

tive which it receives from the environment is, 'Do nothing; wait.' This has the important result that all doing subsequently must be guilt-laden, because we are not waiting. So if we take Sudhir's point seriously, as also the mystical doctrine of waiting, all doing is very hazardous, very risky. In doing something I may be able to predict what I am going to bring about, and normally when I predict an occurrence of something, I wait for it to happen, but when I predict what I am going to do and then go about doing it, it is extremely silly. So there are logical and moral difficulties about doing, and it has an important connection with waiting. I think more can be said about that.⁶

SUNDARA RAJAN :

I want to understand more clearly the idea of connection between an act and its consequences, which Dr. Gandhi referred to as an exemplification. But I have a doubt whether this exemplification may not ultimately, in some sense, prove to be morally unacceptable, and violate some other moral category.

Let me put it differently. In Gandhiji's case, isn't it because the enormity of the catastrophe was in some sense matched by the enormity of the inequity that it gets this moral grandeur? Isn't the idea of proportion or a sense of justice essential to its grandeur? If the exemplification relation is not given this kind of a sense of justice and proportion, would it be a morally acceptable explanation of the phenomena?

MOHINI MULLICK :

The use of the theory of karma for explaining evil seems to me quite unsatisfactory because we seem to have concentrated all morning on suffering, which is a passive form of evil. But that is unsatisfactory because wrongdoing is itself, naturally, a form of evil, and you do not have an explanation there : you have still to account for that wrongdoing. Perhaps you might say that

6. "Abandoning all dharmas—i. e. all other holdings—together—come to Me," this invitation to the highest patience, passivity, waiting, is Sri Krishna's final message to Arjuna who asks for a rule, a way, of action. —Ed.

you cannot ask the question of undeservedness in relation to wrongdoing, but I am going to question this. We are making categories of passive evil and active evil, and somehow accounting for the passive by the active. But can I not ask on a metaphysical plane the question : Have I deserved to be the wrongdoer, a perpetrator of this inequity? That sounds like a category mistake, but I will stick my neck out since the discussion demands it. Contrariwise can I not ask a question about my so-called passive and undeserved suffering, something which I have received and yet have no control over? There have been many references to the Buddha, and I was reminded of the Buddha telling us the active way out of suffering, so that there is an active category connected with suffering just as much as there can be a passivity in wrongdoing. Have I made sense?

RAMCHANDRA GANDHI :

You have made sense, except that the point could be reformulated. Since doing itself is in question, you cannot ask what wrong have I done that I continue doing wrong. The category of freedom is essential here. If you want to say it is undeserved, you will also want to say in some sense that doing is not voluntary or free. There could be such a metaphysical system, but that would be shifting from one system to another. Within the metaphysical system where voluntary action is important, you cannot ask this question without a change. I think this brings us back to the question of freedom, but there are greater anxieties.

DEVAHUTI :

In continuation of Mrs. Mullick's remark about the Buddha suggesting an active way out of suffering, the Bodhisattva too suggested a passive way, just as the Christ, that of waiting.

It seems to me that karma is a complex phenomenon, and it is very difficult to explain or justify happiness here or sorrow there. I would like to emphasise here the importance of intention in determining what is good and what is evil. If evil inspires an act, then even the good act is evil, and if goodness inspires an act, then even the evil act is good. That is as far as the individual doer is concerned. But the doer's act affects more people than the doer. If an

evil-intentioned act does good to the people, then is retribution for the act to be confined to the doer or to all the people as well, who, knowing the intention, yet accept the act? According to Gandhiji, I think, retribution would accrue both to the doer of evil and those who benefit knowing fully well the intention of the doer. Retribution is really a wrong word to use, but vocabulary often fails in such matters. The doer or the one to whom it is done are all doers, karmically, I would say, so that intent is at the same time a conscious activity of a given moment and a causal activity catapulted by the previous act of the doer and of others at an earlier moment.

B. R. NANDA :

I want to make two points : one about the context in which Gandhiji spoke, and the other about karma.

Gandhiji was, for more than half a century, a great teacher of men, and almost every situation he came across, he turned to good account for his purpose. Once when he was touring, someone was run over by his car. And he reported later that it had been no accident, that although he had asked the driver to slow down, since his warning was not heeded, he should have got down and started walking. Throughout his career, whenever anything went wrong, he always looked within himself to see whether he had been responsible. So there is here a heightened sense of responsibility, and also the feeling that one man's doing influences not only himself but to a large extent, his environment. When dealing with civil disobedience movements, satyagrahas, Gandhiji said that one true satyagrahi was enough, and that he did not care for numbers, because no more were needed. I am sure no one, not the British or the others, could understand how one man or twenty men who were pure could succeed in their efforts. Purity for Gandhiji meant compassion, the eschewing of hatred, and whenever any of his movements failed, he attributed it to the harbouring of hatred and the lack of compassion. When Abyssinia and Czechoslovakia were being bombed, Gandhiji was asked what he would have done, and he said he would have come out in the open under the bomb, and sent a prayer to the person who had released it, that he did not hate him but loved him.⁷

7. Not, obviously, for dropping bombs. —Ed.

If you take this into account, Gandhiji's remark about the Bihar earthquake is seen to be quite individualistic. I don't think he meant it as a theological or philosophical statement. His belief in the doctrine of karma was, I feel, more like the ledger book concept mentioned earlier, and his thought is basically the classical, yogic, Hindu thought where God, soul, karma and rebirth are all interlinked. We cannot understand him by taking the theory of karma out of this context. Once we take it in the context, it becomes intelligible. Suffering, for example, is one thing, at the level of the body and another thing, at the level of mind or at the level of the soul. The theory of karma does not treat the individual as a tool in the hands of fate, but provides for freedom of action in the present and the future. It does not have such a constricting effect. I am reminded of M. N. Srinivas' remark about the people he studied: they sowed their crops, they treated their patients and did not shirk action in any way; though when they failed, or someone died, then karma was a consolation.

PROVOCATIONS

□ Evil is limitless but it is not infinite. Only the infinite limits the limitless.

— SIMONE WEIL

□ When we have sinned by injustice it is not enough to suffer what is just, we have to suffer injustice.

— SIMONE WEIL

□ Speech of Ivan in the *Karamzovas* : ' Even though this immense factory were to produce the most extraordinary marvels and were to cost only one single tear from a single child, I refuse.' I am in complete agreement with this sentiments. No reason whatever which anyone could produce to compensate for a child's tear would make me consent to that tear. Absolutely none which the mind could conceive. There is just one, however, but it is intelligible only to supernatural love : ' God willed it'. And for that reason I would consent to a world which was nothing but evil as readily as to a child's tear.

— SIMONE WEIL

□ Everything gratuitously given to a created thing is given to God, like a drop of wine poured on the ground from a cup.

If one thinks one has given something gratuitously, that very thought itself is a price, a reward.

Therefore one can never know whether or not one has given gratuitously.

A list should be made of those things which are true so long as we don't think them and become false as soon as we think them.

Like the Cretan—"I am a liar." At the moment when he is thinking it, he is not a liar. That sophism is very profound.

All the good and all the evil that one thinks of oneself is false at the moment of thinking it. That is why one should think only evil of oneself. And one must not know that it is false.

— SIMONE WEIL

□ To be in love is to create a religion whose god is fallible.

— PAUL VALERY

□ There are two main human sins from which all the others derive : impatience and indolence. It was because of impatience that they were expelled from Paradise, it is because of indolence that they do not return. Yet perhaps there is only one major sin : impatience. Because of impatience they were expelled, because of impatience they do not return.

— KAFKA

□ Evil knows of the Good, but Good does not know of Evil.

— KAFKA

□ Once, when Denys and I had been up, and were landing on the plain of the farm, a very old Kikuyu came up and talked to us :

"You were up very high today," he said, "we could not see you, only hear the aeroplane sing like a bee."

I agreed that we had been up high.

"Did you see God?" he asked.

"No, Ndwetti," I said, "we did not see God."

"Aha, then you were not up high enough," he said, "but now tell me : do you think that you will be able to get up high enough to see him ?"

"I do not know, Ndwetti," I said.

"And you, Bedar," he said, turning to Denys, "What do you think ? Will you get up high enough in your aeroplane to see God ?"

"Really I do not know," said Denys.

"Then," said Ndwetti, "I do not know at all why you two go on flying."

— from *OUT OF AFRICA*, Isak Denisen

□ Idleness is the beginning of all vice, the crown of all virtues.

— KAFKA

□ Even if Kafka did not pray—and this we do not know—he still possessed in the highest degree what Malebranche called "the natural prayer of the soul" : attentiveness.

— WALTER BENJAMIN

□ Truth is the death of intention.

— WALTER BENJAMIN

□ Totalitarian movements are orthodoxies without doctrine.

— RAYMON ARON

□

Section VI

CONCLUDING
PRESENTATIONS**DAYA KRISHNA** : Whither Indian Philosophy ?**T. N. MADAN** : Whither Indian Social Science ?**K. J. SHAH** : SvarajChairman : **ASHOK KELKAR****DAYA KRISHNA** : *Whither Indian Philosophy ?*

The topic given to me does not bear directly on the seminar¹, and if that is an evil, I hope it does not have the consequence of unrelated remarks.

I shall not talk on "Whither Indian Philosophy?" because we just do not know. The prophesying or predicting game is not one that I would enter into. On the other hand, the answer is already there : for the last two days you have seen some of the best Indian philosophers in action, and you must have noticed a difference. If you have not, I shall make you conscious of it. Firstly, there were around the table sociologists, political scientists, psychoanalysts, literary artists and many others from a variety of intellectual disciplines, and this, to my mind, seemed a new direction in Indian philosophising today. Secondly, it was fairly obvious that the concern of the seminar, its tone and temper, were definite, not merely in manner but also in content, and very few references were made to thinking in England or U. S. A. or the Continent. The references primarily made were to Indian philosophers or tradition, which is a sign of healthy independence, and I am sure it will grow. Professor Strawson's presentation was in the best British tradition, but I think even those who were his students presented things far

1. But of course it does. —Ed.

more differently. He has inspired them in some respect, but they have asserted their independence and their attachment conscious or unconscious, to their own traditions.

These remarks aside, I would like to address myself to the very theme of the seminar, i.e., Language, Tradition & Modern Civilisation.

I assume that language and tradition are closely interlinked and the former, as it were, is the repository of the latter. Both constrict and guide our thinking, consciously or unconsciously. But it is not immediately obvious what modern civilisation actually is. There have been a number of debates on modernity and tradition, particularly from the sociological and economic aspects, but seldom has it been seen in the context of language and the change therein. However, that will not be the focus of my concern. My concern will be, and it has been to some extent the focus of the seminar, the issues raised by modernity which challenge tradition to think and articulate itself anew. It is not the problem of rationality or even the problem of science and technology. I think the challenge of modernity lies in a different direction, and this is, I suggest, the apprehension of a new set of values. I think this is important, because no culture or civilisation can be or ought to be characterised by its technology or the stance it has acquired for the satisfaction of man's desires or wants. Beyond that, it should be specified by the dominant values pursued under it.

I suggest modernity is characterised by two values. There may be more of course. In the past, in almost all civilisations, it was considered self-evident that it was the right of the king to conquer and enslave, while those who were defeated had no rights at all. Today this right itself has been questioned, and the term "imperial" has completely changed meaning. In Roman and Mughal times it meant grandeur, success, large unification, domination and the spread of civilisation, while today it is just the opposite : it is not merely no longer considered right for any nation, however powerful economically or militarily, to conquer any other nation, but also, amazingly, that this viewpoint has been accepted. Today it is the duty of those who are more powerful, whether by their own effort or by accident, to help others who are dependent. This, to my mind, is related to another value which is sometimes antagonistic to it : the right or obligation to make others realise, to the

utmost, their own uniqueness and freedom and potentiality. Imagine today the right to diversity : each individual, group, nation has the inherent right to strike its own path and realize its own individuality, and it is the obligation of others to help this happen.

I think these two notions are closely related to the discussion of freedom and causality, to the question of karma. These problems have been taken up in all traditions, but today the issue arise in a different context. All past cultures and traditions have functioned within an awareness of limits and finitude. Human limits were accepted. But today everything is possible, and there are no limits. It may be an illusion created by science and technology but it is part of the common culture of mankind today. There is an interesting book called 'The Next 10000 years', which starts off by saying that the things which were considered impossible at some point in time were realised within the next few years. The suggestion is that on the one hand we feel that if we don't have the knowledge today we will get it tomorrow, and on the other, that everything is permitted. The two are related in the sense that each individual should explore to the utmost the limits of freedom. It (the exploration) may verge on insanity in the psychic sense; it may verge on death in the physical sense; it may lead to social anarchy in the social sense, but the limits must be explored. And nobody knows what the limits are. All previous societies were afraid that a little deviation here or there would destroy the social structure, but today it is different : the problem is of limits, and whether they should be imposed by the state or the individual.

If anything is possible and everything is permitted, what is the notion of responsibility? This is the third dilemma, that in a situation where the notion of freedom is extending and getting new content, the concept of responsibility faces a concomitant change. Take for example Amnesty International or so many other movements : they indicate an interesting idea that was propounded this morning, that the awareness of suffering anywhere arouses in me the feeling of responsibility for it and the desire to do something to alleviate it. On one side what is permitted is even violence, even murder, both ideologically and non-ideologically, and on the other side we have a Utopia where everything is possible. We have an increase in what may be called a global sense of responsibility of each individual and group, for not merely amelioration

of economic conditions but also to help them to be themselves. I suggest that these three constellations of the modern value system which have emerged in the context of tradition — I will not talk about language — have to be reviewed.

I will make two comments in this connection and then end. Professor Strawson in his presentation said that if dispositions, desires, volitions, etc., were not felt as alien, there would be no problem at all, for even if they were causing my action, I would not feel unfree. And this notion, whether they were to be considered alien or not, was taken up by Mahajan, who envisaged the possibility of their being alien. And Professor Strawson said that was a vacuous possibility. It surprised me that he was not aware of a whole tradition of ours, in this subcontinent, which has argued for just this possibility that he has considered so vacuous. And it is not merely that they argued for it, but it affected their culture in a marked sense. To the Indian mind it is almost obvious that desires, inclinations, dispositions etc., the psychic core of the being, is an alien thing; that it is not "me". This is the first step taken by both Sāṅkhya and Advaita Vedānta. What I am suggesting is that we all seem to be bound within our own cultural traditions, and so much so that the things which are not merely posited as a possibility but actualised by a large number of individuals, the things that whole cultures have considered desirable, may not be in the consciousness of persons from other traditions.

The whole notion of freedom and its relationship with causality, with responsibility, with its limits, is, to my mind, the central concern of today's thought in diverse fields. How can traditional thought be brought to bear on this issue is a question which perhaps this seminar has not addressed itself to. I will make two suggestions.

To my mind, the Indian search for freedom was posited on the query : If there are multiple centres of freedom, how can each absolutise itself without endangering the same possibility for others? This would appear to be impossible, for the absolutisation of my freedom could only be at the expense of others. So shall I accept an essential limitation of my freedom, or a group's freedom? This led to the inner quest. The number of experiments that have been made in what may be called inner freedom are fantastic. I say this by the way, so that there might surface the notion of

the inner world. It was surprising to find an Indian subscribing to the view that the inner world consists of aspirations, ambitions, etc. The inner world, in fact, consists of many things and is far richer than just the childhood problems of the good and the bad mother.

As contrasted with this — and one can always say that a contrast is untenable — the western quest has been of a totally different kind, at least after the renaissance. They don't phrase the dilemma of multiple centres of freedom: if there are multiple centres, they cannot, obviously, be absolutised. But passing by this dilemma, the westerners thought of building socio-political structures which may maximise the freedom of each without endangering the other. So the problem is of building structures which, although they cannot absolutise, will maximise the freedom of each. However, beyond this, the freedom quest has been in the external direction. It has led to the concept of omnipotent control over externality, an externality subservient to man's desires and satisfactions. I am not saying that this aspect was absent in the older traditions, only that it was grasped in a very different way.

I suggest, therefore, that the future task of Indian philosophy will be to conceptualise tradition in a new way so that it can become relevant to contemporary problems. There are Indian thinkers who have a generalised idea of the categories and concepts, and the way the concepts are interrelated in tradition, but there is no differentiated conceptualisation of traditional thought. Take economics, sociology, ethics or even the discussion of karma: It was done beautifully, but to my mind there are many questions that could be articulated: What is a tāmasic karma or a sāt̄tvic karma? What is karma itself? How does it relate to freedom? Does it deny or negate freedom? What is the relation between karma and mokṣa? Between karma and jñāna? These are questions which have been discussed in traditional thought, and to articulate them in an interrelated series of concepts is, to my mind, one of the tasks Indian philosophy could undertake.

T. N. MADAN : *Whither Indian Social Science?*

I would say that the implications of the discussions at the seminar for the sociology and cultural anthropology of India

must be divided into two parts: implications flowing from Professor Saran's position as I know it, and implications flowing from other positions. Professor Saran's position is an unambiguous one, and it is the total, uncompromising rejection of the idea of social science. For him the social sciences represent the deprivations of the positivist regime. Social life, culture, etc., can be subjects for thought, but the categories employed have to be metaphysical rather than sociological. I think he feels a bit annoyed when someone agrees with him and then does something in a manner which does not come up to his exacting standards. Yesterday, when Dr. Kakar was speaking, Professor Saran restated his position in a single sentence. He said that if psychoanalysis was the product of western civilisation, it possibly couldn't give explanations: the part cannot explain the whole. And if it was a typical product of the west, how could it help to explain other cultures?

Unlike many other social scientists, he won't have economics and reject psychoanalysis: there is no question of picking one discipline and attacking the other. For him, the understanding of society must come from within, but he certainly does not advocate any cultural solipsism. He draws attention, rather, to what in his paper is called the perennial philosophy. But I detect in Professor Saran a despair that the social scientists will not be able to do the kind of task expected of them, so long as they think of themselves as social scientists. I think he has spoken with agony of the ruined consciousness of modern man, and he has written of the betrayal of the Indian tradition by the social scientists. In short, one point of departure would be to try and face Professor Saran's critique of social sciences, and try to do things the way he thinks they should be done. If that is not possible, then his argument can be met differently, and to the best of my knowledge, we are not doing it.

If we opt for the other choice — the idea of a social science — the implications of what has been going on here for us are of several kinds, and I shall mention two.

Yesterday, when Professor Strawson was speaking, I was reminded of one of the founding fathers of cultural anthropology, Boas, who was a physicist before he became a cultural anthropologist, and who published a paper in 1942 entitled 'Liberty Among

Primitive People.' There he said that freedom is a subjective concept and has meaning only in a subjective sense; that a man who is in complete harmony with his culture is free. For that reason, he said, the concept of freedom could develop only in those cases where there were conflicts between the individual and the culture in which he lived. He went on to argue that primitive people had no concept or sense of freedom because they lacked knowledge of alternatives of diverse forms of thought and action. There was no correction, no enlargement, and the free man was one who realised that he was part of an all-encompassing system.² This was something Boas was obviously conscious of, because he denied it for traditional or primitive society.

Why I am making this point I will clarify in a moment, but let me refer to another physicist turned anthropologist, Malinowski, who published a book in 1944 called 'Freedom and Civilisation'. He said that freedom was the gift of culture, and by the end of the book he reversed the argument, saying that culture was the gift of freedom. He talked of cultural freedom as increasing man's biological freedom, by increasing environmental control. He recognized the tyranny of culture.

I mentioned these two only to make a negative point, which is that whereas people like Boas and Malinowski dealt with these questions, Indian sociologists and anthropologists do not deal with the questions that lie at the root of social sciences in the west. For instance, I do not know of any university department of Sociology in India which does not have a course on structuralism—functionalism but which requires students to read Hobbes and deal with the problems of social order. Nor do Indian sociologists and anthropologists deal with the situations which arise in the Indian context and tradition. The whole of yesterday morning I waited for somebody to raise the question of *puruṣārtha*, of *mokṣa*, of *paramārtha*, to try to relate a discussion of freedom across the two traditions. So the first point I would like to make is that our sociologists and anthropologists do not have roots in either of the two traditions, Western or Indian. We have generated a good deal of information and sophisticated technique of data

2. Not at all unlike Spinoza's free man. Did Boas realise this? —Ed.

collection and analysis, and there is an intense preoccupation with contemporary social life, together with its manipulation. Of course, we don't call it manipulation, but modernisation. The whole theme is dominated by the behaviouristic model, and there is little concern with issues like freedom or dignity or suffering. Economists in this country do not think that economic development involves ethical issues and I think the manner in which economics has been incorporated in the State is a warning to sociologists, but we seem to be very willing to be captured.

The second point I would like to make is that although I said we had achieved considerable sophistication in techniques of data collection and analysis, I did not say it of methodology. Specialisation has overtaken us, and there is considerable fragmentation, with the result that dialogue between the social sciences is difficult, as was quite clear last evening. And the problem of connection, to which Professor Gandhi referred, is, to my mind, terribly important, although not easily achieved. There are a number of discourses with which the sociologist is invited to deal : to look at people's categories of thought, and of those who have thought about society, and so on.

When Professor Gandhi gave his presentation, some of us were talking outside and the issue arose of what Gandhiji's intention was by his statement, and the relation between the statement and Professor Gandhi's analysis. Somebody suggested that he might have just used the statement as a starting point. I think we face this problem of a multiplicity of discourses and their relation in a very big way. This is where we must learn from the philosophers : how one faces such methodological issues as the relationship between ideology and action, between thought and practice. And we have some answers for this from people holding certain political positions, but I don't think we have answers in terms of sociology or anthropology.

K. J. SHAH : *Svaraj*

The topic suggested to me by Professor Gandhi was 'Svaraj'. I think since long it has been agreed generally that there can be no dispute about the need for *svraj*, that the boundaries of freedom and independence have to be extended in other directions than

political. I do not have to plead for *swaraj*. But I do think it is necessary to consider the problems that are present, and even if one just looks at them, the meaning of the word '*swaraj*' will become clearer in the process.

Freedom or independence implies that one would decide what one is going to accept, either in theory or in practice, not only individually but also collectively. It is no longer thought that our freedom would consist of adopting wholesale western theories and practices. If anyone does have that idea, it would be very shortlived. It might have been considered by some that our freedom would consist in accepting our tradition in theory and practice, if not entirely, at least to a very large extent. I think even those who subscribe to this position are very limited in number today. And therefore people have accepted that whichever we might keep central, whether modern life and civilisation or traditional life and civilisation, we must adopt something which is good in the other, and if not adopt it, then at least adapt it to our purposes. But I think both adoption and adaptation, though very tempting, can be, and perhaps have been, very dangerous and treacherous. It is necessary for us to consider these two syndromes. One of the things that happens is that adoption or adaptation of, say, traditional thought to modern civilisation causes really a loss of perspective and principle of the traditional way, and is subsumed under the perspective and principle of the modern way. I think this has happened in a large variety of contexts, both theoretical and practical. One of the most conspicuous examples could be in the field of medicine. It is not necessary to go into the details, but this kind of thing is possible. Often we do not really adopt or adapt, but just keep the traditional and the modern together: in economics, politics, philosophy, literature and almost all other fields. When one has this juxtaposition without having a perspective, I think it leads to a loss of values, to a loss of direction. One's topographical sketch, in a metaphysical way, is lost. This indeed is a very great danger.

Different examples of this kind of thing were present in our seminar. It is very difficult at this late stage to find pure cases, but what is important is not the purity of the cases but the direction they point towards. Take for instance, Professor Strawson's paper. I think it might be possible to say that one side of Spinoza was

either ignored or subsumed under an understanding and perspective which was definitely more modern and which fits the contemporary spirit much more than what must have been present in Spinoza. The equation between God and Nature when taken in one way, yields an understanding quite different from that which could be derived from a different vision, and perhaps the problems Spinoza was concerned with have to be seen in this light. It is necessary at least to see that there are two perspectives, and they cannot go together, or so I feel. Some decision is necessary here in accepting one or the other perspective. This does not mean, however, that everything from the other perspective will be of no value, but it will have to be achieved through the perspective we decide for. For instance, in Professor Kothari's paper, modern physics could be said to have been viewed from what may be called the traditional perspective. I think in spite of all the similarities we might find, either modern physics would be recalcitrant or traditional thought would be recalcitrant. If we want that modern physics become part of traditional thought or perspective, it would have to undergo a change of which I am ignorant.

Take Dr. Kakar's paper, where something that was the opposite of Professor Kothari's paper might be said to have been attempted. Professor Saran's paper was an honest and clean paper: he had nothing to do with the devil, and kept the west or modern civilisation with its limitations away. This is not to say that he could not accept things, but certainly not within that perspective. In Professor Gandhi's paper there was, I think, an attempt to break out of both traditional and modern perspectives — there was a reformulation of the questions and answers. Whether they are valid is a different matter, but it is enormously important that this possibility be seen.

Certainly if we are to have *swaraj* we must look at things from different perspectives, but we must not abandon it there. We must make choices, because in my opinion it is not possible to leave them side by side without considerably altering one or the other, whether the question be theoretical or practical. We have tried to avoid this debate, and it is high time if at all we are to move in the direction of *swaraj*—let alone reach it—that we face it. These debates cannot be left undecided, the implications of which are not really brought out.

But will any choice we make really be *svaraj*, independence, freedom? I don't think so. I think it is necessary to ask "whose *svaraj*?" Would our choice be the right one for the whole of India, economically and politically? Would it be true only for India and not for others? Would India's political, economic, intellectual independence require the independence of other parts of the world? If we want *svaraj* it cannot just be for a small group in India—it has at least to represent a possibility of being for all other parts too.

It would then be very important to take a look at the values mentioned by Professor Daya Krishna, and consider the realisation of *svaraj* with reference not just to India but others. Is everything possible and permissible? For how many and who? What would be the limits? And if there are limits are they limits to freedom? What about the value of conquest, and the individual's need to realise his fullest potentiality within him? I think, as Professor Daya Krishna mentioned, what we need is not to actualise this value for which we require a political or moral leader, but being what we are, at least to clearly articulate the perspectives and implications. If we do this, we cannot discuss today issues without taking into account their perspectives, and relating them to other possible perspectives. The intention of Professor Gandhi to use the proceedings of the seminar for classroom teaching would be a step in the right direction.

DISCUSSION

ASHOK KELKAR :

Before we take up the presentations, I would like to mention that in spite of the disparate temperaments and backgrounds of the three speakers, a continuous theme has evolved, with due reservations. Earlier on in this seminar we had a discussion about the possible anticipation of the idea of freedom as the recognition of necessity. Professor Daya Krishna, in a way, turned the phrase around and talked of the modern recognition of the necessity of freedom.³ Freedom is no longer considered to be a luxury but

3. Can this sort of creative inversion of a phrase be called philosophical spoonerism? —Ed.

a necessity. Specifically then, we can apply this recognition to the realm of ideas in contemporary India : i. e., how Indians can attain a certain kind of freedom in the realm of ideas. Two case studies were presented : Professor Daya Krishna on philosophy — he had some optimistic predictions — and Professor Madan on Indian social sciences, in which he came up with a rather pessimistic picture of a group of people who have chosen not to exercise their freedom. Then the discussion took up the conditions for the attainment of this particular dream of the Indians exercising their freedom in the realm of ideas. One of the inner conditions is, of course, motivation : what would impel Indian thinkers not to accept passively the ideas of others? One of the outer conditions deals with language. The use of English, I feel, is partly going to influence the way we express ourselves, and we will always be looking from the corner of our eyes, as it were, to a possible western reader. I have myself experienced this when I write not in Marathi but in English, and I find an effect on my perspective. Finally, there are, of course, social and political conditions which will restore to the Indian intellectual a sense of belonging, a sense that he has a mission to perform.

P. F. STRAWSON :

I would like to refer to a point by Dr. Daya Krishna about an ancient tradition of which, I confess, I was, and am, almost completely ignorant. There was a suggestion that men could achieve detachment from desires, attitudes, etc., and come to regard them as alien, thereby attaining a state of freedom. I have no reason to doubt that some exceptional individuals could do this, but there are a couple of points I would like to make, one empirical and the other evaluational.

The empirical point is that I find myself doubting this possibility for the great majority of mankind, the common man.

The second, evaluational point, is that even if it were possible, it is not clear to me whether it would be desirable. There is a vast range of human aims, projects and achievements which seem to be incompatible with this sort of detachment, and I should be sorry to see the human range limited in any way. Dr. Daya Krishna also said that the individual should be allowed to manifest his

potentiality to the fullest, and I feel this potentiality has a lot to do with ordinary human desires and attitudes. To try and detach oneself from them would be a severe limitation, of freedom also.

Professor Shah suggested that I had considered Spinoza not under the aspect of eternity, to use his own phrase, but under the aspect of modernity, and to that extent did not do justice to Spinoza's thought. To that I would plead possibly guilty, but without any great sense of shame, for, as he remarked there are two aspects, and if one is illuminated, then that is something. I would agree with him that we should take from the great intellectuals of the past what we can use and not what we cannot.

RAMCHANDRA GANDHI :

There is a misunderstanding here worth avoiding. I think the word "alien" is unfortunate in Mahajan's description and Dayaji's. There is a sense of otherness and not of alienness in our detached relationship to desires, etc. One is not seeking detachment in the sense of wanting to forsake or crucify disposition and desire, but perspective and a less self-centred and possibly more elevated use of these things. The exercise is not of the kind Professor Strawson has expressed anxiety about.

T. N. MADAN :

What do we do with the fact that it is achievement orientation largely which has today led us to consumerism in a manner which is bringing the world to the brink of disaster? Where do we draw the line? Is it the life of detachment-oriented civilisation or is it the life of achievement-oriented civilisation which has brought us to the kind of situation that we face today? This is a crisis of the north, not a crisis of the south, and we can never catch up with the levels of achievements of the north. Are we going to be transitional societies forever?

P. F. STRAWSON :

I was not, of course, giving indiscriminate endorsement to all human aims and desires. I would have a certain value system with priorities attached to it, and those would condemn many of the tendencies of our time.

DHARMENDRA GOEL :

I am going to speak on three questions : (i) What is tradition? (ii) What is sociology of knowledge? and (iii) What is the problem of freedom?

The point that I very strongly dismiss is the constant vague talk about tradition, for I do not understand what the word stands for. This is not the occasion for going into semantics or phenomenology, but when we are talking about India I would say that in India we have something which is a phenomenon of the simultaneity of the non-synchronous. India is not one piece. India is also tribal India, it is also segmented India. It is also a laboratory of the non-contemporaneous, and this point must be very strongly underlined. Whatever might be the emerging consensus among the three learned speakers on this question, I maintain that it would be very wrong, almost fascist, to assume that there is such a thing as a single Indian tradition. There is no such thing. But there is a simultaneity of the non-contemporaneous; there are tribals; there are all kinds of people, and there are segments and classes of oppressors and oppressed. Therefore I would be the last person to give in to the nice, silken assumption of a single Indian tradition. Tradition should not be made into a dead term that confuses and has vague opinions and conditions under it.

I think the confrontation which has been going on for the last three days between modernity and tradition, or science and religion, or whatever polarities one might like to choose under it, poses certain questions regarding the cognitivity of truth and validity. What is the criterion of validity? Are we suggesting that there is no final criterion of validity? Sociology of knowledge is of various vintages. We know of Marxist sociology which is very current and which suggests that isolated cognitive activity is nothing but a concealed conspiracy of vested interests. But sociology of knowledge has many other ideas. Even tradition can become a kind of sociology of knowledge. I strongly resent the insinuation that a human being is incapable of becoming himself because he is condemned to the traditional in a certain way, chained to the standpoint of a particular tradition. In spite of whatever surroundings he may have lived in, the conditions he has been brought up in, there is a possibility of man in some sense being creative. One

of the promises of being man is that he is capable of transcending conditions under which he functions. To that extent, I think, the seminar has highlighted the point that we must have a very intense and sometimes even a very cruel look at the problem of whether there can be any quest for pure truth. This truth need not necessarily be dampened by the veneration we feel towards something that we call our tradition. The term 'our tradition' to me seems anathematic because I think, as far as truth is concerned, there cannot be 'yours' or 'ours'.

The third point is that freedom too has two dimensions. There have been many dimensions which have been talked about: mokṣa, dharma, and the rest. I shall not mention any of them. What I am thinking of is a peculiar idea which is becoming my private psychosis or neurosis, and that is, freedom means either being a Prometheus, of trying to create a new truth by one's own inner burning, or it means the other, pessimistic alternative of being a Sisyphus. These are the two concerns of man: seeing oneself as the creator of a new truth, bringing out something from nowhere, from one's inside, or knowing fully well that the world is alien and complete and yet I am condemned continuously to push the stone up.

ASHOK KELKAR :

I think the prediction I made to myself has come true: I knew that Professor Goel was going to open a new side to the discussion and I thought we might follow the principle suggested by Professor Shah that our discussion could go in circles rather than randomly from topic to topic. That is why my holding up Professor Goel at the risk of his anger was justified. I am also glad that he brought up the topic of the dispossessed in India, and at this point I would like to remind you that there is a group of young Harijans in Maharashtra who have passed beyond the stage of burning down the Manusmṛti. Instead, they act in relation to it, in the sense of rejecting what normally goes by the name of Indian tradition. I think Dr. Goel has given us a useful reminder.

ABHA CHATURVEDI :

With regard to what Dr. Goel has said, I would like to point

out that perhaps there might not be a single tradition in India if by tradition we mean not only traditional ways of thinking or sociology, but also traditional ways of living and ways of life. If we want to confine ourselves to philosophy or intellectual thought, however, perhaps there is something like traditional Indian thought. I am also worried about the word 'tradition' because I am not sure whether it includes only themes, concepts and categories or the way of philosophising too. If we are modernising our tradition, perhaps we can use some of the western analytical tools and apply it to the Indian themes and categories to get a modern Indian framework of philosophy. I am not sure whether Professor Daya Krishna would agree with that.

With regard to language, I am not sure that the use of English always hampers our expression or thought, because language will hinder our thought only if we presume that we have not yet started thinking in that particular language. I am also not sure whether or not a number of Indians have started thinking in English, and whether it is easier for them to translate thought from English to their regional language than the other way round. So I doubt if I would agree with Dr. Kelkar on that point.

ASHOK KELKAR :

I would like Professor Saran to say something because the issue raised by Dr. Goel about the cleavages in Indian tradition and the problems it raises are crucial to his own thesis.

A. K. SARAN :

I think I am fully prepared to face this predicament. It is a genuine problem, but I think Professor Goel is not prepared to face it whereas I am. If you distinguish between a dominant Indian tradition and a marginal, peripheral one, which is now in revolt, let us make a choice which one we want to make dominant, and see whether it will still preserve or maintain Indian tradition, or the Indianness of tradition. I was not talking of a Hindu tradition. I was only using it as an exemplifying category. Even if we believe in the unity of the Indian tradition, even if we say that this dominant tradition is really the central and the marginal is marginal by the consent of those who are on the margin,

we still have to face the historical fact of a multiplicity. We cannot say that there is only one Hindu tradition and that is the real tradition: there are other traditions both synchronously and diachronously. So that problem has to be faced and grappled with. There is a solution to that, and solutions have been proposed to the diversity of tradition by acknowledging that all these traditions are in some sense true, genuine traditions. But then there is no occasion to go into the question. On the other hand, when you say that the brahminical tradition is the dominant tradition, then I would suggest that the category of a dominant brahminical tradition in India is itself untenable, because in the brahminical tradition there are so many traditions, some of them at least seemingly diametrically opposed to each other. So we will be faced with the same problem.

This problem arises not only with the category 'tradition', but also 'modernity', or even when you attribute a thought or a work to a person. In the latter case, what would you take to be the criterion: the published text, the written but not published text, the cancelled text? How would you decide on the corpus of a particular thinker? I do not mean to suggest that this is not a genuine problem but, I don't think this problem undermines all thought. We can and do have solutions. All it needs is that we should discuss it and make our own implicit solutions explicit.

ASHOK KELKAR :

I think it is time to move on to the problem of language. I would like to repeat Dr. Gandhi's invitation, particularly to those of us here who have experienced expressing themselves in both English and Indian languages. We could at least have the benefit of their experience regarding the manner these things have reacted on their mode of thinking and so on.

T. N. MADAN :

Language is an important issue. In my experience as a teacher of kinship courses—I am talking of the very narrow field of anthropology—I have come up against all kinds of interesting difficulties. For example, as taught in western universities, theories about incest taboo are very central in kinship theory. I found many years ago

that in no major Indian language is there a word for incest separate from adultery or from any other word which might be used for sexual relations between people who should not be having them. I think this has immense implications. People are now evolving words because they have come to see this difficulty. If some of the central categories of kinship theory as evolved in the west, which have linguistic expressions like incest and kinship, are lacking in Indian languages, do we or do we not face the problem here?

DAYA KRISHNA :

I would like to make a few comments regarding the issues of tradition, language and freedom.

I think Dr. Goel's remarks are wide of the mark. The point is not that there are diverse collectivities or groups in India with their own traditions, but this: How have, over the millenia, the Indian intellectuals conceptualised and articulated their own problems and experiences? What categories did they use? How were these categories interrelated? What were the questions they considered significant? What were the answers they considered acceptable? A civilisation is formed of diverse cultures, diverse groups. Even a small country like England has the Irish, the Welsh, the Scots, and in London itself more than one kind of English is spoken. So a student of any society is aware of diversity. But this diversity does not stand in the way of a fairly coherent body of intellectual tradition. You start, after all, with Plato and Aristotle and you go on to Augustine, Kant, Hegel and so on. The point is that there is a well-known body of tradition. It is not that you accept it or even try to know it in categories, but that you are aware of the tradition and you react to it, innovate in it, ask new questions and perhaps reject it. In India there is a lack of differentiated knowledge and conceptualisation of tradition in thought about diverse areas of experience: society, man, economy, politics, even philosophy. What are the epistemological issues that the Indians considered important? What are the ontological and axiological issues? So I would say that the question of tradition is of a different kind, and the failure of the Indian intelligentsia, to my mind is, the failure to conceptually articulate their own tradition.

The other, personal point about language is that when I start writing in Hindi, it is as if a different spirit takes over. The words make me move in a different direction from where I want to go. Words themselves have a force, and they build a direction, so if you don't want to go in that direction you have to resist it very consciously, and the result is what is called swimming against the current: you don't reach where you want to reach. If you write in English and then try to say the same thing in Hindi or any other language, you become aware that what you had accepted and assumed as clear is not quite clear, because translation requires great clarity.

The problem of freedom and the relationship between the developed and the underdeveloped countries is very large, and we can discuss it, but in a different context. You should not just ask the question with respect to developed countries and a developing country like India. You should ask yourself first about your relations with Nepal or Bhutan or Sikkim or some of the African countries. Are the terms of your relationships the terms of freedom? What type of relations, economic, political, religious, would you feel there should be so that they foster the other's freedom? Are our terms and agreements of a different kind, a different order than, for example, the relations or terms between the U. S. and India? The question is not one that you should ask them but which you should ask yourself. India is a developed country in relation to many other countries to which it exports technology, to which it is even selling arms. So unless you see the problems in a relative light, you will not be able to form criteria which would have cross-national validity.

RAMCHANDRA GANDHI :

I think the question of language is vitally important, and I want to say something not in the context of the difficulties of expressing this or that subtlety of thought in a language, but from an entirely different level.

The word that comes immediately to my mind is love. We talked of language, tradition and modern civilisation—I think somewhere the word 'love' ought to have been there. Why? The two languages I know are English and Hindi and they involve a conflict between the love of truth and the love of my neighbour.

I find when I want to pursue a train of thought in philosophy, because of the fact that I have studied the subject in English, and thought and written about it in English, I tend to begin to do it in English. I don't want to be stopped by considerations of love of my neighbour, or of millions of humans for that matter. I cut myself off from them totally. But even if I am succeeding in expressing very well some subtlety of thought in English, I think I am making a difficult choice. Love of truth but not love of neighbour: how can this be a real choice? So I do feel that I must immediately start, and I have, though rather late in life, made some small efforts to write in Hindi. Love of mother should have made me learn Tamil very well, but love of neighbour is more important in this context, and my neighbour happens to be Hindi or Urdu or Hindustani speaking. This, I think, is a categorical moral imperative for intellectuals in our country. But this does not mean that I must stop writing in English. If I love my neighbour, I must be ready to teach him English, because those not wanting to teach English, I feel, are lacking in love. This also does not mean that he must necessarily be taught the kind of English we have learnt, but surely a simpler, more efficient, less embarrassed kind of English. It is just that we are not working hard enough, that we don't love our neighbours enough. We think we love truth alone, but how can we love truth adequately if we don't love our neighbour? I suggest there is a conflict here, but it can be resolved. In my mind there is absolutely no escape from the categorical moral demand of immediately starting to write and speak in the Indian language that I know. Without this, there will be nothing but fallacy in communication, either an unjustified silence or a gross distortion. All this will be terrible for the growth of our country. I think svaraj is absolutely incompatible with this duplicity. Gandhiji made this point very clearly decades ago without any suggestion that English should be rejected. He said that we were too close to our times to judge the harm our neglect of our languages would bring. This was in an article on higher education, and he said that what passes for higher education in India in the humanities is rubbish, mainly because it is of no use to all except a few thousands. This has to be corrected. I call upon the various leaders of opinion and thought and action here to do something about this immediately. Of course this will mean investment of resources.

I am very grateful to God and India and England that I have been able to learn English but I must love my neighbour enough to teach him quickly, without fuss, without guilt, sufficient English, should he wish to learn that language; and I must love him enough to learn the language which I share with him, and to use it and perfect it so that I can be an efficient translator for India and for England. There can be no conflict between love of truth and love of neighbour, because I think love of neighbour springs from truth.

HOOJA :

I know that in ancient times brahmins used to speak in Sanskrit: then came a time when the brahmins spoke in Persian, and now a time has come when the brahmins—which for me is a category of profession rather than heredity, and which includes all the learned people here—are speaking in English. This is the elitist psychology which has kept the scholars away from the common man. The Vedas were at one time the monopoly of the brahmins, which they would not unlock for the common man. The result was that through the centuries the knowledge of the Vedas was perverted, not interpreted. It was left to Swami Dayanand in 1870 to say that Vedas could be studied even by the Sudras and women. You will find that most of Hindu thought became popular and was assimilated only when it was brought into the common languages by people like Guru Nanak and Chaitanya. So my request to the brahmins assembled here will be to come out of their icy Himalayan towers and, as bilingual people, interpret and serve as a pipeline between knowledge and the common person, so that it spreads down to the people and the whole mass is elevated. That is the duty of the brahmins.

ASHOK KELKAR :

As a student of language, I would like to bring to your attention more dimensions of the language problem, apart from the problem of effective communication—the duty to one's neighbour, as Gandhi put it. One has to do with the fact that in many areas you find that Indian thinkers are aware of the French or German or other European thinkers only through translations or interpretations of Anglo-Saxon writers. My own knowledge of French brings

it home to me that if I read something in French, it gives me an entirely different way of looking at this than the Anglo-Saxon way.

The other point I wanted to make was that the kind of gaps Professor Madan talked about, i.e., the lack of a word for incest—are very significant. Another gap I noticed is the Hindi word *pidhi* for generation, and my own language has one too. But there is no word for 'generation' in Sanskrit, and it is time that we investigate, why such a gap existed. It is particularly surprising, considering that in India we stress greatly our relation with our ancestors.

Lastly, since one of the tools which modern western philosophy has given us is that of conceptual analysis, it would be interesting to apply it to the reigning concepts of traditional Indian thinking: concepts like '*artha*' for instance. We happily take for granted the usage of the word '*artha*' for the economic realm as well as for the meaning of something. Personally I think it is well worthy investigating why '*artha*' came to have two such entirely different meanings.

K. J. SHAH :

I am afraid the discussion has gone off the rails. The issue was the different kinds of understanding, the two different kinds of perspective, and this must not be forgotten. Even if there are several kinds of division in Indian thought and tradition, the perspective continues, and I think our problem is that of perspective, which is not touched upon by this discussion. As regards the question of language, I think both Saran and Gandhi feel very strongly about it, though in different ways, and I would like to add that I feel strongly about it too. In so far as I do, I would say we must certainly learn all the languages of the world, but it is high time that we did something about the language of our neighbour. Indian languages continue to occupy the second position, and to that extent, our relationship with our neighbour is likely to remain thin. Our relationship with the outsider is anyway thin.

SUNDARA RAJAN :

I am afraid what I have to say may lead Professor Shah to misunderstand my intentions, and I hope that does not happen.

If one has not merely to think and communicate in a perspective but also to live one's life within that perspective and experience the humiliations and successes of that form of life, then, it seems to me, the suffering, the oppression which is contained in the perspective is not difficult to apprehend within the perspective itself. If one has to become clear about what a certain form of life implies in terms of oppression and misery, in this struggle for awareness of what in our own lives we are doing, should a doctrine or a set of beliefs which is coming from outside be an ally in our attempts at autonomy? This kind of help may start at a purely practical level of clarifying the matter, but if passion for understanding the misery of our own lives is strong—and I believe it is, in my own case and in the case of a few friends of mine—these alien ideas becomes constitutive of our autonomy itself. They become part of a newly emerging identity and I believe that if this happens we will be able to develop something most necessary for our quest for svaraj: not merely a critical temper, but a new ethos or critique, a sensibility which will hold our own forms of life in a certain total, critical reflection. This idea of a critique, it seems to me, has to come from without, for psychological and cultural reasons. Hence we must not neglect this side of the matter : that western ideas may have a liberative, emancipatory role to play in our own struggles. I am not saying this is the only thing svaraj consists of, but it is an important element in our struggle for independence. Otherwise, most of the misery, practical as well as theoretical, is invisible to us. Perhaps the misery is not our own, but the misery of other people. Take for example the suffering of the Dalits. A new Marxian perspective in my case and in the case of friends, clarifies this enormously, and I believe this can be an element in our quest for svaraj.

ASHOK KELKAR :

Sundara Rajan has taken the euphemistic cover off the word "modern" and called it "western".

B. R. NANDA :

Speaking as a student of history, I think the problems we are discussing even in theory are practical problems. Professor

Shah said the choice is between adopting or adapting, between choosing one perspective or the other, and if you look back at the last 150 years, you find a very dynamic process in which this has been faced by many of our people from Raja Rammohan Roy onwards : men like Ranade, Gokhale, and Gandhi himself, most of all. How should we face the contact with the west, with the outside world, and keep our own roots? How should this contact be made in order to facilitate a creative reintegration of the Indian tradition? The Indian tradition, as someone pointed out, is not something which can be described in a few words : there are various levels of social, economic and industrial development. But one thing is true, that even in the so-called undeveloped regions of the country there is an integration of architecture, music, dance, art, folk-tale, mythology, literature and so on—a tradition or traditions.

There is something derogatory about the word 'tradition' which we must get rid of. I think Mr. Hooja made an important point about the gap between the elitist thinkers and the mass of the people. I am afraid our knowledge of tradition is not yet deep enough to enable us to come to any true perspective. In India the choice is the same as many other countries had : In Turkey, for example, a special law was passed and the alphabet was changed from Arabic to Roman. That was one way of modernising Turkey, which was in the 1920's. Our people have approached the problem very differently. Our leaders have used the contact with the west as a stimulus to reexamine their own traditions. I am not saying that the reexamination is complete, but a great deal has been done to change it. As a student of history, I can say that society today is not what it was 50 or 100 years ago. There have been tremendous changes. If we review the areas which hurt us all even today, say inequality, it involves caste and untouchability, the status of women, use of local languages, education for women and various other things. I think in all these areas, which were the weaker points of our culture and tradition, a great deal of change has taken place.

I think we are quite wrong in saying that our leaders were not conscious of the diversities of culture in our country. Once when Gandhiji was asked about the tribals of Assam and their culture in a rather derogatory fashion, he said, "What have I to take to them? What religion should I teach them? I should go and join

their prayer." If you read Nehru's 'Discovery of India,' you will find that he had his own special approach to all these problems.

Coming back to language, I cannot imagine a Gandhi or a Nehru who did not know English, and I dread to think that in the next 15 or 20 years we will have people who know only Oriya or Marathi or Hindi or Gujarati. I am afraid they will not be able to tackle the problems of the 21st century.

PROVOCATIONS

□ Nomad peoples, shepherds, hunters, farmers and even tannibals, may all, by virtue of energy and personal dignity, be the superiors of our races of the west.

These will perhaps be destroyed.

— BAUDELAIRE

□ Only the brute is really potent. Sexuality is the lyricism of the masses.

— BAUDELAIRE

□ Commerce is in its very essence *Satanic*. Commerce is return of the loan, a loan in which there is the understanding: *give me more than I give you.*

The spirit of every businessman is completely depraved. Commerce is *natural*, therefore shameful.

The least vile of all merchants is he who says: "Let us be virtuous, since, thus, we shall gain much more money than the fools who are dishonest."

For the merchant, even honesty is financial speculation.

— BAUDELAIRE

□ Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and thus, the real appropriation of human nature, through and for man. It is therefore the return of man himself as a social, that is, really human, being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous development. Communism as a complete naturalism is humanism, and as a complete humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and Nature, and

between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution.

— KARL MARX

□ A man whose whole family had died under torture, and who had himself been tortured for a long time in a concentration camp; or a sixteenth century Indian (American), the sole survivor after the total extermination of his people. Such men if they had previously believed in the mercy of God would either believe in it no longer, or else they would conceive of it quite differently from before. I have not been through such things. I know, however, that they exist; so what is the difference ?

— SIMONE WEIL

□ Of two men who have no experience of God, he who denies him is perhaps nearer to him than the other.

—SIMONE WEIL

□ Rootedness lies in something other than the social.

— SIMONE WEIL

□ We have seen how, on the assumption that private property has been positively abolished, man produces man, himself and then other men, how the object, which is the direct activity of his personality, is at the same time his existence for other men, and their existence for him. Similarly, the material of labour, and man himself as a subject, are the point of origin as well as the result of this movement (and because there must be this point of original private property is a historical necessity). Therefore, the social character is the universal character of the whole movement; as society itself produced man as man, so it is produced by him. Activity and mind are social in their content, as well as in their origin; they are social activity and social mind. The human significance of Nature only exists for social man, the basis of his existence for others and of their existence for him. Only then is Nature the basis of his own human existence, and a vital part of human reality. The natural existence of man has become his

human existence and Nature itself has become, for him, human. Thus society is the accomplished union of man with Nature, the veritable resurrection of Nature, the realised naturalism of man and the realised humanism of Nature.

— KARL MARX

□ Inventions hasten on ahead of us as the coast always hastens on ahead of the steamer, which is ceaselessly shaken by its engine. Inventions achieve all that can be achieved. It is unfair to say, for instance : the aeroplane does not fly like the bird, or : We shall never be capable of creating a living bird. Of course not, but the error lies in the objection, just as if the steamer were expected ever and again to arrive at its port of departure in spite of keeping on a straight course.—A bird cannot be created by means of an original act, for it is already created, is continually coming into existence as a result of the first act of creation, and it is impossible to break into this series, created on the ground of an original, unceasing will, a living series continually showering forth; it is just as is recounted in a legend; although the first woman was created out of the man's rib, this was never repeated, but from then on men always took to wife the daughters of others.—The method and tendency of the creation of the bird—this is the point—and of the aeroplane need not, however, be different, and the savage's way of interpreting things, confusing a shot from a gun with a roll of thunder, may have a limited truth.

— KAFKA

□ The Buddhist doctrine proceeds in the same way, by elimination. Our own constitution and that of the world is repeatedly analysed and as each one of the five physical and mental factors of the transient personality with which the "untaught manyfolk" identify "themselves" is listed, the pronouncement follows, "That is not my 'Self'" (*na me so ātmā*). You will observe that amongst these childish mentalities who identify themselves with their accidents, the Buddha would have included Descartes, with his *cogito ergo sum*.

— A. K. COOMARASWAMY

□ The artist is not a special kind of man, but every man a special kind of artist.

— A. K. COOMARASWAMY

□ Can we imagine a perfected ardour apart from understanding or a perfected understanding without ardour ?

— A. K. COOMARASWAMY

□ Patriotism. We must not have any love other than charity. A nation cannot be an object of charity. But a country can be one—as an environment bearing traditions which are eternal. Every country can be that.

— SIMONE WEIL

□ When I survey the life of India during the last 3,000 years and bear in mind her literature, traditions and ideals, the searchings of her philosophers, and the work of her artists, the music of her sons and daughters, and the nobility of the religion they have evolved, and when from these elements I form in my mind a picture of an ideal India and an ideal earthly life, I confess it is difficult for me to imagine a more powerful source of inspiration, a deeper well of truth to draw upon.

— A. K. COOMARASWAMY

□ I want to serve not merely India but humanity and to be as absolutely universal as possible—like the Avalokiteshwara.

— A. K. COOMARASWAMY

□ Man's fundamental weakness lies by no means in the fact that he cannot achieve victory but in the fact that he cannot exploit his victory. Youth conquers everything, including the original deception, the concealed devilry, but there is no one there to catch hold of that victory and make it come alive for by then youth is over. Old age is past daring to lay a finger on the victory, and the new generation of youth, tormented by the new attack that instantly begins, wants its own victory. So although the devil is constantly being overcome, he is never destroyed.

— KAFKA

□ A recognition of the fact that things can only be beautiful in kind, and not in one another's kinds, and the conception of the formality of beauty, bring us back again to the futility of a naturalistic art; the beauties of a living man and of a statue or stone man are different in kind and not interchangeable; the more we try to make the statue look like a man, the more we denature the stone and caricature the man. It is the form of a man in a nature of flesh that constitutes the beauty of this man; the form of a man in a nature of stone the beauty of the statue; and these two beauties are incompatible.

— A. K. COOMARASWAMY

□ To make the primordial truth intelligible, to make the unheard audible, to enunciate the primordial word, such is the task of art, or it is not art.

— WALTER ANDRAE

□ □ □

ADDENDUM AND CORRIGENDUM

Page	Location	Incorrect	Correct
3	9th line from above	discretness	discreteness
3	Foot Note No. 3 last line	thought	taught
4	9th line from above	“Why is the Sky beautiful?” Science..	“Why is the sky beautiful?”, science..
4	3rd para; 4th line	explanation	explanation
6	3rd para; 13th line	the metaphysical system like Vedanta etc.	a metaphysical system like Vedanta.
7	3rd para; 3rd line	native	naive
10	2nd para; 4th line	within me	within myself
12	3rd para; 2nd line	describe	describes
18	3rd para; 1st line	the question	the question ¹⁰
18	4th para; 14th line	Purususottama	Purusottama
18	Foot Note No. 9, 2nd line	also	via
18	add Foot Note No. 10		Such a question was raised, although not recorded here, Ed.
19	3rd provocation, 19th line	conservations	co nservation
23	2nd para; 2nd line	“What is man”	“What is man?”
23	3rd para; 8th line	anthropologicl	anthropological
28	2nd para; 1st line	Next comes residue..	Next comes the residue..
28	2nd para; 2nd line	description	description
28	3rd para; 5th line	but as some thing	but is something
28	Foot Note No. 2 last line	Maniohacan	Manichaeen

Page	Location	Incorrect	Correct
29	1st para; 4th line	derogating	derogation
30	4th para; 4th line	thinknig	thinking
31	1st para; 29th line	may not very	may not be very
31	Foot Note No. 5, 1st line	would be	would-be
32	1st para; 4th line	postulate	postulates
33	3rd para; 11th line	fals	false
33	3rd para; last line	indisoluble	indissoluble
34	1st para; 1st line	sence	sense
34	3rd para; 9th line	has	have
38	1st para; 14th line	abeyance it is..	abeyance. It is..
39	1st para; 7th line	intelligible	unintelligible
40	Foot Note No. 8; 3rd line	face	faces
41	3rd Provocation; 15th line	"As I myself ?"	"As I myself !"
42	2nd para; 1st line	"As I myself ?"	"As I myself !"
44	2nd para; 12th line	have solved..	have resolved..
47	3rd para; 8th line	cooper	copper
53	3rd para; 7th line	freedom caused	freedom, is caused..
54	2nd para; 2nd line	deliberation of— thinking	deliberation—of thinking
56	3rd para; 2nd line	equivalentents	equivalence
58	2nd para; 3rd line	casual	causal
59	2nd para; 1st line	as it were	as it were—
59	3rd para; 6th line	common vocabu- lary but,..	common vocabu- lary, but
59	5th para; 2nd line	.. a problem as,	a problem, as..
60	1st para; 1st line	.. he	we
61	2nd para; 2nd line	Blue an Brown Books	Blue and Brown Books
67	2nd para; 25th line	drshta	drṣṭa

Page	Location	Incorrect	Correct
69	3rd para; 6th line	constrainsts	constraints
70	1st para; 2nd line	are responsible for the..	are responsible for our actions, and what earlier influences are responsible for the..
74	2nd para; 2nd line	..with me..	with me.
76	2nd para; 1st line	..nature..	..Nature..
76	3rd para; 8th line	..to Professor Gandhi's..	..with Professor Gandhi's..
76	4th para; 7th line	..which more or less	..which is more or less..
137	Foot Note No. 2	trichotmy	trichotomy