

external object inspite of objections given in the preceding sūtra. The example given is that of a person whose mind is engaged elsewhere but is drawn away by the pain in his foot. Firstly, it is not clear what is sought to be proved and there are counter-instances in which when one is deeply involved in something one does not notice the pain unless it crosses a certain intensity. In fact there are many instances of people engaged in battle who have known only later that they have been seriously hurt or even lost a limb.

The sūtra 3.2.33 returns again to the issue of the non-simultaneity of recollections and suggests that they are not simultaneously present because the conditions such as attention, perception of the sign etc. are not all present together. The point seems to be that the non-simultaneity of cognition is not because of the mind but because of the fact that all the conditions for the occurrence of cognition are not fulfilled.

The sūtra 3.2.34 brings in a totally different consideration into the discussion and suggests that without the prior occurrence of desire or aversion, no activity can take place and thus, whether it is cognition or recollection, one will have to postulate a prior desire or aversion for the occurrence of the same, but desire and aversion can only belong to the self and not to the mind or the body.

The sūtra 3.2.35 tries to argue that, after all, desire and aversion are known only by bodily activities and hence they should rightly be regarded as belonging to the body and not to the soul, and if so, knowledge etc. will also have to be regarded as the property of the body. This, of course, is the extreme behaviourist position which is being taken by the thinker concerned and will not be acceptable to the Nyāya thinkers but it is interesting to see that the behaviourist argument is being raised as early as the Nyāya sūtras. Also in the context of the Nyāya sūtras, the argument achieves added importance as they have taken desire and aversion to be the grounds for inferring the existence of the soul.

However, the sūtra 3.2.36 seems to suggest that the beginning and cessation of activity or absence of activity is also found in the material objects and hence cannot be the ground of ascription of consciousness or intelligence to them for, by definition, they are supposed not to possess them. The argument perhaps seems to be that the characteristics of desire and aversion which are being ascribed to the body share certain similarities with those that are found in purely material objects and yet are distinctly different from them. The materialist or the behaviourist is considering this similarity and ignoring the differences, but if one does so one will destroy the basic difference between living and non-living matter and hence desire and aversion cannot be ascribed to the body. (There is a problem with respect to the sūtra numbering, particularly 37, 38, 39. Numbering of the sūtras is different in N.S., Bhāṣya and Nyāya Sūci Nibandha.)

The sūtra 3.2.40 gives an interesting ground for distinguishing between the behaviour of material and non-material objects. It suggests that the distinction lies between what may be called universality and non-universality. Perhaps, what the author wants to suggest is that in the world of nature there is a universality in behaviour just because there is no freedom or *samkalpa* to interfere or initiate changes leading in a different direction. The desire and aversion that are found in human or living beings is thus of a different kind than the beginning or cessation of activity in natural objects. In fact the translation of *niyama* and *aniyama* as unversality and absence of universality seems to be incorrect. A better translation would be regularity or irregularity or lawfulness and absence of law as indicative of freedom. The sūtra 3.2.41 makes this clear as it brings in the notion of *pāraṭantrya*, that is subjection to something else and *akratābhyāgam*, that is, getting the fruits of some action even though one had not done it oneself. The latter has been translated as contingency but this is not exactly correct as the phrase is often used in the context of the theory of karma which propounds that if the theory is true then one cannot enjoy the fruit of some one else's action. The argument

here is that intelligence etc. cannot be ascribed to body or senses or mind or anything else except the soul as all of these depend for their activity on the latter, and also if all or any of these were to be ascribed the property, then there will be a problem as to whom to ascribe the real agency of the action and who will enjoy the fruits thereof. The argument is interesting but one could develop a theory of plurality of agencies and the concept of relative autonomy or relative independence. The relation of the soul to the *buddhi*, *manas*, *indriya*, etc. need not be postulated on a one-way autocratic model but as a series of hierarchies each with its own relative autonomy and independence and both influencing and being influenced by an agency higher than them, as it obtains in most social or political systems. It is strange to find that this latter model was not developed in the tradition, even though it was available to them not only in the socio-political field but also in the theory of *puruṣārthas* which is closely tied to the individual self. The sūtra 3.2.42 merely tries to strengthen the argument by suggesting that one may infer the same by a process of elimination, that is, as there is no other entity to which intelligence can be attributed and hence it can only be the property of that which remains, that is, the soul.

The sūtra 3.2.43 adds that recollection or memory also must belong to the soul, for the soul is supposed to be the cognizer. Perhaps the argument here should be that memory must be the property of the soul as it cannot belong to anything else because it is considered to be an entity which abides through all changes. The sūtra 3.2.44 is a long one and says that recollection arises from such causes as attention, association and a number of other causes which are detailed in the sūtra itself. However, it is not clear what is the point of giving these causes from which recollection may arise. The sūtras 3.2.42 to 3.2.45 are concerned with the issue whether apprehension is totally evanescent like sound or it is relatively evanescent, that is, durable for sometime like a jar. The view accepted is that it is totally evanescent and the reasons given are: (1) that we apprehend motion which itself

is fleeting. The translation of *buddhi* as apprehension is very strange.

Normally, *buddhi* should have been translated as intelligence but this has not been done and needs investigation. The argument seems to be that as we have apprehension of motion which involves constant change, the apprehension itself must involve continuous change also. However, this is a strange argument as we can also argue that motion involves something which is in motion and hence its apprehension, like that of memory, involves the apprehension of something permanent also. In fact the sūtra 3.2.43 raises the objection that if the *buddhi* were transient or evanescent then the perception of things would also become indistinct as we will not be able to observe anything which is even relatively permanent. Furthermore, this will make memory impossible as nothing that is apprehended will have any permanent characteristic in it. The sūtra 3.2.43 further explicates that just as during lightening flash, the light of the flash being evanescent, the perception of the colour is indistinct, so also must be the apprehension of all things. But as this is not the case, the argument about the evanescence of *buddhi* is mistaken. The sūtra 3.2.44 seems to turn the tables on the objection and says that, in fact, the argument given proves just the opposite. The sūtra 3.2.45 says that the said perception, in fact, is like the distinct perception of the continuous series of lamp flames. The argument is that even if cognition is evanescent the perception of things will always be distinct. The example given is that of the perception of the continuous series of lamp flames. The argument however is not clear for, as a matter of fact, we have both distinct and indistinct apprehensions. Also it is not quite clear whether the *buddhi* as a faculty itself consists of continuously changing events or processes, or it is the objects that it apprehends which have this nature. After all, the objects themselves are of many types, some fleeting and some not so fleeting. The sūtra, 3.2.46 to 3.2.55 try to discuss the issue as to whose quality *buddhi* is supposed to be and the doubt is expressed by pointing out that,

as a matter of fact, in any object we find qualities which both belong to it and those which do not exactly belong to it and belong to something else. One of the examples given in the Bhāṣya is that of water in which we perceive both fluidity and warmth. But while fluidity is the natural property of water, warmth is a natural property not of water but of fire. The sūtra 3.2.47 argues that *buddhi* or sentience is not a quality of the body because colour and other qualities continue to exist as long as the body exists. The argument seems to be that sentience is not a natural quality of the body as, for example, colour and other properties are, for the body is found to be without it as when the body is dead just as water is found without the warmth. The sūtra 3.2.48 suggests that the example is not quite correct as even in the case of an object which has a certain colour, the colour may change due to some reason such as that of baking. The sūtra 3.2.49 suggests that the argument is not quite correct as the qualities produced by heat are due to the presence of counteractive forces and so the analogy cannot be sustained. Moreover, in material objects, though the colour may disappear, another colour appears in its place while such a thing never happens in the case of the body when it loses its quality of sentience. Perhaps the author is groping for a distinction between essential and non-essential qualities or between a range of qualities which may belong to the object and those which cannot belong to it. The sūtra 3.2.50 gives another reason why sentience cannot be said to be a property of the body. The reason given is that it pervades the whole of the body and not just any one part of it.

The sūtra 3.2.51 objects to this by saying that this is not quite true as no sentience is found in hair and nails. One can cut or remove them without one feeling any awareness at all. The sūtra 3.2.52 answers the objection by suggesting that the body should be taken to extend only upto the point where there is skin and as both in the case of hair and nails the skin is not there they are not integral parts of the body. In fact both the nails and the hair are said to continue to grow even after the death of the body.

The sūtra 3.2.53 suggests that sentience is a quality which is completely different in character from the qualities of the body as while it is felt by itself, it is not perceived by the senses but rather by the mind. The sūtra 3.2.54 objects to this by saying that many of the other qualities which are ascribed to the body such as colour etc. are also different from each other, yet even so they are ascribed to the body and hence there is no reason why sentience, even though it is different from other properties, should not be ascribed to the body. The sūtra 3.2.55 tries to answer this objection by saying that there is a basic difference between sentience and all the other properties in that the latter are all apprehensible by the senses while sentience is not perceived or apprehended by any particular sense organ which is concerned with it.

The sūtras 3.2.56-59 deal with the mind and the sūtra 3.2.56 argues that the mind must be only one as no two cognitions are apprehended simultaneously. The sūtra 3.2.57 raises an objection to this by asserting that this is not true for, as a matter of fact, we do perceive a number of actions simultaneously. The sūtra 3.2.58 answers this objection by saying that the said perception is like the perception of the fire circle which appears as one because it is moved in a circle very rapidly. This obviously is no answer, for in the case of the fire circle we know that it is moving rapidly and that if its motion is slowed it will not appear as unitary, while in the case of simultaneous cognition of objects, their rapid motion is only a matter of inference necessitated by the acceptance of a hypothesis which has no *prima facie* necessity about it. In fact, though the objection was concerned with actions which involve some sort of a motion, it need not have been so as we perceive simultaneously not merely many actions but also many objects. But, even if we confine ourselves to actions and accept the analogy of the fire circle, the question would arise as to what is ultimately the unitary action which is perceived and if that ultimate unit of action has to be completely static, that is, not consisting of any motion, then how can it be regarded as

an action. The sūtra 3.2.59 says that the mind must be atomic in character for the same reason, but it is not clear what is exactly meant by calling the mind atomic, particularly as mind does not occupy space and hence the notion of divisibility cannot normally be applied to it. (It is strange that both the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika do not seem to have devoted much attention to this problem.)

The sūtras 3.2.60-72 deal with the issue of how the body is formed. The sūtra 3.2.60 says that the formation of the body is due to the persistence of the effect of previous actions. This obviously is a reference to the theory of karma but, firstly, it does not seem to have any relevance at all and secondly, the theory of karma has neither been established nor yet been discussed. Nor, for that matter, the existence of past lives been established or discussed in any way. In fact, the issue is not even raised as to how the mind can become aware of past actions when they are past on the one hand and plural in number on the other. The sūtra 3.2.61 raises the objection that why should any difference be made between the production or formation of the body and the production or formation of other material objects which are also formed out of other material substances. The sūtra 3.2.62 says that this cannot be accepted because what is urged is still to be proved. The statement is strange because, if taken seriously, it would mean that nothing is produced except through the influence of *karma* and that matter cannot move on its own and that composite things cannot be formed out of it because of this reason. However, what is action and what causes it does not seem to have been discussed in the text upto this point. The sūtra 3.2.63 objects to this. It says that obviously the causes of the formation of the body are the parents. The point seems to be that living beings are formed out of other living beings while in the case of purely material objects this does not seem to be so. The sūtra 3.2.64 seems to give another argument that it is food that is needed for the formation of the body and its maintenance and growth which is not the case with material objects. The sūtra

3.2.65 seems to give a strange reason for believing in the influence of previous karma in the formation of the body in that it urges that if the formation of the body were independent of previous actions then every union between the parents should result in the formation of the body and as it does not obviously do so the material objects themselves could not be the cause of the formation. However, the argument is not only strange but does not seem to prove what is sought to be proved, for it is not quite clear how the existence of the past karma will be regarded as present when it is past and hence is already there and cannot be absent. Another point which is even more disturbing is as to how any choice is made between the past actions which are many and not only different but conflicting in nature. And, thirdly, how does the unity between these actions and the unity in the actions of some one else become relevant in the formation of the body. There is, of course, another problem which perhaps the author of the Nyāya sūtras did not know that the formation of the body is a result of the union between the sperm and the ovum which does not always occur in the case of every sexual union as he seems to suppose. The sūtra 3.2.66 argues that just as karma is the cause of the formation of the body, similarly it is also the cause of the connection of the body with a particular soul. The sūtra 3.2.67 suggests that this also explains how each soul is associated with a different body and how it is not possible for any one soul to be associated with any body whatsoever. The sūtra 3.2.68 says that if it be asserted that the formation of the body is due to *adr̥ṣṭa* as the mīmāṃsakas argue then, even after final release there will be likelihood of a body being produced and hence the hypothesis of *adr̥ṣṭa* cannot be accepted. However, it is not quite clear as to what is the difference between the postulation of karma and the postulation of *adr̥ṣṭa*. The sūtra 3.2.69 tries to argue that it could not be the relationship due to the action of the mind as, if it were the mind which was to be the cause of the formation of the body, there could be no severance of this connection. The point does not seem quite clear

as, surely, if a connection can happen at any point of time, then it implies that it was not necessary and the object could have been without it. However, the commentator seems to suggest that if mind were the cause of the bringing of the body into being then it could not be the cause of its death, as that which is the cause of life cannot be the cause of death and, in any case, the body was not in existence before so that mind could get into relation with it. According to the Bhāṣya this seems to be an objection to the Jain view. The sūtra 3.2.70 explicates this point further by saying that, in such a situation death would not be possible and the body will have to be regarded as everlasting. The sūtra 3.2.71 objects to this by saying that it would be like the eternality of the dark colour of the atom which even though eternal can change under certain conditions, as when it is obstructed or set aside by contact with fire as in baking. The point of the objection perhaps is that death may be seen as a temporary obstruction to life which may reappear when those obstructive conditions are removed. The sūtra 3.2.72 says that this is a fantastic hypothesis and cannot be accepted as not only would it involve the admission of what is not supported either by reasoning or fact but also because it would involve the absurdity of a person suffering the consequences of what he has not done thus violating the basic premise of the law of karma which is the foundation stone of the moral intelligibility of the universe. The point perhaps is that if death can occur due to external circumstances, then obviously a person has to suffer it not because of something that he had done but purely because of accidental, external conditions over which he had no control.

Part IV - Section 1 - (68 Sūtras)

The sūtra 4.1.1 deals with what may be called *pravṛtti* or the tendency of the mind to go outwards or the concern with external goals and objects which has been defined as activity, but the term *pravṛtti* is far wider than what is connoted by the term action in

the english language. The sūtra merely says that all that is to be said about the topic has already been discussed. The sūtra 4.1.2 talks about the defects or *doṣa* and makes the same statement about it. However, there are two problems which do not seem to have been attended to; one, there is a large part of thought on the subject which tends to argue that *pravṛtti* as such is a *doṣa* and hence its complete cessation alone is desirable. On the other hand, one may try to distinguish within *pravṛtti* itself that which is right and that which is wrong. If so, then *pravṛtti* as such cannot be considered to be a *doṣa* and hence one will have to distinguish between the right and wrong forms of *pravṛtti*. The sūtra 4.1.3 suggests that there are three groups of defects which are all included under *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* which are distinct from one another. But it does not seem clear as to how *moha* is different from *rāga* as one cannot have *moha* without *rāga* though there certainly can be *rāga* without *moha*. It will be interesting to think whether *dveṣa* also generates *moha* of a certain sort. In any case, the statement in the sūtra that the three are distinct from each other does not seem to be correct. The sūtra 4.1.4 raises the objection that *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* cannot be regarded as different from each other as they have one and the same thing as their anti-thesis is one and it is usually known as *tattva jñāna*.

The sūtra 4.1.5 tries to answer the objection and says that it is not quite correct to hold that all things or properties which have the same antithesis are not different from each other. The example given not in the sūtra but in the Bhāṣya and in the Vārttika is from colour in the case of a pot etc. However, there is a more interesting logical point which has perhaps been missed. The point seems to be that in case the opposite of two properties is the same how can those properties be different. What is being assumed is that there must be a radical difference between the negation of one and the negation of the other in case they are different. Ultimately, the issue relates to the question what is to be regarded as the antithesis or the opposite or the contrary of any property. This would lead to a differentiated analysis of the

whole notion of negation which unfortunately does not seem to have been undertaken either by Vātsyayana or Uddyotakara who have commented on the sūtra. The sūtra 4.1.6 suggests that *moha* is the worst of them all, for if one did not have *moha*, the others that is *rāga* or *dveṣa*, would not arise. But if it is so, then there should be only one *doṣa*, that is, *moha* for if there were no *moha*, *rāga* or *dveṣa* will not arise. It is not clear what exactly is meant by *moha*. The translation of *moha* as infatuation does not seem correct. The sūtra 4.1.7 raises the issue that if what is said in sūtra 4.1.6 is correct, then *moha* cannot itself be considered to be a *doṣa* for, according to the sūtra 4.1.6, it itself is the cause of the coming into being of *rāga* or *dveṣa* and the effect is always different from the cause. The sūtra 4.1.8 tries to counter this objection by saying that *moha* still can be regarded as a *doṣa*, for it possesses the characteristic of what has already been defined as a *doṣa*, that is, it leads to an activity. The point of the objection however, was not just this but also a deeper one that if *moha* is the cause of *rāga* and *dveṣa* then there is no point in listing them separately and secondly, the cause of a *doṣa* cannot itself be a *doṣa* as this might lead to infinite regress. The whole discussion seems to be confused and, in any case, the logical and the epistemological issues involved have hardly been discussed.

The sūtra 4.1.9 suggests another answer to the objection that there is no bar for things belonging to the same class to bear among themselves the relation of cause and effect. The point seems to be that if things belong to the same class and if they also have a relation of cause and effect between them then, obviously, the cause can have the same property as the effect. The issue is important and needs further discussion. The sūtra 4.1.10 argues that rebirth is possible only if the soul is held to be eternal. The problem to which the sūtra seems to address itself appears to relate to the question that if the soul is eternal, then how can it ever be born and if so the whole question of *doṣa* along with the problem of *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* will become irrelevant. The sūtra tries to suggest that if the soul were not

eternal, there would be no point in talking about rebirth either. The sūtra 4.1.11 says that things that are *vyakta* arise only out of those which also are *vyakta* as is attested by perception. The previous sūtra seemed to suggest that birth and rebirth and death would be intelligible by the fact that the soul which is eternal got connected and disconnected with the body and all the other adjuncts which are necessary for the body. But as far as the production of the body is concerned it itself is like all other objects which seem to be produced from other perceptible objects. The use of the term *vyakta* is not quite clear. Does it refer to its *avyakta* stage when it was only potential and not manifest? On the other hand, does it mean that *avyakta* objects are bound to be eternal as they cannot come into being and that the soul is an *avyakta* object of this kind? The sūtra 4.1.12 objects to the contention made in 4.1.11 and points out that the idea that something which is *vyakta* is produced out of something which is also *vyakta* is not true, as a jar is not produced from another jar. The objection is silly as what was said was that the jar has to be produced from something else which is equally perceptible or *vyakta*. The sūtra 4.1.13 gives the obvious answer that the jar is actually produced from something which is equally perceptible, apprehensible or *vyakta*.

The sūtras 4.1.14-18 are supposed to discuss the contention that things may arise out of *abhāva* or *sūnya*. The sūtra 4.1.14 argues that entities are produced out of *abhāva* or nothingness or non-being as no object comes into existence without having destroyed its cause. The sūtra 4.1.15 points out a self-contradiction in this statement by suggesting that something that comes later cannot be the cause of destruction of something which occurred before it for that which destroys must already be in existence. The sūtra 4.1.16 tries to argue from the use of language against the charge of self-contradiction and suggests that the case denoting causal function is used both with respect to what has occurred in the past and what will occur in the future and hence if linguistic usage is taken seriously, the charge of self-contradiction

is untenable. The sūtra 4.1.17 tries to by-pass this objection by saying that in any case there is no production out of things destroyed, for if a thing does not exist how can it produce anything else. The sūtra 4.1.18 says that what is said in 4.1.17 is not meant to deny that there is a sequence in the causal situation which may give rise to the impression that something has arisen out of the destruction of something else, but the destruction itself cannot be considered as the cause of what has come into being. The whole discussion is about the nature of causality and demands a more serious discussion than either the sūrakāra or his commentators seem to have done.

The sūtra 4.1.19 discusses an alternative view which says that God alone is the cause of everything because we find that what man tries to achieve is seldom achieved through his actions. The sūtra 4.1.20 says that God could not be considered as the cause of what happens as in the absence of any human agency, no fruit appears at all. The sūtra 4.1.21 suggests that if we take both the sūtra 19 and 20 seriously, that is, human actions do not always attain the ends for which they are undertaken, and that no end is achieved without human action, then it follows that the success or failure of human actions depends on the support or help given by God or its absence in the situation concerned. The sūtra 4.1.22 suggests that things can be produced without there being any *nimitta* for them. The example given is very strange as it refers to the sharpness of thorn. The commentator suggests that what is being denied in the term *nimitta* is the efficient cause and not causality of any other kind. However, there may be total denial of causality and not just of efficient causality alone as what is being asserted in the sūtra may be that it is chance and not any determinate causality which results in the production of things. The sūtra 4.1.23 suggests that as chance itself is being said to be the cause, causality is not being denied but only that something else is the cause than the one we usually think it to be. Also, perhaps, what is suggested is that, firstly, it is not clear what is meant by chance and secondly what is meant by chance being

the cause of something. The sūtra 4.1.24 says that 4.1.23 is confusing between *nimitta* and *animitta* wherein the latter is the negation of the former and as the two are completely different, the statement in 4.1.23 does not make any sense at all.

The sūtra 4.1.25 expresses the Buddhist position that all things are *anitya* as they both come into being and are destroyed. But this can not be true as it entails that at least *anityatā* is *nitya*. The sūtra 4.1.27 again tries to suggest that the objection raised in 4.1.26 is not alright as there are instances such as fire which after destroying all things itself vanishes or gets destroyed and hence remains no more. Similarly, the non-permanence of all things need not be regarded as permanent. It seems that in many of these sūtras, the author is struggling to make a distinction which nowadays has been clearly formulated in terms of language and meta-language or the first level use of language and the second level use of language. Many of the issues could perhaps be easily clarified in this manner. The sūtra 4.1.28 tries to suggest that the determination whether a certain thing is eternal or not can only be on the basis of what is actually perceived. The translation seems to be incorrect as what the sūtra means is that the denial of the permanence of something can only be made on the basis of the system that one builds in connection with what one apprehends or what one finds in experience. In case the terms *upalabdhi* and *vyavasthā* which are used in the sūtra are taken seriously it will lead to a more sophisticated contention than that which seems to be captured in the translation of the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika propounded on it. The sūtra 4.1.29 carries the argument in a different direction by pointing to the counterposition that everything is *nitya* or permanent because all the five basic substances or elements are eternal. This obviously is opposed to the Buddhist position which was presented by the sūtra 4.1.25 that everything is passing or impermanent. The sūtra 4.1.30 denies this as it has denied the earlier counterposition by suggesting that we actually perceive the causes of production and destruction or coming into being or passing away.

The sūtra 4.1.31 says that, after all, all things possess the characteristics of elementary substances and hence they must be present in them and as the elementary substances are supposed to be eternal, these things also will have the element of eternality in them. The sūtra 4.1.32 merely repeats the argument already given in 4.1.30. The sūtra 4.1.33 also gives another reason for denying the permanence of all things because of the presence of primary elements in them by saying that no *vyavasthā* would be possible if what is being urged was accepted. The sūtra is not quite clear. The translation says that the view cannot be accepted for there would be no possibility of differentiation. But surely there is differentiation between the primary elements and their properties. Also, the term *vyavasthā* cannot mean just differentiation though it certainly presupposes the existence of differentiation in what is to be organised. The sūtra 4.1.34 discusses another alternative which argues that all must be regarded as differentiated or diverse because everything can be characterized in terms of different properties. The translation again seems to be mistaken for it translates *bhāvas* as symbols or names which of course it cannot be. The sūtra 4.1.35 suggests against this that an entity is built out of different properties and hence the differentiation of properties does not entail that there is no single or unitary entity at all. The sūtra 4.1.36 further argues that symbols of things are restricted in their application to particular objects. The contention seems to be that after all even separate characterizations refer to unitary objects and hence one will not be able to assert that there is no unity at all and that every characterization is different from every other characterization. The problem seems to be that basically every quality is distinct from every other quality and if only qualities were to be real then everything will be different from everything else. And yet things have a unity even though one thing is different from another. How then to understand both the differences in qualities on the one hand and identity or unity of things and objects on the other. However, there is a deeper

problem regarding the identity of qualities themselves, for different instances of a quality are also supposed to be the same.

The sūtra 4.1.37 discusses the contention that all things must be non-entities because everything is a negation of everything else. This perhaps refers to the Buddhist contention that every entity is a denial of all other entities and thus primarily consists of its differentiation from them. The sūtra 4.1.38 controverts this by saying that even if a thing is different from all other things, it has a positive nature of its own. The sūtra 4.1.39 raises an objection to this by suggesting that there is no such thing as the character of individuality of things as basically it is only a relational property relative to other things. There is, for example, no such property as long or short as these are relative statements and hence the same thing may be long or short in relation to different things. The sūtra 4.1.40 objects to this by suggesting that there is a self-contradiction involved in the statement. It is not quite clear what exactly the term *vyāhata* means but the discussion as given in the *Bhāṣya* and the *Varttika* seems to suggest that if one property is relative to the other then the other cannot be regarded to be relative to it, which obviously is a weak objection. The more important point is that all properties cannot be regarded as relational in character. A property like red, for example, is different from properties like long or short and yet the question is whether we will recognize any property as that property if there were no other properties belonging to the same class. If there were, for example, only one colour in the world would we recognize it as that colour, even if we accept that it would not be relational in the same sense in which properties like long or short are relational. The sūtra 4.1.41 seems to give a generalized argument as to why no absolute limitation can be imposed on the number of things in the universe. The reason given is that in case some argument is given for establishing or proving the number of things in the universe then the number will be larger than the number suggested since it will include the proof for establishing the number. On the other hand, if the

argument or the proof that is given is supposed to be included in the number of things that are already there in the universe then obviously no proof can be given for them, for a proof will have to be provided for the proof itself. Perhaps, the argument given for denying the limited number of existents in the universe could be given differently than the way it has been presented in the sūtra as there is always a possibility of everything being an object of consciousness and as this itself is or can be an object of consciousness at the second level, there will always be the possibility of the limited number suggested being out-numbered or increased by this fact. In any case the point seems interesting and should be the subject of greater discussion. In modern terminology, the distinction is made between levels or orders where one level or order is not supposed to be confused with the other. Also, there is a distinction between things which can be enumerated and those which cannot be enumerated. Beyond this we have a distinction between trans-finite numbers and the levels of infinity which obviously could not have been discussed by the author of the Nyāya sūtra. But, in any case, the problem which is being discussed remains the same. The sūtra 4.1.42 raises the objection that the argument given in sūtra 4.1.41 is not correct as the means of proving is only a part of what is to be proved and cannot be regarded as something apart from it.

The sūtra 4.1.43 raises an objection to this contention by saying that the contention cannot be made as it is not accepted that things can have any parts. For if it is accepted that things have parts then they cannot be finite in number as then the parts can have other parts also.

The sūtra 4.1.44 starts the discussion of a different issue. The discussion from sūtras 44-51 is concerned with the issue whether the fruits of action can reasonably be considered to cause rebirth as normally the effect of an action should be realized immediately and even if it is accepted that sometimes the fruit of an action does not occur immediately, then one will have to find as to why it does not do so. The sūtra 4.1.44 therefore starts with the doubt

whether the fruit occurs immediately or after the lapse of some time. The sūtra 4.1.45 says that the fruit does not occur immediately because it is of the sort which can be experienced only at a later time. The action in the context of which the discussion according to the commentary, is taking place, that is, if it is being done for the sake of attaining heaven, then it can only occur after a lapse of time. But the issue is a far wider one as the theory of karma is not confined to the performance of the Vedic Yajña alone, and even among the Vedic Yajñas, there are some that are done for relatively more immediate fruits in this life such as those concerning rain or getting a progeny. The sūtra 4.1.46 raises the objection that the fruition cannot appear after a lapse of time as the cause thereof will have ceased to exist long ago. The sūtra 4.1.47 suggests that it is not the case that no effect occurs immediately. It is only that the actual fruit that is wanted occurs later and that the effect that is produced immediately functions as the intermediate cause for the production of the final effect, as it is, for example, in the case of fruit of the trees. The sūtra 4.1.48 objects to this by saying that this is a very strange position as it is not clear what is the status of the so-called final fruit before it has fructified. Also, because it occurs long after the action was done it can neither be regarded as existent as it has not appeared, nor as totally non-existent because it is supposed to be there potentially, nor can it be regarded as both existent and non-existent because the two are totally dissimilar. The real effect can only be the intermediate one or the one immediately following the supposed cause of the ultimate fruit. The objection applies, in fact, to the whole notion of potentiality and is a challenge to understand it differently. The sūtra 4.1.49 takes recourse to ordinary experience and says that, after all, we observe both the production or the coming into being of objects and their destruction, disappearance or passing away and hence we have to assume that something was non-existent before and that it ceases to be existent when it passes away. However, this does not help in understanding the concept of potentiality which was the subject of discussion.

The sūtra 4.1.50 tries to suggest that the very idea of potentiality implies that the fruit thereof was non-existent and wonders where is the problem then. The sūtra 4.1.51 suggests that there is a radical difference between the example of the tree and its fruit and action and its results as both inhere in totally different kinds of entities. One is material, while the other is spiritual. The objection according to the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika relates not to the difference in the nature of the āśraya but rather in the fact that the person who does the act and the person who reaps the fruit are two different persons with two different bodies. This, of course, is to confuse the identity of the person with the identity of the body and raises the question wherein the identity of a person lies.

The sūtra 4.1.52 tries to answer the objection by pointing out that the soul or the self is the āśraya of both happiness and merit or dharma etc. and hence the objection does not hold. The sūtra 4.1.53 suggests that the answer given in 4.1.52 is not satisfactory as among the fruits mentioned, there are such things as son, wife, cattle, gold, food etc. which obviously cannot subsist in the soul. The sūtra 4.1.54 suggests that these things are called fruits only indirectly as their real effect is in the soul in terms of its happiness. This is plain hedonism and has all the defects that people have pointed out with respect to hedonism. Also, it is devoid of morality as it regards others instrumentally and not intrinsically. In fact, this is also to subvert the notion of *dharma* which in its true meaning is not concerned with one's happiness or unhappiness, but in the fulfilment of one's obligations and the doing of what is right.

The sūtras 4.1.55 to 58 are supposed to be concerned with the problem of suffering. The sūtra 4.1.55 suggests that birth itself is the basic suffering as it is associated with all the hinderances and encumbrances associated with it. The sūtra 4.1.56 says that it will not be proper to think of birth as identical with pain and suffering as it also provides the possibility of whatever happiness or pleasure one gets from life. The Bhāṣya and the Vārttika do

not seem to be correct in presenting it. The sūtra 4.1.57 tries to meet the objection by suggesting that it is not that the fact of pleasure is being denied but as the pleasure itself gives rise to the desire and longing for more and more of it, it itself becomes the cause of frustration and suffering. The sūtra 4.1.58 adds to this the point that there are many kinds of suffering, some of which are even wrongly regarded as pleasant.

The sūtras 4.1.59 to 68 are supposed to be concerned with the nature of final release. The sūtra 4.1.59 tries to say that there can be no such thing as release or *apavarga* because one has always to pay debts to the ṛṣis, gods and the forefathers. Also because man is afflicted with various *kleśas* such as ignorance, egoism, hatred, affection and yearning for life and also because he can never be free from activity of mind and body while he is alive. The sūtra 4.1.60 suggests that the terms *ṛṇa*, *kleśa* and *pravṛtti* etc. should not be understood in their primary sense but rather in their secondary sense for, in the context in which they have been used, the primary sense is inapplicable. One may see a detailed description of this in the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika. The sūtra 4.1.61 suggests that the Brāhmaṇa texts themselves speak of the transference of the sacrificial fire after a certain stage implying thereby that one ceases to be a householder and thus is not bound by all those debts and duties which belong only to a householder. The sūtra 4.1.62 gives the same argument in a different context, the main idea being that the so-called debts and duties are not universal but bound to the state of the householder only. However, the sūtrakāra does not see that he has argued in sūtra 4.1.60 that these terms should be taken in a secondary rather than a primary sense. If so, it will be obvious that the examples given are relevant only as far as the primary sense of these terms is concerned. Even a renouncer has obligations to his Guru and to the order or the *saṃpradāya* of which he is a member and also to the common laity on whom he depends for his physical needs and who, in turn, expect some spiritual nourishment from him. The discussion uptil now was only of the so-called debts which

a person incurs because of the fact of being born in this world. The sūtra 4.1.63 discusses the problem of the *kleśas* which were supposed to stand in the way of the possibility of final release or *mokṣa* and argues that the so-called *kleśas* are absent in the case of deep sleep when a person is having no dreams at all, for at that time he cannot be supposed to have any suffering etc. It is surprising to find the Nyāya sūtra referring to the state of deep sleep as, normally, it is only the Advaita Vedāntins who are supposed to refer to it. Perhaps the example was a common one in those times. The sūtra 4.1.64 further suggests that when *kleśas* have been destroyed, activity does not lead to rebirth. This again is a strange statement for it does not say that the activity ceases when the *kleśas* have ceased but only that the actions done in such a situation do not lead to rebirth. (The meaning of the term *pratisaṅghāta* is not clear.) This position recalls very much the view of action upheld by the Gītā, the only difference being that there the term *kleśas* is defined in a more precise manner. It may also be noted that the term *kleśas* is being used perhaps in the same sense as it is used in the Yoga sūtra. There, thus, seems to be a commonly prevalent terminology regarding the analysis of the human situation which seems to have little to do with doctrinal differences regarding the theory of proof or *pramāṇa* with which the Nyāya sūtra is supposed to be specifically concerned. The sūtra 4.1.65 raises an objection to the possibility of *kleśas* being destroyed by arguing that they belong to the very nature of man and hence cannot be got rid of. The sūtra 4.1.66 argues that it is not difficult to conceive of the cessation of some thing which is natural or intrinsic to man just as one notices continuously this negation or cessation of the beginningless non-existence of a thing when it comes into being. The analogy seems to be with respect to the cessation of some thing that is beginningless but the idea of a *svabhāva* has nothing to do with beginninglessness but concerns rather the essential property of a thing. The argument is that a thing cannot lose its specific property without losing its identity. The sūtra 4.1.67 suggests

another alternative. The cessation of the *kleśas*, even when they are natural, may be like the cessation of the dark colour of the atom. The analogy here is that the natural colour of the atom is supposed to be dark but it is destroyed by fire. Similarly natural properties may also undergo transformation under special circumstances. However, then we will have to distinguish between natural properties and essential properties as any property that can cease or undergo a transformation without affecting the being of the object concerned cannot normally be regarded as its essential property. The sūtra 4.1.68 gives another reason for suggesting that the opponent's contention is mistaken by pointing out that the source of desire along with all the other *kleśas* is *saṅkalpa* which strangely has been wrongly translated as misapprehension. *Saṅkalpa* is certainly not *avidyā* or ignorance.

Part IV - Section 2 - (50 Sūtras)

The sūtra 4.2.1 suggests that *tattva jñāna* or the knowledge of reality leads to the cessation of *ahaṅkāra* or the sense of egoity or 'I-ness' which is the cause of all the defects. This is very strange indeed for basically it is a *sāṃkhyan* position and goes completely counter to the Nyāya position which holds that *tattva jñāna* consists not in a process of deidentification of *puruṣa* with *prakṛti* or of consciousness with object or even of consciousness with self-consciousness as in Advaita Vedānta but rather with the knowledge of the topics mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.1. The sūtra 4.2.2 again is very strange as it seems to say that the objects are the causes of the defects arising in the self because they lead to a *saṅkalpa* which may in this context be translated as the desire that has arisen from them and the willed action of consciousness to pursue the end of desire. Basically this again is an Upaniṣadic position that it is the outgoing movement of consciousness which then gets entangled in all the objects which is the cause of the basic mistake and suffering in the human situation. The sūtra 4.1.3 is again very strange as it seems to suggest that the cause

of the defects arising in the mind is because it is concerned with the objects as a whole. The Bhāṣya and the Vārttika seem to give an even stranger interpretation of the sūtra as they suggest that the mind tends to be concerned only with the agreeable aspects of the object and ignore the disagreeable aspects while the author wants you to concern yourself only with the disagreeable aspects. This all is very silly as the disagreeable aspects also tend to involve one with the object and for the author of the Nyāya sūtra it cannot be a defect that the object is known as a whole as any one aspect will not allow true knowledge of it. Strangely also the sūtrakāra has used the word *abhimāna* which perhaps is the same as *ahamkāra* but the latter arises in the context of the self and not the object. All in all, the sūtras are very strange and the commentaries stranger.

The sūtra 4.2.4 raises the issue that the doubt arises as there is both *vidyā* and *avidyā* or knowledge and ignorance about the object. Here again the translation is very strange; in fact incorrect, as *vidyā* and *avidyā* have been translated as apprehension and non-apprehension. Also, it is not clear how *avidyā* can give rise to *saṁśaya* if it means ignorance. It can do so only if it is taken to mean false knowledge. On the other hand, doubt can only arise if there is a conflict about what is the case which obviously cannot be described as *vidyā* and *avidyā*. According to the commentator, the discussion is about the composites and its components. However, it is not clear how this judgement has been reached by the commentator.

The sūtra 4.2.5 says that there can be no doubt about the matter as it has been established before in sūtra 2.1.33 while discussing the problem of the whole and part. The sūtra 4.2.6 tries to suggest that obviously there can be no doubt because the *vṛtti* cannot obtain or, as the Bhāṣyakāra says, the existence of any such thing as the composite is impossible. The sūtra 4.2.7 tries to suggest that there cannot be any such thing as a composite. The discussion basically is about the relation of the whole and the parts and most probably comes from the side of the Buddhists

who maintain that this relation is incomprehensible for neither the whole can exist in the parts nor can the parts be conceived to exist apart from the whole. The point obviously seems to be that the whole is a construction on the basis of entities which can only be conceived of ultimately as completely separate from one another and do not consist of any parts at all. Thus, what is real are only unrelated 'reals' or ultimate partless atoms which cannot be called parts in any sense of the term as they have no relation to anything else. The sūtras 4.2.8 to 10 raise these objections in different ways. The sūtra 4.2.7 raises the difficulty regarding the various components of a whole which cannot be considered as either residing in the whole or in a part of it. The sūtra 4.2.8 merely explicates this by saying that obviously the whole cannot exist in the parts while 4.2.9 says that it also cannot exist apart from them and sūtra 4.2.10 says that the whole cannot be the same as its parts as it must be different from them.

The sūtra 4.2.11 answers all these objections by pointing that the questions themselves are wrongly posed as the whole is unitary and single in character and hence any term which connotes diversity or difference cannot be applied to it. The problems have arisen therefore because of a linguistic confusion and because the whole has not been regarded as a real whole. However, the author of the sūtra has not seen that after all, even a whole is distinguished from other wholes and hence predicates differentiating it from others can be applied to it. This however is a separate problem than the ones being raised in earlier sūtras.

The sūtra 4.2.12 tries to answer an objection where neither the objection nor the answer seems clear. The sūtra 4.2.13 continues the discussion and seems to argue that one can perceive wholes without assuming the reality of anything such as wholes as we see a mass of hair without seeing each individual hair. The point seems to be that we may perceive a whole without perceiving or even being consciously aware of the individual elements which constitute it. The example given is of hair where we are aware of the totality or the whole without being aware

of the individual hair which make up the whole and render it possible. The sūtra 4.2.14 makes a generalized observation suggesting that the distinctness or the indistinctness of the perception is due to the sensitivity or dullness of the sense organs even though they never go beyond the range in which they usually operate. The point perhaps seems to be that whether we perceive an indistinct whole or each of the distinct elements comprising the whole depends on the sharpness or dullness of our sense organs and not so much on the objects themselves. The sūtra 4.2.15 suggests that the difficulties which have been pointed in connection with the whole and its parts are unending and will continue till the world ceases. (The translation again seems to be strange because the term that has been used is *pralaya* which means total dissolution of everything). The Bhāṣya however suggests that after all everything we perceive is made up of wholes consisting of parts which are again wholes which have parts till we reach the ultimate atoms which do not have parts and which alone will remain when everything disintegrates but which, in any case, will never be the object of perception. The sūtra 4.2.16 reminds the sūtrakāra that even in *pralaya* at least the atoms will remain. The sūtra 4.2.17 seems to suggest that the atom perhaps may not be regarded as indivisible but only as that which is beyond the dyad. It is not quite clear as to what exactly is meant by this statement.

The sūtra 4.2.18 raises the objection against the very notion of atom or rather against its indivisibility, for it is urged that it must be pervaded by *ākāśa* or empty space, and thus be divisible, having parts. The sūtra 4.2.19 suggests that if this is not accepted then *ākāśa* would cease to be all pervading. The sūtra 4.2.20 tries to answer this objection by suggesting that the terms “inside” and “outside” are only applicable to that which is a product as the term “inside” stands for that constituent part of the object which is hidden by other constituents and the term “outside” is applied to that constituent part which hides the other. However, as the atom is not a product and does not have constituent parts the term

“outside” and “inside” cannot be applied to it. This is an interesting objection and a relatively modern one as it argues that unless certain criteria of applicability are fulfilled, terms cannot be unconditionally applied in all contexts. The Vārttika on sūtra 4.2.20 makes some interesting points regarding the meaning of permeation and what exactly could possibly be meant when it is said that the atom is permeated by *ākāśa*. The sūtra 4.2.21 suggests that *ākāśa* is regarded as all pervading due to the pervasion of sound and conjunction. It is not quite clear what exactly does the sūtra mean. It suggests perhaps that the all pervasiveness of *ākāśa* is itself a matter of inference because sound seems to spread in it indefinitely and that any two objects can only be conjoined to each other if there is *ākāśa* between them. It is strange that while the argument from conjunction is given, the argument from motion is not there. The sūtra 4.2.22 gives the properties of *ākāśa*. These are mentioned as lack of any displacement by things moving in it or striking against it as it happens in water. Also, lack of obstruction for things moving in it or striking against it and its being intangible. There is an interesting argument in the Bhāṣya which says that the non-eternality of things is due to destruction or dismemberment of their constituent parts and not by permeation of *ākāśa*. It is not quite clear what the term *ākāśa* means; is it the same as space or different from it. The sūtra 4.2.23 gives another reason why the atom must be made up of component parts. The reason given is that atoms are material and only material objects have a shape or form and that which has shape or form must have parts.

The sūtra 4.2.24 gives another reason why atoms must have parts and this reason is that they are capable of *saṁyoga* or conjunction, and if it were not so then no concrete objects would be made out of them. The sūtra 4.2.25 answers all these objections by saying that all of them lead to infinite regress and no argument can be accepted as valid if it leads to infinite regress.

The sūtras from 4.2.27 are supposed to be concerned with the refutation of the denial of the reality of the external world.

The sūtra 4.2.26 suggests that due to the analysis of reason or after it objects seem to lose their reality as it cannot be found after a thing has been analysed, just as a cloth does not seem to be there after its threads have been taken apart one by one. The sūtra 4.2.27 counters this by saying that this cannot be correct as it involves a self-contradiction because the very fact that reason analyses things means that there are things to be analysed and that the analysis is supposed to reveal the nature of what has been analysed. The sūtra 4.2.28 explains the non-apprehension of the whole when the parts have been taken from it explaining that this non-apprehension is due to the fact that it subsists in them and hence cannot be apprehended apart from them. However, what has not been pointed out is that the whole is a particular arrangement of the parts and when the parts are arranged differently the resultant whole will be different.

The sūtra 4.2.29 makes a generalized statement that in reality things are recognised by means of their appropriate means of cognition. The point perhaps is that in order to apprehend the whole one has to go about in a different manner than by taking its constituent parts apart one by one. In fact, even in modern analytical approach to the subject it is so, for a correct understanding of the object one should know not only the elements it consists of, but also how they all are put together. The sūtra 4.2.30 suggests that the argument is untenable at a deeper level for if it is successful then it proves at least that one thing is real, that is, the argument itself. And in case it is held not to prove even this, then it does not prove anything at all. This is the usual way of arguing which Gautama seems to adopt at many places and it will be interesting to find the number of places and the contexts in which he has used this argument.

The sūtra 4.2.31 argues that if every *prameya* has to have an appropriate *pramāṇa* for it then it will be something like a dreamt object which may be seen as the object of the dreaming process itself. The sūtra attempts to reply to the position maintained in the earlier sūtra that appropriateness cannot distinguish between

truth and falsity of what is known. The point seems to be that the appropriateness of the means of knowing to the object known may be as mistaken as if some one were to argue that the reality of a dreamt object is a function of or depends upon the fact that it is dreamt. The objection is misplaced for, firstly, dreaming does not depend on us and secondly, even if one were to dream one cannot ensure the objects that will appear in the dream. The sūtra 4.2.32 suggests another alternative that it may be likened to the notion of reality found in magical phenomena, imaginary cities in the air or the mirage. These examples again are not on the same level. The mirage is an objective phenomenon which, though illusory, occurs to everyone and hence there is objectivity about it. The magical phenomena are produced by somebody who deludes others but not oneself while a *gandharva nagar* does not seem to be either here or there unless it refers to the phenomenon one sometimes observes in clouds and their formations.

The sūtra 4.2.33 gives the usual answer of the author of the Nyāya sūtras that these are pure conjectures and cannot be taken seriously as there is no attempt to give a reason why what is being stated should be accepted as true. The sūtra 4.2.34 suggests that the example of dream objects is not correct as, like memory, and objects of desire, they have been previously experienced independently. So the reality of these objects is a derived reality (strangely, the word *saṅkalpa* which occurs in the sūtra has been translated as desire by Ganganath Jha).

The sūtra 4.2.35 suggests that just as on waking the so-called reality of dreamt objects gets destroyed similarly on the arising of true knowledge the false knowledge vanishes. But even when one wakes up, the dreamt objects may continue to have their effects on one even though one may realize that they are not as 'real' as one thought they were. Not only this, one may like to go back to the dream 'world' if the dream was pleasant and the waking reality unpleasant. The analogy is not very correct unless one assumes that the knowledge of reality is deeply fulfilling in a sense which normal life can never do. However, one other

alternative has not been seriously considered which is different from both dream and waking reality and this is where one actively builds a world of imagination in which one finds more fulfilment than the world of dreams. This is the world of art or human creation. And this reality is not independent of human beings even though it may be independent of a person or a group of persons. The sūtra 4.2.36 argues that in the same manner, the existence of the apprehension also cannot be denied because we actually perceive both its cause and its occurrence. In any case, the contention seems to be that no universal or generalized denial is possible even from the examples of erroneous cognition as the fact of their being cognition, whether veridical or erroneous, obtains.

The sūtra 4.2.37 makes a further point by saying that an erroneous cognition has a two-fold character as, in order to be considered as erroneous, it has to be distinguished from true cognition which is of the object as it 'really' is and hence, it presupposes both true knowledge and the object of which it is a knowledge.

The sūtras 4.2.38 to 49 deal with the development of true knowledge and again strangely, the sūtra 4.2.38 says that true knowledge proceeds from the practice of a particular form of meditation which has never been mentioned earlier in any of the sūtras. The sūtra 4.2.39 suggests that this kind of meditation is not possible as certain kinds of objects are bound to appear in consciousness because they are extremely powerful and their appearance cannot be stopped. The sūtra 4.2.40 further suggests that such a process of meditation is not possible because of the natural disturbances arising from such things as hunger and thirst. The sūtra 4.2.41 suggests that a meditative state can arise from what has been previously accomplished which is capable of overcoming the obstacles mentioned in sūtras 4.2.39 and 40.

The sūtra 4.2.42 suggests that one should practice yoga in forests, caves and river banks. The sūtra 4.2.43 suggests that even after the so-called final release in case one gets it, the usual

problems of life are bound to arise and trouble one. The sūtra 4.2.44 tries to deny this by suggesting that this need not be so, for such a state of consciousness can arise only when the body itself has been prepared properly by the previous *karmas*. The sūtra 4.2.45 suggests that in the state of final release or *apavarga* even this is supposed to cease as there are no more fruits of any action, good or bad, to be realised. However, none of these sūtras, directly or indirectly, try to come to terms with the question whether the state of *apavarga* can only be realised after the cessation of all bodily and mental processes, or that such a state of *jīvana mukti* is possible or that the final state can be realised even when one is alive, in the usual sense of the term and if so, one will have all the biological needs such as those of food, air, water etc. and also be in relation with other human beings resulting in all the problems that these naturally entail for anybody. The sūtra 4.2.46 suggests that for retaining such a state of the body and the mind, one should pursue the usual methods of yoga which are described in the yoga sūtras such as *yama*, *niyama* etc. It is interesting to find that specific reference to Yoga occurs in the Nyāya Sūtra which are supposed to be earlier than the Yoga Sūtra.

The sūtra 4.2.47 surprisingly adds that for achieving such knowledge one should also have friendly discussion with persons learned in the sciences. The sūtra 4.2.48 clarifies that such discussion should be carried on with the students, teachers, companions in study and other well known learned persons who wish to enquire and who are not jealous of one. The sūtra 4.2.49 suggests that one need not put forward counter theories or counter arguments even if one has them in such discussions as one is primarily interested in achieving clarification for oneself. However, it is not clear how one can get clarification without discussion and how discussion can be carried on without making relevant objections.

The sūtra 4.2.50 suggests that in some cases one may engage in *jalpa* and *vitandā* for the purpose of defending one's own

position just as the hedge of thorny branches is put up for the protection of newly sprouting seeds. This recommendation is strange indeed for the best strategy in this situation would be not to associate with such persons in the first place and not to discuss with them if one cannot get away from them, for if one engages in discussion one may again start doubting oneself or be convinced by what the opponent is saying. The sūtra 4.2.51 is even stranger as it recommends that one should even pick up a quarrel with such a person and then deal with them by disputation and wrangling. This is the last recommendation of 4.2, and one wonders what will happen to the meditative consciousness if one follows the recommendation of the author. Perhaps, the *Naiyāyikas* followed the recommendations and lost the art of meditation.

Part V - Section 1 - (43 Sūtras)

The very first sūtra of the first section of the fifth chapter clearly indicates that the heart of the author was not in meditation and that he had brought it in for extraneous reasons. The sūtra 5.1.1 gives a list of *kāryasama* which have been translated as futile rejoinders listed as twenty-four in the sūtra. The notion of *kāryasama* is interesting particularly as explained by some of the commentators. In fact if the commentators are right the translation should not have been futile rejoinder. According to their explanation the rejoinder has the characteristic that while it raises objections to what others have said, the objections are of such a nature that, though they controvert the opponents' position, they do not establish what the person is arguing for and in some sense, try to refute it. It will be interesting if the concept of *kāryasama* is worked out independently and all the twenty four forms of it are examined in detail. In fact it would be interesting to have concrete examples of each and analyse them individually. The sūtra 5.1.2 tries to discuss the first example of *kāryasama* where the argument is based either on similarity or dissimilarity and the

opponent objects on the same basis. The sūtra 5.1.3 suggests that such a kind of argument would be as futile as if some one were to say that a particular object is a cow because it has cowness in it. The sūtra 5.1.4 gives an example of those *kāryasama* which are described as *sādhyasama* meaning thereby that these are concerned with that which has to be proved. The sūtra 5.1.5 seems to suggest that only on the ground of some dissimilarity, nothing can be proved. However, the position is not quite clear. The heart of the problem seems to be that how far similarity or dissimilarity can be a ground for further valid inference. Perhaps it is being suggested that there is an asymmetry between similarity and dissimilarity in this regard for while similarity can provide some ground for a valid inference, mere dissimilarity cannot do so.

The sūtra 5.1.6 tries to suggest that the example which is given can never provide a sufficient ground for what is to be proved as the presence of what is to be proved in the example may only be accidental. The point perhaps is regarding the role that an example plays in a proof. This is important if we remember that an example forms an integral part of the proof in Nyāya. The sūtra 5.1.7 proposes the dilemma that the relation between *hetu* and *sādhyā* can only be of two kinds and in both the cases the proof will not be possible. The argument seems to be that either the *hetu* merges with the *sādhyā* and is completely united with it or remains completely separate from it. In the first case it certainly cannot be a ground for proof as it becomes undifferentiated from it and in the second case as it is completely unrelated to it, it cannot prove it. The sūtra 5.1.8 tries to give concrete examples to suggest that the objection raised in 5.1.7 is uncalled for. The examples given are both positive and negative to show that an effect comes into being when the agents and the instruments etc. are in contact with each other and also an effect is produced when they are not in contact with each other. The example given in the first case is that of the production of the jar from the clay where you need a relation between the potter,

the wheel, the stick and the clay. The example in the second case is strange as it derives from killing by magic as it is effected without any contact between the two parties concerned. The sūtra 5.1.9 raises again the question of the example and suggests two kinds of dilemma with regard to it; one, where the opponent continues to question the nature of the example and suggests that it itself has to be proved. On the other hand, the opponent may give a counter-example to the one that has been offered, thus suggesting that the example does not prove anything. The sūtra 5.1.10 suggests that, after all, the questioning cannot be continued indefinitely as there has to be a limit to the questioning or it will naturally stop, as, for example, in the case of the burning of the lamp. Perhaps the point is that even though in some cases questions may be raised about what is being given as a ground for the assertion, the process cannot be carried on indefinitely without it becoming meaningless or vacuous in character. The sūtra 5.1.11 suggests that if the counter-instance is taken to be an effective argument then there is no reason why the positive example should be denied the character of being an argument. The reply does not seem to be correct as what the counter-instance is supposed to prove is only that the so-called positive instance does not decisively prove anything.

The sūtra 5.1.12 raises the objection that if the ground for proving the existence of something occurs before that thing has come into being, then, how can it be related to it for the latter does not exist at all and hence cannot be proved through it. The sūtra 5.1.13 tries to answer this dilemma by saying that, after all, we do talk about the cause of something when it has come into being and at that time to urge that something has been the cause of it cannot be groundless for the cause also had been earlier in existence. In fact, in many instances, cause need not disappear when the effect comes into being as it may continue to sustain it by its active presence. Many of these objections and replies seem to be concerned with how to make the relation of causality

intelligible. Also it seems that the Indian logicians have not been able to distinguish clearly between a logical and a causal ground involved in any argument. Thus, the two seem to be continually intermixed and are hardly separated from each other: The sūtra 5.1.14 is not quite clear particularly in the translation as the word "community" has been used which has not occurred in the sūtra. The basic point of the sūtra seems to be that when both the examples are perceptual in character, then, one can always emphasize some points of similarity or dissimilarity between the two to prove opposite conclusions. At a subtler level, Wittgenstein has shown that even ostensive definitions may fail totally in their purpose. The sūtra 5.1.15 argues that if a certain kind of similarity can give rise to a doubt then the recognition of a dissimilarity should be able to remove the doubt. However, if doubt still persists when both similarities and dissimilarities have been noticed then there will be no end to doubt for there will be no way left for removing it. Also, mere similarity is not accepted as an everlasting source of doubt and hence the dilemma pointed out in 5.1.14 is not exactly a dilemma. The sūtra 5.1.16 poses the dilemma that when an object is similar to two opposed or contrasting things, then there is likelihood of simultaneously two contrary views arising and this is what is meant by vacillation or hesitancy or not being able to make up one's mind.

The sūtra 5.1.17 suggests that, after all, the hesitancy can only arise if the opposite is believed to be reasonably established and hence the contrary view must be regarded as established before the hesitancy can even arise. The sūtra 5.1.18 tries to raise the dilemma that what proves can only be either before or after or together with that which it is intended to prove but, if it is before that which is to be proved how could it be supposed to prove it. On the other hand, if it is held to exist after what has to be proved then as what has to be proved does not exist how can it prove it and if the two were to exist simultaneously then there is no point in proving anything as both are present.

The sūtra 5.1.19 tries to answer this dilemma by saying that the objection is irrelevant as it is the function of that which proves to prove something which may be present or absent but whose presence or absence is irrelevant to the relationship or the ground on which its present or future existence is sought to be asserted. It is fairly clear in many of these examples that neither the objection nor the reply are very clear. Even the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika do not seem to grasp the issue or analyse it clearly. It would be interesting if the issues could be formulated with greater rigour with the help of modern developments in logic and epistemology. Also it would be useful to see if any more refined analysis of these issues has occurred in Navya Nyāya later.

The sūtra 5.1.20 further argues that, as, on the opponent's contention in 5.1.18, nothing can be denied or asserted, it is meaningless for him to assert a denial. This obviously is a repetition of the style of argument in which Gautama seems to be indulging continuously. It does not seem to distinguish between levels of discourse and between first level and second level statement. The sūtra 5.1.21 deals with the dilemma relating to presumption or *arthāpatti*. The dilemma here arises because both the position and its opposite is sought to be proved on the basis of similarity. The sūtra 5.1.22 seems to interpret *arthāpatti* in a strange sense as it tries to suggest something that is not stated but only implied and tries to refute the argument that if some implication is supposed to counter the contention that is being made, then some other implication which has not been stated may be counter to what the opponent is saying. Besides this, the sūtra 5.1.22 also suggests that *arthāpatti* or what is unstated but implied is always *anekāntika* in character. The use of the term *anekāntika* here is interesting as normally it is supposed to be used by the Jains. The point perhaps seems to be that what is presupposed or implied can be so diverse in character that nothing definite can be settled by such an argument. If so, the contention is both

philosophically and logically interesting and needs further investigation.

The sūtra 5.1.23 presents the dilemma arising from the contention that if the possession of a single common property were to make two things non-different then all things would have to be regarded as not different from each other, because the property of existence is present in everything. The sūtra 5.1.24 argues that the contention is not correct as, while in some cases it is true, in others it may not be the case and hence, nothing positive can be said on the basis of the fact that there is one common property between two objects. The sūtra 5.1.25 gives a dilemma on the basis of commonness of evidence for both the position and the counter-position. The sūtra uses the term *kāraṇa* which can be taken to mean evidence though not necessarily so. However, what perhaps the dilemma is supposed to consist in is that the same ground can establish both the position and the counter-position and hence is either equally relevant or irrelevant in the situation. The sūtra 5.1.26 seems to counter the dilemma by suggesting that in case the evidence *proves* the positive, it cannot simultaneously prove its opposite and hence there must be something wrong in the contention made in 5.1.25. The sūtra 5.1.27 suggests that the dilemma named parity of apprehension is based upon the fact that it is found even in the absence of what is offered as its ground or cause. The sūtra 5.1.28 suggests that instead of the ground or cause the event may have some other ground or cause and hence there is little point in treating the situation as a dilemma.

The sūtra 5.1.29 tries to discuss the dilemma of non-apprehension and suggests that such a dilemma arises when that which obstructs the apprehension is itself not apprehended and the fact that we are not apprehending it itself is not apprehended. However, this is a very strange situation as, if the non-apprehension is itself not apprehended, then the double negation should give rise to an affirmation which in this case does not happen.

However, the sūtra does not seem to state the dilemma in this form. One has to find out what exactly is the nature of the statement in the sūtra. The sūtra 5.1.30 merely says that the reason urged is no reason at all because non-apprehension is of the nature of negation of apprehension.

The sūtra 5.1.31 argues that whatever the state of knowledge, whether it be of existence or non-existence, it is always known to consciousness and hence the objections urged earlier do not hold. However, if there can be such a thing as doubt, then though the state of doubt is apprehended, that about which there is doubt is not definitely known. It is of course true that the fact that it is not definitely known is itself known fairly definitely but then the dilemma can only be solved by distinguishing between different levels of knowledge. The sūtra uses the term *adhyātma* in a very strange sense. The sūtra 5.1.32 presents the dilemma that if by reason of similarity, different things are regarded as having analogous properties, then everything will have to be regarded as having analogous properties, and if so everything will have to be regarded as ephemeral or non-eternal. The sūtra 5.1.33 merely adopts the usual technique which Gautama has adopted so often by suggesting that if similarity can be a ground for inference, then the opponent's denial can also be denied for there will be similarity between the two. The sūtra 5.1.34 further argues that the ground of inference cannot be just any similarity but only a particular kind of similarity. In fact in any example that is given as a ground of inference, there will be both similarity and dissimilarity with all other things and unless a relevant distinction is pointed out one may infer anything from anything. The sūtra 5.1.35 presents the dilemma that as the character of non-eternality or transience is itself permanent, it would follow that something at least would be eternal. The sūtra 5.1.36 argues that as the non-eternality of something which is non-eternal is accepted, there is no ground for denying it.

The sūtra 5.1.37 suggests that there is an ambiguity in saying

that something is produced because of effort as there is an ambiguity in the notion of production. The Bhāṣya seems to clarify that the ambiguity arises because the effort may only remove the obstruction in the apprehension of something which is already there. As the mere statement that something is produced by effort is intrinsically ambiguous, it does not clearly indicate what exactly is the case. The sūtra 5.1.38 suggests that even though there are several kinds of products, in cases where the causes of non-apprehension are present, effort could not be said to be the cause of apprehension but only of the removal of the obstruction which was standing in the way of apprehension.

The sūtra 5.1.39 says that whether one asserts or denies the argument, in both cases it seems to have the same defect. This does not establish anything and it is not quite clear what is the context of the assertion. The Bhāṣya and the Vārttika try to clarify it but it does not become very clear. The sūtra 5.1.40 suggests that this will be true of every thing everywhere. Perhaps the sūtras 39-40 have to be taken together as they relate to cases where both the opposite positions suffer from the same defect and hence it is difficult to choose between them. Perhaps, at a deeper level, what is being said is that all positions in philosophy seem to suffer ultimately from the same defects and hence there can be little ground to choose between them. However, this cannot be the Nyāya position. The sūtra 5.1.41 continues to argue that the denial of the denial would have the same fault as that which is true about the denial. However, normally, a denial of the denial is supposed to result in an affirmation and hence the term denial here must have been used in a different sense. The sūtra 5.1.42 seems to argue that as the opponent has accepted that the denial of the denial has the same defects, he has, in a sense, accepted that the earlier denial was obviously defective. The sūtra 5.1.43 urges that there is nothing to fear from the opponent's having accepted the defect in the denial as all the parties seem to be suffering equally

from all defects. This is a strange conclusion in a section devoted to dilemmas. In fact, the thrust of the whole section does not seem clear at all. It seems *prima facie* to be a total waste of effort on the part of a logician, and the commentators do not seem to clarify the issue in any way. In fact, they seem to confuse it even further by suggesting that the whole discussion is centered around the eternity and non-eternity of sound which had been discussed threadbare earlier in so many sūtras where also it was not clear why so much attention was being wasted on the issue. Here, in this section, it would be totally unjustified to think that the discussion is primarily concerned with the issue relating to the eternality or non-eternality of sound particularly as the notion of dilemma which is being discussed is far more general in character and the various types into which it has been subdivided, seem to share some common characteristics. All in all, it is a very unsatisfactory section even though some of the arguments remind one of those given by the Buddhists.

Part V - Section 2 (25 Sūtras)

Part II of the fifth chapter tries to give a detailed list of the situations in which one may be considered to be defeated in an argument conclusively. The sūtra 5.2.1 mentions these in detail and the later sūtras discuss them individually. The sūtra 5.2.2 explicates the first situation mentioned in sūtra 5.2.1 which is called *pratijñā hāni* meaning thereby that where the proposition which is to be established is itself violated. The idea is explicated by pointing out that it occurs when the property of the counter-instance is admitted by one to be present in the example cited by oneself. This kind of situation is created as the opponent has contradicted himself in giving the example which has the elements of what disproves the contention to be proved. The sūtra 5.2.3 explicates the second situation mentioned in the sūtra 5.2.1. This merely means that when some problem is encountered in

establishing the contention with which one had started, one shifts to a different contention and hence what was to be proved is left behind and something else in its place is urged than what was to be proved. The sūtra 5.2.4 explicates the third situation mentioned in the sūtra 5.2.1 and suggests that such a situation takes place when the reason or the ground which one offers in support of the contention to be proved, proves just the opposite. The sūtra 5.2.5 explicates the fourth situation mentioned in the sūtra 5.2.1. This relates to the situation wherein the original thesis has been shown to be mistaken, the opponent retracts or withdraws what was formerly sought to be affirmed by him. This is called renouncing the contention. The first four situations thus relate to a contention which was sought to be proved by an opponent. It would be interesting to find as to what exactly is the difference between the first and the third, particularly as the terms used are *hāni* and *virodha*. Perhaps the difference lies in the fact that while in the first case the example given supports the opposite contention, in the second case it is the ground or the reason itself which leads to the opposite contention. The sūtra 5.2.6 explicates the fifth situation mentioned in sūtra 5.2.1. The situation occurs when someone has given a ground or a reason in unqualified form and which when shown to be deficient is modified and given in a qualified form. The sūtra 5.2.7 explicates the sixth situation mentioned in sūtra 5.2.1. This basically relates to what is irrelevant as the reason that is offered has no bearing or connection with that which is to be proved. The sūtra 5.2.8 explicates the seventh situation mentioned in the sūtra 5.2.1 and suggests that what has been said is totally meaningless as if one were uttering only sequences of syllables without forming sentences or words. The sūtra 5.2.9 explicates the eighth situation mentioned in the sūtra 5.2.1 and concerns the unintelligibility of what has been said even when it has been repeated three times both by the audience and the party concerned with whom the debate is being carried on. The sūtra is interesting because it, for the first

time, brings the audience into the picture and also because one is permitted three times to explain what one means and that the charge of unintelligibility has to be sustained both by the learned members of the audience and the person with whom the debate is being engaged in. The sūtra 5.2.10 explicates the ninth situation mentioned in sūtra 5.2.1 and relates to the case where there is no connection between the expressions which follow one another so that while each of them has a meaning or sense, but when taken together no coherent unified meaning emerges out of them. This is characterized as incoherence. The sūtra 5.2.11 explicates the tenth situation mentioned in sūtra 5.2.1 and is concerned with a reversal of order of the sequence in which the reasoning is stated by the person concerned. Normally, reasoning is supposed to move in a certain order where the first step leads to the second, the second to the third and so on. But, when such a situation does not obtain, it is considered to be a defect in the presentation of the argument. Interestingly, in the Vārttikā on the sūtra it is said that some persons do not regard this as an adequate ground for defeat.

The sūtra 5.2.12 explicates the eleventh situation which occurs when some step has been missed or some factor omitted in the reasoning. This is characterized as incomplete reasoning. The sūtra 5.2.13 explicates the twelfth situation which is just the opposite of this as here, what is given as a ground or example is more than what is required for the proof. The situations mentioned in 5.2.12 and 13 are obviously not of such a serious character as to lead to the dismissal of the opponent's argument completely. Again there seem to be some persons who do not consider that they can be seen as leading to a defeat. The sūtra 5.2.14 says that the restatement of words and ideas constitute repetition except in the exceptional case when that which was to be proved is once again stated at the conclusion of the argument. It is not quite clear why this should be regarded as a ground for defeat as it does not exactly invalidate the proof in case it has

been given. The sūtra 5.2.15 gives another ground of repetition where someone tries to state explicitly what has already been stated implicitly earlier. The sūtra 5.2.16 refers to the situation where the opponent fails to explicitly state what one has said three times, even though the audience has understood, then he should be taken as defeated in the argument. This is different from the earlier situation where the opponent was supposed to explicate what he himself had said while here he is expected to explain what has been said by the opposite party to the satisfaction of every one concerned. The sūtra 5.2.17 gives another situation where the statement has been repeated three times and has been understood by the audience but is not understood by the opponent, then, in this situation, he is regarded as being defeated. The sūtra 5.2.18 relates to a situation where one cannot answer what one has been asked and hence feels embarrassed because of this. The term *ajñānāma* for embarrassment seems strange indeed. The sūtra 5.2.19 refers to the eighteenth situation mentioned in 5.2.1 that when a person does not understand the answer contained in the denial of one's position by the opponent, one is said to be defeated in the argument. The sūtra 5.2.20 refers to a situation where the party breaks off the discussion under the pretext of having some urgent business to attend to. The sūtra 5.2.21 refers to a situation where the party admits the flaw in one's own thesis but urges that the situation of the opponent is no better as what he is saying suffers from the same defect. The sūtra 5.2.22 refers to a situation where someone does not point out that the other has lost the argument even when he has lost it, then, the first one will be considered defeated. The sūtra 5.2.23 refers to a situation where one falsely alleges that the other person has lost the argument when he has not really lost it. In such a case one is considered defeated because one has made a wrong allegation. The sūtra 5.2.24 refers to a situation where, having taken up one standpoint, if one carries on the discussion without restriction to that particular standpoint, then one is considered to be defeated.

The sūtra 5.2.25 refers to fallacies which have been already pointed out and says that in case they occur in the argument, then one may also be considered to have been defeated in addition to all the situations that have been mentioned in 5.2.1.

Chapter 3

Some Further Reflections on the Sūtras after reading the Commentaries on it, particularly those of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana*

I

The sūtra I.I.I centres not only around the enumeration of the sixteen padārthas or topics but also about their relation to *tattvajñāna* and *niḥśreyasa*. The Nyāya Sūtra does not refer to these sixteen topics explicitly as *padārthas*. It is only later commentators starting from Vātsyāyana who used the term and appear to refer specifically to them.

The closing part of the sūtra says "... निग्रहस्थानानाम् तत्त्वज्ञानात् निःश्रेयसाधिगमः". The sūtra therefore, seems to say that by the knowledge of these sixteen topics one shall get *niḥśreyasa*. The discussion on the term *tattvajñāna* occurs in N.S. 4.2.1 where it seems to have been used as meaning true knowledge and not the knowledge of that which is ultimately real or true.

The term *tattvajñāna*, therefore, here means the true knowledge of the sixteen *padārthas* mentioned in the sūtra I.I.I and states that the true knowledge of each and all of them will lead to *niḥśreyasa*.

* The references to Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana are from the texts edited by Pt. Ananta Lal Thakur and published by Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1996, 1997.