

SAMVĀDA

A Dialogue between

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Two Philosophical Traditions

Edited by

DAYA KRISHNA

AND

MOHINDRA

MUKUND LATE

INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHICAL
RESEARCH
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*A Dialogue between
Two Philosophical Traditions*

Edited by
DAYA KRISHNA
M.P. REGE
R.C. DWIVEDI
MUKUND LATH

INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL
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दृष्टिमुन्मील्य लोकस्य न्यायदीपेन भास्वता ।
हन्त शुक्लमहाभागैः कस्मान्नेत्रे निमीलिते ॥
तद्दृशितपथा नूनं संवादः प्रचरिष्यति ।
तर्कप्रदीप्तशास्त्रार्थं शुक्लो नः प्रेरयिष्यति ॥
प्राच्यपाश्चात्यदृष्टीनामालोचनपुरस्सरम् ।
नवीनमार्गनिर्माणं हार्दं श्राद्धं भविष्यति ॥

संवादास्तु भवन्त्ये बाहुल्येन सुमेधसाम् ।
नैकरूपतया सर्वे ते मन्तव्या विपश्चिता ॥

ĀNANDAVARDHANA, *Dhvanyāloka*

There are bound to be plenty of
coincidences amongst great minds.
But all of them should not be
taken by the wise as being identical.

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PREFACE

This is, perhaps, the first record of a dialogue between philosophers trained in the classical Indian tradition of philosophizing and those trained in the western tradition on a philosophical theme which is both contemporary, and primarily western. That India has had a long tradition of at least two millennia of active philosophizing in the fields of logic, ethics, aesthetics, epistemology and metaphysics is at least vaguely known to the philosophical community in the world today, though many in the west feel hesitant in according it the title of 'philosophy' in their sense of the word. But few, even in India, are aware that the tradition of active philosophizing within the classical frameworks of Indian philosophical thought is not dead, that there are hundreds of living thinkers who still pursue with intellectual vigour and rigour the classical concerns of Indian thought. The reason why philosophers trained in the western traditions of philosophizing and located in the universities built on the western model in this country do not know about these pandits lies primarily in the fact that these scholars carry on their intellectual activity in a language which is generally unknown to persons trained in the western traditions of knowledge. Few people know, in India or elsewhere, that Sanskrit is still the *living lingua franca* of traditional scholarship in India, that the only language in which intellectual dialogue can be carried on between these persons from different parts of India, which may be as distant from each other as Kashmir and Kerala or Manipur and Gujarat, is Sanskrit and Sanskrit alone, as the only other language they know is their regional language which are as diverse as the regions they belong to. Unlike Latin, therefore, Sanskrit is the living language of traditional scholarship in contemporary India, and if one wants to enter into a dialogue with this tradition, one will have to do so in Sanskrit or have facilities for bilingual translation from Sanskrit into English and *vice versa*. This, though so obvious when stated, seems to have escaped the notice of everybody till Prof. Rege realized it and took active steps to realize the preconditions of any successful dialogue between the two intellectual traditions which are not only culturally

and civilizationally far apart, but also do not share a common language through which the conceptual distances could be bridged.

The Rege experiment, of which this is a record, was unique in another respect also. One could perhaps find its halting precursors in the meeting at Tirupati when Prof. K. Satchidananda Murty was its Vice-Chancellor or even in some earlier experiments at Jaipur which had resulted in the publication of a monograph entitled *Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives*.¹ Yet, none of these had really clicked. They were good while they lasted. But they did not generate that feeling of discovery, enthusiasm and success which the Rege seminar did at Poona. They were, so to say, abortive beginnings which did not lead to any successful fruition. The Rege experiment, on the other hand, led to a series of successive activities each giving rise to another as is the way of all creative activity. In fact, nothing was pre-thought or pre-planned. Rather, each step showed the way for the next—and the next, for the next next. The imaginative support of institutions like the Indian Council of Philosophical Research and the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan in the beginning and of the Tibetan Institute of Higher Studies at Sarnath, the Central Institute of Indian Languages at Mysore, the Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth at Tirupati, the Adyar Library and Research Centre at Madras and later the Ford Foundation at Delhi have helped the activity continue, diversify and develop in many directions till a stage has been reached where it is not unusual to find Sanskrit pandits taking active part in discussion in seminars devoted to philosophical issues.

The Poona meeting, in fact, had led to a different kind of meeting organized jointly by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research and the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan to think of ways and means of revitalizing the Indian philosophical tradition to which a large number of scholars, both traditional and modern, interested in classical Indian philosophy were invited. After two days of intensive discussion on the subject the meeting recommended, amongst other things, that a Who's Who of traditional pandits in various fields of knowledge be prepared and that besides organizing the dialogues on various intellectual issues of contemporary relevance, pandits in those areas of traditional philosophy where scholarship was fast declining be invited to suggest how

knowledge in these fields may be restored, safeguarded and developed. *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Kashmir Śaivism* were indicated as such areas where the work could first begin. Accordingly, meetings of outstanding traditional pandits in the field of *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Kashmir Śaivism* were held at Sarnath, Tirupati and Srinagar respectively. The *Nyāya* meeting at Sarnath had the active organizational and financial support of the Tibetan Institute of Higher Studies and its Director, Prof. S. Rinpoche, who has always gone out of his way to support us in such activities. The meeting on *Mīmāṃsā* at Tirupati was totally financed by the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan whose Director, Dr. Mandan Mishra, was one of the moving spirits behind all these activities and without his enthusiasm and support, not much would have been achieved as he knew practically everyone in the world of traditional scholarship in India and could bridge the gulf between us. The meeting on *Kashmir Śaivism* had the organizational support of the Department of Sanskrit of the Kashmir University and of other scholars in the town.

In all these meetings, discussion was organized around issues previously formulated and circulated in Sanskrit to the potential participants, the last session always being devoted to the question as to what are the deficiencies in the system as handed down to us and how should we try to develop it further. The very asking of these questions set the mind of the traditional scholars in a different direction. The focus of their attention was, so to say, turned from the past to the future.

These have not been the only spin-offs of the Poona seminar. There have been others, and they are worth mentioning also. One has been the extension of the dialogue to areas other than the strictly philosophical and to traditions other than the Sanskritic. The first was done in the field of linguistics where a dialogue between traditional pandits and modern linguists was held on 'Current Issues in Linguistics'. The whole thing had the administrative and financial support of the Central Institute of Indian Languages and its dynamic Director, Prof. D.P. Pattanayak, as well as that of the Adyar Library and Research Centre and its well-known scholar-Director, Prof. Kunjuni Raja. The issues were framed in consultation with eminent linguists not only at the Mysore Institute but also those at the Central Institute of English and Foreign Language

ages, Hyderabad and Deccan College, Pune. As for the movement outside the Sanskritic tradition, it was triggered off by a chance remark of Prof. K. Satchidananda Murty as to why the dialogue with the tradition be confined to Sanskrit pandits alone. This led to another path-breaking initiative on the part of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research and resulted in the organization of a dialogue on philosophical problems with the *Ulema*, the Arabic scholars representing the West Asian philosophical tradition in India. The dialogue was organized under the leadership of Prof. Jamal Khwaja of Aligarh Muslim University and was an eye-opener to all those who participated in it.

If the chance remark of Prof. K. Satchidananda Murty led to an awareness of the diversity of intellectual traditions in India with which dialogues on contemporary issues were to be held, an accidental question on the part of some pandits at the Nyāya meeting at Sarnath led to the organization of Summer/Winter schools in Modern Logic and *Navya-Nyāya* for traditional and modern scholars together, later. During a discussion on the way relations have been treated in modern logic as contrasted to the way they have been treated in *Nyāya*, some of the younger pandits had remarked that they would like to know more about it. We all felt that it will be interesting to see what effect an acquaintance with modern logic would have on a traditional scholar steeped in a totally different way of looking at logical problems. The Indian Council of Philosophical Research, as usual, took the lead in supporting the idea and later, the Ford Foundation came in to help the project further. Prof. Rege once again was the lynch-pin in the whole experiment and in his usual way added a new dimension to it. He suggested that along with the teaching of modern logic to traditional pandits, we might also simultaneously provide facilities for teaching *Navya-Nyāya* to those persons trained in modern logic who would like to learn it, followed by an intensive seminar on issues in comparative logic arising out of the simultaneous study of two major traditions of logic as developed historically in the world up till now. The idea has been implemented with interesting results which, hopefully, would be presented to the scholarly world soon.

The Rege experiment, thus, has more than justified itself. Had it achieved far less, it would still have been worthwhile. But when

one looks back and surveys what has been achieved since the pioneering dialogue at Poona proceedings of which are being presented here, one wonders if all this could really be true. If one further recalls the ethos in which most institutions work in India, one can only wonder at the miracle. How could so many accidents have converged together to facilitate each step further? There are sceptics, as always, who doubt about the worth of the whole enterprise. There are others who believe that it is a movement positively in the wrong direction. For them, there is no need to resurrect the past or to make it alive. Let that which deserves to die, be allowed to die. One hears these sceptics and cynics and strict modernisers and wonders how long the accidents will be allowed to happen, or the miracle last. Perhaps, the publication of the Poona Transcript would silence the doubters—at least the more reasonable ones among them—and herald the beginning of a new cycle of activities even more exciting and fruitful than the first one. At least, it is with this hope that this transcript is placed before the scholarly world.

The rumour about the Rege experiment and the Poona transcript has been there for long. And, many had begun to doubt whether the thing would ever see the light of the day. The story of the transcript and its editing is tortuous and long. But only those would appreciate it who have ever done a similar thing on their own. Transcribing a dialogue when there were no written papers is a difficult enterprise, but imagine the difficulty when the dialogue is in two languages as different from one other as English and Sanskrit and when it is difficult to find persons with equal competence in both, particularly at the level where transcribing from the tapes is concerned. Further, there is not only the problem of two languages, but of two different conceptual structures, two different ways of looking at problems and analysing them—and it is almost impossible to find a person equally at home in both. Arindam* was, of course, an exception and we were lucky to have him at Poona and elsewhere. But he was not there for editing. And to make a dialogue transcript readable and yet keep the flavour of the dialogue-atmosphere, is an assignment not easy to achieve. That the combined labour of Prof. M. P. Rege, Prof. R.C. Dwivedi and Dr. Mukund Lath—all very busy persons—were able to achieve this in no small measure was due to their

dedication and commitment to this whole continuing enterprise which would hardly have been feasible without them.

And now that the tapes have been transcribed, and the transcription edition ready for publication, we hope that the publication will prove as inspiring to its readers as the original experiment was to those who participated in it and as fruitful and rich in consequences as the original enterprise has been.

To the late Pt. Badarinath Shukla, the towering pandit of the older generation, this volume is dedicated. Without his inspiration, enthusiasm, affection and guidance little would have been achieved as he was the bridge between the old and the new, the traditional and the modern. He was, so to say, the modern amongst the traditional, and the traditional amongst the moderns—and hence the bridge-builder *par excellence* revered by everybody, acceptable to everybody.

DAYA KRISHNA

INTRODUCTION

For the last two hundred years and more many western and western-trained Indian scholars have devoted themselves to the study of 'traditional' Indian philosophical thought. The fruits of their labours are available in the form of translations of classical works into modern European languages, works which attempt to render in these languages the doctrines of the various philosophical schools, *darśanas* or *matas*, scholarly papers and books which try carefully to explicate the basic concepts in terms of which problems were formulated by the different schools and their solutions worked out, and sometimes to trace these concepts to primitive myths and rituals, and works which undertake a critical examination of the developed doctrines of the different schools with a view to bringing out their presuppositions and basic premises, and also exposing the occasional weak links in their internal logic and fallacies in the supporting arguments which mar their claim to truth. Comprehensive histories of Indian philosophy have also been published like the monumental *History of Indian Philosophy* by the late S.N. Dasgupta. Thus a voluminous exegetical literature has come into existence which has considerably advanced and sharpened our understanding of the Indian philosophical tradition. It has also made Indian philosophical thought for the first time accessible to those readers, western and Indian alike, who lack Sanskrit or have not mastered the peculiar idiom, replete with an abstruse terminology, in which philosophical argumentation was and is carried on in Indian philosophy. We all owe a large debt of gratitude to these scholars.

For most Indian scholars who worked assiduously in this field, Indian philosophy was a part, perhaps the most precious part, of their cultural patrimony which it was their duty to conserve and make available to the world community. That such a task had become necessary for them itself implied that they were no more working from within the Indian philosophical tradition, but had stepped outside it and that however intimate their knowledge of it might be, they were looking at it from an external point of view.

However, a contemporary *Naiyāyika* will fail to understand the talk of preserving the heritage of Indian philosophical thought. He

will be busy expounding the *Nyāya* doctrine on certain philosophical issues and in the process advancing, if necessary, fresh arguments to defend the *Nyāya* position against the latest attack on it. He is engaged in philosophical thinking and not in the activity of conserving philosophical heritage. He is addressing, through the shared and time-hallowed medium of Sanskrit, the contemporary adherents of rival schools like *Mīmāṃsā* or *Advaita* and also fellow-*Naiyāyikas* on some common philosophical concerns and what he has to say, if judged to be significant enough by his peers, would become an increment, however small, added to the accumulated stock of philosophical literature in Sanskrit. A western-trained scholar on the other hand, writes not in Sanskrit but in some other language, these days commonly in English. With this change in language, the nature and point of what he is doing suffers a radical change. The medium affects the message. The basic terms in which he articulates his understanding of Indian doctrines inevitably remain western, terms which have originated and crystallized in the course of the development of the western philosophical tradition and the broader cognitive tradition, in the debates and controversies, discoveries and criticism which propelled it. His understanding of the doctrine could be as inward as possible but his statement of it involves his lifting it from the Indian conceptual framework within which it has been developed and shaped and setting it within the western framework. In expounding it he has to translate it. This act of transfer carries with it an implicit criterion of evaluation. The Indian doctrine is significant to the extent that it raised or touched upon or foreshadowed conceptual issues with which the ongoing philosophical debate in the West is concerned, and in tackling them deployed modes of arguments which were similar to those used by western thinkers, leading to parallel epistemological or ontological conclusions. It is the western philosophical tradition which yields the yardstick by which to measure the relevance or importance of Indian thought. The cognitive and practical concerns of western philosophy are taken as central or natural and Indian thought has to prove its worth by establishing that somehow its speculations and conclusions had a direct or at least an indirect bearing on them. In the prevailing circumstances western-trained Indian students of Indian philosophy quite naturally adopted this point of view

of looking at Indian philosophy and one of the most thriving areas of philosophical studies in India has been that of 'comparative philosophy' which is devoted to exploring similarities between western and Indian doctrines such as *Nyāya* and realism, *Mīmāṃsā* and hermeneutics and so forth, and even between the views propounded by major western philosophers and classical Indian philosophers such as Kant and Śaṅkara, or Whitehead and Vācaspati Miśra. In the early decades of the century when Absolute Idealism was the reigning philosophy in Britain and to a lesser extent in America, it was to the idealistic *Advaita* and other varieties of *Vedānta* that Indian commentators pointed to representative Indian doctrines. Later when the tide of realism and analysis swept the Anglo-Saxon philosophical scene, the emphasis shifted to *Nyāya*. Still later, when Anglo-Saxon philosophy came to adopt a highly sophisticated and technical idiom as a proper and necessary medium of philosophical discussion, it was to the sophisticated technicalities of *Navya-Nyāya* that Indian commentators turned for something to match it with.

The result of this dominance of the western philosophical tradition has been that the Indian tradition is treated more or less as one which essentially belongs to the past, as one which had its day even though it continues to linger on. It is regarded as a proper object of historical rather than of philosophical interest. The contribution it can make to current philosophical debate can only be indirect. When the doctrines of an Indian philosophical school or an individual thinker are subjected to critical examination, the purpose is not to identify the elements in it which successfully stand scrutiny so as to incorporate them, after necessary elaboration into the corpus of accepted philosophical knowledge. The purpose rather is to ascertain and assess the contribution it makes to the development of Indian philosophical thought. To put the point in Indian terms, Indian philosophical theories were never allowed the role of *pūrvapakṣa* or *siddhānta* in the western philosophical debate even after they had become accessible. They remained securely embedded in the particular, exclusive context of the Indian tradition.

This phenomenon was quite understandable as far as western philosophers were concerned. The philosophical problems they were engaged in arose from developments in the areas of know-

ledge, values, and social organisation and institutions which occurred in their own society, and from the responses of their predecessors to these. If the question of the relation between the western philosophical tradition and other traditions was posed to them they would have rightly claimed that their philosophical tradition was very largely self-contained so that they did not have to look beyond it for intellectual resources which could help them to arrive at a better understanding of the nature of the problems they were grappling with and the lines along which solutions to them could be explored. But the astonishing thing is that even in India philosophical activity ran on two parallel grooves. One form of the activity was to participate in the on-going western philosophical debate and thus contribute to its progress. In western eyes such contributions could only be marginal. In Indian eyes it had considerable importance, for the capacity to contribute to the western debate was an index to the success with which western philosophical thought had been assimilated and it was believed that this assimilation gave inwardness and depth to the necessary process of modernisation of Indian society. The other form of philosophical activity was addressed to the explication of the concepts and the exegesis of the theories of the Indian schools. These were exercises in the history of philosophy. These two activities remained apart. There was never an interplay of western and Indian philosophical ideas. To say that for Indian thinkers the Indian philosophical tradition was their own would be to utter a tautology. But it was their own because of their cultural inheritance and not in the sense that they worked within it and that their individual thought contributed to develop it. For them the western and the Indian traditions were equal but separate. When they philosophized they took their stand within the western tradition. When they turned to the Indian tradition, they worked on it with the aim of reclaiming past treasures of thought.

When one talks of Indian philosophers one has in mind western-trained Indian philosophers. But there has always been in India a countrywide community of philosophers, who worked within the Indian tradition and were engaged in formulating, criticising and reformulating philosophical theories through the medium of Sanskrit. This is the community of pandits or *Śāstris*. But they were never counted as philosophers. The role which western-

trained Indian philosophers in their scheme of things had assigned to them was that of repositories of the knowledge of traditional thought. That is to say they were regarded as scholars and not as philosophers. Certainly without their assistance the great Indian classical texts would remain impenetrable to anyone who was not educated in the traditional way. And this was their main use in the eyes of western-trained Indian philosophers. The pandits had kept alive our ancient philosophical tradition in extremely adverse circumstances for which we all owe a great debt of gratitude to them. And they are the best equipped to help in the task of reclaiming traditional Indian philosophy for the benefit of western-trained Indians and westerners. Their aid or collaboration alone made it possible to render this thought in a form which was adjusted to the understanding of this audience.

Traditional pandits, however, had a different conception of their own role. They proudly described themselves as *Naiyāyikas*, *Mīmāṃsakas*, etc., i.e., as exponents and champions of the philosophical doctrines of a particular school. They regarded it as their proper job, in this capacity, to advance criticism against the tenets of rival schools and the arguments which supported them, and to defend the views of their own school against attacks from others. They would also occasionally be led to reformulate a part of the traditional view for meeting objections raised against them which appeared to be valid. The modifications and innovations which they thus introduced in the body of the traditional doctrine would appear to be slight and insignificant when viewed against the background of the continuity of the essential part of the doctrine over a long stretch of time and hence were likely to be missed.

Another reason why they were often missed was that the Indian philosophical tradition has been largely oral. It has mainly maintained itself and progressed through the medium of live debates and discussions at which pandits came face to face to thrash out philosophical problems, for a *śāstrārtha*. The corrections and additions to the traditional doctrine on a particular point which these philosophical meets led to, will be incorporated in case they found general acceptance, for the oral exposition of the doctrine which pandit-teachers gave for the benefit of their students. It was only gradually that they found a place in written texts. The written texts themselves were composed from time to time to incorporate

the improvements that had been made in the doctrine of a school over a period of time. They marked stages in the evolution of the doctrine. Western-trained philosophers were cut-off from such philosophical discussions because of their lack of knowledge of Sanskrit and of deep and extensive knowledge of traditional texts. But it is clear that it was in the arena of such meetings that pandits like the late Shri Rajeshvarashastry Dravid or the late Shri Badarinathaji Shukla had proved their extraordinary dialectical prowess and earned their formidable reputations. Their peers respected them primarily as philosophers and not as scholars. But of such towering Indian philosophers western-trained Indian philosophers had no knowledge at all. One cannot say that western-trained Indian philosophers ignored them. They were hardly aware of their existence. As Prof. Daya Krishna has remarked, there was an *apartheid* separating the two.

There was indeed one area of traditional Indian philosophy which was cultivated by many western-trained Indian philosophers as philosophy and not merely studied from a western historical perspective, that is various forms of *Vedānta*. When western-trained Indian philosophers wrote on philosophical problems pertaining to this area, they were clearly stating their own views and arguing for them and not merely presenting an analytical report of the tenets and arguments of an Indian school. But the Indian notion or notions of the spiritual quest and of *sādhana* are an integral part of a conceptual scheme which articulates a total form of social and individual life. The concepts of *puruṣārtha*, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, *mokṣa*, *vidhiṣedha*, *sādhāraṇadharmā*, *cāturvarṇya*, etc., are elements in a unified conceptual scheme which defines a view of human nature, the nature of human society, social and individual ideals, and forms of self-realisation based on these views. By and large, western-trained Indian philosophers who tried to develop the spiritual side of Indian philosophy did not similarly attempt to develop the social and moral philosophy, in which it was rooted. They conceived their studies in it, as in *Nyāya* or *Sāṃkhya*, not as philosophical exercises but as exercises in the history of philosophy.

If this is an unfortunate situation, it must be said in fairness that pandits share the responsibility for it with western-trained philosophers. It was understandable that till the 'age of discovery,'

the Indian philosophical tradition should have developed in isolation without being influenced by and without responding to currents of thought elsewhere because of the fact of geographical isolation. Even so, one must recognize that this geographical isolation was itself partly the result of the mental isolation into which the Brahmins had retreated owing to pride based on ignorance. They, perhaps, took unduly seriously the boast of the *Mahābhārata* that in matters of *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* what is not here is not to be found elsewhere. Western philosophy of modern times in its creative role, fashioned new ideals of knowledge designing methods for pursuing them and took serious note of current social and political movements and tried to provide theoretical foundation and justification to their ends, formulating in the process new forms of individual and social morality. This creativity was made possible by the openness of the western mind which was further reinforced by it. By comparison, Indian philosophy gives the impression of moving in a closed circle. The discussions, no doubt, are free, but *all* the *pūrva-pakṣas* are given. The arguments which can be advanced in their support or for defending them against possible attacks are well-known. The possible counter-arguments from the side of the *siddhānta* are also well-rehearsed. One may indeed exercise one's ingenuity to think of some new arguments but it is not easy to think of a genuinely new argument in a debate when its terms of reference are rigidly set and when it has gone on for a millennium and more. The new argument is much likely to be a variation on an old argument. Discussions of philosophical problems within the traditional Indian framework, therefore, look like mock-discussions. They are like tournaments which provide occasions for display of individual prowess and skill, and victory to the best. But the victory is internal to the tournament and closes it. It makes no difference to the course of real events. In other words, discussions and debates are not expected to result in making an addition to or alteration in the received body of philosophical knowledge. They could only produce improvements in style, not in substance.

Nevertheless this is certainly a mistaken view of the function which the institution of philosophical discussions, *śāstrārtha*, played in the development of Indian thought. There have been radical innovations in the doctrines of the various schools, the

most impressive example of which is the rise of the *Navya-Nyāya* movement and its appreciative reception by other schools. The new concepts undoubtedly must have been tested in philosophical discussions and seen to prevail. But the mistake is pardonable. In any case, the challenge of having to deal with a radically different set of *pūrva-pakṣa* than those to which it had been accustomed could be expected to have a revitalizing influence on Indian philosophy. It could serve as a severe test of the logical strength and stability of its basic concepts and their potential for creative development.

Since the sixteenth century the western philosophical tradition has undergone a rich and rapid development in diverse directions. It has initiated new ways of thought in many spheres of human experience and activity like the natural sciences, arts and literature, and history, and also responded creatively to the discoveries and achievements which were made in these fields. It has closely interacted with other cognitive and practical activities respecting, at least since Kant, their autonomy but also contributing to their development in a variety of ways. By comparison Indian philosophy, though not stagnant, has developed much more slowly and over a narrower area as it remained wedded to traditional forms of knowledge, traditional social institutions and practices, and forms of spirituality. The only way to revitalize it is to bring it in to the arena of modern, i.e., western thought.

In a way it is already in the arena but only as a passive object of examination and assessment. What is necessary is for it to assume the role of a subject actively criticising and evaluating western philosophical theories from a perspective yielded by its own philosophical standpoints. *Naiyāyikas*, *Mīmāṃsakas*, *Vaiyākaraṇas* and others must enter the current philosophical debate not merely as witnesses to be subjected to examination and cross-examination but as full participants in it, engaged in its give and take. They will then absorb and assimilate what they have taken, but what they will have taken will be what they have decided to take in the light of their judgement that it was worth taking. And the capacity to absorb and assimilate is a mark of vitality. But while they will be taking they will also be giving, at least offering. Indian schools have developed over centuries through continuous and incisive dialogue with one another. Surely the time has come

for them to extend the scope of the dialogue by admitting western philosophical schools to it. The stimulus they will receive thereby will certainly make them develop in unforeseeable directions. Even the internal dialogue between Indian schools will be enriched because it will be mediated by reference to doctrines which are new to them and will raise questions of a kind they had not considered before.

The dialogue, between pandits and philosophers held in Pune from July 11th to the 16th, 1983, the proceedings of which form the main body of this book, was conceived as a modest beginning of an effort in this direction. A brief narrative of what went on behind the scene before the stage was set for it may, perhaps, not be out of place.

I selected Russell's theory of the nature of proposition as presented in his *Principles of Mathematics* as the subject of the dialogue because it represents something like an attempt to make a new beginning in philosophical analysis by turning one's back on what has gone on before. I thought that it would therefore be comparatively easier to put the theory across to pandits as its exposition would not demand many references to the tenets and arguments of earlier schools and thinkers, and the points of agreement and disagreement between them. Also Russell's realistic and analytical approach has an obvious affinity with that of *Nyāya* and *Mīmāṃsā*. The next step was to secure the collaboration of Prof. E.R. Swaminathan, a sound and versatile scholar of the *darśanas* who was then on the faculty of Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapitha at Tirupati. But for his unstinted co-operation the dialogue could not have taken place. We agreed that the best course for us to take would be for me to prepare a statement in English summarizing the main points made by Russell and formulating the philosophical problems raised by them. He would then translate the statement into Sanskrit for the benefit of those pandits who were unfamiliar with English. (For the English statement and its accurate and elegant Sanskrit translation, see pp. xxxiii—xliv). I may remark that this probably was the first time when a western philosophical doctrine was presented through the medium of Sanskrit to an audience of pandits.

Armed with the Sanskrit statement I began meeting some of the eminent pandits whom I particularly wanted to get interested in

the project for securing their participation in it. I first met Shri Shrinivas Shastri of Deccan College, Pune, through his disciple Dr. V.N. Jha who was then Reader in Sanskrit in the Department of Sanskrit, Pune University. Dr. Jha has spent several years regularly reading advanced *Navya-Nyāya* texts with Shri Shrinivas Shastri who excels both in *Navya-Nyāya* and *Advaita*. I had several discussions with Shri Shrinivas Shastri during which I tried to explain to him Russell's theory of the nature of proposition, its philosophical context and implications, with Dr. Jha functioning both as an interpreter and participant. It was an extremely encouraging experience, I discovered; I must confess to my surprise, that the two pandits could, without much difficulty, acquire an accurate understanding of Russell's theory and appreciate its philosophical significance. But pandits are professionally trained to tentatively entertain philosophical theories on their own terms for the purpose of working out their philosophical presuppositions and implications. Shri Shrinivas Shastri also agreed with alacrity to participate in the dialogue when it would be held. This was an extremely good augury.

I could now make so bold as to visit personally Shri Badarinath Shastri Shukla, the doyen of *Naiyāyikas*, at Varanasi. When I explained to him the idea of the dialogue I was trying to hold, he entered into its spirit with great enthusiasm, went over the Sanskrit statement with me line by line and at the end promised his total co-operation in this venture. Readers will note that as the dialogue progressed he emerged as the magisterial spokesman of the Indian side and dealt with all the issues as they successively came up with an open mind and incisive logic. He was also kind enough to send me a statement in which he set out his replies to all the questions which had been framed in the Sanskrit statement some of which could not be taken up in the dialogue for want of time.

Another eminent scholar-philosopher who generously put his services at my disposal in organising the event was Prof. K.T. Pandurangi. He introduced me and the idea of the dialogue to many pandits who in addition to being masters of traditional doctrines could enter with zest into philosophical discussion. Prof. K.T. Pandurangi combines the advantage of having studied for many years, the *darśanas* in a *pāṭhaśālā* in the traditional way, as well as having a facility in English which enables him to expound

lucidly and accurately the more subtle points in Indian doctrines. The group of pandits who came with him from Bangalore made a fruitful contribution to the dialogue. I would like to make a special mention of Dr. D. Prahladacharya, a young Mādhva pandit whose deep and extensive knowledge of traditional theories, clarity and openness of mind and mastery of acute philosophical reasoning came as a reassuring proof that the tradition continues to thrive with undiminished vigour.

I must say that while planning the dialogue and making preparations for it, I had all along heavily depended on and benefitted from the advice and support of my old friends Prof. Daya Krishna and Dr. Francine Krishna and their colleagues at Jaipur, who for many years had methodically pursued studies in various areas of Indian thought, adopting a similar approach to it and aiming at similar objectives. It would have been unthinkable for me to hold the dialogue without their participation.

The dialogue had to be bilingual. This meant that scholars who could translate from Sanskrit into English and *vice versa* had an essential role to play in making it possible. As would be evident, the translations they were required to provide extempore were not merely translations from one language into another but also from one conceptual framework into another. Fortunately there were some scholars present who could successfully discharge this difficult task with aplomb. The participants in the dialogue were all aware of the heavy burden they carried and a debt of gratitude which they owed to them. I would like to especially thank Dr. Arindam Chakravarti in this connection who, as readers will notice, emerged as the principal mediator between the two sides as the dialogue progressed.

What were the concrete, specific philosophical gains which resulted from the dialogue? It will be premature at this stage to try to answer this question because the dialogue has just begun. The issues have barely been joined. The dialogue will have to continue. The problems which have been identified in this phase will have to be pursued at a much deeper level. So also the implications of the tentative solutions which have been suggested to them for other connected problems will have to be carefully explored. But I would like to make two points in this connection. One is that a group of pandits who being as well-versed in Indian

darśanas as any in the land are keen to engage western philosophy in a dialogue has been identified. Further from the enthusiasm with which the idea of the project has been received by pandits everywhere, one may guess that the group that is identified is merely a sample representing a much larger population.

The second is a suggestion I would like to make. It will be seen that a large part of the discussion centers on the western concept of *proposition*. This is a deeply entrenched concept in the western philosophical tradition which Indian theories have managed to do without. To put the matter roughly, for the western tradition the content of knowledge consists of true propositions. With this is connected the thesis that it is the sentence which conveys a unit of meaning or represents a move in the language game. For Indians knowledge is of a thing, albeit not a bare thing but a thing characterised by features or attributes. With this view goes a flexible concept of a sentence so that even a word like (a) 'pot' counts as a sentence. How deep does this difference between the two views go? One can hazard an answer only after the constellation of concepts like 'sentence', 'word', 'meaning', 'knowledge', 'belief', 'truth', etc., as they are interpreted in each of the traditions are examined in depth and detail. It appears to me, therefore that it is in the direction of *śābdabodha* (knowledge gained by understanding sentences) that the dialogue should continue. This is an area which overlaps epistemology and ontology, as well as formal logic with its formalised syntax and semantics. It is thus central to philosophical inquiry and has been minutely explored by classical Indian thinkers. The recent movements of analytical philosophy and hermeneutics have also progressed in this direction. It is, perhaps, in this area that a dialogue of this kind will be most fruitful and rewarding.

Finally, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the Ford Foundation for the financial support they extended to the project and to the Indian Council of Philosophical Research for agreeing to publish the Dialogue as transcribed from the tapes and to Prof. R.C. Dwivedi and Dr. Mukund Lath for help in editing it.

M.P. REGE

उपक्रमः

विश्वविश्रुतस्य दार्शनिकशिरोमणेः वट्टेन्डरसेलमहोदयस्य प्रोपोजिशन-
(वाक्यार्थ) - विषयकं सिद्धान्तमधिकृत्य ख्रिस्तीय १९८३ वर्षे जुलाईमासस्य
एकादशदिनाङ्कात् षोडशदिनाङ्कं यावत् संस्कृतस्य प्राच्यानां प्रथितयशसां पण्डितानां
पाश्चात्यदर्शनविदां विदुषां च मध्ये पुण्यपत्तने विचारगोष्ठी प्रावर्तत । यन्त्रसाहाय्येन
शब्दशो निबद्धमस्या विवरणं कालेन लिपिबद्धं कृत्वा महता परिश्रमेण च संपाद्य
सम्प्रति प्रस्तूयते । संवादेविधिना सम्पन्नाया अस्या गोष्ठ्या वार्तालापस्वरूपं
प्रायेण सुरक्षितं तत एव उच्चारणानुरूपं टंकणं बहुत्र अपाणिनीयं सदपि न सर्वत्र
शुद्धिं लभितं, न च पण्डितैः स्वयमेव समस्तपदेषु ग्रहणसौकर्याय कृताः सन्धिच्छे-
दादयः शुद्धिमापादिताः, न वा संयुक्ताक्षरेषु सन्धिनियमाः सर्वत्र समादृताः ।
नानेन वस्तुवृत्तने नैसर्गिकेण पण्डितजनकृतेन वागव्यवहारेण पाणिनिः पाठको वा
खेदमनुभविष्यति, अयमेवास्माकं प्रत्ययः । विचाराणां क्रमेण समुन्मेषोऽपि तथैव
परिरक्षितः । एतेन विद्वद्गोष्ठीविवरणस्य प्रामाणिकत्वं तत्र च पाठकानां
सहभागित्वमिव सेत्स्यतः । ग्रन्थपठने चापूर्वं आस्वादोऽपि भविष्यति ।

आंग्लभाषया पाश्चात्यदर्शनमध्यापयतां विदुषां संस्कृतभाषया दर्शनशास्त्रार्थान्
विवदतां पण्डितानां च मध्ये संवादो नैव दृश्यते । भारतस्य समृद्धा तर्ककर्कशा
दार्शनिकचिन्तनपद्धतिरद्यापि जीवति । टीकोपटीकाभिः स्वतन्त्रग्रन्थनिर्माणैश्च
तस्या विकासोऽपि दृश्यते । परन्तु भारतस्य सर्वासु दिक्षु विद्यमानानां पण्डितानां
परस्परं संपर्को जातुचिदेव जायते । दक्षिणेषु लब्धप्रतिष्ठा नव्यनैयायिकाः, नव्यवैया-
करणा मीमांसका वा उत्तरेषु विद्यमानान् स्वबन्धून न परिचिन्वन्ति । अन्येषामपि
दिग्गजानामियमेव कथा । पुनश्च पाश्चात्यशास्त्राभ्यासकुशलैः सह संपर्कस्तु दुर्लभ
एव । तेषु नवीनपूर्वपक्षाणां परामर्शो दुर्घट इवाभाति । प्रसिद्धपूर्वपक्षपिण्डपेषणं न
खलु शास्त्राणां विकासायालं भवति । आंग्लभाषया भारतीयदर्शनस्य प्राथमिकः
परिचयः पाश्चात्यपाठकान् लक्ष्यीकृत्य नैकैः ग्रन्थकारैः कारितः । भारतीयचिन्तनं
कथमिव पाश्चात्यचिन्तनस्य साम्यमुपेतीति हृदि निधाय केचन ग्रन्थकारा अद्यापि
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविवेचने प्रवर्तमानाः प्रायेण पाश्चात्यदार्शनिकानां प्रमाणपत्रं
प्राप्तुं प्रयतन्ते । पाश्चात्यदर्शनदृष्टीः पूर्वपक्षीकृत्य स्वसिद्धान्तसमर्थनशक्तिस्तु तेषु
प्रायेण न परिभाव्यते । पाश्चात्यदर्शने दोषा भवेयुस्तेषु केचन पौरस्त्यदृष्ट्या समा-
धातुं शक्यन्त इति विचारो मनागपि नोदेति । हन्त, इदमेकच्छत्रं साम्राज्यं
कथमपेयात्, स्वतन्त्रस्तर्कतरणिश्चोदीयादिति चिन्तया पर्याकुलं मनस्तिष्ठति
मतिमताम् । 'न हि तरणिरुदीते दिक्पराधीनवृत्तिः ।'

प्राच्यपण्डितानां पाश्चात्यदर्शनविदांच मध्ये परस्परं परिचयाभावात् 'सर्वं ज्ञान-मसमच्छास्त्रे प्रतिष्ठितं' मिति मत्वा पण्डिताः शास्त्रब्रह्माणं गणेशइति मत्वा सर्वार्थ-सिद्धयै प्रवक्षिणीकुर्वन्ति, नान्यत्र तेषां विश्वसञ्चरे मतिगतिर्वा प्रवर्तते । अपरे पुनः 'भारतीयं दर्शनं दर्शनमेव नास्ति, यच्च तत्रास्ति तत्सर्वं तुच्छं सुविज्ञातं वे'ति मत्वा पण्डितानन्त्यजानिव परित्यजन्ति । द्विसहस्रवर्षेभ्योऽधिकं निरन्तरं जीवन्त्या भारतस्य सर्वासु दिक्षु लब्धप्रतिष्ठाया भारतीयचिन्तनपरम्परायाः स्वतन्त्रेऽपि देशे दुर्दशामिमां दृष्ट्वा केषां सचेतनानां चेतांसि न दूयेरन् । अत्र च भारते अन्या अपि पश्चिमेशिया-देशादिप्रसूताश्चिन्तनसरण्यो नवीनप्ररोहानवापुरिति ता अपि विचारार्हाः । राष्ट्रिय-संस्कृतसंस्थानस्य, भारतीयदार्शनिकानुसधानपरिषदः, फोर्ड-फ्राउन्डेशनस्यान्येषां च संस्थानानामाधिकसहयोगेन प्रा० दयाकृष्णस्य, प्रा० एम०पी० रेगे इत्याख्यस्य च नेतृत्वे नैकेषां विदुषां च सहयोगेन वर्देन्डरसेलमहोदयस्य प्रोपोजिशन-विषयकं विचारं क्षोदक्षमं कर्तुं 'वादे वादे जायते तत्त्वबोधः' इति न्यायेन पुण्यपत्तने प्रथमा गोष्ठी प्रावर्तते । तदनु न्यायशास्त्रमधिकृत्य उच्चतर-भोटीयाध्ययनसंस्थाने सार-नाथे, वाक्यमीमांसाविषये नवदिल्ल्यां, त्रिकशासनमधिकृत्य काश्मीरस्थश्रीनगरे अन्यासु च दिक्षु तत्तद्विषयिण्यो गोष्ठ्यः क्रमेण प्राच्यपाश्चात्यचिन्तनपरम्परा-प्रसूततत्त्वदृष्टिस्वरूपार्थं प्रक्रान्ताः । न केवलं तर्कं दर्शनशास्त्रे वा वैज्ञानिकविषयेष्वपि तथैव पारस्परिकः संवादः सुमेधसां समजायत । एष नव्यः सारस्वतोपक्रमः पुण्यपत्तने प्रथममुपक्रान्तः, रेगेमहोदयश्च तत्र प्रयोगाधिकृतः । पारस्परिकविचारे एकत्र आंग्लभाषाविद आंग्लभाषया स्वार्थं व्याहरन्, अन्यतश्च संस्कृतगिरा पण्डितोत्तमाः स्वविचारान् प्रकटयामासुः । उभयभाषाविदश्चोभयेषामनुवादविधिना साहाय्यमाचरेहः । सत्यप्येतादृशि भाषान्तरकरणसाहाय्ये विचाराणां याथार्थ्यनावगम उपक्रमे काठिन्यं वैपरीत्यमन्यथाभावं वा पस्पर्शं । अभिनवप्रयोगे भिन्नस्रोतःसंभूत-चिन्तनपरामर्शं च इयमेव साधारणी गतिः । तथापि क्रमेण स्फुटतामुपेयिवान् विचार-विमर्श इति पाठकानां प्रतिपृष्ठं पठनेन स्पष्टीभविष्यति । संवादविधिना कृतस्यास्य विमर्शस्य स्वरूपं तथावत्परिरक्षितं, पौनरुक्त्यं तु बहुवापाकृतम् । तत एव यत्र क्वचन पुनरुक्तिरन्वाख्यानं, प्रकरणान्तरं, शब्दार्थानां चवितचर्वाणं चात्र दृश्यन्ते । तथापि तत् संवादस्य सहजसुभगं स्वरूपं प्रकटीकरोति । तेनैव प्रथमं स्वलिपद-पदार्थसंबन्धापि भारती शनैः शनैः पारस्परिकबोधसौहार्दमभ्यविन्दत । एतच्च वाद-जल्प-वितण्डाविमुखानां तत्त्वार्थग्रहणदाढर्चनिविष्टदृष्टीनां प्राच्यपाश्चात्य-विदुषां संवादेनानेन स्फुटं चकास्ति । पाठकाश्चात्र परमं प्रमाणं न वयम् ।

डा० दयाकृष्णेन स्वकीय आसुखे प्रतिपादितं यत् पुण्यपत्तने संपन्नाया नव-प्रयोगात्मिकाया गोष्ठ्याः फलान्येव क्रमेण न्याय-मीमांसा-त्रिकदर्शनेषु सारनाथ-रूपतिश्रीनगरेषु सम्पन्नानि गोष्ठ्यन्तराणि सन्ति । भाषाविज्ञानक्षेत्रे नवीनप्रश्न-

चर्चा भुवनेश्वरे संवृत्ता । प्राचीनपण्डितानामाधुनिकतर्कशास्त्रावबोधाय जिज्ञासा, पाश्चात्यदर्शनप्रवणानां नव्यन्यायग्रन्थार्थाधिगमे समीहा, अन्ये चैवंविधा आरम्भा अस्या एव रेगेप्रवर्तितया गोष्ठ्याः सुफलानि सन्ति । विविधेषु सारस्वतसंवादेषु यैः साहाय्यमाचरितं, स्वत एव वा काश्चन प्रवृत्तयः प्रारब्धास्तेषु राष्ट्रियसंस्कृतसंस्थानं, भारतीयदार्शनिक-अनुसधानपरिषत्, फोर्ड-प्रतिष्ठानं, भारतीयभाषासंस्थानं, केन्द्रीयमांगलभाषाया वैदेशिकभाषाणां च संस्थानं, डेक्कन-महाविद्यालयः, भोटी-योच्चतराध्ययनसंस्थानं तत्रत्या अधिकारिणश्च सविशेषमुल्लेखमर्हन्ति ।

भारते बौद्धिकचिन्तनपरंपरा संस्कृतमाध्यमेन द्विसहस्राब्देभ्यो निरन्तरं प्रचलिता । अद्यापि सा परम्परा प्राचीनेषु पण्डितेषु जीवति । भारतस्य सर्वासु दिक्षु पण्डिता दार्शनिकप्रश्नाननयं वामरभारत्या उत्थापयन्ति, समाधानं चान्वेषयन्ति । वस्तुत आसेतुहिमाचलमद्यापि प्राचीनबौद्धिकपरम्पराभिव्यक्तेर्भाषा संस्कृतमेव, नान्या । न तस्याः स्थानं ग्रीक-लातिन-भाषावदस्माभिः परिकल्पनीयम् । प्राचीन-दर्शनपरंपरापारङ्गतेषु पण्डितेषु श्रीबदरीनाथशुक्लमहोदया मूर्धन्या आसन् । ते खलु प्राचीनेषु नवीनाः, नवीनेषु च प्राचीनाः सन्तः प्राच्यपाश्चात्यकूलयोः परमसेतु-बन्ध इवाभवन् । हन्त, प्राच्यप्रतीच्यतर्काणां स्वमनीषिकया परिष्कारदिशमुन्मील्य 'संवादस्य' प्रकाशनात्पूर्वमेव ते दिवङ्गताः । अयं ग्रन्थस्तेभ्यः सादरं समर्प्यते ।

प्रो० रेगेमहोदयः स्वस्यामांगलभाषायां लिखितायां भूमिकायां भारतीयदर्शनस्य विविधपक्षविचारकाणामितिहासलेखकानां च प्रवृत्तिं परामृशन् तत्प्रवृत्तेर्बहिरङ्गत्वं परिरक्षणैकप्रवणत्वं च प्रतिपादयति । आंग्लभाषया भारतीयदर्शनं विमृशन्तः पाश्चात्यदर्शनपद्धतिप्रवणा लेखकाः प्रायेण पाश्चात्यतत्त्वचिन्तनपद्धतिं, तदाभिव्यक्तिप्रणालीं च प्राधान्येन स्वीकृत्य भारतीयदर्शनानि विवेचयन्ति । आंग्लभाषा-विज्ञाः पाश्चात्याः (प्राच्या वा) तेषां बोद्धव्याः । अतएव ते साधनायाः, पुरुषार्थानां विधिनिषेधयोः, साधारणधर्माणां चातुर्वर्ण्यव्यवस्थादीनां च विवेचनं परिहरन्ति । समाजदर्शनं नीतिदर्शनं च पाश्चात्यपद्धत्या दीक्षितानां भारतीयदार्शनिकानां विवेच्यपथवीं नावगाहेते । इयमेव खण्डदृष्टिः । एतद्विपरीतं प्राचीनपण्डिता नैया-यिकादयः संस्कृतेन स्वमतविरुद्धान् तर्कानामूलचूलं परामृश्य स्वशास्त्रानु-कूलान् तर्कानुद्भाव्य स्वशास्त्रपरंपराविकासाय निरन्तरं प्रयतन्ते । अतएव तेषां दृष्टेरन्तरङ्गत्वं विकासोन्मुखत्वं स्वप्रतिभानुकूलत्वं च सिध्यन्ति । भारतीयदर्शनं पाश्चात्यदृष्ट्या प्रतिपादयतां विदुषां विमर्शास्तु पाश्चात्यतत्त्वचिन्तनं क्रोडीकृत्य तदनुयायितया प्रवर्तन्ते । तुलनात्मकदर्शनमनुसंधानानां दृष्टिरपि कान्ट-शंकर-मध्ये, ह्याइटहैड-वाचस्पतिमिश्रमध्ये तुलनामूलं, यत्र हि शंकरो वाचस्पतिमिश्रः, अन्यो वा भारतीयः कश्चिद्दार्शनिकः पाश्चात्यदार्शनिकमतेन प्रमीयते, प्रमाणी-क्रियते च । तत एव पाश्चात्यदार्शनिकविचारधाराणां पाश्चात्यदेशेषु तत्काले

प्रामुख्यमनुसृत्य प्रथमम् अद्वैतवेदान्तस्य तदनु न्यायस्य पर्यन्ते च नव्यन्यायस्याध्ययनं प्रसिद्धिं लेभे । अस्यैवेदं दुष्फलं यद्भारतीयपरम्परा अतीतोन्मुखा विभाव्यते, या हि सम्प्रति यथाकथञ्चिन्नः निःश्वसन्ती त्रियमाणा परिगण्यते । अस्यैव चायं दुष्परिणामो यद्भारतीयदर्शनं विश्वदर्शनमध्ये पूर्वपक्षत्वेन सिद्धान्तरूपेण वा नोल्लिख्यते, न वा स्थाप्यते । ज्ञान-मूल्य-संस्थादिविषये स्वदेशप्रकृत्यनुसारं दार्शनिकचिन्तनपद्धतिः योरोपीयदार्शनिकानां च तत्र प्रवृत्तिः सहजे । किन्तु भारतीयानां पाश्चात्यदर्शन-विकासाय पण्डितम्मन्यता आश्चर्यभावहति । न तत्र तेषां साकल्येन गतिर्मतिर्वा प्रभवति । अतएव भारतीयानां पाश्चात्यदर्शनक्षेत्रे वास्तविकमवदानं नैव सम्बो-भवीति । केचिदपरे पुनः प्राचीनभारतीयचिन्तनकोषमांग्लभाषयोद्घाटयितुं प्रवृत्ताः । प्राचीना भारतीया चिन्तनप्रणाली पाश्चात्यदर्शनप्रणालीसदृशी विद्यत इति तैः साधयितुमिष्यते । एका स्वतन्त्रा वर्तते पाश्चात्यदर्शनधारा, भारतीया चास्ति द्वितीया पृथग् विद्यमाना धारा । धाराद्वयस्य शुद्धदर्शनदृष्ट्या तात्त्विक-संवादस्तु न कैश्चिदपि भारतीयदार्शनिकैरस्थितः । तेन च तदीयैः प्रयत्नैः पाश्चा-त्यस्य भारतीयस्य वा दर्शनस्य विकासोऽपि न समजनि ।

अस्ति चैतेभ्यो भिन्ना पण्डितानां शास्त्रिणां च निरवच्छिन्ना भारतीया दार्शनिक-चिन्तनपरम्परा । सा हि भारतीयचिन्तनधारायां निष्णाता सती संस्कृतेन स्वमतानि प्रकाशयन्ती प्राचीनमतपरिज्ञानार्थमन्यान् सर्वान्भूशमुपकरोति । तस्यां केचन नैयायिकाः, अपरे मीमांसकाः, अन्ये च वेदान्तादिदर्शननदीष्णाः स्वज्ञानसम्प्रदायानुसारं स्वमतानि शास्त्रार्थेषु सिद्धान्तिकृत्य परपक्षान् दूषयित्वा निरन्तरं बौद्धिकपरम्परां विकासयन्ति । शास्त्रार्थैः, गोष्ठीभिः परिषदादीनां माध्यमैश्च पूर्वं बहुकालं मौखिक-परम्परया, तदनु स्वीकृतपक्षाणां तर्काणां विचारानां च ग्रन्थविधिना लेखनेन भार-तीया बौद्धिकपरम्परा दार्शनिकसम्प्रदायेषु (स्कूलस ऑफ थॉट) विकासं लेभे लभते च । पण्डितराजराजेश्वरशास्त्रिद्रविड-पण्डितबदरीनाथशुक्लसदृशा दार्शनिका-स्तस्या एव परम्परायाः साम्प्रतिकेऽपि युगे प्रातिनिध्यं चक्रुः । हन्त, तेषु बहवो दार्शनिकशिरोमणयोऽस्माभिर्न प्रत्यभिज्ञायन्ते । तेषु च बहवो प्राचीनशास्त्रार्थानां पिष्टपेषणमेव कुर्वन्ति । तत्तद्देशोद्भवानां विविधदार्शनिकविचारसरणेषु प्रोन्मि-षितान् तर्कान् नैव ते परिचिन्वन्ति । सत्यपि भाषाभेदे भारतीयदार्शनिकपरम्परायाः पाश्चात्यदर्शनपरम्परया सह तात्त्विकः संवाद आवश्यकः । “वादे वादे जायते तत्त्वबोधः ।”

एतत्सर्वमनुसन्धाय, रसेलमहोदयेन ‘गणितसिद्धान्ताः’ इत्याख्ये स्वग्रन्थे प्रति-पादितस्य प्रोपोजिशनविषयकसिद्धान्तस्य भारतीयदृष्ट्या परामर्शार्थं पुण्यपत्तने विचारगोष्ठी समायोजिता यतो ह्यस्य सिद्धान्तस्य न्यायेन मीमांसया च सह वर्तते कश्चन संबन्धः । अस्य सिद्धान्तस्य आंग्लभाषया संक्षेपेण विवरणं प्रस्तूय तच्च

संस्कृतेनानूद्य गोष्ठ्यां भागं ग्रहीष्यमाणानां विदुषां सविधे प्रागेव प्रेषितं येन विचारावसरे किञ्चित् सौकर्यं स्यात् । संवादावसरे च आंग्लभाषायां वक्तव्यस्य संस्कृतेन, संस्कृतभाषणस्य आंग्लभाषायामनुवादस्य व्यवस्था विहिता । एष विधि-स्तदनन्तरं सर्वासु गोष्ठीषु व्यवस्थापितः ।

पुण्यपत्तने प्रोपोजिशनविषये संपन्नाया गोष्ठ्याः किं फलमासीदिति प्रश्नः सुसमाधातुं न शक्यते । तथापि पण्डितेषु नव्यदार्शनिकसमस्यानां विमर्शार्थमौत्सुक्यं तत्परत्वं च प्रतिपदं पुण्यपत्तनगोष्ठ्यामाविरभूत् । तच्च विमर्शं उन्मिषितानां प्रश्नानां पुनर्विचारार्थं धीधनानां धियः प्रचोदयामास, संवादसातत्यस्यावश्यकतां चोलिललेख । प्रोपोजिशनसिद्धान्तः पाश्चात्यदर्शनपरम्परायां दृढं बद्धमूलो किन्तु भारतीयदृष्ट्या तं विनैव वाक्यार्थविचारः सेत्स्यतीति प्रतिभाति । पाश्चात्य-परंपरानुसारं सद्वाक्यार्थगर्भं ज्ञानं वाक्यादेव प्रवर्तते प्रसिद्धचिति च । सदात्मक-प्रोपोजिशनमेव ज्ञानस्य विषयः, स च वाक्यादेव निष्पद्यते नान्यतः । वाक्यमेवार्थ-स्यैकं प्रमापकम् । भारतीयपरम्परानुसारन्तु ज्ञानं सविकल्पस्यैव पदार्थस्य भवति । एकेनापि घटपदेन च वाक्यं जायते । उभयसिद्धान्तयोः कियत्साम्यं कियच्च पार्थक्य-मिति वाक्य-शब्द-अर्थ-ज्ञान-विश्वास-सदादिप्रत्ययानां तुलनात्मकविश्लेषणेन निगदं निर्वक्तुं शक्यते, नान्यथा । एतदर्थं शाब्दबोधस्य साकल्येन विवेचनमावश्यकं विद्यते । भारतीयदर्शनेषु शाब्दबोधविषयिणी चर्चा बहुत्र प्राप्यते । अधुना पाश्चात्यजगति विश्लेषणात्मकं दर्शनम् अर्थ-निर्णयविज्ञानं च बहुमानास्पदम् । पुण्यपत्तने संपन्ना गोष्ठी प्राच्य-पाश्चात्य-दर्शननदीष्णान् विदुषः शाब्दबोधविचारार्थं प्रेरयामासेति सुफलं तस्याः । सर्वमिदमन्यच्चापि विवृतं रेगेमहोदयैः स्वभूमिकायाम् । विस्तरार्थं तदेव द्रष्टव्यम् ।

प्रोपोजिशनविषये व्याकरणदर्शनदृष्टिः, मीमांसादृष्टिः, न्यायदृष्टिः, शास्त्रान्तर-दृष्टिश्च संवादस्य पृष्ठेष्वेतेषु शनैः शनैरुन्मिषति । कथमिव सा दृष्टिः पाश्चात्य-वाक्यार्थविचारैरात्मानमलङ्करोति, पाश्चात्यविचारं च परिष्कुरुत इति नाप्रत्यक्षं स्यात् प्रेक्षावतां प्रतिपित्सूनां पाठकानामिति ।

रामचन्द्र द्विवेदी

QUESTIONS/ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

Russell's Theory of the Structure and Constituents of a Proposition

According to Russell what a sentence expresses is a proposition. Or in other words, the meaning of a sentence is a proposition.

A sentence is composed of words or phrases. For Russell, the meaning of a word or a phrase is always an entity for which it stands or which is indicated by it. Consequently, the proposition which a sentence expresses has for its constituents the entities which are indicated by the words or phrases which compose the sentence.

Thus, take the sentence 'Devadatta is wise'. According to Russell's view the meaning of the proper name 'Devadatta' is the individual Devadatta who is the bearer of the name. Similarly, the meaning of the word 'wise' is the attribute *wisdom* which is a universal. And the meaning of the sentence 'Devadatta is wise' is the proposition which is expressed by it. And of this proposition, the individual Devadatta and the attribute *wisdom* are constituents.

This account of the meaning of a word or a phrase and of the meaning of a sentence raises certain questions:

(a) Is the meaning of a word or a phrase the entity for which it stands? What objections can be taken against this account of meaning?

(b) What positive account do Indian logicians/philosophers and grammarians give of the meaning of a word? What, for instance, is the meaning of the proper name 'Devadatta' and of the adjective 'wise'?

(c) According to Russell, given a sentence like 'Socrates is wise' we have to consider three entities which are connected with it, all of which actually exist: (i) the sentence 'Socrates is wise' itself which is an arrangement of words; (ii) the thing or the individual who is the subject of the sentence, or, in other words, the thing or

the individual who is what the sentence is about—in this case, Socrates; (iii) the proposition expressed by the sentence which also, according to Russell, is an entity which exists.

What objections can be taken to the view that there actually exist propositions over and above sentences and the things they are about?

Some of the reasons which have been advanced in support of the view that there exist propositions in addition to sentences and things are as follows:

(i) A proposition by definition is something which is true or false. Now a sentence cannot be described as true or false. Rather it is what a sentence means or expresses that can be correctly said to be true or false. Therefore, a proposition is distinct from a sentence.

(ii) An English sentence and a Sanskrit sentence which is synonymous with it have the same meaning. This common meaning is the proposition which each sentence expresses. Thus the meaning of saying that two sentences are synonymous is that they express one and the same proposition. It is this proposition which can be properly said to be true or false, not the sentence which expresses it.

(iii) Belief, doubt, assumption, etc. may be described as different cognitive attitudes. Now, a cognitive attitude is necessarily directed to something, which may be called its object. The sentence 'I believe' taken by itself is incomplete. If someone says 'I believe' and stops, it will always be legitimate to ask him "What do you believe?" and what he believes will be the object of his attitude of belief. Now it is contended that the object of a cognitive attitude like belief or doubt is always a proposition. For instance, my belief that the earth is round has for its object the proposition that the earth is round and not the sentence which expresses this proposition. To say that I believe that the earth is round is to say that I regard the proposition expressed by the (English) sentence 'The earth is round' to be true. Similarly, to say that I doubt whether it will rain tomorrow means that I do not believe the proposition that it will rain tomorrow to be true or to be false. It is not a sentence which I believe or doubt but the proposition which is expressed by the sentence. Thus it is clear that we have to explicate the object as a cognitive attitude like belief or doubt by

means of the concepts *proposition* and *truth*. A proposition is true when it corresponds to facts.

What can be said in criticism of this view of the proposition?

What is it that is true or false, according to Indian thinkers? Is it the sentence that is true or false? Or is it *jñāna* that is true or false? What are the similarities and the differences between the concept of a proposition and the concept of *jñāna*?

Turning to the question of the constituents of a proposition, one finds that according to Russell, given the proposition expressed by the sentence 'Socrates is wise' it is the individual Socrates and the quality *wisdom* which are its constituents.

What are the objections which can be raised against this view?

How, according to Indian thinkers, is the cognition (*jñāna*) 'Socrates is wise' related to the individual Socrates and to the quality *wisdom*?

As we have seen, according to Russell, the proposition expressed by a sentence is composed of the meanings of the words and phrases of which the sentence is composed. In order to grasp the proposition which is expressed by a sentence one must grasp the meanings of (the entities denoted by) the words and phrases of which the sentence is composed *and* the way in which they are inter-connected in it. This view seems to correspond to the *abhihitānvayavāda*. Where does this view stand today?

According to Russell, there is a basic distinction between particulars (substances) like Socrates on the one hand and qualities and relations like *wisdom* or *teaching* on the other. A substance can occur in a proposition only as that about which something is asserted, that is, only as a subject.

The general nature of a proposition is that, in it something is asserted of something. The something about which something is asserted is called the subject. Thus, in the proposition *Socrates is wise*, the quality *wisdom* is asserted of the subject Socrates. In the proposition, Devadatta teaches Brahmadata, the relation *teaching* is asserted of Devadatta and Brahmadata. This is a proposition with two subjects. Thus, the subject of a proposition is that entity or those entities about which something is asserted.

A proposition may have one or more subjects. When a proposition has only one subject, what is asserted of it in the proposition is a quality like *wisdom* or *redness*. When a proposition has more

than one subject what is asserted in the proposition is a relation like teaching, (being) taller than, etc.

A quality may occur in a proposition in two ways, or in one of two positions. It may occur in a proposition as what is asserted of a subject, i.e. as a predicate. In the proposition Socrates is wise, the quality wisdom occurs as a predicate. But in the proposition 'wisdom is desirable' it occurs as a subject, as that about which something is asserted. However, according to Russell, a substance like *Devadatta* can occur in a proposition only as a subject, only as that about which something is asserted. It can never occur as that which is asserted of some subject.

Further, according to Russell, a proposition, in addition to containing a subject and a quality or subjects and a relation, contains an element which he calls *assertion*. It is this element of assertion which gives unity to a proposition.

We may consider certain questions about this theory of the nature of a proposition:

(a) Is this analysis of a proposition into (i) the subject (or subjects) about which something is asserted; (ii) something which is asserted of the subject(s); and (iii) assertion, acceptable? What can be said in criticism of it?

(b) Russell accords primacy to substances (things) in regard to proposition. While a proposition may be about a quality or a relation, a quality or a relation may also be what is asserted of a substance. But a substance can never be what is asserted of something. It is always something of which something is asserted.

What can be said in criticism of this doctrine of the primacy of substances or things in the context of a proposition? One may consider this question with reference to the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* view that action, *bhāvanā*, is the subject of the assertion made by a sentence.

(c) According to Russell, the constituents of the proposition expressed by the sentence 'Devadatta teaches Brahmadata' are: (i) Devadatta; (ii) Brahmadata; (iii) the relation *teaching*. Similarly, the constituents of the proposition expressed by the sentence 'Rāma kills Rāvaṇa' are: (i) Rāma; (ii) Rāvaṇa; (iii) the relation *killing*. Thus, for Russell, words and phrases like 'teaches', 'kills' 'is a brother of' which, in a sentence, connect a noun or a proper name with another, always express a relation.

Is the account of the meaning of such words and phrases acceptable? Is it correct to call teaching, killing, relations? Is killing an action or a relation or is it both?

(d) According to Russell, a relation is something which holds between two or more entities. Thus, the relation *killing* subsists between the two entities Rāma and Rāvaṇa. The relation between (e.g. Tirupati is between Bombay and Madras) subsists among three entities, Tirupati, Bombay and Madras.

Is this notion of a relation subsisting between more than two things acceptable? What can be said in criticism of it?

What is the account given by Indian thinkers of the nature of relation?

According to Russell, a proposition necessarily has unity. The proposition 'Socrates is wise' has, as we have seen, for its constituents, the individual Socrates and the quality *wisdom*. But the sentence 'Socrates is wise' does not merely present a list of these constituents. If I say 'Socrates wisdom', I have merely given a list of these two constituents. But I have not uttered a sentence or phrases of which a sentence is composed stands for an entity which is a constituent of the proposition which the sentence expresses. However, a proposition is not merely an assemblage of these constituents but something in which they are unified. Now, according to Russell, it is the act of assertion which combines these constituents into a unity which the proposition is. The act of assertion asserts (that constituent of the proposition which is) a quality of (that constituent of the proposition which is) its subject; or it asserts (that constituent of proposition which is) a relation of (those constituents of it which are) its subjects. In the first case what the proposition states is that the quality characterises the subject. In the latter case it states that the relation holds between its subjects. And it is for this reason that a proposition is not a mere list of entities, but a unity of them.

Now, according to Russell, it is the verb in its proper grammatical form which occurs in a sentence—like the verb 'teaches' in the sentence 'Devadatta teaches Brahmadata'—that performs this act of assertion and it is this element in the proposition which gives it its unity. Therefore, a verb which occurs in a sentence expressing a proposition performs two functions: it stands for a

certain relation—the verb 'teaches' expresses the relation *teaching*—and secondly it expresses an act of assertion because of which the relation gets connected with the subjects of the proposition so that the constituents of the proposition get unified.

An example may help. Russell draws a contrast between 'Devadatta died' which is a sentence expressing a proposition and 'Devadatta's death' which is not a sentence but a noun-phrase. The latter does not express a proposition but merely stands for an event about which a proposition may be asserted. If one says 'Devadatta died' one asserts a proposition which is either true or false. If one says 'Devadatta's death' one has merely referred to an event and not said anything which is true or false. And according to Russell, the difference between the meanings of these two expressions is entirely due to the presence of a verb, viz. 'died' in one and its absence in the other.

What can be said in criticism of the view of the role of the verb in a sentence and its connection with the act of assertion in a proposition.

The sentence 'Socrates is wise' contains the verb 'is'. Now according to Russell's doctrine that every verb in a sentence performs two functions, it expresses a relation and by asserting the relation of the subjects connects it with them, the verb 'is' in this sentence must also express a relation. The question then arises: what is the relation which the verb 'is' expresses? The only two constituents of the proposition expressed by the sentence 'Socrates is wise' are Socrates and *wisdom*; and Socrates is the subject of which *wisdom* is asserted. And obviously *wisdom* is a quality and not a relation. Russell in order to save his doctrine that every verb expresses a relation describes *wisdom* as a monadic, i.e., one-term relation, as distinguished from *teaching* which is a two-term relation. But even if *wisdom* is taken as a monadic relation, it is a relation not expressed by the verb 'is' but by the adjective 'wise'.

The other role of the verb 'is' in the above sentence is to relate *wisdom* to Socrates. But there is no constituent in the proposition expressed by this sentence which can be said to perform this job. The only two constituents in it are Socrates and *wisdom*. We must then say that in this proposition *wisdom* of itself gets connected with Socrates. *Wisdom* is such an entity that it of itself can get connected with Socrates. Similarly, in the proposition expressed

by the sentence 'Devadatta teaches Brahmadatta' the relation *teaching* is such that it, of itself, gets connected with Devadatta and Brahmadatta. What happens then to the role of the verb namely that of connecting the constituents into a unity?

Do Indian thinkers maintain that what a sentence expresses is a unity? What account do they give of this unity? What is the role of the verb in regard to this unity?

विमर्शविषयाः

पदसमुदायो वाक्यम् । वाक्येनाभिहितः वाक्यस्यार्थः, शब्दार्थ इति उच्यते । पदस्यार्थः नियमेन यत्किञ्चित् वस्तु (सत्तावत्) भवति, यद्बोधनाय पदं प्रयुज्यते । यथा वाक्यस्य पदानि अवयवाः तथा (वाक्यघटकैः) पदैः प्रत्येकमभिहितानि वस्तूनि शब्दार्थस्यावयवा भवन्ति ।

रसालः एवं मन्यते ।—देवदत्त इति संज्ञाशब्दः देवदत्ताख्यं व्यक्तिविशेषं संज्ञिनमभिधत्ते । एवं कुशलशब्दः कुशलत्वं सामान्यरूपं धर्मविशेषमभिधत्ते । तथा च 'देवदत्तः कुशलः' इति वाक्येनाभिधीयमान अर्थ एव अस्य वाक्यस्य शब्दार्थः, यस्य देवदत्तव्यक्तिः कुशलताधर्मं इति द्वौ अवयवौ ।

अत्रेदं वक्तव्यम्—

वस्तुरूप एवार्थः सर्वदा पदैरभिधीयते (पदाभिधेयत्वं वस्तुत्वव्याप्यम्) इत्ययं सिद्धान्तः किं सर्ववादिनां संमतः? कान्यत्र दूषणान्युन्मिषन्ति?

भारतीयाः प्रेक्षावन्तः कं पदस्य अर्थमाचक्षन्ते? देवदत्त इति संज्ञाशब्दस्य अभिधेयं किंरूपमाद्रियन्ते? कुशल इति धर्मवाचकस्य च?

रसालस्य मते सन्ति शब्दार्थाः वस्तुसन्तः ये वाक्यैरभिधीयन्ते । तदेवं अस्ति 'सुकृतो यः कुशलः' इति वस्तु अस्ति, 'सुकृतः कुशलः अस्ति' इति वाक्यम् अस्ति, वाक्येन अभिधीयमानः शब्दार्थश्चेति त्रयो विचारपथं नेतव्याः । एवं च 'सुकृतः कुशलः अस्ति' इत्यादिषु वाक्येषु समालोचनीया भवन्ति इमे त्रयः सन्तः मिथः सम्बन्धिनः—विशिष्टपदरचनात्मकं 'सुकृतः कुशलः अस्ति' इति वाक्यम्; स चार्थः यं वर्णयितुं वाक्यं प्रवृत्तम्—प्रकृते सुकृतो नाम पुरुषव्यक्तिभेदः; शब्दार्थश्च वाक्येन अवबोध्यमानः वस्तुसन्—इति ।

अस्ति शब्दार्थः पदार्थेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तः इति पक्षस्य अभ्युपगमे किमस्ति किञ्चित् परिपन्थि?

पदार्थेभ्यः वाक्याच्च शब्दार्थस्य व्यतिरेकं साधयितुं अनेका युक्तयः उपन्यस्ताः वादिभिः तासु काश्चित् इदानीं भाव्यन्ते ।

शब्दार्थः बाधितः अबाधितो वा स्यात् । वाक्यं बाधितमबाधितं वेति वक्तुं न पायंते । परन्तु वाक्यस्य अभिधेय एव बाधितोऽबाधितो वा भवेत् । तथाहि—

पर्यायेण प्रवर्तमाने वाक्ये भाषाद्वयनिबद्धे समानार्थे भवतः । उभयसाधारणः अयमर्थ एव वाक्याभ्यां प्रत्येकं प्रत्याख्यमानः शब्दार्थः । एवं च 'परस्परपर्याये इमे वाक्ये' इत्युक्तेरयमर्थः, यत् 'इमे वाक्ये तमेवैकं शब्दार्थमभिदधाते' इति । शब्दार्थ एव बाधितः अबाधितो वा, न तु तदभिधायकं वाक्यम् ।

सन्ति अनेकाः परस्परव्यावृत्ताः आन्तराः अन्तःकरणवृत्तयः श्रद्धा, विचिकित्सा, जिज्ञासा इत्येवमाद्याः । एतादृशीभिः वृत्तिभिः शब्दार्थ एव विषयीक्रियते, नान्यः । तथाहि—वसुमती गोलाकारा इत्यहं श्रद्धे इत्यत्र 'वसुमती गोलाकारा' इतीदं वाक्यं न श्रद्धायाः कर्म (विषयः), अपि तु अनेन वाक्येन बोध्यमानः शब्दार्थ एव । एवं 'श्वो वृष्टिः भविता न वा इत्यहं संशये' इत्यत्रापि शब्दार्थ एव सन्देहस्य कर्म (विषयः) । तथा च यावदुक्तं भवति 'पृथिवी गोलाकारा इत्यहं श्रद्धे' इत्यनेन तावदुक्तं भवति, 'पृथिवी गोलाकारा इति शब्दार्थः अबाधितः इत्यहमवधारयामि', इत्यनेन । तथैव च 'श्वो वृष्टिर्भविता न वा इत्यहं सन्देहि' इतीयमुक्तिः 'श्वो वृष्टिः भविता' इत्ययं शब्दार्थः बाधितः अबाधितो वा इति नाहमवधारयामि इत्युक्तितो न विशिष्यते ।

शब्दार्थस्तदा अबाधितो भवति यदा अर्थं (बाह्यमान्तरं वा) संवदति, विपर्यये तु बाधितो भवति । तस्मात् अस्ति शब्दार्थो नाम कश्चित् पदार्थेभ्यः वाक्याच्च अतिरिक्त इति स्थितम् ।

वर्णितः शब्दार्थः विचारसहः आहोस्विन्नः

भारतीयानां परीक्षकाणां दृष्ट्या अत्र कस्य बाधः अबाधो वा? बाधाबाधौ वाक्यस्य? उत ज्ञानस्य? शब्दार्थस्य बाधाबाधौ, ज्ञानस्य बाधाबाधौ इत्येतयोः मत्तोः किं साम्यम्? किं च वैषम्यम्?

'सुकृतः कुशलः' इति शब्दार्थस्य सुकृतनाम्नी पुरुषव्यक्तिः कुशलत्वधर्मश्चेति स्तो द्वाववयवौ इति रसालस्य मतम् । अपि कश्चिदत्राक्षेपः समुज्जृम्भते ?

अपश्चिमानां विपश्चितां मते 'सुकृतः कुशलः' इत्याकारकं ज्ञानं सुकृतेन पुरुषव्यक्ति-विशेषेण कथं सम्बन्ध्यते? कथंकारं च कुशलत्वधर्मेण?

रसालो वदति—वाक्यघटकानां पदानां अभिधेयाः यावन्तोऽर्थाः तावद्भूरेव अवयवभूतैः संघटितः शब्दार्थः—इति । अयं वादः अभिहितान्वयवादेन साम्यं बिभर्ति । किमत्र चोद्यं अवतरति?

भूयोऽपि स वदति—*व्यक्तीनां (द्रव्याणां) सुकृताद्यानां धर्मेभ्यः कुशलत्वादिभ्यः सम्बन्धेभ्यः अध्यापनादिभ्यश्च अस्ति स्वरूपतो भेदः । शब्दार्थे द्रव्यं (अवयवभूतं) तादृशमेव भवितुमर्हति यदुद्दिश्य किञ्चिद्विधीयते । यत्र उद्देश्यं एकमनेकं वा आदाय

*इत ऊर्ध्वमिह द्रव्यशब्दो व्यक्तिपरः द्रष्टव्यः । पाणिनीयदर्शनेऽपि द्रव्यशब्दस्य व्यक्तिपरतया प्रयोगो निर्देशमर्हति ।

ततो विजातीयं यत्किञ्चिद्विधीयते स शब्दार्थः । 'सुकृतः कुशलः' इति शब्दार्थे सुकृत-मुद्देश्यं गृहीत्वा कुशलत्वाख्यो धर्मो विधीयते । 'देवदत्तो ब्रह्मदत्तमध्यापयति' इत्यस्मिन् शब्दार्थे देवदत्तब्रह्मदत्तौ उद्दिश्य अध्यापनरूपः सम्बन्धो विधीयते । अनन्तरोदाहृतः शब्दार्थः उद्देश्यद्वयघटितः । तद्वस्तु उद्देश्यं भवति (तानि वस्तुनि वा उद्देश्यानि भवन्ति) शब्दार्थे यत् (यानि वा) आदाय किञ्चिद्विधीयते । शब्दार्थ एकोद्देश्यको वा अनेकोद्देश्यको वा भवेत् । यदा शब्दार्थः एकोद्देश्यको भवति तदा धर्मः कश्चित्—कुशलत्वं लोहितमा वा—विधीयते । यदा तु शब्दार्थः अनेकोद्देश्यकः तदा सम्बन्धः कश्चित्—अध्यापनं प्राशुतरत्वं वा—विधीयते ।

शब्दार्थेषु धर्मः (गुणः) द्वेषा अनुप्रविशेत्—कदाचित् विधेयत्वेन, कदाचि-दुद्देश्यत्वेन । तथाहि—'सुकृतः कुशलः' इत्यत्र शब्दार्थे कौशलाख्यो गुणः विधेयत्वे-नानुप्रविष्टः । 'कुशलत्वं प्रेप्सितव्यम्' इत्यत्र तु स उद्देश्यत्वेनानुप्रविशति, तदुद्देशेनैव *शब्दार्थस्य (प्रेप्सायाः) विधीयमानत्वात् । पुनरप्याह रसालः—शब्दार्थेषु द्रव्यं देवदत्तादि उद्देश्यमेव (यदादाय शब्दार्थो विधीयते) भवितुमर्हति, न कदा-चिदपि विधेयम् (अन्यत् किञ्चिदुद्दिश्य विधीयमानम्) । वर्णितायां विचारसरणौ आश्रितम्, उद्देश्यं (यदादाय किञ्चित् विधीयते), विधेयं (अन्यत् किञ्चिदुद्दिश्य यत् विधीयते), विधानं चेति शब्दार्थस्य यत् त्रेधा विभजनं तत् किं वादिभिः अभ्यु-पगमनीयम् उत दोषगणप्रस्तत्वेन प्रहातव्यम्?

शब्दार्थेषु द्रव्यस्य मुख्यतामातिष्ठते रसालः । यत्र द्रव्यमेकमनेकं वा उद्दिश्य यत् किञ्चिद्विधीयते स शब्दार्थः । धर्मः (गुणः) सम्बन्धो वा कश्चित् शब्दार्थे उद्देश्यो भवेत्; कदाचित् द्रव्यमुद्दिश्य विधीयमानो भवेत् । द्रव्यं न कदाचिदपि अन्यदुद्दिश्य विधीयमानतां भजेत । तत् नियमेन तथाविधं भजेत यथा तदुद्देशेन अन्यत् किञ्चित् विधीयमानतामश्नुवीत ।

शब्दार्थस्वरूपनिरूपणप्रकरणेऽस्मिन् सन्निधापितोऽयं द्रव्यमुख्यतावादः किं परीक्षां क्षमेत? पूर्वमीमांसकैः आदृतः भावनामुख्योद्देश्यकवादः अस्मिन् प्रसङ्गे समालोचन-मर्हति ।

रसालस्य मते 'देवदत्तः ब्रह्मदत्तमध्यापयति' इति वाक्येनोपस्थापितस्य शब्दार्थस्य सन्ति त्रयोऽवयवाः—देवदत्तः, ब्रह्मदत्तः अध्यापनरूपः सम्बन्धश्चेति । एवमेव 'रामः रावणं हन्ति' इति वाक्यात् प्रतीयमानस्य शब्दार्थस्य रामः रावणः हननात्मकः सम्बन्धश्चेति त्रयोऽवयवाः । काव्यकुक्षिनिक्षिप्तानि सन्ति संज्ञाशब्दं सर्वनामशब्दं वा संज्ञाशब्दान्तरेण सर्वनामशब्दान्तरेण वा सम्बन्धयन्ति 'अध्यापयति', 'हन्ति',

*पूर्वं समग्री वाक्यार्थः शब्दार्थ इति व्यवहृतः । सप्रति तु उद्देश्यविकलः अवशिष्टोः शब्दार्थत्वेन व्यवहृत्यते । एवं अर्थद्वये शब्दार्थशब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते रसालः ।

‘(अयमस्य) धाता’ इत्यादीनि पदानि उक्तरीत्या सम्बन्धमेव नियमेन अभिदधति इत्यभिप्रेति रसालः ।

उदाहृतानां शब्दानाम् अभिधेयत्वेन वर्णितः एवंविधोऽर्थः किमङ्गीकारमर्हति? अध्यापनहननादीनामर्थानां सम्बन्धत्वेन व्यपदेशः किमुपपन्नः? हननं किं क्रिया उत सम्बन्धः? अथवा उभयम्?

अर्थद्वयनिष्ठः अनेकार्थनिष्ठो वा अर्थविशेषः सम्बन्धः इति सम्बन्धं लक्षयति रसालः । तथा च हननाख्यः रामरावणयोः समवैति । मध्यवाचिनः अस्तिसमभि-
व्याहृताः मध्यान्तरान्तरालादयः शब्दाः त्रयाणामर्थानां सम्बन्धं ब्रुवन्ति, यथा गयाप्रयागयोः मध्ये वाराणसी अस्ति इत्यत्र गयाप्रयागवाराणसीनां त्रयाणाम् ।

सम्बन्धस्य स्वरूपं कथं वर्णयन्ति भारतीयाः विचक्षणाः?

रसालो मन्यते—शब्दार्थः नियमेन विशिष्टैकार्थरूपो भवति—इति । ‘सुकृतः कुशलः अस्ति’ इति शब्दार्थस्य सुकृतनाम्नी व्यक्तिः कुशलत्वधर्मश्चेति अवयवौ स्त इत्यवोचाम । उदाहृतं वाक्यं स्वतन्त्रयोः अनन्वितयोः अवयवयोः अभिधानमात्रेण नोपक्षीयते । ‘सुकृतः कुशलत्वम्’ इत्युक्तिः प्रकृतशब्दार्थस्य अवयवौ यद्यपि अभि-
दधाति तथापि सा वाक्यं न भवति, प्रकृतवाक्याभिहितशब्दार्थबोधनसामर्थ्यविरहात् । वाक्यावयवभूतानि पदानि प्रत्येकं तादृशमेकं वस्तु अभिदधते यत् वाक्यावबोधस्य शब्दार्थस्य अवयवो भवति । शब्दार्थः तावत् तादृशः कश्चित् यत्रैतेऽवयवाः विशिष्टै-
कार्थरूपताम् आसादयन्ति । विधानरूपः क्रियाविशेषः (व्यापारः) अवयवानेतान् विशकलितान् मिथः सङ्गमयति विशिष्टैकार्थशब्दार्थरूपेण । धर्मविधेयकवाक्यीयो विधानव्यापारः उद्देश्यगतं किञ्चिद्धर्मम् अवभासयति । सम्बन्धविधेयकवाक्यीयो विधानव्यापारः अनेकोद्देश्यगतं कञ्चित् सम्बन्धमवभासयति । आद्यम् उदाहरणं धर्मः कश्चिदुद्देश्यं विशिनष्टि इत्यावेदयति । द्वितीयं तु उद्देश्ययोरुद्देश्यानां वा सम्बन्धं वक्ति । उक्तयुक्त्या शब्दार्थः न वस्तुसमूहमात्ररूपः अपितु विशिष्टैकार्थरूपः इति सिद्धयति ।

उक्तो विधानव्यापारः किं समग्रवाक्यनिष्ठः? आहो यत्किञ्चिद्वाक्यावयवनिष्ठः? रसालः मन्यते—परिनिष्ठतरूपस्य अध्यापयत्यादेः क्रियापदस्यैव (तिङन्तस्य) वाक्यावयवभूतस्य अयं विधानव्यापारः यः शब्दार्थस्य विशिष्टैकरूपतां (विशिष्टै-
कार्थरूपतां) आपादयति । तदेवं शब्दार्थाभिधायकं वाक्यानुप्रविष्टं क्रियापदं द्वेषा व्याप्रियते । पदार्थयोः (पदार्थानां) सम्बन्धं वक्ति इति पदार्थसम्बन्धाभिधानं प्रथमो व्यापारः । उदाहृतवाक्ये अध्यापयतीति तिङन्तः अध्यापनरूपं सम्बन्धं शब्दार्थैकदेशभूतम् अभिधत्ते । विदधाति च—येन विधानेन सम्बन्धः स्वयं शब्दार्थाव-
यवैः उद्देश्यैः संसर्गमवाप्यः पदार्थानां विशिष्टैकार्थरूपतां (शब्दार्थरूपतां) सम्पाद-

यति इति सम्बन्धस्य उद्देश्यैः संसर्जनरूपो द्वितीयो व्यापारः (विधानव्यापारः) । वर्णिते क्रियापदव्यापारद्वयवादे कानि दूषणानि समुत्तिष्ठन्ति?

‘देवदत्तो ममार’, ‘देवदत्तस्य मरणम्’ इत्यनयोः पदसमुदाययोः वैलक्षण्यं किञ्चि-
दाचष्टे रसालः, निरूपयति च तदित्यम्—आद्यं वाक्यम्, शब्दार्थाभिधायकं च । द्वितीयं सुबन्तसमुदायः, न वाक्यम्; नापि शब्दार्थमभिधत्ते; अपि तु सम्भवं (स्वाश्रयं धात्वर्थं) कञ्चित्, यमुद्देश्यमादाय अन्यत् किञ्चित् विधातुं शक्यम् । ‘देवदत्तो ममार’ इति पदकदम्बकमुच्चरन् वक्ता बाधितमबाधितं वा कञ्चन शब्दार्थम-
भिदधाति । ‘देवदत्तस्य मरणम्’ इत्येतदुच्चरन्तु सम्भवं कञ्चित् ब्रुवाणः विवक्षितस्या-
र्थस्य बाधाबाधोरुदास्ते । अनयोः पदत्रातयोः *अर्थयोः यो भेदो गृह्यते स सर्वात्मना ‘ममार’ इति (देवदत्तो ममार इत्युक्तिमध्यपतितः) क्रियापदसन्नधिप्रयुक्तः, यत् क्रियापदमेव अस्य पदसमुदायस्य वाक्यतामापादयति इति साधयति रसालः ।

तिङन्तस्य वर्णितवैलक्षण्यप्रयोजनकत्वे अनुकूलाः प्रतिकूलाश्च युक्त्य उप-
स्थाप्यन्ताम् ।

इदं वक्तव्यम्—

‘सुकृतः कुशलः अस्ति’ इत्येतद्वाक्यान्तःपाति अस्तीति क्रियापदं व्यापारद्वयवादा-
नुरोधेन सम्बन्धस्य कस्यचन वाचकः इत्यापतति । अत्र पृच्छामः—कोऽयं सम्बन्धः यः अस्तीति क्रियापदेन अभिधीयते? ‘सुकृतः कुशलः अस्ति’ इत्येतद्वाक्याभिहितस्य शब्दार्थस्य द्वावेव अवयवौ, उद्देश्यभूतः सुकृतः तमुद्दिश्य विधीयमानं कुशलत्वं चेति । कुशलत्वं च केवलं गुण एव, न तु द्रव्यम्—इति ।

तिङन्तमात्रं सम्बन्धाभिधायकम् इत्यात्मीये सिद्धान्ते उक्तं दूषणं समुद्दिष्टो रसालः कुशलत्वं एकार्थनिष्ठं सम्बन्धविशेषं मन्यते । अयं च सम्बन्धद्वयाधीन-
सद्भावात् अध्यापनार्देवलक्षणः, एकसम्बन्धिमात्रनिष्ठः सम्बन्धः । (तथा ‘सुकृतः कुशलः अस्ति’ इत्येतद्वाक्यमपि ‘देवदत्तो ब्रह्मदत्तमध्यापयति’ इत्यादि वाक्यवत् सम्बन्धविधेयकमेव भवति इति न किञ्चिद्बुध्यति इत्यभिमानः) ।

अत्र ब्रूमः—नैतावतापि विस्तारः । तथाहि—आस्तां तावदभ्युपगमः, कुशलत्व-
मेकार्थनिष्ठः सम्बन्ध इति । तथापि कुशल इति विशेषणवाचिशब्देनैव वाच्यः सः न तु अस्तीति तिङन्तेन इति तिङन्तेन सम्बन्धाभिधानसिद्धान्तस्य तावकीनस्य किमनेन परिव्राणं कृतं स्यादिति व्यर्थोऽयम् अभ्युपगमः ।

अपि चोदाहृते वाक्ये अस्तीति क्रियापदेन कुशलत्वस्य (एकार्थनिष्ठसम्बन्धस्य) सुकृतेन सम्बन्धनरूपः (विधानाख्यः) अपरोऽपि व्यापारः कथमिति विवेचनीयः । नास्त्यत्र तादृशः अवयवः (शब्दः) यः उक्तं सम्बन्धनं घटयेत् । वर्तते ह्यत्र द्वावेव अवयवौ, सुकृतः कौशलं चेति । एवं च कौशलं (सम्बन्धः) स्वयमेव (विनापि

*इदं सप्तम्यन्तम् ।

घटकं) आत्मानं सुकृतेन सम्बन्धयति इत्यायाति तथा च कुशलत्वं (सम्बन्धः) तादृशं वस्तु यत् स्वेनैव स्वयं सुकृतेन सम्बद्धं, भवति इति पर्यवस्यति । इत्थं च 'देवदत्तः ब्रह्मदत्तमध्यापयति' इति वाक्येनाभिहिते शब्दार्थेऽपि अध्यापनरूपः सम्बन्धः स्वेनैव स्वयं देवदत्तब्रह्मदत्ताभ्यां सम्बन्धमुपेयात् इत्यकामेनाप्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, उभयोरपि वाक्ययोः समानयोगक्षेमत्वेन विनिगमनाविरहात् । एवं स्थिते अवयवभूतानां पदार्थानां विशिष्टैकार्थतापादकतिङन्तगतत्वेन अभिमतस्य विधानव्यापारस्य कथंकारं वा उपयोगः ।

अपि नाम भारतीयाः शास्त्रचिन्तकाः वाक्यस्य विशिष्टैकार्थाभिधायकत्वं रोचयन्ते? किमात्मकं पुनस्ते विशिष्टैकार्थत्वमभिप्रयन्ति? उक्ताया विशिष्टैकार्थतायाः सम्पादने आख्यातस्य किं नाम कृत्यम्?

LIST OF SPEAKERS

1. Arindam Chakravarti
(also referred to as Arindam, Chakroborti)
Asiatic Society, Calcutta
Presently at Wolfson College, Oxford
2. Ashok Kelkar
Deccan College, Pune
(Also referred to as Kelkar)
3. Badrinath Shukla
(Deceased)
Formerly-Vice Chancellor
Sampoornanand Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya
Varanasi
(Also referred to as बदरीनाथ शुक्लः, शुक्लः, Badarinath and Badarinathji)
4. B.B. Bhagwat
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune
(Also referred to as बाबा भागवत)
5. Bisvambhar Pahi
Department of Philosophy
Rjasthan University, Jaipur
(Also referred to as विश्वम्भर, पाहिः)
6. Daya Krishna
R-9 University Campus, Jaipur
(Also referred to as Daya)
7. D. Prahladachar
Department of Sanskrit,
Bangalore University, Bangalore
(Also referred to as प्रह्लादाचार्य)
8. K.J. Shah
12 Navodaya Nagar, Dharwad
(Also referred to as Shah)
9. Krishna Arjuna Vadkar
Gyan Prabodhini
Sadashiv Peth, Pune
(Also referred to as कृष्ण अर्जुन वाडकर)
10. K.T. Pandurangi
Vidyadhishanilaya
No. 132/4, III Block
Jayanagar, Bangalore
(Also referred to as Pandurangi, Pandurangiji and पाण्डुरङ्गी)

11. M.P. Rege
Prajna Pathashala Mandal, Wai
(Also referred to as Rege).
12. Mukund Lath
Department of History
Rajasthan University, Jaipur
(Also referred to as Lath, लाठ).
13. Peri Suryanarayan Shastri
Sanskrit Scholar
17-2-4/13 Sriramnagar,
Rajamundry
(also referred to as Sūryanārāyaṇa, सूर्यनारायण)
14. Prabal Das Gupta
Deccan College
Pune
15. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya
P/139 Metropolitan Co-operative Society
P.O. Dhapa, Canal South Road,
Calcutta
(Also referred to as Shibajeeban, Bhattacharjee and शिवजीवन भट्टाचार्य)
16. S.R. Bhatt
Department of Philosophy
Delhi University
Delhi.
(Also referred to as Bhat).
17. Srinivas Shastry Aiyangar
7 Rasta Peth
Pune
(Also referred to as Srinivas Shastry).
18. Sri Ram Pande
Sampoornanand Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya
Varanasi
(Also referred to as श्रीराम पाण्डेय)
19. S.S. Dixit
21 Ideal Society
Sagar Mall
Kolhapur
20. V.N. Jha
Centre for Advanced Study in Sanskrit
University of Poona
Pune
(Also referred to as वशिष्ठ नारायण झा and झा)

SAMVĀDA

श्रीनिवासशास्त्री—उपस्थिता महाविद्वांसः विदुष्यश्च ! अद्यतनविचार-
विषयोऽयम्—रसेलमहाभागः बहिःसत्ताविशिष्टः पदार्थः पदेनाभिधीयते इति
स्वकीयं मतं प्रकटितं कृतम्; वस्तुत इदानीं घटशब्दो वर्तते—घटत्वविशिष्टमर्थं वयं
वदामः, स्वरूपसत्त्वं पदार्थं घटशब्दोऽभिधेयमिति वयं अङ्गीकुर्मः । परन्तु रसाल-
महाभागाः बाह्यार्थे एव बहिःसत्तामपि अन्तर्भावयन्ति वा न वा नाहं जानामि
'अन्धोऽन्धेन नीयते' इति न्यायेन । अतो भवादृशैः पाश्चात्यविद्यानिष्णातैः तस्मत्
सम्यक्तया प्रतिपादनीयम्—बहिःसत्ताविशिष्ट एवार्थः पदेन प्रतिपाद्यते वा
स्वरूपसत् पदार्थः तं तं जातिविशिष्टमर्थं पदेनाभिधेयमिति भवन्तः प्रति-
पादयन्तु ।

अत्र पौरस्त्यविद्यानिष्णाताः बहवः सभासदो विराजन्ते । ते स्वकीयं मतं सम्यक्
प्रकटीकरिष्यन्ति । अनन्तरं किं साधु किमसाधु इति निर्णयम् । इयं वादकथा
तत्त्वबुभुत्सूनां कथा, न वितण्डा, न जल्पः । सीतादेवी अवादीत्, रामं प्रति
उपदेशमकार्षीत्, 'स्मारये त्वां न शिक्षये ।' तद्वत् भवतोऽहं स्मारयामि, न तु शिक्षणं
करोमि । अतोऽत्र स्वस्वमतं प्रकटनीयम् । परन्तु आप्रहो न कर्तव्यः यदिदानीं
मदीयः पक्षः सर्वैः बहुधा खण्ड्यते तथापि तन्मया स्वीकर्तव्यमेव, यदि प्रतिपक्षं
युक्तिविरुद्धं न भवति तर्हि मया तत् स्वीकर्तव्यमेव । यः कोऽपि पक्षो भवतु
शास्त्रकारः भवतु कश्चन मुनिर्वा तत्र नियंत्रणं नास्ति । यथेष्टं युक्तिभिः शास्त्रार्थः
स्वमतं च प्रतिपादनीयम् । अतः वादकथापुरस्कारेणायं विचारोऽत्र प्रस्तूयते ।

किञ्च अहमध्यक्षस्थाने नैवोपविष्टः । पूर्वतनकाले एतादृशैर्बहुभिर्विद्वद्भिः
अध्यक्षैर्भाव्यमिति निर्बन्ध आसीत् । ब्रह्मा सर्वविदिति । इदानीं वैदिकाः किं
कुर्वन्ति ? सर्वविद् ब्रह्मा नैव लभ्यते, दर्भस्तम्बं स्थापयित्वा तस्मिन् दर्भस्तम्बे
सर्वविदं ब्रह्माणं आह्वयन्ति, तद्वत् मादृशाः अध्यक्षा अल्पविदः । मम कृत्यमन्यत्
किमपि नास्ति—भवद्भिः योऽर्थः विचार्यते, विचार्य निर्णीयते, निर्णीतं तमर्थ-
मुपसंहृत्य अहं प्रतिपादयामीति इवमेव मम कृत्यम् । बहिःसत्ताविशिष्टमर्थवत्पदं
भवतीति रसेलानामभिप्रायः तद्विषये भवन्तः विचारान् प्रतिपादयन्तु । ये
पौरस्त्यविद्यानिष्णातास्ते स्वकीयं मतं प्रतिपादयिष्यन्ति । भवद्भिः विचारः
प्रस्तूयताम् ।

A DIALOGUE

Śrīnivāsa Sāstrī: Learned ladies and gentlemen: Let me tell you about the issue we are going to discuss today. Russell has argued that words refer to entities that have an external existence. But our understanding of the matter is different. We believe that words such as *ghaṭa* refer to an entity qualified by the universal *ghaṭa*-hood. In other words, the word *ghaṭa* means something that exists in a form of its own (*svarūpasat*). Let me confess, however, that I am not sure what Russell means by 'external existence': can it really be equated with the notion of *bāhyārtha* that we have? I am not sure. Like one blind man led by another blind man I am entirely in the dark. I request the philosophers to dip into western modes of thought to give us a clearer idea of what Russell has in mind. We would like to know from you, sirs, whether a word according to Russell denotes something that has an external existence, or does it refer to an entity existing in its own form, qualified by a universal.

We have in our midst many eastern pandits. They too will present their views. We shall then have to face the task of deciding what is right and what is not. We have gathered here to engage in an encounter of ideas. Ours will be a discussion between those who are seeking the truth. We are not aiming at mere sophistry or winning an argument.

Sītā, when she wanted to teach something to Rāma, never said, 'I want to teach you.' She said, 'I want to remind you of something you know. I too would like to remind you of something you know. In expressing your views, do not try to impose it on others. Do not hold on to your views dogmatically; yet do not give them up if they can withstand the force of all the counter-arguments aimed at them. You are free to express any view that you think fit. But whether the view be that of a great *ācārya* or a renowned sage, you must be prepared to support it with sound

arguments; since what we propose to hold here is an exchange of ideas, wherein views will be put to the test of reasoning.

I would also like to say to you something about my being chosen as the chairperson. In ancient times a chairperson had to be a very versatile person. In a *yajña*, the priest called Brahmā was the chairperson; he supervised the whole proceedings. He was expected to possess a thorough knowledge (about the *yajña* as a whole). But what do the priests do in a *yajña* today? There is no well-versed Brahmā found anywhere. So what they do is to put up a small mound made of grass and call it an all-knowing Brahmā. I am a chairperson of a similar kind. I know little and my status is only symbolic. I have nothing to say or to do. I will listen to your arguments and your conclusions and sum them up for you—this will be my sole function. Now let the western philosophers expound Russell's purport in saying that a word expresses an external entity. And let the eastern pandits propose their own views. I invite you to respond to the issue.

Bhat: Any logico-epistemic analysis of language has also to take in view the corresponding analysis of knowledge and reality. In fact, language only communicates what is available to us in knowledge and knowledge is nothing, but to use a metaphorical expression, a revelation of reality; and therefore ultimately for understanding the meaning of language we have to go back to reality, of course, via knowledge. Now the concept of entity with which we are at present grappling has to be located somewhere in reality. And when we talk of an entity we should not always mean something which is in the external world or is physical in character. Here we can with profit analyse the Nyāya concept of *padārtha* which not only stands for positive entities but also negative ones, for *abhāva* also is a *padārtha*. Further, *padārtha* not only stands for tangible entities but also for abstract ones, not only the substantives but also the adjectives, and therefore we have a list of seven *padārthas* beginning with *dravya*. So by entity we may in fact mean all those things which have *astitva*. Even *abhāva* has *astitva* as when we say '*Bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*'. So *astitva* can be regarded as one of the necessary conditions for anything to be designated as entity. And then, whatever has *astitva* must be given to us in knowledge. Then only can we use the word '*astitva*'. Therefore the