'.³ But if something which is a *fact* involves all the *value components* which he ascribes to it in the above statement, then it is a very odd kind of fact indeed. It does not merely involve the identity of the factual and the valuational, but also a *guarantee* that there is something in the nature of reality which ensures the triumph of value over disvalue or, in more traditional language, of good over evil. But this, as most students of philosophy would recognize, is usually regarded as a fallacy. G. E. Moore christened it 'the Naturalistic Fallacy'⁴ at the beginning of the century and since then it has generally been referred to by that name. Not all philosophers are in agreement about it (they hardly agree on anything), but anyone who does not subscribe to this view usually feels it incumbent on himself to come to terms with it. Not so Sir Julian, or any of the other luminaries gathered together to celebrate the Darwin Centennial.

In fact, as one looks through the roster of celebrities who participated in the conference, one is struck by the fact that hardly any philosophers were listed. Perhaps philosophy was not supposed to be relevant to any of the discussions that were to be held. But if the sort of ideas Sir Julian propounded were considered relevant to the issue of the conference, then it is difficult to see how the contributions of philosophers who have concerned themselves with the notion of evolution could have been considered irrelevant to it. One is struck, in fact, by the paucity of critical attitudes throughout the conference as reported in the commemorative volumes. It was as if the Centennial were a celebration not so much in honour of Darwin as of evolution itself. To be critical in such an atmosphere would have appeared a sign of bad manners, if not downright heresy. It was a meeting of the faithful, and the doubting Thomases had perhaps been deliberately excluded.

All this may seem unfair to the organizers and participants in the conference. The reason why everything was discussed except the notion of evolution itself, we may be told, lay in the situation itself. Within the scientific community, there is no dispute about the fact of evolution. As Huxley said at the very beginning, in television previews called 'At Random', 'the

first point to make about Darwin's theory is that it is no longer a theory, but a fact. No serious scientist would deny the fact that evolution has occurred, just as he would not deny the fact that the earth goes round the sun'.⁵ And, slightly later on, 'But all scientists agree that evolution is a fact. There are two problems involved here. First whether evolution has happened—and there is absolutely no disagreement among scientists that it has. The second problem is *how* evolution takes place, and here there has been argument, although we have made enormous progress in understanding the process of evolution and the role of natural selection in it.'⁶

But do all serious scientists understand the same thing by evolution? Would, for example, everybody⁷ agree with what Sir Julian has written in *The Evolutionary Vision* from which we quoted certain passages earlier? And if anyone disagreed, would he, in Huxley's view, not be a scientist at all, or at least not a serious scientist? Presumably, Hermann J. Müller and Sir Charles Galton Darwin are serious scientists. They were participants in the Centennial celebration and each presented a paper there. Müller's paper was entitled 'The Guidance of Human Evolution' and Sir Charles Darwin's, 'Can Man Control His Numbers?' These were later published in Volume II of the Centennial proceedings. Yet, any reader of these two articles will find the evolutionary vision of Sir Julian absent from their pages. There is no feeling that 'truth will necessarily prevail' or that it will 'set us free', whatever may be meant by these phrases. Darwin's is a frankly pessimistic conclusion, and he is aware that it is such. He writes, 'I am very fully conscious that the views I have expressed run entirely counter to many of the optimistic hopes of the present age.'⁸ Müller tries to sound optimistic, but basically he makes his favourable prognosis dependent on genetic control and improvement of population, which is even more difficult than the mere control of population about which Sir Charles, amongst others, is so pessimistic. Müller concludes by saying 'from now on, evolution is what we make it, *provided that we choose the true and the good. Otherwise, we shall sink back into oblivion.*'⁹ His words sound almost theological. And, if everything depends on man's choice of the true and the good, the situation is hopeless indeed.

It may be said that the difference we are pointing to may

better be understood as a difference in temperament rather than a difference in the substantive positions held about evolution. It is a difference between pessimism and optimism, even though the facts discerned and the possibilities envisaged are the same. After all, Huxley is as much aware of the alarming pitfalls on the evolutionary path as anyone else. And though his list of dangers contains such oddities as 'the rise and appeal of communist ideology, especially in the underprivileged sectors of the world's people', and such generalities as 'our general preoccupation with means rather than ends, with technology and quantity rather than creativity and quality',¹⁰ it still shows an awareness at least of the threat of overpopulation with which Darwin is concerned, if not of the problem of genetic control which Müller deals with in his article. Yet, even if this be true, it is fairly obvious that Huxley is far less self-critical in appraising what he is writing than are the other two scientists referred to. It is basically not merely a question of temperament, but of how much one wants to read into the idea of evolution, and whether one is prepared to examine critically what is thus included. The difference, for example, between Huxley's assessment of Teilhard de Chardin's ideas on evolution and that of P. B. Medawar can hardly be understood in terms of differences in temperament between the two authors, but rather, must be viewed as a consequence of differences in their ideas about what evolution means.¹¹

We have emphasized the Darwin Centennial discussions as they provided the occasion for the largest concentration in recent times of eminent scientists who had concerned themselves with issues relating to evolution. Yet, it would not be unfair to say that they hardly touched the central core of the notion itself. Rather, they tended to imply not only that there was nothing problematic about it, but almost that it was axiomatically true. It would not be amiss, therefore, to inquire as to how far the idea of evolution necessarily involves the concepts of development and differentiation as many political scientists, amongst others, have supposed it to do.

Normally, the idea of evolution is supposed to relate primarily to the realm of living organisms and the way they differentiated into species over a period of time. The pre-eminent association of the idea with the name of Darwin and the title

of the book in which he propounded the idea are evidence of this. Yet, no one hesitates to talk about the evolution of the earth or the solar system or even of the cosmos. On the other hand, there is equally little hesitation in talking about social and cultural evolution, or even the evolution of an idea or art form, or thought system. There should perhaps be little objection to the use of the word in a loose, popular sense provided this does not lead to any serious confusions. Also, it may be legitimate to extend by analogy a notion that has arisen in a certain field to other areas where its application helps in understanding them. Yet, there is always an extension where the analogy is superficial or even misleading. And, equally, there is looseness of usage which only confuses thought. Is the extension of the term 'evolution', then, an example of either of the latter types?

It is well known that the idea of a systematic sequence of changes appeared earlier in relation to geology and was fairly firmly established in that field long before Darwin appeared on the scene. But a mere systematic sequence of changes is not evolution, for it is just another name for what is usually known as causality. Within the Darwinian perspective, the systematic sequence of changes *has to be brought about in a certain manner and has to result in certain consequences* in order to be called evolution. These stipulations relate, on the one hand, to what is known as *natural selection* and, on the other, to what is usually called *origin of species*. If there were no such things as *species*, there would remain nothing to explain, thus rendering the *hypothesis* of evolution (*pace* Sir Julian) unnecessary. Equally, if there were no such thing as *natural selection*, then whatever we might postulate to account for the fact of there being species, it would never be of the nature of what Darwin meant by evolution. It is only the distinctive linkage of the two which makes for the distinctive notion of evolution. If even one is absent in a situation, the concept can hardly be applied to it.

But, however obvious this conclusion may appear, it has been continuously ignored in the writings on the subject. It never seems to have been asked by those who have written about cosmological, geological, or chemical evolution, what it would mean for there to be species of inorganic matter or for natural selection to take place with respect to them. Perhaps the chemical elements could be thought of as species of inorganic

matter, or even the ultimate particles of matter, such as electrons, protons, neutrons, and the diverse types of mesons. But what would be gained by calling them 'species' is difficult to understand. The basic point is that it does not make sense to talk about natural selection with respect to non-living matter. A complex structure may dissolve and we may say that it has been pronounced unfit to exist by the environment or that it has failed to meet the challenge of the environment. But this is only a manner of speaking, and everyone knows it to be so. Further, there is none of the replication and variation which is needed before natural selection can play its role. But supposing there is replication and variation in non-living matter, as some have argued,¹² there would even then remain the question as to which factor is supposed to do the selection, or with reference to which the process of selection is said to take place. Is non-living matter itself evolving? And if it is, with respect to what?¹³

There are, however, not only complex structures of non-living matter, but also those that are not complex, but rather most elementary in nature. Shall we say that there is evolution with respect to these also? But they are supposed to be the very stuff out of which the universe is made, and if this is so, how can they be said to evolve? Many scientists objected in the conference to Gaffron's use of the term 'chemical selection' which, according to him, started 'with the solubility of molecules in water'.¹⁴ But in order to talk of evolution at this level, we would perhaps have to talk in terms of 'physical selection', which, if anything, would be still more monstrous. If, as Dobzhansky has said, 'the term chemical selection' was a misnomer, then there is still more reason to think that 'physical selection' is such.

If, on the other hand, we think in terms of energy rather than particles, it becomes even more difficult to think in terms of a struggle for survival or natural selection. There are supposed to be conservation laws which ensure that the amount of energy in the universe, whatever may be meant by the word, remains constant. As there is, therefore, neither an increase nor decrease of energy, there could not possibly be any talk of evolution with respect to it. One may, of course, amuse oneself by thinking of the transformation of potential into kinetic energy as evolutionary in character, or perhaps even of the

counter-tendency to the second law of thermodynamics as having this nature. Many biologists do seem to believe, in the words of Medawar, 'that evolution flouts or foils the second law of thermodynamics', even though in his opinion this is a misconception arising from 'a confusion of thought'.¹⁵ But whether evolution flouts it or not, no one disputes that in the realm of non-living matter, the second law of thermodynamics reigns supreme. However, if this is so, it would equally obviously follow, at least for those who argue for the distinction, that there can be no evolution as far as non-living matter is concerned. Yet, many scientists hold both positions without seeing the contradiction involved therein.

One may, in fact, amuse oneself further if one wants to think of the various types of energy as species of energy. But as most types of energy are transformable into one another, this would destroy the notion of species at its very core. This, in the eyes of many, would be sufficient to dispose of the application of the notion of evolution to the realm of non-living matter. But exactly the same situation obtains in socio-cultural evolution. Even those who are aware that something different is meant when we talk of socio-cultural evolution tend to slur over the problems involved. Sol Tax, for example, points out that, '*the term "evolution" is applied to both socially transmitted culture and gene transmitted biology because neither can establish an exclusive claim. However, there is no identity between the two usages. The cultural processes of continuity and change are different, and it is only by analogy, if at all, that one can speak of "natural selection", for example, in the development of cultures.*'¹⁶

But if there is no identity between the two usages, then why use the same word to connote two different things? At least in the context of scientific discussion where clarity of thought and precision are considered so important in expression, it would presumably be best to avoid such a practice altogether. The only reason Tax gives for the continued use in both biology and cultural anthropology of the term 'evolution', even when the meanings differ, is that 'neither can establish an exclusive claim' to it. But this is too legalistic a view of the matter and, in any case, can hardly be considered a sufficient reason for the retention of a practice that facilitates confusion in thought, if it

does not actually create and perpetuate it. The term 'evolution' is so closely associated with the biological realm that its extension backward into the realm of non-living matter or forward into the realm of society and culture cannot but lead to serious confusions in thought. It is on the basis of these ambiguities that the thought of a Chardin or a Huxley thrives. The inclusion of everything under the rubric of 'evolution' becomes possible, and we can have statements like the following from the pen of an eminent scientist without their arousing any debate or disagreement. In talking about the Centennial, Huxley said that 'this is one of the first public occasions on which it has been frankly faced that all aspects of reality are subject to evolution, from atoms and stars to fish and flowers, from fish and flowers to human societies and values—indeed, that all reality is a single process of evolution.'¹⁷ But does this mean anything more than that everything changes? And hasn't this always been known to man?

On the other hand, if it is contended that evolution is something more than change, then what the 'more' is has to be specified. Does this 'more' consist in the specific mechanism through which change is brought about, and has it anything to do with the direction in which change takes place? Normally, the mechanism is supposed to be 'natural selection', and the result is supposed to be 'speciation'. But in order that 'natural selection' may operate, it is necessary that there should exist what Müller has characterized as 'the property of replication of mutations—that is, self-copying and self-copying of changes',¹⁸ or even 'the ability for *continuous* mutation' which, according to Evans, 'seems to be an inherent characteristic of living cells',¹⁹ or what Müller calls the level 'where an unlimited number of changes in pattern are possible, each of which is self-replicating'.²⁰ However expressed, the point is that 'natural selection' should have something to play upon or to select from if such anthropomorphic expressions are to be permitted.

But, whether anthropomorphically stated or not, what is 'natural selection' supposed to do? It is supposed to *eliminate* those mutations or changes which make an organism unfit to survive and thus leave only those to reproduce which are relatively better able to survive. This explanation, however,

would account only for the origin of species and their elimination, but not for the simultaneous existence of diverse kinds of species. For, if many kinds of species may simultaneously exist in any environment, then it can only be presumed that the environment is neutral with respect to them. Or that, as far as the environment is concerned, they are all equally fit and none may be regarded as better than the other. It may be suggested that one possible explanation for the simultaneous existence of different species is not that the environment is neutral between them, but that there are different kinds of environments and that each of the species is fitted to its own environment. This corresponds, to some extent, to the notion of 'niche' in the literature on biological and even cultural evolution. But this would imply that there is a one-to-one correlation between each species and its environment and that no two species can exist in the same environment. This may seem to be logically very neat but, unfortunately, the diversity in environment is generally inferred from the diversity in species, and no independent criteria are ever given for determining what is to count as diversity in environment. The whole contention, thus, becomes merely tautological in character.

In fact, what constitutes an 'environment' is not clearly specified in the literature. If, for example, 'environment' includes other species also, then all the species play a role in the 'natural selection' of each one of them. In such a situation each species is exercising a *selection* role in relation to all the other species. The simultaneous existence of all the diverse species may, then, be considered the result of a checkmated position in which none can win over the others. The equilibrium can be disturbed only by some relatively favourable mutations within some species or by some sudden change in the physical environment which renders some species more favourably situated than others. But mutations are going on all the time and so are sudden changes in the environment. It seems surprising, therefore, that the orchestrated equilibrium of the simultaneous existence of so many diverse species should have continued for millennia—as seems to have been the case in biological history.

On the other hand, it might be asserted that any of the changes that happen to be severely disequilibrating, whether changes in species or physical environment or both, tend to set

the selective activity in motion once more, with the result that the equilibrium would once again be restored with all the species at a higher level of survival capacity than before. This, however, would make the disappearance of species a very rare phenomenon—far rarer, perhaps, than what we have observed in biological history.

If, on the other hand, we turn to the question of physical environment, we find the situation still more baffling. Normally, we find a great many different species within the same environment. Certainly, it is true that there are different environmental regions and that different species are found settled there. But the converse of this does not seem true, unless it is made to appear so by a definitional transformation. Within any homogeneous climatic or environmental zone, one can find as much diversity amongst species inhabiting it as one wishes.

But whatever the solution to these problems may be, there can be little doubt that the exercise of 'natural selection' is concerned *only* with survival, and this too in the simple biological sense of the term. There is, and can be, nothing *more* in the strict scientific view of the matter. The 'survival of the fittest' merely means the survival of those who have been fittest to survive and this, though true, is almost tautological. Perhaps it is saved from being a complete tautology by the fact that survival of any living organism, whether as an individual or as a species, is not necessary at all. To put it in other words, all life is an accident and nothing in the physical world ensures that it is not so. As G. E. Moore pointed out long ago, 'the survival of the fittest does *not* mean, as one might suppose, the survival of what is fittest to fulfil a good purpose—best adapted to a good end; at the last, it means merely the survival of the fittest to survive. . . .'²¹ It is no part of Darwin's theory, he points out, that 'more evolved' is necessarily equivalent to 'higher', as many have thought and propagated. According to him, 'that theory will explain, equally well, how by an alteration in the environment (the gradual cooling of the earth, for example) quite a different species from man, a species which we think infinitely lower, might survive us'.²²

This is the hub of the problem. Is there anything in the theory of evolution as developed by Darwin to suggest that anything more than survival is ensured by 'natural selection', or that if

something survives, it shows any other fitness besides that which enabled it to survive? All who have tried to develop a world-view based on evolution have tended to imply that something more than mere survival is involved. But they have seldom given open expression to this assumption, or tried to defend it by arguments or evidence. Why should that which survives be necessarily better in the moral, aesthetic, or spiritual senses of the term? And why should any quality or qualities be considered indispensable to survival, when what survives is not so much a function of itself as of that which performs the selecting function, that is, the environment? Environments may change, and this change may render superfluous or even harmful qualities that were earlier helpful in survival. Further, if the struggle is for survival, and if surviving species were all selected on the basis of their possessing qualities essential to survival, then it is difficult to see what exactly could be meant by calling one species 'more evolved' than another, if the species which are being compared are both surviving and, in fact, have survived for a long time.

This, I think, is an important question. If 'survival' alone matters, and in the evolutionary perspective 'natural selection' means just that, then there is no point in talking about species that have not yet been eliminated from the biological scene in terms of 'more evolved' or 'less evolved'. The only relevant criterion in that situation would perhaps be the length of survival and/or the diversity of environments in which a species survives. Man has had a very short span of biological survival as compared with many other species, and though his capacity to survive in many different kinds of environment is well attested, this may be taken only as enhancing his potentiality for survival rather than as assuring survival itself.

The point may be clarified in a different way. The capacity to survive in different environments only shows that, if any of the specific environments were to change but remain within the range where survival has already been shown to be possible, man would still be able to survive. This only gives a greater range within which a species can survive. But if there is a particular environment suited to a particular species, and if that environment persists somewhere or other and the species continues to live in it, then there seems no *intrinsic* reason to

think of it as evolutionally 'more evolved' than another. Certain types of bacteria can survive very high and very low temperatures, and yet this fact alone hardly makes anyone think of them as more evolved. It may be thought that, by virtue of the variety of environments in which one species can survive, it would have the potentiality for existing in larger numbers than other species that cannot live in several environments. Yet, however attractive this argument may seem, many of the species restricted to a specific environment exist in far larger numbers than man can even dream of himself having.

It appears, therefore, that there is little to choose between man and other species on the basis of survival. And, if a choice had to be made, most other species would win in the comparison. There is, however, one respect in which man may be thought to be 'more evolved', in the strictly evolutionistic sense of the word, and that relates to his *capacity* to destroy other species or to use them for his own purposes, including that of survival. If this is correct, such a capacity also provides the criteria for judging between any species, as to which is 'more evolved' than another. These criteria would be 'the capacity to destroy other species', and 'the capacity to use other species for purposes of one's own survival'.* But, in spite of the persuasiveness of these criteria, it does not seem quite clear whether any species, including man, actually has the first capacity or even whether it could exercise such a capacity, if it had it, without destroying itself in the process. As Gregory Bateson remarked in the Nineteenth Annual Korzybski Memorial Lecture, 'if the organism ends up destroying its environment, it has in fact destroyed itself'.²³ Bateson, of course, was referring more to the natural environment, but his remark is equally apt for the biological environment. The more we understand the ecological balance, the more we discover a symbiotic interdependence of species rather than a competitive fight-to-the-finish between

* There is a slight difference in the two formulations with respect to the capacity to use others. The one referring to man designates the capacity to *use* others as 'the capacity to use them, for his own purposes, including that of survival', while the generalized formulation restricts use of others to 'purposes of one's own survival'. The difference derives from the distinctive nature of man which is different from those of all other species. But in the evolutionistic context it is only the perspective of survival which is relevant.

them. And, while the elimination of some isolated species might be practised with success, it is difficult to think of the elimination of all species.

The symbiotic relation of interdependence, to the extent that it exists, also disposes of the second criterion ('the capacity to use other species for purposes of one's own survival'), as the relationship of 'use' may be considered mutual in character. The trouble, basically, is that thinkers who offer such criteria generally forget that in the evolutionary perspective there cannot be any other value except that of sheer biological survival. And hence the fact that a certain species flourishes or survives because it is of 'use' to some other species is irrelevant to the fact that it survives. 'Being of use' is useful to it, for it ensures its survival. One might object that if it ceased to be of 'use' in such a situation, it would cease to survive. But this is fallacious, for it is very likely that the species would find some other means for survival. In fact, in such a situation, 'natural selection' would favour those that are relatively less dependent for their survival on their being of use to some other species, and these would then reproduce and survive.

It may be said that the suggested criteria were meant to be understood in terms of capacity rather than the exercise of capacity. But even if it be so, 'capacity' has to be conceived of in such a way that the conception makes coherent sense. In the evolutionary perspective, I suggest that the capacities which are being offered as criteria for considering one species as 'more evolved' than another do not make sense. Take, for example, the capacity to destroy another species or even all the other species, which is being suggested as a possible criterion of evolutionary development. Now, unless we assume the *simultaneous, sudden* destruction of *all* the members of the species at once, the evolutionary hypothesis suggests that those who will survive would develop an immunity to our method of destruction. And this is what we have found with respect to so many species we have attempted to destroy. After some time the surviving members and their progeny over successive generations develop increasing immunity against the particular method that was so effective against their members several generations earlier. But how can anybody ever be sure that *all* the members of a species, not to talk of all the members of all

the species, have been eliminated or destroyed? Evolution, if we may say so, has and can have no favourites. It has no preferences between man and any other species. To think it has, is to negate the theory of evolution and it is strange to find eminent biologists doing this and, that too, in the name of evolution itself. The egocentric or rather species-centric illusion could go no farther.

This may seem to confine the meaning of the term 'evolution' too much to what Sahlins has called 'specific evolution', and to ignore what he has called 'general evolution'.²⁴ General evolution, according to him, consists of the emergence of 'higher forms of life', which are 'higher' absolutely. It has got nothing to do with the origination of species which, according to him, is what 'specific' evolution is concerned with. In his own words, 'it is accurate to say that specific evolution is the production of diverse species, general evolution the production of higher forms.'²⁵ And, 'the fundamental difference between specific and general evolution appears in this: the former is a connected, historic sequence of forms, the latter a sequence of stages exemplified by forms of a given order of development.'²⁶ Specific evolution is primarily concerned with adaptive specialization and accounts for the origination and diversification of species. In Sahlins' words, 'specific evolution is the phylogenetic, adaptive, diversifying, specialising, ramifying aspect of total evolution.'²⁷ General evolution, on the other hand, 'is the emergence of higher forms of life, regardless of particular lines of descent or historical sequences of adaptive modification'.²⁸ And while 'in the specific perspective advance is characteristically relative—relative to the environmental circumstances',²⁹ 'to embrace general evolution is to abandon relativism'.³⁰ For, 'the study of all-round progress requires criteria that are absolute, that are relevant to all organisms regardless of particular environments.'³¹ And the absolute criteria for deciding which is higher on the evolutionary scale, and which is lower, may 'be conceived in functional, energy-capturing terms', for 'higher forms harness more energy than lower'.³² Or, 'the criteria of general progress may be structural, the achievement of higher *organization*'.³³ 'Thermodynamic achievement', Sahlins writes, 'is the ability to concentrate energy in the organism, to put energy to work building and maintaining structure. . . . It

is the amount (of energy) so trapped (corrected for gross size of the form) and *the degree to which it is raised to a higher state* that would seem to be evolutionary measure of life.'³⁴ Further, 'thermodynamic accomplishment has its structural concomitant, greater organization. The relation between energy-harnessing and organization is reciprocal: the more energy concentrated the greater the structure, and the more complicated the structure the more energy that can be harnessed.'³⁵

These diverse ideas are summed up in Sahlins' notion of 'level of integration'. He argues that 'the idea of level of integration can be broken down into three aspects. An organism is at a higher level of integration than another when it has more parts and sub-parts (a higher order of segmentation); when its parts are more specialized; and when the whole is more effectively integrated.'³⁶ To sum up, in Sahlins' own words, 'Specific evolution is "descent with modification", the adaptive variation of life along its many lines; general evolution is the progressive emergence of higher life "stage by stage".'³⁷ Thus, 'the advance or improvement we see in specific evolution is relative to the adaptive problem', while 'the progress of general evolution is, in contrast, absolute, it is passage from less to greater energy exploitation, lower to higher levels of integration, and less to greater all-round adaptability'.³⁸

These exhaustive quotations may be expected hopefully to make clear the difference between the two types of evolution which Sahlins is trying to distinguish and which, according to him, have generally been confused in most writings on the subject. But the distinction itself is overlapping to a significant extent. Sahlins himself treats 'adaptability' as a common feature both of specific and general evolution. In fact, general evolution is supposed to be a movement in absolute terms from 'less to greater all-round adaptability'. True, it is also supposed to be a movement from 'less to greater energy exploitation', and 'less to higher levels of integration', but it is not quite clear whether these are to be treated as independent of each other or not. Could we have, for example, 'greater energy exploitation' without achieving a 'higher level of integration', or *vice versa*? The more crucial question, however, is whether one could have both or any of them without ensuring 'greater all-round adaptability', and if so, would such a species survive for long? To ask

the question is to answer it. The evolutionary perspective permits no other value except that of survival to dominate the scene of life, and Sahlins' attempt to get out of the tight noose of survival succeeds no better than that of others.

Sahlins does not discuss the relationship between the three criteria he gives for general evolution. But it is fairly obvious that the first two are basically *instrumental* for achieving the third. Yet, if this were accepted, it would make general evolution as relative as specific evolution, since for Sahlins adaptability is primarily a characteristic of specific evolution and is essentially relative in nature. On the other hand, if we treat them as independent of adaptability, it should be possible to conceive of an increase in them at the cost of adaptability. But in that case the requirements of competitive survival would work against those who overshot the mark and forgot that their basic task was to survive and reproduce, and reproduce and survive and nothing more.

Even if we forget the essential underpinning and primacy of survival values, as Sahlins tries to do in his notion of general evolution, it is not clear what exactly is meant by 'greater energy exploitation' which is advanced by him as the key criterion in the new formulation. 'Thermodynamic achievement or accomplishment' is supposed to be the objectively measurable distinguishing feature of general evolution as contrasted with specific evolution. But if it is a quantitative notion, it could be measured *only* in terms of some input-output ratio where the efficiency of the transforming structure would be reflected in either cutting down the loss involved in the transformation, or in its relative ability of translating potential energy into actual energy, or in transforming it into a more serviceable form. This is necessitated by the principle of conservation of energy which implies, in principle, the quantitative equivalence between input and output. In real terms, therefore, there can be no gain or loss. It *only appears* to be so because of our desires, interests and purposes. The deeper point, however, relates to the fact that the criterion of energy-exploitation cannot but be purely quantitative in nature. There is little reason to think that great qualitative achievements also involve great expenditure of energy. A person running a race obviously uses a greater amount of energy than, say, one who composes a

poem or solves a mathematical problem or cogitates about a philosophical issue. Not only this, one could not even distinguish between a good or bad poem or between elegant and inelegant solutions to a mathematical problem or between a profound and trivial cogitation on a philosophical issue on the basis of the amount of energy spent on them. In fact, one could not even distinguish between absolute failure and relative success on any such ground. Yet, this is what Sahlins requires the criterion to do. But it is obvious that it is impossible, in principle, for the criterion to achieve this. One cannot wring out quality from quantity, however hard one may try. But without this, Sahlins' criterion is as useless as any other.

Sahlins fails to see the problem as he smuggles in the notion of 'higher' levels or states without specifying what he means by 'higher' or 'lower' in this context. He argues, 'it is the amount (of energy) so trapped (corrected for gross size of the form) and the degree to which it is raised to a higher state that would seem to be evolutionary measure of life.'³⁹ Now, not only does he not give any detailed measurements of the energy so trapped by various species determining their absolute ranking in general evolution, but he also fails to specify what it means for the energy to be raised to a 'higher state', and how it is to be measured.

The utterly unoperationalized use of concepts to demarcate a fundamental distinction in one of the major areas of biological theory suggests not only the theoretical naïveté of the author, but also reflects on those who have hailed it as a major achievement concerning the theory of evolution. As far as energy is concerned, there can only be 'more' or 'less', but not 'higher' or 'lower'. Perhaps, Sahlins does mean by 'higher', what is usually meant by 'more', for there is a usage in which it just means that. But then it is doubtful if he could establish his thesis at all, as most of the major achievements of man which enable him to exploit larger amounts of energy than any other species on this planet are themselves *not* the result of the possession of any greater energy on his part or of its greater utilization in quantitative terms.

The same may be said with respect to Sahlins' attempt to correlate 'thermodynamic accomplishment' with what he calls its 'structural concomitant', that is, 'greater organization'. It may be so in some cases but there equally are cases where it is

not so. Otherwise, the movement towards simplifying structures would always mean a depletion of energy, which it does not, either in theory or practice. As we have already pointed out, there can be such a thing as 'over-organization' and 'too much structure'. And, on a purely qualitative level, it would be equally difficult for anyone to maintain that Baroque is the highest form of architecture merely because it is more complexly organized than others; or, that the attempt of many modern artists to achieve almost ideal simplicity of structure is bound to be self-defeating, as it violates the criterion derived from a study of what Sahlins calls 'general evolution'.

Thus, Sahlins' attempt to link the notions of differentiated and complex structures to those of development in the absolute sense of the term via his notion of general evolution fails as much as the attempts of other evolutionists who do not make any such distinction. All the considerations urged earlier against the position on evolution typified by a thinker such as Huxley, apply equally to Sahlins. And if evolution can provide no grounding to the criterion of development as 'differentiation,' it is difficult to believe that anything else could. It was perhaps natural for political scientists to accept the authority of biology which had in their eyes the status and prestige of a natural science. But a more critical attitude would have revealed that everything which is propagated in the name of 'natural science' is not 'scientific'. The resurgence of neo-evolutionism in the social sciences, then, is the revival of a superstition which was thought to have been banished long ago. Political science can hardly gain anything by basing its notion of 'political development' on such a weak foundation.

NOTES

1. See Sol Tax, *Evolution After Darwin*, vol. III (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 249-61.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 260-1.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
4. G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).
5. Tax, p. 41.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-3.

7. 'Everybody', meaning every 'serious scientist', whatever may be meant by that term.
8. Tax, vol. II, p. 473.
9. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 460, italics mine.
10. *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 255.
11. See in this connection Sir Julian Huxley's Introduction to Teilhard de Chardin's *The Phenomenon of Man*, and the review of the same book by P. B. Medawar, included in his work, *The Art of the Soluble* (London: Methuen, 1967).
12. See in this connection the interesting discussion between Gerard, who asks 'Why is not the replication of the architecture of a crystal or the replication of a branching polymer from monomers, which depends on the pre-existing polymer, life?' and others, in Tax, vol. III, pp. 80-4.
13. For a discussion of this question, see p. 41 ff.
14. Tax, vol. III, p. 562.
15. Medawar, p. 77.
16. Tax, vol. III, p. 280, italics author's.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 249.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 81, italics author's.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
21. Moore, p. 28, italics author's.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-8.
23. Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), p. 451.
24. Marshall D. Sahlins and Elman R. Service, *Evolution and Culture* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968).
25. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*, p. 21, italics mine.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-2.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-3, italics mine.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 21, italics mine.