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Rethinking Axiality: Why the Transcendence–Immanence Binary Does not Work for India

Shail Mayaram

An acknowledgement

These reflections on axiality were originally written as part of a keynote address to be delivered at a Conference on "Imagining culture(s), Undoing Disciplines" organized by the University of Miami Center for the Humanities (2011), which for certain reasons I was unable to attend. When Monika invited me to contribute to a volume celebrating the work of Mukund Lath it struck me that this might accord well with his own interests and exploration of *dharma saṃkaṭa* and of being and knowing in his most recent book, *Kyā hai? Kyā nahīṁ hai?* (Lath 2004; Lath 2009). An abbreviated version was presented at a workshop on Religion organized by Manindra Thakur at the Centre for Political Studies of the Jawaharlal Nehru Univesity. I am grateful for the response of its participants.

Charles Taylor's magnum opus *A Secular Age* (Taylor 2009) throws open a challenge: How does one think about conditions of belief and secularity in the nonwest? Taylor's book is concerned with the West or the North Atlantic world whose roots lie in Latin Christendom but not with the worlds of the Indian Ocean or the Pacific. It raises for me the question of what were pre-modern "bulwarks of belief" and practice in the nonwest? What is the nature of religious imaginations of, say, India and China or the many universes of Arabic, Persian and the many vernaculars? What are the changing moments therein?

This paper explores in a preliminary fashion some issues concerning the changing religious imagination of the nonwest and is in that sense a prolegomenon. The nature of the religious imagination, the culture-power dynamic and the relationship between the religious and the secular undergoes a different trajectory in both India and China, two of the major non-western civilizations. What are also different are their conceptual grids.

What must be done prior to thinking the history of secularity in the nonwest is the task of cleaning the slate before it can be written anew. A starting point is to rethink the categories that are often invoked to analyze anOther topography of religion. In effect, three sets of categories have been used by social science to think about the culture/power dynamic:

religious/secular
transcendent/immanent
sacred/profane

Interestingly, while most theorists accept the critique of the religion/secular binary, the new binary between transcendent and immanent has become something of a Kantian *a priori* and has been resurrected in the idea of axiality (Casanova 2009).

The axial splitting between the transcendent and the immanent is one of the core ontological assumptions invoked by several historical sociologists and political philosophers. This is an understanding grounded in the historical experience of the Abrahamic religions and of the North Atlantic world. It involves two core ideas—the split between the immanent and the transcendent and a new sense of time. The following argument challenges the temporal/typological framework that universalizes the axial age.

The revival of the idea of axiality is associated with Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. Reformulating an initial conceptualization by Karl Jaspers, he argued that the Axial Age breaks through in the middle of first millennium BCE. Given the radically new idea of a transcendent God, kings could no longer claim to be gods. Instead it authorized prophets and priests. With the disappearance of king-god, a new model of the secular ruler appeared, accountable to a higher order or authority, to God and divine law.

Axiality helped shape the great world religions and the classical empires. It accomplished what Jaspers calls the transition from mythos to logos and Cassirer, the limits of mythical thinking (Eisenstadt 1986). Jaspers had built on Alfred Weber's idea of a "real uniformity within the Eurasian bloc." He identified a religious and philosophical questioning in Asiatic-Greek civilization (subsuming Zorastrian religion, Jewish prophecy and Greek philosophy involving Persians, Jews and Greeks who accomplished a breakthrough by questioning the "magistic" worldview) and in India and China (with Confucianism and Buddhism, described as secondary arenas) (Arnason 2005). Jaspers saw India and China alongside the West, rather than Egypt and Babylonia. Jaspers' thesis was projected as an alternative to Christian and post-Christian philosophies of history suggesting that Greek and Jewish sources were crucial to western traditions. Among the problems with his work was that he saw nomads as "barbarian peripheries to civilizational centers" suggesting an implicit theory of progress.

In a relatively recent work that Eisenstadt gave me when I visited him in Jerusalem in 2010 (some months before his passing away and subsequently published as Eisenstadt 2011), he referred to "multiple patterns in modernity," but not of axiality. The Florence Conference that debated the idea of axiality had, however, highlighted the need to think about multiple axialities involving the Greek, Jewish, Indian and Chinese traditions (Arnason et al. 2005).

Eisenstadt points out the tensions in the internal structure of axial visions: inclusivist universalist claims and an exclusivist tendency. The idea of the Axial Age, he maintains, constitutes a revolutionary process that has shaped the course of history and is a challenge to sociological theory (Eisenstadt 2011). He also invokes Robert Bellah who had suggested a transition from archaic modes of thought to the historic religions. For Bellah there was a close association between religion and the transcendental ("the historic religions are all in some sense transcendental"), and the historical religions represent a theoretical stage of human thinking or reflexivity. He maintains that this became a basic, predominant and hegemonic premise of cultural programs and institutional formations within a society or civilization.

In Eisenstadt's view the revolutionary markers of the Axial Age rupture are explicit:

> They include a broadening of horizons, or an opening up of potentially universal perspectives, in contrast to the particularism of more archaic modes of thought; an ontological distinction between higher and lower levels of reality; and a normative subordination of the lower level to the higher, with more or less overtly stated implications for human efforts to translate guiding principles into ongoing practices. In other words, the developing Axial visions entailed the concept of a world beyond the immediate boundaries of their respective settings—potentially leading to the constitution of broader institutional frameworks, opening up a range of possible institutional formations....(Eisenstadt 2011)

Johann P. Arnason, Smuel N. Eisenstadt and Björn Wittrock emphasize the idea of a historical period with defined structural aspects; of radical cultural transformation in several major civilizations that experienced major rupture; and elaborated new models of order—implying a shift from particularism and archaic to an opening up of potentially universal perspectives (Arnason et al. 2005). They contrast the axial model with older civilizational theory in that it does not view civilizations as closed worlds. Eisenstadt's concluding statement in the volume emphasizes relations between axial and non-axial civilizations such as Japan. Arnason, Eisenstadt and Wittrock mention that the axial model draws on Max Weber but avoids his emphasis on particular religious traditions and dismissive treatment of others, in particular the ways in which Weber minimized inner conflicts of Chinese traditions and their transformative potential. They also acknowledge that the models of Jaspers and Eisenstadt are dependent on assumptions of Greek and Jewish versions of axiality, particularly the distinction between the transcendental and mundane.

To be fair, Jan Assmann critiques traditional conceptions of axiality, particularly the illusion of a "mysterious synchrony" and points out that there have been older and also later moments of axiality as when Akhenaten initiated a monotheistic revolution in the 14th century BCE (Assmann 2008). There is also the question of whether Zoroaster belongs to an axial or a preceding moment.

As one looks at India, axiality becomes highly problematic. Let us begin with the question of how historical sociologists and theorists conceive of axiality. Jan Heesterman views the Vedic sacrifice as the starting-point of an axial transformation in India, viewing the ritual system concerned with order. But a far larger number of scholars identify the *śramaṇa* traditions and specifically Buddhism as constitutive of axiality.

Taylor, however, takes a different position. He identifies the transcendent/immanent distinction as "foundational" in defining religion for our culture and refers to the "Axial Age" as an extraordinary period when "'higher' forms of religion appeared seemingly independent in different civilizations, marked by founding figures as Confucius, Gautama, Socrates, the Hebrew prophets" (Taylor 2009: 16, 151). Taylor views axiality as a transformative moment that articulates the idea of a higher human good. It involves personae such as monks, sages and renouncers and institutions in that it undercuts the "pagan"; just as the *saṅgha* undermines the *brahman*. Axiality initiates "a break in all three dimensions of embeddedness: Social order, cosmos, human good." Taylor acknowledges that Buddhism radically undercuts the cosmos but does not see it as undermining the idea of transcendence. What is problematic is his conception of Buddhist *nirvāṇa* as a "beyond or outside."[1] If the cosmos is undercut how can *nirvāṇa* be an outside? With respect to Latin Christendom, he maintains that the process is completed only in the 16th century (Taylor 2011). "Or if it remains cosmic, it loses its original ambivalent character, and exhibits an order of unalloyed goodness, as with the 'Heaven', guarantor of just rule in Chinese thought, or the order of Ideas of Plato, whose key is the Good" (152).

More recently, Rajeev Bhargava (n.d.) has identified in the Ashokan inscriptions the idea of the common good articulated in the idea of *dhamma*, which marks a radical break with the Vedic (*vaidika*). The argument leaves several questions unanswered.

Is the Vedic only about transactions between men and gods for material gains—i.e., the idea of sacrifice exclusively as propitiating the gods? Does the Vedic not also offer clues to transcendental morality (as distinct from ethics)? Further, does the Buddhist moment mark a break with the past or does it conjoin with another past? The argument raises further issues. How is difference marked between the *brāhmaṇa* and the *śramaṇa*? What is the nature of the later dialogue between the two? Is the Vedic being conflated with the brahmanical?

The *śramaṇa* traditions, as Govind Chandra Pande demonstrates, predate the Vedas. *Śramaṇa* came from moral exertion (*śrama*)and countered the *yajña*-centric worldview. Both Buddhism and Jainism represented continuity with the pre-Vedic and are also "deeply influenced by Vedic thought." "The fashionable view regarding Buddhism as a Protestant Vedicism and its birth as a Reformation appears to be based on a misreading of later Vedic history caused by the fascination of a historical analogy and the ignorance or neglect of Pre-Vedic-civilization" (Pande 1957: 317). Joshi cites G.C. Pande, H. Zimmer and H.L. Jain on the non-Vedic and non-Aryan origin of Buddhism, Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Jainism. Joshi points out likewise that even before the Upaniṣads and the Buddha there were non-Vedic and non-brahmanic sages and ascetics. He maintains, "Buddhism and the non-Brāhmaṇic thought of the Upaniṣads belong to the non-Aryan and pre-Vedic Indian cultural tradition" (Joshi 1970: 12). He builds on Pande's argument pointing to the Harappan influence in the culture of *munis* and *śramaṇas*. We need to remember that Śakyamuni was predated by six Buddhas.

Raymond Panikkar cites a Ṛgvedic hymm (X.136) dedicated to the *muni* or silent ascetic, who is a *keśin* (with long loose hair) and who consumes *viś* (poison, as Śiva does):

> Within him is fire, within him is drink,
> within him both earth and heaven.
> He is the Sun which views the whole world,
> he is indeed Light itself—
> the long-haired ascetic.

There is mention also of the Vrātyas, those who don't follow ritual. They are called *yatis* in the *brāhmaṇas* (Pande 2011). The *yatis* and *munis* in Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Jainism, Ajivism do not recognize the Veda. It was only later with Patañjali (200 CE) that Yoga was turned into a theistic system.

The *vaidika/śramaṇaka* is hardly the equivalent of the "archaic"/Abrahamic. The Ṛgveda is not archaic/pagan given the ideas of *śāntī*, *ṛta* and *ṛṇa* expressive of conceptions of the cosmos, order and human good. *Ṛta* and *satya* provide the cosmic foundation of the universe and may be apprehended by *tapas* or disciplined "seeking" or *sādhana* and realized through them (Krishna 2011).

Bhargava cites Edward Fitzpatrick Crangle (1994) as suggesting that early Vedic practices involve "a worldly attitude whereby the worshipper seeks to appease gods by performing ritual sacrificial ceremonies." Crangle and Bhargava clearly approach the Vedic tradition from the outside contrasted with, say, Panikkar, who attempts to understand it from within. It is interesting that they cite the "otherness" within Vedic belief describing those who were opposed to Aryan rituals as "unbelievers, riteless people."

Bhargava sees the Buddha as offering a different conception of *dharma*, not for personal or collective self-fulfillment but to make easier a common life of a diverse society. It offers a "transcendental point from which one examines the cosmos" and from this emanates a moral vision it makes a profound restructuring of society and polity possible. Bhargava points out that Romila Thapar also sees the 6th century as a "century of universal questioning." Moreover, Buddha's teachings opened up the

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[1] "The transcendent may now be quite beyond or outside of the cosmos, as with the Creator God of Genesis, or the Nirvana of Buddhism," Taylor writes citing Oakley. This involves a "rupture with Jewish idea of creation ex nihilio, which took God out of the cosmos and placed him above it."

possibility of the radical socio-political restructuring of the world and the self by politico-moral action from above. Buddha's ethic included the pivotal importance of moral action (Bhargava forthcoming).

Bhargava builds on D.D. Kosambi who highlights not only the personal conversion of the emperor but of the entire state apparatus. Aśoka inaugurates the new idea of the *cakravartin*, the wheel turner, the upholder of *dharma* who is intrinsic to the social and moral order of the world. His seventh edict is an attempt to tame the institution of kingship and to contain the absolute exercise of power. *Dhamma* is not virtue, religious truth or piety, but akin as Obeysekere and Tambiah have pointed out to transcendental morality (cited by Bhargava forthcoming).

The two moments of Śakyamuni and Aśoka thus become conflated in Bhargava's argument. The problem is also that the past is understood through a contemporary lens. Bhargava offers a view of "religion" based on mutual exclusion. What is the extent to which contemporary categories such as "hate speech" can be superimposed on the past? Can the polemics between Sufis and yogis be called thus, or that between different Sufi lineages or between the brahmans and *bhikkhus*?

It is the Upaniṣads, Bhargava concludes, that provide the axial turn, the birth of the idea of radical transcendence and therefore of a duality between this world (*saṃsāra*) and *brahman* or *ātman*, the ultimate reality pervading the whole universe or our deepest inner, imperishable. *Mokṣa* is liberation (*mukti*) from the cycle of *saṃsāra*, achieved through *jñāna*, inner, intuitive knowledge. But does the upanishadic signify duality or a non-dual perspective (see on this Gandhi 1984).

The question to be asked is whether the upanishadic texts are not part of the "Vedic experience," as Panikkar puts it. Clearly the idea of axiality runs into problems with respect to Indian typologies and temporalities. It also superimposes categories based on the Semitic experience of other cultures.

Indeed, both India and China suggest trajectories that challenge the transcendent/immanent binary. China defines understanding in terms of religion as belief in "transcendent." Both Buddhism and Confucianism are its denial—in Buddhism there was only the constantly changing immanent and as for Confucianism the binary itself became irrelevant. Indeed, an immanent–transcendent holism is what would seem more apt.

In India there are theistic systems that refer to a causal god, but there are others in which the idea of the divine is transcausal and acosmic. Shlomo Biderman's critique of axiality and the transposition of "transcendence" is particularly interesting as it comes from a scholar deeply grounded in both Judaic and Indian philosophies. Strangely none of the Axial Age theorists have chosen to respond to him. He contrasts transcendence in two cultures, European and Indian, pointing out that the presupposition of transcendence (where presupposition means an assumption) is rooted in the West's philosophical and religious framework going back to ancient Greeks as in Plato's theory of forms (less adequately called theory of ideas). It establishes "the ontological precedence of the outward over the inward, exteriority over interiority, the universal over the particular, transcendent over the immanent" (Biderman 2008: 18; the subsequent page numbers in parentheses are citations from this work).

Biderman cites Heinrich Heine in saying that the prominence given to the presupposition of transcendence in the West came from the "fusion of the Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysical assumption and Judeo-Christian religious belief in a transcendent personal God" (23). He points out the enormous irony in that Plato and Aristotle transcend pagan "ancient Greek merriment." Mythic worlds of stories of the exploits of the Gods would only later be invoked by Nietzsche's Dionysius. Heine castigates these Greek philosophers for failing to defend Hellenism or "the Greek way of feeling and thinking." Christianity followed Judaism in instituting transcendence as the foundation of culture promoting a worldview that is "dismal, emaciated, ascetic, over-spiritual" (24). Biderman comments on the "common knowledge that the three forms of western monotheism share between them a belief in the existence of a divine being. But it is less commonly observed that this belief is deeply rooted in the common conceptual bedrock…[which is] the presupposition of transcendence" "This is a presupposition about God's exteriority, His outwardness, His being different, the total 'Other', unlike any other being", "His complete contrariness to both nature and human beings, and the gap between Him and human beings" (24–25). Biderman acknowledges exceptions such as the Stoics and Neoplatonists, but even when godhead is depicted in immanent terms it is grounded in transcendence. The presupposition of transcendence, Biderman argues, continues to play a "constitutive role within Western religious languages....Transcendence *precedes* both belief and practice by virtue of being a 'mental paradigm,'" that "draws a clear-cut demarcation between interiority and exteriority and sees this demarcation as being essentially asymmetrical-positing a clear precedence of exteriority over interiority, of the objective over the subjective" (27). The word *sacred*, derived from Latin *sacrare*, meaning to set apart as holy, to consecrate.

Transcendence is not necessarily linked to monotheism, Biderman points out. Indeed, the Biblical world could be called henotheism, as Max Müller did, with God as supreme among a plurality of gods. The Exodus states, "Who is like unto thee, O Lord, among the gods?" Philosophical interpretations view God as non-corporeal, non-material, singular, abstract although there are attempts also to endow God with corporeal form, as anthropomorphic and with attributes. The presupposition of transcendence is whether God is portrayed as an abstract being, formless and incorporeal or as personal with qualities. Biderman highlights the violent and vehement rejection of different forms of idolatry. Jan Assmann terms this family of religions as counter-religion since they reject anything opposing them, referring to such alternatives as paganism, heresy or idolatry (42). They are constantly compromised by Jewish midrashic, kabbalistic and Hasidic literature, Meister Eckhart and forms of Sufism in the attempt to bridge the "yawning abyss," as Gershom Scholem puts it, between God and man (50).

Indian philosophical and religious milieus do not put the presupposition of transcendence at the center as suggested by two millennia of Indian thought, Biderman argues. Divinity is not considered "something *essentially* different from the world and as something that has ontological precedence over man and the world" (52). Hasidism and Indian devotionalism are not similar, unlike what Martin Buber thought.

In the Vedic tradition, ritual/sacrifice is very different from the paradigmatic Abrahamic sacrifice of Cain/Abel or of Abraham. Humans along with gods and sacrificial activity are subject to cosmic order. Ritual is attributed a cosmic role, ritual creates the world and preserves it and there is an autonomy of the ritual act that makes gods dependent on the seers. Between the ninth and seventh centuries BCE an internalization of ritualistic activity occurs. The ritualistic act is perceived as a "unique act of creation: man upholds the cosmos through his ritualistic activity (and, alongside that, by means of his linguistic activity, he preserves the Vedas, the framework of the cosmos, by performing them)" (58–59).

The second instance of the absence of the presupposition of transcendence is in the idea of atman. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*'s conception, "If a man knows 'I am Brahman' in this way, he becomes this whole world. Not even the gods are able to prevent it, for he becomes their very self (atman). So when a man venerates another deity, thinking, 'He is one, and I am another', he does not understand....The gods, therefore, are not pleased at the prospect of men coming to understand this" (60). "I am Brahman" reverses the relationship between man and god, makes gods dependent on the knowing self. God is different from man, but not an "other." "Idolatry" and the idea of "heresy" are integral conceptions of Western monotheism that are alien in this context.

The *śramaṇa* traditions also deny the idea of the transcendent. In Buddhism there is no notion of divinity and the idea of *īśvara* is denied. It would reject Plato's assumption that true reality is "out there" beyond the cave (that is, beyond phenomenal life), Biderman points out (53). From Nāgārjuna (150 CE) there is a radical critique of all *pramāṇas* regarding their capacity to grasp the nature of ultimate reality (Krishna 2000: ch. 3). On the other hand, over the years folkloristic Buddhism adopts a significant part of the Indian pantheon.

The notion of *pratītyasamutpāda* is translated as "dependent arising" also co-arising or "interdependent arising", i.e., that phenomena arise together in a mutually interdependent web of cause and effect, which is what the Buddha awakened to. What is denied here is a theory of creationism or origins in the assertion that any phenomena exists only because of the existence of other phenomena in an incredible complex web of cause and effect covering time past, time present and time future. This is symbolized by the *indrajāla* or multidimensional spider's web on which lie dew drops or jewels reflecting all other dew drops.

In *pratītyasamutpāda* everything depends on everything else, all things are conditioned and transient (*anicca*), have no real independent identity (*anatta*) and thus do not truly exist as entities though the ordinary mind perceives them as such. Knowledge/wisdom (*prajñā*) is to "see things as they are" (*yathā-bhūta-ñāna-dassana*) and that all phenomena are insubstantial and empty (*sūnya*) and thence to renounce desire and attachment, cultivate awareness and understanding and transcend the conditioned realm of form through buddhahood. Nāgārjuna, the most important representative of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism, rejects both monistic and dualistic accounts of causation and explains *śūnyatā* (emptiness) of causality by demonstrating the interdependence of cause and effect.

I conclude this discussion with a further set of questions to the proponents of Axiality. What are the indices, the minimalist agenda, in other words, what conditions will disprove the idea of Axiality or certify its non-existence?

Is it the case that Axiality obfuscates what might be important inter-civilizational differences?

Does the idea of prophecy and of revelation and of God and priests mark difference or sameness? Is the criteria of justification and legitimation of the social and political order different in India and China?

The question is as to whether there was one axial turn or many such turns, the Ṛgveda constituting one, the Upaniṣads another, and the Buddha and Mahāvīra yet another. Akkā Mahādevī, Kabīr, Nānak and Mīrā being moments in the "medieval" followed by the great modern sages, among them being Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahaṃsa, Sri Aurobindo, Nārāyaṇa Guru and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. But in that case the idea of the Axial Age Revolution is so watered down, as to be rendered virtually useless

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A Short Improvisation on Time, Transcendence, and Self-Identity[1]

Daniel Raveh

1 Prologue

I first met Mukundji in Daya Krishna's writings. "Dr. Mukund Lath", as he is always formally referred to, is mentioned in many of Dayaji's articles as the most intimate of interlocutors, as a source of creative thinking and a voice deeply rooted in the Sanskrit tradition. These two scholars and close associates share a working method which I call "thinking with". For Daya Krishna and Mukund Lath, the challenge of reading a text is to think with its author. For both of them, a text is a "meeting place" of author and reader, a "realm of between" as Daya Krishna puts it, in which the reader is as integral a contributor to the thinking process, to the text as a process, as the author. Such an attitude changes the conventional balance between authorship and readership. The text no longer "belongs" exclusively to the author, but turns into what Daya Krishna refers to as *saṃvāda*, a dialogic encounter, a mutual experiment.

As I was recently reading Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* and its commentaries together with Mukundji, that is, as we were thinking with Patañjali and his commentators, he found special interest in Vācaspatimiśra's *Tattvavaiśāradī* and Hariharānanda Āraṇya's *Bhāsvatī*. Whenever we encountered a problem (and "problems" are "good" as they stir the philosophical exploration), Mukundji would suggest turning to "our friend" Vācaspatimiśra, to see how he works with the problem at hand, or to consult "our Bengali friend" Āraṇya. Seeing them as friends is a natural outcome of the "thinking with" method. If Vācaspatimiśra and Āraṇya, Patañjali, Śaṅkara and every other *mahā*-thinker are not taken as gurus and their writings are not treated as an untouchable *śruti*; if one is free to draw on their insights or take issue with them; if one spends hours and days reading them and thinking with them, preferring the coolness of the philosophy-*loka* over the heat of the mundane sphere, they literally become friends. Therefore I was excited (and Mukundji composedly curious) whenever we were able, between the lines of their philosophical arguments, to learn something about our friends, Patañjali's commentators. I will give two examples:

In his commentary on *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* 1.49 Vācaspatimiśra discusses the interplay between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, means of knowledge and knowable. Does a *pramāṇa* "objectively" reveal an "independent" object to the perceiver, or does it "actively" shape the object, or even ratify its factuality as hinted here by the *pūrva*-

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[1] The title draws on and corresponds with Daya Krishna's "Time, Truth and Transcendence" (1999).

pakṣin? Vācaspatimiśra suggests that a *pramāṇa* is not the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the *prameya* in the strong sense that when the former ceases, so does the latter. He illustrates: even when the moon is just a single *kalā*, namely, one sixteenth of a full moon, and the deer (*hariṇa*) in the moon cannot be seen, no one doubts his existence. Besides its philosophical purport, i.e., the fact that it questions the conventional balance between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, the illustration is interesting because of the deer. The images of the rabbit or man in the moon are well known.[2]. It was the first time that I encountered the as plausible deer image.

Another anecdote which provides a glimpse into the lifeworld of another friend, Vyāsa, Patañjali's *bhāṣya-kāra*, is found in his commentary of *Yogasūtra* 2.54. Reflecting upon of the relation between *pratyāhāra* and *vairāgya*, detachment at the level of the senses and the mind respectively, Vyāsa wonders which comes first, *pratyāhāra* or *vairāgya*, or whether detachment at the level of the senses precedes or follows, contributes to or is contributed to by detachment at the level of the mind. Vyāsa's own take is that the senses follow the mind, i.e., that it is "inner" detachment which precedes its "external" counterpart. To drive the point home, he picturesquely maintains that just as the bees follow the king-bee (*madhukara-rāja*) when he flies, and rest when he rests, so the senses follow the mind and become disengaged from their objects when the mind ceases. A counter-perspective would be that as long as there is sensory input, the mind cannot find rest and quiescence, and therefore detachment at the level of the senses must precede *vairāgya* at the mind-level. On top of its philosophical import, the king-bee illustration is a delightful reminder that "our friend" Vyāsa, with whom we work, Mukundji and I, on Patañjali's text, belongs to the 4th or 5th century CE. Interestingly, some of Vyāsa's English translators translate *madhukara-rāja* as queen-bee, thus "correcting" the illustration. To my mind, such a move undervalues the friendship with Vyāsa.

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[2] In the preface of her book *The Hindus: An Alternative History*, Wendy Doniger works with the images of man and rabbit in the moon. According to her, the Western (or Euro-American as she puts it) vision is of a man in the moon; the Indian (or Hindu as she puts it, even though she quotes just a single source: the Buddhist *Jātaka* tales) is of a hare (or rabbit) in the moon. She adds that "other cultures see a woman, a moose, a buffalo, a frog and so forth" (p. 11). Doniger perceptibly explains that the different vision of a man in one culture, a rabbit in another, is not derived from the fact that the Euro-Americans and the Indians see the moon from different angles. Rather, it is simply a different "translation" of the dark shape visible in the moon. She uses the man/rabbit anecdote to underscore the openness and panoramic approach needed, according to her, in cross-cultural research. She beautifully writes: "[O]nce you've seen the rabbit (or hare) in the moon, it's hard to see the man anymore, but the double vision is what we should strive for."

2 *Kṣaṇa, krama, svarūpa*: moment, sequence and self-identity in Pātañjala-yoga

In the following lines I will touch on the notion of time as depicted in Pātañjala-yoga, and on the (dis)connection of time and self-identity. Mukundji's presence will become transparent as we move on. Not merely was he kind enough to read portions of the *Yogasūtra* and its commentarial body with me, but also did he think of change (interrelated with time) and identity in his paper "Identity through Necessary Change: Thinking about *rāga-bhāva* – Concepts and Characters". I will draw on this perceptive paper.

In *Yogasūtra* (YS) 3.9–10, Patañjali portrays the *yogin* as a "collector" of "silent moments" (*nirodha-kṣaṇa*-s), attempting to gradually minimize the "gaps" between them in order to achieve consistent, uninterrupted silent flow (*praśānta-vāhitā*) of consciousnesses.[3] In YS 3.53 Patañjali further writes that through meditation (*saṃyama*) on *kṣaṇa* and *krama*, moment and sequence, knowledge-born-of-discernment (*viveka-jaṃ jñānam*) is accomplished, depicted by him (in YS 3.55) as non-sequential (*akrama*), all-encompassing (*sarva-viṣaya*), eternal (*sarvathā-viṣaya*) and liberative (*tāraka*).[4]

In his gloss of *sūtra* 3.53, Vyāsa argues that,

> *sa khalv ayam kālo vastu-śūnyo buddhi-nirmāṇaḥ śabda-jñāna–anupātī*, "time (*kāla*) is a substance-less (*vastu-śūnya*) mental-construction (*buddhi-nirmāṇa*), based merely on verbal proficiency (*śabda-jñāna–anupātī*)".

Interestingly, the *bhāṣya-kāra* employs Patañjali's exact words in YS 1.9, a verse dedicated not to time but to *vikalpa* or verbal construction. In YS 1.9, Patañjali writes that,

> *śabda-jñāna–anupātī vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ*, "verbal construction (*vikalpa*) is substance-less (or reference-less), and based merely on verbal proficiency".

The immediate connection between time and verbal construction is that time, according to Vyāsa, is in fact substance-less or "unreal", but "exists" in language, or is maintained as "real" through language. *Muhūrta*,[5] day, night etc., he explains, are nothing but *vikalpa*. He continues to suggest that "the present is a single moment;

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[3] YS 3.10: *tasya praśānta-vāhitā saṃskārāt*. A flow of silent (consciousness, *praśānta-vāhitā*) is brought about by (*nirodha-*)*saṃskāra*-s.

[4] Vyāsa glosses the term *tāraka* as denoting knowledge emerging from one's *sva-pratibhā*, "own light", contrary to knowledge based on any "external" instruction (*upadeśa*). The *Vivaraṇa-kāra* and Vijñānabhikṣu explain that it is knowledge derived from *saṃyama* or yogic meditation. Vācaspatimiśra focuses on the capacity of knowledge-born-of-discernment to liberate or deliver from the *saṃsāra*.

[5] *Muhūrta* is a short period of time. According to Āraṇya (1981: 336), in the present case it indicates a measure of time covering 48 minutes.

earlier and later moments do not exist".[6] His gloss is in tune with Patañjali's assertion in YS 4.12, that "past and future exist (in the present) in their special form ("stored" in "karmic memory")".[7] Vyāsa further argues that two moments (*kṣaṇa*-s) cannot co-exist. This is to say that only a single moment, or more precisely the present moment, exists. Time as a universal, consisting of past, present and future, is nothing more than *vikalpa*, "lingual occurrence". The *yogin* differs from the worldly (*laukika*) person in his capacity to see "time" as made of different components, real and unreal. He is not taken by the familiarity of the sequence (*krama*), and is capable of ascertaining the *kṣaṇa*-, the atomic moment, the "now", in the kramic façade.

The *Vivaraṇa-kāra*, in his commentary on YS 3.53, underscores the absolute difference in the way time is perceived by a *yogin* who has reached one-pointedness and is absorbed in *sattva* (*ekāgra-bhūmi-pratiṣṭha-citta-sattvaḥ*) and by a *vyutthita-cittasya*, a person with a chattering, scattered mind. Even if he still takes part in the (false, worldly) "experience of time" (*kāla-anubhava*), a one-pointed *yogin* "knows" that there is no essential difference between the single moment and a thousand cosmic eras (*kṣaṇa-yuga-sahasrayos tulyatā*). The sameness (*tulyatā*) of the two is based on the fact that every measurement of time, short or long, is constructed upon the present moment which alone is real. The *Vivaraṇa-kāra* continues to speculate that in a dream, one can cross a thousand miles within a few minutes, whereas in reality it would take a whole year. His conclusion is that "the conglomeration known as time is indeed a strange[8] mental-construct" (*tasmād-buddhi-vaicitrya-nirmita eva kāla-samāhāraḥ*). Time is a conglomeration (*samāhāra*) created in language (through sentences such as "he sleeps till the time of milking the cow", the author of the *Vivaraṇa* exemplifies).[9] Strangely, one lives in language, primarily in language. Salman Rushdie, in his *The Ground Beneath Her Feet*, coins a delightful acronym to signify the language spoken in Bombay-now-Mumbai: Hug-Me.[10] It stands for Hindi, Urdu, Gujarati, Marathi and English as the languages which "Bombay *bhāṣā*" is the intermixture of. If I may take Rushdie's Hug-Me away from its immediate context, apropos the *Vivaraṇa-kāra*'s observations about time, then it seems that the hug of language, every language, perhaps like every hug, creates a "dreamy" experience in which "reality" is forgotten. For the *yogin*, even the wakeful experience of time ("He studies till the time the rice is cooked", the author of the *Vivaraṇa* further exemplifies) is "dreamy" and unnecessarily expansive, compared with the "minimal" time instant referred to by Patañjali as *kṣaṇa*.

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[6] *tasmād vartamāna evaikaḥ kṣaṇo na pūrvottara-kṣaṇāḥ santīti* (*Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* 3.53 in Āraṇya 1981: 336).

[7] YS 4.12: *atīta-anāgataṃ sva-rūpato "sty adhva-bhedād dharmāṇām*. "Past and future exist (in the present) in their special form ("stored" in "karmic memory"). Owing to the time difference, their properties are different."

[8] *Vaicitrya* is "that which is strange, fantastic, wonderful, multi-faceted".

[9] Ibid.

[10] Rushdie 1999: 7.

Vijñānabhikṣu takes YS 3.53 as an occasion to discuss the notion of time in Pātañjala-yoga opposite time as perceived by the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists. In a nutshell it can be said that the Yoga stance regarding time as *kṣaṇa* (moment) stands in sheer contrast with the position of the Vaiśeṣika school of thought. The Vaiśeṣikas view time as unitary, objective and absolute. For them, the instant is a relative, pragmatic conception which depends upon its relation to an event. Moreover, it presupposes the universal substratum of the time-substance (*kāla-dravya*) which is a metaphysical reality. On the other hand, Pātañjala-yoga seems to be on a par with the kṣaṇavādic Buddhist viewpoint. However, as Anindita Balslev aptly puts it, "the common denial of the ubiquitous time as a unitary, objective reality does not lead to a common understanding in their [Yogic and Buddhist] conception of becoming and being".[11] For the Buddhists, the conception of time as an instant implies that even the self is instantaneous and ever-changing. In Yoga the self, *puruṣa*, is that which endures in time. It is timeless, unchanging, in fact unchangeable.

Vijñānabhikṣu's debate with the Buddhists in his commentary of *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* 3.53, regarding the interplay between the changing and the unchangeable, corresponds with Patañjali's own statement in YS 3.14:

> A *dharmin* is "he" whom a series of past, present and future (*śānta-udita-avyapadeśya*) *dharma*-s belong to.[12]

The *dharmin* (form-bearer) remains unchanged amidst the constant changing *dharma*-s (forms). However, the *dharmin* in the present *sūtra* is not *puruṣa*, the selfhood or essence which stands at the center of the yogic process as self-enquiry. The *dharmin* is rather that which is referred to in the Sāṃkhyan formulation, adopted by Patañjali, as *aliṅga* (the unmanifest), namely the most subtle layer of *prakṛti*, consisting of primeval matter. According to the Sāṃkhyan narrative, everything in the world is in constant flux (*pariṇāma*), as explained by Patañjali in the previous *sūtra* (YS 3.13). What is seen by the conventional eye as a solid unchanging object is in fact a "still photo" of a dynamic change-process. The raw material which takes different forms, which assumes different qualities, is none other than *prakṛti*. Hence it is not just *puruṣa* that the *yogin*-s and the Buddhists are disputed about, but in effect *puruṣa-prakṛti*,[13] as a general name for the essentialist approach affirmed in Pātañjala-yoga, rejected by the Buddhists.

Nevertheless, for Vijñānabhikṣu, the discussion of time, of moment and sequence, is not merely theoretic. The notion of *kṣaṇa* refers both to the atomic units which the kramic, sequential chain is made of, and to an Archimedean point beyond time as becoming. The timelessness which the *yogin* strives for is to be found in the *kṣaṇa*, not in *krama*. Sequence is time, and time is *vastu-śūnya*. If according to YS

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[11] Balslev 2009: 115.

[12] YS 3.14: *śānta-udita-avyapadeśya-dharma-anupātī dharmī*.

[13] In *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* 4.33 Vyāsa explicitly speaks of the *nityatā* (eternity, permanence) of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* alike.

3.9-10 the *yogin* "collects" silent "*nirodha* moments", then it should be noted that together they do not form a sequence. The term *krama* refers merely to a series of worldly "*vyutthāna* moments". In the course of meditation, the *yogin* withdraws into a "silent moment", gradually transforming it to a "continuous moment", beginningless and endless, unaffected by change. It is no longer a moment among moments, but an enduring, non-sequential (*akrama*) moment. This existential reading of the moment-sequence dynamics becomes evident in YS 4.33. Just an instant before the final definition of *kaivalya* in YS 4.34, the closing verse of the *Yogasūtra*, Patañjali returns to the *kṣaṇa/krama* interplay and writes:

> *Krama* (sequence) is "the other" of *kṣaṇa* (moment), and is ascertained at the moment of the termination of change (*pariṇāma-apara-anta*).[14]

Krama is the *pratiyogin* or "the other"[15] of *kṣaṇa* in the sense that the latter is real, while the former is mere *vikalpa*. YS 4.33 can be read simultaneously as a part of Patañjali's discussion of time, and as an existential, even metaphysical statement anticipating the *kaivalya-sūtra* (YS 4.34) which comes next. As the *yogin* approaches the peak of his "yoga ascent", having arrived at the last moment of his phenomenal existence as succession of *pariṇāma*-s, he is finally in the position to "look back" and "bid farewell" to the phenomenal sequence, or in fact to sequence as such, as he melts into the infinite singularity of *kṣaṇa*. This non-sequential outside-of-time-ness Patañjali refers to as *kaivalya* or "freedom". This freedom is not just from time as sequentiality, but also from the conventional notion of self-identity based on time as sequentiality, linearity, chronological onward motion. At the same time, if I may adopt Isaiah Berlin's famous distinction, *kaivalya* is not just "freedom from" but also "freedom to". It is freedom to or toward self-identity of a totally different kind, born of the timeless *kṣaṇa*, self-identity in the sense of recovering (rather than discovering as it is there and was there all along) the *svarūpa* or inner essence or authenticity which Patañjali, drawing on the Sāṃkhya tradition, refers to as *puruṣa*.

3 Ghajini

A.R. Murugadoss's film *Ghajini* (2008) is a fascinating movie. I will discuss it briefly from two angles. First, I will reflect on *Ghajini* as translation. Then I will try to clarify, through the film, the difference between the two models of self-identity introduced above, namely the standard model based on *krama* or sequentiality and the alternative, yogic, *kṣaṇa*-based, falling-out-of-time model.

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[14] *kṣaṇa-pratiyogī pariṇāma-apara-anta-nirgrāhyaḥ kramaḥ*.

[15] The term *pratiyogin* can be translated as counterpart, counter-correlate, rival, partner. Bhojarāja in his commentary suggests that the phrase *kṣaṇa-pratiyogī* means *kṣaṇa-vilakṣaṇaḥ*, "different from *kṣaṇa*"..

Ghajini is a translation (or remake or adaptation, which I view as modes of translation) of Christopher Nolan's film *Memento* (2000). It is in fact a second attempt on Murugadoss's behalf to work with or recreate *Memento*. His first take was the Tamil film *Ghajini* (2005). Thinking about translation apropos *Ghajini* is not unrelated to Mukundji's work. He himself is deeply interested in translation, both practically and theoretically. On the theoretic level, he touches on the notion of *svīkaraṇa* (literally "making one's own"), a term used by the 9th- or 10th-century poet Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* with reference to lines, couplets, stanza and other units "borrowed" or "quoted" from other poets and used in one's own poetry. For Rājaśekhara, Mukundji explains, a *svīkaraṇa* is not *haraṇa* or plagiarism, but "a legitimate, even commendable poetic practice, which operates through creatively transforming a given material".[16] This is to say that a translation should not be necessarily measured by its loyalty to the "original", but also, perhaps even primarily, by its creativity or the way that a certain material is "made mine" by the translator. The notion of *svīkaraṇa*, beautifully translated by Mukundji as "transcreation", implies that creativity is collective and reciprocal. It implies that the translator takes part in the authorship of the text, be it a poem, a piece of prose, a musical chapter, a film, etc. A translator, or at least a good translator, across languages, eras or art-forms, is therefore not just an artisan but a full-fledged artist. The task of the translator, Walter Benjamin suggests in his famous "The Task of the Translator" (1923), is to de-conceal "the language of Eden", a primordial universal tongue "broken" into infinite languages owing to the human hubris symbolized by the tower of Babel. This basic language, according to Benjamin, resonates in each and every language and is to be reached through translation as inter-linguistic dialogue. Benjamin's contention is based on the biblical tower of Babel myth (*Genesis* 11:1–9). Benjamin's insight takes me, if I may follow my imagination, as far as to Prayāg Rāj, the *saṅgam* or conjunction of three rivers: Gaṅgā, Yamunā and Sarasvatī. The former two rivers/goddesses are flowing with water. The latter is metaphoric, subtle, inner rather than outer. Drawing on Benjamin, I would like to suggest that the dialogic *saṅgam* of Gaṅgā and Yamunā as two languages has the capacity of revealing Sarasvatī, the goddess of wisdom, as the primeval language vibrating in both. However Sarasvatī is also the patroness of music and the arts. I would therefore broaden Benjamin's vision and infer that every translation as a *saṅgam* or dialogue evokes goddess Sarasvatī as the source not merely of language but of creativity as such. A good translator, then, or a transcreator, is he who sips from the subterranean river of creativity, commonly hidden from the eye and beyond reach.

In two of his articles, "Bharata Muni and Hindi Films" and "Bharata Muni and Hindi Films Revisited",[17] Mukundji touches on what he sees as the continuity from Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* and Abhinavagupta's commentary on Bharata's work to contemporary Hindi cinema. He underscores the in-between-ness of the present-day Hindi film, influenced by Western cinema and drawing on classical formulations of the *rasa* theory. Mukundji's focus is (of course) on music and more precisely, on the song and dance sequences indispensable in formula-oriented or *masālā* movies. My present contention is that popular Indian cinema echoes not just *rasa*-overtones but even classical philosophical notions, as in *Ghajini*'s treatment of self-identity.

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[16] Lath 1998: 25.

[17] Ibid.: 123–49 and 150–62.

Christopher Nolan's film *Memento* is a disturbing movie. Its non-linearity, present occurrences blended with flashbacks of an undeciphered past, fragments of blurred memory, all leave the spectator in a zone of uncomfortable uncertainty, interwoven with ambivalence pertaining to the shattered, ambiguous identity of Leonard, the protagonist. The film offers contradicting hints, which raise the suspicion that Leonard himself, a present-day Oedipus, blind not in terms of eyesight but of memory, is the murderer of his own wife, the very same murderer whom with great effort he attempts to find. Protagonist and spectator alike do not know how to create a coherent picture of the scrambled jigsaw-puzzle pieces they collect scene after scene. As the movie rolls forward (or actually backwards), spectator and protagonist alike develop an increasing apprehension of (and simultaneously obsession for) self-revelation, which can never be accomplished owing to Leonard's short-term memory loss. He is unable to establish a coherent sequence out of the broken pieces of identity which he finds along his journey. His struggle for self-identity is a foretold failure. *Memento* invites the spectator to investigate a space of elusive ambiguity, suppressed underneath the alleged safety of the on-the-surface reality. Each of us, the film hints, is a Leonard fighting in vain for sequential, linear self-identity, with certain degrees of tentative success. This success is necessarily short-termed, if one takes into account biological considerations such as old age. Memory is the string which binds together the momentary events that one chooses to identify with or repress, to include in or exclude from his story.

The most potent scene of *Ghajini*, taking the plot into a direction unvisited by Jonathan and Christopher Nolan, the scriptwriters of *Memento*, is the "erasing scene". Ghajini, the villain (and interestingly the film is called after the Villain, perhaps since the protagonist ultimately "melts" into a space beyond names, beyond language itself, as I will suggest shortly), responsible for the death of Sanjay's wife-to-(never)-be, manages to get hold of Sanjay while he is unconscious, to erase his tattoos and burn his photos. In brackets let me explain that Sanjay Singhania (Aamir Khan) is the protagonist, the Leonard of Murugadoss's Hindi *Ghajini*. Through these tattoos and with the help of snapshots which he constantly takes, Sanjay, like *Memento*'s Leonard, arduously holds on to the scattered pieces of his shattered identity. Now that the tattooed fragments of memory are erased, and the photographs with their brief informative notes, "friend", "Ghajini" etc. are burned, Sanjay reaches—or so it seems—a dead end. There is no use in killing him, explains Ghajini. He is as good as dead, having literally become an object, nothing more. It appears as if Sanjay's identity is lost forever, as if he is doomed to exist in darkness within darkness, without any hope for light. The "twist" lies in the fact that when his phenomenal, sequential identity is irreversibly "deleted", something new, different, unknown, unknowable, arises, hinting in my reading at the notion of the *ātman* ("the merging of the individual identity into the undifferentiated mass of consciousness", as B.K. Matilal beautifully articulates[18]). The *ātman* (or for that matter, Patañjali's *puruṣa*) constitutes an alternative, metaphysical identity. Therefore, Sanjay's "deletion", memory- and "phenomenal identity"-wise, is in fact his "salvation" (*mokṣa*).[19]

What I am suggesting is that in "Indian terms", or more precisely in Upaniṣadic or yogic terms, there is something deeper and far more substantial and worthy of de-concealing than Freud's "unconscious", which the "inner labyrinth" of raw "psychological" material that Leonard in *Memento* is thrown into, corresponds with. Therefore Sanjay Singhania's loss of memory does not merely throw him—in *Ghajini*—into a similar isolated space, lacking "footholds", controlled by violent impulses. It also provides him with a rare opportunity to reach the *ātman*, his most authentic layer of being, underneath the stormy psychological currents in which *Memento*'s Leonard (almost) drowns.

Time is a dominant feature of *Memento*, with its inverted chronicle and disorderly flashbacks. Time is a key-factor in *Ghajini* too, even if the movie "moves" onward, except for flashbacks. The flashback scenes are in fact so long as to constitute two separate time-zones, present versus past. The past depicts Sanjay as a successful CEO of a communication company having a beautiful love affair with beautiful Kalpana, a charming, good-hearted actress in the field of advertisements. In the present, Sanjay is a lonely haunted person in search for the murderer of Kalpana of his dreams, of his previous identity. The past is pleasant, cozy and full of laughter. The present is cold, hopeless and violent. Interestingly, the past is chronicled by Sanjay in a meticulous diary. The present (with obscure glimpses of the past) is recorded in fragmental, "painful" tattoos and snapshots. Even more interesting is the fact that the diary is handwritten in Hindi, the tattoos and photo-notes in English. Is it because Hindi is "cozy" and "homey", whereas English stands for alienation and exile? Or perhaps it signifies the transformation, which Sanjay undergoes, from concrete (the individual) to universal (the *ātman*), English being more "universal"?

Kalpana falls in love with Sanjay without knowing who he is. She believes, and he allows her to believe, that he is a young "wannabe actor" trying to find his way in "the industry". She falls in love with him without knowing his *nām*, *kām* and *dhām* – as the protagonist of another movie (*Khal Nayak*, 1993) matter-of-factishly puts it.

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[18] Matilal 2002: 16.

[19] Interestingly, the cover of *Ghajini*'s DVD (2008, UTV Communications) features Sanjay (Aamir Khan) with a circle of light around his bare body, his hands stretched sideways. It is obviously a "Christ posture", which indicates not merely the suffering which Sanjay carries upon his (muscled) shoulders, but also his "sainthood", a contemporary (Christian/Western) "translation"—I would like to suggest—of the classic notion of *mokṣa*.

However, she sees something in him, which he himself perhaps cannot see, something beyond the details of his "phenomenal identity". She lives and dies without knowing that he is Sanjay Singhania, touching on a subtler aspect of his identity, relating to his "*ātman*-hood". At the same time she repeatedly tells her colleagues in "the industry" a false story—intended to promote her status—of how she met and became romantically involved with Sanjay Singhania, the communication tycoon, without realizing that the man she really falls in love with is that very tycoon. At one point she even tells Sanjay, not knowing that he is who he is, of her intimate liaison with Sanjay (that is, with him). I mention this comic anecdote, of a false story which is unknowingly true, since I want to highlight the interlacement of repetition and self-identity. Is it repetitiveness which creates our identity? Or more precisely, is it identification with a "story" told and retold which constitutes our identity as biography? And since the "story" is narrated through language, are we not back with sequential identity based on *vastu-śūnya* time and verbal construction (*vikalpa*)?

Ardhakathānaka ("Half a Tale") is a unique work. It is the only autobiography which we know of written in pre-modern India, that is, before the Western influence and Gandhi's famous autobiography which paved the way to many others. "Half a Tale", written in 1641, at the peak of the Mughal rule in India, is the autobiography of Banārasī, a Jain merchant who became the leader of a "protestant movement" within the Jain Tradition, known as Adhyātma.

According to Mukundji, the apt translator of Banārasī's autobiography, he had no predecessors in writing an autobiography, nor is he likely to have been influenced in this respect by autobiographical writing in the Arabic-Persian world.[20] He titled his autobiography "Half a Tale" since he was 55 years old as he wrote it, whereas the total span of life allotted to the human being—according to an ancient Jain belief which he quotes—is 110 years. 'However', Mukundji elucidates, 'he did not live much beyond the completion of his "Half a Tale", and so, what we have, is in effect, a full story.'.[21] Mukundji touches on the astonishing fact that besides the absence of the autobiographical genre from the classic Indian bookshelf, we know literally nothing, in terms of their biography, of the greatest authors, artists and spiritual figures in the Indian history, from the Buddha and Śaṅkara to the authors of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, as well as the artists who have created the murals of Ajanta and rock temples of Ellora. "The question why did Indians choose not to write autobiographies, and moreover, to remain anonymous," Mukundji suggests, "is complex, almost metaphysical in its ramifications."[22] As the comparative discussion of *Ghajini* opposite *Memento* has indicated, the question is indeed metaphysical. If one's "true self" transcends the phenomenal realm of *nāma-rūpa* (names and forms), and since the purpose of art (at least according to some exponents of the *rasa*-theory) is to facilitate such transcendence (on the part of artist and appreciator alike), than not signing one's artwork with a "name" starts to make sense.

The point I am trying to convey is that Banārasī's autobiography is "half a tale" not just because—and here I take issue with Mukundji's observation ("what we have is in effect a full story")—the author was 55 as he wrote it, but since every autobiography, or every self-identity based on a sequence "maintained" by memory, is necessarily "half a tale". Half, since the essence of the human person can only be found between the lines of the "sequence", i.e. in the "moment", as suggested by Patañjali in his *Yogasūtra*. Half, since the *ātman*, as a general name for one's "inner essence", is fundamentally "lost in translation". Banārasī himself comments toward the end of his narrative that (in Mukundji's transcreation),

> In a man's life there is much that is too subtle to be palpable. [...] Even in the tiny span of a day, a man passes through myriad states of consciousness. The all-knowing Kevalin can perceive them, but even he cannot describe them in their fullness. [...] What I have reported is certainly the grossest of the gross part of my life.[23]

If the Latin "*memento*"—the imperative of *meminisse*—means "remember!", a phrase employed in Christopher Nolan's *Memento* as a desperate reminder, carved in Leonard's skin, to hold onto one's self-identity no-matter-what; then A.R. Murugadoss's *Ghajini*, apropos *Half a Tale*, hints at "the other half of the tale", too subtle to be palpable and consisting of one's "inner selfhood". The "other half" awaits those who are willing to let go of or forget their sequence-based identity, and dare looking deeper.

4 But Nevertheless

This could have been a perfect ending to my paper: forgetfulness instead of memory, subtlety taking over the gross, the *ātman* as an alternative, liberative, *kṣaṇa*-based self-identity. But nevertheless it is too schematic, too round a conclusion for an angular philosophical discussion. Therefore the last word will be given to the *pūrvapakṣin*, in this case to Mukundji himself.

"Identity," he surmises in his article "Identity through Necessary Change", "is usually understood as something which remains the same *despite* change" (italics in the original).[24] He attempts to explore an alternative to this convention, namely to the *ātman* solution or *ātman*-like solutions to the self-identity problem. A similar move is made by Daya Krishna in a paper titled "Time, Truth and Transcendence". He suggests that "Time has always been seen as the enemy of truth,"[25] time as interrelated with change, truth with identity. Like Mukundji, he offers a counter-perspective which refutes the alleged enmity between time and truth, change and identity.

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[20] Lath 1981: 21–3.
[21] Ibid.: 8.
[22] Ibid.: 14.
[23] Ibid.: 281–2.
[24] Lath 2003: 85.
[25] Daya Krishna 1999: 323.

Mukundji's contention is that

> [t]here are identities where difference is not contingent but *necessary* to identity. Identity in such cases is formed and maintained through a process of change. [...] This identity not only accommodates but also invites change and plurality.[26]

The case-study in Mukundji's enquiry into identity-through-necessary-change is the *rāga* in classical Indian music. "The *rāga* pattern," he explains,

> is given and forms the basis of a free and open *ālāpa* or improvised elaboration according to a set of rules, which assume the pattern but allow room for imagination. [...] Identity in a *rāga* cannot be restricted to a given pattern or even rules, since a good *ālāpa* reweaves them in its own way, and a great *ālāpa* can even transform them.[27]

Mukundji touches on the ambivalent interplay between structure and improvisation, form and formlessness, as the basis of identity in *rāga*-music. But what *is* identity through (rather than despite) change? How is it to be thought of and spoken about meaningfully if the usual overtones which accompany the notion of identity are those of permanence, invariability, immovability and constancy? Mukundji's discussion, which emphasizes the instrumental role of the *ālāpa*, does not imply total abandonment of the self-identity notion as for example in Buddhist formulations. Mukundji's take is that the identity of the *rāga* can only be deciphered through a dialogue with the *rāga* itself as a "living" and "felt" identity. Like a writer who while writing creates his characters only to discover that they have a "life" of their own (to the extent that Vyāsa and Vālmīki, the legendary authors of the great epics, "enter" their own creation and take active part within the narrative, shoulder to shoulder with their very own characters), the musician, in Mukundji's formulation, cannot but invite or evoke the *rāga* to introduce itself to him and his listeners. Thus the identity of the *rāga* (ideally, like every other identity) is to be carved out dialogically. In his commentary of *Yogasūtra* 3.6, in reply to the question when the *yogin* should proceed from one yogic stage (*bhūmi*) to the next, Vyāsa (Patañjali's *bhāṣya-kāra*) states (or quotes from another source) that "yoga itself is the teacher" (*yoga eva upādhyāyaḥ*). This is to say that the *yogin* should ask no one but the yoga (portrayed as a "living" and "felt" entity like the *rāga* in Mukundji's analysis) if and when to take the next step. In the same way, I would finally suggest, the *rāga* itself is the teacher. *Ālāpa* is the musician's dialogue with the *rāga* about its identity.

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[26] Lath 2003: 85–6.

[27] Ibid.: 87–8.

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2 Films

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Epilogue
Engaging Subjective Knowledge: Learning from Amar Singh's Narratives of and by the Self

Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph

Our account of subjective knowledge as it is found in the first-person voice of Amar Singh's diary raises questions about what should count as knowledge in social science and history?[1] We have tried here to show that subjectivity is valid and useful, that first-person accounts of experience—"telling what I know," narratives of and by the self, partial and contingent truths, and self-as other ethnography—contribute to knowledge. The move to subjective knowledge does not require the abandonment of objectivity. Self-consciousness and reflexivity simply make it possible to render the familiar unfamiliar, to gain a certain detachment, to achieve "objective subjectivity."

In daily entries, Amar Singh "tells what he knows." What he knows is not the whole truth, objective truth, or impartial truth—the kinds of knowledge that most social scientists and historians recognize and use. It is a less familiar form of truth: subjective knowledge.

By telling what he knows in his diary, Amar Singh makes the personal a form of knowledge. His narratives of and by the self breach conventional liberal understandings about separating private and public realms. He wrote in his diary secretly, in private space, but much of what he wrote addressed public questions. He wrote about living as a colonial subject of the British Raj in India. He wrote about experienceing political domination and racial inferiority. He wrote about being a young man restrained by expectations of deference and obedience to one's elders. He wrote about the suffering and oppression his wife and mother endured under his grandfather's patriarchal rule of the 100-person Kanota household.

Why should social scientists and historians be interested in a diary? Isn't a diary a singular representation? Don't we need many diaries, or at least a sample, before we can treat them as representative of a time and place? How can one person's diary stand for anything more than a single, perhaps idiosyncratic way of life?

The answer lies in the elective affinity of what Ludwig Wittgenstein calls "following a rule" (Wittgenstein 1953). A few well-placed informants make it possible to discern that a rule is being followed. Like linguists identifying a language's grammar, anthropologists find culture in the rules that key informants follow in their speech and conduct.

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[1] This essay draws on our 2002 Nora and Edward Ryerson Lecture given at the University of Chicago on April 15, 2002 (Rudolph and Rudolph 2002) and on Rudolph and Rudolph 2003.

What is meant by "following a rule"? A person can be said to follow a rule "if he acts the same way on the same occasion."[2] To know if someone is following a rule, "one has to take into account not only the actions of the person whose behavior is in question. ... but also the reactions of other people to what he does .... [It is only when] somebody else could in principle discover the rule I am following that I can intelligibly be said to follow a rule at all."[3]

The ethnography found in Amar Singh's diary—depicted not only in his own voice, but also in the voices of those on whom he reports—shows informants following a rule.

This is how Amar Singh's diary narratives fit in: they provide access to key informants—Amar Singh and those whose voices he chronicles—who tell us about who they are or want to become, and about the rules they live by or contest.

Amar Singh's diary conveys discovery, enactment, and interpretation of rules relevant to several cultural contexts. Located between the cultural norms and practices of both princely and British India, between black and white racial categories, between colonial rulers and colonial subjects, between male patriarchy and female oppression, Amar Singh adopts liminal and hybrid responses. British Raj interlocutors wonder whether they should read him as a Rajput ruler, an Edwardian officer and gentleman, or an impostor, a black native who doesn't know his station.[4] Inducting subjective knowledge sheds light on these questions.

Introducing Subjective Knowledge

We start our account of "engaging subjective knowledge" by locating ourselves as subjects. We confess that we lived in a *ménage à trois* for 30 years. This arrangement was suspected by our children and a few close friends. The third member of our relationship was Amar Singh. His presence often disrupted our household, compelling us to travel frequently to distant places, diminishing the family exchequer, and affecting our family culture. Amar Singh became our constant companion from the breathtaking moment in 1971 when Mohan Singh Kanota ushered us into his father's high-ceilinged room in Narain Niwas to show us his uncle's diary: 90 folio-sized, 800-page volumes bound in red leather. The three decades spent selecting, editing, and interpreting Amar Singh's diary have led us to reflect on the subjective knowledge that his narratives make available.

Here, it seems appropriate to recall a story familiar to anthropologists: A Cree hunter is asked by a Canadian court to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about his people's way of life. "I'm not sure I can tell the truth," he says, "but I can tell what I know."[5] Amar Singh says something similar about his diary. After completing the last entry for 1898—the year he converted his copybook into "the diary"—the 19-year-old turns over the fledgling volume to his much admired and respected teacher, Ram Nathji, tutor at the Jodhpur court of the young maharaja, Sardar Singh. He does so in the hope and expectation that Ram Nathji will comment on what he has written. The teacher pencils mostly approving observations and comments throughout the diary's pages but comes down hard on Amar Singh at the end of the last page for writing so much about the "butchery" of hunting boar, tigers, and birds, but writing nothing about Jodhpur's worst famine of the century.

Amar Singh's response to Ram Nathji is reminiscent of the Cree hunter's response to the Canadian court: "I ought to have written about the famine, but you must bear in mind that no opportunities were given me to study or watch it and consequently I could not write anything .... What I have written is [that] of which I am an eye witness or have heard from very reliable sources."[6]

Amar Singh, like the Cree hunter, takes a position on the epistemology of subjective knowledge; he tells what he knows about what he has experienced. His knowledge is situated and contextual; his voice is located in a time, place, and circumstance. The epistemology of subjective knowledge stands counter to that of objective knowledge—i.e., knowledge based on a view from nowhere; unmediated, transparent observation generated by unmarked and unencumbered observers.[7]

James Clifford describes the Cree hunter's concept of truth as "rigorous partiality." Clifford reverses the conventional valuation of partiality and impartiality, treating the former as the more desirable state. Rigorous partiality recognizes and validates the situated, inflected nature of truth. Rather than denying or repressing the sociology of knowledge, rigorous partiality self-consciously acknowledges that context shapes why and how knowledge is acquired and what it is taken to mean.

Clifford's claim for rigorous partiality is consistent with Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutic stance, in *Truth and Method* (Gadamer 1989), that the scientific ideal of objectivity is compromised by personal experience, cultural tradition, and prior understandings.[8] According to Clifford, partiality also signifies that which is not whole, complete, or capable of being carried to completion. "Rigorous partiality" makes the epistemological claim that knowing the whole truth is a capacity not given to mortals. The best they can do is to strive for partial truths.

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[2] Winch 1967: 28. See also Edmonds, Eidinow and Eidinow 2001.

[3] Winch 1967: 30.

[4] For example, he could be read in light of David Cannadine's trope of "ornamentalism" (i.e., colonies of the British Empire replicating and emulating the theater and deference of hierarchy). Rajput princes and noblemen could be esteemed for class reasons by socially inferior but socially ambitious British civilians and military officers. At the same time, they could be disesteemed by British civilians and military officers as racially and culturally inferior others. Thus, Lord Curzon, the viceroy, could imagine blue-blooded Indian princes and noblemen, perceived as loyal feudal vassals of the queen empress, joining the all-white Indian army officer corps as King's Commissioned Officers (KCOs) after graduating from the Imperial Cadet Corps (about which, more below). But he could also envision Raj elites recognizing that no one will "look at a black man commanding a white man." See Cannadine 2001.

[5] Clifford, James. "Introduction: Partial truths." In: Clifford and Marcus 1986: 8.

[6] Rudolph and Rudolph with Mohan Singh Kanota 2002: 69.

[7] Donald (now Deirdre) McCloskey has discounted the objective-truth claims of social scientists because they mistakenly assume a disinterested and omniscient observer or clothe themselves in the authority of the gnomic present's general truth (McCloskey1990).

Working with Amar Singh's diary, we have considered the relationship between a personal document written daily in the first person and subjective knowledge. We began to ask ourselves: What kind of knowledge can be found in a diary? And how does such knowledge differ from other forms of knowledge? Monopoly claims have been made for objective knowledge, particularly knowledge based on stereotypical views of science and scientific method. Influential, powerful voices have asserted that only science can ask and answer questions. If it isn't scientific, it can't be true. Subjective knowledge poses a challenge to such claims. We are not arguing that subjective knowledge is the only form of knowledge or even that it is the best or a better form of knowledge. But there is room at the roundtable of knowledge for the imaginative truths found in literature, myth, and memory; for the archival truths of history; for the spiritual truths of religions and religious experience; and for the aesthetic truths of the visual and performing arts.[9]

Max Weber embraced a similar commitment to pluralism in ways of knowing and forms of knowledge on the last page of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*:

> It is not our aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and history. Each is equally possible, but each, if it does not serve as the preparation, but as the conclusion of an investigation, accomplishes equally little in the interest of historical truth.[10]

Weber's advocacy of multiple epistemes and the diverse forms of knowledge that result from their use stands in marked contrast to the single-truth claims of objectivist social science.

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[8] According to Brice Wachterhauser, Gadamer problematizes claims about objective knowledge by arguing that "every truth claim comes somehow laced with the values and interests of the researchers and the research community." All truth claims, Wachterhauser continues, "are in some sense 'relative' to the point of view or 'interpretation' of the researchers .... Gadamer's hermeneutics hopes to teach us ... that all human understanding is 'finite' .... 'Finitude' points to a dependency of knowledge on conditions that the human knower can never fully know ... [and] this challenges us to revise our understanding of the type of autonomous control we can hope to exercise over our own cognitive endeavors." Wachterhauser.2002: 52–53, 56–57.

[9] We find that Stephen Toulmin's admonition in *Return to Reason* to "live with uncertainty," along with his historical and philosophical exposition of pluralism and pragmatism, comes closest to our epistemological outlook. See Toulmin2001, particularly the chapters on "The Invention of Disciplines" and "The Trouble with Disciplines."

[10] Weber 1976: 183.

Subjective Knowledge and Identity Formation

How does a diary written daily, in private and in the first person, clarify the relationship between subjective knowledge and identity formation? We "read" Amar Singh's identity formation not only through his words but also through his photographic self-representations. Preserved in 35 albums in his ancestral *havelī*, Amar Singh's photographs constitute an important dimension of his narrative. We begin with a picture that represents his construction of a liminal self.

Figure 1 displays the multivalent identity he assembles: a Rajput cavalry officer whose boots signify a life spent in the saddle, and a seated reader whose book signals a taste for literature. The image reminds us that Amar Singh is challenging the stereotype of North India's warrior-ruler caste ("A Rajput who reads will never ride a horse") by suggesting the presence of a reflexive literary self. His diary makes clear that this Rajput managed to ride, read, and write a lot. The image also displays intimations of his liminal location—the Indian elements being the Jodhpur-style *sāphā* (turban), the Rajasthani decorative plasterwork, and the jodhpurs; the English



Fig. 1. "A Rajput who reads will never ride a horse"? Amar Singh reading.
Photo from Amar Singh's albums, courtesy of Mohan Singh

elements being the cavalry boots, the well-cut Norfolk jacket, the fine shirt and tie, and the upholstered chair. Amar Singh is simultaneously a Rajput warrior-ruler and an Edwardian officer and gentleman. He lives on the limes, the border, straddling and participating in two forms of life, the English culture of British India and the Rajput culture of princely India.

Given Amar Singh's location in *fin de siècle* imperial India, we prefer the word *liminal* over the related term *hybrid* to characterize his identity.[11] We see liminal identities as fluid, subject to changing contexts, and hybrid identities as continuous and self-perpetuating. As we use the term, liminality invokes a contingent location on one side or another of a border that separates two forms of life, or a location in the culturally ambiguous no-man's-land that lies between them. Hybridity differs from liminality by invoking a created but durable and self-perpetuating combination of qualities. We find the term liminality appropriate for navigating the shoals of end-of-the-century cultural expectations characteristic of the imperial era, when cultural border-crossing was suspect. We find hybridity to be more appropriate for describing the multicultural perspective of "postcolonial" thinking and practice at the close of the twentieth century.[12]

Amar Singh captures his sense of living liminally—sometimes on one side of the border between two cultures, sometimes on the other—in a remark about what makes Indian and English food taste good. Indian food tastes best, he writes, when it is eaten from a *thālī* with the hand; English food tastes best when eaten from a plate with knives and forks. Like the photo in Figure 1, the food metaphor suggests that Amar Singh most of the time is comfortable with his interstitial location.

At the end of the nineteenth century, when Amar Singh began to write his diary, most Englishmen didn't accept liminal practices, much less hybrid identities. Both were rejected as fake. A "black Englishman" was at best an anomaly, at worst an abomination. He either had assimilated imperfectly and become a bad copy, or had assimilated perfectly and become deracinated, an inauthentic self, a phony. It was a time when imperial narratives conflated culture and biology. Cultural traits were seen as inbred, like blue eyes and blond hair. Ethnic and racial identities were everywhere essentialized;[13] a Jat was a Jat, and Jats were good cultivators. Rudyard Kipling mocked the claims of English-educated nationalist *babus*—deracinated, inauthentic men whose liminal condition contradicted their claim to speak for the people of India. [14] When Dr. Aziz in E. M. Forster's novel *A Passage to India* fails to insert correctly the button needed to attach a starched collar to his shirt, he fails the test for passing as English (Forster 1978).

Upon graduating in 1905 from Lord Curzon's "dear child," the Imperial Cadet Corps, Amar Singh and his classmates didn't pass the "Englishness" test either. Although the cadets as princes or noblemen were regarded as superior persons, they were not deemed worthy of being made King's Commissioned Officers (KCOs) in the British Indian army, a status the viceroy, Lord Curzon, had led them to expect. Racial inferiority and segregation remained the order of the day. Rebuffed at the highest levels of the empire, Curzon accepted his defeat by recognizing that making Indians KCOs would have meant "a black man commanding a white man," which "no one will look at."[15] Amar Singh's identity as an Indian nobleman, a status that appealed to class-conscious Englishmen, was trumped by racial disdain.

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[11] Liminality has more than one meaning. One variant can be found in narratives of rites of passage, such as Turner 1967. As the text makes clear, Turner's is not the variant of liminality we have in mind. For Turner, liminality designates an indeterminate moment in the life cycle, a vertical process as boy becomes man; it is a destabilizing moment fraught with hazard. For us, liminality refers to cultural location and context, a horizontal process in which a person's identity and practices adjust to changing cultural settings.

For Robert Young's reading of liminality and hybridity and his account of Ashis Nandy's interpretation of Gandhi's liminality and hybridity—a reading and an account that bear a family resemblance to ours—see subsections 4 and 5 of chapter 24 in Robert J.C. Young 2001. Young first notes that Nandy speaks of Gandhi's colonial-era construction of "cultural hybridity." He then goes on to characterize Nandy as arguing that "'liminality' … is not only the state of being of the postcolonial migrant, as [Homi] Bhabha has since suggested (Bhabha 1994), but amounts to an authentic state of Indianness itself." (Young 2001: 346).

[12] For more on the conceptualization and location of hybridity at the end of the twentieth century, see Bhabha 1994.

[13] When Amar Singh was experiencing the apartheid of the Indian army, American imperialists such as Theodore Roosevelt shared the British Raj's dichotomous, essentialized thinking about race and ethnicity. President Roosevelt enthusiastically embraced Rudyard Kipling's phrase "the white man's burden" in his successful quest for empire.

[14] Rudyard Kipling, "Pagett, M. P." In: Rudyard Kipling 1989: 26.

[15] Quoted in Dilks 1970: 240. Lord Curzon wrote these words in the early stages of a protracted but ultimately unsuccessful effort that reached up to the prime minister, Lord Salisbury, and the queen empress, Victoria. Salisbury supported Indian army opinion against the viceroy in opposing Imperial Cadet Corps graduates for KCOs, and he seems to have advised the queen empress along the same lines.

Ten years later, during World War I, there were high-level efforts to end the Indian army's apartheid system. On November 18, 1915, with the shedding of Indian blood in Flanders on behalf of the British cause fresh in mind, the secretary of state for India, Austen Chamberlain, telegraphed the viceroy, Charles Hardinge, that "on imperial grounds early action [with respect to granting the status of KCO to Indian officers] seems to me desirable in order to mark the part played by Indian troops in the war and refute the colour bar theory…. The following have, I understand, all proved their fitness for commissions in Indian regiments both as officers and comrades." Captain Amar Singh's name is the first of the six mentioned. See Telegram No. 2012.

It did not happen—at least not on January 1, 1916, when Chamberlain thought it could more easily appear as an "act of grace and not in response to agitation." On August 25, 1917, five days after the "momentous declaration" committing Britain to "responsible government" for India, it did happen, but only for a few years—roughly until Amar Singh's retirement from the Indian army in 1922. With Liberal member Edwin Montagu as secretary of state for India, and Lord Chelmsford the viceroy, and a "powerful and increasing demand for a greater Indian share in the administration of the country," the title of KCO was offered to Captain Amar Singh and eight other former Imperial Cadets. For more on Amar Singh's Indian army career, the Imperial Cadet Corps, and early efforts to desegregate and thereby Indianize the Indian army, see Rudolph and Rudolph with Mohan Singh 2002, part IV. We examine the Indian army's racial

Three years earlier, while serving with the Jodhpur Lancers in the Allied Expeditionary Force in China during the Boxer Rebellion, Amar Singh had experienced how the British construction of race affected the way Indians were perceived by other Europeans:

> Here is another proof of the slight treatment that the Indian officers receive. … Jasjee and Bhabootjee, who are both a major and a captain respectively, are kept down in a wretched hole in the second class with six others. The four British sergeants are there in a separate cabin … but on better footing. Major Turner and Capt Hudson had a greater anxiety for these four sergeants than they had for the others whom they put down as merely native officers, which means nothing worth bothering….
>
> Again there is another example. British sergeants and soldiers never salute Indian officers…. They look as if they expect the others to salute them …. [I]t is a mark of great favour on the part of the sergeant or soldier if he even condescends to say good morning …. I do not blame the French soldiers for calling the Indians coolies, considering the way the British treat them. They of course know what they see or hear. If a foreign soldier sees a British soldier not saluting an Indian officer, they naturally come to the conclusion that the latter is a coolie and so they call him. The British make a great row when they hear the foreigners calling Indian soldiers and officers coolies, though they do not mind treating them as such themselves. Aboard *S. S. Itria*, Sunday, July 14, 1901.[16]

Nevertheless, despite the hazards of liminality, we find Amar Singh navigating its turbulent waters with considerable ease and success. It is an old skill on the subcontinent. From at least Mughal times, reciprocal cultural adaptation and borrowing was common. Rajput kings and courts adopted Mughal architecture, art, dress, and food. Mughal emperors learned from Rajput rulers. "[T]he greatest of Indian social and political leaders," Ashis Nandy argues, "built their self-definitions as Indians over the last two centuries" on liminality.[17] We see Amar Singh wearing jodhpurs, an anglicized version of an Indian garment. The British adapt in the opposite direction: they wear khakis and live in bungalows.

In the next picture, Figure 2, Amar Singh's grandfather, Zorawar Singh, enacts a liminality that encompasses subcontinental and transcontinental cultural differences.[18] You see him here circa 1880 as a 10-village lord, minister in the govern-

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apartheid, Amar Singh's liminal positioning from 1905 through 1917, and the window of nominal racial equality he experiences as a KCO from 1917 through 1922. See Mason 1974, and Sundaram 1996.

[16] Rudolph and Rudolph with Mohan Singh 2002: 159.

[17] Nandy 1988:104.

[18] We follow Emma Tarlo in believing that "clothing matters." She demonstrates the semiotic richness of dress in Tarlo 1996. The introduction and chapter 3 are particularly compelling



Fig. 2. Zorawar Singh constructs a self from Rajput, Mughal, French, Victorian, and ancient Greek accoutrements.
Photo from Amar Singh's albums, courtesy of Mohan Singh Kanota.

ment of Maharaja Ram Singh of Jaipur, and a leading member of his court. The very genre of the image, a photographic portrait, speaks of liminality; it tells us that the periphery, the down-country town of Jaipur located at a far edge of the empire, emulated the latest practice in the empire's cosmopolitan center in London (Harris 2001). From 1876, visiting rulers had photographic portraits prepared in anticipation of an audience with the queen empress, Victoria.

Zorawar Singh's dress reflects a variety of cultural adaptations: the epaulets fashionable since Napoléon's time for European regimental dress; the pearls at the throat and the silk sword scarf that emulate Mughal court dress; the *angarkhī*, a local shirtlike garment featuring a rounded cutout at the neck; the recently acquired gold anklets marking his rise in the Jaipur court to the rank of *tāzīmī sardār*. He rests his hand on a table bearing the literary accoutrements of a Victorian gentleman—book, pen, inkwell—and poses in front of a *de rigueur* portraiture stage prop, in this case a

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analyses of how clothes make meaning and identity.

"Parthenon" backdrop (the outline of the roof is partly visible on the far right of the image) symbolizing British recognition of Greece as the cradle of Western civilization. Zorawar Singh's liminality naturalizes why and how his grandson and heir, Amar Singh, easily fell into a similar mode of identity formation.

Two more photos of the young Amar Singh—as a staff officer serving in the Indian army—display the environment that enabled and limited his identity choices. From 1905 until the outbreak of World War I in 1914, he was the only Indian in a white British officers' mess and cantonment society at Mhow in central India.



Fig. 3. The only turban at the Ormerod-Westcott wedding.
Photo from Amar Singh's albums, courtesy of Mohan Singh Kanota.

Figure 3, a portrait of the Ormerod-Westcott wedding, is one of many photos in Amar Singh's albums in which his is the only Indian *sāphā* in an English sea of ladies' garden hats and men's straw boaters. On the far right side, Amar Singh's dark face and white *sāphā* appear just behind a clergyman in a black suit. The picture shows Amar Singh's ethnic and cultural liminality. Figure 4 displays the Edwardian drawing room of the officer's bungalow he occupied in the Mhow cantonment. He has surrounded himself with *objets d'art*, paintings, and elegant *fin de siècle* furniture. While his code switching between cultural contexts—eating from *thālīs*, eating from plates—suggests the fluidity of his liminal condition, his lifestyle and dress suggest the durability of the hybrid identity that he has begun to construct.



Fig. 4. Amar Singh's Victorian drawing room at Mhow.
Photo from Amar Singh's albums, courtesy of Mohan Singh Kanota.

The subjective knowledge of the diary provides us with an account of how and why liminal and hybrid identities are constructed. To evaluate the significance of this process, we reach forward in time to two postcolonial theorists of identity questions, Ashis Nandy and Partha Chatterjee.[19] Contrary to the expectations of many nationalists, independence from British rule in 1947 didn't put an end to liminal and hybrid identities or provide an answer to the question of what constitutes an authentic Indian. Hybridity is seen by some cultural theorists and cultural nationalists as an identity failure. British sovereignty ended, but Britain's cultural presence lingered in the English language and in the categories of thought among independent India's educated classes. Should their colonial liminality or hybridity count as Indian? Nandy and Chatterjee say no. For these scholars, the realization of a post-independence, authentic Indianness was radically compromised by the cumulative and insidious effects of Thomas Babington Macaulay's 1835 essay "Minute on Indian Education." Proudly ignorant of "Oriental" languages and learning, and convinced of the superiority of European civilization and the English language, Macaulay aimed to create "a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect."[20] Nandy and Chatterjee find that the Macaulay inspired colonial project succeeded only too well.

Nandy indicts an "intimate enemy," the internalization of the former colonial master's mentality, for blocking the realization of an authentic Indian self. For Chatterjee, "derivative discourse," the assimilation of the colonial master's conceptual vocabulary, handicaps post-independence thought and action. It can, perhaps, be overcome by resorting to an inner space where an uncompromised Indian identity is said somehow to survive.[21]

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[19] Nandy 1988 and 2001, Chatterjee 1986.

[20] Macaulay, Thomas Babington. "Minute on Indian Education" In Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin. 2001: 428–30.

But for others, pre-independence hybridity anticipated India's transnational future. In today's universe of postcolonial discourse and practice, hybridity is celebrated by many as an authentic Indian identity. The diasporic experience so common to educated Indians has helped legitimate hybridity, making it more an object of admiration than of derision. Novelist Salman Rushdie exemplifies the arrival of hybrid identity on the postcolonial, postmodern scene in what he writes and how he lives—in Bombay, Karachi, London, and New York. So too do the information technology engineers straddling Silicon Valley and Bangalore. As we enter the twenty-first century, global processes have intensified rather than resolved the search for and debate over an authentic Indian identity.

Self-as-Other Ethnography or An Ethnography of the Self

Now that we have introduced Amar Singh, the subject, and examined how his narratives of and by the self clarify colonial identity formation, we want to make space for subjective knowledge in history and the social sciences. We turn to the voices of anthropologists who, as ethnographers, observed the other in the colonial relationship. Our story of the diary as a form of subjective knowledge begins and, in a sense, ends with the thoughts of the late M.N. Srinivas, an anthropologist and sociologist whose work on culture and social change transformed the way social scientists and historians understand caste and modernization in India. In texts written

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[21] See Nandy 1988 and Chatterjee 1986. For a Marx-flavored postcolonial theory reading of these two texts, see Young 2001, sections 2 and 3 of chapter 24.

In the 1960s, the negative valuation assigned by colonial masters and triumphant nationalists to liminality and hybridity migrated to the modernization theory that social scientists, mostly American, used to explain "development" in the "new nations" of the postcolonial world. Modernization theory held that "new nations" would experience social change as a transition from the darkness of tradition to the light of modernity. No longer traditional but not yet modern, liminal and hybrid transitional personalities, like transitional societies, were viewed as unfinished, unstable, and inauthentic.

Three influential modernization theory books of the early 1960s illustrated the negative valuation of transitional personalities and societies: Almond and Verba 1963; Riggs 1964; and Pye 1962. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's concept of civic culture, which they expected would civilize the new nations of the third world, bore a suspicious resemblance to American democracy at its best. Fred Riggs envisioned tradition and modernity as "agraria" and "industria," respectively, and the transition between them in terms of a "prismatic" society suspended between the "fused" (traditional) and the "diffracted" (modern). Lucian Pye found that "transitional personalities are peculiarly prone ... to essentially self-defeating practices; and ... they lack the stable and more impersonal institutional forms which can harness man's more irrational purposes." (Pye 1962: 36–7)

For a critique and an alternative to 1960s modernization theory, see the introduction of Rudolph and Rudolph 1969.

and published just before his death in Bangalore in November 1999, Srinivas provided warrants for the approach we take here. By the late 1990s, he had gone beyond explanations based on social structure and social function, which characterized his major works, to an appreciation of the importance of subjective knowledge and human agency in the making and shaping of culture:

> Every life mirrors to some extent the culture and the changes it undergoes. The life of every individual can be regarded as a "case study," and who is better qualified than the individual himself to study [it] .... Anthropology started as the study of "the other," an exotic other .... [T]he culmination of the movement from the study of the other to studying.... one's own culture is surely the study of one's own life.... The latter can be looked at as a field, with the anthropologist being both the observer and the observed, ending for once the duality which inheres in all traditional fieldwork.[22]

Fig. 5. The chief and the anthropologist: whose gaze?
Hutchison Picture Library, London.

As we read and reread Amar Singh's diary, it gradually dawned on us that it provided not only an account of a self in formation, but also an ethnography, a cultural account of a way of life. We combined the two by thinking of the diary's narratives as a self-constructing culture, what we subsequently came to call "self-as-other ethnography" or "an ethnography of the self."

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[22] Srinivas 1996: 656–7.

The claim that Amar Singh was an ethnographer, of whatever stripe, runs counter to what anthropologists claimed they did from the time when, at the beginning of World War I, Bronislaw Malinowski invented anthropology as a "science" based on "fieldwork" and participant/observer methodology. In the beginning, there was the self and the other. European anthropologists initially went to study the alien, exotic, and distant "other" in colonial places such as the Trobriand Islands or an Indian village, places where the natives could be observed enacting their culture, fulfilling cultural "obligations," behaving in culturally appropriate ways. Anthropologists from the metropole formulated a culture for the natives and told the Western world and the natives about it in their scholarly monographs.

One of James Clifford's stories about a graduate student ethnographer and an African chief captures the process of defining the natives' culture for them. (To put you in the proper frame of mind and to illustrate the ambiguity of the relationship that Clifford examines, we ask you to look at Figure 5, from the cover of the January 12, 2000, *Times Literary Supplement*, which featured Tanya Luhrmann's review of books about and by Clifford Geertz. Who is the self, and who is the other?) The story goes like this: A graduate student of African ethno-history prepares for his fieldwork in Gabon among the Mpongwe by consulting an early twentieth-century work of a pioneering ethnographer, André Raponda-Walker. When he reaches the field, the student's interview with a Mpongwe chief proceeds well until the chief has trouble with a particular word: "'Just a moment,' he says cheerfully, and disappears into his house to return with a copy of RapondaWalker's compendium. For the rest of the interview the book lies open on his lap."[23]

The "us" in the early days of ethnography referred to "Europeans" from imperial metropoles; the "them," natives living under colonial domination in what were deemed cultural isolates—denizens of remote islands, villagers living behind mud walls, tribals hidden away in the bush. Natives were objects to be studied, subjects of alien rulers, peoples that administrators had to control and civilize—the white man's burden, in Kipling's unintendedly ironic phrase.

So how did we get from "self and other" to "self as other"? How did the natives lose culture and gain voice? The transformation did not occur overnight or even recently. An important move in the direction of "self as other" took place when Srinivas's friend and younger colleague, Triloki Nath Madan (like Srinivas, an Indian ethnographer of India), wrote "On Living Intimately with Strangers."[24] Madan was one of the earliest reflexive "others" among Indian anthropologists. He did not, as others would do later, make an exclusivist claim in the name of "authenticity" to knowledge of his own culture. Instead, he saw himself as an anomaly when he remarked that "social anthropology took a very long time to realize the potential of studying one's own society." He cited two of Malinowski's students—Jomo Kenyatta, "an African tribal chief," and Fei Hsiao-Tung, "a Chinese Mandarin" whose studies were published in 1938 and 1939—as earlier examples of reflexive "natives" writing their own ethnographies. Madan also cited Malinowski's observation in the foreword to Fei's *Peasant Life in China* that writing anthropologies "of one's own people [is] the most arduous, but also the most valuable achievement of a fieldworker."[25]

Arguing that an anthropologist can go home again if he or she can "render the familiar unfamiliar," Madan went home again to study his own Kashmiri Pandit community. He recognized that "detachment" distinguished his way of studying his own community from the "empathy" called for by participant observation of an "other." What he did, he said, was closer to "objective subjectivity" than it was to the "subjective objectivity" of participant/observer ethnography.[26] Studying his culture in his own country and, more decisively, his own community led him in time to the view that anthropologists should "not divide humankind into 'ourselves' and 'others.'"[27]

The "other" of participant/observer anthropology is not, it seems, barred from self-understanding—the capacity, in Srinivas's words, of making himself or herself "a case study," if he or she can render the familiar unfamiliar. "Critical self-awareness," Madan says, is available to ethnographers who can access "distance," a "sense of surprise," and "anthropological doubt." This kind of self-consciousness and reflexivity can, according to Srinivas, remove the epistemological divide between self and other and open the way to ending "the duality which inheres in all traditional fieldwork."[28]

Amar Singh's self-as-other ethnography helps him to avoid some of the obfuscating mediations associated with self-and other ethnography: the subjectivity and the projections that affect observation and knowing, the fortuitous or calculated resistance and/or compliance of the native subject, and the objectivist fictions of scientific narration and authorial rhetoric. Geertz tells us how anthropologists try to persuade us to believe them despite such difficulties:

> The ability of anthropologists to get us to take what they say seriously has less to do with either a factual look or an air of conceptual elegance than it has to do with their capacity to convince us that what they say is a result of having actually penetrated (or, if you prefer, been penetrated by) another form of life, of having, one way or another, truly "been there. Persuading us that his offstage miracle has occurred … is where the writing comes in."[29]

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[23] On ethnographic allegory, see Clifford and Marcus 1986: 98–121.

[24] Madan, T. N. "On Living Intimately with Strangers." In: Béteille and Madan 1975: 131–56.

[25] Madan, in Béteille and Madan 1975: 156.

[26] "Subjective objectivity" is reminiscent of views expressed in Gadamer 1989 and Polanyi 1962.

[27] "On critical self-awareness.", in Madan 1994: 147–66.

[28] Srinivas 1996: 656–7.

[29] Geertz 1988. "It is clear," Geertz says, "that in …[Foucauldian] terms anthropology is pretty

falling back. The German army's Schlieffen Plan to encircle Paris by invading through Belgium and penetrating to the Marne was moving toward success. Without the arrival of an Indian corps of two-plus divisions and their valiant and determined resistance, the German offensive might very well have succeeded.[35]

Amar Singh feared that this story of the Indian soldiers' contribution to fighting and winning World War I would fall victim to India's colonial relationship to Britain:

> To my mind it is a thing of the greatest importance to keep a nation's records. In this we are backward ....[W]e ought to have brought our own charans, who are our hereditary [bards] .... What we want is a man of learning and imagination who could and would write from personal experience .... The English historians will simply treat ... the war in a very general way .... [W]hat we can expect is a mere mention.[36]

And a mere mention is what they received. This diary entry seems to resuscitate claims that being a witch provides a special vantage point for knowledge about witches and that power enhances the witch's ability to speak and to be heard. Impersonation does not always yield subjective knowledge. Sometimes knowing depends on direct experience and being heard depends on occupying a seat at the table.

Let us return to the theory and practice of self-as-other ethnography and see what light it casts on the standing of subjective knowledge in the social sciences. In recent decades, the dichotomies of self and other, participant and observer, ethnographer and native, even subjectivity and objectivity, have eroded. Among anthropologists, such dichotomies have given way to first-person fieldwork accounts of the theater of the other. In "polyphonic," "dialogic" textual production, both the ethnographer/writer and the subject/native are on stage. As Figure 5 makes clear, the asymmetries of power have faded; the observer and the observed engage each other in scripted conversation.

But the ethnographer and the native do not share in the crafting of the script. Despite the appearance on stage of reciprocity and mutual determination, the writing of the play, however literary and "partial" it may be, remains the task of the ethnographer, the self of the self/other duality. Politically, he or she retains authority over the text about the other. Amar Singh, a reflexive other writing in his diary about culture in the making as well as the doing, is located outside a participant/observer relationship. By conflating self and other, he constitutes himself, in Srinivas's words, as a "case study." He is "both the observer and the observed," a condition that ends "the duality which inheres in all traditional fieldwork."[37] He tells what he knows as a reflexive self-as-other diarist, erasing the border between objective and subjective knowledge by being participant, observer, informant, narrator, and author, all rolled into one. Amar Singh sets the stage, writes the play, and speaks its lines.

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[35] As Philip Mason puts it, "It is hard to see how the Germans could have failed to pierce the line" if the Indians had not been there and held (Mason 1974: 414).

[36] Amar Singh diary entry for 15 October 1915.

[37] Srinivas 1996: 657.

By Way of Conclusion

We have tried here to show that subjective knowledge based on first-person accounts of experience—"telling what I know," narratives of and by the self, partial and contingent truths, and self-as-other ethnography—is a valid form of knowledge. The move to subjective knowledge does not require abandoning other forms of knowledge or objectivity. Self-consciousness and reflexivity make it possible to render the familiar unfamiliar, to gain a certain detachment, to achieve, in Madan's phrase, "objective subjectivity."

The anthropological writing of the postcolonial era directly confronted an epistemological challenge common to the social sciences: the duality of the observer and the observed, and the associated claim that observation can be unmediated or transparent. With the end of colonialism, anthropologists began to question the way they represented the other. They found that they had been obscuring the other's voice and self-representation—sometimes, however inadvertently, speaking for the other. After gaining political independence and empowerment in the postwar era, native subjects and marginalized minorities increasingly spoke for themselves. Self-knowledge and self-representation made subjective knowledge more visible and accessible. It is in the context of self knowledge and self representation that Amar Singh's diary shows how subjective knowledge has a valid place in the epistemology of social sciences and history.

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उन्नीसवीं शती के कतिपय हिन्दी-उर्दू संकलन-साहित्य की अमूल्य निधि

चन्द्रमणि सिंह

जब मोनिका जी ने भाई मुकुन्द जी के सम्मान में प्रकाशित होने वाली पुस्तक के लिए एक आलेख तैयार करने के लिए कहा तो मुझे बड़ी खुशी हुई, किन्तु विषय का चयन कठिन था । भारतीय संस्कृति में जिसे "नागरक" कहते थे, वही हैं मुकुन्द जी । आचार्य हजारी प्रसाद द्विवेदी ने अपनी पुस्तक "प्राचीन भारत के कलात्मक विनोद" (हिन्दी ग्रन्थ रत्नाकर प्रा॰ लि॰ मुम्बई से १९६३ में प्रकाशित) में "नागरक" के विषय में विस्तृत चर्चा की है । उसकी दिनचर्या लिखी है । वह कला का जानकार व आश्रयदाता होता था । वह जानता था कि यदि सम्पत्ति का उपयोग दान व भोग में न किया जाए तो उसका नाश हो जाता है, साथ ही सम्पत्ति शक्ति व सम्मान भी प्रदान करती है, इसके लिए वह शिल्पियों व कलाकारों को धन से पुरस्कृत करता था । ऐसे नागरक के सम्मान में लिखने के लिए एक उपयुक्त विषय का चयन करना था । संयोग से पिछले दिनों १९वीं शती के साहित्य का अध्ययन करते हुए कुछ ऐसे संकलनों को देखने का अवसर मिला जिन्हें साहित्य-संगीत रसिकों ने अपनी मन पसन्द रचनाओं को संकलित कर मुद्रित करवाया था । मुझे यही विषय उपयुक्त लगा, और एक आकर्षण यह भी था कि विषय अछूता है तो कुछ नयी दृष्टि से सोचने एवं लिखने का अवसर मिलेगा । प्रस्तुत है उन संकलनों का परिचय । इनमें १९वीं शती के उत्तरार्द्ध की गंगा-जमनी भारतीय संस्कृति का परिचय मिलता है, जब विद्या प्रेमी लोग अपनी मन पसन्द रचनाओं को इकट्ठा कर संकलन तैयार कर लेते थे और अवकाश के क्षनों में उन्हें पढ़ा करते थे । ये रचनाएं गद्य एवं पद्य दोनों ही विधाओं में होती थीं । इन पुस्तकों में अधिकांश सचित्र हैं, काली स्याही के रेखांकनों से सुसज्जित । जिन क्षेत्रों में इन्हें तैयार करवाया जाता था उसी क्षेत्र की शैली में रेखांकन बनते थे क्योंकि चित्रकार स्थानीय ही होता था । ये लोग रेखाएं ब्रश की जगह निब से बनाते थे । जब मुद्रण का इतना प्रचार नहीं हुआ था तो हस्तलिखित प्रतियां ही तैयार करवाई जाती थीं और बाद में जब लीथो की छपाई शुरू हुई तब ये संकलन मंत्रालयों में छपने लगे ।

इस लेख में तीन संकलनों की चर्चा होगी जिस में दो की लिपि नागरी है और एक की उर्दू । जैसा कि ऊपर लिखा गया है कि १९वीं शती में लिपियां भले ही दो थीं, बोलचाल की भाषा एक ही थी । विशुद्ध

संस्कृत या फारसी शब्दों का कहीं कहीं प्रयोग होता था किन्तु बोलचाल की भाषा हिन्दुस्तानी थी और इन पुस्तकों में वही प्रयुक्त हुई है ।

पहले संग्रह में तीन कृतियां शामिल की गई हैं । पहली है

> रागमाला पहिला भाग—जिसमें ठुमरी, अद्धा, दादरा, तिमंटा, सावरी, पीलू, चौमासा, ख्याल, खमाच, विहाग, देस, पर्च, काफी, कलंगड़ा, पूरवी, बिलावल, तराना, यमन, तिलंग, लचका, सोहनी, चतुरंग, ध्रुपद, बहार, पावस, कजरी, सावन, होली, बारहमासा, भजन, गजलें आदि हस्व फरमायश लाला रघुनाथ प्रशाद ताजिर कुतुब चौक, लखनऊ माह जनवरी सन् १८८७ ईसवी॥
> मतवै इन्तिजामी लषनऊ में छापा॥

यह इबारत तो मुख पृष्ठ पर छपी है, अन्दर इसके कई उदाहरण हैं, उसके बाद गजल हैं जिनमें कुछ महिला शायरों व गायिकाओं की रचनाएं भी हैं, उदाहरण के लिए, मुश्तरी, गौहर जान, बीगन जान तवायफ,बी वलायतों, बी नन्हें जान कलकत्ता, बी सुलह यहूदन, कमर जान, बी खुर्शीद जान तवायफ एवं बी मुहम्मदी जान ।

उसके बाद कतिपय नृत्य मुद्राओंके विवरण सचित्र दिए गए हैं जिनमें २० रेखाचित्र हैं । इनके संबंध में उल्लेखनीय बात यह है कि चित्र में अंकित नर्त्तकियां, कत्थक नृत्य में पहनी जाने वाली पोशाकें पहने हुए हैं जिससे कथक नृत्य में पहनी जाने वाली वेश-भूषा की जानकारी मिलती है (दें॰ चित्र सं॰ १–४) ।

इसके बाद एक अलग पुस्तिका है जो दो भागों में है, नाम है "नित्य कुसुमा करोद्यान अर्थात् चमनिस्ताने हमेशः बहार" । इसमें अच्छे शायरों की रचनाएं और चुनी हुई गजलें दी गई हैं ।

प्रथम भाग के छापने के उद्देश्य में कहा गया है कि

> 'उरदू' कविता और गाने के रसिकों के आनन्द और उपकार के वास्ते बबू अमीर सिंह ने संग्रह किया । पता है बनारस नम्बर १ नैपाली खपरा हरिपप्रकाश यन्त्रालय में अमीर सिंह ने पांचवी बार मुद्रित किया ।

प्रथम भाग में जफर, दाग, मोमिन, अली गौहर, हकीर, गाफिल, आतिश, शिकोहुद्दीन, अख्तर, तूर, मकबूल, रमजान अली, जौक, आगा, सखी, ताबां, सौदा, अमानत, गोया, नियाज, नजीर, मकसूद, खुसरो, नूरशाह, सबा, जामिन, सिराज, रसा, अमीर, महशाह, हैदर, नासिख, जाहिर, मुश्तरी, हरिबिलास एवं सुखराम जी ब्रह्मचारी की रचनाएं हैं । तीन बिना छाप की हैं, कुल मिला कर बयासी गजलों का संग्रह है ।

जफर की एक रचना है —

यार था गुलजार था मै थी फिजां मैं न था ।

लायके पाबोसे जानां क्या हिना थी मैं न था ॥
हाथ क्यों बांधे मेरे छल्ला अगर चोरी गया ।
यह सरापा शोखिए दुजदे हिना थी मैं न था ॥
मैंने पूछा उस सनम से क्या हुआ हस्बो शबाब ।
हंस के बोला वो सनम शानै खुदा थी मैं न था ॥
कोई जा सकता नहीं असमत सराए यार तक ।
परदएदर जिसने उलटा वह हवा थी मैं न था ॥
बेखुदी में ले लिया बोसा खता की के मुआफ ।
इस दिले बेताब की साहब खता थी मैं न था ॥
मैं सिसकता ही रहा और मर गए फरहादो कैस ।
क्या उन्हीं दोनों के हिस्सों में कजी थी मैं न था ॥
नातवानी ने बचाई जान मेरी हिज्र में ।
कोने कोने ढूंढती फिरती कजा थी मैं न था ॥
दाग इसका दिल पे मेरे ऐ जफर रह जाएगा ।
खानहाए यार में खल्के खुदा थी मैं न था ॥४॥ (पृ. ३ पर)

गजले मोमिन —

वो जो हमसे तुमसे करार था तुम्हें याद हो कि न याद हो ।
वही याने वादः निबाह का तुम्हें याद हो कि न याद हो ॥
वो जो जुल्फ थे मुंह पर पेश्तर वो करम कि था मेरे हाल पर ।
वो हरेक बातों में रूठना तुम्हें याद हो कि न याद हो ॥
वो नए गिले व शिकायतें वो मजे कि हिकायते ।
मुझे सब हैं याद जरा जरा तुम्हें याद हो कि न याद हो ॥
कभी हमसे तुमसे भी राह थी कभी हमसे तुमसे भी चाह थी ।
कभी हम भी तुम भी थे आशना तुम्हें याद हो कि न याद हो ॥
वो बिगड़ना वस्ल की रात का वो न मानना किसी बात का ।
वो नहीं नहीं की जो थी सदा तुम्हें याद हो कि न याद हो ॥
जिसे आप कहते थे बेवफा उसे आप कहते हैं आशना ।
मैं वही हूँ मोमिन मुब्तिला तुम्हें याद हो कि न याद हो ॥९॥ (पृ॰ ७ पर)

"नित्य कुसुमा करोद्यान अर्थात् चमनिस्ताने हमेशः बहार" के दूसरे भाग में एक सौ सत्रह गजल संग्रहीत हैं और इसका प्रकाशन १९४२ (ई॰ सन् १८८५) में हुआ था । इसके प्रथम पृष्ठ में लिखा है—

> इस हिस्से में नए और पुराने अच्छे-अच्छे शायरों की बहुत उम्दा चुनी हुई गजलें दी गई हैं ।
> उरदू कविता और गाने के रसिकों के आनन्द और उपकार के वास्ते श्री बाबू हरिश्चन्द्र (रसा) ने हरिप्रकाश यन्त्रालय के स्वामी बाबू अमिरसिंह की सन्मति से संग्रह किया । (All right [!] reserved)
> बनारस, महल्ला नैपाली खपरा, हरिप्रकाश यन्त्रालय में अमीर सिंह ने मुद्रित किया ।

शुरुआत होती है "रसा" की गजल से—

जहां देखो वहां मौजूद है मेरा कृष्ण प्यारा है ।
उसी का सब है जलवा जो जहां में आशकारा है ॥

भला मखलूक खालिक की सिफत समझे कहां कुदरत ।
इसी से नेत नेत ऐ यार वेदों ने पुकारा है ॥

इस संकलन में भारतेन्दु हरिश्चन्द्र "रसा", गिरिधरदास – भारतेन्दु जी के पिता –, मीर नबाब मूनिस, बहादुर शाह जफर, असगर अली खां, नसीम, मीर बहादुर अली वहशत, मुंशी तफजल हसन खां शैदा, वजीर अली सबा, अशरफ खां, शेख बलायत अली, ख्वाजा वजीर "नजीर", राजा बलवान सिंह "राजा", नबाब असगर जान "असगर", ख्वाजा वजीर के बेटे ख्वाजा बादशाह, ख्वाजा मीर "दर्द", शेख इमाम बख्श "नासिख", नबाब मुहम्मद तरकी खां "तरकी", शेख कलन्दर बख्श "जुरअत", नबाब सैयद मुहम्मद खां"रिन्द", मीर आबिद अली "आबिद", सैयद हादी अली "बेखुद", ख्वाजा हैदर अली "आतिश", मिर्जा मुहम्मद रजा "तूर", मुनव्वर खां "गाफिल", मिर्जा अलीजाह बहादुर दिलेरुद्दोला "शैदा", राहत अली खां "आशिक", पं॰ विशेशरनाथ साहब "अनवर", फकीर मुहम्मद खां "गोया", मौलवी मुहम्मद इन-आम-उल्लाह "इन आम", अब्दुल्ला खां "मेह", मुंशी बांके बिहारी लाल "राहत", नजीर, मीर नबाब मूनिस, बी शीरी जान "नाज", बी छुट्टन जान "जुहरा", बी कमरन जान "मुश्तरी", जहांगीर शाहजादा, बहादुरशाह फिरदूसमका, नवाजिस हुसैन खां "नवाजिस", मीरतकी "मीर", "सोज", मिरजा असदुल्ला खां "गालिब", असगर अली खां "नसीम" देहलवी, रैहा, महरु, मुहम्मद इबराहीम "जौक", मीर हसन "हसन", मिरजा सुलैमा कदर बहादुर "सुलैमा", बिग्गा तखल्लुस "शीरी", हजरत सुल्ताने आलम वाजिद अली शाह "अख्तर", फतहुद्दौला मिरजा मुकम्मद रजा "वर्क",मुंशी नन्दकिशोर "किसोर", सैयद आगा हसन खां "अमानत", रेखता-हींगा हरि, रेखता-नागरीदास जी, अदा एवं रसिक गोविन्द ।

संकलन में दो रेखते भी हैं, एक हींगा हरी का और दूसरा नागरीदास का । रेखता काव्य की एक विधा है, जिसमें हिन्दी व ब्रज के साथ पंजाबी शब्दों का प्रयोग किया जाता है । "नागरीदास" किशनगढ़ के राजा सावंत सिंह का उपनाम था, वह इसी नाम से काव्य रचना करते थे । उनकी रचनाओं का एक संकलन "नागरीदास ग्रंथावली" के नाम से नागरीप्रचारिणी सभा से प्रकाशित हुआ है ।

गिरधरदास जी स्वनाम धन्य भारतेन्दु जी के पिता थे और ब्रजभाषा में काव्य रचना करते थे । संभवतः कभी-कभी वह उर्दू में भी लिखते होंगे पर उर्दू की अधिक जानकारी उन्हें नहीं थी—ऐसा उन्होंने इस गजल में स्वीकार किया है । इस पुस्तक में उनकी एक रचना संकलित की गई है जिसमें उन्होंने लिखा है—

दास गिरधर तुम फकत हिन्दी पढ़े थे खूब सी । किसलिए उरदू के शाएर में गिने जाने लगे ।

इन संकलनों से देश की तत्कालीन साहित्यिक गतिविधियों की भी जानकारी मिलती है । १९वीं शती में देश का साहित्यिक वातावरण कुछ ऐसा था कि हिन्दी के कवि व लेखक कई भाषाओं में रचना करते थे—उर्दू, पंजाबी, मारवाड़ी एवं गुजराती । कविता की भाषा तो ब्रजभाषा थी ही, गद्य तत्कालीन "हिंदवी" या "भाषा" में लिखा जाता था । आधुनिक हिंदी के जनक भारतेन्दु हरिश्चन्द्र तो लगभग सभी उत्तर भारतीय भाषाओं में पद्य रचना करते थे । उर्दू लेखन में उनका उपनाम "रसा" था । प्रस्तुत है उनकी गजल के कुछ अंश—

जहां देखा वहां मौजूद मेरा कृष्ण प्यारा है ।
उसी का सब है जलवा जो जहां में आशकारा है ॥
तेरा दम भरते हैं हिन्दू अगर नाकूस बजता है ।
तुम्हीं को शेख ने प्यारे अजां देकर पुकारा है ।

भारतेन्दु जी उर्दू गद्य भी लिखते थे, सन् १८८३ में उन्होंने "कानून ताज़ीरात शौहर" लिखा, जिसकी समालोचना "हिन्दुस्तानी लखनऊ" नामक समाचार पत्र में छपी थी ।

जयपुर के नगर प्रासाद में ऐसे ही एक संकलन के दो पत्र हैं जिसका प्रकाशन बसवा, राज जयपुर निवासी कन्हैयालाल माथुर कायस्थ ने करवाया था । पुस्तक के आवरण पृष्ठ पर शीर्षक परिचय आदि इस प्रकार दिया गया है (दे॰ चित्र ५) —

श्री राधाकृष्णाभ्योनमः
दोहा
काव्य शास्त्र आनंद ते रसिकन के दिन जात
मूरख के दिन नींद में कलह करत उत्पात
रसिक सरोवर
जिसको
मुन्शी कन्हैयालाल वल्द किशोरी
लाल साहब कायस्थ बसवा निवा-
सी ने अति परिश्रम से
अपने शोकीन दोस्तों के चित्त विनोदार्थ
श्री सूरदास, तुलसीदास, केशवदास, ललित किशोरी, हरि विलास, गंग इत्यादि कवियों के बनाए हुए अनेक
राग रागनियों में भजन ठुमरी मलार बसंत होरी रेखता लावनी छप्पय कवित्त पहेली वा शाएरान दाग
नासिख की गजलें संग्रह करके
अबुल उलाई प्रेस आगरा में छपाया ।

तदाद जिल्द ५०० जनवरी सन् १९०१ कीमत पांच आना

पूरी पुस्तक अनुपलब्ध होने के कारण इसके विषय में अधिक नहीं कहा जा सकता।

अब उर्दू का एक संकलन जिसमें "जानकी जी", "शिवपुराण", "प्रेमसागर", "रामकथा" (तुलसी-कृत), "गुलजार-ए नसीम" (गुलबकावली), "पद्मावत", "शीरीं-खुसरो", "कयात हग़ाजबरज़" एवं "बैताल पचीसी" एक ही जिल्द में बंधी हैं । इनका प्रकाशन वर्ष १९वीं शती के अलग-अलग साल में हुआ ।[1]

१. "जानकी जी" — कर्त्ता मुंशी शंकर दयाल "फरहत", १९२० वि॰ (सन् १८६३ ई॰), जलालाबाद, जिला फर्रुखाबाद, जनाब मुंशी नवल किशोर साहब दाम इकबालहू ।

२. "शिवपुराण", कर्त्ता मुंशी शंकर दयाल "फरहत", प्रथम संस्करण — संवत् १९१९ (सन् १८६२ ई॰), यह दूसरा संस्करण है ।

३. "प्रेमसागर" — इसमें प्रकाशन की तिथि नहीं पढ़ी जा सकी ।

४. "रामकथा" (तुलसीकृत), मुंशी शंकरदयाल "फरहत", जलालाबाद, जिला फर्रुखाबाद, मुंशी नवलकिशोर, मुकाम कानपुर ।

५. "गुलजार-ए नसीम" (गुल बकावली), जनवरी १८७३ ई॰, नवल किशोर प्रेस, कानपुर ।

६. "पद्मावत" — उर्दू, तसवीरों सहित, तस्वीर बनाने वाले मीर सैयदउद्दीन, सन् १८७१ ई॰ में लखनऊ मुहल्ला सआदतगंज, गुलशल अवध में छपी ।

७. "शीरीं खुसरौ" — उर्दू, तसवीरों सहित, सन् १८७१ ई॰ में मतबए गुलशन अवध लखनऊ में छपी इसमें शेरों की संख्या २७१० है ।

८. "कयात हग़ाजबरज़", किसी शायर की रचनाएं हैं, गद्य-पद्य दोनों ही हैं, काश्मीरी दरवाजा देहली, सन् १२८९ हि॰ मुताबिक मार्च १८७३ ई॰ ।

९. "बैताल पचीसी" मय तसवीरात — पुस्तक अधूरी है, कुल पृष्ठ ८२ हैं, पचीसी में पचीस कहानियां होती हैं, इस पुस्तक में २४वीं कहानी शुरू तो हुई पर पूरी नहीं हो सकी ।

यह उस युग की गंगा-जमनी जीवनशैली एवं साहित्यिक अभिरुचि का एक श्रेष्ठ उदाहरण है । ये सभी ग्रंथ सचित्र हैं । काली रेखाचित्रों से सुसज्जित, गुलदस्ते के एक चित्र में रंग अवश्य ऊपर से लगाया गया है। लीथो पद्धति से छपे रेखाचित्रों का अंकन तत्कालिन वेश-भूषा और रहन-सहन के आधार पर ही हुआ है । इस संबंध में एक बात अवश्य द्रष्टव्य है कि पुस्तकों पर बने चित्रों में रेखांकन की शैली स्थानीय ही होती थी, उदाहरण के लिए यदि पुस्तक लखनऊ-कानपुर की छपी है तो अवध शैली के रेखांकन हैं और यदि लाहौर में छपी हो तो पहाड़ी-सिख ढंग के ।

उक्त पुस्तक मेरे परिवार के संग्रह से आई है और अवध क्षेत्र की छपी है अतः इसमें अवध शैली के ही अंकन हैं ।

इन पुस्तकों में भारत की समन्वित संस्कृति के तो दर्शन होते ही हैं, भाषाई—विशेषकर संस्कृत व फारसी की अगली पीढ़ी हिन्दी व उर्दू का बड़ा अच्छा स्वरूप सामने आता है । इन रचनों में कट्टरता नहीं है, समन्वयन का प्रयास है ।

ये संकलन एक अन्य दृष्टि से भी महत्त्वपूर्ण हैं कि इनमें महिलाओं द्वारा रचित कई गजलें हैं जिनसे उस युग की स्त्री शिक्षा की जानकारी मिलती है । इनमें बी छुट्टन, बी कमरन जान "मुश्तरी", बीगन जान तवायफ, बी॰ वलायतो, बी॰ नन्हे जान, बी॰ सुलह यहूदन, खुर्शीद जान तवायफ, मुहम्मदी जान एवं बी॰ शीरी जान के नाम उल्लेखनीय हैं। इनके नामों से लगता है कि ये लोग नृत्य-गीत से जुड़े तवायफ समाज की थीं पर उनमें काव्य प्रतिभा थी, वे ऐसी रचनाएं करती थीं जिसे तत्कालीन समाज का शिक्षित वर्ग पढ़ता था, यही नहीं नागरीदास जी, जफर, नजीर, भारतेन्दु, जौक व मोमिन के साथ उनकी गजलें छपी थीं । यह वह समय था जब हिन्दी के कवि, नाटककार एवं लेखकों के लिए अन्य भारतीय भषाएं अनजानी नहीं थीं । वे लोग अन्य भाषाओं में लिख कर, अनुवाद के माध्यम से भारतीय भाषाओं को समृद्ध बना रहे थे ।

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[1] उर्दू लिपि में ग्रन्थों के नाम पढ़ने के लिए मैं प्रो॰ वीरेन्द्र नारायण सक्सेना की आभारी हूं ।



४२ २१

तरकीब इस गति भरने की
यह है कि पट्टा के किनारे को
बायें हाथ के उंगली से दाबकर
और दायें हाथ में भौंह पे डुपट्टा
का झुरमुट लगाकर अपने भौंह
पर डुपट्टे के किनारे को बल दे
के नाज व अदा से गति भरे व च
शोतफा दोत्ता करे और हर एक से
आंख लडाता जावे और सब को
अपने मजा व करिश्मा से रिझ
व और गत में अजाय मजे के

तरकीब इस गति भरने की यह है
कि दोनों हाथों का मुकट बना
के ऊपर तले हाथ रखके और
हाथों की उंगलियां खड़ी करके
व उनको सर पर रखके गति
भरे यह गति भैरव खंग व तत्
र से है कि नृत्य कन्हैया से ई
जाद हुए हैं और इसकी क
तये कई बजा पर हैं लेकिन यह
गति भरे और बजा कत से स
म पूरा है ॥

चित्र १: "रागमाला", भाग १, लखनऊ, ईसवी सन् १८८७, गति का विवरण और रेखांकन ७–८।



४३ २३

सिफत - इस गति भरने की
यह है कि दोनों हाथ मिला के
फैलाकर और हाथों बनाकर
परियों के नाज़ो अदा से नृत्य
करे आंख और भौंह और कू
ला मसकता जाय व कमर भी
बल और हाज़िरेन व नाज़िरेन
से आंख लड़ती जाय और उड़
सके दुतकर के मिस्ल हवा
के लेना चाहिये व यह गति
मुशाकल्लस्क परस्ता है ॥

सिफत - इस गति भरने की
यह है कि ऊपर तले हाथ रख
मिस्लतर्खार हाजा के और उ
सका मुकट बना के और सा
व पर तिरछा करके गति भरे
और सारी महफिल ते आय
गति भैरव और सोलह व चार
अजा मसकते जाय और
यह गति भी लेदत में लीजा
यगी कि स्नन्द्र तत वेग और
नटवर से जो कृष्ण से ईजाद
हुई है—

चित्र २: "रागमाला", भाग १, लखनऊ, ईसवी सन् १८८७, गति का विवरण और रेखांकन ९–१०।



सिफत – इस गति भरने की
यह है कि बायें हाथ का मुक़
टवना के सर पर रखे हाथ की
बांसुरी करके जिस बजा से ब
जाते हैं गति भरे इस तरी मह
फिल का दौरा करे और वाजा
मसकूरीन मसकाते जायें ए
क नाज़िरीन व हाज़िरीन तीर
मिजगा से घायल होता जा
इ व मालुम होकि यह गति भ
रकिस्म तरंगा व नटवार से है
हास से जारी हुई है ॥

नम्बर ११

सिफत – इस गति की यह है
कि जैसे कोई बांसुरी बजाकर
गाता है दोनों हाथों से बांसु
र बजा करे व हाथ दाईं और व
मुंह बाईं तरफ़ व पांव तिर्छा
करके गति भरे व इस गति में
जरा खम देना वाजिब है व कू
ला व कमर व आंख व भौंह म
सकती जावें व कुल महफ़िल
का दौरा करे व गति भी किस्म
तरंगा व नटवर से कि जो नृ
त्य कन्य्हा से जारी हुई

नम्बर १२

चित्र ३: "रागमाला", भाग १, लखनऊ, ईसवी सन् १८८७, गति का विवरण और रेखांकन ११–१२ ।



सिफत – इस गति भरने की
यह है कि दोनों हाथ मिस्ल
कद दरवाज़ा करे व हथेलियां बं
द करके दोनों उंगलियां ख
ड़ी करे गति भरे व कूला व कम
र मटकाती जाय व दोनों छाती
याव और ख भौंह मटकाती
जाय व इस अंदाज़ से गति भरे
कि नाज़िरीन व हाज़िरीन के
हर गति के साथ गति हो
ती जाय ॥

नम्बर १५

सिफत – इस गति भरने की
यह है कि दोनों हाथों का साफ़
बना के रखे व थाली की किनो
को अंगूठे में दाब कर सफ़ा
पियाला पुर में थाली छोटे व
हनो के मिस्ल चारों तरफ़ ते
चे व वही अदा सेलाव क
र मसकाते जाय व यह गति
कुल कतों से मुशकिल है
व कथिकों के नाचने की
है ॥

नम्बर १६

चित्र ४: "रागमाला", भाग १, लखनऊ, ईसवी सन् १८८७, गति का विवरण और रेखांकन १५–१६ ।



चित्र ५: "रसिकसरोवर", संपादक: किशोरी लाल, आगरा, ईसवी सन् १९०१: शीर्षक पृष्ठ ।

Summary

Some 19th-Century Collections of Hindi-Urdu Poetry: A Priceless Treasure

Chandramani Singh

The second half of the 19th century saw the publication of anthologies of Hindi-Urdu poetry that were put together and commissioned to print by lovers of poetry, music and dance. The collections reflect their taste and entertainment preferences. In these the Indic and Persianate registers of speech blend harmoniously to form what can be described best as the then current Hindustani as it was also spoken. Some collections include drawings, executed with pen and ink for lithographic reproduction, in those days the most common printing technique. The paper discusses three examples, the first two in Nagari script, the third in Urdu: (1) *Rāgmālā*, pt. 1, Lakhnau: Matba'-e Intizāmī, 1887; (2) *Nitya kusumā karodyān, arthāt Camanistān-e hameśaḥ bahār*, pt. 2, Banaras 1885: Hariprakāś Yantrālay, and (3) a compilation uniting several compositions variously published by the Naval Kishore Press (Kanpur and Lucknow), the Matba'-e Gulśan-e Avadh (Lucknow), and some with anonymous places and/or unidentified years of publication. Among these texts were famous ones like the *Padmāvat* (illustrated Urdu version, Lucknow 1871: Matba'-e Gulśan-e Avadh) or an incomplete illustrated *Baitāl pacīsī*, some works by Śaṅkardayāl 'Farhat' Lakhnavī from Jalalabad, a well-known minor poet of the period (*Jānakī jī*, n.p. 1863: Naval Kishore Press; *Śivpurāṇ* 2nd ed., n.d., n.p., 1st ed. 1862; *Rāmkathā*, based on Tulsīdās' *Rāmcaritmānas*, Kanpur n.d.: Naval Kishore Press), or popular *qiṣṣas* such as *Gulzār-e nasīm (Gul-e bakāvalī)* (Kanpur 1873: Naval Kishore Press).

The illustrations of these books represent the regional style of their respective places of publication. Apart from showing literary, aesthetic and entertainment preferences of the period with its mingled Indic and Persianate tradition, the publications also testify to the recognition of female poets from the *tavāyaf* milieu, represented in the anthologies in a seizeable number side by side with poets of classical fame.

(Monika Horstmann)

Poems by Mukund Lath

निष्प्रभ, धूसर इन्द्रधनुष[1]

1

ज्यों निष्प्रभ, धूसर
इन्द्रधनुष
बीहड़ में खँडहर
राजमहल

भटके भैंसे का खुर
पल भर
कुछ चमक पुरानी
जगा गया

एए विरत्त-सुरचाव-विरस-विरलाहिलक्खिअ-च्छाया ।
महिस-खुर-च्छेअ-विहाविअ-प्पहा मणि-अडुद्देसा ॥ ६५९ ॥

एते विरक्तसुरचापविरसविरलाभिलक्षितच्छायाः । महिषखुरच्छेदविभावितप्रभा मणितटोद्देशाः ॥ ६५९ ॥

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[1] Source: *Tir rahī van kī gandh: Vākpatirāj kā prakṛtikāvya Mukund Lāṭh ke chandoṃ meṃ.* Allahabad: Rākā Prakāśan for Prākṛt Bhāratī Akādamī, Jaipur, 2004. Courtesy of Mukund Lath and Prākṛt Bhāratī Akādemī.
The editor has added for each of the poems its Prakrit source and the Sanskrit paraphrase of this. Source: Vākpatirāja. *Gaüḍavaho*, ed. by N.G. Suru (Prakrit Text Series 18). Ahmedabad: Prakrit Text Society, 1975. N.G. Suru added diacritics indicating shortening of long vowels. These have been omitted. The Sanskrit paraphrase (*chāyā*) is by N. G. Suru.

2

अनजानी जंगल-बेल जड़ा
उखड़ा, रुखड़ा -
बाड़ी का सँवरा
सुघड़ पेड़।

छाया पहली सी
दिख़ती है

भीतर झाँको
जंगल का मन

इच्छा-परिअत्त-लआ-विआण-उद्देस-पीडिअ-दुमाण ।
छाया सच्चिअ अण्ण व्व रण्ण-फरुसा उववणाण ॥६६०॥

इच्छापरिवृत्तलतावितानोद्देशपीडितद्रुमाणाम् । छाया सैवान्येव अरण्यपरुषा उपवनानाम् ॥६६०॥

3

जो कलियों तक ही बढ़ते थे
खिलती बाला के बालों में
खुल केशर केशर चटख
फूल

अब फल तक पक, बूढ़े
जर्जर
झर, सूखे पत्तों में
दुबके

विब्भमवईण भिज्जंतमलअ-परिगूढ-केसरं जाण ।
ताणंच्चिअ विअलइ इज लआण फल-पेल्लिअं कुसुमं ॥६६१॥

विभ्रमवतीनां भिद्यमानमलकपरिगूढकेसरं यासाम् । तासामेव विगलतीह लतानां फलप्रेरितं कुसुमम् ॥६६१॥

4

छत
ऊँची ऊँची
ढही;
कहीं फट
बिखर गई दीवार;

घास -
आँगन में सूख रही
सूनी

ऊपर आ यहां बैठ देखो
कल रंगमहल
अब
निर्जल, तपती
बाव

ओसरिअ-सिहर-बंधा तहट्ठिओवत्त-भित्ति-पब्भारा ।
भवणोच्छंगा तेच्चेअ विजल-वावीणिहा जाआ ॥६६२॥

अपसृतशिखरबन्धास्तथास्थितापवृत्तभित्तिप्राग्भाराः । भवनोत्सङ्गास्त एव विजलवापीनिभा जाताः ॥६६२॥

5

भोर भोर
सूरज अगोरता, जीर्ण
सरोवर का विषाद

नीचे सूखे में
शंखनखी।
तट पर आ भटकी
महक

साथ अनजाने लाई
कब की खोई
कमल-गंध

इह कारहीसु कल्लं उण्णंति व भूसु सावसाआसु ।
आरामंति विणिम्महिअ-कमल-गंधाओ व दिसाओ ॥६६८॥

इह कारभीषु कल्यमुन्नयन्तीव भूषु सावसादासु । आरमन्ति विनिर्गतकमलगन्धा इव दिशाः ॥६६८॥

6

झूले बँधते थे यहां
डोर अब कहां?
गाँठ फिर भी पकड़े है
डालों को

नीचे
पीली है घास
उचटती उगती है

उनके मँडराते पाँव तले
जो झूल चले

साहासु बंध-परिसेस-रज्जु-वोच्छेअ-विरल-जर-दब्भा ।
दोला-मग्गा उवणिग्गमेसु एए तरु अलाण ॥६६९॥

शाखासु बन्धपरिशेषरज्जुव्युच्छेदविरलजरद्दर्भाः । दोलामार्गा उपनिर्गमेष्वेते तरुतलानाम् ॥६६९॥

7

गाढ़ी ईंटों का शोण चूर्ण
पहले के जौहर सा छाया

गुणगान
यहां होता था
पिछले राजा का

बूढ़े साँपों के
विचरण का
अब यही छोर

अवसण्ण-पुराण-णरिंद-कित्तण-ट्ठाण-सोण-चुण्णाओ ।
इह जर-भुअंग-संभाविआओ पेरंत-भूमीओ ॥६७०॥

अवसन्नपुराणनरेन्द्रकीर्तनस्थानशोणचूर्णाः ।इह जरद्भुजङ्गसंभाविताः पर्यन्तभूमयः ॥६७०॥

8

कीचड़ कीचड़ की आरपार
बिंध गई
सेंध

पूरी गहरी दीवार
इधर से उधर नाप
कँचुली फँसी है -
झूल रही

बचा ही था पर
अभी साँप

इह विहडिअ-पिंडी-बंध-संधि-परिलंबि-वाल-णिम्मोआ ।

आयाम-परिठ्ठिअ-वंक-विअड-लिंगा थलाहोआ ॥ ६७६ ॥

इह विघटितपिण्डीबन्धसंधिपरिलम्बिव्यालनिर्मोकाः । आयामपरिष्ठितपङ्कविकटलिङ्गाः स्थलाभोगाः ॥ ६७६ ॥

9

घिस गई कहीं
कुछ टूटी भी है, इधर उधर -
थोड़ी ही पर

जंगल ने कम छेड़ा इसको

गाढ़े गाढ़े पत्थर चुन, चुनी
सुढर, चौड़ी, गहरी
रथ्या

पथ है प्रशस्त
पर कहां, कौन जाये
किस घर?

पीणत्तण-दर-परिणाम-भंग-परिकसण-मणि-कवालाओ ।

आहोअं अज्ज वि इह कहेंति गहिराओ रत्थाओ ॥ ६८० ॥

पीनत्वदरपरिणामभङ्गपरिकर्षणमणिकपालाः । आभोगमद्यापि इह कथयन्ति गभीरा रथ्याः ॥ ६८० ॥

10

अब घुआँ नहीं उठता
न धूल झड़ती
बाहर

घर बियाबान
दिन ढलते ढलते
रात
निगल जाति पथ को

घर करता
बेघर अंधकार

अघडंत-धूम-रअ-णिग्गमाओ पल्हत्थ-भवण-विरलाओ ।
इह होंति गाढ-तिमिरा च्चिरेण रअणीसु रत्थाओ ॥६८७॥

अघटमानधूमरजोनिर्गमाः पर्यस्तभवनविरलाः । इह भवन्ति गाढतिमिराश्चिरेण रजनीषु रथ्याः ॥६८७॥

11

खिर
बिखर गई :
खिड़की पर
पत्थर की जाली

अब और उजाला है भीतर
अनिमेष, स्तब्ध

दीवारों की झीनी छाया
में खुभी डूब
खंभे की काली
कठिन छाँह

इह गंभीराअंति व अहिआलोआइं जालअ-विहंगा ।
छायासु वि दर-पाविअ-खंभ-च्छायाइं भवणाइं ॥६८३॥

इह गम्भीरायन्त इव अधिकालोकानि जालकविभङ्गात्। छायास्वपि दरप्राप्तस्तम्भच्छायानि भवनानि ॥६८३॥

12

दिन का सन्नाटा ।

चुप के छज्जे पर
सहसा
कुछ गिरा

रोंगटे खड़े कर गई
हल्की सी आवाज़

प्रेत है?

दिअसे वि भूअ-संभावणाए उक्कंटयंति अंगाइं ।
णीसद्दाओ वि इह झत्ति घडिअ-सद्दाओ वडहीओ ॥६८४॥

दिवसेऽपि भूतसंभावनया उत्कण्टयन्त्यङ्गानि । निःशब्दा अपीह झटिति घटितशब्दा वलभ्यः ॥६८४॥

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