

ointment, washed his feet with tears and wiped them with her hair. As against the above hypothesis, some consider "Pūjā" is formed by a combination of the Dravidian words *pū* and *cey* or *gey*, and means 'flower-act' (puṣpa-karma). M. Collins, C. Chakravarti and S. K. Chatterji accept this derivation. Collins translated Pūjā as flower-offering (Tamil *Pūci* = to offer flowers). In *Rāmāyaṇa*, we read that Lakṣmaṇa made puṣpa-bali to gods.

1

The philosophy of Pūjā is elaborated in the Tantras, which according to Tucci are "one of the highest expressions of Indian mysticism", and according to Eliade constitute an "imposing spiritual synthesis" and "a great philosophical and religious movement."

Brahman in itself, says the *Ānanda Laharī* (ch. III), has no body (*aśarīrī*); it is pure consciousness. But one cannot meditate or worship the formless. So, to fulfil the needs of the upāsakas and bhaktas — not sufficiently advanced — forms of Brahman are invented (*kalpita*)*. "Upāsakānām kāryārtham brahmaṇorūpakalpanā". "Ēvam guṇānusārena rūpāṇi vividhāni ca, kalpitāni hitārthāya bhaktānām alpamedhasām". Without an object of worship, there can be no pūjā; and without an object on which one's steady gaze can be fixed, concentration (*ekāgratā*) which leads to enstasis (*samādhi*) is not possible. Just as it is impossible to hold the firmament between a pair of tongs, said a Tantric teacher, it is impossible to worship the attributeless Brahman by a mind with attributes.² The mind must necessarily have before it an external object or a mental representation, and pratimā (image) or pratika (emblem) serves this purpose. Examples of these are an image, a picture, a jar of water, a rare stone (*sālagrāma*), a cone-shaped stone (*linga*), a geometric design (*yantra*), or

*Kalpanā = invention, fiction, hypothesis (Macdonnell's "A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary")

a sound form (mantra)*. But, some Tantras point out, these are only aids to worship and if such imagined forms were to lead to liberation, then undoubtedly men who dream that they have become kings would indeed become kings.³ Men, such Tantras continue, who believe that God is present only in the images made of clay, stone, metal or wood, merely trouble themselves by their askesis (tapas) and cannot attain liberation.⁴ None attain liberation without saving knowledge. Some Tantras, however, maintain that Brahman has form and attributes and that images etc., are more than aids. Faith and activity infuse into an image life and consciousness and there is a real presence of the Deity in an image. When an image is consecrated according to appropriate rites, the omnipotent God, it is stated, descends into an image with a portion of his *śakti*, power [supernatural (aprākṛta) body]⁵. Similarly, God descends into this world and assumes human and other forms for the purpose of providing devotees with concrete objects on which they can meditate.⁶ That, of course, is only one of the purposes of an Avatāra. So, by appropriate rites of invocation an image becomes enlivened (*prāṇapratīṣṭā*) and God's presence is realized in it. Such is the other theory. If the Absolute can become Man, i.e. incarnate as Kṛṣṇa or Jesus, it may indwell in a special and forceful way in the *linga* at Banaras or the image on Tirumalai hill, for the salvation of mankind.

Pūjā consists of meditation and ritual. Meditation on God and his attributes is intended to divinize mind and thinking. By constantly looking at and focussing attention on God's form and thinking of his attributes and acts, one's mind and disposition become attuned to the Sacred and become holy. Ritual is the practical expression of doctrine; it is the art of religion. As Śankara said in the *Chāndogya Bhāṣya*, for mankind habituated to ceremony, adoration without ceremony is difficult. God is the sovereign lord of

*A mantra is a sound pattern the utterance of which creates a form of God. ("Mantrōccāraṇamātreṇa devarūpam prajāyate", *Bṛhadgāndharva Tantra*.)

all that is and when it is believed that he is really present in a consecrated image or emblem, the latter is worshipped in the same way in which one's lord and master and the author of one's being is adored when he appears before one. Men, says the *Mahānirvāṇa Tantra*, cannot live without action; they enjoy and suffer because of it; and they are born, they live and they die as slaves of action; so, ritual, religious action, *sādhana*, is intended to make at least some actions sacred.⁷ In ritual the body is made to move with thought, physical acts and workings of the mind are coordinated, and the intricate complexity and order of the ritual keeps attention fixed. The articles used, vestures, gestures and words in a ritual are meant to rouse feelings and provoke states of consciousness helpful to spiritual life. A ritual grows in power on the individual to the extent he understands its meaning and becomes at home while performing it and identifies himself with the minutiae of its purpose and structure. Starting with an expressed resolve to worship — for a specific purpose, if any — in Pūjā one invokes the presence of the *Iṣṭadevatā* — one's chosen form of the one God — into an image or emblem and in his felt real Presence praises and lauds (*stavana*) him and offers to him various articles — water, flowers, perfume, incense, clothes and food — as one does to a venerable guest invited to one's house.

When in lieu of material things, right feelings and good action are offered to God, it is mental or inner Pūjā. Flowers of feeling (*bhāvapuṣpa*), says the *Jñāneśvara Samhitā*, can be offered to the Deity. Passionlessness (*arāga*), absence of malice (*adveṣa*) and freedom from delusion (*amoha*), etc., are such *bhāvapuṣpas*. The *Mahānirvāṇa Tantra* says: to have a correct understanding of the nondual reality that is Brahman is the highest stage, the next is the stage in which Brahman is meditated upon, lower than that is the one in which praise (*stuti*) and silent prayer (*japa*) take place, and the lowest is that in which outer Pūjā takes place.⁸ This, of course, is an assessment of stages made from the Advaitic standpoint, but all Tantras agree that inner Pūjā is superior to outer.

Admitting that for an Advaitin there can be no Yoga or Pūjā, the *Mahānirvāṇa Tantra* observes that whereas Yoga is the union of the individual (*jīva*) and the Supreme Self (*Ātman*), Pūjā is the union of the worshipper and the worshipped.⁹

Tāntric *Sādhana* and *Pratikopāsanā* found in the *Āraṇyakas* are varieties of Pūjā.

2

In Vedic and Hebrew religions and perhaps in all ancient religion, sacrifice is the basic rite. In sacrifice an object — a material thing or a living being — is offered and destroyed according to a fixed procedure: this brings about relationship between the sacred and the profane, the object sacrificed serving as the means of communication, the mediator between the two worlds. As a prayer can be an act of thanksgiving, a vow and a propitiation, a sacrifice can fulfil a variety of functions simultaneously. The result of a sacrifice is a change in the person who performs it, or in his situation, or in some things and persons which are of interest to him. Yajna was also conceived as a means of escape from death, *amṛtam*, a guarantee against annihilation of oneself. Lévi rightly saw a connection between this conception and the Buddhist theory of *mokṣa* (deliverance). It is also possible that Puruṣa's sacrifice of himself for the sake of the world, the suicide of the God, influenced the formation of the *Bodhisattva* ideal: the *Bodhisattva* is ever ready to renounce everything he has and his life too for the welfare of others. Renunciation of all that one has, giving up everything for the sake of immortality or freedom from *samsāra*, and sacrificing one's possessions (butter, barley, cattle, horses), slaves, wives, and children and even one's life for the sake of this-worldly and heavenly goods and salvation — these are related ideas. The Bible also connects sacrifice with salvation: "Offer to God the sacrifice of praise: and pay thy vows to the most High. And call upon me in the day of trouble: I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me"¹⁰. The redemptive sacrifice of

Jesus and its perpetuation in the daily Mass, and the connection between Christian communion and everlasting salvation in theory (e.g. Irenaeus) and in belief, are well-known. H. Hubert and M. Mauss who have written the best book on the grammar of sacrifice have remarked: "The mechanism of consecration in the Catholic Mass is, in its general form, the same as that of the Hindu sacrifices. It shows us, with a clarity leaving nothing to be desired the alternating rhythm of expiation and communion."¹¹

Hubert and Mauss hold that agrarian sacrifices provided the point of departure for the evolution of the sacrifice of the god. The development of rites like those in the former, they contend, gave rise to the concept of a sacrifice of redemption and communion of the unique and transcendent god, and in the idea of the sacrifice of a divine personage they think sacrifice attains its highest expression. It is possible that among other things their Christian background made them think so.

Sacrifices like Varunapraghāsas in which barley is consecrated to Varuṇa,¹² and Diipolia or Bouphonia in which the Greeks sacrificed a bullock to Zeus Polieus at the end of the harvest in June, are agrarian sacrifices. The Soma sacrifice, Hubert and Mauss say, is a sacrifice of the god. In some texts, they say, Soma is a god, his own sacrificer and the archetype of the heavenly sacrificers, and they argue that from this to the suicide of the god the distance is not great.

Soma is the juice or sap of a now unidentifiable plant or herb, which purified and mixed with milk or a decoction of barley, was fermented and drunk by the Aryans. As deep draughts of it elevated man's spirits and made him able to do things beyond his usual powers, it was supposed to be divine. Consequently, as Kaegi said, this sap was personified as the god Soma even in the Indo-Iranian period and almost all the deeds of other gods were ascribed to him. He is, wrote Whitney, "addressed in the highest strains of adulation and veneration; all powers, belong to him; all blessings are besought of him, as his to bestow". When soma sap is pressed and

drunk ritualistically, god Soma is killed and partaken of and his divine power is thereby infused into the sacrificer. An archetypal sacrifice in which god Soma sacrificed himself was also postulated. In view of all this, while some aspects of Soma sacrifice justify the interpretation of it given by Hubert and Mauss, I would rather maintain that Puruṣa-sacrifice mentioned in the Ṛg-Veda and Nārāyaṇa- and Prajāpati-sacrifices mentioned in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa are better instances of the sacrifice of the God through which the world came into being. Through a continued sacrifice lasting for five days, says the Śatapatha, Puruṣa-Nārāyaṇa simultaneously became everything and superior to everything.¹³ God's suicide originates the world; but he is not annihilated thereby; on the other hand, by this very act he transcends and rules over the world he has brought into existence.

The Tantras assimilated Yajna to Pūjā (or ārādhanā) and Yoga. Yoga*, says the Āhirbudhnya Samhitā, is worship of the heart (hṛdaya-ārādhanā) or self-sacrifice (ātma-havis) offered to God by giving him one's own soul in its original purity, and is the counterpart of the external sacrifice (bāhya-yāga).¹⁴ Elsewhere this Samhitā recommends that God should be meditated upon as a sacrifice ("yajnarūpadharam devam"). God's body, it suggests, is the altar, his mouth the āhavanīya fire, his heart the southern fire,—the enemies of his devotees the sacrificial animals,—his sixteen arms the priests—and compassion his sacrificial gift. The highest spiritual technique, sādhanā, this text declares, is Nyāsa, self-sacrifice. Nyāsa is taking refuge, *śaraṇāgati*, the prayerful thought: "I am a receptacle of sins, naught and helpless; do Thou become my means (upāya) of salvation".¹⁵

Buddhist Tantras also refer to Antaryāga, inner sacrifice, and spiritual Pūjā, Ādhyātmika Pūjā.

*According to this text, Yoga is the samyoga (union) of the individual soul and supreme soul (31.15).

PŪJĀ AND YAJNA: NOTES

- 1 *Mahānirvāna Tantra*, XIII. 13.
- 2 Cited by Sir John Woodroffe.
- 3 *Mahānirvāna*, XIV. 118.
- 4 Loc. cit., 119.
- 5 *Viśvaksena Samhitā*, p. 122 and 143.
- 6 O. Schrader, *Introduction to Pāncarātra And the Āhirbudhnya Samhitā*, p. 49.
- 7 *Mahānirvāna*, XIV. 104-6.
- 8 Ibid., XIV. 122.
- 9 Ibid., XIV. 123.
- 10 Psalm XLIX. 14-15.
- 11 *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function*, p. 94.
- 12 *Śatapatha*, 2.5.2.1., & *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, 1.6.4.1.
- 13 *Śatapatha*, XIII. 6.1.; XII. 3.4.
- 14 *Āhirbudhnya*, 31.4-5.
- 15 Ibid., 37.22f.

TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

“The one and only real and profound theme of the world and of human history — a theme to which all others subordinate — remains the conflict between belief and unbelief.”

— Goethe, “Notes and Discourses Concerning the West—*Ostlicher Divan*.”

I

In his last years Kant considered that it was the function of transcendental philosophy to resolve the questions, what is God? Is there a God? But after much thinking, at one stage he came to the conclusion that it was preposterous to ask whether there was a God. (*Opus Postumum*) The following is an essay in transcendental philosophy: the question of God is raised and discussed, but not resolved.

Perhaps a quite clear and good answer to the question, How does God come into philosophy? is given by Heidegger. Being may be thought of in three ways. (a) It is the self-fathoming and self-substantiating ground of what-is*; (b) it is the most general sort of unity, i.e. the unity to be found at the bottom of what-is; and (c) it is also the unity of the highest sort, the unity of what-is taken as a whole. The first way of thinking — i.e. about Being as Logos (=Ground, the gathering together or unifying of what-is)— is logical; the second which is concerned with what-is as such is ontological; and the last way of thinking about what-is as a whole is theological. In whatever way it is thought Being is the Ground of what-is, and philosophy, metaphysics in particular, is concerned with “giving an account of the Ground, accounting for it and in the end calling it to account”. Being is Ground in a complete sense only when it is conceived as the first Ground, in the sense of a self-caused First cause or *causa sui*, the God of metaphysics. It is the highest being which grounds all beings, the foundation of all that is. In the course of the history of philosophy it appeared to different thinkers either as substance or subject. What-is appears as grounded and its ground presents itself as the self-caused first cause. This is how according to Heidegger God came into philosophy.¹

*das Seiende = lit. that which is, i.e. beings, entities, or actuality.

While Heidegger's account may perhaps correctly show how God entered into Western philosophy, it does not at all apply to a number of Eastern philosophies which have no place for God. About the latter something will be said in the last portions of this chapter. The modern world is dominated by the West; consequently contemporary thinking has come to be identified with what the West thinks. Let us see how this deals with the question of God. For a number of reasons since the formulation of the heliocentric theory there has been a loss of sense certitude. Among other reasons this was due to finding that what the senses showed was not true, that there was much more than what they showed, and that they even distorted what they showed. Goethe brought this out well in the following passage: "I can well understand that it must please you, sages of the sky, to bring the immense universe gradually as close to your eyes as I saw that planet just now. But allow me to say—that these instruments, with which we aid our senses, have a morally detrimental effect on man.—For what he thus perceives with his senses is out of keeping with his inner faculty of discernment; it would need a culture, as high as only exceptional people can possess, in order to harmonize, to a certain extent, the inner truth with the inappropriate vision from without".²

Rationalism destroyed the idea of community and replaced it by that of an infinitely large collection of isolated reasonable individuals who are all equal and interchangeable. It also destroyed the idea of an orderly universe and replaced it by that of an infinite space without limits or individual qualities. When the community and the universe vanished, the media through which God was supposed to have previously communicated no longer existed. As Pascal said, in infinite space God falls silent; the concept of infinite space is incompatible with the existence of God.³ Rationalism makes reason or commonsense—the ability to judge correctly and distinguish truth from error—the supreme reality, and it is supposed to be equal in all men, most evenly distributed among all. Compared with man's reason, the God of

Descartes and Malebranche is not fully real. As Pascal pointed out, in Cartesianism God's only function is to "give a little tap to start the world off" after which he has nothing else to do. Spinoza relieved God of these two tasks also: creation of the world and its maintenance. A consistently individualistic mode of thinking has no room for a God with any real functions. In the sphere of ethics also neither rationalistic nor empiricist individualism can accept any supra-individual reality which can guide man and give him transcendent norms.

Not all philosophers accepted the supremacy of reason, for critical philosophy maintained that there was nothing in reason other than what the senses gave, and also that there might be nothing except what was seen through the forms of space and time. There can be no knowledge of reality in itself, also no knowledge of God. As by and large God was taken by Western culture as the abode of values and guarantee of goodness and justice, the result of the lack of knowledge of God is evident.

Hegel was perhaps the first great philosopher to develop the theme of "God's death", which could be understood in three senses: (1) The belief in God, Hegel indicated, has withered away because proofs for his existence have been discredited; the idea of God has become abstract and ineffective; economic motives have gained predominance; and the pietists and deists have isolated God from the world. Even for those who believed in God, he was an estranged God—unconnected with their real interests. (2) Anything must go through the antithetic movement of negation, separation, and estrangement of itself. The absolute spirit or God must also undergo self-diremption and externalization in finite forms before achieving full self-possession. God died in order that the world and man may come into being and that in man spirit may come to know itself as spirit. (3) Lastly, according to Hegel, the God of religion, the lesser truth, has to be replaced by the absolute of philosophy, the higher truth. Truth present in a symbolic and veiled way in religion becomes manifest in its true nature in philosophy. Belief in personal transcendent

God must be elevated and transformed into the realization of the absolute spirit. The distance between man and God must be annulled and the finite must be dialectically identified with the infinite. As consciousness and its highest object are essentially identical, for philosophy God is a dead God, and the living actuality is the one absolute self or the spiritual totality of finite and infinite being.⁴ Thus from at least one dominant type of Western philosophy and generally from contemporary thinking God made his exit. The result may best be described in Hegel's words: "The ethical world has vanished.—Trust in the eternal laws of the gods is silenced, just as the oracles are dumb, whose work it was to know what was right in particular cases. The statues set up are now corpses in stone from whom the animating soul has flown, while the hymns of praise are words from which all belief has gone. The tables of the gods are bereft of spiritual food and drink— --." ⁵ (See Annexe II.)

Philosophers like Nietzsche following their line of thinking could not accept the independent reality of God. Previously human culture entertained the idea of God; in modern times this idea declined and so, they say, God died. Men created him and men murdered him. Extinction of the idea of God is the death of God; men who cannot accept the idea of God are the murderers of God. But the strange thing about the West is even men like Nietzsche thought that when there was no God there was no meaning in worldly existence. With God's death they thought all Western values collapsed. When God is denied, said Nietzsche, man has to become God for if one no longer finds what is great in God one finds it nowhere. Then one must either deny greatness and goodness — all values — or create them.⁶ (See Annexe II) The entire system of standards and conduct hinging on God has ceased to be with his death; either a new system has to be created or men have to live without a system. Few can do either of these two things. Thus there is a moral and cultural chaos. The same conclusion is drawn by a leading contemporary thinker. Taking up Nietzsche's tidings about God's death as a statement of

fact, Sartre writes: "He is dead, he spoke to us and now is silent, all that we touch now is his corpse."⁷ Sartre says the consequence of this is there is nothing unconditionally binding, there is no universal morality and there are no absolute values. For man henceforth "all is permitted", he is at last free and can determine values.⁸ Sartre makes this clearer: If one has done away with God, someone has to invent values; "life has no meaning *a priori*"; one has to give it a meaning and the meaning one chooses is value.⁹

Not only Western philosophy but also Western literature indicates the same predicament, viz., as Rilke has stated, without God "life, suspended in a bottomless pit, is impossible",¹⁰ but there is no God, though he ought to be! Dostoevsky in his powerful way described the result of rejecting divine coherence. Man can accept the world only if he is assured that justice and harmony prevail in it. But when one cannot believe in divine justice, there is nothing in the name of which or with the sanction of which man can act. Everything becomes lawful. When there is no God to give man guidance, man has to live out of the sufficiency of his own intelligence. When one consistently lives by logic as Ivan Karamazov did, like him one goes mad. When God is denied, the unlimited freedom open to man leads him to unlimited despotism (e.g. Shigalyov), or every conceivable duplicity and every performable crime (e.g. Stepan Verkhovensky). Let us take another great modern writer, Kafka. His writings show that for the modern mind there is no God, because it knows that the world it comprehends is the only one and ultimate reality, though at the same time it is assured that there ought to be God. The modern man feels he is a slave, but does not know where freedom is; he experiences misery, but does not know where happiness can be found. Man "feels imprisoned on this earth, he feels constricted; the melancholy, the impotence, the feverish fancies of the captive afflict him; no comfort can comfort him, since it is merely comfort, gentle, head-splitting comfort glozing the brutal fact of imprisonment. But if he is asked what he actually wants

he cannot reply for — that is one of his strongest proofs — he has no conception of freedom.”¹¹ Similarly, the people in Samuel Beckett’s works are neither able to accept a theistic position nor an atheistic position. They, on the one hand, have contempt for “a personal God quaquaquaquaqu with white beard”, while, on the other hand, they are spell-bound by theological speculation. Asked if they believe in God, they hesitantly say “no”,¹² and at the same time curse him for not existing: “The bastard! He doesn’t exist!”¹³

It follows from the above account that the contemporary Western mind holds that God’s existence is not proved and at the same time because of the injustice, evil and suffering in the world it cannot believe in him. But simultaneously Western culture finds it inconceivable that there could be values and norms if there were no God. Without values one cannot live by something or for something: When there is no God there are no objective values. Every individual has then to create his own values and patterns of conduct. The people of Dostoevsky, Kafka and Beckett illustrate the result of this. Most of them wish there was a God, but they know he is not; some of them try to live independently without him, but end in madness or despair, despotism or cruelty. For contemporary Western culture the world without God is lost and a Godless man is forlorn, but such, it declares, is the fact. This is an absurd world, and if we do not wish to die we have to live in it, uncertain of everything, but doing something.

In many Eastern cultures values are not tied up with God. Many of their philosophies have tried to explain how there can be righteousness and justice, moral law and order, without God. In some of their philosophies there may be a God, but he neither creates nor governs the world, nor does he dispense justice. He is not required to guarantee truth or justice. He may be the ideal or the supreme teacher in some philosophies, but in others he is not so. Consequently, for the Easterners even if there is no God, life can have meaning and there can be absolute values. Even if there is

no God, there are things which are unconditionally binding on man: What one chooses is not value, all is not permitted and everything is not lawful.

In the following sections these various Eastern and Western positions are dealt with.

II

By a consideration of a few selected thinkers from Europe, let us see the conclusion reached about God by some of the greatest philosophers of Western Christian Culture. I will briefly deal with some views of six important men representing different types of thinking.

ANSELM & THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Anselm wanted to find a single simple argument “which would require no other for its proof than itself alone; and alone would suffice to demonstrate that God truly exists”.¹⁴ His *Proslogium* was the result of this attempt. By God is meant a being than which nothing greater can be thought. If such a being is only in *intellectu*, it is possible to think of something greater than it, i.e. the same object as real. Having conceived of such a thing, it would be contradictory to say that it does not exist in reality. It is unthinkable that “that than which nothing greater can be thought” should be non-existent. The fool is able to say that there is no God by thinking of the word ‘God’ and not by thinking of the thing denoted by that word. The non-existence of God in the latter way is unthinkable. This argument can be attacked in two ways as Gaunilo did. We have ideas of things which do not exist, so from the mere idea of a thing its existence cannot be proved.¹⁵ Further, no conception of “that than which nothing greater can be thought” is possible, because we do not have any direct knowledge of it, nor can we frame a conception of it from our knowledge of things like it, for there is nothing like it.¹⁶ It is clear that Gaunilo does not

understand Anselm. He gives the example of a perfect island, which can be thought of but which does not exist. The idea of God is taken by Anselm in the absolute sense; God is not the highest of all contingent things, while a perfect island is only the highest among a given class of things. Anselm readily agrees that from the idea of a thing which is only the highest in its class or from the idea of a thing highest in the contingent series nothing can be proved as to its existence. Anselm makes a distinction between this "being than which a greater cannot be conceived" and Gaunilo's "being greater than all other beings".¹⁷ The perfect island or for the matter of that nothing contingent is the "id quo majus cogitari possit". God is the very ultimate of thought and of being, he is the ground of them. He is not one, though best, among a class of things or even among things. Nothing that would reduce the absolute to the status of a contingent being should be predicated of it; for to do so is to explain the contingent in terms of the contingent. In answer to Gaunilo's objection that we do not have such an idea, Anselm gives the Platonic argument that knowledge of the more or less good presupposes knowledge of the supreme good. "Everything that is less good, in so far as it is good, is like the greater good. It is therefore evident to any rational mind, that by ascending from the lesser good to the greater, we can form a considerable notion of a being than which a greater is inconceivable".¹⁸ Even negative knowledge is knowledge of a sort, for even the ineffable, if it is known as such, is not entirely inconceivable. "There is nothing to prevent one's saying ineffable, although what is said to be ineffable cannot be spoken of. Inconceivable is conceivable, although that to which the word 'inconceivable' can be applied is not conceivable".¹⁹ If the existence of the very idea is denied just because it is not thoroughly understood, "you should say that the man who cannot face the direct rays of the sun does not see the light of day, which is none other than the sun light".²⁰ Thus Anselm tries to prove that the idea of God is the necessary condition of all knowledge and if the condition itself is subjective the objectivity

of knowledge vanishes. Further, the knowledge which judges the principle of knowledge to be subjective becomes itself subjective. So the condition of knowing must also be the condition of being; and that which is the condition of being must necessarily be, otherwise nothing could be.

Anselm's contention is that the existence of the idea of God is demonstrable, for anybody with sufficient power of analysis finds that it is necessarily involved in all knowledge, while for one who believes in God it is needless to show that there is such an idea; and once there is such an idea logic forces us to admit that the object of that idea is real. There is another possibility to be considered. Even if the idea of the Absolute is shown to be involved in all knowledge one may still not accept its objectivity. But he who refuses to credit the Absolute with objectivity sinks into relativism and what he asserts to be true is also not true, because according to him there is no such thing as truth. He becomes a Protagorean subjectivist. Logic has no answer to give to such a man. So in order that the world should be intelligible and that the distinctions of true and false, good and bad, should be valid, we should believe in God. A man who asserts that it is true that God does not exist assumes that what he says is true implying thereby there is objective truth, which is nothing but God. So the very denial of God is a contradiction — though the mere state of doubt about it involves no contradiction for as yet no judgment has been made. To escape from the clutches of doubt and self-contradiction, one should believe in God's existence. So, Anselm says: "unless I believed, I should not understand".²¹ This faith does not negate reason but justifies it, for without that faith in the Absolute it is impossible to exercise reason.

According to Aquinas, God's existence cannot be established by the above argument because we do not possess that insight into divine nature which would enable us to perceive that he exists as soon as we have an idea of him. Existence does not add anything to the notion of God, it merely transfers it from the notional realm to the realm of reality.²² So, he

thinks, God's existence must be demonstrated in a strictly logical way from the facts of experience.

In his criticism of the ontological argument, Kant remarks that the concept of a necessary being is devoid of all intelligible content. To define the necessary being as that the non-existence of which is impossible is verbal jugglery. If the unconditioned is that in which there is an absence of all conditions, it becomes nothing. Kant also asks why we cannot think limited existence itself as necessary. Another point made by Kant's criticism is that there is no difference between the conception of a thing and the conception of it as existing. Existence does not belong to the predicates of the conception, so it cannot be derived from the latter; for it denotes nothing more than the position of the subject with all the characteristics which are thought in its conception. By the addition of existence the content of the concept is not enriched. A hundred real sovereigns do not contain a penny more than a hundred conceived sovereigns. Many people believe that Kant has demolished the ontological argument. The principal way in which his criticism differs from that of Gaunilo is that in the place of Gaunilo's 'perfect island', a hundred sovereigns are substituted. So Anselm's reply to Gaunilo can be taken as a reply to the sort of argument developed in Kant's criticism.

However, in thoughts which Kant (died 1804) recorded in the last years of his life (1800-3), there is much of importance to be found about the idea of God. In them he says that "the mere idea of God is at the same time the proof of his existence" and also "a postulate of his existence". "To think of him and believe in him is an identical act". "The thought of God", says Kant, "is at the same time belief in him and in his Personality".²³ From what he said elsewhere this probably means that when one recognizes the Moral Law one finds oneself in God's presence; as the Law reveals his Personality its divine origin is revealed in the Law itself. But this way of thinking is not allowed to stand as such, for a different way of thinking is set by its side simultaneously. "God", Kant

writes, "is not a Being outside of me, but merely a thought within me. God is the morally practical Reason giving laws to itself.—The proposition, There is a God, means no more than: There is a human reason, determining itself according to morality, a supreme Principle which perceives itself determined and necessitated to act without cessation in accordance with such a Principle.—God must only be sought *within us*".²⁴ He amplifies this further: "God is thus no substance discoverable outside of me but merely a moral relation within me.—The idea—not conception—of God is not the conception of a substance.—(God) is the thought of a personality within me".²⁵ What does all this mean? According to Buber this means: The moment man thinks God he is compelled to believe in the latter, but the philosopher is compelled to deny this faith the character of truth and reality.²⁶

On Kant's criticism of the ontological proof Hegel comments that the notion of God is such that it involves existence, while no other idea does so. Everything including the hundred sovereigns, which Kant mentions, is such that its being in time and space is discrepant from its notion. That is precisely why everything is finite. But in God's case he has to be what can only be 'thought as existing'. The notion of God if referred back to itself results in abolishing all intermediation and becoming immediate. As this reference to self is nothing else than being, the notion of God includes being.²⁷ Hegel finally sums up, "The petty stricture of the Kritik that 'thought and being are different' can at most molest the path of the human mind from the thought of God to the certainty that He is: it cannot take it away".²⁸

W. E. Hocking in his well-known book writes that the correct form of the ontological argument is: I have an idea of God, therefore I have an experience of God; experience finds me in living relation to the what is not myself, the Other. He says it is incorrect to argue: I have an idea of God, therefore, God exists. According to Hocking, "the ontological argument is the only one which is wholly faithful to the history, the anthropology of religion. It is the only proof of God".²⁹

AQUINAS & THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

The theological proofs of Aquinas depend upon the principle that the character of an effect must be found in its cause in a more eminent degree. The distinguished Neo-Platonist, Proclus was the first to elaborate this theory of causality which was incidental to the prevalent theory of triadic development which he accepted. This theory maintains that the produced is similar to that which produces it, for one can only produce the other by communicating itself to it. At the same time the produced differs from that which produces it as what is divided from unity and as the derivative from the original. In the first respect the cause remains incompletely in the effect, and the effect in its cause; in the second respect the effect proceeds out of the cause. By virtue of its similarity to the cause, the effect is drawn towards the cause, seeks to imitate it on a lower scale and tends to return back to it; while by reason of its difference from the cause it differentiates or produces. Thus we have the triad of the original, the emergence from it and the return to it. Creatures are similar to God in an imperfect way, the characters found in them are found in God in a more eminent way, they are all originated by God and their final end is God—this Thomistic position betrays the influence of Proclus. It is possible that Aquinas came to know of this conception of causation through some other writers.

It is worth while to notice that the principle of causation which Aquinas employs in his proofs is based on the principle of sufficient reason which is held to be a first principle. For the Aristotelian-Thomist way of thinking the proper object of thought is being—that which is. Being can mean that which is and that which can be, but it is possible to think of pure being without any reference to its existence. We can think of being as such because we can abstract from our concept of existing thing and have two simpler concepts: that which exists and existence. That which primarily is, is the substance, the essence, the *propter se* of a thing. As soon as

we have arrived at a conception of being by comparing being with itself, we arrive at the principle of identity, from which it follows that being is not nothing. By comparing being with non-being we get the principle of excluded middle. According to Aristotle, "these truths hold good for everything that is, and not for some special genus apart from others. And all men use them".³⁰ "For a principle which every one must have who understands anything that is, is not a hypothesis; and that which every one must know who knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all".³¹ These are, it is thus argued, the first principles and the fundamental presuppositions of all knowledge, which cannot be directly proved, but which can be shown to be indispensable by a *reductio ad absurdum*. As soon as we have admitted the existence of things, it is clear that a thing must have in itself or another a sufficient reason for its existence, that is, a sufficient reason why it is as it is and not otherwise. A thing that begins to exist, that which has come into existence from nothing, has not in itself the sufficient reason for its passing from non-existence to existence; otherwise pure potency would be actuality. So the sufficient reason for the existence of a thing must be found in some actually existent thing other than itself. But as no reason can be found as to why a transition has been made from non-existence to existence, some influence must have been exercised over this: In short, the concept of a new thing involves the concept of another thing, which is actually existent and which exercises a necessary and sufficient influence to give it the existence which it has not of itself. This influence is known as efficient causality and the principle of causality states, in Aristotle's classic words, "A principle of change is another". Hence a cause is that which by its influence determines the existence of a new thing other than itself.³² Aquinas starts from the position of Plato and Aristotle, namely, that reality is objective and independent of what we think and that we directly apprehend things. Insofar as a thing is, it is knowable and this constitutes the

ontological truth of the thing. As things are objective, the relations between them are objective. Independent of our thought things are similar to each other, dependent on one another and so on. So the principle of causation, it is considered, is ontologically valid.

On the other hand, if, as Hume conceived in the *Enquiry*, the cause is to be exactly proportionate to the effect, God cannot excel the world in any way though he is proved. (See below for details.) But this was not the conception of causation which Aquinas and Descartes entertained. For Aquinas the cause is always superior to the effect because it contains within itself the reason for the effect. The cause can explain the effect and if it fails to do this, it is not the cause of that effect. Hume does not conceive cause in this way. He conceives it mechanically as is evident from the example given in the *Enquiry*, namely, that of ten ounces being raised in a balance. (See below). He admits that a cause is greater than the effect, but remarks that it cannot be determined how much greater it is. Certainly no sane theologian ever attempted to determine how much greater God is than the world. The cosmological argument, as formulated by the great theologians, is in search of a reason, a ground for the world's being. An infinite series, though certainly possible, is not such a reason. The insufficiency and contingency of the world depends on an Other — which actuates it and its being and is therefore superior to the world. The cause proved by the cosmological argument is not one like its effect, but one which comprehending in its efficiency the entire being of the world towers above it, absolutely separated from the world in its very essence. Such a cause is independent, self-sufficient and self-existent and as it is the ultimate explanation it cannot be explained by means of anything else. The cause of the finite world must be infinite; if it too is finite it requires another cause. The only pertinent objection of Hume to this argument is that the world itself can be conceived as necessarily existent. The idea is not new; Cicero, in his *Dialogues Concerning the Nature of Gods*, described some philosophers holding nature

to be self-sufficient. Here we have to be careful about what we mean by universe or nature. If universe or nature means the aggregate of things, it too is contingent as every thing in it is contingent. A sum of zeros, as said earlier, must still be equal to zero. A lot of contingent things put together cannot produce necessity. On the other hand, if by nature or universe is meant that eternal system in which the course of events takes place without being affected in any way by this passage of events, then nature or universe itself may be God. It is in this sense that Spinoza and Berkeley held nature to be identical with God. But this Universe or Nature is not the mundane course of evanescent events.

If the premises and logic of Aquinas are accepted his arguments cannot be demolished. If like Kant we deny the very premises and hold that things in themselves cannot be known and that the necessity and universality of the principle of causation lies in its indispensability to the thinking mind only, then the object proved by these proofs has no existence in reality. But if the premises of Aquinas are accepted, then the proofs cannot at all be attacked on the grounds upon which Kant based his criticism. The cosmological argument does not end in proving that there is a first of a series of causes, which too is like the rest. Kant thinking that God proved by this argument is "the highest member in the series of the causes of changes in the world", which begins the series, commented that "the causality of such a thing would be in time and so it would belong to the world".³³ Similarly, commenting on these proofs Bertrand Russell remarked that "all of these — depend upon the supposed impossibility of a series having no first term."³⁴ Aquinas regarded an infinite series of causes perfectly conceivable³⁵ and it is also equally conceivable that the world has had no finite duration. He in fact said that the creation of the world in time is philosophically indemonstrable. What he argued was that a causal series temporally finite or infinite is inherently contradictory unless it is regarded as dependent on an ultimate cause outside the series. A series of dependent things each referring itself to the other

before it, is unintelligible and contradictory unless it is grounded in an independent self-sufficient being which is its own *raison d'être*. The argument does not at all concern itself with succession in time, and the point of the argument remains unaffected by the problem of the beginning of time and a time when there were no events. The argument does not lead us to a first cause which is like the members of the series of causes but one which is not at all like the rest. The sufficient reason for the world cannot be found in anything in this world because it is possible and justifiable to ask about everything in the world why it is so and what its conditions are. So, according to Thomist logic, we must postulate a cause transcendent to the world as its cause which would have its *raison d'être* within itself and about which it would be needless to ask why it is so.

It is interesting to recall that Karl Marx's criticism of the causal argument also applies only to a particular formulation of it, and not to its Thomistic statement. Whenever anyone asks about the creation of nature and man, Marx writes,³⁶ they are presupposed to be not existing and yet it is demanded their existence be proved. Such a question is based on an abstraction from the existence of nature and man. If they are non-existent, the questioner also is non-existent; on the other hand if such an abstraction is abandoned, the question is given up. An abstractive act of this sort, he means, annihilates the inquirer himself, while the abandonment of such an act makes the question about a first cause impossible. But the Thomistic formulation does not argue to a temporal beginning of the world, nor does it require visualizing the first moment of creation; it argues to a complete dependence in being and seeks to explain that the contingent composite being of the world is dependent upon an absolute being. The present existence of man and other experienced finite things is not denied by the cosmological argument; finite being is retained in its own integrity and actuality, but its characteristics with which one is directly acquainted bring up before one the unavoidable question: what is its first cause? What does its existing actuality actually require?

The cosmological argument as formulated by Aquinas does not depend upon the ontological. The fundamental fact from which the cosmological argument starts is a matter of direct evidence, namely, that there are dependent and contingent things in this world. The entire universe is something which began to be and will cease to be, so its non-existence is possible. It is contingent. It is evident that every contingent thing must have a cause which is either uncaused or caused by some other thing. If the latter alternative is accepted the problem will recur. So at some stage we must accept the first alternative and a necessary being is established in that way. Incapacity to account for themselves being the chief characteristic of contingent causes, any number of them put together would still be unable to account for all existence even though the number may be infinite. Any number of zeros put together will still be zero. The cosmological argument of which the first three proofs of Aquinas are variants, does not depend upon the ontological, but upon common sense — the common awareness of truth. If it is once admitted that there is anything then it follows that there is a necessary being. Kant himself admitted that the cosmological "proof takes its stand on experience"³⁷ and "that experience may perhaps lead us to the concept of absolute necessity"³⁸. Kant's objection was that it could not be referred to any "determinate thing".³⁹ If by determinate thing Kant meant that which was limited in time and space, certainly nobody ever conceived God in that way. But if by determinate thing Kant meant that which was a distinct being, a unique being, an individual, because nothing else is of the same kind, God's very nature constitutes him into a distinct being.

Another important criticism of the cosmological argument is that based as it is on the principle of causality it tries to prove that there is a thing to which the causal law does not apply and thus it cuts off the ground from under its own feet. But the cosmological argument is not based on the 'dialectical assumption' that 'everything must have a cause', as Kant thought.⁴⁰ The principle of causality does not state that

everything must have a cause but that every contingent thing must have a cause. A self-dependent immutable thing has no cause, only things which change must have causes. As this is what the principle of causation states, there is no question of the cosmological argument trying to controvert its own assumption.

From all this discussion, it may be conceded that some men have a genuine but nevertheless elusive experience that the world of nature and self is neither illusory nor self-sufficient and that it has, therefore, a derivative reality. This may be expressed as an argument from the non-self-sufficient to the cause or ground of it; but it does not prove that the world of nature and self is dependent on an absolute Spirit or Personality and it is also indemonstrable that the world taken as whole is insufficient and contingent.

HUME & THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

In the *Enquiry* Hume discusses what he calls "the chief or sole argument for a divine existence".⁴¹ Kant also speaks of it as "the oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the common reason of mankind."⁴² The argument, Hume says, proceeds from a particular effect to a particular cause. In the order of nature we find signs of intelligence and design, the cause of which cannot be assigned to chance or unconscious matter. So an intelligent cause of them must be inferred. If the appearances of things prove such a cause it is certainly allowable to draw an inference. But a cause which is solely inferred through the effect must just be sufficient to produce the effect and nothing more should be ascribed to it. A body of ten ounces raised in any balance serves to prove that the counterbalancing weight is more than ten ounces, but does not prove that it is more than a hundred ounces. So also if an intelligent cause is to be inferred from certain phenomena in nature it must just be sufficient enough to produce them. As such a cause is inferred solely through its effect and as we have no other means of knowing it, we cannot infer any of

its attributes or any principle of action in it. The cause must be exactly proportionate to the effect. None can deny that nature as it appears to us is full of evil and disorder. So we cannot ascribe justice and goodness to the cause of nature. It is arbitrary to say that God's justice exerts itself in part but not fully, for there is no reason why it should have a particular extent only. It is, says Hume, nonsense to say that God created man in perfection but that he fell due to his sin or that this world is the best of all possible worlds, for "who carried these speculators into the celestial regions, who admitted them into the council of the gods, who opened to them the book of fate, that they thus rashly affirm?" "They have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination". So it is uncertain to infer an intelligent cause from the course of nature because the subject is beyond our reach and it is useless because we cannot establish any new principles of conduct from such a cause, as our knowledge of it is solely derived from the course of nature. In fact it is a "sophism" to deduce a cause solely from its effect as nothing more can be known of the cause than what is fully discovered from the effect. When we see an unfinished building we infer that it will be completed in due course, because the man who has designed and contrived the building so far will not leave it unfinished. This is possible because we first know that a particular thing is man's handiwork and we can infer what may be expected from him as we have previous knowledge of man and his work. An analogous argument is impossible in the case of God because we do not have any previous knowledge of him and because he is unique and unlike everything else. We can imagine or conjecture but can never prove any attribute or quality in him, unless we tacitly assume to be in the place of the Supreme Being and conclude that he will think and do what we ourselves in his situation think and do. This raises the more important question: Can we at all infer a cause solely through its effect and can it be so unique that it is unlike everything else? If a watch is found on a desert island we infer that a man has left it there, because we already know

that watches are made by man. We infer fire when we see smoke because we already know that smoke is produced by fire. The universe is so unique and so very unlike anything else that it is not possible to conjecture or infer its cause. Though a cause of it may be posited, Hume concludes, no idea of its nature or attributes can be had as it is so unlike everything else.

In Hume's *Dialogues* Cleanthes argues that by analogy with our experience of the human mind effecting order and arrangement, we must infer a cause of the Universal order, distinct from the universe and beyond it and like the human mind. In answer to this Hume puts into the mouth of Philo all the objections enumerated in the *Enquiry* and makes him conclude by asking that if deity is analogous to man, why not be perfectly anthropomorphic and conceive him as corporeal and as having eyes, nose, mouth, etc.? Cleanthes is unable to meet these criticisms and merely says that in spite of them 'the hypothesis of design in the universe' is not got rid of and that it is 'a sufficient foundation for religion'.⁴³

The teleological argument which Hume formulates and discusses in the *Dialogues* is not of the Aristotelian type. It is anthropomorphic, based on a supposed analogy between human handiworks and nature. Such an argument is manifestly inadequate. As Hume points out at the end of the *Dialogues*, if the similarity between productions of art and works of nature is granted then a remote analogy between human intelligence and the cause of the order in the universe must also be granted. But this analogy is not greater than that between the "rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal and the structure of human thought". As Philo is made to say, the very considerable differences between the effects lead us to posit proportional differences in the causes. The teleological argument formulated thus is inconclusive. Properly put, the teleological argument proceeds thus: the order and purpose manifest everywhere in nature must have a sufficient cause, which must be admitted to be intelligent. This intelligent cause must be either self-sufficient or not. In

case it is the latter the cosmological argument will now take up the issue. The cause so established must be conceived to be just and good as otherwise we can have no cosmic optimism; it is Reason for if the foundation of the universe is irrational, the universe itself becomes irrational and there can be no objective basis for science and rational inquiry. And as to be perfect is to be self-sufficient, the most self-sufficient being must be most perfect.

Let us now see what Kant says about the teleological argument in the last *Critique*. Observation of nature shows that it is adapted to ends, so we understand it under the concept of design. This principle belongs to the faculty of judgment, the function of which is to think the particular as contained in the universal. The teleological principle is transcendental referring the empirical plurality of nature to an end which unifies this plurality. Kant believed that only the discovery of mechanical laws can explain nature, and that the teleological principle cannot explain nature though it may aid us in investigating nature. Teleology is no part of natural science,⁴⁴ for it is quite possible that nature is entirely guided by mechanical laws. If there were a supreme understanding it may find the principle of teleology identical with that of mechanism. We are compelled to use this principle but cannot conceive how it is to be harmonized with that of causality, unless it be in a supersensible substratum which is the reason of all that is. Objectively such a Final Cause can neither be asserted nor denied, but the forms of our faculty of judgment compel us to regard an intelligent being as the condition of the possibility of ends in nature. This supposition may not be valid and any theology based on this, according to Kant, is misunderstood teleology.⁴⁵

SOME COMMENTS

On this account of the discussion of the problem, Is there God? the following comments may be made. St. Anselm is able to show that the idea of perfect truth and goodness is

involved in knowledge and if knowing and being are the same, Perfect Being exists. Objective truth and goodness by which only we can objectively judge whether anything is true and good is, according to him, God. St. Thomas starts with the contingency of the world, understands causality in a particular way, accepts the Aristotelian first principles of knowledge, and infers that there is necessary Being. For him knowledge and being are correlative; though he holds that intellect passively receives sense-impressions on which it then actively goes to work by abstracting from them and forming concepts, which are, so to speak, the proper materials of pure thought, and are applicable to facts.

Hume's discussion of the argument from design in the universe shows that it does not prove an intelligent cause of it, but if not the hypothesis of design, at least the idea of an order in the world or of a purpose in nature is difficult to get rid of. If causation is conceived mechanically, as Hume does, it cannot prove what the cosmological argument seeks to prove. In Part IX of his *Dialogues*, Hume also attempts to show that "necessary being" is meaningless, because whatever is conceived as existent can be conceived as nonexistent; so there is nothing the nonexistence of which implies a contradiction. It is also not necessary to suppose that something always existed, but if necessary, the universe itself may be considered as necessary being, and if we could know the universe in its entirety, possibly we may find that its non-existence is a great contradiction. Hume's argument makes us draw the following conclusion. Through an *a priori* analysis of ideas considered to be valid, the idea of necessary being has been arrived at and considered valid by some. A theory of knowledge such as that of Hume renders this impossible. Lastly, while things in the universe singly may be contingent, the universe as a whole may not be so, for a whole may have characteristics which its constituent elements do not have.

KANT & THE MORAL ARGUMENT

Let us now come to Kant's first *Critique*. He considers that whatever is not derived through the methodology employed by the mathematico-physical sciences is not knowledge. All that lies outside this field — aesthetic insight, morality and religion — is not knowledge and "could never be permitted to assume the title and dignity of science and rational insight".⁴⁶ So, there cannot be any knowledge of God. But at the same time, defining "appearance" as everything that can be apprehended through space and time, Kant states that the concept of appearance "establishes the objective reality of noumena and justifies the division of objects into phenomena and noumena." We can, however, never know noumena positively.⁴⁷ Kant also admits that the *a priori* synthetic principles of reason are concepts which organize all experience, to which experience is subordinate, but which are not its objects. These transcendental ideas, not deduced from sense and transcending all experience, are not fictions of the brain, but have their own reality.⁴⁸ A pure principle of reason can in general be explained by the concept of the unconditioned, conceived as the ground of the synthesis of the conditioned.⁴⁹ At one place Kant says that as things are conditioned, they do involve the idea of the unconditioned, and that this idea is flawless and the crown and completion of all human knowledge.⁵⁰ When the idea is conceived not only in *concreto* but in *individuo* determined purely by the idea itself, it is the ideal. Ideals also cannot be granted objective reality, nor can they be brushed aside as figments of the brain.⁵¹ They provide reason with a standard to estimate and measure things. The idea of the sum total of all concepts necessary for completely determining any concept, is the ideal of pure reason. As anything is determined by negating some concepts from it, the totality of all predicates is prior to and the substratum and source of the multiplicity of things. It is the supreme reality, the ground of all things. But this ideal is only postulated by reason to complete the synthesis of all experience; it need not and should

not be objectified and hypostatized.⁵² The pure concepts of the understanding (i.e. categories) are objectively valid, because through them alone any object whatsoever can be thought. Sense impressions can be connected and transformed into knowledge only by categories. They are the ground of experience. So, according to Kant, they are valid, but they are applicable only to experience. The manifold knowledge of experience can be unified to form a connected system through the concept of the unconditioned, supplied by the ideas. Though the ideas are necessary concepts of reason, and are legitimately used for regulating experience, they can not give any objective knowledge. So any knowledge of God is impossible. This is an implication which follows from Kant's critical philosophy which assumes that thought cannot grasp the true being of things, that knowledge is limited to what can be derived from senses and understanding, and that the transition of thought from the conditioned to the unconditioned, from the world of sense to what is beyond, from the finite to the infinite, is natural but does not yield any knowledge.

Kant's second *Critique* does not in any way contradict the conclusion of the first *Critique* that we cannot have any knowledge of God. The moral law is objective and universal, either because we are conscious of it *a priori*, or because freedom of which we are conscious is deducible from the moral law alone and this serves to prove that law.⁵³ Kant expresses both these views. The moral law directly points to the noumenal world,⁵⁴ but does not give any knowledge of it. The concept of the *summum bonum*, constituted by virtue and happiness together as the final and complete end of all action,⁵⁵ is established by practical interests; it is *a priori* and is deduced transcendently. In order that happiness may be proportioned to virtue, a supreme intelligent being who is the common cause of the natural and moral worlds and who harmonizes nature with the *summum bonum*, must be posited.⁵⁶ Thus God's existence rests on moral necessity and certainty, but this is only subjective, and what is postu-

lated by morality may not be objectively existent. It is on merely subjective grounds that we wish happiness should be associated with virtue.⁵⁷ Therefore, moral faith is only a free affirmation, not a necessity; it is "a practical dogmatic knowledge".⁵⁸ It proves nothing for theoretical, pure, rational cognition.⁵⁹ One may criticize Kantian moral theology in the following way. The universal validity of the moral law and man's freedom can be explained by assuming that the universe is morally ordered, and there is no necessity to go beyond this moral order and assume an intelligent being as its cause. The disinterestedness and sovereignty of the moral law vanish by postulating a being capable of awarding happiness proportionate to virtue, and the demand for a purely formal moral principle is not met by considering ethics as the science of ends and deducing a supreme goal therefrom.

The third *Critique* also is in tune with the conclusions of the first two. The teleological way of looking at things arises when certain phenomena — especially such as life — are not intelligible to us without the concept of ends. But because the phenomena of organic life reveal 'natural purposes', and as it is difficult to deny intentionality or design to purposive production, we are necessarily led to the idea of nature as a unified teleological whole.⁶⁰ But this, though necessary, is a subjective way of looking at things, and possibly all phenomena may be capable of mechanical explanation, though we are unable to understand it. So, to posit a supreme intelligence who designed the universe as a teleological system is unjustified, nor can we assert that the universe in its entirety is subject to mechanical laws only.

But even after writing the three *Critiques* Kant did not think he had answered the question, Is there a God? He continued to grapple with the problem of God till the end of his life, as the *Opus Postumum* containing the remarkable notes he wrote during his last seven years testifies. Reference has already been made to some of the ideas in it. Raising the questions, what is God? Is there a God? Kant answers: "In the world considered as a totality of rational beings, there

is also a totality of morally practical Reason, and consequently of an imperative Right and therewith also a God".⁶¹ C. C. J. Webb thinks this means all rational beings are subject to the Moral Law taken as a whole and because of this common subjection all rational beings form a single whole or community; and God is revealed in this Moral Law. "Reason", Kant writes, "proceeds according to the categorical imperative and the lawgiver is God. There is a God, for there is a categorical Imperative"; and he adds that the consciousness of moral Freedom "is the feeling of the presence of the Godhead in man".⁶² "God is a power", he records at another place, "commanding us through a Categorical Imperative without reference to our happiness; a real Person, but certainly not one perceptible as an object of the senses".⁶³ Kant defines a Person as a "Being determining itself according to principles of Freedom", and also as "a substance consciously fitted to all ends"⁶⁴ and as a "being of pure intelligence".⁶⁵ A thinking Being is conscious of himself as a Person and insofar as a rational being personifies 'itself' for the sake of an end, it is a moral Person. God is a Person, i.e. a rational being with rights only, whereas a rational being with both rights and duties is man.⁶⁶ But in another note Kant says personality should not be attributed to God.⁶⁷

God is not Demiurge, Kant notes, because, the natural world taken by itself may suggest that it originated from a non-moral or even immoral intelligence. He is not World Soul because he is not a hypothetical being supposed to account for empirical facts, as the morally practical Reason is the only true source of this conception.⁶⁸ God, asserts Kant, is a holy being, the ideal of moral agents, but not their creator*.⁶⁹ But elsewhere Kant writes that "In God, that is through his all-enabling bringing of the world into existence, we live and move and have our being".⁷⁰ God and the world

*This may be compared to the Later Mimāṃsā conception of God as the most compassionate and the Yoga conception of God as the Perfect Person, untouched by nescience, Karma and its fruits. In both these systems he is not creator. Also, cp. Marcionism.

are related to each other like matter and "its quickening Spirit" are related to each other; the world is subordinate to God, these two are not coordinate as body and soul are.⁷¹ According to Kant, to believe in God is to believe in a living God, for to believe in an entity, he says, is to believe in an idol. But "the idea of God as a living God is nothing but the inescapable fate of man". This means, as Buber comments, "it is totally impossible to "believe in God" legitimately."⁷² The *Opus Postumum* shows "the endless and hopeless struggle" of a great and aged philosopher with the problem of God and reveals "a scene of incomparable existential tragedy".⁷³ Is it possible philosophy at the most only points towards God but cannot deal with him, recognizes him but cannot believe in him and love him?

One may not be altogether unjustified in agreeing with A. E. Taylor: "It does not seem that anything new in principle has been added either for or against theism since Kant".⁷⁴

HEGEL & THE DIALECTIC PROOF

Hegel's position has already been indicated earlier to some extent. He himself considered that his philosophy was not a contradiction of Christianity and in his later years claimed that he was born a Lutheran and remained so, though at times he spoke of himself as a pantheist. Authorities like Friedrich, Pfeiderer and Wallace assure us that is so.⁷⁵ But E. Schmidt considered that while Hegel was an orthodox Lutheran in belief, he became a prisoner of his own dialectic and secularized eschatology in speculative matters.⁷⁶ Similarly, R. Haym thought Hegel's philosophy which arose out of religious interests eventually lost contact with basic religious experience.^{76(a)} On the other hand, McTaggart thought that Hegel who denied a personal God while asserting an impersonal Absolute ought to be held as disbelieving in God, and he called Hegel the most dangerous rival of Christianity since he subordinated Christianity to his own philosophical cosmos.⁷⁷ Hegel has been interpreted differently also. In

the *Science of Logic*, he informs us that finite things incessantly perish and become other finite things *ad infinitum*, and thus continuously negate their own finitude. Things by perishing into other things change themselves, pass beyond themselves and find themselves again. This self-identity or the negation of negation is affirmative Being, the other of the Finite, the Infinite. The Infinite is nothing else but the fact that finitude 'exists only as a passing beyond' itself.⁷⁸ The finite thus has no veritable being; but this does not, according to Herbert Marcuse's interpretation, mean that true being is to be sought in a transmundane Beyond or in the inmost soul of man. They are, says Marcuse, rejected. The negation of finitude is at the same time the negation of the infinite Beyond; the ought has to be fulfilled in this world.⁷⁹ Hegel's Infinite, as thus interpreted, is the 'other' of the finite, so, dependent on the latter, and as such is a finite infinity. There is for Hegel, Marcuse asserts, no reality other than and above the finite; no two worlds, but only one world, in which finite things attain their self-determination through perishing.⁸⁰ Similarly, A. Kojève maintains that "Hegel is the first to have attempted a complete atheistic and finitist *philosophy*, in respect to man".⁸¹ But this cannot be a completely correct interpretation. Explaining his difference from Spinoza, Hegel pointed out that Spinoza only asserted that what is called world did not exist, that it was only a form of God and that it was nothing in and by itself; and that unlike Spinoza his philosophy conceived God as spirit.⁸² For his own absolute idealism as well as for religion too, Hegel pointed out, the actual world we see is created and governed by God, i.e. its existence is founded in the universal divine Idea.⁸³ God, says Hegel, exists as spirit in all spirits; he is a living God, who is acting and working. Religion for him is not a discovery of man, but a work of divine operation and creation in man.⁸⁴

From such a conception it follows that religion has its centre and life in thought and man is lifted up to God on the basis of thought. God who in his essence is thought can be reached only in thought. Therefore, for Hegel the proofs of

God's existence are "the proper movement of the object in itself".⁸⁵ Hegel brings forward dialectic proofs in the place of the syllogistic proofs criticized by Kant. The former, it is claimed, dialectically imitate the dynamics of religious experience. His philosophy of religion seeks to understand religion as it is, the highest form of which is Christianity, which sees 'God as Love, limitless love, and that means spirit'.⁸⁶

According to Hegel, one of the tasks to which rational metaphysics sets itself is the demonstration of God's existence. By demonstration discursive understanding means the exhibition of the dependence of one truth upon another. In such proofs something firm and fast is presupposed from which something else follows. If God's existence is demonstrated in this way his existence is shown to be dependent on other terms. This kind of proof is shy of making a transition from the finite to the infinite. The God so proved has to be conceived in either of the two ways: as an object set over against the finite (the world) or as the very substance of the world. The first alternative leads to dualism by making the infinite and the finite opposed to and so coterminous with each other. If the infinite is on one side and the finite on the other side with a deep abyss in between, both are conceived as equally steadfast. Then the infinite becomes just one of the two, the finite enjoying an equal degree of permanence and independence as the infinite.⁸⁷ Adoption of the second alternative leads to pantheism, a union of God 'into' the finite, degrading him to the adventitious congeries of existence.⁸⁸ An escape from this predicament is possible by abolishing the antithesis between God and the world. The infinite cannot be a counterpart of the finite; God is known only when nature and finite spirit, his creations, are recognized as nothing apart from God.⁸⁹ True rational demonstration consists in starting from what is not God, but in the very process of demonstration the starting point is called into question and the consequent (God) is shown to be its ground. This is, according to Hegel, what genuine theology or philosophy of religion does.⁹⁰

Hegel has no patience with Kant's criticism of the theological proofs. While admitting that these proofs cannot be taken as syllogisms which deem the starting-point as a solid basis remaining the same throughout, he holds they describe the native course of the mind rising beyond the data of the sense. Thought has to make the passage from the finite to the infinite and he who says that there must be no such passage, says that there must be no thought. In these proofs reasoning does not proceed from a thing which is and continues to be to another of the same kind. The process of thought recasts and transmutes the phenomenal from which it starts, negating it by transforming it into the universal. Thought arising from the world to God signifies that the world is only seemingly real and that it being a sum of incidents is in *esse* and *posse* null. These proofs are not therefore ordinary syllogisms. At the same time the transition which seems to have been made from the finite to the infinite is only apparent, as every trace of transition is absorbed in the very process. "The world, which might have seemed to be the means of reaching God, is explained to be a nullity. Unless the being of the world is nullified the *point d'appui* for the exaltation is lost. In this way the apparent means vanishes, and the process of derivation is cancelled in the very act by which it proceeds".⁹¹

Hegel's way of proving God is really only a way of proving absolute spirit. His proofs are not theistic proofs, though he considered them as such because for him "that which we call God" is "the spiritual principle", the only real, which is accessible only to reason. One of the earliest and effective critics of Hegel's proofs was Karl Marx. (1) Hegel, wrote Marx,⁹² sought to justify theological proofs by completely reversing and rejecting them. While theologians argued from the reality of the contingent world to God, Hegel argued from its unreality. This sort of argument dealt a deathblow to *a posteriori* proofs in an age when the finite and the contingent could no more be denied. (2) Hegel's ontological argument, Marx commented, is tautologous, for it only states that

whatever one represents to oneself is an actual representation for one. Having an effect on oneself cannot be an index of objective truth; the only sort of existence involved in this 'proof' is an imaginary or a conveniently determined one. (3) This 'proof' is just a reflection of human consciousness, for what somehow exists immediately as soon as it is thought is only a mental modification. (4) So, "the proofs for God's existence are nothing but *proofs for the existence of the essential human self-consciousness, logical explications of it*". Analysis of these proofs shows they are only illusory projections of man's own ideals of himself. If, Marx concludes, in order to rescue them it is maintained that they do not refer to positive, finite entities, it would mean proving God from the emptiness, unreasonableness and badness of man and the world.⁹³

A FEW FURTHER COMMENTS

From the foregoing account it may be justifiable to make these further comments. The God who Hegel thinks is proved is not the same one who Sts. Anselm and Aquinas think is proved. The Absolute Spirit which is dialectically involved in the world process and actualizes itself in man cannot be the Perfect Being and the necessary Being of which the *Proslogium* and the *Summa* spoke. The God proved in these books does not appear to be the same who is believed to be revealed in the Christian Gospels and the Epistles of St. Paul. These Gods differ again from the object of Kant's moral faith. Since all these ideas differ from one another, could they correspond to the same Reality, and could all these ideas be true? One answer that could be given is that the real God is the one proclaimed by the Hebrew prophets and revealed by Jesus and that the God of the philosophers is not the real God. This was Pascal's attitude and in our time Buber's, the latter stopping with the prophets. But those of us who are not blessed with faith as Pascal and Buber were, are perplexed by the fact that there have been prophets other than

Hebraic and revealers other than Jesus. We cannot also fail to note that *all* philosophers do not think that God exists and even all those who think so do not have the same idea of God. The latter consideration makes us doubt: Is it because there are as many realities or aspects of the same reality corresponding to their several ideas? Or, is it the case that one of these ideas alone is true? Or, is it possible that all such ideas are only fancies?

PASCAL & THE WAGER ARGUMENT

In any case we must not also forget that religious geniuses of the order of Pascal, who at the same time were first-rate scientists, thought that God is not to be proved. Pascal would urge that one has to believe in God, or strive to believe in him. Those who have faith see that the universe is the work of God, but on those who do not have such a faith the cosmological and other arguments do not make any impact. Pascal writes: "It is an astounding fact that no canonical writer has ever made use of nature to prove God. They all strive to make us believe in Him". He continues, "why! Do you not say yourself that the heavens and birds prove God?" No. "And does your religion not say so?" No.⁹⁴ Reason, says Pascal, cannot decide whether God is or is not; religion is not certain. But we must wager that God is, it is not optional. If we have to act only on certainty, we can do nothing at all, for nothing is certain. It is not certain that we will see tomorrow. Moreover, in battles and on sea we deliberately work for an uncertainty. In man's life, uncertainty plays a fundamental role; "the nature of odds" shows man is compelled to work for what is uncertain. Life would be impossible if man is to act only when he is certain and refrain from action whenever he is uncertain. In life we choose in the many wagers we come across everyday; and as we must of necessity choose, our reason is not shocked in choosing one rather than the other. We are, says Pascal, "embarked" because being human we

are in quest of infinite happiness, the achievement of which depends on God, because it is impossible to achieve it in this life. Yet, the existence of God is not a certainty, but is only a hope. So, Pascal concludes, we have to lay our bets in favour of God's existence in the one essential choice offered to us between the Infinite and nothing. Thereby while we lose nothing, we may gain all. We must, therefore, believe. If one would like to attain faith one should act as if one believed; and this will naturally make one believe. Also, "endeavour then to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions".⁹⁵

It may be recalled that according to Kant also wager is the touchstone of doctrinal faith and the logical conclusion at which reason arrives on a theoretical plane. But, it cannot be extended to the practical plane, as the moral law is autonomous and absolute.⁹⁶ Thus the idea of a wager has an important place in Kant's philosophy also: As no one can really choose to give up all attempts to be happy, one must wager that virtue and happiness are linked together; and as only God can guarantee this, one simultaneously must wager on the practical postulate that God exists. It is interesting to observe that for the wager on God Marxism substituted the wager on the classless society of the future. Marxism is faith in the future which men must make for themselves by what they do, and it is a hope that the classless society will eventually be created by the movement of history. As such it is, as Lucien Goldmann pointed out, a wager that in the alternative facing humanity of a choice between socialism and barbarity, the former will triumph and that our actions to bring it about will, in fact, be successful.⁹⁷ Lastly, we may also recall that Plato after making Socrates discourse about immortality and the other world makes him say that his description of "the soul and her mansions" may not be exactly true, but man "may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with words like these". "Fair is the prize, and the hope great!" (*Phaedo*,

Jowett's Trans.) This Platonic passage could have inspired the wager argument. It is a glorious venture to believe in God, immortality and the other world, and live according to such a belief.

III

In the East the attitude to the question of God is so different. The first fact of importance is we have religions which are atheistic. Not only Buddhism and Jainism, but Confucianism and Taoism are such. But all these great religions consider that the universe is morally ordered and friendly, that ethical action is meaningful and that the highest good is to be attained through such action. The conviction that moral law is eternal and objective is also common to all of them.

Taking the Indian religions first,⁹⁸ it can be said that their greater concern is with Dharma rather than with a being who creates and governs the universe, who may or may not exist, and even if he existed it is not necessary to know and worship him; for some of these religions hold *kaivalya*, *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* can certainly be attained even if one does not know and worship God. If Dharma is of paramount importance, knowledge of it naturally becomes very essential. Jainism and Buddhism assert that the eternal norm was rediscovered and revived by the Jinas and Buddhas, and it is possible for anyone to do so if he treads the same path. Hindu schools found a difficulty in such a position. How can the eternal universal moral law be discovered by any finite being with limited intelligence? However arduous, sincere and elevating one's penance, yoga and moral effort may be, one cannot transcend oneself; the human mind, *puruṣa buddhi*, however perfect, keen and refined it becomes, cannot cease to be personal and finite. So they searched for the crystallization, the embodiment in propositions, of the knowledge of Dharma. This they believed was contained in the Veda, because, (they argued) the Veda was of such a nature that no finite intelligence could have composed it, because the identity

of its author or authors was not known, because at no time was it non-existent, because it taught a wisdom which did not contradict knowledge obtained through perception and reason, and because rightly interpreted it was found to be coherent and consistent. Mīmāṃsā concluded the Veda must be eternal, because no one could have been and no one is known to be its author and there must always have been an eternal knowledge of Dharma which is eternal and men could never have been without the knowledge of Dharma. Schools which could accept the existence of an omniscient God who made the world could argue that he was the author of the Veda, others that it was the discovery of primal sages.

To the question, how can the unconditional moral imperative be justified? these Hindu systems replied that eternal knowledge of Dharma is the source of all moral obligation. The Jaina and Buddhist systems replied that knowledge founded in the omniscience of the Jinas is the source. These standpoints have many difficulties. One might ask, how can there be eternal knowledge? The world, it may be answered, is eternal and eternal knowledge can coexist with it and in it. Another may ask, how can any human being achieve omniscience? It may be replied: Through purity and perfection of mind. The replies are as unsatisfactory as those given in the West when the position that the moral law is universal and valid is questioned.

Does not the moral law require an ordainer and governor? The theists, of course, thought God fulfilled this need. But those thinkers who considered it to be natural and eternal, or everlasting like the universe, did not think so. Fruits of secular as well as religious actions are attained or produced by the actions themselves and the superintendence of God is not required for this — so declared the Sāṃkhya, early Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vaiśeṣika. This was sought to be proved by showing that the alternate hypothesis, viz. that God is the moral governor of the world, was untenable. The other schools held that both temporal happiness and salvation are bestowed by God, human action being requited by him. But

all the systems accepted that in the absence of human action there is no result and God bestowed fruits in accordance with human action. Rain produces crops, no doubt, but not unless there are potent seeds and proper soil. God then is not the sole or independent cause of men getting happiness and salvation. The theistic schools accept God as the bestower of fruits only in this sense. In some schools of Bhakti — which are generally non-philosophical — God is depicted as the arbiter of human destiny. In Buddhism and Jainism, as in Mīmāṃsā, the structure of the universe is ethical and as other actions produce their own results, ethical action too produces its own proper results sooner or later.

IV

In the principal Oriental cultures, that is of China and India, we find evidence of a certain way of thinking which is very interesting.

If we examine the *Wu Hsing*, the theory of Five Powers or Activities, in its developed form, it maintains that there are five dynamic interacting forces involved in a continuous cyclical motion, and by turns overcoming each other. It was thought that all the changes which things undergo and the properties manifested in the course of those changes can be classified as coming under or related to these five fundamental processes or forces. Men and things, societies and physical nature, are governed by the mutual conquest (*hsiang shêng*) of these forces, which are overcoming each other in a cyclical way. Everything is made up of these. Further, whatever is classifiable into fives is symbolically correlated with them, and with the help of numerology this fivefold order is fitted together with the rest of the things classified into fours, nines, etc. All these classifications imply that things fall into different orders, and that all these orders are themselves sub-orders of a universal order.⁹⁹ This may be further explained as follows. First of all a correspondence is assumed among all things which can be classified into fives and the Five Forces,

and they are supposed to influence each other because they are all connected. All these form a pattern. Things classifiable in other ways stand around this, so to say, but they have their own patterns. All these can be symbolically correlated, for all things are fitted so well and precisely into a well-ordered universal order that, as the *Ta Tai Li Chi* and Liu Hsin said,¹⁰⁰ not a hair can be inserted in between them.

The various correlations among things are the symbolizations of different orders, all of which together form one universal order which pervades this ever-moving cyclical universe. It is a universe in which, as Marcel Granet showed, phenomena alternate with each other, but do not succeed each other.¹⁰¹ Within this universe things of "the same genus energize each other",¹⁰² i.e. things of the same sort only can influence each other. Each sort forms a class. Between the various classes there are different types and degrees of relationships.¹⁰³ Things are what they are and behave as they do, because of their relational positions in the universe. So the natures of things as well as their activities are spontaneous and inevitable. Thus there is a system in the universe, although it is not mechanical. As all things correspond and are interlinked, nature and man mutually influence each other and history is cyclical, because the Five Activities which are responsible for everything overcome each other cyclically. Thus human history corresponds to natural history; they mutually influence each other, the changes in the one manifesting themselves in the other.

We have, similarly, in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads what Keith called "endless identifications", with "love of numbers" as "a dominant factor". For example, *prāṇa* is divided into five varieties and associated with another five: mind, speech, breath, sight and hearing. All these again are said to have entered into the central *Prāṇa* becoming his special aspects. The central *Prāṇa* is the integrated unity of the ordinary *prāṇa*, *manas*, etc. The central *Prāṇa* is like the head of a community whom he represents and on whose behalf he acts, and who may also delegate his powers to the

members of his community, who then can represent him and can act on his behalf.¹⁰⁴ (The central *Prāṇa*, thus, is not the same as the ordinary *prāṇa*, as Keith thought.) Thus between the central *Prāṇa* and the Head of a community and between the *Prāṇas*, mind, etc., and the members of a community there is an analogy. Elsewhere, breath, voice etc., are described as the functions of the self, from whom they originate and in whom they are unified.¹⁰⁵ To give some more examples, at one place the Upaniṣad says mind is the self, speech the wife, breath progeny, the eye material possessions and the ear heavenly goods.¹⁰⁶ Here a correspondence or identification between the psycho-physical and the sociological is established. The *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* at one place equates the pit from which is dug out the clay to make a sacrificial fire pan, with the sacrificer's "matrix" (*yonī*) and "equal self" (*samambīla*), for it has the same gauge as himself.¹⁰⁷ Indra who sits in the centre of a cosmogram surrounded by 32 gods, minor Indras, is 'kindled' in the middle of the breaths or organs; so they became 'indriyas'.¹⁰⁸ Enough has been said to show that like the Chinese, the Indians too made equations and correlations between different things. Man is the universe in miniature; the elements are the principles of his body. The astronomical cosmogram, the site plan of a temple, that of a sacrificial plot and the structure of the human body correspond. Astronomical and medical charts can be equated. The Indians believed Man was in rapport with the cosmos. Evil acts disturb nature and good planetary combinations produce good men and desirable social happenings. "The myriad patterns are all subsumed in the Great Pattern", said Chheng Hao.¹⁰⁹ What is in *pinḍāṇḍa* is in *Brahmāṇḍa*. (Philo called man 'the little world', 'brachys kosmos'.)

Now what do all these correspondences in which Indians and Chinese delighted in establish? Lévy-Bruhl and others considered this to be a sort of primitive thinking, in which concepts are analysed *ad infinitum* in a futile way, without submitting them to the tests of experience. Vague unveri-

fiable notions and mystical preconnections make up the content of this thought. It reflects, he said, the mentality of inferior societies. If primitive mentality is exemplified in thinking that nothing is logically or physically absurd, that anything can be believed and that anything can be a cause of anything—that's how Lévy-Bruhl describes it—then the Chinese and Indian ways of thinking do not surely exemplify it. On the other hand, scholars like Granet maintain the Chinese to be a distinct type of thinking which may be called "coordinative thinking". It may be contrasted with what H. Wilhelm called the "subordinative thinking" of Europe.¹¹⁰ As W. Jabłoński said, the former is based on the idea of correspondence and the latter on that of causality.¹¹¹ Things according to the former kind of thinking are *connected* rather than *caused*; in the universe there is an alternation of aspects rather than a succession of phenomena.¹¹² Things influence one another not in a mechanically causal way, but because they, to use Jung's word, "synchronize"¹¹³ with each other by virtue of their positions in the total order that is the universe. Needham thinks this Oriental way of thinking is closer to modern science, than the older European causal way of thinking which is closer to Cartesian-Newtonian science. It is interesting to mention that Leibniz thought he found his binary arithmetic in *I Ching*, and Wiener points out that modern computing machines are built on a binary basis. As regards our own tradition, Paul Mus thinks that the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads have hit upon "some of the fundamentals of our latest 'logistic' conceptions—topology or *analysis situs* and the notion of functional connection".¹¹⁴ They had a "thoroughly rationalized apprehension" of the idea of "the emergence of a qualitative construct, rising at a critical moment, above elements it presupposes and immediately integrates, but without being an addition to them."¹¹⁵ "Vedic symbolism and modern attempts at non-syllogistic thinking", he writes, "operate along quite comparable lines".¹¹⁶ Needham and Mus leave us wondering.

This kind of thinking could reach the conclusion that the

universe is a whole: both the macrocosm and the microcosm are harmonious unities of their elements, requiring no controlling entity within or without. Chuang Tzu explained that the human being is so organized that all its parts are equally complete in their places, such that mutually controlling each other they become masters and servants of each other by turns.¹¹⁷ The parts in the body differ in their duties and functions and do not mix up, but are held together in a common unity. They complete one another without forcing themselves to cooperate.¹¹⁸ Thus the complex interrelationships of the various constituents of the human being bring about its harmonious functioning. There is no inner controller separate from the body, the nine orifices do not require the heart (consciousness) to regulate them.¹¹⁹ Similarly, all things in the universe are cyclically metamorphosed into each other. There is no need to postulate a governor of the universe.¹²⁰ What happens in the human being happens throughout the universe, as it is just like a vast living body with innumerable parts spontaneously cooperating with each other.¹²¹ The universe is a vast organism within which things opposed to each other do not arise simultaneously, but run in a parallel way, each in turn controlling the other. Such is their pattern (*tzhu chhi wen*).¹²² The constituents of the body as well as those of the universe work together for good without the former having an inner controller and the latter a world-soul or external deity.¹²³ To sum up this kind of thinking, the universe is a vast pattern in which all things harmoniously cooperate with each other following their own inner natures forming different wholes, at different levels, all these fused into a unity. There is order in the world, but no ordering entity.

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 101 Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 289-291.
 102 E. R. Hughes, *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times*, p. 305.
 103 Needham, loc. cit., p. 281 ff.
 104 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I. V. 21.
 105 *Ibid.*, I. IV. 7.

- 106 Ibid., I. IV. 17.
 107 *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, VI. III. 3.26 (Eggeling's Trans. p. 213.)
 108 Ibid., VI 1.1.1 (Eggeling, p. 148.)
 109 Cited by Needham, loc. cit., p. 281, f.n. b.
 110 Needham, loc. cit., p. 280.
 111 Ibid., p. 288.
 112 Citations from Granet, in Needham, loc. cit., p. 289, 290-1. Renouvier, whom Needham does not mention, also noted that "for the Chinese all phenomena are connected": Quoted by H. Berr, Preface (p. XXII) to M. Granet, *Chinese Civilization*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1957.
 113 Wilhelm and Jung, *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, p. 142.
 114 His paper in C. A. Moore (ed.), *Philosophy and Culture — East and West*, Honolulu 1962, p. 604.
 115 Ibid., p. 600.
 116 Ibid., p. 605.
 117 Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, Princeton 1963, p. 181-2. J. Legge, *The Texts of Taoism*, New York 1959, p. 227-228. J. R. Ware, *The Sayings of Chuang Chou*, p. 21.
 118 Hsiang & Kuo, "Commentary on Chuang Tzu", Ch. 6, cited by Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, Bodde's Trans., Vol. II, p. 211.
 119 *Kuan Tzu*, Ch. 55: Quoted by Needham, loc. cit. p. 52. Needham depends on G. Haloun's translation.
 120 See the pages in sources cited in note 117 above and the page in Needham cited in above note.
 121 Hsiang & Kuo, loc. cit.
 122 Tung Chung-Shu, cited by Fung Yu-lan, loc. cit., p. 24.
 123 *Chuang Tzu*, Chs. 2 and 5. (Trans., by Legge & Ware.)

ANNEXE I

A DIALECTIC OF ATHEISM

It was the considered opinion of Nicholas Berdyaev that Dostoevsky was the greatest philosopher and metaphysician Russia had known.¹ Nietzsche acknowledged that "Dostoevsky was the only psychologist from whom he had anything to learn". (*The Twilight of the Idols*, IX, 45.) Marc Slonim wrote that in *The Brothers Karamazov* Dostoevsky expressed "all the intellectual doubts and emotional torments of the modern man."² But we can also keep in mind that he was an epileptic and, according to Freud, a sadomasochist. In his works Dostoevsky, Berdyaev claimed, developed the dialectic of the destiny of mankind.³ In one of his letters Dostoevsky stated that the chief problem which tormented his conscious and subconscious being throughout his life was the question of the existence of God.⁴ Dostoevsky's ideas are thus very much relevant to what we discussed in this chapter. In this annexe it is proposed to discuss some of the views expressed in his novels.

Everyone in the world of Dostoevsky finds "God" fascinating and important. Even Ivan Karamazov, who has travelled far on the road to self-assertion and rebellion against God, is made to acknowledge the power and beauty of the idea of God: "What's strange, what would be marvellous, is not that God should really exist; the marvel is that such an idea, the idea of the necessity of God, could enter the head of such a savage, vicious beast as man. So holy it is, so touching, so wise and so great a credit it does to man."⁵ Another character, Kirilov, argues that man invented God to go on living and not kill himself and that this is the whole of universal history up till now. He asks: "God is necessary, and so must exist;—but I know he doesn't exist and can't exist;—but don't you understand that a man with two such ideas cannot go on living?"⁶ According to Kirilov's dialectic, it is absurd to realize that there is no God and not to realize

at the same instant that man himself has become God. If God exists, all is his will and against it man can do nothing; but if God does not exist, all is man's will and he is bound to show self-will. Self-will is the attribute of man's God-head, so to prove his independence an atheist would, Kirilov concludes, kill himself.⁷ From the antithesis of the God-man and the man-god (superman), Kirilov works out the idea of the self-deified man, who is happy and proud, who does not care whether he lives or dies, who conquers pain and fear and who overcomes evil and suffering. The world when peopled by such men will be altered, for things, men's thoughts and feelings will be then different.

In *The Possessed* and in the Notebooks for it we find the following ideas. God and man's faith in him are the cornerstone of the structure on which society rests, every society in the world has so far believed in God; no one people has so far ordered its life on the basis of science and reason. So, when a society quits believing in God, it will undergo changes and the individual who has lost this belief will also undergo physical change. Society is built on morality derived from religion and if there is no religion another morality would be substituted. "As soon as God is abolished, a new era will begin for mankind". It follows, as Shatov is made to say, the only way to start a revolution is to start with atheism.⁸ When there is no god, man is absolutely free. Unlimited freedom, Shigalyov shows, leads to unlimited despotism and all social questions will be solved then, for despotism can bring about freedom and equality for all. "In a herd there is bound to be equality". In slavery all are slaves and equals, everyone belongs to all the others and all belong to everyone. In the Shigalyov order, there would be complete obedience and complete loss of individuality.⁹ All this implies that the absence of God would lead man to such freedom that he would attempt to set himself up as God, and he may end either by killing himself or by creating and maintaining through despotism an ant-heap society whose principle is compulsion.

A man or nation, writes Dostoevsky in the *Diary of A Writer*, cannot live without a 'higher idea' and there is only one such idea on this earth, that of an immortal soul. It is, according to him, the first source of the truth and integrity of conscience and all other 'higher ideas' flow from it. When that idea is lost, suicide appears to be a necessity for sensitive men. Ivan Karamazov works this out. There is nothing in the whole world, he says, to make men love their neighbours, for there is no law of nature that man should love mankind. If men have hitherto loved one another, it is simply because they believed in immortality. If this belief were to be destroyed, Ivan argues, every living force maintaining the life of the world would at once dry up. Nothing then would be immoral and everything would be lawful. The moral law of nature will be immediately changed into the exact contrary of the former religious law as soon as one ceases to believe in God or immortality. The most rational outcome of the atheistic position is that egoism is not only lawful but is inevitable. Ivan's theory can be thus summarized: "There is no virtue if there is no immortality;" "If there's no everlasting God, there's no such thing as virtue, and there's no need of it.— All things are lawful".¹⁰ The bewilderment this causes to an ordinary man is well expressed by Ivan's brother, Mitya: If God "doesn't exist, man is the chief of the earth, of the universe. Magnificent! Only how is he going to be good without God? That's the question.— Rakitin says that one can love humanity without God. Well, only a snivelling idiot can maintain that. I can't understand it".¹¹ In *The Possessed* there is the anecdote of a captain who after sitting for a long time, without uttering a word, listening to a discussion of atheism by three army officers, suddenly stood up and said aloud: "If there is no God, then what sort of captain am I after that?"¹² The captain evidently could not understand how in the absence of God there could be an established order and he could know what he ought to do and ought not to do and also why he should do his duty.

Ivan Karamazov's is what Dostoevsky calls an "Euclidean mind." *Firstly*, it finds no positive basis for believing in God and it repudiates the world because there is so much evil and suffering, especially of the innocent, in it. It cannot also accept the world in the hope of a future harmony, because nothing that might happen in future can in any way justify the terrible and unjust present. If there be no God and no meaning in what is happening now, neither divine harmony nor progress in this world can be accepted. *Secondly*, one can love others only when one believes God exists and is their common father. Men can mutually love one another only if they believe they are fellow creatures of the same creator. It is impossible to love one another if there be no God. Assuming man cannot be loved apart from God, Ivan declares he cannot love his fellows.¹³

In the Notebooks for *The Possessed* the problem is posed as follows at one place. The one urgent question is, can one believe (that there is God) while being civilized, i.e. while being a European? To this question, civilization gives a factual answer in the negative. But can society exist without faith (on the basis of science)?¹⁴ Nevertheless, in *The Possessed* at some places the idea that unknowingly or unconsciously every individual and every nation believes in God is expressed. (1) According to Stavrogin, the most enigmatic and the principal character in this book, if one finds one believed in God one would believe in him, but as one does not know that one believed in him, one does not believe in him.¹⁵ About Stavrogin himself Kirilov says that "if Stavrogin believes in God, then he doesn't believe that he believes. And if he doesn't believe, then he doesn't believe that he doesn't believe".¹⁶ This appears to mean that on the one hand a believer may not be convinced that he is a believer—may not be fully aware of himself as a believer—and on the other hand a disbeliever may not be convinced that he is a disbeliever—may not be fully aware of himself as a disbeliever. Stavrogin and Kirilov appear to conceive God as the supreme and absolute Value and the ultimate Purpose by virtue of

which the world, human life and history have meaning. (2) In this book itself in another context Shatov advances the idea that all peoples (nations) are conceiving and seeking God in their different ways. But as their conceptions and ways of seeking are different, it is argued, they are seeking different gods and every people has its own special God and all other gods may not be reconcilable with any particular god. A common God may not be the true God, but for each nation its own special God may be the true God. When a nation has no God of its own, it decays; and when a God becomes a common God to two or more nations, he dies.¹⁷ But for Shatov "God" seems only to mean "the end", the aesthetic and ethical principle, pursued by a nation or people. This principle, 'the spirit of life', is not a principle of reason and science. Every nation is formed and moved by the desire to realize an 'end' (a God) and yet it may deny the existence of such an 'end'. This God, Shatov maintains, is not an attribute of nationality; on the other hand, the whole evolution of a nation is solely the pursuit of God, its own special God.¹⁸ Shatov's position seems only to lead to the conclusion that every nation has an ethos of its own, which animates and sustains it, and the realization of which constitutes the destiny of that nation. Such an ethos is not a rational or scientific principle, but a vital one; but it is not also the universal God propounded in some major religions, nor the God discussed by philosophers like Descartes and Kant. But one of the points insisted upon by Shatov is that no nation or people lives in accordance with science and reason, and that all nations are pursuing their different ethos—their own special Gods, though a nation may deny this. (3) In another work, *A Raw Youth*, we read that proud men, especially scornful men, "choose God rather than bow before men; to submit to him is less humiliating". This means that just as pride may make one deny or defy God, it may make one accept God and submit oneself to him. Not all faith is based on humility.

We may now come to what appear to be two positive arguments for God's existence, found in Dostoevsky's works.

(1) Stepan Verkhovensky holds forth as follows towards the end of his life. Love is higher than existence and it is the crown of existence. So, existence must be subject to it. God is necessary to man if only because God is the only being whom man can love eternally. If once man has come to love God and rejoice in this love, God cannot unjustly extinguish both man and his joy and turn both into nothingness. So, if God exists, man is immortal.¹⁹ The logic underlying Stepan's rhetoric is somewhat like this: Human existence becomes fruitful and fulfilled only through love, which is its culmination. One can completely and unceasingly love only a perfect being; if there is love there must be sublime love; in order that man may have such love, there must be God. If man has begun to find happiness in such love, God cannot allow this happiness to come to an end. The weakness of this argument becomes more obvious by reformulating it thus: I gain significance and fulfilment only by loving; my love can be perfect and sublime only if its object is such and so there must be such an object and that is God; and God cannot allow my love for him to die, so I as well as my love for him must be immortal. (2) The other argument is more interesting. If the world is wholly good and righteous it itself would be God. The world is evil and unjust, so there must be also what is not this; the world cannot be the all. God is, because evil is. This may be somewhat elaborated thus. If the world were to be necessarily, compulsorily and entirely good, happy and rational, there would be no freedom in it. But the world is full of evil, injustice, unhappiness and senselessness, just because it is based on freedom. There could have been a better world, but there would have been no freedom in it. Thus if freedom is not accepted as the mystery behind all creation, this evil world and God who could create it cannot be accepted.²⁰ Summarized, this argument states in the first place that in a necessarily good and harmonious world there cannot be freedom and freedom is the supreme good, and because there is freedom in the world, Freedom is the foundation of the world. Secondly, because the world is evil and

unjust, there is need for and there must be the Good and the Just. It is obvious that this is a flimsy argument and even if it is not, it does not also prove the existence of the God of the Bible or of rational theology.

André Gide wrote that Dostoevsky tried to diffuse the knowledge of God throughout his works in all its human and anxious complexity.²¹ In this annexe as it is not possible to give a more adequate account of the ideas expressed in his books than what has been given above, a few comments may now be made on them.

It is true that every society and civilization has a religion or religions; but there are religions which have no place for God and/or soul. Buddhism and some of the major religious traditions of China and Japan deny both God and soul. Jainism and some of the great Hindu systems — e.g. Mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya — deny God. Some Vedic and Upaniṣadic passages deny the soul's immortality. Till a late stage Judaism did not posit the immortal soul and another life. In Greece, Rohde and Unamuno pointed out, the immortality of the soul was neither accepted as a philosophical principle, nor was it an object of popular Hellenic belief.²² Yet, all these religions and philosophies arose within and shaped societies and civilizations, whose spiritual and material achievements, including the quality of the ethical life they produced, were not inferior to those of others. So, *pace* Ivan Karamazov, there can be virtue even if there is no immortality and even if there is no God all things are not lawful.

What about Christianity? In what sort of immortality does it believe? Jesus spoke of the Son of Man rising from the dead, but even his immediate disciples were not sure what rising from the dead meant.²³ The Gospel says Jesus rose from the dead and at his resurrection "many bodies of the saints that had slept arose".²⁴ Later St. Paul argued that as the gospel proclaimed that Christ was raised from the dead and he himself saw Christ and as Christ's resurrection was the essence of Christian faith, if Christ did not rise from the dead the gospel and faith were null and void. If Christ was raised

from the dead, there is resurrection of the dead, and if there be no resurrection then Christ was not raised.²⁵ It was on the authority of his own experience (his seeing Christ) and the gospel that Paul preached the risen Christ; and he argued: Christ who was made man, died and rose, so all men who die will ultimately rise; for if the dead will not rise, Christ also could not have risen. 'In Christ all will be brought to life', but in a particular order. Christ's resurrection is the guarantee of the resurrection of all. All the dead will rise and live again "with the same bodies and souls that they had" (as the Catechism puts it). Harnack, Unamuno and others have made it clear that for the gospel writers resurrection did not presuppose immortality of the soul in the philosophical sense, and that for the first Fathers of the Church immortality of the soul did not pertain to the natural order — i.e. it was not something rational; for them immortality was a divine gift of grace and had to be accepted on the basis of the scriptures only.²⁶ In view of all this it may not be incorrect to say that whatever else is found in Christian theology about the immortality of the soul was borrowed from non-Christian, primarily Greek, sources. In the Christian and Muslim scriptures* we do not find the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, *if* by it is meant the teaching about an imperishable spiritual entity, immortal by its very nature, distinct from the body and yet inhabiting it, but with the possibility of freedom from embodiment. In Orphism, some of the Platonic dialogues, some of the Upaniṣadic passages and the Gītā we find

*Matthew (VI. 25) and Luke (XII. 23) distinguish between life and body, and Matthew (X. 28) also speaks of soul and body, both of which can be destroyed in hell by God, but the former by no one else on earth. In I Corinthians and II Corinthians (V. 1-4) Paul mentions animal and spiritual bodies and our earthly frame and heavenly habitation. In I Thessalonians (V. 23) spirit, soul and body are referred to. Before Muhammad the Arabs did not entertain the idea of resurrection, but he taught physical resurrection (*Qur'an*, XVII. 49-51, 98-99). According to Islam man "consists of body and something else which will both share in resurrection". (A. S. Tritton, *Islam*, London 1966, p. 43.) Influenced by Neo-Platonism and Aristotle, Muslim philosophers in general denied resurrection, and some of them the immortality of soul, but the faithful held on to the belief in resurrection.

such a teaching. In the Christian scriptures we have the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ and hence of all: "the dead will rise immortal, and we shall be changed" (Paul). According to the first doctrine the soul is immortal by its very nature, but according to the second through Christ God clothes the mortal with immortality. In either case there is no basis for maintaining that there cannot be ethics and virtue if there is no belief in immortality (either natural or divinely conferred). Surely Platonic ethics can be advocated and practised without a belief in the immortality of the soul, and the Sermon on the Mount admired and acted upon without a belief in resurrection*. The ethics of the Gītā does not radically differ from that of the Saddharma Pundarīka Sūtra, though the first propounds theism and *ātmavāda* (doctrine of the soul) and the second does not.

Like some Eastern philosophic systems and religions, the philosophy of Spinoza demonstrates the possibility of sublime ethics without a belief in a personal God or personal immortality, and his philosophy is not alone in the West in this respect. To live in a soulless, and irrational way just because one does not believe that one's soul is eternal and immortal is, Spinoza wrote, as absurd as to saturate oneself with deadly poisons just because one does not believe that one could eternally nourish one's body with wholesome food. This is, according to him, so absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting.²⁷ Moreover, it may be pointed out that one may accept God and immortality and yet may be utterly immoral. As Ivan Karamazov himself pointed out, his father was a pig but his ideas were right enough;²⁸ and Ivan himself who did not believe in God and immortality could love humanity, nature and justice.²⁹

Some of the Czars who accepted God and immortality were more despotical than some of the communist rulers, and some of the Buddhist and Jaina kings were the most benevolent, just and wise rulers in history. In the annexe to Chapter I

*No less a person than Nietzsche admitted "genuine Christianity" was "possible in all ages", i.e. including in this age when God is dead! (*Antichrist*, 39.)

the Greek pursuit of virtue without such beliefs has been referred to. The political theories of the Christian Machiavelli and the orthodox Brāhmin Kautilya are far below the moral level of the political theories of Confucian and Buddhist thinkers. Was medieval Europe more ethical than modern Europe? The contemporary Chinese civilization of Mao seems to be in no way inferior to the contemporary civilizations of Catholic Latin America or Muslim Middle East, and are not the dictatorships of the Godless Tito and Ceausescu less intolerable than those of Christians like Franco and Salazar? The barbarities and cruelties which Christians perpetrated in colonial Asia and Africa, the continuing atrocities in Vietnam and *apartheid* disprove any necessary connection between morality and belief in God and between atheism and immorality. One may even venture to ask, is the presentday civilization of USA morally superior to that of USSR? Was Heidegger wrong when he commented, "Russia and America are, from a metaphysical point of view, the same; the same desolate frenzy of technology unleashed, and of the rootless organization of the Average Man"?³⁰ Yet, one of them claims to be Christian and the other atheistic and materialistic. Rāvaṇa and Duryodhana accepted Vedic authority, followed the prescribed pattern of life, believed in God, the other world, rebirth and the immortality of soul, knew what Dharma was, but that did not make them virtuous. They were the prototypes for many Hindu monarchs. So, atheism and denial of immortality need not necessarily lead to immorality and despotism, whereas acceptance of God and immortal soul, of a religion like Christianity, Islam or Hinduism, does not necessarily result in morality, democracy, justice and liberty.

It is also possible to deny God and yet refuse to be God,*

*It is also possible to assert that God exists and affirm oneself to be God. Euripides did not hesitate to say the soul is God. (Fragment 1007.) Some Indians could exclaim, "aham Brahmāsmi", and "Sivoham"; while al-Hallāj claimed "Ana al-Haqq", and so did Abū Sa'īd of Khurasan. Ibn al-'Arabi went further: "The Creator is the created"; "Thou art man, and thou art God"; "he who understands his self understands God". (S. A. Q. Husaini, *Ibn al-'Arabi*, ch. VIII.)

and to deny transcendence without accepting historic absolutism. God may be expelled from history without leading to the deification of history. In *The Rebel*, Albert Camus has shown this: If it is realized that no enterprise can be based on a complete knowledge of 'history as an entirety', any enterprise can be only a justifiable adventure, a risk; a man who so realizes will refuse to be God and come to recognize, through what Camus calls "the value of limitation", 'the law of moderation', the values of life and love.³¹ We may recall that Versilov, a character in Dostoevsky's *A Raw Youth*, expresses the hope that when the "great idea of immortality" is lost, in its place "men will give to the world, to nature, to their neighbours, to every blade of grass, that overflowing love which they formerly consecrated to the vision of eternal life". Seeing in the earth and its life their beginning and end, Versilov says, men will come to cherish it with a special affection; "knowing that their days are numbered and that there is nothing else" they will understand the human situation as it is and will come to love each other. Everyone will think tomorrow may be his last day, but that it will not matter because when he is gone there will be others and after them their children.³² Such is Versilov's hope which Dostoevsky may not have shared, but his genius envisaged this too as a possibility.

Byron also expresses a similar idea through Lucifer in his 'mystery', *Cain*:

"And this should be the human sum

Of knowledge, to know mortal nature's nothingness".

But he points out:

"...at least we sympathize —

And, suffering in concert, make our pangs

Innumerable, more endurable,

By the unbounded sympathy of all

With all!"

It is in a way true that to deny God is to exalt man, as some of Dostoevsky's works imply; but, as Russell pointed out, it may be contended that "it is well to exalt the dignity of

Man, by freeing him as far as possible, from the tyranny of non-human Power".³³ Man is 'a helpless atom'* in this vast, blind and inimical universe and he may not be able to preserve his individual life after death, but he has the freedom to examine, know and criticize the world of fact and in imagination create the world of ideals and to choose to worship only Goodness, though as the world is not made for him, things which he attempts to accomplish may be forbidden to him. But is not this sort of religion advocated by Russell difficult to practise? It may be replied that the religion which Kṛṣṇa or Christ wants us to follow is no less difficult. Finally, the immortality of the soul is not always a consolatory principle to all, as Robespierre thought. If the mortality of the soul is terrible, Kierkegaard concluded, no less terrible is its immortality. At the beginning of his *Télémaque*, Fénelon informs us that Calypso was dismayed at being immortal. Endless existence can be an unnerving and even frightening prospect.† "Time is the mercy of eternity; Without Time's swiftness", William Blake wrote, "all were eternal torment". (*The Milton*)

The question may be asked, if one does not believe in God and immortality, why should man be moral? Spinoza's answer has already been noted. One may practise morality because one may think it is rational to do so, or because it is conducive to the welfare of oneself and all others, or because one feels one ought to do what is right, or because virtuous life is beautiful and harmonious, or just because it is useful, or because it "pays". Most people, however, are moral because 'morality' has been inculcated in them by tradition and society and they do not even think of being 'immoral'

*Cp. "... animated atoms, All living, and all doom'd to death, and wretched".—Byron, *Cain*.

†Cp. "Ha! not to be able to die...not to be permitted to rest after the toils of life...to be condemned to hold for milleniums that yawning monster Sameness, and Time." The awful avenger in heaven, Ahasuerus exclaims, has not in his armoury of wrath a punishment more dreadful. (Shelley, *Notes On Queen Mab*, Note on VII. 67.) Another great poet Leopardi asserted nobody would consent to live his life over again. He thought it was 'stinking pride' which made man believe he was immortal. Who is man to pretend to immortality?

(i.e. breaking the law, flouting social norms and customs). "As the fanatic abstains through fear of God or of hell", wrote A. C. Swinburne, "the free-thinker abstains from what he sees or thinks to be evil (i.e. adverse or alien to his nature at its best) through respect for what he is and reverence for what he may be".³⁴ Kant also asserted: "Morality...needs the idea neither of another being above man for man to recognize his duty, nor of another motive apart from the law for him to fulfil his duty. ...Morality thus needs religion in no way for morality's sake".³⁵ We may also recall what Bacon said: "Atheism leaves to man reason, philosophy, natural piety, laws, reputation, and every thing that can serve to conduct him to virtue; but superstition destroys all these, and erects itself into a tyranny over the understanding of men". Atheism, he continues, "renders man more clear-sighted, since he sees nothing beyond the boundaries of the present life". (*Moral Essays*)

There is also, as earlier indicated, another important consideration. When it is said by some that an atheist cannot be virtuous, it is assumed that (1) conscious faith precedes and determines action and that (2) no faith or philosophy except theism can serve as the foundation and motivation for moral life. These assumptions have no bases. It is claimed that experimental psychologists like Jean Piaget have established that an individual becomes aware of moral and other values corresponding to any actions only after performing them and that value awareness *always* follows action. We may admit that a man's values and beliefs do influence behaviour, while behavioural change is followed by changes in these. This is not the place to discuss the origin and development of moral values, beliefs and judgment.³⁶ There is no evidence of any causal relation between one's faith and one's behaviour; one's faith or philosophy is never the sole sufficient cause of one's behaviour. Men do not always act accord-

*We might recollect that Cicero who believed in God and immortality admitted that "the man who concludes that the soul is mortal may yet attempt deeds that will not die...from a thirst for virtue". (*Tusculan Disputations*, Bk. I, XXXVIII, 91. J. E. King's Trans., p. 109).

ing to their ideologies and convictions. There need not be consonance between a man's faith and action. "I know Dharma, but I do not have the inclination to act accordingly", said Duryodhana. "Jānāmi dharmam, na ca me pravṛttih". Experimental studies have shown that there is "a clear discrepancy" between moral values or concepts and behaviour.³⁷ Besides the fact that conceptions of virtue and morality have changed from time to time and from one society to another, it cannot be established that only theism and no other type of faith is consistent with virtue and morality, as these latter are understood by the higher civilizations (e.g. Sino-Japanese, Indian and European); while, in fact, it can be established that some atheistic philosophies as well as theism are consistent with these. Many without faith in God and immortality have been virtuous, while many with such a faith have been vicious. Moreover, incompatible philosophies can lead to common action and men with different faiths can lead the same kind of life. As already said, atheists like Nāgārjuna and Chuang Tzu, and theists like Rāmānuja and Aquinas led equally virtuous lives; and some of the sultans who were believers in God, heaven and hell led lives as vicious as those of unbelievers like Stalin and Hitler. It may be held that to believe itself is to be virtuous, irrespective of the way of life one leads, and that without belief one cannot be virtuous; and yet another may hold that only he who believes in the risen Christ can be virtuous. Such untenable positions need not detain us now.

It is not always rational necessity that impels men to believe in God or anything else. When some men are in extremity of anguish and have nowhere left to turn, they come to believe in God,³⁸ though it is not the only consideration that leads men to God. Some believe in God and immortality in order that they may live this life, endure it and give it meaning.³⁹ Others without a belief in God or immortality can live, endure, find meaning and engage themselves in ethical endeavour of the highest type. The Buddhist, Confucian and Taoist sages are witnesses to this. Yet others have chosen alternatives different from these.

A DIALECTIC OF ATHEISM: NOTES

- 1 Berdyaev, *Dostoievsky*, London 1936, pp. 35-6, 218.
- 2 Introduction to *The Brothers Karamazov*, Modern Library, New York 1950.
- 3 Berdyaev, *Ibid.*, p. 51.
- 4 Letter to A. N. Maïkov, cited by André Gide, *Dostoievsky*, London, 1949, p. 97.
- 5 *The Brothers Karamazov*, p. 278.
- 6 *The Devils (The Possessed)*, (D. Magarshack's Trans.), Penguin Books, 1960, p. 611.
- 7 *op. cit.*, pp. 612-4.
- 8 For above: Dostoevsky, *The Notebooks For the Possessed*, Ed. E. Wasiolek and Trans. V. Terras, Chicago 1968, pp. 343-4, 201, 87; *The Devils*, pp. 256, 232.
- 9 *The Devils*, pp. 404, 418-9.
- 10 *The Brothers Karamazov*, pp. 78-9, 768.
- 11 *op. cit.*, p. 721.
- 12 *The Devils*, p. 232-3.
- 13 *The Brothers Karamazov*, p. 281.
- 14 *The Notebooks For The Possessed*, p. 236-7.
- 15 *The Devils*, p. 245.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 611.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 256-7.
- 18 *loc. cit.*
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 655.
- 20 I mostly followed Berdyaev, *op. cit.*, p. 84-7, in giving an account of this second argument.
- 21 Gide, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
- 22 M. de Unamuno, *The Tragic Sense of Life*, London 1931, p. 61. Cp. B. Jowett, Introduction to *Phaedo* where he speaks of "the feeble hold on the Greek mind" of "the belief in the individuality of the soul after death".
- 23 Mark, IX. 10.
- 24 Matthew, XXVII, 52; XXVIII. 6.
- 25 I Corinthians, XV. 12-23.
- 26 Unamuno, *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 288.
- 27 *Ethics*, Part V, corollary to proposition Xli.
- 28 *The Brothers Karamazov*, p. 722.
- 29 *Ibid.*, Book V, Chap. IV. Ivan says, "From love of humanity I don't want it" (final harmony). He loves "the sticky little leaves as they open in the spring". (chap. III).
- 30 Quoted in M. Grene, *Heidegger*, New York 1958, p. 95.

- 31 *The Rebel*, London 1953, pp. 256, 262, 271-3.
 32 *A Raw Youth*, Pt. III, Ch. VII.
 33 *Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, The Modern Library, New York, p. 5.
 34 *William Blake, A Critical Essay*, Heinemann, London, 1925, p. 228 n.
 35 *Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason*, Preface; S. Körner's Trans.
 36 Besides Piaget's classic *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, London, 1932, for recent findings B. Berelson and G. A. Steiner, *Human Behaviour*, Chapter 14, Harcourt Brace & World, New York, 1964, may be consulted. In the former the theories of Durkheim, Lalande, Brunshvicg etc., are discussed.
 37 Berelson and Steiner, op. cit., p. 576-7.
 38 *Crime and Punishment*, p. 14.
 39 Unamuno, *Ibid.*, p. 258; also p. 184, 194.

ANNEXE II

GOD, NON-EXISTENT, SILENT OR DEAD ?

This annexe consists of notes or short essays on some topics.

1. *Theism, Absolutism and Atheism*: That the universe has no creator or governor is an idea which is as old as the other that it has. Creatorship has been understood in different ways: creation out of nothing, out of Deity's own substance and out of eternal or preexisting matter. That God only shaped the world and that souls are eternal is generally the theory held by Indian theism. The universe has no creator, but has only a governor—such is the conception of some theists in different countries. According to them God only ensures that the moral law is upheld and that virtue is rewarded and vice punished. There are also theisms in which God is only the Primal Teacher, the one who first acquainted beings with what morality and duty are and wherein salvation consists. God on this view is just the Omniscient One, benefactor of mankind, as he shows the path to salvation. There is also a certain type of theism in which he is just the eternally Perfect and Compassionate One, the Supreme Ideal, who by his everlasting presence only shows what we can also become if we become holy. "God" has been conceived in all these senses. What is common in all these theistic conceptions is that he is a Person, a Spirit or Self, eternal, supreme and perfect. But he may or may not have created the world and he may not be the moral governor and he may not have anything to do with man's lot in this and another world. If it is accepted that this constitutes the minimum of theism, a philosophy or religion which denies this is atheism.

On the ground that man's experience and logic do not indicate the existence of God, conceived in any of the above senses, and that the contents of intuitions, visions, prophecies and scriptures which claim to testify to his existence are false because they are incoherent, self-contradictory and opposed