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Tributes to the memory of Pandit Badrinath Shukla

#### SOME REMINISCENCES

It was in the year 1976 that I had the good fortune of meeting Pandit Sri Badrinath Shuklaji, The Department of Sanskrit, Sri Venkateshwara University, Firupati, had organized a fifteen-day 'All India Level Institute in Nyaya'. I was one of the participants. Sri E.R. Srikrishna Sharma, the then Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, was the Director of the Institute. Veteran Naiyayikas of the day, such as Vepattoor Subramhaya Shastri, V.S. Ramachandra Shastri, Damodara Pisharoti, N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. were invited to guide the participants. The most important topics in Nyaya such as Prathamantarthamukhya Visesyaka Śabdabodhavāda, Pramanyavāda, Samavāvavāda and Atmavāda were prescribed for discussion. To tackle the problems in a methodical way a questionnaire, touching all the important points, was also prepared. In the first week, the scholars who guided the participants explained the issues excellently, and gave the insights of the subtle philosophical points.

It was in the second week that Pandit Sri Badrinath Suklaji came and guided the discussions. Pramānyavāda was under discussion. He intervened often and helped the discussion by making use of the Nyaya technique. The next topic for discussion was Samavāya. Nyāya holds a peculiar view of this concept which is criticized by almost all the other schools of philosophy. The discussion on it went on nearly for three days. Each and every point, however adverse it was from Nyaya point of view, was given threadbare discussion. All along the participants, most of whom were traditional young scholars, raised very pertinent questions. Sri Shuklaji was there to answer all of them. He never lost his composure. He never avoided the inconvenient questions. With an ingenuity of his own, he explained the subtle issues involved and helped others to understand them clearly. It was a rare experience for all and a memorable occasion.

After that I met Sri Suklaji in many seminars held in different parts of the country, such as Delhi, Pune, Sagar, Sarnath, etc., and it was Sri Shuklaji who was the main spirit behind their success.

The memories of the Sastrartha Gostu jointly organized by ICPR and Rashtriya Sanskrit Samsthan at Sarnath are still afresh in our minds. Almost, all the prominent Naiyayikas of the country participated in it. It was before that august assembly of scholars that Sri Shuklaji demonstrated that even a Naiyāyika of traditional school could think in a different manner. Here he presented a paper on Dehātmavāda in which, making use of all the Navya-Nyāya techniques, he argued that there was no need to accept the atman which was different from body. It is true that such views were held by the early Cārvākas in this country who were severely criticized by the other schools. Nevertheless, Sri Shuklaji's arguments were never stale. His arguments were purely in the style of a Naiyāyika, and were strikingly original. Whether Sri Shuklaji believed in what he argued was not relevant at the moment. But he showed for once, probably for the first time after Raghunātha Śiromoni, that a Naiyāyika could be a revolutionary and original as well in his thinking.

Again, before the seminar was concluded another incident took place in which Sri Shuklaji once again showed that he was a Naiyāyika to the core. A scholar who had specialized in Buddhist philosophy made an attempt to criticize some of the Nyāya doctrines. At first Sri Shuklaji tried to convince him of the logicality of the Nyāya stand. But the scholar, instead of noting the reasoning, continued to repeat the Buddhist stand. Sri Shuklaji hit back. Threadbare, he analysed the Buddhist stand and shattered it. He proclaimed: akhanditam bauddha matam na tiştet (अखिंदतं बीदमतं न तिष्ठेत्). It was a rare treat to the lovers of the dialectics of Nyāya and Buddhism.

Being a South Indian, I must confess that my contacts with him were not so frequent. Yet, on a few occasions, in which I had some opportunities to observe him very closely, he left on me an indelible impression. Probably, he was the only traditional scholar who had realized that the Nyāya scholarship which had already reached a low point of standard would completely vanish from this country unless its subtities were exposed to the minds. There is no doubt that it is only because of him that some of the leading Western-trained philosophers of this country have started taking interest in Nyāya philosophy.

Whenever a famous personality passes away, normally, almost mechanically, we use the expression 'a great loss to the country', etc., etc. But, in the case of Sri Shuklaji, I believe that these words are more than true.

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D. PRAHLADACHAR

## **BADRINATHJI: SOME REMINISCENCES**

Traduttore—traditore: a translator is a traitor. So runs the Latin adage. It was in my capacity of a translator that I first got to know Acharya Badrinathji at Pune in July 1983. For five days I had to translate the questions, explanations, interruptions and arguments issued in English by the philosophers trained in the Western tradition in my rough and ready, limping, inelegant Sanskrit for the benefit of the traditional Pandits headed by Badrinathji. But, more formidably, I had immediately to translate the Pandit's replies, refutations, counter-questions and sustained arguments back into English. Unlike Sri Nivas Shastriji of Pune who spoke slowly, articulately and perhaps deli-

berately descending down to our level, Badrinathji's words—the chiselled Sanskrit prose—poured out fast; and his ideas uncompromisingly profound and ingenious ran even faster. It was impossible to interrupt him. Since he knew enough English to detect any gross mis-representation, one had no scope of filling up gaps of comprehension by any hazy bit of imagination or rhetoric. He would tirelessly reiterate the steps of the argument, explain more lucidly, anticipate every possible confusion, and thus help the poor translator a lot. Yet, I constantly felt that I was betraying him. My loose, halting, guessing, oversimplifying linglish failed constantly to be faithful to his rigorously argued tight talk. So, apart from betraying him, in a different sense I betrayed my ignorance, my lack of training in the art of philosophical truth-searching.

Yet—and here was the true greatness of that ideal educator—I never felt too small or humiliated. Badrinathji was an intellectual giant, but unlike many contemporary towering traditional Indian Pandits would not smother honest questions or trample opposition. That way, he was a stalwart in the truly Nyāya tradition of Vāda-kathā, where you don't argue to demolish or to win but to find the truth.

In Pune we had been discussing Russell's theory of propositions, both the early and the later theories. The first two days Badrinathii along with other very competent Pandits, was mainly asking questions to be clear about the Western position or positions which, to start with, must have sounded pretty outlandish and odd in Naiyayika ears. Early Russell's distinction between Being and Existence and the status of false propositions as objectively subsistent entities was difficult to stomach not because he was opposed to abstract entities as a Naiyayika but because he thought he could do without such subsistent meanings of sentences or truth-bearers. Professor Daya Krishna, Prof. Pahi (who also spoke some Sanskrit) and Prof. Shibjiban Bhattacharya hammered the standard reasons for positing propositions. Prof. Rege produced convincing examples. Then, suddenly, Badrinathji seemed to see the point. On the third day he came out as a defender of Russell, and argued that we do need propositional contents if we have to give an account of what the philosophical debator refutes when he comprehends the opponent's position without accepting it as true. He almost introduced this new notion in Nyaya terminology into the Nyaya framework. As a translator I felt somewhat disappointed. Did he then succumb to the Russellian pressure? Was he giving up the Nyaya hard-headedness which refuses to admit any intervening third realm between words and things? In the evening, outside the meetings—by then we had become best of friends—an unequal friendship that was to last till the unexpected end of his life—he told me in Sanskrit: 'I have established your Russell today properly in our own terms, so that, now, tomorrow I can refute him.' He kept his promise. The whole exercise is now on record, first in his own historic Sanskrit paper on Russell's notion of propositions and other issues in philosophical logic (I think the first original essay in Sanskrit on contemporary philosophical topics), and

then in the transcript of the Pune proceedings painstakingly prepared by Prof.

Rege and others over the years which is soon expected to be published.

He was the seniormost and most eminent scholar in these meetings, the Pune one being followed by further sessions in Delhi, Varanasi, Tirupati and Srinagar; and I was the juniormost and most little-known one. Yet his affection and pampering made me feel as if I was born to learn from him and had a right to demand his patience and paternal warmth.

Two tiny examples of his quick wit will not be out of place here. At one point some other orthodox Sanskrit-speaking scholar asked him: 'What you say is quite strikingly novel, but is it the Nyāya view?' And pat came the answer in chaste Sanskrit: 'I am a Naiyāyika, and it is my view, hence it is a Nyāya view.'

At another point, the Western philosophical problem of induction was being explained to him. No universal generalization can be conclusively proved. (Is there any recognition of this problem in Indian logic?) Instead of answering it directly he asked innocently: 'How do you mean this negative statement? As a universal generalization or not? If this is universal, it can't be conclusively established. So, the counter-example, i.e. some conclusively provable universal generalization, might exist?' Then he laughed and said: 'I feel there is a genuine problem, but I just threw some dust in your eyes to get some time to think over it.'

In Vārānasi (1985) he shook the smugness of the complacent expositions of the classical Nyāya theory of soul-substance by arguing in elaborate details that all the ontological purposes, which are served by the ātman (soul) in the Nyāya framework, could be served by the body and the manas (internal sense organ), so that the self as a ninth substance falls away as redundant. Towards the end of his closely argued paper which propounds a physicalism—carefully distinguished from the Cārvāka materialism—Badrinathji fearlessly voiced the (not uncommon) feeling that if, instead of being assured of a relaxed eternity, the human individual is goaded by the philosophical warning of this bodily existence being the only one change given to him, his moral hurry to proceed to perfection will be even more urgent. Hence the ethical salutariness of physicalism as against the dualistic theory of immortality of the soul.

I remember the constant (sometimes flippant but never unserious on his part) philosophical chat we had while standing in a queue in front of the Bālāji temple on top of the Tirupati Venkatachal hill. Some of Badrinathji's own disciples were trying to polyc holes in his Nyāya theory of body-self identity (he preferred this shocking title, for he meant it as a proposed emendation of the Nyāya position rather than a refutation of it). I was approvingly repeating those arguments while he was cracking jokes with another group of people. He could overhear and snapped at us quickly with a solid answer to our attack. He told me that he would wait for five years for a reply from any competent defender of the classical Nyāya dualism. If none comes forward,

he will himself show how such a physicalism will turn out to be inconsistent with more basic Nyāya presuppositions about the categories like substance, quality, action, inference, etc. His challenge yet remains unmet. In the true Indian philosophical spirit, he built up a Pūrva Pakṣa with more care than even a committed materialist would do it. When you are making academic schemes, i.e. plan in the area of knowledge and learning, says the well-known Sanskrit moral maxim, think of yourself as ageless and deathless (ajarāmaravat).

When I last saw him at his own home in Vārānasi in August 1987, his health had totally broken down. Sustained talking was beyond his capacity, but sustained thought was still his prerogative. We were discussing our old favourite topic: must we somehow believe that p is the case to understand correctly someone's statement to the effect that p is the case? He had promised to contribute a core-paper in a volume on 'Knowing from Words' that we were planning to bring out on the Indian and Western theories of knowledge by testimony and theories of meaning and interpretation. He never suggested that he might not be able to write another paper.

At Srinagar in 1986 we gathered together to discuss what is living and what is dead in Kashmir Shaivism. I used to cook for Badrinathji. He had severe bouts of coughing and a bad shivering kind of fever. Yet, while I cooked, the eighty-year old 'Scholar Extraordinary' would entertain me by Sanskrit poems, ranging from the sublimest, though romantic, to the most hilarious ones. He loved to listen to music, and always asked me to sing this or that bhajan for him. His innovative mind made characteristic contributions even in his musical taste. He wanted me to devise new Tālas (rhythm-cycles or beats to sing to) after the longer Sanskrit metres. His special favourite was the verse-rhythm called Śikharini (match) which is a seventeen-lettered rhythe-scheme. He tried to make it into a musical rhythm. It was amazingly refreshing to listen to romantic poetry recited by this orthodox aged Pandit steeped in the driest of disciplines—the Navya-Nyāya.

In spite of being a committed Naiyāyika, Badrinathji propounded that moksa could not consist in a sheer privation of suffering. It must have been intended by Gautama himself as a positive state of bliss.\* He had arguments for interpreting the Nyāya sūtras in that line, challenging, when needed, even Vātsyāyana, the commentator. Given his zest for life, his undying thirst for freshness and his ever-youthful enthusiasm to learn from other traditions and newer generations, he must be very impatient to be reborn to finish the numerous unfinished projects he has left behind, unless, of course, he unwittingly hit the truth while arguing, tongue-in cheek, that there is no rebirth. There is one other possibility. He might have attained the positively joyful

<sup>•</sup>He would hasten to distinguish his position from that of Bhasahvajña who was famous for introducing Anandamokşavāda in Nyāya metaphysics, introducing characteristic niceties in his reasonings.

state of liberation, the conception of which he was busy in justifying philosophically.

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#### PANDIT BADRINATH SHUKLA: SOME REMINISCENCES

I first met Pandit Badrinath Shukla when he came to the University of Rajasthan to deliver a series of lectures in the Department of Philosophy. Everyone was very much excited by the presence of this learned scholar who not only knew the answers to all the questions but could even grasp the question hardly before the words came out of the mouth. Shuklaji never said that the question was not in the texts; he never quoted what others had said, but formulated his answers on the basis of his own thought; and it was clear that his thought had led him far outside the confines of the Nyāya orthodoxy. So, when Daya brought him home to bask for a while in the winter sun in our garden, I was quite overawed. Lean, yet graceful, his figure was as imposing as his mind. And, to my surprise, he was not reserved but warm and affectionate with the capacity to reach out immediately to others. And what a hearty laugh! In fact, as I later became more familiar with the pandits, I found them funloving and full of jokes.

My interest in the traditional scholars has not been so much in their learning as it is for the most part a closed world to me as I do not know Sanskrit. But I have always been led to wonder about their milieu. What were the traditional pāthaśālās like? What was the course of study, the curriculum? Who attended them? Of course, I was later to learn that it was different for the scholars in the South than it was in the North. And so I used to ply Shuklaji with all kinds of questions. He must have been amused, but nevertheless he was very patient. He told me he had been taught as a young boy growing up in eastern UP all the branches of traditional learning: the Vedas, the Dharma-śāstras, the Sāhitya, traditional mathematics and medicine and even Jyotis (astronomy), so that the traditional sciences were also included. A well-rounded curriculum indeed! Then later he began his studies with a pandit who specialized in Nyāya.

The second time we met was in Pune when Prof. M.P. Rege held the very first of the series of the 'Dialogues with Pandits'. Shuklaji had brought with him another scholar and also a young  $cel\bar{a}$  who used to cook as well, and I remember the pungent smell of the red pepper in the frying pan before the vegetables were added and the aroma of  $d\bar{a}l$  while discussions on philosophy went on and on in the hours of the morning before the sessions started. Later, they would continue during the long evening walks.

In the seminar it became obvious at once that Shuklaji was the master of

the game, though the other pandits were also very learned, specially the good-natured Pandit Srinivas Sastri of Pune and the great grammarian Pandit Peri Surya Narain Sastri of Andhra. But Shuklaji was remarkable in the way he could grasp the questions that had been formulated for the seminar, issues that had been raised by Russell, Wittgenstein and Frege which had been translated into Sanskrit and given ahead of time to the pandits. One of the main problems was the nature of the proposition—none of the traditional scholars could understand the necessity for it. Then, of course, the question arose as to what, if anything, was used as a counterpart in Nyāya. It was amusing to hear the pandits pronouncing Russell as 'Russala', so that Russell almost seemed to have become a member of the Nyāya canon.

Later, I asked Shuklaji if any of the questions that were raised by the Western logicians had also been discussed in the Nyāya tradition. He replied that many of the issues had already been raised by the seventeenth century in India. Then, when I asked if he felt that Nyāya was a living tradition, he vigorously argued that it was very much alive, and that he himself had been working and thinking along new lines that were yet in the Nyāya framework.

When we gathered together in Srinagar for the seminar on 'Kashmir Shaivism', little did any of us know that it would be our last meeting with Shuklaji. It was his first visit to the valley and he seemed to enjoy the new landscape, the delicious apples fresh from the rees, the scent of pines and the cool air. His response was almost childlike—everything was new: the shikara ride to the houseboat, the water birds, the special sweets from the town. He made us all love to serve him.

One of the sessions was held in Gulmarg, and the drive through the valley and the stops at the mountain streams gave him great pleasure. We have photos of the session in Gulmarg in the meadow of flowers with the blue-grey hills surrounding the valley. There he is, presiding over the group like a wise Indian Prospero, towering over everyone, intent on his ideas, but making the mental work full of him and enjoyment, while the rest of us sat at his feet.

The passing away of Shuklaji is a great loss. Not just because of his personality, not just because of his great learning, but because of his freedom of spirit reflected in the intrepid way he could respond to something new and yet make it organically part of his own and in turn part of the tradition itself. In him the tradition was rendered alive.

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# NYĀYA-DĪPA: THE LAMP OF LOGIC IS EXTINGUISHED

Kāśī is a unique seat of traditional Sanskrit learning in India. For centuries it has drawn pandits from all parts of the country making it a cosmopolitan city

for various Sāstric disciplines, more particularly the Navya-Vyākaraṇā (Neo-Grammar), Navya-Nyāya (Neo-Logic), Vedāntā of Saṅkara and Sāhitya Sāstra which are far more complex and profound in intellectual structure than their old forms as they follow the Navya-Nyāya technique which aims at minute perfection of concepts and precision of expression. Pandits from Bengal and Mithila ruled Navya-Nyāya learning at the turn of this century in Vārānasī. Pandit Bal Krishna Mishra, a Maithili at Sanskrit College (now the Faculty of Sanskrit and Theology) of Benaras Hindu University, was the eminent Neo-Naiyāyika under whose care Pandit Badrinath Shukla grew as a wrestling Naiyāyika in his youth and gradually outshone all others in the field. This secured for him an initial appointment in the Sanskrit College, Benaras Hindu University, and later on the most prestigious Professorship of Nyāya at Government Sanskrit College (constituted now as the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University), Vārānasī.

It was here in the summer of 1954 that I had some lessons in Nyāyasiddhānta-Muktāvali from him. His exposition of the benedictory verses of this text stupefied me, because he conveyed not merely the primary sense of the text but led me into the complicated world of Navya-Nyaya through these seemingly simple verses in Sanskrit. But this was, and is, the speciality of traditional Sanskrit learning in India. A master of the Sastras can impregnate a simple word, phrase or sentence with all the possible meanings implicit in it, and make it a springboard for more and more complex and abstract meaning and thought. Badrinathji possessed this quality in an extraordinary degree. He used it both positively and negatively to establish his own position and demolish the counter-positions of others. In fact, this skill is the hallmark of an eminent teacher also. Hence the dictum Vyākhyā-Buddhibalāpekṣā. The elucidation depends on a sharp intellect. This kind of instruction was glorified in the sanctified temples of Sanskrit learning in Kaśi. No other scholar or teacher was a match for Shuklaji in this respect. He popularized the learning of Nyāya and Vedānta and, raised the standard of studies in these subjects by his brilliant exposition even of such popular texts as the  $Tarkabh\bar{a}s\bar{a}$  and the Vedāntasāra.

However, this, by itself, is not enough to earn outstanding eminence in the world of Sanskrit learning. Success in Sāstrārtha (intellectual encounter on a technical subject of a Śāstra) with equals or more than equals is also required to establish one's unrivalled position in the extremely demanding community of traditional scholars in the field. This requires not merely a mastery over the details of the discipline but also a razor-sharp intellect which can immediately perceive fallacies in the arguments of the opponent and can formulate new issues and problems to defeat apparently strong and formidable positions. Shuklaji was known for his eminence and success in such Śāstrārthas.

The same intellectual supremacy was successfully demonstrated when, in the assembly of the Naiyāyikas gathered in a seminar organized by Prof. Daya Krishna at Sarnath, he propounded his theory of the body being the

soul following the technique and principles of Navya-Nyāya. None of the pandits assembled there could successfully challenge his arguments which he had built up without violating the tradition of Nyaya. His supremacy in Navya-Nyaya and his penetrating, sharp intellect were well known and adored by his students and admirers. But a relatively unknown and interesting facet of his intellectual personality was not known to many and certainly not to me. Perhaps it was only revealed through the new experiment which Prof. Daya Krishna carried out by bringing together pandits well-versed in traditional Sastric disciplines and modern intellectuals trained in Western modes of knowledge. Seminars organized at Poona, Delhi, Sarnath, Srinagar and some other places discussed current theories, posed new issues and challenged the tradition to respond to them effectively. Pandits, the intellectual repositories of the traditional knowledge of India, were generally never invited to the seminars held in the universities and institutions of higher learning in the country. Rather, they were treated as if they were deaf and dumb, for they could not hear or speak the language of Westcentric scholars who rule the intellectual world of India. Prof. Daya Krishna's experiment provided a common platform for traditional and modern (for want of a better world) scholars by providing the facility of on-going translation and thus devising the possibility of a living dialogue between them. Shuklaji played a leading role in all these seminars by first understanding the new concepts with full sympathy, then analysing them in his own intellectual context and finally modifying the old formulations in the light of new facts and interpretations. This heralded new developments in Indian thought, and deepened our understanding of Western concepts in logic, philosophy and linguistics.

The great adventure in search of universal knowledge met its first setback in the passing away of Shuklaji who remained responsive to hard-core philosophy and uncompromising rationality till he breathed his last. It was he who could minutely analyse the new concepts, compare them with the kindred concepts of his tradition, and be bold enough to accept change and modification in traditionally recognized thoughts and modes if he was convinced of the validity and rationality of the new philosophical perception. Nyāya is a lamp of all disciplines: pradīpah sarva-vīdyānām. Its greatest votary in our times is no more with us. Let his published works on Nyāya, Vedānta, Jainism and the Purāṇa light our path.

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### MY FIRST MEETING WITH BADRINATHJI

Badrinathji had come to Jaipur to deliver some lectures on anumāna in Navya-Nyāya when I first saw him and heard him. His exposition of this very complicated subject was clear and interest-arousing even for those, such as

me, uninitiated in the mysteries of Navya-Nyāya. What was most remarkable was the manner in which he answered questions. He could get the point of a question even before it was fully enunciated and properly articulated. Perhaps this was because of his Navya-Nyāya training where the very method of exposition proceeds through questionings and objections. This comes out even in his small essay on *Dehātmavāda* which I have translated, and which is published in this issue of *JICPR*.

I was asked to take him and his wife out and show them around Jaipur. Badrinathji was not interested in the places of 'tourist interest'—the museums, the forts, the city-palace. For him and for most Indians, Jaipur is not really a tourist town in this sense. It is a Tīrthasthāna, the major place of interest being Galtā, the site of Galava Muni's Aśram and perhaps the only Sūrya temple now in worship. Badrinathji, however, was even more interested in visiting Govinddevaji's temple, one of the most revered and popular gaudlya temples of Jaipur, which, since Jaisingh who built the town, is quite a gaudlya place. Jaisingh was himself a gaudlya. Badrinathji was very moved at the sight of the beautiful Kṛṣṇa image at the temple. He said he was a bhaktat at heart and sometimes, like Caitanya, felt that Navya-Nyāya was nothing but a dry intellectual exercise—not satisfying for the soul. But moved he may have been by bhakti—few Indian's are not—yet Badrinathji was an intellectual at heart and keenly enjoyed a good intellectual question.

I had asked him one. It was a question which had been bothering me for a long time since I was a student of M.A. years ago. The question concerned a famous sūtra in the Nātyasāstra, of Bharata: vibhāva, anubhāva und sancāri bhāvas together give rise to rasa, says Bharata in this sūtra. Vibhāvas refer to characters and situations on the stage, anubhāvas to actors and actresses and sancarts to various sentiments and emotions. This satra has been considered the basic sūtra for understanding the process of rasa-arousal in Indian aestheties and is said to apply to all art experience including music. This had been bothering me since I was introduced to Rasasāstra as a student of M.A. I had also been a student of music since a much earlier age. How could this sūtra, I had asked myself, apply to music, since music was neither vibhāvas or anubhāvas? I had some good teachers in M.A. who were very well versed in the texts on rasa. I had put my question to them too. It was, it seemed to me, a simple question which could be simply answered. But my teachers and some others to whom I put the question failed to see it as a simple question. They were too bogged down by the weight of the tradition which had elevated Bharata's sūtra into a great and fundamental aesthetic principle. They were puzzled, but they thought that the tradition must have an answer to the question. They were trained in the tradition, but they worked at the tradition as a thing of the past. They revered it from a distance. There were one or two 'moderns' among my teachers—with one whom I registered as a Ph.D. student in order to work on this very question—who were much more open to this question; but for them, too, the interest in the question was a purely impersonal historical matter, which, they thought, concerned a tradition dead, bygone and irrelevant to modern art and thought. To me the question seemed a living question, a question which bothered me here and now.

When I put the question to Badrinathji, his reaction was very satisfying for me. He could see the point immediately. He, too, had studied the theories of rasa, for they are part of the curriculum of any good Indian Pandit, and he, too, was taught that the Sāstra's sūtra was the key to understanding all the arts, including music. But it was easy for him to question the tradition: he was at home in it and felt free with it. For him it was not a thing of the past. It was a living thing which provided a structure for his own thought. But these structures were not immobile or sacrosanct. They could be questioned and transformed. The Navya-Nyāya training had, indeed, sharpened his mind in seeing questions and also in assessing definitions such as the one which Bharata's sūtra offers. He could at once see that Bharata's definition cannot be made to extend to music, if music has no vibhāvas and anubhāvas.

Later in a Pune seminar, where both Indian and Western-trained philosophers had gathered to discuss Russell's theory of propositions, I saw Badrinathji's brilliance and philosophical acumen in handling not only traditional, but even modern questions with a sharp and open mind. He was one of those persons who make us wonder whether the categories 'modern' and 'traditional' are really meaningful.

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MUKUND LATH