41. This is indeed a possibility. The young son of my American friend once commented in my presence that he drank only coke for he thought that drinking water would not quench thirst.
42. Vācaspati (Thakur's edn.), p. 30. See Udayana's comment in *ibid.*, p. 99.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 99. Compare Udayana's comment: 'Utpatter evārabhya viṣaya-viśeṣa-grahaṇa-grastatvāc ca na śaṅkāvakāśaḥ.'

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Indian philosophy and mokṣa: revisiting an old controversy*

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Almost two decades ago I had published two articles[1] questioning the integral relationship between Indian philosophy and *mokṣa*, on the one hand, and the exclusive characterization of Indian philosophy as spiritual, on the other.

Few scholars in the field of Indian Philosophy have taken any serious note of either of the contentions or of the arguments offered on their behalf in the articles concerned. Prof. Karl H. Potter is one of the few exceptions, as he has not only devoted a substantial portion of his paper entitled 'Indian Philosophy's Alleged Religious Orientation'[2] presented in the conference on the same subject held at Brockport, U.S.A. in 1972 but also referred to it again in his *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. ii. As the issue may be deemed to be of fundamental import for the very articulation of Indian philosophy, it may not be amiss to try to discuss and clarify the points in the debate once again.

The issue, in a sense, derives its vital power from what one conceives of philosophy to be and from one's desire to find in the Indian tradition that which one thinks ought to be there. There is even a deeper clevage in the debate between those who, for some reason or other, feel negatively or positively toward anything that is designated as 'spiritual' or 'religious'. Deeper than this, perhaps, is the division amongst those who are hostile or antipathic to tradition and those who have not only an admiration or nostalgia for the past but also feel that without a living relationship with their own intellectual culture they cannot be themselves or grow and contribute to the global cognitive concerns of today.

Yet, whatever the divisions and the motivations amongst the participants in the debate, some ground rules will have to be accepted if the dispute claims to be cognitive and thus, at least in principle, settlable in character. The following ground rules are offered in the hope that they would provide at least a tentative beginning in the formulation of what may be called a meaningful discussion on the subject.

The first and foremost precondition of a serious cognitive debate may be taken to be the acceptance of a common criterion or a set of criteria for the admission of a text or a thinker or a tradition as philosophical in character. Even if this is not accepted on Wittgensteinian grounds, one may be expected

*This article is dedicated to my students of the Wednesday Seminar whose independent responses to the controversy between Potter and me would shortly be published elsewhere.

at least to subscribe to the negative contention that in case one uses any criterion whatsoever to designate a text, a thinker or a tradition as philosophical, then one would have to admit all other texts, thinkers or traditions as philosophical if they display the same characteristic or characteristics, also. In case one wants to deny even this on some such ground as 'everything is what it is, and not another thing', then not only would one opt out of the cognitive debate but also deprive himself of the possibility of even the first characterization, as there was nothing in it intrinsically to confine it to just that object alone unless it happened to be a definite description or a rigid designator in Kripke's sense of the term.

If this be accepted even provisionally and if it is also accepted that the term 'philosophy' arises from within the western tradition deriving in the main from Greek thinking on the subject, then it is obvious that whatever will display these characteristics would have to be understood not only as philosophy but as philosophy bearing the same characteristics which philosophy in the western tradition is supposed to have. The terms 'spirituality' and 'religion' should share the same constraints, and if someone complains that this is to surreptitiously underwrite the western concept of philosophy as the only concept of philosophy and treat it as paradigmatic and thus impose it on other traditions, we would only say that it will be better in such a situation if some other term is used to avoid confusion.

Further, in a discussion of this sort, one may be legitimately expected to use the same characterization on the basis of the same criteria irrespective of the fact whether one is talking about one philosophical tradition or another. In the light of this, we may formulate the questions whose answers we are seeking in the following manner:

(1) Is Indian philosophy 'spiritual' in a sense in which western philosophy cannot be characterized as such?
(2) Is the concept of *mokṣa* distinctive of Indian philosophy in the sense that no analogous concept is to be found in the western philosophical tradition?
(3) Even if such an analogous concept can be found in the western philosophical tradition, is it a fact that it (i.e. *mokṣa*) occupies such a central pivotal place in the Indian philosophical tradition that the latter cannot make sense or even be possibly understood without reference to it?

The characterization of Indian philosophy as 'spiritual', and the contention that it is integrally related to *mokṣa* in the sense that it cannot be intelligibly understood without reference to it are usually supposed to be identical by most writers on Indian philosophy. Yet the two contentions, though closely related, are not identical. In fact, one may hold the one without holding the other as the two may vary independently of each other. The former contention is generally supposed to entail the later, but only if the term 'spiritual' is understood in a very specific sense of the word. *Mokṣa* is a concept which may be

said to belong to practical philosophy or to what Kant called 'practical reason'. It designates a goal to be pursued, an ideal to be actualized and as such it will have to be related, evaluated and understood in relation to other values, goals or ideals which have also been prescribed for man's realization. True, there is a feature of *mokṣa* as an ideal which does not belong to most other ideals, particularly those that pertain to something outside the self. *Mokṣa* is supposed to be the realization of the true nature of the self itself even if it be the case, as in Buddhism, that there is no true nature either of the self or of anything else.[3] But if it is the *true* or *real* nature of the self, or no-nature as in Buddhism, then how can it ever be lost? This is the point of dispute between those who have argued for the *nitya-siddha* nature of the self as against those who have argued for the *sādhana-siddha* nature of the self. Also, in Śaṁkara-Vedanta *mokṣa* cannot be relegated to the practical sphere as it cannot, in principle, be the result of *karma* or action.

Yet, whatever the difficulties in assimilating *mokṣa* to the practical sphere, it should be remembered that the difficulties are *theoretical* in character, and that it would be even more odd to treat it as belonging to the cognitive part of the philosophical enterprise in India. The problem of *mokṣa* arises because what is ontologically required to be the case is not existentially such—a situation which is radically different from others where what 'ought to be' does not happen to be so as a 'matter of fact'. Normally, the 'ought' when it obtains with respect to any objective situation whatsoever is not treated as ontologically real, even though in the Platonic framework the difference between the 'idea' and the 'ideal' vanishes, and everything is supposed to be judged for its reality in relation to the idea which it more or less embodies in itself. Yet, even in the Platonic context, one may assume some difference between those sense objects with respect of which one cannot do anything towards the lessening of the discrepancy between them and their idea and those in whose cases such is not the case. Even amongst the latter, one may assume a radical difference between such an awareness with respect to one's own self and every other thing in the world which may possibly be brought nearer to its idea by effort on one's part.

The paradox with respect to one's own self lies in the awareness that though ontologically one is what one ought to be—and it cannot be otherwise—one does not feel it to be so. Kant faces this dilemma in the dichotomy between the Holy Will which ought to *be* and the Moral Will which is determined by the sense of Duty and which the Will is actually supposed to be in its ontological reality. Yet if the sense of Duty arises from the contrary pull of desires and inclinations and if the latter are the necessary material for the will to excercise its function upon, then how can the idea of the Holy Will be tenable in principle? The alleged unity between the theoretical and the practical reason in Kant raises a similar problem, though in a different context. For Kant there is a deep dichotomy between knowledge and action, and the transcendental presuppositions, which each one of them has, are radically different

from each other. Also, for Kant, the ontological freedom which action presupposes is *only* in the context of moral action which is the same as the doing of an action from the sense of duty, which itself makes sense only because of the existence of desires and inclinations on the part of the person concerned. On the other hand, the freedom which the Indian talks about is not so much the freedom involved in moral action as that of enjoying a state of being or rather of just being or being, being-as-such. *Mokṣa*, therefore, in the perspective of Indian philosophy, is more talked about in the context of knowledge of what truth is, and Knowledge in this case being of the self ensures or rather coincides with its own reality, that is, the real nature of the self.

Mokṣa then is not *dharma*, that is, it does not belong to the domain of moral action even though the latter *may* prepare the ground for the true knowledge of the self to arise and thus, in a sense, to bring it into being also. The central problem for the Indian philosophical reflection, therefore, has been that of error and not of evil as has been the case in the western tradition. And, depending on the way one conceives the true nature of the self to be, one also conceives of what the realization of *mokṣa* would consist in. But the acceptance of such an ideal would not necessarily make Indian philosophy spiritual just as the acceptance of any other ideal, even with respect to the self, would make any philosophy spiritual or non-spiritual.

A philosophy is usually characterized as 'spiritual' or 'non-spiritual' because of the way it conceives of the nature of 'reality' and not because of the manner in which it conceives of the ultimate or highest ideal for man. It is its answer to the question about the reality of matter that determines whether a philosophy is to be considered as 'spiritual' or not, and not its answer to the question about the supreme end which human beings ought to pursue.

Thus a philosophy would not be entitled to be called 'spiritual' if it posits as the highest or ultimate goal for man the freeing of himself or itself from the bondage of matter or the involvement in the embodied state and all the attendant problems that it involves. Rather, it would be entitled to that title if and only if it denies the reality of matter and argues for the ultimate reality of only consciousness or that which is more akin or analogous to consciousness in our experience than to what we call matter. Judged in this perspective, the 'theistic-atheistic controversy' regarding the predominant characterization of the Indian philosophical tradition in terms of one or the other is irrelevant to the issue of its characterization as 'spiritual' or otherwise. Potter is right in pointing out that one's view about the predominance of 'theism' or 'atheism' in India would depend upon the date one chooses for the characterization. If, for example, one chooses the second century A.D., one would discover that 'the major systems extant at that time—Sāṁkhya, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Jainism, the several schools of Buddhism, and Cārvāka—are none of them theistic'. But 'if one slices instead at, say, the fourteenth century A.D. one finds that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has become pronouncedly theistic, that Buddhism and Cārvāka have disappeared, and that several varieties of theistic

Vedānta have come to prominence'.[4] Yet, however true, this cannot help Potter in establishing the 'spiritual' character of the Indian philosophical tradition. In order to do that, he should have tried to show that there was an increasing denial of the independent reality of matter on the part of a large number of philosophers in India. But this would have been difficult to establish as, except for *Vijñānavādin* Buddhists, hardly any school of Indian philosophy has denied the independent reality of matter in an ontological sense. Most of the Indian philosophers have been pluralists in their ontology and those who have opted for an uncompromising monism, like the *Advaita Vedāntins*, have also generally opted for the position that the ultimate reality cannot be described with any differentiating characterizations, even though it may be pragmatically more convenient and intellectually more adequate to understand it at the phenomenal level as more analogous to the nature of consciousness that we know of than in terms of that which is experienced by us as its opposite, that is, matter. From the strictly *Advaitic* point of view, the characterization of ultimate reality as 'that which is material' is as incorrect as 'that which is conscious, or that which has the nature of consciousness'.

The issue would perhaps be clarified a little more if we raise it in the context of the western philosophical tradition. Would the acceptance of God by a philosopher in his system make us characterize it as 'spiritual' in nature? In case Potter's answer to this question were to be in the affirmative, he would be hard put to find a philosopher in the whole history of the western philosophical tradition who has not accepted God in some form or other. There are, of course, a few exceptions and their names are known to everybody, but if one were to count heads on this score there is little doubt that the Indian philosophical tradition would be found to be far less 'spiritual' than the western one in this respect. In fact, if one were to make a comparative study of the role that God plays in the two philosophical traditions, one would find that his role in the Indian intellectual traditions in the field of philosophy is far more marginal than in their counterpart systems in the western tradition.

Yet, even though most persons in the field of comparative philosophy have known of these facts, hardly any of them have even raised these questions with respect to the western philosophical tradition. In fact, it is strange to find that issues and questions which have been so persistently raised with respect to the Indian philosophical tradition have never been so raised with respect to the philosophical tradition in the West. 'Is western philosophy essentially spiritual?' or 'is it essentially concerned with Man's liberation?' are questions which have never bothered the students or historians of western philosophy. This is not the occasion to go into the historical reasons which were responsible for the obsessive concern with these issues in the context of Indian philosophy. But it would be strange if we do not note the complete blindness of scholars who have taken part in the debate towards the existence of those very features in the western philosophical tradition on the basis of which they distinctively characterize the Indian philosophical tradition one way or another.[5]

At the ontological level, then, the characterization of any philosophical tradition as distinctively 'spiritual' would lie not in its acceptance or denial of God or of its acceptance of the independent reality of 'consciousness' but in its denial of the independent reality of what is usually understood by the term 'matter' in common parlance. Judged on this count, it would be difficult for Potter or for anybody else to characterize Indian philosophy as 'spiritual' and this at any period in its more than two milennia long period of growth and development.

But philosophy, as everyone knows, is not just asserting an ontological or epistemological proposition, but rather giving reasons for it *and* countering possible objections that may be raised against it. This is what philosophical activity consists in—argument and counter-argument, *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*—and this is what philosophers in India did all the time. The very format of philosophical writing demanded that one present the counter-position, the *pūrva pakṣa* first and, only after refuting it, establish one's position. Many of the positions are now known only through the statement of these counter-positions as the texts in which they had been argued have been lost. Also, the greater the philosopher, the more powerful his statement of the *pūrva-pakṣa*, the ideal always being that even the proponent of the counter-position could not have presented it better. Potter knows all this, as does everyone else. And yet he alleges that 'it is not clear to what extent Daya is offering persuasive definitions in the Language of factual claims.'[6] According to him, 'the crux of the problem Daya raises is: should we use the word "philosophy" in some appropriate way *drawn from contemporary Western* practices or should we redefine it to fit a concept employed within Indian philosophy itself ?'[7] (italics mine). But there *is* no need to go to contemporary or even older western sources to find what philosophy is when the Indian tradition itself spells it out so explicitly. Each *śāstra* or field of knowledge has to have its *uddeśya*, *lakṣaṇa* and *parīkṣā*; and *parīkṣā* presupposes *vimarśa* or *saṁśaya*, that is, doubt. Doubt or *saṁśaya* arises because there is *vipratipatti*, i.e. two opposite positions seem to be supported by equally weighty arguments. It is true that 'the word" philosophy' is not a Sanskrit word"[8] but there is no reason to suppose there is no Sanskrit analogue to it in the Indian tradition. Surely, the term *ānvikṣikī* comes as close to it as one may want it to be. Also, one should not forget that the traditional Greek meaning of the term 'philosophy' related it more to wisdom than to what it has gradually come to mean in its milennia-long usage in the western tradition.

Potter tries to take help from the theory of *puruṣārthas* to support his contention that philosophy in India is centrally and inalienably related to *mokṣa*. He writes: 'There *is* in India a traditional distinction among fields of knowledge, according to which treatises devoted to such fields may be divided according as they fall into *arthaśāstra*, *kāmaśāstra*, *dharmaśāstra* or *mokṣa-śāstra*'.[9] He goes on to argue that...

> the logic of the four aims of life is such that one who transcends the first two by coming to view life in terms of *dharma* does not thereby leave behind the points of view (subject-matter, methodology) of the first two but rather combines them into a new and more adequate overview of life. The same thing, in turn, is said to happen when one advances toward *mokṣa* or liberation. Since in this way the point of view of liberation not only constitutes the highest value and the ultimate goal, but also represents the most adequate understanding of anything worth understanding, it is evident why treatises on all sorts of subjects were introduced in such a fashion to suggest that the work would present its subject under the aspect of liberation.[10]

It is surprising to find a scholar so eminent as Potter succumbing to the rhetoric of *puruṣārthas* and not be able to see through it. First, how are the so-called *arthaśāstras* and *kāmaśāstras* related to *artha* and *kāma* of the Indian tradition? The former relate to the science of politics and the latter to the science of sex. *Artha* and *kāma* as *puruṣārthas*, on the other hand, are not supposed to be confined 'just' to these. Where then are those *śāstras* which are concerned with these as *puruṣārthas*, unless every treatise which is not concerned with *dharma* or *mokṣa* is treated as being concerned with either *artha* or *kāma* by definition? Further, as is well known, only three *puruṣārthas* were accepted in the beginning and the fourth *puruṣārtha*, that is, *mokṣa* came to be added only later under the influence of the *śramaṇa* tradition.[11] Also, there was always a tension between *dharma* and *mokṣa*, as the latter denied all significant relationship with others, a relationship without which *dharma* would cease to have any function or meaning. The heart of *dharma* was obligation to others, while *mokṣa* was always treated as the transcendence of all obligations whatsoever. The realm of *dharma* was the realm of *dvanda* (duality), while the realm of *mokṣa* was *dvandātīta* (beyond all duality).

This is not the occasion to go into a detailed exegesis of the *puruṣārthas* and their interrelationship, but it should be obvious that while there may be some justification for integrating *dharma* with *artha* and *kāma* and suggesting that 'a new and more adequate overview of life' is reached with it, there is little justification for doing the same with *mokṣa*. The term 'liberation' as a translation of *mokṣa* is systematically misleading as it suggests the essentially this-world-centred western secular ethos of the term. *Mokṣa*, in most Indian systems, is either a *denial* or a *transcendence* of the world. It is linked with the fourth *āśrama*, that is, *sannyāsa* in which one is supposed to be *ritually* dead to the obligations of society, i.e. the world. Hence it would not be correct to say, as Potter does, that it is only in the perspective of *mokṣa* that 'the most adequate understanding of anything worth understanding' can occur. What is understood is that nothing else was worth understanding and that one was under a basic illusion when one thought they were worth understanding. In fact, the pursuit of *mokṣa* as a *puruṣārtha* or even its awareness as such makes one realize the hollowness and fruitlessness of the enterprise of understand-

ing.[12] *Jñāna* certainly has always been regarded as one of the paths to *mokṣa*, but then *jñāna* is not knowledge in the usual sense of the word. Rather, it is a denial of the possibility of that knowledge and its relegation to the realm of ignorance or *avidyā* as it is founded on the distinction between self and object and the acceptance of *bheda* or difference as real. It may be urged that this is to accept the *Advaitic* position as paradigmatic for the understanding of the notion of *jñāna* in the Indian tradition. But even when the ontological position is held differently, as in other schools of Indian philosophy, the situation in respect of secular knowledge is no different. In the state of *kaivalya* in Sāṁkhya, for example, it is difficult to see how after the deidentification with *buddhi*, any knowledge can remain there at all. The whole enterprise of knowledge even in Sāṁkhya occurs within the ambit of and is made possible by the identification of *puruṣa* with *prakṛti* which is the root cause of both ignorance and bondage in this system. Similarly in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the soul in the state of *mokṣa* is not supposed to be conscious at all, and thus the question of its providing 'a new and more adequate overview' to what had been known earlier cannot even arise. As for the Buddhists, everything is *vikalpa*, a conceptual construction whose constructional character comes to be known in *nirvāṇa* and hence given up. Or rather it falls of itself when the nature of truth comes to be known; for 'giving up' would imply an act of will or choice which is perhaps not possible at this stage. The Jains, of course, ascribe omniscience to their realized souls, but it seems difficult to settle whether this means adding *syāt* to all knowledge or leaving it behind as it was a sign of finitude and ignorance.

Thus Potter's attempt to see a continuity between the *puruṣārthas* and their final fulfilment in *mokṣa*, however interesting and laudable in itself, is hardly sustained by the way *mokṣa* is conceived of in most systems of Indian philosophy. One would have to radically reinterpret the notion of *mokṣa* to make it perform the function which Potter wants it to do in his way of looking at the whole thing.

Similar is the problem with his attempt to see philosophy as 'a moment in every inquiry, rather than a distinct kind of inquiry' itself.[13] Now, if philosophy is to be a moment in every inquiry, one should know what philosophy is and what role that philosophical moment plays in different enquiries. Unfortunately, it does not seem that Potter is clear about the issues involved in his formulation. He writes, for example: '...the interrelated totality of the various sciences should ultimately issue in a systematic account reflecting the various discoveries of specific sciences conditioned and synthesized through philosophical criticism.'[14] But this is to assume that the specific sciences should have completed their task before the philosophical activity can perform its function—an assumption that would render philosophical activity impossible as it is difficult to understand how the various sciences could have completed their task at any point in historical time. Also there is and can be no fixed list of sciences as Potter seems to assume. New sciences continuously

come into being and disturb whatever 'interrelated totality' might have been achieved. But the deeper problem is with this 'interrelated totality' itself and the so-called 'philosophical criticism' through which it is 'synthesized'. Why should 'philosophical criticism' be considered necessary for achieving this 'interrelated totality' of the discoveries of the various sciences? Why cannot science itself perform this function? And what is this moment of 'philosophical criticism' over and above the critical function which all scientists exercise with respect to each other's work? It 'there is no special method of philosophy distinct from the method or methods utilized in the several kinds of enquiry', and if one should view 'the various sciences as specialized facets of the general pursuit of philosophy', as Potter contends, then why use the term 'philosophy' at all, for it has nothing distinctive to convey from that which is already conveyed by 'science'? Further, if this is what Potter wanted to say, then it was misleading for him to talk of philosophy being 'a moment in every inquiry'; for it is not just a *moment* in every inquiry but rather the whole of the inquiry itself. To see philosophy as identical with the whole cognitive enterprise of man is to do justice neither to philosophy nor to the cognitive enterprise or even to illumine anything in this regard. But Potter seems unsatisfied even with this limited identification and wants to go beyond and identify philosophy with all other enterprises of Man as well.

That there are non-cognitive quests seems to be accepted by Potter, at least by implication in his article. Whether these are to be considered as philosophical or not remains unclear in his formulation. Are they to be regarded as 'philosophical' because there is an essential intellectual moment in them or because 'philosophy' itself need not be essentially cognitive or intellectual in character? The distinction is important, as the quest for liberation, i.e. *mokṣa*, seems to be regarded as philosophical on both grounds. He writes: 'Thus the quest for liberation involves an intellectual component, though doubtless it is not exhausted in intellectual inquiry'.[15] And that 'if the quest for liberation involves intellectual as well as non-intellectual moments, and if liberation represents among other things an ideal state of cognitive attainment towards which all branches of inquiry ultimately aim, then the contrast between what he [Daya] thinks of as philosophy and what he takes to be the non-rational pursuit of liberation collapses.'[16] Now an 'intellectual moment' cannot make a non-cognitive quest cognitive. And what are the 'other things' which liberation also is supposed to represent? And does *mokṣa* represent 'an ideal state of cognitive attainment' in the usual sense which is attached to the word 'cognitive'?

These questions have to be posed and answered in as clear and straightforward a manner as possible, for Potter's formulation seems to thrive on systematic ambiguities in the terms that he chooses to employ. When he writes that 'the search for liberation is a search for an ultimate understanding of the truth', the reader forgets that the use of the terms 'understanding' and 'truth' have little in common with the way they are used not only in co mmon parlance

but scientific contexts. In most schools of Indian philosophy, the state of *mokṣa* is conceived of in such a way that either there is no object left there to be known or, if any object is allowed at all, no relationship with it of any kind, whether cognitive or otherwise, is permitted. In Advaita Vedānta, the very awareness of something as an object is a sign that one is still in ignorance and that *mokṣa* has not been achieved. In Sāṁkhya, though the ontological reality of *prakṛti* is accepted, *puruṣa* in its state of *kaivalya* cannot be aware of it as it is dissociated from *buddhi* which alone permits *viveka*, that is, distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*.[17] As for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the soul is supposed to be unconscious in its state of liberation, and hence the question of knowledge cannot even arise in that state. In *nirvāṇa*, according to Buddhism, the flame is extinguished and what remains can hardly be regarded either as knowledge or its fulfilment in the usual senses of these words. Jainism, of course, has the notion of a *sarvajña*, the all-knowing person, in the state of liberation and this may be said to fulfil Potter's understanding of what *mokṣa* means in the Indian tradition. But one swallow does not make a summer, and it would be strange if the Jaina position in this regard is taken as representing the dominant Indian tradition in this respect.

These facts are well known and it is difficult to believe that Potter is unaware of them. In fact, the way he himself articulates the so-called 'intellectual moment' in the pursuit of *mokṣa* should make clear not only its accidental and adventitious character, but also that it cannot survive in any significant sense in the state of *mokṣa* when achieved. According to him, 'this intellectual component can in the case of Indian philosophy be best understood as the effort to remove doubts and fears which, deriving from sceptical and fatalistic views, threaten to render a person incapable of undertaking the quest.'[18] But what if one has no such doubts and fears? Would one still need philosophy for undertaking the quest? On all ordinary understanding of the sentence just quoted, the answer would be a definitive 'No'. In fact, it is not even clear how would Potter characterize the so-called sceptical and fatalistic views which generate the doubts and fears which 'render a person incapable of undertaking the quest.' Would he regard them as a part of philosophy or not? Or, in his view, there can be no sceptical or fatalistic philosophies, but only those which are the opposite of these and arise only in the context of their refutation. Further, would he distinguish between 'doubts and fears' which arise from 'sceptical and fatalistic views' and those which have no relation to them? And if so, would he hold that it is only the former sort of 'doubts and fears' which 'render a person incapable of undertaking the quest' for *mokṣa*? And should not one distinguish between 'doubts' and 'fears' in this connection? The notion of 'doubt' generated by *purely* intellectual considerations is well known to philosophers, but one can hardly say the same thing about 'fear'. The deeper problem, however, concerns the issue whether 'doubts and fears' raised by purely intellectual considerations can ever render a person incapable of undertaking a quest of any kind whatsoever. I had raised this issue in my earlier discussion

of Potter's position, but for reasons best known to him he has chosen to remain silent on the subject. The evidence from the history of philosophy on this point is at least *prima facie* against Potter's contention. Not a single paradox from Zeno to Russell or even later has ever stood in the way of man's quest, whether cognitive or practical. Also, there is a gratuitous assumption in Potter's thought that sceptical and fatalistic views cannot find new arguments to sustain themselves against their opponents. The history of philosophy in India and elsewhere shows the untenability of such an assumption. In fact, sceptical and fatalistic positions seem as perennial in philosophy as those that are supposed to be their opposites. The relation of theoretical positions to non-theoretical quests is not easy to determine, but it would be gratuitous to assume, as Potter does, that the latter need always be obstructed by the former. In fact, Potter's own formulation seems to confine the presumed relationship between 'the sceptical and fatalistic views' and the inability to undertake 'the quest' for *mokṣa* to Indian philosophy only. But it is not quite clear why the 'doubts and fears', 'deriving from sceptical and fatalistic views', should render only an Indian 'incapable of undertaking the quest'. In case the relationship holds, all men should suffer from it and not Indians only. It would not do to say that as the Indians alone were concerned with *mokṣa* the restriction is confined to the Indian case only; for, presumably the difficulties created by sceptical and fatalistic views affect all quests equally and not just the quest for *mokṣa*. But if such were to be the case, it would apply to all philosophers, whether Indian or not, and thus be a characteristic of philosophy in general and not just of Indian philosophy in particular.

Further, there is the diversity of schools in Indian philosophy; and if each one of them is supposed to be integrally related to *mokṣa*, then either *mokṣa* itself would have to be conceived in a pluralistic manner or only *one* of them (no matter which) would be truly related to *mokṣa*, and the rest only spuriously. The Mīmāṁsā, for example, does not even ritually proclaim itself as concerned with *mokṣa*. Yet Potter does not see any difficulty in the situation; and though he quotes my statement that 'many schools of philosophy have literally nothing to do with *mokṣa*. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṁsā would predominantly come within this group', he chooses to discuss only the first two and not the third.[19] The discussion even with respect to the first two is carried on in a manner that leaves much to be desired. Potter writes:

> The first part of Daya's argument must be met by showing what the path to liberation is according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and how theoretical speculation gets involved in the life of the freedom seeker.... As for the charge that belief in *mokṣa* is a matter of lip service without sincere conviction, I think it will become apparent from the nature of the arguments used by Naiyāyikas...that liberation is always on their mind even if not uppermost in the question of the moment.[20]

Potter's discussion of the issue does not take into account the fact that there are serious doubts about the text of the *Nyāyasūtras* in its present form. The most detailed discussion regarding this problem may be found in the 'Introduction' by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya to the volume on Nyāya published in the series 'Indian Philosophy in Its Sources.'[21] It is, of course, true that Potter could not have taken this into account as the second volume of the *Encyclopedia* was published long before the volume in which the 'Introduction' by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya appears. But it is inconceivable that the material to which Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya refers in his 'Introduction' could have been unknown to Potter. In fact, Potter refers to H.P. Sastri's article 'An Examination of the Nyāya-Sūtras', which opens with the statement that 'anyone who carefully reads the Nyāya-Sūtras will perceive that they are not the work of one man, of one age, of the professors of one science, or even of the professors of one system of religion.'[22] But he has referred to the article as containing 'comments of interest concerning the author of the *Nyāyasūtras*' and not in connection with the author's remarkable contention regarding the contents of the *sūtras* themselves.[23] This is surprising since the author does not accept the second *sūtra* on which Potter relies for his argument for the integral relation between Nyāya and *mokṣa*, as against my contention to the contrary. He writes: 'What is not clear from Kaṇāda's account is how knowledge is related to this process (of liberation). Gautama's *Nyāyasūtras* makes this more explicit. In his second *sūtra* he presents a fivefold chain of causal conditions leading to bondage.'[24] But as H.P. Sastri pointed out: 'The second *sūtra* contains topics which are not enumerated in the first...?' and that 'the only reasonable explanation of this double enumeration seems to be that some later writer has interpolated the second *sūtra* with a view to add philosophical sections to the work.'[25]

Now there can be little doubt that the second *sūtra* is not just a repetition of the first *sūtra*, but adds a totally different dimension to the so-called purpose of the *Nyāyasūtras*. The first *sūtra* lists the *distinctive* concern of the Nyāya which is supposed to deal with argument or reasoning. The second deals with what may be regarded as common to most of the philosophical and non-philosophical traditions in India after the Vedic times. Potter himself notes the similarity of the 'fivefold chain of causal conditions leading to bondage' mentioned in the second *sūtra* with the 'twelvefold chain of Buddhism' without seeing the devastating implications of what he is saying. He writes: 'This is reminiscent of the twelvefold chain of Buddhism (pratītyasamutpāda) which leads from ignorance (avidyā) to rebirth and misery in a somewhat more complicated series.'[26]

But if this is the *central philosophical issue*, what happens to the radical differences between the Nyāya and the Buddhist positions and the great debate between the successive giants of the two schools, a debate which lasted for more than half a millennium and which has been so ably documented by D.N. Shastri in his *Critique of Indian Realism*.?[27] Surely the debate was not

about the fact whether the so-called causal chain leading to bondage was fivefold or twelve-fold or even about the nature of liberation and the means by which it could be attained. This is important, for anyone who seriously wishes to argue that Indian philosophy is integrally related to *mokṣa*, has to show that the differences between the so-called schools of Indian philosophy centre around their differing conceptions of *mokṣa* or the way in which it can be realized or regarding issues deriving from these. But, as far as I know, nothing of the kind has been attempted, let alone shown by anyone, including Potter. In fact, Potter accepts that the generalized method which all philosophical systems accept for the attainment of *mokṣa* is what in the Indian tradition has come to be known as *yoga*. But if this is the situation, how can *differences* between philosophical schools be accounted for on this basis? Ultimately, it is the differences or rather the arguments for the differences that define the separate identity of a school or system from others. One of the cardinal principles of philosophical exegetists in this connection is to try to interpret the texts in such a way as to preserve the differences in philosophical positions rather than blur them. The tension between the actual text and the ideal type philosophical position would, of course, always be there. But then the way out would be to distinguish between the actual philosophical position attributable to a thinker on the basis of an extant text and the alternative positions that could possibly be held logically on the issue concerned.[28]

Potter has tried to suggest that, at least in the case of Nyāya, a distinctive method for attaining *mokṣa* could perhaps be found. As he writes: 'This true knowledge, Gautama explains, is to be achieved by the classical methods of concentration, meditation, and yoga, but he significantly adds that one may get it by discussion with others.'[29] And he adds: 'It is this latter means that the Nyāya system is especially concerned to expedite....'[30] The reference here obviously is to *sūtra* 47 of the 4th *adhyāya*, *āhnika* 2 which prescribes *sahasaṁvādaḥ*, i.e. discussion for purposes of gaining *jñāna*, i.e. knowledge. Now, even if the term *jñāna* is taken to mean *mokṣa*, as some of the traditional commentators did, it is difficult to be clear about the relation between 'concentration, meditation, and yoga' mentioned in the 46th *sūtra* and the discussion with learned people mentioned in the 47th *sūtra*. Normally, the latter is needed only until the former processes of *sādhanā* have been firmly established, for they alone, when perfected, will lead to *samādhi*, i.e. *mokṣa*; in no case can the latter by itself lead to *mokṣa*. The sequence of the *sūtras*, on the other hand, leads one to think that the practice of yoga, etc. is only a preliminary exercise to *sahasaṁvādaḥ*, i.e. discussion with others without which the ultimate good cannot be realized. But 'discussion with others' may at best lead to *niḥśreyasa* as promised in the first *sūtra* and not to *apavarga* which is mentioned in the second *sūtra*. In fact, the attainment of the latter, i.e. *apavarga* would make *sahasaṁvādaḥ* impossible as in *sūtra* 45 it is clearly stated that in the state of liberation the body does not exist, and presumably there can be no discussion without the body. Rather the presence of the latter, i.e. 'discussion

with others' may be taken as a sure sign that *apavarga* or liberation has not been achieved.

Potter's statement also gives the impression that, according to Nyāya 'discussion with others' is an alternative means to 'classical methods of concentration, meditation, and yoga', and that this is its distinctive contribution to the methodology of liberation in Indian philosophy. But it would be difficult for even a Naiyāyika to accept this interpretation as 'discussion with others' may lead to clarity regarding what is to be realized but not to the realization itself. Not only is it not a sufficient condition, but it may not even be regarded as a necessary condition, as few in the Indian tradition have maintained that without 'discussion with others' one could not realize *mokṣa*. In a sense 'discussion with others' will have a uniform role to play in all systems as it is hoped by each system that 'discussion with others' would lead both to the acceptance of what is regarded as true by the system and to clarity regarding the goal that it holds to be desirable above everything else. The fact that such a situation has never obtained does not trouble Potter any more than it did any of the Indian philosophers in the past for the simple reason that as philosophers they were interested more in argumentation than in *mokṣa*. To the extent that they were interested in *mokṣa* as a *puruṣārtha*, they practiced the usual time-honoured yogic practices along with all the other non-yogic ones which had been handed down by tradition and through the practice of which one hoped to reach whatever was designated as *mokṣa* by the tradition. In fact, it would be difficult to correlate the differences in the practical pursuit of *mokṣa* on the part of a philosopher in case he pursued any such thing at all and the philosophical positions he held and the arguments he gave for holding them. The two had little to do with each other and formed almost autonomous realms where each could be pursued independently of the other.

There is another problem with respect to the use of two different terms—*niḥśreyasa* and *apavarga* in *sūtras* 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 of the *Nyāyasūtras*. Normally both are taken by most translators to mean the same thing, i.e. *mokṣa*. But as D.P. Chattopadhyaya has sought to argue in his 'Introduction' to the volume on *Nyāya* in the series entitled 'Indian Philosophy in Its Sources', the two need not mean the same thing.[31] As he writes, there is 'the long drawn habit of the Indian thinkers to conceive "the highest good" in terms of "liberation" itself. *But the habit is unfounded* (italics mine).'[32] And Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya goes even further when he writes:

> And therein lies the most obvious objection against the explanation of Vātsyāyana—that he has taken the two words *niḥśreyasa* and *apavarga*—to be synonymous which is not a fact. The word *niḥśreyasa*—dissolved, as *niścitam śreyaḥ*—literally means 'definitely beneficial'; it does not necessarily stand for an extraordinary (*alaukika*) state like liberation only.... In fact, as has been pointed out by the commentators, there are two kinds of *niḥśreyasa*—*dṛṣṭa* or ordinary, such as the obtainment of a garland and *adṛṣṭa* or extraordinary, such as the attainment of *svarga*. Thus, the word *niḥśreyasa* is wider in meaning than the word *apavarga*, the state of liberation being merely one of the kinds of *niḥśreyasa*.[33]

Gangopadhyaya goes on to argue further that 'in the first *sūtra* Gautam most probably is concerned with *dṛṣṭa niḥśreyasa* only and has got little to do with *adṛṣṭa niḥśreyasa*'.[34]

There is, of course, the added problem that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* in 1.1.2 talks also of *niḥśreyasa* in connection with *dharma* which is supposed to be the declared topic of the *sūtras*, as mentioned in *sūtra* 1.1.1. Of course, the second *sūtra* also talks of *abhyudaya* and seeks to define *dharma* mentioned in the first *sūtra* by the fact that it leads to the attainment of *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa*. Now this is a very strange definition, as it is a definition not in terms of the distinguishing properties of the notion concerned but in terms of the *consequences* it has for the person who pursues *dharma*. This is not the occasion to discuss the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* in detail, but it may be pointed out that the definition of *abhyudaya*, which was immediately required by the second *sūtra*, is not given till 6.2.1. and even that hardly provides a definition of *abhyudaya* as it is a purely negative definition in that it identifies *abhyudaya* with any and every *prayojana* that does not happen to be *dṛṣṭa*. The *sūtra* 10.20 again gives almost the same definition of *abhyudaya*. Besides the fact that it suffers from the same defects as the earlier definition, there is the added problem that it occurs almost at the end of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* and thus seems to give it an importance over and above *niḥśreyasa*, giving an appearance of making it the central concern of the *sūtras* which goes against the whole spirit of the traditional way in which they have been interpreted uptil now. Moreover, the definition of *niḥśreyasa* given in the fourth *sūtra* suffers from various difficulties also.[35] First, the definition is once again given in terms of causes of which it is supposed to be the consequence. It is *tattvajñāna* that is supposed to result in *niḥśreyasa*. But that is an empty formula which would be accepted by everybody. The differences would arise concerning how the blanks are to be filled in; what is to count as *tattvajñāna*, and what as *niḥśreyasa*. Unless independent criteria are provided for both and their invariable concomitance established, the phrase *tattvajñānāna niḥśreyasam* would have little meaning. There is, of course, the added problem whether the two are *identical* as is presumably held in Advaita Vedānta or whether, as the *sūtra* seems to indicate, the latter is a *consequence* of the former. Further, there is the question as to how the word *jñāna* is to be understood in these contexts. At least in the context of the subsequent *sūtras* there can be little doubt that as far as the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* are concerned, the term *Jñāna* is not to be understood on the pattern of what it is supposed to mean in Advaita Vedānta. It is clearly stated in the *sūtra* that the *tattvajñāna* which the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* are speaking of and which is supposed to lead to *niḥśreyasa* is the knowledge of *sādharmya* (similarity or resemblance) and *vaidharmya* (difference) between *padārthas* which them-

selves are extensionally defined as *dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa,* and *samvāya.* Each of these is later, as is well known, defined extensionally also.

Besides the extensional and the causal characteristics of the definitions offered by the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, there is another peculiarity which seems to have escaped as much notice as the former by the writers on the subject. The fourth *sūtra,* which purports to give the definition of *niḥśreyasa* which is supposed to tell at least partially about *dharma* as is clearly enunciated in *sūtra* 1.1.2 and whose exposition and analysis is the main task of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* as a whole as proclaimed in sūtra 1.1.1 itself, mentions the term *dharma* without clearly indicating the sense in which it is being used. All the six *padārthas* whose *sādharmyavaidharmya* knowledge is supposed to lead to *tattvajñāna* which, in its turn, is supposed to result in *niḥśreyasa* are themselves supposed to have *sādharmya-vaidharma* determined by what the author of the *sūtras* designates as *dharma-viśeṣas* (1.1.4). But what are these *dharma-viśeṣas*? Surely, they cannot be the *padārthas* themselves, for the similarities and differences amongst the *padārthas* are themselves a creation of the *dharma-viśeṣas.* Nor can they be identified with the *dharma* of the *sūtra* 1.1.1, as it would give rise to the charge of circularity in the foundational definition lying at the very base of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras. Dharma* in 1.1.2 is defined at least partly in terms of *niḥśreyasa* and *niḥśreyasa* is defined in 1.1.4. in terms of *dharma-viśeṣas.* It may be said that the difference between *dharma* and *dharma-viśeṣas* saves the situation; but how can we know the *dharma-viśeṣas* without knowing what *dharma* is? If the term *dharma* in the *sūtra* 1.1.4 is to be construed differently from that given in 1.1.1 as has to be done to avoid the charge of circularity, then the author of the *sūtras* would have to be held guilty of not only introducing a term which is deceptively similar to the one used in the *sūtra* 1.1.1 and thus giving rise to unnecessary ambiguity in discourse, but also of introducing a *new* term without first defining it in the system. The latter is a serious defect in the *sūtra* style of writing in particular, and the situation becomes even more serious when the author seems, at least on a *prima facie* reading of the text, unaware of it.

However it be, it is fairly clear that the term *niḥśreyasa,* as used in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras,* could hardly be taken in the sense of *apavarga* without not only completely forgetting the context of the *sūtra* 1.1.4, which defines the term *niḥśreyasa* for the system, but also the fact that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* themselves not only use the term *apavarga,* in a sense different from that of *mokṣa* in *sūtra* 2.2.25, but also give a definition of *mokṣa* in 5.2.18 which is different from that of *niḥśreyasa* given in 1.1.4. This, of course, assumes that *apavarga* in the same as *mokṣa.* In case this is not done, we would have the added problem of distinguishing between *apavarga* and *mokṣa.* All this accords well with the generally accepted position that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* are not only earlier than the *Nyāyasūtras* but in their earliest form also anti-Vedic in character. As Kuppuswamy Sastri observes:

> ...the Nyāya ontology is built upon the atomic theory and pluralistic realism of the Vaiśeṣika. The Nyāya epistemology with its fourfold scheme of *pramāṇas* is distinctly pro-Vedic: and in this respect, it shows a sharp contrast with the Vaiśeṣika scheme of *pramāṇas* which consists of perception and inference and which betrays anti-Vedic leanings.[36] Also, it may not be unreasonable to conjecture that the *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* was perhaps dominated by atheistic and pro-Buddhistic proclivities, such as were quite in keeping with the text of the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* and with the spirit of the tradition characterising the Vaiśeṣikas as *ardhavainā̃śikas* (semi-nihilists)...[37]

All of this, of course, belongs to the earliest period when the so-called systems were only in their formative stage. If we move on to the Gaṅgeśa and post-Gaṅgeśa period in the development of Nyāya, it would be a bold person indeed who would even look for their relationship to the pursuit of *mokṣa.* The period covers almost five hundred years, from twelfth century to the seventeenth century, and has at least thirty-six known thinkers who are supposed to have actively contributed to the development and refinement of logical thought in India—a development that affected all branches of learning to such an extent that practically no study could lay claims to intellectuality without giving evidence that it had mastered the techniques and methodology of the Navya-Nyāya form of analysis.[38]

Of course, to most writers on Indian philosophy, including Karl H. Potter, these five hundred years are of little consequence. Not only these but all the rest of the facts mentioned earlier do not have sufficient weight to outweigh the self-proclaimed declaration of the purpose of the *sūtras* in the eyes of these writers. These very same people, however, do not show any hesitation in characterizing the whole western philosophy in terms of its modern period, which, by common consent, is supposed to start with Descartes in the seventeenth century. Prejudices die hard, and the prejudices of scholars die harder still. But when the prejudices of a scholar govern the structure of an *Encyclopedia,* as it does in the case of Potter, it will only ensure that something achieves the status of certain knowledge when, at best, it is uncertain opinion based on arbitrary methods of interpretation which are applied only in the case of the Indian philosophical tradition and never to the one in the West.[39]

Notes

1. 'Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy: East and West,* January, 1965, pp. 37-51; 'Three Myths about Indian Philosophy', *Diogenes,* no. 55, July-September 1966; *Quest,* no. 53, 1967.
2. *Philosophic Exchange,* vol. i, no. 3, (Summer 1972) pp. 159-74. (The Journal of the

Centre for Philosophic Exchange of the State University of New York, College of Arts and Science at Brockport, New York, USA).

3. Perhaps there is a radical asymmetry between the lack of any essential nature in all things and the lack of essential nature of self. The latter is far more difficult to envisage or realize than the former. It may be because of this that *nirvāṇa* primarily means the realization of the 'no-self' nature of self rather than of the 'no-self' nature of objects. It remains a moot question whether the two 'no-selves' in Buddhism are necessarily seen as identical, as they are seen in the Advaitic realization.
4. Karl H. Potter, 'Indian Philosophy's Alleged Religious Orientation,' *Philosophic Exchange*, p. 102.
5. For a similar situation in the field of socio-cultural studies relating to India, see the author's review article 'Anthropology: The Bonded Science?' *New Quest*, May-June 1983.
6. Potter, p. 164.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
11. The following two *ślokas* from *Mahābhārata* amongst many others that could be quoted amply confirm this:

    (a) *Trivarga iti vikhyāto gaṇa aiṣa svayaṁbhuvā |*
    caturtho mokṣa ityeva prathagarthaḥ prathaggaṇaḥ ||

    12.59.30.

    (b) *Mokṣasyāpi trivargoanyaḥ proktaḥ sattvam rajastamaḥ |*
    sthānaṁ vṛddiḥ kṣayaścaiva trivargaścaiva dandjaḥ ||

    12.59.31.
12. Potter has complained that 'Daya doesn't indicate which texts he has in mind as a basis' for this. Well, the following may perhaps suffice as a small sample to substantiate what is well known to most persons, at least in India. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (1.2.9, 1.2.23, 2.6.10) and *Muṇḍakponiṣad* (3.2.3.) are some of the well-known passages in this connection. The tradition is epitomized in the common Bengali saying *Biśvāse milāy kṛṣṇa, tarke bahu dūr* (Only through Faith, one may find Krishna. Far, far is he from all argument and reasoning).
13. Potter, p. 166.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
17. *Ibid.* See on this point my article 'Is Īśwarkṛṣṇa's Sāṁkhya-Kārikā Really Sāṁkhyan?' *Philosophy-East and West*, July 1968.
18. Potter, p. 166.
19. Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. ii, p. 19. With regard to *Mīmāṁsā*, he does accept that 'in ancient times Pūrvamīmāṁsā did not accept liberation as an end, preaching that the ultimate purpose in life was to attain heaven through performance of acts prescribed in Vedic injunctions and avoidance of those acts prescribed by the same sacred scriptures.' (p. 24). However, he does not see the implications of what he has accepted.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.
21. *Nyāya-Sūtra* with Vātsyāyana's commentary. Complete English translation by Mriṇāl Kānti Gangopādhyāya, Calcutta, 1982.
22. H.P. Sastri, *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1905, reprinted in Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (ed.) *Studies in the History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. ii, Calcutta, K.P. Bagchi & Co., 1978, p. 88.

23. Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. ii, p. 694.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
25. H P. Sastri, p. 93.
26. Potter, *Encyclopedia*, vol. ii, p. 32.
27. D.N. Shastri, *Critique of Indian Realism*, Agra University, Agra 1964.
28. For some concrete explications of this exegetical principle see author's 'Is Īśwara-kṛṣṇa's Sāṁkhya-Kārikā Really Sāṁkhyan?' *Philosophy: East and West* July, 1968; 'Adhyāsa—A Non-Advaitic Beginning in Śaṁkara Vedanta' *Philosophy: East and West*, July 1965 and 'Vedanta—Does It Really Mean Anything?' *Conspectus* (2), 1966.
29. Potter, *Encyclopedia*, vol. ii. p. 32.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
31. *Nyāya: Gautama's Nyāya-Sūtra with Vātsyāyana's Commentary.*
32. *Ibid.*, p. lxii.
33. *Ibid.*, p. lxii. There are, in fact, many instances where it is clear that *niḥśreyasa* has not been used in the sense of *apavarga*. Besides the *śloka* from *Mahābhārata* 2.5.24 (critical edn.) which Mriṇāl Kānti Gangopādhyāya has quoted, there is for example the śloka 5.25.12 in the same text which says:

    Mahadbalaṁ Dhāratrāṣtrasya rajñaḥ,
    ko vai śakto hantuṁkṣīyamāṇaḥ |
    sohaṁ jaye caiva parājaye ca,
    Niḥśreyasaṁ nādhigacchāmi kiṁcit ||

34. *Ibid.*, p. lxiii-lxiv. See on this point the whole argument developed by the author from p. lxii to p. lxv.
35. Of course, the *sūtra* 1.1.4 as given in Śaṁkara Miśra's *upaskāra* commentary is not found either in the *Sūtra-pāṭha* given on the basis of Candrānanda's *vṛtti*, published in Gaekwad Oriental Series (No. 136) edited by Muni Sri Jambūvijayaji, or in the *Sūtra-pāṭha*, published from Mithilā Vidyāpīṭha, on the basis of a *vṛtti* which is earlier than that of Śaṁkara Miśra but presumably later than that of Candrānanda. But if the Sūtra 1.1.4 as given in Śaṁkara Miśra's version is not accepted, then we would have the added problem of explaining how the *sūtrakāra* could have committed procedural absurdity of proceeding with the *vyākhyā* without defining the terms *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa* which were used in the *sūtra* 1.1.2.
36. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (ed.), *Studies in the History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. ii, Calcutta, K.P. Bagchi & Co., 1978, p. 118 (from S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, Madras, 1951). This has been disputed by Sri Ananta Lal Thakur in his *Introduction to the Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda* with the commentary of Candrānanda critically edited by Muni Sri Jambūvijayaji, published by Baroda Oriental Institute, 1961, p. 3. He is also of the opinion that 'the word "dharma" in Vs. T.i. 182 means *padārthadharma*' (p. 3).
37. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
38. See M. Chakravarti, 'History of Navya-Nyāya in Bengal and Mithila' in Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (ed.), *Studies in the History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. ii, pp. 146-82.
39. This may seem unfair to Potter as he *has* referred to positions contrary to those held by him on the subject. But the basic question is whether it was academically proper for him to give a whole perspective to the *Encyclopedia* through his 'Introduction' to the Second Volume when he has such a strong *partisan* position on the subject.

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