

by the word 'I'. When this stage is negated, it will lead us to the Absolute.

These are, in short, the contributions of KCB in the field of Advaita Vedānta philosophy.

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The Concept of Demand in Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's Philosophy

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Lexically the term 'demand' means to require, to need, to ask or call for as a right or with authority, or to claim or seek as due by right.¹ Taking into consideration these various literal meanings of the term 'demand' we are naturally faced with the questions: Why does a demand arise at a particular spatio-temporal point? What are the circumstances, physical or psychological, that cause a demand? What are the characteristics, necessary or accompanying, that constitute a demand in a given situation?

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMAND

A demand is a mental state. Though it may be for a physical or a non-physical object yet it does not occupy a locus in the physical world. An attempt at a causal explanation of the term hints at certain peculiar psychological factors involved in it. (i) At first we demand something because we desire and therefore need it. The desire again is caused by a 'feeling of want'. Man's longings and cravings for the object, the want of which is felt at a deeper level, take the form of a need. But then we cannot demand anything simply because we need it. The poor may need all the amenities of life just as others do but cannot demand them. (ii) This suggests the second factor inherent in demand. We can demand something only when we feel that we deserve it or we are capable enough to have it. So while demanding something we are at the same time conscious of the capability that causes the awareness of the right towards its fulfilment. This element of right turns a demand into a 'claim made with authority', just like the 'demand' of a creditor for payment. The analysis suggests that (i) the feeling of want and so the need, and (ii) the awareness of right towards its fulfilment constitute the defining characteristics of a demand. These two psychological factors form the *sine qua non* of a demand.

VARIOUS FORMULATIONS OF DEMAND

A demand can be formulated variously according to the need of the situation. In economics demand means a desire for a particular commodity coupled with the ability to pay for it which ensures the consumer's right to purchase. Any one of the two by itself is not capable of turning a simple desire into a demand. The longing of the poor for a particular commodity sans the ability to pay for it is reduced to a mere wish. Likewise the rich man's ability to pay without desire for it cannot also be a demand for that commodity. In the legal field a demand stands for the asking for or seeking what is due or claimed as due. Here also asking or need plus claim or right constitute a demand. In history we often hear of the demand of particular socio-economic or political situations helping the emergence of a hero and his role in the transformation of society. This invariably is the case with all great personalities like Buddha, Christ or Muhammad. They are all products of the demand of a particular situation. In their cases the precise historical situation as well as their traits or personalities created a desire, and so the need for the emancipation of the harassed and the oppressed. Aided by their struggle ensuring the right to achieve the cherished goal: these constitute the demand of the situation which in turn becomes a means powerful enough to bring about such momentous changes in society.

DEMAND AS CONCEIVED BY K.C. BHATTACHARYYA (KCB)

The concept of demand has been assigned a very important place in KCB's philosophy. Before coming to the dynamic role it plays in the development of his metaphysical scheme it would be better to understand how he conceives 'demand'. In his monograph *The Subject as Freedom*, KCB comprehends demand as a 'conscious spiritual demand'. The demand is 'for the intuition of the subject as absolute freedom . . . for the intuition of the freedom as evident'.² We have already observed that demand is essentially non-objective having no *locus standi* in the objective world. Hence, it is mental and of the nature of consciousness. KCB observes 'The consciousness of perfection, freedom or salvation as the end is . . . a demand for some kind of activity of the subject towards itself'.³ Demand as conceived by him is necessarily conscious and spiritual by implication. It is conscious because it stems from the very depth of the consciousness itself for the realization of itself. In a sense the demand is of the consciousness, by the consciousness, for the consciousness. Further, the demand is not for any worldly object but for absolute freedom. It marks the spiritual progress of the subject. According to KCB spiritual progress means the realization of the subject as free,⁴ and

the demand is essentially for the realization of the subject as freedom, hence it is spiritual.

EMERGENCE OF DEMAND

For a correct appreciation of KCB's conception of demand and to understand the circumstance that necessitates the emergence of demand we must keep in mind his general philosophical position. A Vedāntist by temperament, he conceives the self, or the subject as he prefers it, after Advaita Vedānta, as pure consciousness and interprets it as free function or freedom, or rather, in his own words, as 'felt detachment from the object'.⁵ As such, the subject is what the object is not. The basic nature of the subject has been described by him as the 'cult of the subject',⁶ or the subjectivity which consists in the awareness of the distinction of the subject from the object. As he observes 'This cult of the subject, as it might be called, takes various forms but they all involve a feeling of dissociation of the subject from the object, an awareness of the subject as what the object is not'.⁷ One basic difference between the subject and object is that while the object is a meant entity,⁸ the subject is not a meant entity.⁹ The subject not being a meant entity follows from KCB's conception of meaning. A word is taken to mean something when the speaker and the hearer could use the word to understand the self-same entity.¹⁰ The object has a meaning-content in this general sense and hence it is referred to by a general term 'this', whereas the subject does not possess a meaning-content in this general sense and is best expressed through the spoken word 'I'. The word 'I' when spoken not only represents the self but also the self as speaking, communicating or expressing itself. His self-consciousness is not merely expressed but also incarnated in the word 'I'.¹¹ As so expressed the subject is absolutely distinct from the object, rather it is free from the object. KCB observes that the 'modes of subjectivity are the modes of freeing oneself from the modes of objectivity'.¹² His transcendental psychology analyses 'the positively felt and believed freedom of the subject from objectivity' and also elaborates the 'modes of freedom that have no reference to the object at all'.¹³

It is at this point that we face a serious problem. The much assured freedom of the subject is not felt as evident. The subject as pure consciousness as intended by or rather as 'what intends by the word I',¹⁴ as not only essentially free but as 'freedom as evident',¹⁵ is not realized in its purity in common consciousness. Surrounded by the world of object as we are, our freedom is always limited. Even worse is our feeling to be wedded to the physical body which keeps at a distance the freedom so ardently felt in the depths of our heart. Hence, a feeling of restlessness on the part of the subject, a feeling

of missing, of not having something which ought to have been realized. Yet there is the belief of this freedom being evident. The subject is all the time conscious of its freedom, of its felt detachment from the object. Hence, the feeling of missing the freedom and the vigorous belief in its achievability cause the emergence of demand at each level of subjectivity. The subjective attitude appears as a demand for the specific activity primarily in the inwardizing direction. The subjective function being essentially the knowing of the object as distinct from it, knowing which is only believed and not known as fact, has to be known as fact, as the self-evidencing reality of the subject itself.¹⁶

The idea of realizing the subject (i.e., the demand) arises only because we are identified with the body while we are introspectively aware of ourselves as not objective and yet as definitely positive. We do not know ourselves as dissociated from the object, yet we are aware of a possible dissociation or freedom.¹⁷

Had there not been the feeling of missing the freedom coupled with a completely assured faith in its achievability¹⁸ there would not have been the demand for its realization.

SIGNIFICANCE OF DEMAND

As so conceived, demand in KCB's philosophy appears to be an inner force which continuously drives the subject towards the realization of its absolute freedom. It is the pre-condition of the self-realizing activity of the subject. The demanded actual dissociation passes through various stages taking the form of different modes of subjectivity involving higher and higher grades of perfection.¹⁹ The process starts as early as at the stage of the objective. We know the self not as object but in knowing the distinction of the object from it, or in knowing the object as distinct from it. In KCB's expression 'the object is through the self-alienation of the subject' and 'the subject is not known except by a denial of the object'.²⁰ Hence, there is the demand for dissociation from the object. This leads to the assertion of bodily subjectivity. The subject is primarily intended by the word 'I' and as the body is identified with the 'I' it is permissible to speak of the bodily subject.²¹ In this stage the self dissociates itself as embodied from all extra-organic objects. KCB holds that the feeling of detachment from the object is the feeling of freedom and the 'first hint of this freedom is reached in the feeling of the body'.²² But even then the body cannot be identified with the subject as 'I' because the I-consciousness itself involves an awareness of the dissociation between 'I' and the body. Yet the

dissociation in question is not only imperfect but also potential at the lower stages of the subjectivity. There we find merely a demand for actual dissociation.

At the psychic stage the subject as identified with image and thought realizes for the first time an actual dissociation from the object. But the dissociation is not perfect, for both image and thought though dissociated from the object, yet somehow retain their relation with it. The subjectivity, therefore, involves an awareness of its distinction from psychic activities also. So even at this stage there is a demand for a still higher perfection, a demand 'pointing to the positive freedom from objective meaning'. It, therefore, negates its identification with its thought-content that ultimately leads to the stage of spiritual subjectivity.

Spiritual subjectivity consists of three sub-stages, namely feeling, introspection and beyond introspection. The demand at the stage of thought is two-fold: (i) to have pure subjectivity by itself and (ii) to have it as a being.²³ The first demand is realized in feeling which, according to KCB, represents the stage of complete dissociation from objectivity.²⁴ Subjectivity as pure subjectivity without any reference to object is first understood as dissociating itself from objective meaning in feeling. It consists of two stages: (i) freedom from actual thought and (ii) freedom from possible thought.²⁵ The first or the lower stage of feeling involves a feeling of a growing absence of meaning and the second or the higher stage involves the feeling of accomplished absence of meaning as unmeanable. But even then the absence of meaning in both stages somehow stands as meaning, as meaning the unmeanable. This is contradictory, which again necessitates a demand for the realization of purer form of subjectivity. The subjectivity tends from now to realize the second demand, i.e., to have itself as a pure being. The demand is to be completely dissociated from all actual and possible meaning.

This second demand is realized at the stage of spiritual introspection, which, according to KCB, is self-revealing through the word 'I'.²⁶ The introspective self is a self-evidencing self which although known by another self, is not known by the introspector himself.²⁷ It is self-evidencing only to another and not self-evident to itself. As such it is unrealized knowledge. But at the same time the introspective self has the awareness of the other self as a possible introspector. The other self's (or hearer's) understanding of the self-evidencing self (or the speaker, the I) is a possible introspection to the self-evidencing self. The awareness of these possibles in oneself, according to KCB, indicates the necessity of a spiritual discipline of realization of the self already implied by the

introspection.²⁸ The self so far only self-evidencing to another demands now to be self-evident to itself.

However, this demand remains unfulfilled at the stages of actual or possible introspection. According to KCB, though the subject is free at the stage of introspection yet it is not realized as freedom as evident. The realization of the subject, that is absolute freedom, is only a possibility²⁹ at the stage of introspection. The introspective self is the individual subject which knows itself as a distinct individual³⁰ but at the same time it is also aware of the possibility of realizing its true nature—the absolute self which is free even from the I-consciousness. Therefore, there is a demand now to transcend its individuality, its I-consciousness.³¹ KCB maintains that true subjectivity consists in a going beyond the 'I' in a denial of the 'I'. The demanded activity for a going beyond the 'I' appears at first glance impossible. Yet KCB holds that the individual self is all the time aware of the possibility of this self-transcendence. It possesses the consciousness of the possibility of being capable of annulling all its actual and possible distinction from itself and thus of realizing the de-individualized absolute self, that is freedom, as evident.³²

It is evident that the self's ascent from the stage of the objective to that of absolutely unobjective absolute freedom³³ is possible only on the basis of a conscious striving for and an assured belief in the achievability of its highest destiny which takes the form of a spiritual demand. The demand emerges at the end of every stage when some basic difficulties arise which cannot be resolved at that stage. Therefore, it takes the form of an inner demand for going beyond that stage.³⁴ The elaboration of these stages suggests the possibility of realising the subject as absolute freedom, of retracting the felt positive freedom towards the object into pure intuition of the self.³⁵

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9. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 19. It seems that while taking this view of meaning KCB had the referential theory of meaning in mind.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20.
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13. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
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16. *Ibid.*, p. 32. G.B. Burch interprets this demanding attitude as the subject-oriented self-realizing activity (*mokṣa*) vide *Search for the Absolute in Neo-Vedānta*: K.C. Bhattacharyya, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1976, pp. 58fn.
17. K.C. Bhattacharyya, op. cit., Vol. II, Editor's introduction, p. xxix.
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20. K.C. Bhattacharyya, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 195.
21. *Ibid.*, Editor's introduction, pp. xxv–xxvi.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
23. Although the two demands emerge simultaneously they are realized successively. The second one is realized after the first in response to an anomaly. This second realization of pure subjectivity as with being is realized at the stage of introspection which is a self-maturation as much of thought as of feeling. Vide Kalidas Bhattacharyya, *The Fundamentals of K.C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy*, Saraswat Library, Calcutta, 1975, pp. 136–37.
24. K.C. Bhattacharyya, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 75.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
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28. *Ibid.*
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30. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
31. *Ibid.*
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33. The dialectic involves ten steps in all: external object, perceived body, felt body, absence, image, thought, feeling, introspection, beyond introspection and freedom.
34. Demand in this sense justifies at each stage the denial of whatever is illusory and the transcendence from the given to the absolute elimination of the givenness vide, author's article entitled 'K.C. Bhattacharyya's Concept of Negation: An Appraisal', *The Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, August 1986.
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The Concept of Rasa as Explicated by Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya

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Bharata is supposed to be the author of *Rasa* Theory in stage-drama, poetry and art. He picked up the word *rasa* from the *Atharva-Veda* and used it in the context of stage-drama (*Rasān Atharvaṇādapi*. NS 1). Since then the term has been carried down to us through Bhattanayaka, Abhinava Gupta, Visvanatha, Mammata, Jagannatha and many others as our precious cultural inheritance. But during this *transfer* of property it was used in different ways and many a concept was foisted on it. Bharata had used it as some kind of object in the presentation of drama (an object that is appreciated) just in the same way as we presuppose *jñeya* is the object of knowing. But just as *anuvyavasāya* or *pratyabhijñā* is not something material, but only belongs to the epistemic world, similarly, Abhinava had pointed out that the concept of *rasa* belonged to the universe of appreciation itself (*viññanavādāva lambanāt*), and on the analogy of the distinction between *jñeya* and *jñāna* he continued to accept the distinction between *āsvādya* and *āsvāda* which was originally made by Bharata. But during the last one-and-a-half centuries the distinction was almost erased and *rasa* was taken as appreciation or *asvāda* and it was equated with 'pleasure, beatitude, rest and lysis'. Dr Shankaran, Dr Raghavan, Dr Nagendra, Dr Watve and others seem to be the protagonists of such a view. Even Dr Manamohan Ghosh's translation of *Nāṭya Śāstra*, must have indirectly led to such a view.

On this historical background it would be worthwhile to understand Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's (KCB) interpretation of the concept of *rasa*. He has studied and analysed the concept of *rasa* without any prior prejudice and has made so valuable a contribution to the *Rasa* Theory that if we follow KCB's interpretation it would be easier to understand the growth of *Rasa* Theory from Bharata to Jagannath and after.

According to KCB there is no English equivalent for the word '*rasa*'. Literally, '*rasa*' means (1) essence and (2) that which is

either tasted or felt. These two meanings are assimilated into the aesthetic conception of *rasa*. *Rasa* thus stands for two 'things', it is an eternal feeling—the essence of feeling—and still it is the object of further feeling. It also stands for an eternal (aesthetic) value that is felt.

Essence is an intellectual concept, but KCB does not take it as logical universal. If logical universals are apprehended in feeling then we would get a confused concept of *rasa*. Logical universal is an ideal of life while aesthetic essence is an ideal of feeling. *Rasa* is neither an idea nor a universal truth. It is not such ideal that is realized or not yet realized. It should be understood purely through feeling, and in terms of feeling. Intellect or will has no place in artistic feeling, so what appears valuable to artistic feeling may not appear the same to the intellect or to the will. Here feeling governs. In upholding such a view KCB seems to be influenced on the one hand by Kant's *Critique of Judgement* and on the other hand by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinava Gupta. One should remember here that Bhaṭṭanāyaka distinguished between two uses of the term *rasa*, one in the singular and the other in the plural, and in all probability regarded that the singular use of '*rasa*' stood for value, standard, parameter or norm, while its use in the plural was merely the illustration or *dr̥ṣṭānta* of the norm.

As pointed out earlier, according to KCB, '*rasa*' means either aesthetic enjoyment or that which is aesthetically enjoyed. For explicating the concept of *rasa* he distinguishes three levels of feeling. They are (i) primary feeling; (ii) sympathetic feeling and (iii) contemplative feeling. He distinguishes aesthetic enjoyment from other types of feeling.

He states that artistic feeling is not merely a feeling among feelings but the 'feeling par excellence' and for understanding it he explains the different levels of feelings and shows that 'aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*)' belongs to the 'highest level'. The levels emerge from mental evolution and thus KCB emphasizes the study of mental levels of the enjoyer.

PRIMARY FEELING

KCB starts with primary or direct feeling and distinguishes it from the feeling of feelings. He assigns the word sympathy to the feeling of feelings. It is interesting to see that Bharata too, distinguishes between *sthāyī-bhāva* and *kaviantargata-bhava*. He and following him, Abhinava Gupta, distinguished between two situations, say, *A* and *B*. To take an illustration from the *Rāmāyaṇa* story of the Kraunca couple, *A* would depict the mental state of the Kraunca birds. But *B* would depict the mind of the poet Vālmīki, which would

have the story of the Kraunca birds (as understood by the poet, i.e. *A*) and also his reactions. Thus *B* would depict a more complex situation and it is such complex situations which KCB would call sympathy or the feeling arising out of a basic feeling situation. It may also be pointed out that what Buddha calls *misery* or *duḥkha* depicts the situation *A*, whereas the *karuṇa* which it evokes in other observers—depicts situation *B*.

According to KCB, in the case of primary or distinct feeling, that is in the enjoyment of an object, the object is not the mere means of enjoyment for the enjoyer. The enjoyer does not feel the difference between enjoyment and the object enjoyed. The duality becomes obscured. The subject of enjoyment unconsciously affects and is affected by the object. The object for the enjoyer is more than a fact—it has a value. It gets an enjoyable look or expression. Even the subject does not feel detached from the object. He feels that he is attracted by the object or weighed down by the object. This is the direct feeling which is influenced by the object. This feeling is limited to the object. KCB gives the example of a child playing with a toy. Here the child is glued to the toy.

SYMPATHY

This is the case of feeling of feelings. It depicts a reaction to the primary feeling situation. It does not emerge from the object itself. It is the joy of joy which emerges in the separate—different—mind. The second man imagines the feeling of the first man. That the second person sympathizes means that he feels or reacts to the feelings of the first person. So his feeling (the child's enjoyment of the object) is the direct object for the second person. The object of his sympathy is not the direct object as in the first case. The resultant feeling emerging from the first is the object of the second. KCB calls it sympathy. Primary joy (feeling) is confined only to the subject-object. It is bound. But the second-level feeling—feeling of feelings—i.e., sympathy, is freer than the primary, as that feeling can be enjoyed by more than one person in the house. For example, the grandfather or the mother watching the child's enjoyment and imagining it, feels his feeling. Here the joyous look or expression is not projected unconsciously. The second person feels like imagining it. He is not fascinated by or glued to the object. This feeling is freer than the primary but not totally free, as it is coupled with interest. Subjective feeling is there. That feeling is for a particular person. We cannot enjoy the feeling of somebody else's child. So it is still limited by subjective feelings. Thus 'freer than the first' stands on a higher level but does not constitute aesthetic enjoyment as it is not totally free. It is bound by

individual fact. Every feeling affects its object by lending a look or value to it. Sympathy is not affected by the direct object. The look or value is imagined in sympathy. Sympathy is detached from the fact, as floating on it or as shining beyond it, while the feeling is as adjectival to the fact. The freedom of the sympathetic feeling is reflected in the object as the detachment of expression from the given fact, as expression 'in the air' without substratum. KCB explains this stage by two analogies:

- (1) A person who is directly feeling the terror from a terrible object and another person who is feeling his feelings. The second person is not directly involved in it.
- (2) A mother who is worried by the sufferings of her child and a visitor who is sympathizing with her and who can imagine her feelings. He is not directly involved in the worry.

The second feeling, though it stands on a higher level, is not aesthetic feeling. Beauty is not presented as an adjective or quality of the object; it emerges from the reflexes of an object feeling. Thus aesthetic enjoyment stands on a still higher level than the level of feeling for the object and also from the level of sympathy. At the level of sympathy detachment is felt from objective fact but not from a subjective one.

Now KCB brings in experience at another level. He calls it sympathy with sympathy or duplicated sympathy.

DUPLICATED SYMPATHY

This is sympathy with sympathy. Here a third person, say a writer, is sympathizing with the second person who has sympathy with the first person's feeling and thus is unaffected by feeling. In the level of duplicated sympathy a feeling can be emotionally contemplated in a detached way, felt as dissociated from its character as a given subjective fact realized as self-subsisting value. It has a felt independent reality on which the given object is only a kind of symbol. It is totally detached from the particularity of fact, it becomes a kind of eternal reality, a real eternal value. Here again KCB has Bharata's concept of *rasa* and its interpretation by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinava Gupta in his mind. While understanding the concept of *sthāyī-bhāva* Lollaṭa and Śankuka had asked the question, whose *sthāyī-bhāvas* are evoked in a drama? Are they the *sthāyī-bhāvas* of the characters in 'history' or are they the characteristics of heroes in the drama depicted by the dramatists, or are they the *sthāyī-bhāvas* of the actors? It will be pertinent to see that Bhaṭṭanāyaka brought here the concept of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, which in all probability influenced KCB's interpretation. KCB also

seems to have in the background the explanation which James Ward offers, in his *Psychology of Sensation and Feelings*.

According to KCB, *beauty* belongs to such an eternal value and accordingly aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*) belongs to the level of duplicated sympathy—sympathy with sympathy. At this stage the beauty of an object appears to be seen rather than imagined; this shows that a feeling of such an experience has a reality not inferior to that of the object as a given fact. But it is not seen as a quality or adjective of the object even though it appears as adjective or subordinate to it. The relation of the object and its beauty should be recognized here as a peculiar relation—the relation of the symbol to the symbolized, it is just like the logical relation between a word and its meaning.

Thus aesthetic enjoyment belongs to *sympathy with sympathy* or duplicated sympathy because it is totally free from individuality and becomes impersonal. KCB explains it with the following example. He says, 'I may enjoy contemplating an old man affectionately watching his grandchild playing with a toy, contrast here the child's joy in the toy with the grandfather's sympathetic joy and this again with my contemplative joy.' Here the child is immersed in the enjoyment of the toy—the old man is not immersed in the toy, but still his feeling is not yet of the artistic character. It is still of the nature of a personal selective interest in a particular child and his feeling. But in contemplative joy such personal complexion is suspended. In such joy we are interested in the child's feeling reflected in the grandfather's heart as an eternal emotion or value. We enjoy the essence of the emotion, get immersed in it even like the child in the toy, without getting affected by it and without losing our freedom. Our feeling and the child's feeling become one just as the feeling of the old man and the feeling of the child become one. Our personality dissolves but still we are not involved in the object as the child is involved. We freely become impersonal.

So aesthetic enjoyment is a feeling for another actual person, feeling for a third actual person. In other cases, one or both of these persons may be imaginary. KCB explains the imaginary second person with the following example. In the aesthetic contemplation of a poor waif in the street—while calling it beautiful we contemplate what the child would be to its mother who is an imaginary second person.

In the case of an imaginary third person we contemplate a mother treasuring the toys of her dead child. She sees the same value in the toys as though the child were still alive and playing with them. The child in this case is imaginary but the mother's emotions are actual or personal and to the person contemplating on it, the emotion is a beautiful theme for art. When we contemplate a character in a

drama both the persons are imaginary—the characters is an imaginary third person as also the primary subject. Then there is a question of who is sympathizing with the second person. We have to understand here the difference between imagining an object as actual and imagining it as imaginary.

In imagining it as actual the object is imagined as presented to an actual feeling of the person, imagining as a savoury dish would be imagined by a hungry person.

In imagining it as imaginary the feeling bodying forth the image is itself imaginary. The object is imagined as what would be imagined by another person having the actual feeling. The character in the drama is not imagined as an actual person. It is an imagination of someone imagining the character as an actual person and we sympathize with this imaginary 'someone' as the second person. This imaginary second person has the value of the concept of a person in general as he is not a particular person. Here we have in the concept an *efflux* of feeling and not of the intellect. This person is felt, not thought, by us who are contemplating aesthetically. The felt person is semi-mythological. KCB calls it *Heart Universal*.

Artistic feeling according to KCB is contemplated as reflected in or sympathized with by this Heart Universal and the feeling of the contemplating person merges his personal or private heart in the Heart Universal.

Self-consciousness should be dropped in artistic enjoyment and the enjoyed feeling should be detached from an individual subject (third person). They are eternalized in the Heart Universal.

KCB concludes,

we can say that there are three levels of feeling—they are primary, sympathetic and contemplative. Beauty of an object implies three features distinguishing it from the object—expression, detachment and eternity. These are the projections of primary feeling, sympathetic feeling and contemplative feeling. All the three feelings are combined in one person who is the aesthetic enjoyer at three different emotional levels at the same time. And so aesthetic enjoyment is not merely a feeling among feeling but the feeling par excellence.

Rasa should be interpreted in terms of feeling, without any reference to the intellectual Idea or the spiritual Idea. Artistic enjoyment is free from entanglement of fact but has eternal value. They are identified without losing freedom.

We enjoy in the object its beauty which is an eternal self-subsisting value to which the object is related as a symbol.

While talking of Indian art, he says that it is contemplative in character. It is not dynamically creative. *Rasa* is conceived as a subjective absolute rather than as an objective absolute or beauty.

To conclude, we may say that KCB does not consider natural beauty in the context of *rasa* as natural beauty belongs to primary feeling.

Aesthetic beauty must be freed from all interest. It must become universal, i.e. impersonal.

It is evident that though influenced by Kant he differs from him in judgement of beauty, but perhaps Kant's sublime belongs to the category of *rasa* as it is of contemplative character. But he is certainly explicating Bharata's Theory of *Rasa* as interpreted by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinava Gupta.

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya and Anekāntavāda

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Gopinath Bhattacharyya said about Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's interpretation of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Vedānta that it is development in new directions of some fundamental tenets of these schools.¹ 'It is development not in the sense of necessary amplification of what is potential therein; it is rather the discovery of new potentialities.'² This comment is also very true of Krishna Chandra's interpretation of the Jaina theory of *Anekānta*. In fact, instead of saying that it is an *interpretation* of the old concept, it would be more correct to say that it is an *extension* of his own fundamental position, keeping the Jaina concept in the forefront. In this paper I have tried to present my thoughts on KCB's views about *Anekāntavāda* along these lines.

Krishna Chandra himself said that ordinary realism is committed to the conception of a 'plurality of determinate truths'.³ We find that this is very true of the traditional Jaina concept of *Anekāntavāda*. But Krishna Chandra reads the theory differently. He describes it as ultra realism. His position is that according to the Jainas the given can be presented in various ways, all of which need not necessarily be determinate and definite. This he explains by interpreting the seven modes of truth advocated by the Jainas in his own way.

I have prefaced my presentation of Krishna Chandra's views, with two short summaries. In the first, I speak of *Anekāntavāda* as it has been developed in traditional texts. Here the seven *bhāṅgas* have been seen as alternatives; but they are all coordinate and each of them is definite. In the second I have talked about *Anekāntavāda* as it has been interpreted by Bimal Matilal. I take him to be an ideal interpreter, for he looks at *Anekāntavāda* and the associated views from our position, and consistently brings out the various implications, using the contemporary philosophical tools lying at his disposal. In the concluding section I speak of Krishna Chandra.

In the last section of the 'Jaina Theory of Anekānta' Krishna Chandra describes it as a theory of indeterministic truth. He holds that truth need not necessarily be determinate; what is presented in experience can be definitely thinkable or not definitely thinkable. In different papers he has spoken of the indefinite. He urges for the 'admission of the indefinite in logic, side by side with definite

position and definite negation'.⁴ According to him the indefinite has found a place in metaphysics. The list, in which he gives a few examples of the indefinite chosen at random, includes 'the negative matter of Plato, the *māyā* of the Vedāntists, and the *śūnyam* or void of the Buddhists'.⁵ He mentions many more, and it seems that whatever is indispensable for a particular system of thought but cannot be defined rationally and definitely, has been termed by him indefinite. He speaks of the indefinite as homeless in logic. However, his search for it ends in the Jaina system, where the indefinite has been accepted as an integral part of logic.

Krishna Chandra thinks that the seven expressions of the seven-valued logic of the Jainas, reflect seven faces of the real and their relationship is not *togetherness* but *alternation*. He comments about Jaina philosophy that 'The faith in one truth or even in a plurality of truths, each simply given as determinate, would be rejected by it as a species of intolerance.'⁶ While this would not be denied by the Jainas, it is to be noted that they accept each of the expressions as determinate, and they do not clarify the exact nature of alternation. Further, because of their appeal to standpoints, in order to answer the charge of incompatibility, their seven expressions can be interpreted to stand for a collection of truths. From this, Krishna Chandra's position is definitely different. In order to understand him even in broad outlines, we shall have to enter his own realm of thinking and decipher such concepts as 'togetherness', 'definite-indefinite', 'alternation', etc., which he used in his own specific sense. Let us see how far we can understand this highly original thinker.⁷

I

Anekāntavāda and *Syādvāda* are closely associated with each other. *Anekāntavāda* literally means the theory of non-onesidedness. In his introduction to *Anekāntajayapatākā*, the editor says, '*Anekāntavāda* stands for a many-sided exposition.'⁸ Historically, *Anekāntavāda* originated as a protest against the *Ekāntavādas* or the one-sided absolutistic systems, such as Buddhism, Vedānta, etc. But we find that *Anekāntavāda* also has an ontological significance and it asserts that reality is non-onesided. In this sense it holds that reality has infinite facets. But this is not mere pluralism. It claims that reality has opposite faces. For example, it is said that the real is *anekātmaka* being both universal and particular, or being both substance and attribute.⁹ The Jainas not only hold that the real has contrary features, but they also assert that contradictories, such as existence and non-existence, are also aspects of the same real.¹⁰

Syādvāda on the other hand is fully a theory of predication. It recommends that the epithet '*syāt*' should be attached to every expression. '*Syāt*' is said to be an indeclinable, which literally means 'may be'.¹¹ But, 'may be' might suggest a subjective sense of uncertainty, which is unwelcome to the Jaina realist. '*Syāt*' is thus taken to mean 'in some respects' in this context. Thus *Syādvāda* asserts that all expressions are 'relational', being attached to different perspectives. Further, it implies that every predication is true, but it never expresses the whole truth.

We see that Kapadia claims that *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda* are synonyms.¹² He quotes from *Syādvādamañjari* of Mallisen Suri to make his point. The quotation asserts that '*Syāt*, the indeclinable signifies non-onesidedness, so it is *Anekāntavāda*.' But this approach overlooks the fact that *Anekāntavāda* has its ontological nuances. Strictly speaking, *Syādvāda* is meant to emphasize the partial and the relational nature of the judgments, and as such it has no necessary connection with *Anekānta* reality. But *Syādvāda* as coupled with the seven-valued logic of the Jainas, the *Saptabhaṅginayavāda*, is founded on *Anekānta* ontology.

Vādi Devasuri says that a word in expressing its object follows the law of sevenfold predication.¹³ *Saptabhaṅgī* is defined by him as use of seven sorts of expression, regarding one and the same thing, with reference to its one chosen particular aspect, without any inconsistency by means of affirmation and negation, either severally or jointly, being marked with 'in some respects'.¹⁴ Obviously, the apparently inconsistent predications are possible because of the '*syāt*'. Vādi Devasuri makes it clear that seven types of predication are made about each of the infinite faces of the real.¹⁵ So it holds that the real is infinitesimal and its faces are sometimes opposed to one another. Thus *saptabhaṅgī* is dependent upon both *Syādvāda* and the *Anekānta* nature of reality.

In the seven-valued logic the first two forms of expression are positive and negative, 'S is' and 'S is not' respectively. Naturally, these are mutually incompatible. All other criticisms directed against this particular Jaina position are traceable to this fundamental charge of inconsistency. The Jainas assert that in the non-onesided reality these mutually opposed features exist in the same substance, and from different standpoints opposite predications are possible. Through analysis of concrete examples they present their position. From the theory of inference they give their example. It is urged that the *hetu* should have both *sapakṣasattā* and *vipakṣasattā*, i.e., the *hetu* must exist in the *sapakṣa* and not exist in the *vipakṣa*. Thus in different locations existence and non-existence are features of the same *hetu* and we can consistently assert that 'in some respects the *hetu* exists' and 'in some respects the *hetu* does not exist'.¹⁶

The 'syāt' which means the indefinite 'in some respect' has been amplified to include definite determinants like space, time, substantiality, etc. The list remains open and many other determinants might be added. By varying these determinants, 'S is' becomes 'S is not'. The pitcher which exists as solid does not exist as liquid; that which is existent at Kānyakubja is not existent at Mathurā; that which is existent in summer is non-existent in winter; that which is existent as black is non-existent as red; and so on. In all these expressions we are talking about reality. Thus both in reality and in corresponding expressions, mutually opposed features are co-present.¹⁷

In the third form, the first two are combined consecutively; this is called *kramārpaṇa*. Because of the time difference, there is no incompatibility. Thus it is said that 'in some respect, the pitcher exists and it does not exist' or 'in some respect, S is and S is not'. In the fourth form or *sahārpaṇa* the first two expressions are to be conjoined simultaneously. It is impossible to say that the pitcher exists and it does not exist, without sacrificing the law of contradiction, unless one is talking figuratively. But the Jainas are doing serious consistent logic, and they say that here the pitcher is inexpressible. As is well known, by combining the fourth *bhaṅga* with the other three, we get the last three forms of the expression: 'In some respects, S is and is inexpressible', 'In some respects, S is not and is inexpressible' and 'In some respects, S is and is not and is inexpressible'.

The Jainas have further added that none of these seven forms is more basic than the others. One must not hold that the positive forms are more fundamental and the negatives lean on them. A word does not express a negation indirectly. Their general tenet is that something can be presented indirectly, only when it has been known directly.¹⁸ Sometimes it is claimed that the fourth predication is absolutely true, whereas the other forms are relatively true, i.e., true in some respects only, so it must be assigned a special position. But this is not acceptable to the Jainas, for according to them an absence of a viewpoint is itself a viewpoint and the description 'inexpressible' does not exhaustively express the nature of the given.¹⁹ So all the forms of expression are coordinate according to the Jainas.

Further, it is said that the predications are meant to distinguish an object from other objects. Thus each of these expressions indicate the definite and determinate nature of the object.²⁰

Both these two points are important for us for we shall see how Bimal Matilal dwells upon both of them and how KCB drifted away.

We feel that the Jainas, who claim to be realists, should have worked out the *Anekānta* ontology in further detail. The general

idea is that these expressions are not merely different subjective ways of knowing reality, but there is some objective reality corresponding to these. What is the exact ontological status of these correlates of the seven forms of expression? If these be *pariyāya*, or modes of the real, in their own turn, then the critic would urge that each of them should again be judged in seven different ways which would naturally lead to infinite regress. The Jainas did not raise this issue. The mutual relation of these expressions was supposed to be alternation, these were presented as alternative descriptions of the same reality. The Jainas do not comment on the nature of this alternation.

11

Bimal Matilal has been interested in the concept of *Anekāntavāda* and has dwelt upon it in many places. He makes a number of valuable observations, but here I have picked out only one or two of them, which are relevant for our discussion.

He presents *Anekāntavāda* as a philosophy of synthesis and reconciliation. Like many other commentators, he also maintains that 'the Jainas carried the principle of non-violence to the intellectual level, and thus propounded their *Anekānta* doctrine'.²¹ This view has been favoured by many, including Krishna Chandra. Bimal further continues that the Jainas, like the Buddhists, saw the evils of onesided philosophies, and while the Buddhists rejected the extreme views and prescribed the middle path, the Jainas held that all rival conclusions might be retained and reconciled, provided they are asserted with proper qualifications and conditionalizations.

By directing our attention to this prescription of the original Jaina theory, he brings out the latent weakness of the Jaina position. He shows that the *syāt* operator does not mean 'perhaps' or 'may be', it does not indicate any hesitancy on the part of the knowing subject, but it stands for 'conditional yes'.²² He shows that the expressions 'Syāt S is' and 'Syāt S is not' actually stand for 'From standpoint 1, S is' and 'From standpoint 2, S is not'. Thus they can be easily represented by two conditionals, 'If m, then S is P' and 'If n, then S is not P'. So, although the pair of categorical propositions look mutually inconsistent, the conditionals are not at all incompatible with each other. This translation shows that the charge of incompatibility cannot be levelled against the Jainas. But it also shows that in the sevenfold scheme of propositions, the Jainas are not talking about the same ontological situation. The two expressions 'If m, then S is P' and 'If n, then S is not P' have no logical relation at all, the antecedents being different. He clearly shows that the different *bhaṅgas* in the sevenfold scheme are

conditionals having the appearance of categoricals. Variable determinants are hidden behind the same epithet 'Syāt'.

Although in their commentaries the Jainas have clearly asserted that the epithet 'syāt' stands for different conditions in different expressions, still the use of the same word 'syāt' has often been misleading. Readers are inadvertently led to think that the judgements are made under the same condition. Bimal's discussions bring out this point. Pradeep P. Gokhale says that the specification of the 'syāt' amounts to distortion of the original logical form of 'syāt'. He says that 'the peculiarity and the beauty of *Syādvāda* lies in indicating the existence of *some* standpoint, *some* condition or *some* respect which makes the given statement true'.²³ So he says that Bimal's recommendation that the so-called categoricals in the seven-valued logic are actually definite conditionals, fails to capture the exact implication of 'syāt'; he however, does not deny that here expressions are tied to varying standpoints. So without entering into a critical evaluation of his own scheme, we may say that he would agree with us that even if Bimal's translations distort the original vagueness associated with *syāt*, it establishes clearly that *Syādvāda* is a doctrine of standpoints. But we see that it also shows that the judgments do not converge upon the same reality and they cannot be accepted as alternative descriptions of the same reality. So though the charge of incompatibility cannot be levelled against the Jainas, their theory no more remains significantly valuable. The seven *bhaṅgas* become a collection of seven judgments asserted about a pluralistic reality. Their mutual relation can no more be called alternation.

When the Jainas originally talked about different philosophical theories about Reality (with a capital R), their theory made some sense. They held that differences of standpoints, of categorical frameworks, of priorities, accounted for philosophical differences of various theories and with proper explanations these can be reconciled. But the defect of the Jaina position becomes clear through the discussion of empirical propositions.

Bimal Matilal puts his position even more clearly in his last article on *Anekāntavāda* in *JICPR*, Vol. VIII, No. 2. He shows that indexical elements are responsible for the determination of truth value, and thus by varying these elements, we can say 'yes' and 'no' to the same proposition. This is a very consistent and at the same time revealing rendering of the Jaina position that propositions are always tied to standpoints, and no position is absolutely true. But after drawing out many other corollaries of the Jaina position, he is aware that in and through his interpretation the core of the *Anekānta* metaphysics is lost, the core which emphasized the 'contradictory and the opposite sides of the same reality'.²⁴ However, he points out that in spite of

all our explanations, we cannot explain away the fourth expression where contradictory predicates are asserted simultaneously of the same reality, under the same 'syāt', and the predicate emerges as a 'separate and non-composite value called *avaktavya*'.²⁵

He does not himself satisfactorily explain how each expression can be assigned this value without flouting the law of contradiction, and what is the precise nature of the real which answers this description. Perhaps the 'syāt' here stands for the viewpoint of 'no viewpoint' or the condition of unconditionality. He draws many analogues from modern logic, but is not fully satisfied with any of these. The Jainas are aware that here opposed predicates clash with each other, they accept it as a standpoint coordinate with other standpoints, but they do not positively explain what this standpoint stands for.

I think that Bimal gives a faithful interpretation of Jaina logic. Here Krishna Chandra's attitude is radically different. He is basically interested in *Anekānta* ontology, and his logic is tied to his ontology. Within reality he sees various facets and their mutual relation is indeterminateness and alternation. He does not speak of empirical standpoints at all. His starting point is that the given real is both particular and universal. Then he turns to the mutual interrelation of these two categories and derives all the seven *bhaṅgas* from it. I turn to Krishna Chandra in the next section.

III

Krishna Chandra is looking for seven ontological faces of reality, which would correspond to the seven *bhaṅgas* of the Jaina logic. The experienced object before all metaphysical dissection has been called the determinate existent. One face of this given object is its particularity. This particularity is conferred to the given object by experience. But Krishna Chandra is quite aware that according to realism experience does not constitute objects, but it merely discovers. Thus, corresponding to the experience or thought of positing a particular, there must be a face of the real object. This face is called 'being' and it corresponds to the first *bhaṅga* of *saptabhaṅginaya*, viz., 'S is'. But the same determinate existent is existence universal, shorn of all its particularity. Existence or thinghood, being universal is opposed to particularity. The determinate existent has a definite position in experience and the given is experienced as universal, existence only through rejection of its particularity. So the same given real bereft of all particular characters is called negation, by Krishna Chandra. It corresponds to 'S is not'.

Krishna Chandra here comments that 'The same logic is sometimes expressed by saying that a determinate existent A is in one respect and is not in another respect.'²⁶ But it is amply clear that this 'respect' is very different from the traditional Jaina concept of standpoint. Instead of recommending a shift in the empirical perspective, he is dwelling upon the interrelation of two ontological categories. The Jaina thinker Vādi Deva has said that the real is both universal and particular being infinitefold, but he did not interpret the *bhaṅgas* in this way.²⁷

The determinate existent has been described here as 'definite definite'. The first 'definite', or the adjectival definite, indicates the definiteness of experience, it is the objective counterpart of thought. The second definite, the substantival definite, stands for the content of experience. As the objective face corresponding to the position or assertion of the given as particular and the objective givenness as existence are definitely distinct from each other, their relation is differenced togetherness, or definite distinction. This answers the third *bhaṅga* of the Jainas, which is 'S is and S is not'. In traditional thought this is consecutive presentation or Kramārpaṇa. Krishna Chandra is merely stating here that both the faces are present in the real and he is logically analysing the content and is not talking of temporal consecutiveness.

But in experience the given is not necessarily always definite. When we focus on the clashing nature of the two faces, in co-presentation or *sahārpaṇa*, the faces tend to erase and cancel each other. The two cannot be present in the real simultaneously, they seem to drive away each other. It is not possible to analyse the content of this expression by using positive assertions; through double negations the content is described as—not a particular position, nor non-existent.²⁸ This analysis shows that there is an inexplicable surd in the content of the given, but being given in experience, its claim to reality is undeniable. The content is called indefinite; it is described as 'definite indefinite' by Krishna Chandra. The experience and its objectivized face is definite, but the content is indefinite; the two incompatibles combine here through the relation of non-distinction. Here Krishna Chandra uses two unusual concepts, the concept of indefinite and that of 'non-distinction'. In the earlier part of the article he analyses both the concepts.

He develops the concept of indefinite through two illustrations. In the first one he analyses the concept of knowledge of knowledge. For realism there is no distinction between knowledge and known, for both are equally objective. Pure realism does not accept the difference between contemplating and enjoying, for it both the object and knowledge belong to the realm of the known. But the difficulty arises when we dwell upon the concept of

knowledge of knowledge. How do we differentiate between knowledge as known and the object as known? Knowledge has to be known as different and distinct from the known. Krishna Chandra takes here two easy steps: knowledge has to be known as *unknown* (i.e., as distinct from known). This is self-contradictory, but yet it is presented in experience; thus it is known as indefinite. Whatever cannot be rationally articulated, but is presented in experience, is said to be indefinite.

He introduces the concept of the objective indefinite by referring to Hobhouse. According to Hobhouse, in simple apprehension, what is apprehended is definite, but it has an indefinite background. The indefinite is here apprehended too, but it is apprehended as indefinite. The indefinite which Krishna Chandra introduces in the context of the *anekānta* reality corresponds to the '*Avaktavya*' of the seven-valued logic.

While analysing the different faces of reality and their mutual relation, Krishna Chandra speaks of three basal categories, viz. 'distinction, distinction from distinction as other than distinction, and the indetermination of the two'.²⁹ When the relata are distinct and determinate their relation is distinction. According to Krishna Chandra ordinary realism is satisfied with distinction. In the third mode of reality the relation between the positive and the negative face is distinction. This has also been described as 'differenced togetherness'. The relation which is distinct from distinction should have been identity. But Krishna Chandra does not accept identity as a determinate relation. By discussing Hegel and Nyāya, Krishna Chandra shows that identity always involves distinction, and here either identity or distinction becomes more predominant than the other. If within identity, both are accepted as coordinate, then the relation should be more aptly called distinction from distinction. The relation between being and negation in the fourth mode is this distinction from distinction, which has also been described as indeterminate distinction or non-distinction.

Krishna Chandra next introduces the third type of relation, which he calls indetermination or alternation. As we have seen, according to Krishna Chandra the mutual relation of particularity and thinghood is both distinction and non-distinction. As distinct their relation is 'differenced togetherness' which corresponds to the third mode; as non-distinct their relation is 'undifferenced togetherness' which corresponds to the fourth mode. The relation between each of these modes is alternation or indetermination. He says that 'particularity and thinghood are in each relation without being in the other relation *at the same time*'.³⁰ The relation between all the four forms is this relation of indetermination. The whole analysis is

ontological, so this relation is to be understood as a relation between the faces themselves.

Krishna Chandra next explains the three other modes of reality. He says that there is a basic distinction between the 'definite given' and the 'indefinite given'. The first three modes are the three faces of the definite. The fourth one is indefinite as such; it is to be combined with the first three modes. In the first, the indefinite itself is taken to be a particular, and as such is to be combined with objectivised position. In the next one it is to be seen as many particular negations fused together and in the last one it is combined with the definite determinate existent itself.

Thus we have seven modes of truth, which are the seven faces of the real too. These are:

- (1) Particular position (substantive corresponding to the verb positing).
- (2) Universal thinghood, which is the negation of the particular.
- (3) Position and negation, together with their distinction. This is the determinate existent.
- (4) Indefinite, in which the particular and the universal are indistinguishably together. There is no clearcut distinction between the two, yet they do not collapse into identity.
- (5) This indefinite as being.
- (6) This indefinite as many negations together.
- (7) The indefinite as distinct from the determinate existent.

No other eighth mode is possible as that would be identical with the indefinite.

Krishna Chandra says that each of these modes implies the other modes and implication as objectivised is alternation. Each of these modes is distinct, but as they converge upon the same reality they are also non-distinct. The alternation between the equally undeniable but mutually exclusive faces is said to be the essence of reality. This alternation is not a subjective sense of vacillation or hesitancy, but an objectively real relation.

The concept of the indefinite occupies a very important place in Krishna Chandra's philosophy. This becomes specially evident in his interpretation of the last three modes. In the traditional Jaina logic the fifth expression is that the given object is and is indescribable. According to Krishna Chandra the indefinite itself is a being or a particular position. Similarly, in the traditional thought the sixth expression asserts that the given is not and is indescribable, whereas he speaks of it as asserting that the given indefinite is a fusion of many indistinguishable negations.

His theory of expressions just reflect reality. True to his assertion that according to the realists thought only discovers and does not constitute reality, his theory of judgments only reflected the real, so that the role of the 'syāt' operator is minimal. The charge of incompatibility is answered by him through the concept of alternation. His position is that the clashing faces of reality are all real if they are given in experience. Their mutual relation is alternation and not co-presence or just togetherness. Thus the charge of contradiction is bypassed through alternation and indetermination.

Here I return to the comment of Gopinath Bhattacharyya, quoted by me in the introduction. Bimal amplified the potentialities present in the traditional *Anekāntavāda*. But, Krishna Chandra discovers new potentialities, such that the theory changes beyond recognition. He calls this ultra realism. But if *Anekāntavāda* is different from realism, it is so only after Krishna Chandra's interpretation. Krishna Chandra says that realism believes in a plurality of determinate truths; we have seen that traditional *Anekāntavāda* after Bimal's interpretation is almost reduced to such a theory. Krishna Chandra reads *Anekāntavāda* as a theory of indeterministic truth, which holds that what is presented is thinkable in alternative modes, definite or indefinite, but this reading is specifically his own contribution.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. In a footnote attached to 'Acharya Krishna Chandra's Conception of Philosophy' published in *The Journal of Indian Academy of Philosophy*, Vol. II, Rasvihari Das writes, 'Many people perhaps do not realize that in India we traditionally refer to our great men by their proper names and not by their surnames as is done in modern Europe. Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, etc. are all surnames whereas Shankara, Ramanuja, Udayana, Gangesha, Raghunatha, . . . even Radhakrishnan are all proper names. The present vogue of referring to people by their surnames appears to be a legacy of western influence on our culture'. Following his footsteps, I have spoken of K.C. Bhattacharyya as Krishna Chandra in this paper.
2. K.C. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956, p. xii.
3. K.C. Bhattacharyya, 'The Jaina Theory of Anekānta' (henceforward referred to as JA), *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956, Section 1.
4. K.C. Bhattacharyya, 'Place of the Indefinite in Logic', *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1958, Section 1.
5. *Ibid.*, Section 1.
6. JA, op.cit., Section 30.
7. Those who studied philosophy directly under him have agreed that he was a profound thinker, but it is very difficult to understand him properly. In the paper mentioned in Note 1, the author writes, 'Krishna Chandra was perhaps the acutest philosophical thinker of modern India', but adds 'that his writing

- was very terse'. Again, in his preface to 'The Fundamentals of K.C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy' Kalidas Bhattacharyya remarks 'his writings are extraordinarily terse' and his 'analyses are bafflingly subtle'.
8. Haribhadra Suri, *Anekāntajayapatākā*, edited by H.R. Kapadia, GOS, 1940, p. IX.
 9. Vādi Devasuri, *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokaḷāmkāra*, edited by H.S. Bhattacharyya, Bombay, 1967, Chapter V, *Sūtra* 1, *Sāmānyaviśeṣādyanekāntamakāṃ vastu*.
 10. Haribhadra Suri, *Anekāntajayapatākā*, edited by H.R. Kapadia, GOS, 1940, p. 11, *vastvekāṃ sadasadrupam*.
 11. The 'syāt' epithet has also been derived in other ways. Bimal Matilal in *Logic, Language and Reality*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1985, p. 305 breaks it as follows: as + potential/optative third form, singular, which indicates probability.
 12. Haribhadra Suri, *Anekāntajayapatākā*, op.cit., quotation from *Syādvādamañjari* of Mallisena, p. x, *Syādityavyayamanekāntadyotakam. Tatah syadvādo' nekāntavādah*.
 13. Vādi Devasuri, *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokaḷāmkāra*, op.cit., IV, *Sūtra* 13, *Sarvatrayam dhvani vidhinīṣedhabhyām svārthamabhidadhāna saptabhaṅgimanu-gacchati*.
 14. Ibid., *Sūtra* 14.
 15. Ibid., *Sūtra* 38.
 16. Ibid., on IV, *Sūtra* 16.
 17. Haribhadra Suri, *Anekāntajayapatākā*, op.cit., p. 36. *svadravyakṣetrakālabhāvarūpeṇa sad vartate, paradravya-kṣetrakālabhāvarūpeṇa cāsat. Tataśca saccāsacca bhavati*.
 18. Vādi Devasuri, *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokaḷāmkāra*, op.cit., IV, *Sūtra* 25, *kvacit kadācī kathañcī prādhānyenāpratīpannasya aprādhānya anupapattēh*.
 19. Ibid., *Sūtra* 30, *tasyāvaktavyaśabdenāpyāvacyatva prasamgāt*.
 20. Ibid., *Sūtra* 15. Commentary: The predication thus indicates the definite and the determinate nature of the thing.
 21. Bimal K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, op.cit., p. 314.
 22. Ibid., p. 305.
 23. Pradeep P. Gokhale, 'The Logical Structure of Syādvāda', *JICPR*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, 1991.
 24. Bimal K. Matilal, 'Anekānta: Both Yes and No', *JICPR*, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 1991, p. 9.
 25. Ibid., p. 10.
 26. K.C. Bhattacharyya, 'The Jaina Theory of Anekānta', *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, op.cit., Section 26.
 27. See note no. 9.
 28. K.C. Bhattacharyya, 'The Jaina Theory of Anekānta', op.cit., Section 27.
 29. Ibid., Section 24.
 30. Ibid.

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's Theory of Value

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I

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (KCB) is one of the most original twentieth-century Indian philosophers and one of the most insightful constructive interpreters of the classical Indian thought. He has his own conception of philosophy and philosophical method and has developed his own philosophical terminology.¹ When he develops his own philosophy, he does not quote any other philosopher. In his article 'The Concept of Value' he gives his own analysis of the concept of value and does not give an exposition, interpretation and criticism of someone else's thought. His thoughts are profoundly original.

Even on a cursory reading of the article, one is struck by sentences such as the following.

We speak of value either of a known content or of a willed content. Value is itself a felt content. (p. 285)

The so-called value judgment is not reflective knowing but reflective feeling. (p. 286)

Value is not a known content. (p. 286)

Properly speaking value is no adjective of the object. (p. 289)

Value judgment is an exclamation disguised as information. (p. 291)

Moral valuation is not only not judgment, its expression as information is symbolical and not literal. (p. 295)

Valuation, whether aesthetic or moral, is not judgment. (p. 295)

Value judgment is primarily an exclamation somehow toned down into information. (p. 290)

These are not stray statements picked up from the periphery of the article; they express his central thought about the nature of value. Anyone who is familiar with the recent discussions about the nature

of value judgment in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, cannot fail to notice the similarity between KCB's analysis of value and the emotivist or non-cognitivist theories. In another article, 'Knowledge and Truth', KCB talks of beauty and sacredness as 'the non-cognitive value of the object known' (p. 157). These articles were written by KCB roughly at the time when A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson propounded the emotive theory of value.² Though KCB seems to be aware of the positivists (p. 100) his non-cognitivism is in no way influenced by these linguistic versions of non-cognitivism. His non-cognitivism has a distinct Indian flavour. It is rooted in, and probably grows as a result of, his study and reflection on Vedānta, Kant and the *Rasa* Theory. This article is an attempt at giving an exposition of his theory of value by placing it in the total framework of his philosophy and by showing to what extent and in what respects it differs both from the Kantian and the linguistic versions of non-cognitivism. It, however, does not attempt at tracing the roots of KCB's non-cognitivism.

II

What I have called the linguistic version of non-cognitivism is either a by-product of logical empiricism with its two 'dogmas'—dichotomical division of propositions into analytic (tautological) and synthetic and the verification criterion of cognitive or literal meaning; or it is a description of the functions value judgments perform, in ordinary language. Underlying these theories is a conception of philosophy as the logical analysis of language. To many this linguistic conception of philosophy with clarity and not truth as its aim appears to be 'trivial'. As Mackie complains³ these philosophers do not even raise the question of the ontological status of values. In KCB, one does not find any such commitment to empiricism, to the dichotomical division of propositions, to the verification theory of meaning and to the linguistic conception of philosophy. In him, one does not find such 'trivialization'. He talks of value as 'a felt being'. It is not one of the aspects of the Absolute considered as a unitary something but is one of the alternative forms of the Absolute considered as 'an un-unifiable triplicity' (p. 121) or 'as an alternation of truth, value and reality' (p. 143). He treats value as the absolute for feeling.

However, it does not seem to be proper to treat KCB as a transcendent metaphysician. Like Kant, he seems to deny the possibility of transcendent metaphysics. He says, 'I understand Kant's Idea of the Reason to be not only not knowledge, but to be not even thought in the literal sense' (p. 100). He compares his standpoint with positivism and says, 'Some present-day positivists,

who deny not only metaphysical knowing, but also metaphysical thinking, would not go so far as to deny logic itself to be a body of thought' (p. 100). We know that for the positivists logic is analytic knowledge and hence is literally or cognitively meaningful. They take 'logic to be pure thinking' (p. 100). But for KCB, 'Metaphysics, or more generally, philosophy including logic and epistemology, is not only not actual knowledge, but is not even literal thought' (p. 101).

KCB draws a sharp distinction between science and philosophy, though he regards both as forms of theoretic consciousness. He defines theoretic consciousness as 'the understanding of what can be spoken' (p. 102) or 'understanding of a speakable' (p. 101) and even identifies the four grades of theoretic consciousness with the four grades of speakables. Does this emphasis on speech, speaking, speakability, what can be spoken, in any way resemble the emphasis on language by the linguistic philosophers? Firstly, all forms of consciousness as involving the understanding of a speakable are sometimes called 'thought'. Of these only science or empirical thought, which deals with facts, is 'literal thought'. Secondly, fact can be spoken of as information and understood without reference to the spoken form. Speakability is a contingent character of the content of empirical thought.

The other three grades of consciousness—pure objective thought, pure subjective or spiritual thought and transcendental (not transcendent) thought—constitute philosophy. These three grades of thought which constitute philosophy are 'symbolistic thought which', says KCB, 'should not be called "thought" at all.' Further, speakability is a necessary character of the content of pure philosophic thought. 'In philosophy, the content that is spoken is not intelligible except as spoken,' (p. 103). Since the content of pure thought is not distinguishable from pure thought itself, it is 'sometimes regarded as a fiction, philosophy being rejected as a disease of speech' (p. 103). It is true that KCB does not treat philosophy as a disease of speech. But nor does he regard it as giving knowledge of some 'facts' or 'objects' which are independent of our thinking. Thus he seems to be more Kantian. For KCB, the contents of philosophic thought, though not fiction, are not also assertable as facts. Fictions are spoken beliefs of individual minds, facts are not only independent of individual minds but are also independent of thinking and speaking itself. The contents of philosophic thought are not independent of speaking, though they are independent of an individual mind. They seem to be like Kantian categories or forms of intuition, which are independent of individual minds, purely formal, *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience.

In philosophy, we think of the contents of pure thought in the objective, subjective and transcendental attitudes. Thus we have philosophy of object (objectivity), and philosophy of subject or spirit (subjectivity). When we transcend the objective and subjective attitudes we have the absolute for thought or cognition—neither as object nor as subject—namely the truth, the absolute for will is freedom and the absolute for feeling is value.

Philosophy is transcendental and starts in reflective consciousness. 'Reflection is the awareness of a content as to a mode of consciousness' (p. 125). The central question for transcendental philosophy, therefore, seems to be, 'what is the relation between content and consciousness in all the three modes of consciousness?' According to KCB, it is wrong to assume that this relation is the same for all the three modes of consciousness. This mistake is committed both by the Idealists and Realists—the former holding that the content of consciousness is constituted by consciousness the latter maintaining that it is distinct, independent and unconstituted by the act of consciousness in all the three modes. According to KCB, however, the relation between content and consciousness is different for each mode of consciousness. He says,

the content of knowing is perfectly distinct from knowing and is unconstituted by it. The content of willing is imperfectly distinct from willing though distinct in itself and is constituted by it. Content and consciousness make a unity in the case of feeling but not in the case of knowing and willing. There are thus three modes of distinction of content and consciousness of which we are reflectively conscious. (p. 130)

For understanding KCB's concept of value it is important to know the distinction between the relations of content and consciousness in the three modes of consciousness. These relations we know only in reflective consciousness. What is meant by reflective consciousness? KCB says,

There are apparently two kinds of reflection on a conscious process: it is either the distinguishing of the conscious process from the content or distinguishing content from the process. The former is . . . psychological introspection in which attention is withdrawn from the content of the conscious process and fixed on the process itself which is thereby sterilised and turned into a ghostly temporal event. In the latter, it is the content of the conscious process that is attended to as in the unreflective stage. (p. 286)

It is the reflection in the latter sense that is philosophically illuminating.

When we attend to the content of a knowing act, we find it to be unconstituted by the act. 'The particular act of knowing discovers and does not construct the object known.' In the case of willing the content of willing, viz., an act or an end, 'is constituted by willing in the sense that apart from willing it is nothing at all'. It is not

a future fact that is known in the willing. Willing is, indeed, some form of consciousness of the future but the future here, unlike the future that is said to be known, is not a fact but a contingency, not what will be but what would be if it were willed, not as already determined but what is being determined by the willing and as therefore apart from, the willing nothing at all. Yet the content of willing is distinct from willing as what is constituted is distinct from what constitutes it. (p. 129)

In the case of feeling, the content as felt is indistinguishable from feeling. Unlike in the case of knowing, we do not discover the felt content, and unlike in the case of willing, it cannot be said to be constituted by feeling, it cannot be said to be nothing at all apart from feeling. What is perfectly distinct from another or what is constituted by another is definite in itself. But the content of feeling of which we are reflectively aware is not a definite content because it is imperfectly distinct from another and unconstituted by it. What we are definitely conscious of in reflective feeling is the imperfect distinction itself of content and consciousness, this indefinite as such being in fact their unity. (p. 130)

This analysis of the relation between content and consciousness in the three modes seems to be the key to the understanding of KCB's concept of value. That value is necessarily connected with feeling or that evaluation involves a feeling component is, I believe, accepted by all—even the cognitivists and intuitionists. But KCB makes a stronger claim that value can only be felt and cannot be turned into a known object. This is for two reasons. Firstly, to feel that something is only known, is to feel it 'as unfelt, neutral or indifferent. To the extent a known object appears flat and uninteresting, is it felt as merely known' (p. 288). If value is regarded as known, it would be felt as unfelt, flat and uninteresting. It would be a fact and would cease to be a value. Therefore, value to be a value must be a felt content. This argument shows why value cannot only be known but it does not show why it cannot both be known and felt. KCB's second argument is that no content can be both known and felt simultaneously because in that case it will at once be completely and incompletely distinct from consciousness. And this is not possible. Thus value can only be felt and not known.

Now, even if a philosopher admits that value can only be felt and not known, this admission does not make him a non-cognitivist. The traditional subjectivists, for example, hold that to regard an object as valuable is to have a favourable feeling of approval towards it. They treat value judgments of the form 'X is beautiful' to mean 'I approve of X or I have a specific feeling of joy with X'. Thus a value judgment, according to them, is only a description of the speaker's feeling or approval. It is a proposition capable of being verified. KCB, as a non-cognitivist, rejects this view. He holds not only that value is only felt but also that it is an expression of feeling and not 'an assertion or a description of it'.⁴ Of course, this is not KCB's idiom. He expressed this distinction in terms of 'speaking' and 'speaking of' and holds that 'a value judgment speaks the reflective feeling and does not speak of it' (p. 288). The proper form of a value judgment, according to him, is exclamation. He says,

In exclaiming, we speak our feeling and not speak of it, and when we command, we speak and do not speak of the command, what we thus speak may be however, spoken of in a symbolical or periphrastic way. When we speak our feeling in the way of exclamation, we may also artificially speak of it or express it as information in the form 'this is my feeling about the object' or 'the object has this value'. When we speak of a value in an object then we only indirectly express as information what we should speak exclaimatorily in a form like 'how fine is the object'. (p. 288)

Thus, KCB's theory of value can be legitimately/properly regarded as a form of non-cognitivism, though its statement and the considerations which have led KCB to hold this view differ widely from those of the linguistic and the Kantian versions of it. We have already alluded to the linguistic version and the framework in which it was put forward. Let us now allude to the Kantian version. Firstly, Kant does not propound any general theory of value as KCB does but he writes separately on moral and aesthetic values. Secondly, Kant does not talk directly about reality, beauty or goodness but he discusses the formal and *a priori* conditions of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments in different spheres like those of science, mathematics, metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics. Thirdly, KCB's notion of the 'absolutes' for cognition, will and feeling is absent in Kant. Fourthly, in Kantian ethics we find 'no self-subsistent value which the will is to realize', says KCB, (I, p. 332) and in Kantian aesthetics, we may add, no self-subsistent beauty, a kind of eternal reality, a real eternal value of which the given object is only an expression or an embodiment or a kind of symbol, which is found in KCB. Lastly, while for Kant the question of the existence

of the object is totally irrelevant in aesthetic evaluation, KCB says, 'we speak of the value either of a known content or of a willed content. Value is itself a felt content and so the value of a felt content is but a higher grade of the value of a known or willed content' (p. 285). So the problem of value, in KCB, takes the form of the relation between a felt content and a known or willed content.

III

With this general outline of KCB's theory of value, let us now see how he analyses the value judgment of the form 'The object has this value' or 'This rose is beautiful' in which a known object is evaluated. It cannot be understood to mean that the object, the rose, is known and the value, the beauty, is felt because 'there can apparently be no relation between the incommensurable contents' (p. 285). Objects and their value are not contents of two separate acts of knowing and feeling. Nor can we eliminate knowing and say that the real judgment is 'We thus feel the object' or 'We feel the rose beautiful'. What does 'feel' as a transitive verb mean in reference to the object? It cannot mean simply 'We thus feel when we know the object'. Moreover, how can one speak of 'we' having the feeling in respect of the object? Whether we say 'value is a felt content' or 'we thus feel the object', it symbolizes the same mystery. How is any relation spoken of between the known object and the felt value?

What is at least meant literally by saying that 'The object has this value', according to KCB, is that there is a single consciousness of the two terms, the object and the value. However, knowing and feeling cannot make up one single consciousness and the object cannot be said to be the content of such a single consciousness because 'it would be at once known and felt; at once completely and incompletely distinct from the consciousness' (p. 285).

KCB's solution is that though 'the knowing and the feeling cannot make up one consciousness, (but) it may be that there is a single reflective consciousness of both' (p. 285). The reflective consciousness that he postulates to give an adequate account of the value judgment is not psychological introspection in which attention is fixed on the process of knowing and feeling but it is consciousness of the contents of these processes, viz. 'of the object and the value as known and felt respectively'. To understand the value judgment, 'the object and the value should be taken as the contents of reflective consciousness of knowing and feeling' (p. 286).

Is this consciousness reflective knowing or reflective feeling? Though the judgment form suggests that this consciousness is

reflective knowing, KCB contends, 'that the form is only artificial, if not symbolic and that the so-called value judgment is primarily reflective feeling . . . value cannot be said to be reflectively known though, like value, the object to which it is referred may be said to be reflectively felt' (p. 286).

Why does KCB not admit that the value is felt by the direct feeling of the object and why is he required to posit a higher reflective feeling to account for the value judgment? One consideration discussed above is to show that the object and the value constitute content of a single consciousness. Since on the primary level knowing and feeling do not make up one consciousness, they are regarded as content of single reflective consciousness. But in his article 'The Concept of Rasa', he provides another significant reason for positing higher feeling. He distinguishes between the direct feeling of an object and feeling of such a feeling. On the level of direct feeling of an object, the person feels no distinction between his feeling, say, of enjoyment and the object of enjoyment and hence unconsciously tends to project the joyous look or expression on the object and claims to see it there in the object. He rejects the contention that 'we seem to directly enjoy the beauty of an object and the beauty appears to be just as much seen there in the object as the terrible look of an object to one who feels terror'. 'Where', he asks, 'is the distinction between such enjoyment and an ordinary object-feeling like terror?' (I, p. 351)

A child enjoying his toy is an example of direct feeling of an object. The child is interested in the toy, feels fascinated by it, feels attracted to and glued down as it were, to the toy and thus unconsciously projects the joyous look on the toy. But consider another person, say, the child's mother, sympathizing with the child's enjoyment. The direct object of the feeling of sympathy is not the toy but the child's feeling. It is a feeling of feeling. The mother does not find or see joy in the toy but can imagine the child with whom she sympathises, seeing or finding it in the toy. Thus 'sympathy with joy is also joy but it is freer than the primary joy' (I, p. 350). By reason of this freedom feeling of feeling may be taken as constituting a higher level than the direct feeling of an object. But even the mother's sympathetic joy is rooted in her personal interest in the child. KCB invites us to imagine a third person who sympathizes with the mother's sympathy for the child's feeling of enjoyment. Since this third person has no personal interest either in the child or in the mother, his sympathetic joy is contemplative and impersonal. The aesthetic feeling is higher than the child's direct feeling of the object and even than the mother's sympathetic feeling rooted in personal interest in the child. It is detached both

from the particularity of the objective fact and from the particularity of personal subjective fact. He says, 'the artistic sentiment is not merely a feeling among feelings but the feeling par excellence, standing as it does on a new grade or level altogether as compared with other feelings' (I, p. 349).

It would be worthwhile to compare KCB's view with that of Kant. For both, the aesthetic appreciation must be contemplative and devoid of any personal interest. For Kant though such a feeling is different both from the feeling of the agreeable and the feeling of good, it is not necessarily higher, while for KCB it is necessarily higher than the agreeable. Secondly, for KCB, the aesthetic judgment is passed on the known object, for Kant it is not so.

According to Kant in aesthetic appreciation, the representation is not referred 'to the object by means of understanding with a view to cognition, but by means of imagination, we refer the representation to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure'.⁵ This means that when one says that this rose is beautiful, it is irrelevant whether the rose-appearance is a real rose or a picture or merely an image in the mind. This rose is, therefore, not a known object in the sense that the representations are organized through concepts of understanding into an object.

Kant distinguishes the aesthetic pleasure from the feeling of agreeableness that brings in gratification and the feeling of good that brings in the notion of objective worth. 'The agreeable is what gratifies a man, the beautiful what simply pleases him, and the good what is esteemed (approved), i.e. that on which he sets an objective worth.'⁶ Since the other two delights—delights in the agreeable and the good—are coupled with interest, they are 'determined not merely by the representation of the object, but also by the represented bond of connexion between the subject and the real existence of the object. It is not merely the object but also its real existence that pleases. On the other hand, the judgment of taste is simply contemplative, i.e. it is a judgment which is indifferent as to the existence of an object and decides how its character stands with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.'⁷

Thus for Kant it is not on the object as known but only on object as felt that the aesthetic judgment is passed, while for KCB, it is on the known object that the aesthetic judgment is passed. Hence the problem how the known content and the felt content are related in a single consciousness. Kant does not face such a problem.

When KCB talks of value of a known object, he may have in his mind not only aesthetic evaluation but also moral and religious evaluations of the object as clean and sacred and he proposes to give a single theory for all these types of evaluation of known objects. He seems to suggest that what is relevant or important for a value

judgment is not transcending of practical interest (because value judgment is passed on known objects) but transcending of personal interest in the particularity of fact and treating the given object as only a kind of symbol embodying a real eternal value. He also suggests a gradation from direct feeling of an object to the sympathy with such feeling and a feeling of sympathy with sympathy and says, 'Aesthetic enjoyment thus stands on a level higher than ordinary sympathy which again constitutes a level higher than primary object feeling' (I p. 352).

Thus value judgment is not reflective knowing but reflective feeling.

Valuation implies a feeling consciousness both of the felt content as such and of the known content as such. The known content does not cease to be known by being reflectively felt and the felt content . . . though not known, is endowed with a kind of objectivity by reflection. Both being objective in a sense to the same reflective feeling, they can be spoken of as though they were related in a judgment. (p. 287)

KCB explains how the felt content is objectivized in reflective feeling. Very often I know of another person's feeling on the evidence over and above the mere evidence of my feeling. 'But', says KCB,

sometimes I am also aware without any such evidence that one must or should feel the way I feel. I am here implicitly aware in my feeling towards the object that it is not my feeling only; that the object would be so felt by anyone or what is the same thing that the felt content is somehow in the object.

When I take something to be beautiful, for example, I feel implicitly that anyone will find it so, as I believe, when I take it to be of the colour red. I do not say that it is red to me but only that it is red and so I say it is beautiful. If asked how I know it is beautiful to others, I would say it must or should be so and if it is falsified, as it well may be, I would doubt as I would doubt my senses.

To believe unquestioningly without evidence that we feel in a certain way in respect of the object and to believe that the felt content is in the object are one and the same belief, neither being prior to the other. Here then the feeling that I reflectively feel is not taken as anyone's feeling in particular: it is unappropriated or impersonalized rather than universalized. The content of it also is consciously distinguished from it and taken to be on the level with the object to which it is referred. Thus the content of a reflective feeling as the feeling of the impersonal feeling of the same content is definitely

objectivized through the mediation of impersonal feeling. (p. 287)

The known content and the felt content are both objective but not objective in the same sense. The known content is objective in the sense that it is capable of being spoken of without reference to the consciousness of it. But felt content is objective in the sense that it is a felt content of impersonalised feeling and not in the sense that it can be spoken of without reference to the feeling-consciousness. Therefore, value cannot be said to be a known content.

Moreover speakability of value is different from the speakability of a known content. To mark this distinction he distinguishes between 'speaking' and 'speaking of'. He says,

We can speak of the known content and this value together as both objective to the reflective feeling. To speak of their relation would be really to speak the reflective feeling and not to speak of it. In exclaiming, we speak our feeling and not to speak of it and when we command, we speak and do not speak of the command (p. 288).

As pointed out earlier, KCB here anticipates the emotivist distinction between the 'assertion of feeling' and expression of feeling and the view that value judgment evinces, expresses emotion or feeling and does not describe it. However, two points must be noted here. According to KCB, (i) what is expressed in a value judgment is not the first level feeling but the reflective feeling, and (ii) the first-level feeling is impersonal feeling. The proper form of evaluation, therefore, is not 'the object is beautiful', but 'how beautiful is the object'. He says that we express ourselves in this way, 'to mark the objectivity of the feeling-content induced by the impersonalization of the feeling to indicate in fact that it is not arbitrarily that we thus evaluate the object' (p. 288).

In evaluating a known object, the known object is subjectivized and the felt content is objectivized. To know an object is not to feel it as unfelt. But to feel that something is merely known is to feel it as unfelt, neutral or indifferent. 'To the extent a known object appears flat and uninteresting it is felt as merely known' (p. 288). 'In valuation, we are feelingly aware of the known object as unfelt even when the object is being felt.' In evaluating an object, its neutral or unfelt character is distinguished from its felt character or value. The object is understood as having the former and as not really having the latter. 'Value is thus referred to the object, which is understood as not really having it and may in this sense be called a floating or free adjective of the object' (p. 289).

The value of a known object is a content felt to be one with the object and the object is felt as other than the felt content. That is, unless the known object is felt as unfelt at the time when we feel towards it, the felt content cannot be called value. The objectivity of value consists in feeling oneness of the felt content with the object and this felt content is the content of an impersonalised feeling in respect of the object. 'The reflective feeling of the value as felt and the object as known is the feeling of the objectivity of value and of the unfelt character of the object' (p. 289). To evaluate an object is to become feelingly aware of it. And in this awareness, the object is known to have a certain character independently of how we feel it and is felt to have a certain character in an impersonalised feeling. The latter is contrasted by KCB with the former by calling it a free or floating adjective.

Though KCB draws a distinction between an adjective like red and an adjective like beautiful and calls the latter a floating adjective he raises the question whether value is an adjective at all. He explains the distinction between substantive and adjective by saying 'the substantive is one with adjective which is however distinct from it' (p. 289). Red colour is not a flower but flower is a red colour. Applying this criterion he says, 'value is not felt as other than the known object but the known object is felt as other than the value. So properly speaking value is no adjective of the object' (p. 289).

However, KCB is aware that there is a general intellectual prejudice that though value is not an adjective it is in some sense subordinate to the object because 'while the object does not imply value, value has necessarily to be referred to the object' (p. 290). He thinks that unless we get rid of this notion of subordination, this necessary reference of value to object, value as such will not be understood. He proposes to show by critical examination of valuation that not only is value judgment no judgment (amounting to knowledge) but also that value should be independent of valuation.

According to KCB, value judgment 'is primarily an exclamation somehow toned down into information' (p. 290). 'An exclamation disguised as information' (p. 289). Because 'we cannot primarily speak of value, that we really speak the value and then artificially speak of it. Thus the speakability of value as information is in the last resort a necessary illusion like the speakability of the unspeakable' (p. 291). Therefore value judgment is not informative, is not a judgment claiming to give knowledge. It is an exclamation. This view of KCB appears to be similar to the emotivist view. Ayer says, 'Such aesthetic words as "beautiful" and "hideous" are employed, as ethical words are employed, not to make statements of fact but simply to express certain feelings and evoke a certain response.'⁸ However, KCB's understanding of exclamation is quite

different from that of, say, A.J. Ayer. While Ayer compares value judgments as exclamations and expressions of feelings with cry of pain and as expressing no genuine proposition at all,⁹ for KCB, 'Exclamatory speech is like an impersonal proposition: the predicate is all and the subject seems to be nowhere' (p. 290). Let me put KCB's view in his own words:

A person exclaims 'grand' and so he can say 'lightning' or 'rains'. There is a difference however, for when the exclamation 'grand' is completed into a sentence, we should say 'how grand is this scene' and 'not this scene is grand', the predicate still retaining the principal position. This indicates the relation between object and its value: the known content here is subordinate to the felt content. 'How grand is this scene' means that grandeur—the value, is expressed or embodied in the scene. In the platonic way we may say, the scene partakes of grandeur as the individual partakes of the Idea. Expression appears to be the least mystical description of the relation. Value is expressed in the object as a feeling is expressed in the face. Both the terms here—object and value—are substantive and both are interesting though we are interested in the object because of the feeling or value embodied in it and not in the latter because of the former. It may be, the object as *expressive* is as interesting as the value expressed, but the object as *merely known* is in any case subordinate in the so-called value judgment, to the value expressed in it. Value, we said, is not appreciated as such till the object to which it is referred is felt as known or unfelt or neutral. When the known object is so felt, it is felt to be subordinate to the value, being so felt because of the value. The neutral character of the object is as we pointed out within the content of the feeling that is felt. (p. 290)

KCB illustrates the difference between three levels of feelings in the following way. A person says informatively, 'It is a cool breeze'. This expresses the felt character of the breeze and not the subjective feeling of it. The person may exclaim, 'How cool is the breeze'. This expresses the feeling. But the person may say 'How I enjoy the cool breeze'. This expresses the feeling of feeling. He says,

To speak exclamatorily of the cool breeze is to express reflective feeling but to speak exclamatorily again of the reflective feeling is to express feeling of a higher grade. The value of an object gets freed as a substantive from the object of which it appears as an adjective and acquires the status of an absolute only in this feeling beyond reflective feeling. (p. 291)

KCB distinguishes between relative and absolute value and thinks that the word value should properly be confined to the absolute value. He says, 'value is nothing if not absolute' (p. 292). This, according to him, is

a stage of feeling beyond reflective feeling, an absolute or transcendental feeling the expression of which is not only no information but not even a speakable valuation. It is a pure exclamation in which we do not speak of anything or rather in which we symbolically speak of the unspeakable as such. (p. 292)

IV

The main difference between valuation of a willed content and that of a known content is that the latter is properly expressed as exclamation, while 'the former is an exclamation that is at the same time an imperative' (p. 292).

To say that an act willed is good is a periphrasis for 'how good is this act', which again means 'how we should all act thus'. To say 'how we should act thus' is not simply to utter an imperative but is to wonder at this universal or impersonal obligatoriness, to feel the sacredness of the *ought*. (p. 292)

KCB distinguishes moral evaluation of a willed act from (i) moral or spiritual evaluation of a known object as clean or sacred; (ii) admiration for a willed act as noble or magnificent, this being a sort of aesthetic valuation of the look of the act; and from (iii) the consciousness of right or wrong willing in the willing itself, which is not the valuation at all (pp. 292-93). 'Moral valuation proper would be the valuation of the act—not as it looks but as the inner willing that is finished—as good or evil.' (p. 292)

As we have seen earlier a willed act, i.e. the content of willing is distinct from willing and has an empirical embodiment which however apart from the willing is not even a known content. KCB takes an example of a mere bodily act, namely an acrobatic feat. An acrobatic feat is like an object and is valued almost wholly in the aesthetic way. Yet the fact that it is willed makes some difference. 'It is not merely the outward look of the act that is judged' but it is the look as expressing the success of the psychic effort, the willing, put forth that has value. Let us take a bodily act of moving a limb. The movement of the limb is not something given to and passively observed by consciousness as I perceive movement of some physical object or even of someone else's body. It is a motor experience of doing something, of moving the limb or having it moved. It is not given to willing but is constituted by and the embodiment of willing.

'The embodiment then of a willing is no content at all apart from the willing' (p. 294) and yet is distinct from the willing.

KCB says,

To say that the acrobatic feat is splendid is to say that the will is wonderfully efficient though the will is judged because of its triumphant expression in the body.

At a higher stage we speak of a splendid act of bravery. Here the psychic act is judged more or less aesthetically; though its value consists in the measure of freedom of willing behind it which however would not be judged as splendid but for its expression in the psychic act.

Everywhere then the judgment on an embodied willing is aesthetic relatively to the judgment on the ideal willing that determines it though the value depends on or involves the moral of the ideal willing. (p. 294)

Thus an acrobatic feat is judged aesthetically as an embodiment of the psychic act of bravery, which is judged as an embodiment of free willing. This willing too is judged good or evil only as it is taken to have some kind of being. It has to be understood at least as *this* act in order to be valued even morally. (p. 294)

Valuation ranges from the pure aesthetic valuation of an object to the moral valuation of an act considered simply as the finished being of free willing without any further empirical determination. Beauty, we have seen, has an objective, though not a known, being, the objectivity being mediated through an impersonal feeling. Moral value is objective in the sense of being mediated through an impersonal willing, goodness consists in being eternally or impersonally willed 'But it is not objective being but objective negation or freedom that is eternally willed' (p. 295). Negation is information when a predicate is denied of the subject which is not itself denied at least as a possible existent. But when it is so denied, there is nothing about which the information is given. Now, to say that an act is good is to say that it is free. This is to deny the bare temporal or empirical being of the act. Such a free act is real beyond all empiricity; that is real as constituted by the free willing, without willing it is nothing.

Aesthetic evaluation is no judgment because the subject of the judgment, i.e. the object valued, is subordinate to the predicate 'beauty', which appears at least as a floating character and is really no adjective but a substantive that is expressed in the substantive subject. In moral valuation the subject of the judgment, i.e. the act valued, is considered as a being in the sense simply of being finished or having a bare position in time. Its value, i.e. goodness is

only felt freedom. Thus moral evaluation or judgment on the one hand turns the process of willing into a finished act with bare position in time—this is the subject of moral valuation, i.e. the act evaluated, on the other hand, by calling it good that is free, it negates the objectivity of the subject, because freedom being the essence of the act, the act is nothing apart from willing. Thus the reason why moral valuation is denied to be a judgment is different from that of denying aesthetic evaluation to be judgment 'Moral valuation is not judgment because it is not even literal information.' (p. 295)

To say that an act of willing is evil is to say that it is not freely willed; it is not an embodiment of willing but there was an illusion of willing. The illusion of willing consists in subjectively feeling that one is freely acting when one is really being dragged by some emotion or passion or interest or self motive. Even in good willing there is the consciousness of not having sufficiently exercised one's freedom. 'To exercise freedom is always to work against the downward current—*pāpavahā Nādi*—which however, is still will or freedom and not nature, the freedom to be not free' (p. 296). Moral self-approbation is the consciousness of having exercised our freedom, which could have been however further exercised, while moral self-condemnation is the feeling of not having exercised our freedom against this downward current.

KCB's account of moral judgment differs from that of Kant and also from the linguistic version of non-cognitivism. Moral judgments as prescriptions or categorical imperatives like, 'Promises ought to be kept' are not judgments because they are not indicative sentences. But judgments asserting an action to be good are judgments because they assert that it fulfils the moral law or the ought to will or that it is such as ought to exist as an object. 'Neither ought-to-will nor ought to be', says KCB, 'is a value; value is nothing if not at least partially actualized in an object, while ought means what completely transcends the actual' (p. 332). KCB, therefore, says, 'In Kantian ethics at any rate, there is no moral value, for the "good" means nothing apart from 'ought to will', no self-subsistent value which the will is to realize' (p. 332). Moral judgments as Kant treats them in his second critique are not value judgments proper. For KCB moral judgments are passed on acts conceived as embodiment of willing. Kant does not at least explicitly treat act as an embodiment of willing.

Though KCB's analysis of moral judgments share in common with the linguistic version of non-cognitivism, the idea that moral judgments are not only expressions of feeling but they also involve imperative, it differs from the latter in raising questions about the relation between content of will and will, in holding that an act is an

embodiment of willing, in holding a different conception of freedom of will and so on.

Thus KCB seems to reject the cognitivist theory of value judgments—both naturalist and non-naturalist or intuitionist—that value can be a known content. His non-cognitivist version differs from the linguistic version of non-cognitivism in regarding value judgments as exclamation in which the subject is subordinated to the value predicate and is regarded as an embodiment either of eternal real beauty—the absolute for feeling, or freedom—the absolute for will. He has been able to transcend the national and geographical boundaries in philosophy and has been able to make a genuine contribution to the theory of value which cannot be dubbed as either Indian or western, classical/traditional or modern, but one which has a genuine universal appeal.

NOTES

1. The writings of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya referred to in this article are from his *Studies in Philosophy*, Vols. I and II, edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956—especially Vol. I, Chapter 7, 'The Concept of Rasa'; Vol. II, Chapter 2, 'The Concept of Philosophy'; Vol. II, Chapter 3, 'The Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Form'; Vol. II, Chapter 13, 'The Concept of Value'; Vol. II, Chapter 4, Section VI, 'Judgements of fact, value and ought to be'. Page numbers given in brackets, when given without volume numbers, refer to pages from Vol. II.
2. K.C. Bhattacharyya's 'The Concept of Value' and 'The Concept of the Absolute and Its Alternative Forms', were published in 1934, 'The Concept of Philosophy' in 1936. A.J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* was published in 1936 and C.L. Stevenson's article 'The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms' was published in *Mind* in 1937.
3. J.L. Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*, Pelican, 1986, pp. 20–25.
4. A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1964, p. 109.
5. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgment*, translated by J.C. Meredith, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 41.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
8. A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, op.cit., p. 113.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

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[According to the editor of the above volumes, 'These *Studies in Philosophy* represent all the published and only a few unpublished philosophical writings of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya. There remains over an immense mass of manuscripts which will, perhaps, remain unpublished for all time to come'.

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'The Beautiful and the Ugly'— This unpublished essay written in 1925, came out in the *Memorial Volume* of 1958. Not included in *Studies in Philosophy*, vols. 1 and 2.

[The above two articles were later combined by Bhattacharyya into one article entitled 'The Concept of Rasa' which too remained unpublished during Bhattacharyya's lifetime but was later included in *Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 1, edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956.]

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Is *mokṣa sântā* or *ananta*?

MAHĀVĪRA'S ANSWER TO THE QUESTION

[With this issue, we are starting a new section entitled *Notes and Queries* in the *JICPR*. Most students of the subject have always some problems with what they read, or will like something to be clarified about which they are in doubt as to whether what they understand is correct or not. The section will provide a forum for all such queries and it is hoped that eminent scholars of the subject will help in elucidating and clarifying the issues so raised. Readers are invited to take advantage of this new forum in the *JICPR*.—Editor]

Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī in his monumental work entitled *Āgama Aur Tripiṭaka* reports an incident where Mahāvīra is supposed to answer the question whether *mokṣa* or liberation has also an end or is endless. The answer is tantalizing in the extreme, as it says that from the viewpoint of substantiality and spatiality, it has an end, while from the point of view of temporality and existence, it has no end. Furthermore, the answer gives the exact extent of the space which *mokṣa* is supposed to occupy. This would make *mokṣa* spatial in character and hence as, necessarily, having parts of itself and divisible in nature, if space is regarded as necessarily so. Also, as *mokṣa* is being considered from the viewpoint of being a substance which occupies space and time and has states of itself (if the term '*bhāva*' is interpreted in this sense), then it would be an object like any other object.

Moreover, as the same approach is adopted in answering other questions which have been troubling Skandaka for a long time, it will follow that all entities have to be understood in terms of *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva* and there can be no entities which can be conceived independently of any of these or all of them together. It will also be interesting to know if there are any other entities which have the same characteristics as *mokṣa* and if so, how is it distinguished from them.

The exact statement as given in Muni Śrī Nagarāja Jī's book is the following:

Mahāvīra—Oh Skandaka, you also asked yourself if *mokṣa* has also an end or not. This question too will have to be considered from the point of view of *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (area or space), *kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (being or existence). From the point of view of *dravya*, *mokṣa* is one and it has an end. From the point of view of *kṣetra*, it has a length and breadth¹ of forty-five lakh *yojanas* and its