

Daya Krishna in his article 'An Attempted Analysis of the Concept of Freedom',² reflecting upon the problems raised above, concludes that though it is difficult to determine whether the category of freedom is applicable to non-living things, unicellular organisms and the insect world, it is certainly not applicable to the higher animal kingdom, for 'the very ends of the animal's activity is pre-determined and certainly in no way chosen by him' (p. 550). According to him the so-called feeling of freedom which the higher animals may be supposed to experience when they are able to pursue unhampered and with success the goal they are pursuing, is illusory because all their activities are instinctive activities leading them to their biologically predetermined ends (p. 550). The concept of freedom is applicable only to the realm of actions of human beings, for human beings are the only beings who have self-consciousness. 'To the self-consciousness of man food and sex appear not as caused by the physico-chemical changes in the body, but as ideas inviting relevant modes of action for their realization. The plane of action therefore, at one leap, transcends itself from the merely biological to the essentially teleological' (p. 550). Daya Krishna's reason for affirming the freedom of human beings or persons, therefore, is the teleological character of human actions, and his reason for denying freedom to the animal kingdom is the compulsory pursuit of biologically predetermined ends. Though I agree with the conclusions which Daya Krishna arrives at, in my opinion the argument is weak, for (i) it is to us, the so-called higher animals (I use the word higher not in a valuational sense) that it seems that the so-called lower animals have no purpose, no teleological ends chosen by them but only biologically predetermined ends. It is possible that we are wrong as we do not have the means of knowing, i.e. we do not share their language or their 'form of life' to know about their motives, intentions, etc. Since we cannot speak about this area, should we not, rather than make it a basis of our argument, consign ourselves, following Wittgenstein's advice, to silence? To us—members of the class of human beings—it appears that our actions are free, as to us it seems that we have chosen out of our free will. But to a Superman of Aurobindo, or God of the *Gītā* all our actions may be predetermined, for they

may be the *karmaphalas* of the actions that we may have done either in this life or in our past lives. One need not necessarily believe in the existence of a God or a Superman, or the theory of *karma* to arrive at the conclusion that the actions of human beings are as predetermined as that of the animals. Sociologists and psychologists have conclusively established that the motives, desires and intentions of human beings are determined by their socio-economic and cultural conditions. Freud has shown us that we may be profoundly deceived about how we really feel or why we act as we do. Scientists, particularly genetic engineers, tell us how our nature is completely determined by the genes of our parents.

However, the category of freedom is applicable to human beings alone in the sense in which it is rooted not in the bodily process of human beings but in the very essence of the human mode and practice of life, namely, that human beings are condemned to be free, they cannot be otherwise. The reason for this is two-fold. One, a man is both a body and what Aristotle calls a soul or psyche. Like an inanimate object, the human body is similar to any other natural object in the sense that it too has a determinate nature and is governed by physico-chemical laws; the human psyche—the inner life of moods, passions, feelings, emotions—has its own nature, follows its own rhythm and is largely beyond human control. The moods and passions continually succeed and dissolve into one another and, like bodily processes, are governed by their own laws. But the human being is not merely a body endowed with a psyche. He is a being endowed with a mind capable of subjective self-consciousness, and self-determination. The capacity of self-determination or autonomy implies that an individual freely formulates his purposes, directs his activities, determines the use of his capacities, and forms his own thoughts, beliefs, reasons and feelings. In other words, it means that a man's identity is self-defined in the sense that he freely decides how to structure his own way of life in harmony with his ideals and aspirations rather than conforming to others' expectations of him, or to the role they may have decided for him. Man's centre of gravity or frame of reference lies within and not outside him.³ As a consequence of this 'autonomy' or 'self-

consciousness' or 'self-determination', man is able to create a gap between himself and the world, is able to distance or detach himself from the immediacy of the given, and to decide his response to it. And in choosing his response to the given, man has to make a free choice in the sense that in choosing one way or the other, or in not choosing at all he is not constrained by any factor whatsoever. The fact of subjective self-consciousness makes him aware of himself as an individual entity which is quite distinct from nature and other people. The awareness of being an individual entity different from all other entities combined with the awareness of death, sickness, ageing, etc., gives him a feeling of insignificance and smallness in comparison with the universe, and all others who are not 'he'. This gives him a feeling of aloneness and isolation. In order to overcome the feeling of aloneness and isolation from the world or the universe, he has to choose one value over the other. The freedom to make a choice is both an experience of man's dignity and a moral necessity inherent in the human condition—what Berlin calls 'fundamental human need'. And this fundamental human need 'is due to (man's) own *active* character or *practical* nature. A *critique* (the principles of critical intelligibility) of freedom show(s) among other things:

- (a) Scepticism regarding freedom is an abstract theoretical conclusion which has little or nothing to do with life; and
- (b) It has no firm foundation or root to sustain its non-ambiguous or non-anomalous character.⁴

My second reason for ascribing freedom to man alone is phylogenetic. Phylogenetically, the history of man is characterized as a process of growing individuation and growing freedom. The lower an animal is in the scale of evolution, the greater is its adaptation to nature, and most of its activities are controlled by instinctive and reflex action mechanisms. "Instinct . . . is a diminishing if not a disappearing category in higher animal forms, especially in the human".⁵ Man emerges from the pre-human stage by the first step in the direction of becoming free from coercive instincts. Man at the time of his birth, is the most helpless of all animals. His adaptation to nature is based

essentially on the process of learning and not on instinctual determination.

My third reason for ascribing freedom to man alone lies in his uniqueness in being capable of 'being free with the others', i.e. he alone is capable of co-operating with them, participating in the conduct of their common affairs, and arriving at, and abiding by, collective decisions. No other being in the universe is capable of all these activities.⁶

Finally, man alone can be said to be free for the reason towards which Daya Krishna draws our attention in another context, namely, that 'man is the only being who can choose not to be. Therein lies his greatest freedom—the freedom from ends, from Life, from conscious Being. He is the only animal who can commit suicide—a self-conscious annihilation of itself' (p. 553).

II

Daya Krishna makes a distinction between the epistemological and the metaphysical aspects of freedom. The former he calls 'feeling of freedom' and the latter 'freedom'. The feeling of freedom in man, according to him, 'depends on the successful satisfaction of the socially induced needs (the need for love, domination, prestige, power, social approval, etc.), which if not satisfied, would result in a feeling of intense frustration and unfreedom' (p. 551). It 'does not depend on the fact whether the ends are posited by you, or for you, but only whether it has been *accepted* by you, the question of its positing is irrelevant' (p. 554). It is not total or absolute but it varies according to the change in the nature of the problem that occupies the specious present of the individual consciousness. It 'is independent of the specific nature of the problem with which the human mind happens to be concerned at the moment. It depends rather more on the success or failure in the solution of the problem' (p. 552). The reason for this indifference of the feeling of freedom to the specific nature of the problem to which a human being at any given moment addresses himself, as given by Daya Krishna, is that 'the consciousness of man . . . (is) confined to the specious present (and being so) it feels free or unfree with regard to the problem

that occupies it, at the moment, irrelevant of the past or future, failure or success' (p. 552). One of the main characteristics of the feeling of freedom on which Daya Krishna lays emphasis again and again is the successful accomplishment of ends. According to him, man 'feels free when he successfully pursues (the goals of eating, excreting, loving, responding, etc. in a particular way) and unfree when he fails to achieve them' (p. 551). And again 'feeling of freedom . . . depend(s) . . . in somewhat deeper sense on one's attitude to ends and to the seeking and realization thereof' (p. 554).

In what follows, I examine the above arguments. At the outset I may state that I do not agree either with the reasons given, or the conclusion arrived at by Daya Krishna. Let us begin with some of the uniquely human capacities, namely, rational understanding, moral judgement and action, aesthetic experience, materially productive labour, co-operation, wonder and curiosity, cheating, exploiting and manipulation of fellow-men, etc. In the pursuance of each of these activities man's consciousness or mind is not just confined to, as Daya Krishna thinks, the specious present, but is involved in the idea of perfection. He imagines an ideal. In thinking of this ideal he does not contemplate on just what is given, but on 'how it has been', 'how it has developed', 'what or how it ought to be', 'what could be done (course of action to be taken) to bring it to the contemplated stage', etc. In deciding each one of these, man's imagination can run riot. There is nothing to limit his imagination, other than coherence and consistency. If man was just concerned with the 'specious given' he could never have discovered or invented. If man, as Daya Krishna thinks, in the ages when there were no motor cars, radios, televisions, printing presses and a thousand other amenities of modern life, had felt not less free (p. 551) than us, he would not have felt the need for inventing all these gadgets. Necessity indeed is the mother of invention. In fact we do feel, contrary to Daya Krishna's belief, that people in the past were less free than us, and that people in the future will be more free than us (cf. pp. 551-52). Each invention that man makes is a step towards liberation from the forces that bind him in that particular context. One would necessarily have to postulate an omniscient, timeless

being, like Śankara's *śākṣi puruṣa* (witnessing self), to whom the relative feeling of freedom in man of one generation over the other, would seem to be 'a cleverer manipulation of means for the satisfaction of bio-socially determined ends' and therefore illusory in character. But in the absence of such a being the growing feeling of freedom from the past to the present generation would have to be real—as real as the world. Whereas the natural scientist's aim is to bring freedom to man from the limitations that nature imposes on him, a social scientist aims, through a study of human society and his imagination, to establish a social system where man would be free from social exploitation. Each of these is possible only if man does not limit himself to the 'specious present' or past but projects himself into the future taking into account not only the narrow confines of what is given but also the wide horizon of the future. And in arriving at a solution of the problem at hand, man is certainly guided by the successes and failures either of himself or of his fellow-beings in the past. The reasons of a belief in Hegelian dialectics in terms of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, to explain the growth of knowledge is too well known for me to go into.

Daya Krishna in thinking that 'feeling of freedom' is dependent 'upon the success or failure of the solution of the problem' and not on the choice of 'ends', in my opinion, puts the cart before the horse. It is to ignore the essentials of human nature. Man distinguishes himself from the plant and animal world in having the unique and most important capacity of 'self-direction'. By 'self-direction' is meant the capacity to choose one's purposes from many and to undertake a set of activities from among the many that are available, or even to invent new ones, capable of realizing them. Man has in him both the capacity for choice and capacity to will. Man can have the feeling of freedom if and only if his activity is directed by his own design and not undertaken at the dictates of another. By direction of one's own design what is meant is that he has chosen from a plethora of alternatives available his own ends and the methods of arriving at those ends. The success or failure in the actual solution or actual results has nothing to do with the feeling of freedom; success may at the most give a sense of euphoria and failure lead to frustration and

depression. Unlike other beings who are constitutionally obliged to behave in specific ways, man has the capacity to 'transcend' what is given and to begin something altogether new. He is capable of intercepting natural and social processes and start new processes of his own. In the actualization of this transcendence over the given, man realizes the 'feeling of freedom'. In fact Daya Krishna too seems to hold the same position when he unguardedly says that 'the positing of the ends gives us a feeling of freedom', and adds to it a weaker thesis that 'the realization of an accepted end also gives us the same feeling' (p. 554). But if we have chosen to accept the ends and the method of their achievement then we would necessarily have a feeling of freedom because the feeling of freedom lies in making a choice. Not to choose is also a choice. For example, a man who is content to follow normally, uncritically and unadventurously, the established customs and conventions of a society, would also have a 'feeling of freedom.'

The feeling of freedom or unfreedom has nothing to do with the success or failure of the achievement of ends, as Daya Krishna thinks, but is dependent upon the availability of alternatives for the accomplishment of the ends chosen. It does not depend solely on the capacity for choice of the available method of execution, which animals too possess and exercise, but in the capacity to 'transcend' the given methods and invent new ones. The feeling of freedom depends upon the capacity to overcome obstacles in the execution of individual choice. The obstacles to the execution of individual choice can be both natural and human. These obstacles may be placed by others, or may arise out of the lack of means needed to execute the choice, or out of an 'internal' or psychological incapacity or inhibition. For example, I may wish to fly to America like a bird but cannot; or I may wish to travel by plane but cannot because I am held prisoner, or hostage, or lack money to buy the ticket, or have a morbid fear of falling out of the plane. To overcome each of these obstacles natural and/or human to accomplish the chosen ends, in this case going to America, I will have the feeling of freedom, not when I have reached America but when I am able to overcome the obstacles placed in the way of accomplishment of my aim,

when I am able to earn my passage, when through some innovative method like psychoanalysis I am able to get over the morbid fear of falling out of the plane, am able to get out of the prison, etc. The history of science is replete with examples of scientists who to begin with, propounded then seemingly impossible theories, failed to establish them in their lifetime, but were in later generations proved to be right. Much of the progress in science owes itself to men who were able to transcend the given—both in terms of making a choice and in terms of the method of accomplishment of their chosen ends. So, both in making a choice and in its execution the feeling of freedom does not depend upon success or failure in the accomplishment of ends, but in 'transcendence' of the given. Daya Krishna in another context seems to be saying the same thing: '... it is the *conscious* transcendence that gives us (the) feeling of freedom' (p. 554). However, it is not clear how he reconciles this position with the 'success and failure of the achievements of end' theory of feeling freedom.

Finally, according to Daya Krishna, the reason why most of us always have the feeling of freedom is that 'the self-conscious choice is always made within a perspective and as the perspective forming the framework is generally accepted, all persons feel free most of the time' (p. 566). By the perspective forming framework which is generally accepted he means 'the bio-socially determined ends within the framework of cultural patterns one happens to have been born in. . . ' (p. 552). If Daya Krishna is right, then men could never transcend their 'bio-socially determined ends'. But the history of man, to which I have already made a reference in the preceding paragraph, is full of examples of men who have made choices transcending their given framework. In fact, a genius by definition is one who transcends the given framework. Copernicus, Freud, Wittgenstein, Mahatma Gandhi, Marx, Kropotkin and Raja Ram Mohun Roy are but a few of those who have brought about a significant change in the theories of understanding nature and the world, by propounding theories and methods which were radically different from the perspective forming framework and the socio-cultural pattern prevalent in their times. The feeling of freedom that each one of

us experiences most of the time is not because of the general acceptance of the perspective forming framework, as Daya Krishna thinks, but because it is natural for us to have this feeling since our faces are set towards results and not towards causes, and the cause of present action always eludes us. The feeling of freedom in us, therefore, owes its existence to the natural propensity in men to look forward and not backwards.

III

In the history of philosophical and social thought, though 'freedom' has been used in its bio-social, thought, person, and will aspects, and is applied in the context of the moral, spiritual, social, political and economic aspects of human existence, there is disagreement with regard to its usage in social, political and philosophical arguments. Naturalists like Hume, Mill and Russell believe 'freedom' can be defined as the absence of constraint; Descartes and Kant define it as the *ability to initiate* some thought or action, behavioural or internal; Leibnitz conceives of 'freedom' as the inexplicable spontaneity of body and mind; Spinoza, Marx and Einstein define it as the *recognition of an all-pervading nomic necessity*.

Any analysis of the concept of freedom should explicitly or implicitly contain or at least give a definition of freedom. Freedom in the abstract is a class comprising many species—freedom of thought and speech, freedom of movement, freedom in the use of, and disposal of, one's property, freedom in the choice of one's employees or occupation, etc., on the one hand and freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom from economic insecurity, etc., on the other. The definition of freedom should, ideally, be such that it can accommodate both the negative, i.e. 'freedom from', and the positive, i.e. 'freedom to', aspects of freedom. Daya Krishna, apart from saying that 'Consciousness is the focal region in which the problem of freedom arises and to which it is applied' (p. 554); 'freedom . . . does not lie in the acceptance or rejection of this or that, but in the very fact of self-conscious choice of either' (p. 556), and that 'freedom . . . is only within a framework—a framework that is mostly accepted by the

individual even though in itself it may be no more necessary than anything' (p. 551), about the nature of freedom, neither gives any definition of freedom, nor the aspects of human life to which the concept of 'freedom' is applicable. In the absence of such a positive conception, one could easily say that Daya Krishna's analysis of the concept of freedom is formal. It does not give us the conditions of 'self-conscious choice', and does not tell us, from given alternative frameworks, which one should be chosen and why. Finally, if the framework within which human freedom operates is accepted, how would Daya Krishna account for the transcendence of the framework. On his view, revolutions would become an impossibility. The very fact that the history of mankind is full of revolutions/revolutionary ideas proves that Daya Krishna cannot but be wrong.

NOTES

1. Erich Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom*, Ark Paperbacks, London, 1984, pp. 3-4.
2. 'An Attempted Analysis of the Concept of Freedom', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, USA, June 1952, pp. 550-56.
3. Cf. H. Marcuse, *Studies in Critical Philosophy*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1973, p. 223.
4. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, 'Unity of the Physical World and Human Freedom', *JICPR*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1986, p. 139.
5. L. Bernard, *Instinct*, Holt and Co., New York, 1924, p. 509.
6. Cf. H. Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, Sphere Books, London, 1969, p. 21f.

Transcendental vs. Empirical Freedom: Some Reflections on Daya Krishna

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The striving of man towards knowledge and the quest for values as well as the interplay between the two are seen by Daya Krishna as the secret striving of man for freedom. Freedom is conceived by him as an attempt to create newer horizons of what is valuational and sublime and what is joyous and blissful, and that which can be felt, experienced, beholden and cherished till posterity.

Daya Krishna describes freedom not only as the source of all that is good and beautiful but also as that which constitutes the web of human relationships. He very aptly attributes supreme meaningfulness and significance to this essential concept; yet at the same time he apprehends that the most agonizing and tragic despair of man also is located in the essential core of freedom. This he calls the paradox of freedom which unfolds itself in intricate dialectical patterns symbolizing the essential cultural nuances of a form of society. Through this analysis of freedom Daya Krishna describes the dilemma of man which is an indelible and inalienably intrinsic aspect of the human situation.

Daya Krishna has conceptualized on the diverse forms in terms of which freedom can be visualized. He has also deliberated at length on the limit and the extent to which freedom can be realized. He begins his enterprise by raising the basic question which lies at the heart of an understanding and interpretation of freedom: is freedom endemic to the structure of man's essential

being and consciousness? If man is an integral part of nature, does nature itself endow man with this rare attribute or characteristic? Or, if man is visualized as a divine being, sharing in the characteristics of the Supreme Entity, can we meaningfully speak of a transcendental state of man's consciousness? Further, does man transcend the limits of his spatio-temporal existence, thereby rising to the heights of what may be called transcendental freedom?

In yet another formulation, the question of freedom has been seen in the perspective of man's empirical social existence. It is in this context that Daya Krishna speaks of empirical freedom. In this context we may examine whether there is any antithetical relation between the transcendental and empirical dimensions of freedom and whether there will be a conflict between transcendental freedom and empirical freedom.

This question of substantive characteristics has been taken up by Daya Krishna in his 'An Attempted Analysis of the Concept of Freedom', where he designates the state of conscious feeling as a factual correlate of the concept of freedom.¹ This feeling of freedom constitutes the heart of the concept of freedom. Human beings have the unique distinction of possessing self-consciousness in contradistinction to the animal world which remains within the narrow framework of instinctive pursuits.

The question that arises here is, do animals have the feeling of freedom? In what sense can freedom be attributed to the insect world? Can animal activity be described as free specially when the ends of such activity are pre-determined and in no way are chosen by them?

In this context, however, it may be mentioned that even human beings are born into a particular form of life which has both a biological and a valuational pattern. The consciousness of freedom in the biological domain is achieved as the result of a successful seeking of a biological pre-determined end. Man being self-conscious, knows what he is seeking even at the biological level and therefore the achievement of self-consciousness in man raises the problem of freedom to a new level as the awareness itself may act as an ideational inducement for achievement. Therefore, this action in one leap transforms man from the bio-

logical to the teleological level, where memory and imagination—the two aspects of free ideation—help to give a concrete content to man's activity of goal-seeking. The goals and ends that man seeks to realize are chosen from amongst the above. The problem of freedom, therefore, transforms itself into a problem of ends. The crucial criterion, however, in this case would be whether the ends that are being pursued have really been chosen or have just been accepted.

Daya Krishna has also spoken about man being born not only into this world but into a world that is always socially structured and to a large extent socially interpreted. One is born not just as a person but as a person with a particular body which finds its way into a particular family. This presupposes a specific culture at a unique period of its historical development and a society which already has a formal determinate system of role expectations with a co-ordinate system of rewards and punishments. Each individual encounters these and has to come to terms with them and transcend them in his own way. This coming to terms never ceases, nor is it transcended. Between these two movements lies the internal dialectic of man's feelings of freedom at all levels and in all dimensions.

In such a structurally determined situation the feeling of freedom is to be seen in the context of the existence of society with its intricate inter-personal relations giving rise to new needs. This feeling of freedom in man also depends upon the fulfilment of socially induced needs, which if not fulfilled, result in an intense feeling of unfreedom. In such a social pattern, the biological needs can be accorded primacy from the fulfilment point of view. However, both are determined by society in which man happens to be born.

Daya Krishna has also spoken of freedom in the context of the consciousness of man, which according to him is not only ego-centric but also point-centric, i.e. restricted to the specious present.² This implies feeling free or unfree with regard to the problem that occupies the moment irrespective of past and future.

The above two perspectives do not divide the realm of man's experience of life nor do they exclude each other. Daya Krishna

has argued convincingly that both are complementary to each other. He has also made a distinction between subjective feeling of freedom and freedom as objectively defined and spelt out by the objective observer. In the above two paradigm cases there is likely to be a difference in the ways of interpretation about the relation of ends: whether these are socially induced ends or valuational ends chosen by the agent himself. The range of feeling of freedom in the conscious life of man is dependent mostly on success or failure in the attainment of these ends. This may, therefore, be considered to be an area which has a dubious status.

Daya Krishna has also spoken about 'bracketing of ends' with regard to a particular group of ends or with regard to the whole notion of ends. This is a necessary implication of the postulate of self-consciousness. It is due to the bracketing of ends that one becomes a revolutionary and in other cases one may question the very foundations of biological life itself. These shattering questions may even bring man face to face with his innermost being and may enable him to encounter his ultimate freedom by questioning the foundations of life itself. He may exercise his freedom to negate his whole being and annihilate the same if possible. Therein lies the greatest freedom of man, the freedom from ends, from his life, from his conscious being and self.

Daya Krishna has argued that choice is the ultimate foundation of freedom in man. Therefore, in death the question of freedom or unfreedom does not arise. If death is seen as an external or internal necessity man can only submit to it. However, it is only when death is seen as joyous, as self-conscious annihilation of one's *Dasein* that it appears as Foundational freedom.

According to Daya Krishna, the feeling of freedom does not depend on whether the ends are posited by you or for you but on whether these have been accepted by you. Secondly, the feeling of freedom is dependent on its successful or unsuccessful realization. Additionally, the feeling of freedom, Daya Krishna maintains, depends not merely on one's whole attitudes to ends but to the actual seeking and realization of the ends. It is in this context that positing of the end may be seen to have a transcendent dimension for spelling out a feeling of freedom. Here we transcend the notion of ends in order to transcend the limits of free-

dom. This transcendence enables us to go beyond the inherent duality involved in all values. Daya Krishna has also discussed the spiritualist insight wherein it is not seeking but our attitude of seeking that is important. The ideal of non-attachment to the fruits of action or ends in the *Bhagavad Gita* is an important articulation of this significant insight.

Another formulation which has been quoted by Daya Krishna is from Buddha, that it is craving that is the root of *bondage*. In fact the whole Indian tradition would subscribe to the ideal of this notion of freedom which is realized after the attainment of the conscious transcendence of all values, described in religious literature as 'liberation within life'. It may be observed here that it is *conscious* transcendence that gives the feeling of freedom and not just the fact of transcendence itself.

However, transcendence is not a transcendence of value in the field of action. Action oriented towards values cannot, on the other hand, give the basic foundational freedom which comes from detachment. However, it must be rooted in the transcendental centrality and self-sufficiency of the self.

Daya Krishna has examined the concept of good life in the context of obligation to others. But he points out that besides obligation to others, there are obligations to one's own self and to values that have little directly to do either with one's own self or with other people. The good life is a pursuit of all these together and not of one at the expense of the others. Consequently, there may be conflicts between different obligations and it may be difficult to decide in any particular case as to the priority between them.

The ultimate obligation is perhaps only to one's own self. Man may, however, primarily and predominantly fulfil obligations other than those arising from one's own self. But life that seeks the realization of goodness is not an eternal life, nor can the man have the same capacities and needs. Therefore, neither individually nor collectively can he ever achieve all the goals that he sets for himself. Whatever ideas he may choose, the functional imperatives of individual and social systems will make compromise inevitable. The scarcity of time, the conflicting claims of different values, the mutually conducive relations between the individual

and society, all provide the perspective in which the problem of freedom and good life must be considered.³

The function of consciousness consists in the envisagement of ends and freedom would consist in our capacity for their realization. Hegel would maintain that freedom does not consist in the general form of willing but rather in the content of what is willed. According to Hegel, the perpetually recurring misapprehension of freedom consists in regarding it only in its formal, subjective sense abstracted from its essential objects and aims. Rather, freedom should consist in having the "essential itself" as the object of its existence. This essential being for him is the union of the subjective with the rational will.

Here man is an object of existence in himself only by virtue of the Divine that is in him—that which is designated as the Reason and which in view of its activity and power of self-determination is called freedom.

Daya Krishna is critical of the content of willing factors as the defining characteristic of freedom. He categorically says that freedom does not lie in the acceptance or rejection of this or that but in the self-conscious choice of either. He concedes, though, that this self-conscious choice is made within a perspective and the perspective-forming framework is generally accepted by persons on account of congenial circumstances external to consciousness itself. Thus, the effectivity of consciousness is dialectically related to external factors. It is understanding, articulation and interpretation of this relationship in the context of value-seeking and pursuit of freedom that is susceptible to any fears of being inappropriate. The possibility of questioning not only this or that perspective but the whole notion of perspective is open to man who is confronted with 'to be' or 'not to be' as he faces his ultimate freedom.

However, this situation generates the possibility of conflict at the empirical level as formulations of freedom in terms of man's self-conscious choices can range over a vast area covering his whole life.

Elsewhere Daya Krishna has worked out the concept of freedom as detachment but it is akin to his notion of transcendental freedom. It is derived from the notion of the point-centric, ego-

centric and formless character of consciousness which gives it a detachment from its past, from other persons and from other objects in general. This detachment is there as a possibility that can be actualized any moment by a turning away from the world of objects to the transcendental formless centrality of the self. The freedom from bondage to the passing moment is given eternally to man in his capacity for self-consciousness which can be actualized any time.

Daya Krishna expresses deep anguish at the fact that the West speaks of detachment not as serenity or calm but as a schizophrenic split and as such sees it not only as freedom but also as alienation. Why does the West consider detachment as alienation and freedom as burden? Perhaps detachment, according to Daya Krishna, was felt as the rootlessness of will which after transcendence could rest neither in values nor in objectivity.

However, Daya Krishna is quite vociferous in his plea to accept detachment as a positive value as it is held in the Indian tradition. He holds that India has had a serious engagement with detachment, with consequences described as quiet, calm, serene and joyous. In fact it is in this context that freedom has been defined as liberation from bondage into which one has fallen on account of structural initial conditions. Active will is a movement towards ends and its ultimate end is only the widening and deepening of consciousness. The will, as and when it withdraws, withdraws only into a silent self. Thereafter, withdrawal into will should be undertaken to seek intensive widening and deepening of consciousness; otherwise it would result in bondage rather than freedom. The purification of the will in action is achieved through its commitment to values and foundational freedom in action is achieved by the basic detachment through withdrawal into transcendent self.

Daya Krishna also makes a pertinent distinction between two types of freedom. There is the freedom that comes from effective achievement of ends and there is the freedom that comes from the effective exercise of one's capacities. Each may give freedom of its own type, yet each may still result in a bondage of a deeper and softer sort. This, therefore, may raise problems as it may become difficult to discern freedom from unfreedom.

Daya Krishna has described society as a collective orientation of man to nature and a collective orientation of man to values. In fact, he looks at the history of man in this perspective, the end of which is seen as the presentation and enhancement of the freedom of the individual. The diverse perspectives in history may be seen as the different facets of the history of this freedom.

Daya Krishna describes the theory of social change itself as a theory of the inter-relationships between individuals and the diverse forms of historical evolution. The challenge before each society, according to him, is how to optimize the realization of freedom to the largest possible extent for all its members individually and collectively.⁴

If we explore the implications of transformations of societies then we can surely attribute historical causality to values that we seek to realize. This awareness may not be the only factor of historical causation but among others it may be considered as one of the strongest and most forceful factors.

Daya Krishna has further drawn a meaningful distinction between our knowledge of nature and its impact on the processes of nature on the one hand, and the knowledge of man and society and its impact on social action and social change on the other. He seems to think that the way we conceive nature does not affect in any significant way the natural processes themselves. On the other hand, cognition pertaining to man and society is dominated by valuational dimensions, and the cognitive factors become the base for conative forces for effectivity of consciousness, thereby resulting in social action and social change.

The moment we concede the primacy of the valuational domain it becomes obvious that the realm of values and the realm of choice of values gets a predominant place in the explanation of history, society and social change. The realm of choice *ipso facto* implies an emphasis on the effectivity of consciousness. For, consciousness is the focal region in which alone the consideration pertaining to the concept of freedom can be entertained. Freedom cannot be spoken of in the context of realms where consciousness does not exist or is not supposed to exist.

Daya Krishna observes with great perception that freedom, though defined in its deepest sense with respect to individuals

vis-à-vis other individuals, has seldom been seen in respect of the relationships which societies bear to each other. In his opinion even Gandhi and Lenin have failed to see this relationship.

Referring to the knowledge of the causal-functional type, Daya Krishna maintains that it gives freedom at one level but in doing so it creates bondage at another level. He also makes reference to subtly differentiated growth in the apprehension of values which gives freedom in one direction, but on account of the conflicting nature of the values themselves and the incompatible nature of the empirical means necessary for their diverse realization, bondages of another kind emerge.

There is yet another, a third level of seeking where freedom seeks to realize itself absolutely as a value, transcending all other values and seeking deliverance from all possible bondages—natural or trans-natural. This is what Daya Krishna means by *mokṣa* in the Indian context, i.e., final liberation from all bondage whatsoever. However, this kind of freedom is considered by Daya Krishna as too trans-social to be taken into account by any theory of society or social change except as an ideal which is implicitly immanent in all other seekings of man as an individual. Therefore, freedom may be seen not only as the ultimately distinctive source of all problems and changes in human individuals and societies, but also as an *ultimate* goal of all human endeavour, whether individual or social.

Daya Krishna visualizes a continuous dialectic between freedom and bondage in the realm of the phenomenal. The actualization of knowledge for the pursuit of realization of value is the eternal domain of human endeavour. The dialectic, so conceptualized, indicates the polarities of ideals implicitly inherent in the concept of society. The dialectic operates at two levels: one, in the relation of man to nature, and the other in the relation of man to values. Daya Krishna conceives man's quest for freedom predominantly in terms of either of them. He sees society in a pre-eminent sense as man's relation to man in terms of both. As such, he visualizes man's endeavour as a collective orientation of man to nature and to values. History, he maintains, may be seen, interpreted, assessed and judged in terms of either of these gropings towards the exploration and realization of values.⁵

For Daya Krishna, this dialectic of freedom constraints includes existence of other free beings and operates more fundamentally between the individual and the society. He has drawn a distinction between the two kinds of emphasis which give rise to consequential forms of society. If the emphasis is on society as a last term of one's thought and as the ultimate bearer of value, then the emerging concept of the ideal of society, according to him, is bound to be a socialistic one. On the other hand, if the emphasis and the focus ultimately is on the individual, however feeble he may seem in comparison to the massive and enduring being of society, the emerging concept and ideal to a great extent will correspond to a liberal-democratic set-up. Here the end is seen as the preservation and enhancement of the freedom of the individual and the history of man will be the history of this freedom at all layers and all levels.

For Daya Krishna freedom is a highly subtle and multi-faceted experience. Therefore, problems of man and society generate differentiated awareness of the various kinds of freedom. Correspondingly, therefore, an attempt will have to be made to devise diverse criteria for their identification as, for Daya Krishna, the whole question of social change can be seen as moving towards or away from a particular kind of freedom, or the increase or decrease of the same type of freedom, or actualization of one type of freedom at the expense of other.

Therefore, the whole theory of social change in this perspective will have to explore inter-relationships between different kinds of freedom and assess their formulations against the cultural richness of the socio-historic context to which they belong. The challenging ideal for all societies is, therefore, to acquire optimum freedom of all types in the largest possible measure and to harness all opportunities that society has at its command both individually and collectively.⁶

The realm of human action cannot even be defined without reference to the values sought or embodied therein. Therefore, the considerations concerning the existence of phenomena are relevant. Nevertheless, in Daya Krishna's vision, the enmeshed inter-twining of the seeking for existence and the seeking for values is so complex in all the areas of human activity that it

becomes difficult to disentangle them. He maintains that in conceptualizing the essence of freedom, the supreme example of the assertion of freedom arising basically from aggression and aggrandizement cannot be ignored. Further, since society has to be seen more or less as an integrated inter-relationship of organized groups, an attempt to maintain a working, harmonious relationship is, and has to be, as continuous and consistent as those between individuals and societies.⁷ Then, and then alone, the freedom of one as against the freedom of another, the claim of freedom itself as against that of a legitimate constraint and the interplay and survival of values can be viewed in a proper perspective. And it is in this perspective that the problems of society and those of social change must be viewed.⁸

Daya Krishna speaks of finitude and the consequent limitation of human possibilities in terms of capacities. However, on the other hand, the ideal of transcendental freedom postulates the notion of an infinite essence which goes far beyond the horizon of finitude and merges into the domain of transcendence. Is this not a dichotomous position taken by Daya Krishna? Is it, therefore, not a schizophrenic perception of a unitary individual who is seen as a segmented being?

Daya Krishna speaks of multiplicity of persons and plurality of freedoms at the empirical level. However, what about the conflict between the various kinds of empirical freedoms? And what kind of inter-relationships would exist between these freedoms? Daya Krishna has not stated this explicitly anywhere.

Daya Krishna conceives the possibility of freedom being realized only through annihilation of the freedom of others in the context of the western tradition. However, freedom in its foundations is in-annihilable. The faustian dream for absolute freedom is thus impossible, for, the possibility of infinite freedom would arise only if conflict does not occur at any stage of its realization. Daya Krishna may perhaps like to elaborate this position a little more explicitly.

Additionally, the possibility of absolute freedom can occur only if there is only one centre of freedom. In the case of plurality and multiplicity of centres of freedom the possibility of absolute freedom would arise only if the existence of other centres of

freedom is denied. But that would be a postulational and ontological impossibility.

Lastly, Daya Krishna has spoken of transcendental freedom as an ideal which goes beyond the empirical domain. However, a question which arises in this context is whether it is a unitary or a plural realm. This notion has been upheld by most of the world religions like Islam, Christianity, Taoism, etc. But Daya Krishna has not specified what relationship would obtain between them, especially when each religion would uphold the ideal of transcendence as a unitary realm.

NOTES

1. Daya Krishna, 'An Attempted Analysis of the Concept of Freedom', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, June 1952.
2. Daya Krishna, 'The Invariants of the Human Situation: Valuations and Limitations', in Daya Krishna, *The Art of the Conceptual*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1989, p. 208.
3. Daya Krishna, 'An Attempted Analysis of the Concept of Freedom'.
4. Daya Krishna, *Considerations towards a Theory of Social Change*, Manaktalas, Bombay, 1965, p. 175.
5. Daya Krishna, 'Reality and Value', in Daya Krishna, *The Nature of Philosophy*, Prachi Prakashan, Calcutta, 1955, pp. 105-6.
6. Daya Krishna, *Considerations towards a Theory of Social Change*, p. 190.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
8. Daya Krishna, 'Perspectives of Freedom', in *Social Philosophy Past and Future*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1989, p. 37.

Reflections on Daya Krishna's Concept of Action

D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA

Among the varied philosophical, literary and artistic pursuits which have nourished the natural talent of man, one which deserves to be pursued with the greatest zeal pertains to the extraordinary purity, elegance and excellence of human life. All good arts have the power and the property to draw the mind of man away from vice and direct it to the plentiful pleasures of the mind that one seeks through the contemplation of the highest good. But the art of pursuit of excellence is perhaps the best of all the arts and most worthy of being pursued by a free man who having awakened to that which is best seeks to approximate perfection through actions.

Man seeks to be godlike through the exercise of excellence in action, but without the necessary knowledge and understanding of the structure of human situation in its varied forms at the vertical and the horizontal levels, this dream of godlike perfection may end up in a mere chimera.

Daya Krishna has deliberated at length on the structure of human situation in its varied forms in the vertical and horizontal directions. He has endeavoured to philosophize on the relationships that exist between human action on the one hand and the domain of values on the other.¹

Actions, Daya Krishna maintains, imply a direct reference to the effectivity of consciousness, for actions and concepts, accord-

ing to him, are not causally unrelated. All concepts necessarily are embedded in the structure of consciousness.

Man is predominantly self-conscious. It is perhaps this trait of self-consciousness which demarcates the human kind from the animal kingdom. It is given only to humans to have a constant encounter with fear and hope. Bound thus by the horizons of birth and death, lingeringly aware of celestial bounties beyond the plentiful pleasures and pains of this world, in intimate relationship with persons who have given the greatest moments of joy and sorrow, lured by the desire to know and the impulse to create, man finds himself enmeshed in the web of time and life. Nevertheless, he seeks to realize values with a view to make life meaningful and significant. Does he feel alien to it all? Or is he just a silent spectator? Or does he feel himself to be a detached being, untouched and unhindered by the whirlpool of life and time?

Daya Krishna admits that we have the awareness of the present as well as of the future. However, the free imagination and ideation set man free from his sense-bound consciousness of the present and allow him access to the knowledge of the eternal chain of causality. This relinquishment provides alternative possibilities for action in the wake of probable consequences and accounts for the possibility of choice between alternative courses of actions, enabling man to feel that in his essential human element he is a centre of freedom capable of exercising choice in his day-to-day acts of willing, intending, behaving and acting. The limitations are imposed on the structure of choice by the specificities of personality traits and socially determined cultural moorings in which an individual finds himself anchored. However, the necessity of choice between alternatives creates the necessity for norms in terms of which one may usually exercise the choice.

Daya Krishna speaks about three different forms of orientation for actions, namely, (1) towards persons, (2) towards things and (3) towards oneself. In each of these orientations Daya Krishna maintains that values are involved. Perhaps the diversity and plurality of values and action-structures can be partially explained by this three-fold orientation of actions.²

Without values, Daya Krishna observes, action framework would fall to the level of animal response even though it may not be dominated by instinct. Actions ungoverned by value-considerations are felt to be insignificant at the human level. It is for this reason that even biological activities like eating, drinking and copulating have been structured in terms of values.

The attempt to achieve meaningfulness at all levels of human actions, according to Daya Krishna, provides the permanent necessity for value standards in all fields of human life—be it the field of feeling or interpersonal relationships or relationship with society.

Daya Krishna admits that no value standards can ever be completely realized; nevertheless, without them there will be no straining towards *something beyond*. The functional necessities of personal and social systems to persist provide the counter pole to value standards. This, however, gives rise to tensions, which ever so often define the essential feature of human life. Therefore, Daya Krishna accepts choice as a necessary presupposition for the possibility of goal-seeking as well as social-interaction at the human level.

Another aspect of action taken up by Daya Krishna is its orientation to time on the one hand and to postulated causal relations on the other. In fact, consciousness of causality creates the consciousness of time; for it is in time that seeking for ends as well as initiation of action takes place.

Daya Krishna visualizes action in the context of time frame as oriented either towards the future or as confined to the present. In the former case, it is primarily instrumental since it is seen as causally linked to the chain of causality which may ultimately conclude in the desired goals. In the latter case, however, action is looked at as having an intrinsic character over and above the instrumental. Daya Krishna conceives every action as having an instrumental and an intrinsic aspect.

He also speaks about the nature of instrumental action in the context of the time barrier that may come in the way of ends being sought to be realized and the probabilistic nature of postulated causal relations. The 'bondage of ends' he recalls as the 'bondage of time', and the 'bondage of time' is the 'bondage of

action'. This perhaps accounts for the contingent dimension of human action. The attitudes to ends, however, would be reflected in attitudes to time. The valuational significance of action will be a function of the individual's attitude to both.

The distinction between the instrumental and intrinsic aspects of action is drawn by Daya Krishna on the basis of predominance of one over the other. Nevertheless, it is vital, for Daya Krishna maintains that in the life of every individual, one's experience of 'significance' is directly realized in the realm of action primarily on account of its intrinsic character and that experience of 'significance' is only indirect in the case of instrumental action.³

The basis for the above distinction calls for a deeper reflection as the whole debate on the purity of means and desirability of ends as well as the justification of one over the other in the contemporary philosophy of social action is closely bound up with this distinction. It would, therefore, be necessary to subject this controversial position to a more thorough scrutiny which we may take up towards the end of this exercise.

In any case, significance of action, Daya Krishna maintains, is realized in and through feeling at the 'immediate intuitive level of experience' in respect of actions having an intrinsic aspect. For instrumental actions, the realization for significance occurs only when the goal has been achieved successfully. The success of goal-realization would, however, be largely contingent on the correctness of our knowledge of causal relations. But at the same time Daya Krishna also maintains that the effectivity of action is determined more by the *de facto* appropriateness of the means adopted rather than by consciously held ideas about them.

This observation is pertinent in the wake of awareness that with the advancement of our scientific knowledge and with the deepening of our understanding with regard to causal relations, our theoretic knowledge is continuously facing the challenge of newer possibilities, newer horizons of relationships which may obtain between cause and effect. This would call for a re-orientation of our instrumental actions with a view to realize the ends that we desire to achieve.

Daya Krishna places the action-value structure in the context

of a socially structured situation. For him seeking of ends is not dependent on the efforts and endeavours of one individual alone; in fact the whole enterprise of ends-seeking is becoming dependent on other persons, groups and nation states. Within the hierarchical structure of institutional set-ups, individual ends are becoming more and more dependent upon the interlocking of their integrating functions. This calls for collective cooperation which spells out the social dimension of human actions. The action no more remains at the level of individual enterprise. The realization of individual and social goals necessitates collective participation of the concerned persons and institutions.

The relationship of ends to be achieved and action to be performed is also bound up with the relationship between motive and action. However, despite a great deal of philosophizing to understand the structure of intentionality and its relevance and relation to human action, Daya Krishna expresses unhappiness over the outcome of this venture. For him this is one domain that remains dubious, tenuous and indeterminate and continues to baffle the human mind on account of its multitudinous explanations.

In the context of the concept of effectivity of consciousness and its relation to human action, Daya Krishna postulates three dimensions of human consciousness. First, that consciousness is point-centric. It is the present that is significant for human consciousness. He calls it the 'specious present' in which past and future are reduced merely to moments of theoretic awareness.

Second, consciousness is self-related, i.e. it refers to self alone and is derived from self. If this condition is to be described as what may be called the 'ego-centric' predicament, then Daya Krishna describes this as the inalienable condition of all consciousness which may account for the foundational structural limitations of consciousness within which alone the concepts of significance and value can be entertained.

Third, Daya Krishna describes consciousness as formless, deriving its shape and colour from the object, the image or the idea which it conceives at a particular moment of time. In this context, he speaks about the importance of the mind's unique capacity to concentrate, and whatever it concentrates upon

becomes 'supremely real' for it. This psychical reality of an idea, or a quality of an action lends it the meaningfulness in terms of which alone its value may be realized.

Paradoxically, while the above characteristics of consciousness, i.e. point-centric, ego-centric and formlessness of consciousness, make it the slave of every passing fancy, impulse, image, idea or object, at the same time it paves the way for seeking detachment from the past, other persons and from all objects in general.

This detachment is realized by turning away from the world of objects and persons to the transcendental, formless centrality of the self. In this sense, detachment may be seen as a freedom par excellence which releases man from the bondage of momentary pleasures and passing fancies and makes him transcendently self-conscious to enable him to partake in the eternal joy and blissfulness of a liberated consciousness, which in the Indian context has been hailed as the ideal of liberation or *mokṣa*.⁴

The dilemma of the human situation, according to Daya Krishna, is that the same detachment which is celebrated as the ideal of freedom in the Indian context is seen as a condition of bondage and unfreedom in the western context. In fact, it is described as a state of alienation implying a state of fragmentation, estrangement, dehumanization, debasement, etc. In existentialist literature, the condition is described as one not of joy but of nausea, absurdity and dread; not of calm or serenity but a schizophrenic split.

Obviously, Daya Krishna regrets that the encounter of the West with detachment has not been a happy one as it looks at detachment as a state of fallenness. This is so, according to him, because perhaps the West has not known the secrets of contemplation, whereas the East in general and India in particular has a long acquaintance with detachment with results described as quiet, serene, joyous and blissful. It has been described as transcendental freedom in contradistinction to empirical freedom which is experienced within the socio-empirical framework of human life.

Daya Krishna thus maintains that the foundational freedom in action is achieved by the basic detachment—a detachment which is achieved through a withdrawal into the transcendent self. This

then is the ideal of *sthītaprajña*—one who is the man of God and is rooted in his own self. He is respected for what he *does*, not for what he *is*. The Indian wisdom assigns the highest respect to a man who has attained the status of *sthītaprajña*.⁵

The above position necessitates a retrospective reflection on how the Indian tradition has responded to the issues raised in the foregoing account. What is this ideal *sthītaprajña* in the context of our tradition? Is action entertained in our classical texts as necessary for the attainment of what Daya Krishna calls transcendental freedom? What place has been given to consciousness in our tradition? What place has been offered to *samskāras*? Do these provide a basis for going beyond the *gunās*? Is the position maintained in the *Gīta* morally sound?

Daya Krishna answers some of these questions in another work of his, 'Reflection on Action' in his *Social Philosophy: Past and Future*. He maintains that there are two major directions of human seeking in the context of the theory of action and pursuit of ends. One is what may be called 'socio-centric' and the other 'ātman-centric'. These two perspectives are basically two ways of conceiving the nature of man and society.⁶ Actions can be rationalized if they shape the society in that image with the necessary infrastructure of belief—attitudes—intention—consequence, etc.

The two perspectives give rise to two fundamental predicaments. Nevertheless, a choice has to be made between the two. Daya Krishna calls this act of choosing from amongst the two a valuational act. The former perspective views the human individual as a social being and seeks justification for each of his actions in terms of social consequences. Man's humanity is thus seen as derived from his sociality and it is argued that it is only the process of socialization that really humanizes him, the individual in himself is only ephemeral. What endures in him is the impact of society. Here man is seen as burdened with the absolute responsibility for all that may happen to society. The individual is totally divested of any trappings of transcendental faith.

In the 'ātman-centric' perspective, however, man is conceived as an 'a-social', or rather a 'trans-social' being, and therefore a transcendent being. This sociality is only ephemeral and it does

not define his essential being. He is basically conceived as a son of God or as God himself.

A direct consequence of this formulation is that the whole realm of moral consciousness and moral action which was seen in terms of the obligation to others is now seen in the context of a higher and deeper obligation to one's own self. Society, if at all, is viewed as a facilitating instrument for the pursuit of man's 'a-social' or 'trans-social' ends, or as an obstruction to the realization of one's transcendence from an essentially 'other-centred' or 'socio-centric' consciousness. Perhaps this spiritual urge is articulated in the classical saying, 'For the sake of the transcendent self, one should give up the whole world.' '*Ātmārthe prithvīm tyajet.*'

Therefore, in the socio-centric perspective action becomes externally-oriented action involving one in causality, time, society and history. One has to feel obligated to others and to the future even if there is a feeling of helplessness in the face of the immensity of time and the multitudinous 'otherness' of others.

In the *ātman*-centric perspective the search for transcendental freedom or *mokṣa* takes one away from all these and one may see externally-oriented action as one's main enemy, for it is seen both as a consequence and a cause of one's bondage to the temporal and causal chain which binds one to the wheel of birth and death which eternally rolls on. In this perspective it is maintained that History and Time cannot be overcome through action. Freedom in the sense of liberation from bondage also cannot be attained through actions which are inspired by the socio-centric valuational domain.

It is clear, therefore, that in the Indian tradition reflection on action basically revolves around the way we conceive consciousness to be. It is conceived as calm and stilled, something mirror-like which just is and is aware of itself in joy and happiness and bliss. The above debate around action is also dependent on concepts like *karma* and *jñāna*, which literally mean 'action' and 'knowledge', but Daya Krishna finds this rendering highly misleading in many respects.⁷

In any case, *karma* in the sense of ritual action is enjoined in the Vedas. The orthodox Brāhmanas upheld their primacy and

the Mīmāṃsakas argued for them at the philosophical level. *Jñāna*, on the other hand, meant not all knowledge but knowledge about 'self'. The debate was usually carried on in the context of *mokṣa* or absolute release from the possibility of all suffering. The Bhakti interpretation reasserted the traditional ritualistic notion of *karma* in a new way.

It was only in the *Gītā* that the meaning of *karma* was enlarged so as to include almost all action. Therefore, except for the brief interlude of the *Gītā*, the notion of action as ritual dominated Hindu thought. This is so because ritualization of action makes one escape from the unending dependence and involvement in the universe. The ritual itself may be conceived as an individual or a collective affair, though both devotion and meditation are ultimately individual in nature and are to be pursued by the individual in his aloneness where there is no other or the other just happens to be the Lord only.

Hindu thought has also been aware of how action is initiated in the causal chain which stretches indefinitely; weaving the web in which the individual is caught in history, causality, time and society. In fact notions of rebirth, *karma* and caste embody this conception of man and his actions.

This spells out for man the state of bondage arising out of ignorance. Daya Krishna maintains that if man pursues what he has called the 'active values' in contrast to the 'contemplative values' he may inevitably come to conceive himself essentially in terms of temporality, sociality and history.

Daya Krishna examines the relationship of *tṛṣṇā*, desire and suffering in Hindu thought. In this context, *tṛṣṇā* or desire are seen as the root of all suffering and also as the root of all action. Therefore, action and suffering are inevitably interlinked as suffering is only seen as the consequence of action on account of *tṛṣṇā* or desire.

Daya Krishna applauds the contribution made by the *Gītā* in breaking this impasse created by the inevitable linkage between desire, action and suffering. It conceived of an action which is not rooted in desire and which therefore would not lead to suffering.

However, Daya Krishna maintains that the position held by the *Gītā* can be appreciated only if we take into account the great

debate which engaged the Indian mind for centuries regarding the nature of actions. The first round of debate was between the votaries of ritualistic action called *yajña* or sacrifice and those who under the impact of *śramaṇa* criticism were trying to give a more symbolic interpretation to the concept of sacrifice. The Upanisads are the classic expression of this stage of the debate concerning action.

However, this met with the *śramaṇa* critique which found its focal expression in Buddhism and Jainism. The former propounded the doctrine of desire as the root of action and suffering, the latter treated *karma* as a subtle material envelope which one weaves out of one's actions and which binds one in its meshes. At this stage the *Gītā* argued for the possibility of a type of action whose roots do not lie in desire and which therefore could not lead to suffering.

According to Daya Krishna, the argument of the *Gītā* ran in two divergent directions and it did not see that the directions were opposed to each other. One direction consisted of the search for a type of action whose doing would not produce any consequence on the mind or psyche of the person who did it. This is the direction of action performed without regard to fruits and which is not likely to disturb the consciousness in any significant way. The other direction seeks to break the bond between action and egoistic desire and advocates pursuing it for the sake of the Lord or for promotion and perpetuation of *dharma*, i.e. the concept of righteousness.⁸

The two directions sought to meet the two radical defects discovered in all action by the *śramaṇa* critique. One held that action sprang from egoistic desire and thus led to bondage in a two-fold manner: (i) dependent on something outside itself for its satisfaction and fulfilment, (ii) weaving of the psychic web in which one got enmeshed and caught through what are usually called *saṃskāras* or habits, not so much of action as of thought and feeling.

Daya Krishna criticizes this second aspect for preparing the ground for the shocking assertion in Hindu tradition that good actions also bind and thus ultimately have to be given up and transcended. The idea of transcending all *guṇās* including *satva*

which is the cause of good action thus appeared in the tradition.

The second defect which the *śramaṇa* critique found in action was its character of disturbing the mind which engaged in it. In action the mind is somehow concerned with something outside itself in such a manner that it has no peace of its own. Not merely this, but the logic of action seems to be such that it takes one farther and farther away from the situation where one could possibly enjoy a peaceful, undisturbed consciousness which is calm and joyous in itself. The contemplative moments grow fewer and fewer and gradually the mind loses its capacity to be silent and still.

Daya Krishna, however, offers a rigorous criticism against such an approach. He maintains that if action is moral it has to be concerned with the fruits of one's action. Indifference in such a context is a sign of immorality and it does not matter at all if such concern disturbs one's equanimity of being and consciousness. Rather, one ought to be disturbed, and if one is not so disturbed at the suffering of others, then one is not a human being. This epitomizes a state of dehumanization.

Daya Krishna criticizes the *Gītā* for skirting past this basic conflict, for the *Gītā* recommends both non-egoistic action for the sake of the Lord or *dharma* and unmotivated action which is not rooted in desire for any consequences and thus is indifferent to any fruits of action. Action done for the Lord or for the preservation of *dharma*, nevertheless, is action done for the sake of specific consequences or purposes. It is rooted in motivation which is external to the self and lies in the consequences for which the action is undertaken. The Lord has to be propitiated and *dharma* has to be re-established, maintained or strengthened.

In this context, Daya Krishna asks some fundamental questions. Does Kṛṣṇa behave as if he had no desire for the fruits of action? Does he really act as if all consequences were equally welcome to him? Were victory and defeat equally indifferent alternatives to him? To ask these questions, according to Daya Krishna, is to answer them, for, there is always a philosophy which is implicitly propounded in one's action. Kṛṣṇa is propounding what is to be done in the case of a righteous battle, i.e. the *dharmayuddha* which is enjoined after all means for avoiding it have been

explored and exhausted save one of abject and unrighteous surrender. In such a situation Kṛṣṇa seems to exhort Arjuna to fight for a just cause, not for the sake of fighting but in order to win.

Daya Krishna laments in this context that the idea of action for the preservation of *dharma* was gradually given up and greater emphasis was laid on action performed for the sake of the Lord as well as on action performed without desire for the fruits of action. This, in a subtle but in a definite sense, was only a return to ritualistic *action* purified of even that slight taint of purpose which motivated the performer of vedic sacrifices.

In Daya Krishna's opinion this has proved disastrous for the Indian tradition, for by removing this morally laudable concern the *Gītā* has thus emasculated action at its very roots. The concept of *dharma* has receded and what remains is either the unattached and unaffected consciousness of Saṁkhya or devotional consciousness filled with the awareness and joy of the Lord. Both developed into the *advaitic* and devotional schools of *jñāna* and *bhakti*.

Daya Krishna, however, praises the role of Gandhi for giving a revolutionary, active and goal-oriented interpretation of the *Gītā*. Though the primary aim of Gandhi was attainment of a state of undisturbed consciousness, yet he engaged in an activity, which, in the words of Daya Krishna, may be described as 'instrumental action' having a definite orientation towards goal realization, i.e. achievement of *swarāja* through *ahimsā* and *satyāgraha*.

Daya Krishna has made action the pivot around which revolves the dialectic of the ideal and the actual. Man, through action, seeks to bridge the gap between the way man and society are and the way they *ought* to be.

In this way, Daya Krishna pleads for the attainment of the good life which has been conceived in terms of obligations to others. However, he re-iterates the right of the self by saying that while it is true that there are obligations to others, it is equally true that there are obligations to one's own self and to values that have little directly to do either with one's own self or with other people.

Daya Krishna is right in maintaining that the good life is a pursuit of all these together and not of one at the expense of the

others. There can, of course, be conflict between different obligations and it may be difficult to decide in any particular case as to the priority between them.

Daya Krishna brings to the fore the nature of the dialectic that obtains between human actions and values. He also points out the plurality and multiplicity that exists in the domain of values and the domain of human actions. Therein, he points to the unending chain of human seeking and appropriately cautions the human intellect against many conflicts and polarities that arise from moment to moment. But then, this precisely is perhaps the pattern which defines the essence of human life.

It is true that an individual neither individually nor collectively can achieve all the goals that he sets for himself. Whatever ideals he may choose, the functional imperatives of individual and society systems will make compromise inevitable. The scarcity of time, the conflicting claims of different values, the mutually instrumental relations between the individual and the society—all provide the perspective in which alone the problem of the good life, therefore, must be considered.

Daya Krishna is right in maintaining that actions can give freedom of many types. But he should be aware that action can also enmesh one in greater coils of human bondage. He has also not explicitly stated the various types of freedom, e.g., there is the freedom that comes from actions that seek the effective achievement of ends and there is the freedom that comes from the exercise of one's capacities and abilities.

Daya Krishna has spoken of perpetual ritualistic action needed to ward off the intrusion of hostile and undesirable forces. However, he has failed to see that the action undertaken for the above purpose may itself bring into being consequences which go contrary to what one has been trying to achieve. He has restricted the notion of the transcendental to what may be called beyond space and time, but in my opinion the term transcendental can also be used for creative persons and their acts of creation.⁹

Daya Krishna's concept of action centres round several pairs of concepts marked by creative tension. First, action may be immediately value-fulfilling or mediately value-seeking. Second,

the performer of action may be in her/his solitude or embedded in relation with others. Third, value-seeking action may be situated in some or other causal nexus or the same may be informed of some (extra-causal) transcendental orientation. Fourth, and final, action may be instrumental, i.e. means to a chosen end/value, or action may be in the nature of contemplation, an enterprise of consciousness itself, and consciousness, in this context, is axiological.

First, the reason underlying the distinction drawn between immediate (i) value-fulfilling action and mediate (ii) value-seeking action, is understandable. The urge to act rarely meets with success at the very point of its coming into being. The consciousness which accounts for an urge can hardly have instantly fulfilled its aim or object. Unless one assumes a gap between urge, will or intention, on the one hand, and the object towards which it is addressed, on the other, it is difficult to make any sense of the former. Enclosed or shut up in its immediacy, will or urge fails to develop as and into action. Without an element of disengagement or distance from its object or aim, action has no identity of its own. From its inception to development and fruition, action maintains an identity. This identity is structural. Without it the properties of action cannot be indicated or evaluated. Daya Krishna has certainly been right in saying that action itself is formless. But that does not mean that it is unstructured. The structure of action is to be understood in terms of its motive force, phenomenological development and objectwardness. These factors are not numerically separable from one another. For conceptual purpose these are separable.

Unless these distinct factors of action are recognized, the distinction sought to be drawn between immediate value and mediate value tends to get blurred. Another point that does not come out very clearly from Daya Krishna's writing is as follows. The structure of value and that of action, though obviously lodged within the structure of consciousness, deserve to be distinctly identified. Values, mediate or immediate, must be accorded identity of their own, independently of the actions addressed to them. Values may be solicited, or rejected or consciously avoided without acceptance or rejection. All these attitudes towards

action become meaningful only if we recognize values irrespective of their relation to attitude and actions directed or withdrawn from them.

Action also has its structure. The structure may be positive or social. It may be normative and primarily psychological, i.e. dispositional. Routine action need not be taken as normative. Habitual or random action cannot be regarded as normative. When imitation or emulation becomes thoughtless or mindless and devoid of any consciously entertained relation to an object/aim it fails to be normative. The latter is norm-informed, i.e. born of some or other recognized value-consciousness.¹⁰

Second, though disembodied, values have their own identity. As we know this issue may be approached from two different ends. We may try to ascertain and define what values, good or right, for example, many ethical thinkers, are primarily interested in defining. They want to define the identity or essence of these values. But many others are of the view that these exercises in defining the essential nature of values are fated to be more or less futile. Therefore, they suggest, we should work with some intuitive, *not* 'well-defined', notions of values. The latter approach seems to be free from many unnecessary metaphysical commitments. Instead of asking the question 'what is good', it is better to work with the socially available intuitive notions of 'good things' and 'good beings'. The essentialist metaphysician intervenes and presses the points that underlie the diverse intuitive notions of 'good', 'right' and 'justice'. There seem to be certain reals to be designated by these words. This insistence is pointless because we can be moral without being engaged in this sort of metaphysical and essentialist enterprise. Besides, the diverse practical use of the terms in different cultures also need to be taken into consideration. The alternative taxonomies of values, *puruṣārthās*, cannot be hurled into one and uniform essentialist cascade. The expression 'conflict of values' should not be lightly dismissed as spurious simply because it is not premised upon some or other 'universally acceptable essential values'.

We cannot be moral in solitude except in the dispositional sense of the term morality. Dispositional morality has an implicit reference to some or other social context. This indicates that

morality is basically social or institutional in character. Humans cannot be moral in isolation. Only in and through relation, concretely lived relation, we become or try to be moral. The assumption of this fact implies that the morality of the relations in which we can enter or withdraw is not authored by me, you or she alone. In other words, morality is not an exclusive matter of one's own legislation. Morals, we recognize, are in a way co-authored by us. But this authorship or agreement is uneven in nature. What we author is not identically followed or endorsed even by ourselves. This is symptomatic of the distinct individuality of the concerned authors or agents we distinguish partly because of our different value-schedules and partly because of our different value-preferences. These differences do not altogether negate our consent to be co-authors of morals and laws in a minimal sense.

Third, though, to start with, causal values and transcendental values appear to be antithetical, in-depth consideration shows their intimate connection. What is ordinarily known as cause-effect or the causal nexus is primarily theoretical in import. It is empirically difficult to show where cause ends and effect begins. Equally difficult it is to establish the asymmetry between cause and effect. The thesis of the unidirectionality of a cause-effect relationship is purely commonsensical. Close examination suggests that in the context of action the process of effectuation of causal motivation into action as effect is very complex in character. Given a particular motive as 'causal' input for action does not by itself ensure that it would culminate in or give rise to a particular sort of action, because intervening factors like the presence of other human beings, their co-operation or opposition have also to be taken into account. More importantly, the question of agency, the question of the person whose motive and action are our concern, naturally comes up in a big way. This general point is central to the causal discourse with reference to all sorts of human action.

For example, the historian of today who writes about the motives, actions and societal pre-suppositions of persons of yesteryears, is in practice mentally going back to the past and recapturing her/his materials of what s/he is going to write. This is what the historiographer expresses by saying, rather paradoxically,

cally, that all history is contemporaneous; in history the 'dead' past is brought back to the 'living' present. In other words, historical realism amounts to moving against the arrow of time suggesting thereby that *historically* speaking time is asymmetrical or unreal. This anti-causal (anti-causal in a deep sense) ability inherent in human action may be illustrated even more clearly by analysing the structure and components of creative artistic action. Art work can never be dictated by the natural world and cause factors recognized by the physicist. Nature is transformed, at times even distorted, but beautified, not only in 'abstract' art work but also in concrete art work like landscape, seascape and skyscape.

In a sense, nature is transcended by the artist in her/his artistic activities. Somewhat similar is the import of so-called ritual activities performed by religious people in quest of their transcendental values, spiritual goals. For example, sacrificial offerings, *yajñas*, performed to propitiate gods and to elevate souls cannot be traced to any definite causal moorings. That is one of the main reasons why rituals are said to be symbolic, spiritual and also value-seeking.

The above trans-causal characteristics of action evident in historical, artistic and religious activities show that the idioms of causal discourse as ordinarily understood are either irrelevant, or at best, marginally relevant, to certain areas of value-loaded actions. That seems to be the main consideration why many analytic philosophers prefer the concept of reason to that of cause in the context of action in general, and value-seeking action in particular.

Fourth and final, the distinction drawn by Daya Krishna between contemplative and instrumental action, though tenable in a sense, is very tenuous in character. Let me first say why I maintain that it is tenable. Unlike instrumental action, contemplative action has no aim external to it. Contemplation is action in a peculiar sense. When one contemplates, the content of contemplation can hardly be regarded as an end in relation to which contemplation itself could be considered as means. Contemplation is a sort of immersion in consciousness. It is distinguished from *outlook*, it is a kind of *inlook*. In the mental or spiritual

excursion s/he gets herself/himself immersed and gradually feels withdrawn from the strong pull of 'external' physical objects.

Expressions like 'strong pull' and 'weak pull' beg elucidation. It is not the object-pole alone (and in isolation) which determines the so-called strength or weakness of the pull in question. The character, especially the intentionality and intensity, of the contemplator has an important say in the matter. To contemplate a distant tree, for example, is intuitively different from contemplating my own body or the current ingoings of my own mind. When the object of contemplation is spatio-temporally distant and somewhat alien to me in terms of interest or craving, it has a distinct identity of its own. The same sort of identity cannot be ascribed in contemplation to my own body. The latter, all things being equal, is more or less 'internal' to me and, unrelated to what 'I' stand for, it makes no sense either to others or even to myself. My encounter with my own mental ingoings are very intimate, more intimate than my body is to *myself*. In a way, my body is available to others but not my mental ingoings unless they are of the kind which my behaviour cry out. Even my behaviour as available to me differs from the 'same' as available to others.

The above disengagemental character is not present, certainly not in an articulate manner, in the case of instrumental action. Instrumental action may be added by external adjuncts, gadgets, detachable aids, etc. One can also use one's own body as a means for others' use and utilization. When some economists speak of the saleability or market-value of the worker's manual labour, they are conceiving the body itself as something clearly distinguishable from what it *performs*, what value it produces. This point in a way may be extended even to what we *do* mentally when we come across such locutions as 'I have a mind of my own' and 'her mental torture is due to her estranged husband', we imply that one's ways of owning one's own mind are phenomenologically graded. Expressions like 'intellectually enslaved colonial people' and 'spiritually liberated human' designate different shapes of owning of (distinguishable) consciousness.

Close perusal of the above lines of analysis shows at least one thing very clearly. By changing our orientation of consciousness

vis-à-vis the things and beings we want/intend to have may be differently owned and disowned. Not infrequently we hear how a lover's attitude to the beloved undergoes fundamental change. The same person who was 'darling' the other day may turn out to be 'betrayer' or 'bitch'. At the other extreme one hears of a saintly priest (Ramakrishna, for example) who realizes his 'Kali', the image of a goddess made of clay, as mother. To him, she laughs and talks and is a living being. To take another example, Śakuntala (of Kalidasa) dearly loved all the flora and fauna of Kanva's hermitage. The creepers and deers of the place appeared deeply sensitive, almost reciprocating her love towards them. All these happenings took place, one may say, in Śakuntala's world of contemplation. To take them literally would be to strain our commonsense, not to speak of science.

I would have been happy if Daya Krishna's view of the relation between contemplative action and instrumental action had been clearer and satisfactory and if he could analyse the issues somewhat more in detail and depth. That contemplative action differs from instrumental action, that the former is more 'free' than the latter are not very contentious. But the question is, 'how'?

NOTES

1. Daya Krishna, 'The Invariants of the Human Situation: Valuations and Limitations', in Daya Krishna, *The Art of the Conceptual*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1989, p. 205. See also Daya Krishna, 'The Moral and the Axiological Ought: An Attempt at a Distinction', *Journal of Philosophy*, Oct. 1956, and Daya Krishna, 'The Nature of Value Judgements', *The Australian Journal of Philosophy*, May 1958.
2. Daya Krishna, 'Action and Contemplation', Visva-Bharati Publications, p.1.
3. Daya Krishna, 'An Attempt at a Theory of Ethics', in *ibid.*, pp. 190-94.
4. Daya Krishna, 'Value and Reality', *Journal of Philosophy*, Feb. 1965.
5. Daya Krishna, 'Action and Contemplation', p. 11.
6. Daya Krishna, *Social Philosophy: Past and Future*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1969, pp. 12-14.
7. Daya Krishna, 'The Active and the Contemplative Values', in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, March 1969.
8. Daya Krishna, 'Reflection on Action', in Daya Krishna, *Social Philosophy, Past and Future*, pp. 31-34. See also Daya Krishna, *Considerations Towards a Theory of Social Change*, Manaktalas Bombay, 1965, pp. 22, 28, 54, 79.

9. See my paper 'Towards a Philosophical Theory of Action', in H. Bannerjee and T. Bandopadhyaya (eds.), *Actions, Explanation and Interpretation*, Bagchi, Calcutta, 1990, p. 32.
10. See my paper, 'Action, Reason and Cause', in D.P. Chattopadhyaya, *Knowledge, Freedom and Language*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989, pp. 114-15.

Daya Krishna on Value

DHARMENDRA GOEL

My brief paper is concerned with the concepts of freedom and value as they have occupied Daya Krishna well over three decades in his philosophical writings. My presentation would begin by briefly representing the extremely subtle reflections on value that Daya Krishna has in over his several works, followed by a few comments of my own, and finally I shall try to appraise his philosophical observations on this theme. Let me make it clear at the outset that Daya Krishna is a critical thinker and nowhere is his critical acumen more in evidence than when he tackles the concept of freedom as the sheet anchor of values. Conscious choice and not 'this' or 'that' goal or end embodies this freedom. He writes, '... man is the only being who can choose not to be. Therein lies his greatest freedom—the freedom from ends, from life, from conscious being. He is the only animal who can commit suicide—a self-conscious annihilation of itself.'¹

The second abiding refrain of Daya Krishna's lifelong passion is creative love for diversity and antipathy towards any mystification of the metaphysics of values. He advocates against all those alternative monolithic patterns of 'ends', 'oughts', 'duties', ideals of transcendence or of any secular historical millennium. I would do well to put forth some of his own remarks at this point from his two works related to society and its values.

He distinguishes his work from that of Marx who talked '... of freedom and its technical institutional base but he forgot that

freedom is not all of one kind and that the different kinds may conflict with each other. Marx was a utopian who believed in the harmony of all values and their simultaneous realizability once the social forms of production were fundamentally set right.'²

Daya Krishna has a horror of any forced march to a revolution, and he is poignantly aware of the blasphemy of the dehumanizing horrors of revolutionary unidimensionality in history: He writes:

The missionary zeal of the great religions is the classic example of such an attitude. Once the society is to be organized for the realization of the most supreme of all values all that comes in the way of such realization has to be removed—even if it be the poets that have to be banished, Homer that has to be expurgated, music that has to be censored, and what Plato failed to add—a million that have to be killed.³

He adds a little later

... It is not that the plurality of effects is ignored in the attitude that regards persons as things but only that it loses its tragic poignancy for a person who regards the emotive affective life of persons as irrelevant to, or at best an instrument for the realization of his value.⁴

Daya Krishna is all too distressed by the excessive objectivistic hubris of monopoly of revolutionary faith. He writes,

Socio-cultural phenomena being inevitably realized through the mediation of individual minds, can always be affected through the coercion of these persons. ... The knout, the sword, the bayonet can always make the way clear for the God that wishes to be born, the value that wishes to be realized. This is inevitably related to the unidimensional envisagement of value that to the view regarding the irrelevance of Man's emotive-affective reactions for the persons who are sought to be liquidated and eliminated are not persons at all but barba-

rians, kafirs, mlechchas, heathens, reactionaries and what not.⁵

The problems of the first person singular's identity and his privacy is crucial to values. Daya Krishna writes of it recurrently and castigates all official smudging of this spontaneous deviation: He says:

True—an artist, like most other persons, is born into the social mores of a society and, by the familiar phenomenon of internalization, introjects the valuational ideals of a society into his own personality. But the problem as always, is of the person who deviates—the person who finds himself opposed to the valuational ideals of his society.⁶

Daya Krishna desires to make a sharp distinction between socially interdependent moral-roles and norms and their associated 'oughts' on the one hand and those 'oughts' that emanate from the sensitive awareness of, or creatively spontaneous impulses for a new articulation of experience cherished for its own sake by an artist on the other. He pleads in favour of such a trans-social role of this 'ought' and its inherent right to hold to its autonomous realization, apart from or against any objective collectivist's demands of social praxis. He adopts Hartmann's seminal distinction between 'stronger' and 'weaker' values on the one hand and 'higher' and 'lower' values on the other. In fact the dilemma of higher values being tragically weaker brings out Daya Krishna's own self-expression about his intense fascination for the promethean spark in the human spirit by which he is actually alive and which is destined to beat its ineffectual golden wings for a while only to fall a tragic prey to a sisyphean fate.

... The relation between 'ought claims' which arise from the inter-personal situation of man and those that arise from what we have characterized as his axiological situation may be designated, in Hartmann's terminology, as that which obtains between 'stronger' and 'weaker' values ... the intellectual, aesthetic or spiritual value for which people give up personal

and social obligations is undoubtedly a higher value than the day-to-day fulfilment of customary obligations ... in ethical discussions, that the supra-personal and supra-social nature of values seems to have been entirely forgotten ... even those who have found in the concept of the 'good life' the central focus of their ethical thought have failed to see that the 'ought' claim of axiological values is not exactly the claim for a 'good life'. The claim is rather for the objectivating of a value that is vaguely but at the same time irresistibly apprehended. The life of many an artist can in no way be described as a 'good life'—nor was it in any sense a pursuit of such a life. Yet the claim they apprehended—a Baudelaire, Van Gogh, Dostoevsky ... seems to reveal more the nature of values than the so-called leaders of 'good life'.⁷

Throughout his long and persistent concern for the study of planning procedures of social systems, Daya Krishna has argued as to how to secure balances amongst values which are of as many different kinds of freedom that are based on the basic freedom of the agent, and about the fact that they often conflict. He writes:

The pursuit of values can only be undertaken if a man is free but the end of all the value realization is ultimately complete fulfilment of human personality in its self-conscious being ... freedom as presupposed and freedom as self-consciously realized are two different things. The first is the foundation of all else even in its empirical aspects. The second is the end of all values themselves, an end without which even the values themselves remain unfulfilled in an essential respect.⁸

Daya Krishna has attended to conflicts of values and seeks an optional reconciliation among those that are mutually conflicting. He writes:

Certain types of freedom may be mutually reinforcing or indifferent or even positively incompatible with each other. The exploration and delineation of these diverse types of inter-

relationship is the first requisite for any concrete policy recommendations. . . . Another important problem in this connection is to find out as to what is the minimum degree of a particular kind of freedom which is required almost as an absolute necessity and beyond what point it may be deemed as luxury—in other words . . . beyond a certain point a particular type of freedom may be deemed a luxury. . . .⁹

In a recent work Daya Krishna gets down to reconstructing the coherent idea of human values in the Indian scheme of *puruṣārthas*. He finds that no simple explanation of the hierarchic order of *dharma* and *mokṣa* explains our *artha* and *kāma* fully or can integrate in a cohesive pattern the drives, motives, roles, ideals and freedom that the human condition involves. He suggests that a complete reconsideration should account for these elements of the theory of *puruṣārthas* if it has to be offered as an insightful contribution of the Indian tradition to man's quest for values. Daya Krishna finds fault with this scheme because it does not accommodate intellectual exploration within its hierarchy. He writes:

for all these theories, the independent seeking of any value which is different from these is an illusion except in an instrumental sense. The ultimately suicidal character of all such theories is self-evident as they do not provide for any independent value to the life of the intellect which they themselves embody. Fortunately for the Indian theory of *puruṣārthas*, it has postulated the ideal of *mokṣa* which is tangential to all the other *puruṣārthas*. But it too has no place for independent life of reason as a separate value. . . .¹⁰

Daya Krishna writes on the concept of *puruṣārthas* as follows:

. . . perhaps, the best way might be to construe it as being both descriptive and prescriptive, thus reflecting the human condition itself wherein the determination by norms and ideals and the striving towards them is inbuilt into the condi-

tion itself. The Upaniṣadic terms *preyas* and *sreyas* describe well this amalgamation. . . .¹¹

I could similarly refer to the constitutive role reflexive acts play in our self-identity. Nānaka's triad (of *Nām japō*, *Kīrat karo* and *Vand chako*: contemplate on the transcendent, do manual labour, share what you consume) is one such ego-constitutive path. Daya Krishna wonders if the traditional concept of *puruṣārthas* were offered as exploratory reports about the individual's real praxis, or advised as reasonable ideals. He closely underlines that we can follow 'oughts' only when they are well embedded in our fused self-identity. True, we begin with externally given commands, amorphously contingent dispositions and some impulsively (though not without some sort of good reasons!) chosen ego-ideal, but soon in the reflexive act they fuse, as they constitute value. A further step that Daya Krishna seems to be dimly aware of but never explicitly takes, could be recognizing the coeval formation of a person's being along the ascriptive roles, masks, ideals that it enjoins. Only the traditional metaphysics of *ātman* would oppose our suggestion of asserting the ascriptive identity of *sākṣin*, *kartā*, and *bhoktā* with the duties, values, ideals, norms, obligations and standards we self-legislate and ineffectively enforce in this vale of tears on our mortal coils. This unity of human tragedy needs to be recognized, unless of course we opt for dialectical materialism or mindless behaviourist Skinnerian cybernetics. It would be exciting if my rash remarks would make Daya Krishna react. It is partly because of his work and my closely following it here, that I hazard this opinion; of course, only I am responsible for the errors in it.

Daya Krishna has been somewhat casual in his glorification of higher aesthetic contemplative values and less than appreciative of others that he ridicules as lower values which nevertheless are nondescript conditions of pursuit of spiritual and intellectual excellences themselves. I cannot help pointing out that while he realizes the 'weakness' of the heights of intellectual obligations inasmuch as they presuppose life, liberty, security, cooperation, rule of law, he refuses to recognize the symmetry of the relation

of organic interdependence. That happens to be familiar to Moore's and Sidgwick's students of intrinsic values as constitutive conditions of human praxis, i.e. the imperatives of rationality, creativity, survival and freedom. Or as Gandhi has said, 'when you are puzzled about praxis, remember the last man out you know, do what is most likely to lessen his sorrow.'

Following Daya Krishna's suggestions in his work on utopia,¹² I would agree that any global blueprints must be faulted because they involve inter-subjective comparisons of values, idealization of personal choices and underestimation of wide differences of weights that different persons give to actual and possible alternatives, thus contributing to pave the way to hell with good intentions. Yet, I would like to put forth an alternative utopia where Daya Krishna's kind of subjective, authentic, creative choice would not entirely ignore the lower demands of life, liberty, security and justice. I disagree that they are only of contingent value; rather I recognize them as the *sine-qua-non* of the agent's constitution and of the feasibility conditions for realizing his creative authentic choice. These are rationality, survival, privacy, security. For me, no ideal of liberty or creative choice is visualizable in a society that continues to be steeped in endemic poverty, injustice, coercive insecurity and oppression for its majority—I cannot approve with equanimity of that sardonic toleration of amorphous disorder which makes a Beethoven compose celestial symphonies while Bonaparte's rape of Weimar tramples on the liberties of ordinary mankind. I cannot but condemn Hegel for his rejoicing at the sight of seeing Napoleon as the absolute on his white charger; and nearer home, John Nicholson hordes (Company Bahadur's retributions) murdering poor Indian town-dwellers and peasants in the very vicinity of Red Fort while Ghalib (one of all-time great geniuses of this land) pens dolefully in Ballimārān his immortal *ghazals*. My utopia, unlike Daya Krishna's, has to be a fusion of creativity and justice.

Daya Krishna finds socialist societies highly despicable and makes a well-founded criticism of any kind of authoritarian macro-planning as essentially dehumanizing. He underlines the lack of any effective procedure that could eliminate alienation between the first-person perspective which one micro-orientation

bears to any other man's adversely located second-person perspective. Of course, any additive aggregate collective idealization is bound to have decisions alien to most such micro-perspectives. This absence of any rational procedure that could compare, optimize or accommodate different weights and variously marginalized goods and services ensures that in principle, allowing for human rationality and diversity of choice, no criterion for scaling of different social formations could be devised. Daya Krishna's logic is remorseless and, guided by it, he disturbingly tears to shreds all glib ideals of science and free progress.

Consequently, mankind should rise above the delusions of devising objectively concrete utopias and should rationally seek creative self-expression only in subjective, autonomous values or intellectual explorations. This sounds highly unsatisfactory to any historian. True, there may not be any consistent linear progress, but the slow World Historical education and gradual elimination of evil also cannot be ignored. Daya's acceptance of every tradition because it is an equi-feasible tradition sounds highly conservative, implausible, antinomian and counter-intuitive.

Utility, egoism and intuition are famous methods of rationality that jointly seem to encompass all that our praxis needs and follows. As such Daya Krishna's facile relativism of alternate rationalities seems to me unacceptable despite its fascinating aura.

FINAL APPRAISAL

Daya Krishna's reflections on value are not only a discursive and insightful theoretical elucidation of the concepts of freedom and the diversity and plurality of incompatibilities of diversely pursued ideals; he also advocates and recommends effective removal of all tendencies towards uni-dimensionality as subversive to human dignity. Lastly, he enacts and explores his captivating image of the severe contemplative life of the free man, an engagingly vivid representation of man's serene dignity in his alienated solitude, creative isolation from the unthinking denizens of the lonely crowds we know in our contemporary world as so many rootless men.

He needs to have seen some family resemblances between

such value notions as are embedded in our moral standards, goals, ends or ideals of life, obligations of my station and its duties, roles and virtues that cannot be left mutually indifferent and unrelated as so many monadic freedoms as his work seems to suggest. A re-examination of these notions is awaited despite the many insights that Daya Krishna's work reveals regarding the incommensurability of many values.

Even while agreeing that the primary scenario of value is subjective contemplation and choice, Daya Krishna's reflection on values suffers certainly from lack of understanding of the bridge that brings them to their objective institutionalization. This bridge is called for to analyse the structure of the world-historical process that cannot be conceived as one cosmic accident without any rhythm or order.

NOTES

1. See his 'Attempted Analysis of Concept of Freedom, A Discussion', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, USA, 1952.
2. See 'Considerations Towards a Theory of Social Change', Manaktalas, Bombay, 1967, p. 163. Compare it with his 'Concept of Revolution, An Analysis', *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 23, No. 3, July 1973, pp. 294-5, as well as 'Surplus Value, Profit and Exploitation—An Attempt at an Analysis of some Concepts in Marxian Economics', p. 99: 'The Marxian interpretation of the "labour criterion" would perhaps, include the managerial function as falling under investment, functions from its possible range. The administrative, police and the military labour of running a society would hardly be even considered as a claimant in the field', p. 101.
3. 'Social Change—An Attempt at a study in conflicting patterns of social action' discussion', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XIV, No. 4, June 1954, USA, p. 568.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 569.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 570.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 572.
7. 'The Moral and the Axiological "Ought": An Attempt at a Distinction', *Journal of Philosophy*, pp. 640-41; compare this with 'Active and Contemplative Values', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, March 1969, p. 417; also 'Alienation, Positive and Negative', *Diogenes*, 72, p. 55—he pleads for a feeling unity of love and absorption that captures the otherness of the beloved. In his words, 'further, one may also try to internalize the object of love through imagination and thus torn away from the concreteness of the "other" which may be felt as the basic source of alienation in love. Much of

the development of mystic love may perhaps be, understood this way'. Daya feels that 'Einführung' could cause ecstasy and thus could cause self-alienation twice over once the person loving and next also of the person loved. See N. Hartmann's work *Ethics*, Vol. II: *Moral Values*, Chapter 38: 'The Grade and Strength of Values', pp. 448-49 and p. 451, Allen and Unwin, London, 1932. Also see Bernard Williams, *Morality*, Chapter on 'Goodness and Roles', Cambridge, 1972, pp. 62-68.

8. See Daya Krishna's *Social Philosophy Past and Future*, I.I.A.S., Simla, 1969, p. 77.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 64. Cf. the point Daya Krishna suggests of a thought-experiment with respect to alternative utopias which imply comparisons of value-parameters and projections of consequences of choices previously made; *ibid.*, p. 72.
10. 'The Myth of the Puruṣārthas', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1986, p. 13.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Social Philosophy: Past and Future

YASHDEV SHALYA

*Translated from the Hindi original by
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Daya Krishna occupies a space of unique distinction even amongst the very few front-rank thinkers in contemporary Indian philosophy. This uniqueness is defined by two qualities possessed by him. First, his wholly untraditional, creative approach and his natural tendency to probe into roots. It is because of this innate bent that Daya Krishna is able to raise ever-fresh and fundamental questions. Simplicity, openness and a complete freedom from arrogance are, in fact, ingrained in his personality itself, and are not merely functions of his philosophical thinking. The second characteristic is his wide-ranging vision and capacity to understand and think about problems related to various other disciplines. Besides thinking about traditional philosophical themes, he has also concerned himself with problems related to society, economic systems, politics and public administration, Indology, etc. This capability of multi-disciplinary thinking is not the same as a house with several rooms in it, or a box containing various coloured objects. It is a capability that leads to Daya Krishna's wide vision and reveals such dimensions and levels of various objects of thought as are quite inaccessible to minds which lack this capability. Or, we might put it thus: there is a basic unity of knowledge in which every discipline illuminates another and the illumination from every other discipline reveals new dimensions

of the subject which presently happens to engage our attention. That is what we mean by 'wide and pervasive vision'. Minds which lack this larger view of things have merely accumulative or descriptive capacity. Daya Krishna, obviously, does not belong to the second category of philosophers, but to the first; and is amongst the foremost in that first category.

I have had the opportunity not only of reading various articles and books by Daya Krishna, but also of participating in many symposia with him. Often I have found myself disagreeing with him, and have even been provoked at times. But that is exactly what suits Daya Krishna—what he really likes—to goad and provoke and compel you to think differently. He had expressed the view in his first book, *The Nature of Philosophy*, that 'the function of philosophy is to raise new questions'. He still holds this view. My disagreement is not so much with his basic viewpoint as with certain details of the interpretation of that viewpoint, although, at times, I may not accept the view itself. As for the present book (*Social Philosophy: Past and Future*) as well as the earlier volume called *Considerations Towards a Theory of Social Change*, I find myself in almost full agreement with the viewpoint as well as the interpretative aspect, but I am dissatisfied with some of the propositions, especially the interpretative propositions, of the book under consideration. I would like to discuss here mainly those points of disagreement—reminding Daya Krishna of that famous couplet of Kabir which exhorts us to 'keep our critics close at hand'.

Daya Krishna has raised the following questions regarding the Nature of society:

Is it something completely independent of the way human beings think about it and conceive it to be? Or, is it affected in its very being by the way men think about it and conceive it to be? Has it, so to say, an essence of its own which men have only to find and discover? Or, is it something like what the existentialists say about man; that is, something that has no essence of its own, but something which is made and created out of the infinite choices of diverse men?

His answer to these questions can be summed up thus. Society is the result of self-conscious choices made by individuals, and, consequently, it is a non-object or non-essence. By virtue of being the result of conscious choice, it becomes something contrary to nature. Nature, according to him, means a being which is given or presented to man's thought and concepts, not something to be affected or moulded by him. Being the creation of thought, it assumes the form of the imagination or the concept behind it. Carrying this idea further, Daya Krishna asks,

Will it be really true to say that the way we conceive of man and society does not affect the way they are or even the way they will be? Is not the way we conceive them to be intimately bound up with what they actually come to be? How can we foster the illusion that our conceptual activity with respect to man and society can be value-neutral in the same sense as our conceptual activity is supposed to be with respect to natural objects?

Towards the end of the first lecture on 'Social Philosophy', he picks up the question of the relationship between individual and society and says that 'the question "what is society" is closely linked to the question "what is a human individual?"' He goes on to state, 'It is from the human individual that all creativity emanates and originates; society is only a facilitating mechanism so that the individual may pursue his trans-social ends'. According to him, sociologists in general are committed to the ultimacy of society. They see everything as rooted in the social nexus and as subserving a social end; and this everything includes the conceptual or creative works of the individual. This Daya Krishna will not accept. He further states that 'the two conceptions are opposed ways of conceiving society', precisely because 'the way we conceive affects the way we become, the choice between the two ways of conceiving becomes a valuational choice'. In such a situation, therefore, the cognitive task is to make the value implications explicit and to spell out the possible achievements and perversions within the scope of each of these conceptions.

Here, six questions are worth considering. First, is society the

kind of being which is never the object of knowing, but only a utopia or value projection? Second, if it is merely a projection, then who is its projector? The individual? Or society itself? Third, is nature an essence quite independent of the way it is conceived? Fourth, then, could society also not be conceptual being independent of value judgements? Fifth, even if we consider society to be a value projection, could we grant the same status of being to it as we grant to the human individual? Sixth, what is meant by the statement that society is only the facilitating mechanism for the self-realization of the individual? As such a mechanism, is society a being independent of the individual? Or is it merely the resultant of a community of individuals? It seems to me that Daya Krishna has not given very clear thought to any of these problems here. In his other book, *Considerations Towards a Theory of Social Change*, he has considered the first three of the above questions, though not adequately and systematically. For instance, there he says:

Society, then resembles handicrafts in the sense that it is concerned with the problems of self-preservation which precedence over all other problems. At the same time, however, it also resembles great works of art, which concern themselves with values and ideals—without which they are worthless. But society differs from both in one important respect: it is never a finished work, which can be looked at from all possible angles and which any person possessing aesthetic taste can know in its entirety. Of course, the historians of cultures and civilizations can look at societies thus (in their entirety)—especially, when they have already become obsolete and dead. But, unlike the works of art, these societies had never conceived or desired their end: in fact they aspired to eternal life. . . . Society is a unique subject of its own kind, and although it shares some of the qualities possessed by all such subjects of enquiry, it differs from them in some fundamental characteristics. Established in the cause and effect contextuality of Nature, concerned about the preservation and growth of its constituent members, blissfully preoccupied with its own dreams, and proudly following its own time-honoured ideals,

society is the self-conscious creation of its ever-marching progeny who are simultaneously in love with it and, still different from it. (pp. 98-99)

This definition and depiction of society by Daya Krishna is probably his clearest and most representative statement on this subject. Perhaps it can be treated as complete, in so far as he is not generally known to have said anything else on this theme. But its self-inconsistency cannot bear strict philosophical scrutiny. At the very outset, Daya Krishna distinguishes society from handicrafts or works of art on the ground that it does not have a beginning and an end like them, not on the ground of the former being a creation of the individual and the latter, an impersonal product. But, immediately after that, he attributes beginning and end to societies, and then he discovers yet another basis for establishing the distinction, claiming that a living society does not view itself as one that will necessarily come to an end. But, then, does a work of art see itself as having a beginning, a middle and an end? To see oneself or to form a conception of oneself is the characteristic of a self-conscious subject and not that of a created work of art. It can be said here that a self-conscious subject also conceives himself and, therefore, he himself too is a creation of himself. We have propounded this view elsewhere and, there, we have called both the individual and culture as self-determining subjects. But Daya Krishna does not say so. He views society partly as an object of art and partly as an object different from that. However, a little later, in the same paragraph—while designating society as object—he starts talking about it as if it were a subject, using phrases like: 'concerned about the preservation of its members', etc. Since he has nowhere treated society as a subject, such phrases appear to be mere flights of poetic fancy. From this point of view, Daya Krishna is more consistent in his other book, *Social Philosophy*, because there he views society as self-created in accordance with the human subject's capacity for conceiving himself. In fact, the point of resemblance he finds in both is that the being of both is affected by the concept-forming activity. That explains why he describes society as the combined product of human individuals' thoughts, concepts and choices.

Now, the combined product of several individuals' thoughts, concepts and choices cannot be called 'self-created'. In fact, even in the case of an individual, all the fruits of his actions cannot be called self-conscious; and if they are not even self-conscious, there is no question of their being self-created. What, then, to speak of the results of the choices of several individuals. To cite an example, the books I collect for my personal library or the clothes I wear are my self-conscious choice, but my library or my shirts themselves are by no means self-conscious. If we probe a little deeper, we shall find that many of our choices also are not really our choices. We may purchase a piece of cloth after much consideration, but having reached home, may start wondering whether it was the right choice. We find ourselves exclaiming, 'Oh, I don't know why I preferred this colour rather than the one I saw earlier.' And if this choice is exercised in the realm of persons rather than objects—choosing a friend for example, or a husband, or a wife—then the resultant, we all know, can be even more baffling. We discover, to our dismay, that, 'it is not the same person whom I have seen', or, 'he is not the man I took him to be'. What actually happens is that we fail to understand clearly our own expectations, desires or choices. And even our first and foremost relationships—family, environment, country and time—are never the results of our conscious choice. Is it not extremely naive, then, to consider society as the result of self-conscious choices?

Moreover, 'result of self-conscious choices' and 'self-creatingness' are never equivalent, because my library—although it is the result of self-conscious choice—cannot be said to be self-creating. Only the human individual is self-creating. Perhaps culture, too, can be called self-creative, but not a library—what to speak of society! Daya Krishna nowhere makes it clear in what sense even the individual can be called self-creating. According to psychoanalysts, the greater part of our personality is composed of unconscious, sub-conscious and semi-conscious states of mind. Further, 'the result of conceptions' and 'the result of choice' also do not amount to the same thing. Because, as we shall see later, even nature cannot be said to be the result of conscious choices although it can be said to be the result of conceptions.

When Daya Krishna distinguishes society from nature, his main purpose is to present it as an object for value-judgements, as distinct from an object of knowledge. But, one has to consider whether it is only nature which is an object of knowledge. Are not values themselves objects of knowledge? It is worth noting that Daya Krishna himself, towards the end of his first lecture, has defined the task of sociology as revealing the implications of several valuational concepts; he calls this task a 'cognitive task'. Besides, in his last lecture, he has laid heavy emphasis on the cognitive character and value-neutrality of such a task. But he would certainly not call this object of knowledge natural. Again, towards the end of the last lecture, he defines self-consciousness as the objectification of self—obviously, then, this objectified self too is not natural, according to him. As we have argued elsewhere, in fact it is this object which is the primordial value and the basis of all other values. As for treating society as the creation of self-conscious action, we have already exposed its invalidity while discussing the error in calling it the result of conscious choice. But even in a deeper sense, society is not the creation of man's self-conscious acts. As we have shown elsewhere,⁵ it is inherent in the transcendental configurations of human consciousness.

Among the propositions made by Daya Krishna about society the most fundamental is its non-natural character, because nature according to him is a being independent of thought or conception whereas society is thought-created, conceptual and future⁷ being (*bhāvya*). But nowhere does he give deep consideration to the being of nature herself. All he has to say about nature is this: 'We accept Nature as it is: we never say what it ought to be.' But this view is not as correct as it appears to be on the surface. First of all, it is worth noting that he uses capital 'N' in writing the word nature, which is meant to emphasize that nature in his usage is to be understood as a being, and not as a conglomeration of several objects or phenomena. Similarly, he uses capital 'M' for man and he nowhere makes it clear what he means to convey through this. Does he intend it to mean individual or race or some particular level of consciousness or something else? If we keep in mind his endorsement of Wittgenstein's

canonized but unfortunate phrase, 'family resemblance', then man cannot be anything more than an individual, and then, the use of capital 'M' becomes meaningless. But, for Wittgenstein, the word 'nature' itself would be as devoid of content as the word 'man'. We shall drop this matter here and consider only the question of the non-conceptual character of nature.

In order to establish the distinction between those subject matters which are affected by the way we think and those (e.g., nature) which are not, Daya Krishna has made an allusion to atomic physics. Elsewhere he mentions natural materials like earth, water, air, etc., and man-made material things like tables, chairs, etc., as nature. But, can they all be termed 'nature'? At the most, one can call them natural (although we do not understand how we can call manufactured articles natural, without ignoring the aspect of their being manufactured); but how can we equate them with nature? Mental events too are as natural as physical events, and it is the mental world which Daya Krishna considers to be determinable by thought. So far as physical objects are concerned, both Dinnāga and Kant have demonstrated them to be the constructs of transcendental conceptions and categories. Daya Krishna chooses to ignore this, by which perhaps he means that being transcendental these are not objects of self-conscious, voluntarily applied thought. But, then, nature itself, the object of such thinking, is also not absolute being. This is proved by the fact that it is conceived differently in different cultures and even within different stages of a single culture. Here Daya Krishna can contend that in all such conceptions, nature has been viewed 'as it is', and not 'as it ought to be'. But it is not so: the whole history of technology is the history of the acceptance of nature as something as it ought to be. One can raise the objection here that nature is only material, a means for technology, and that, a means or material has to be made use of exactly in this way—in its independent materiality. But, then, from this point of view, there remains no fundamental difference between nature and society—of course we do look upon society 'as it ought to be', but the form of this expectation of ours is thus: 'It ought not to be as it is'. Granted, we have to distinguish between technology and art but if we look at them from the view-

point of the way they can be affected by conceptual activity and thought, there is no difference between the two. The situation changes even more if we turn our attention to the use of physical materials in the arts themselves—stone and clay in sculpture, colours in painting, and sound in music.

A second important aspect of the natural is causality. In principle, causality denotes determinability by thought, and in practice, it denotes the fusion of the immediate and the particular in the remote and the general. For example, this stone lying in the lawn, this tear arising in the eyes, this sudden anxiety of the mind lose their immediate concreteness and particularity as soon as we ask 'why' and become a common factor in the chain of all conceivable and general happenings; and over and above these, there stands the being of nature, which is the presiding goddess of all natural things and which is a pure conception and thought construct. Here Daya Krishna may say that our disagreement regarding nature does not really make our idea of nature different, it is only the conceiving mind, the conceptual activity, that becomes different, depending upon whether it is a scientific or mythological or poetic mind. Nature, however, remains the same. But this contention would only make nature a subtler object of conceptual activity, it would not make it independent of conceptual activity.

We thus observe that several strands of Daya Krishna's argument regarding the nature of society are not very logical. Not that this invalidates his viewpoint. His basic perceptions are, in fact, correct: namely, that society cannot be made an object of knowledge just as the methodology of the natural sciences studies and manipulates nature; that terms like social engineering are misleading and pernicious, because society is the ground of the enquiry into ideal living and value-perceptions. But instead of highlighting these perceptions he concerns himself too much with emphasizing the opposed characters of society and nature. He forgets that nature for the modern scientist is only a preconceived and prejudiced nature; otherwise, it was quite usual for ancient civilizations to see the various objects and phenomena of nature as presided over by gods and goddesses. Plants and

animals and birds have been placed by them in the same order as man.

Similar to his view of society as valuational being, there is his perception that 'the nature of Man and society are identical to a great extent in one respect: both are self-creating'. But he does not go on to tell us how it is so. Not only this, he does not clarify what he means by Man with a capital M. Similarly, are the terms 'society' and 'culture' identical in meaning? If not, as obviously they are not, then is it not proper to apply the epithet 'self-creating' to culture rather than to society?

The second lecture is given the heading, 'Two Predicaments'. These relate to two ultimate ways in which we can conceive society. One of them is the 'socio-centric' perspective and the other is called the '*ātman*-centric' perspective. '*Ātman*' here connotes not the individual self but *Self*. According to Daya Krishna the first of these characterizes western society and the second Indian society. Behind the first, there is the view that the human individual has nothing in himself that he does not owe to society and, therefore, he achieves even his humanity only through the social tradition in which he grows. In other words, he is totally determined and made by society. Therefore, in this view, it is the duty of man to dedicate all he has to society and consider himself responsible for the good and evil of society. According to Daya Krishna, there is obvious internal contradiction in this view. If the individual is totally determined by society, then his thoughts, emotions and volitions can never be free, he becomes merely a drop in the oceanic society. If it is so, how can the individual be held responsible? Responsibility presupposes non-predetermination, an area of freedom to act. As examples of this ultimate, he cites the societies of the 'Apology' dialogue, the Christian doctrines of original sin and atonement and the Marxist ideology which makes the individual simultaneously a determination of history and responsible for the future. In his earlier book, *Considerations . . .*, also Daya Krishna has discussed this ultimate and its contradictions. There he has depicted social responsibility thus: whatever we do, whatever happens through us consciously or unconsciously, has social consequences, which, owing to the infiniteness of space

and time are infinite themselves. There he calls it a myth for the generation of which he holds the sociologists to be the culprits. In the same context, he mentions the Catholic doctrine of the duty of man to work out his own salvation and simultaneously the doctrine of 'grace'. According to him, this is also a self-contradictory situation.

Daya Krishna's depiction of this ultimate and its inherent contradictions is rather superficial and on that level appears plausible too. But probing a little deeper these so-called ultimates and their contradictions begin to look unreal. Let us briefly consider all the three examples given by him.

The example of Socrates is given to demonstrate the socio-centric ultimate. Socrates was served a death sentence for misleading the youth of Athens. Socrates believed this verdict to be based on untruth and the judges to be deluded. Under such a situation, therefore, according to Daya Krishna, he should have welcomed the opportunity of escaping from jail. But he did not do so just to honour and protect the law which he, otherwise, completely rejected. This, according to Daya Krishna, is obviously granting absolute status to the social imperative. But this is simply not true. To explicate the real meaning of the Socratic decision, we shall cite the example of the Buddha, which Daya Krishna has quoted as an example of the *ātman*-centric ultimate. The Buddha abandoned his kingdom, wife and child in the quest of self-realization. Nobody blamed him for this and in fact everybody gave him the highest honour. But, supposing, he had been wrongly put into jail and had chosen to escape from jail just because of his being innocent, then? Would he have been honoured even in this *ātman*-centric society? In our opinion, he would not have been honoured for this decision, because it does not uphold any value. Now this second example is fundamentally different from the first. One can say that if law or its dispensers are deluded, then what is the point of accepting such a blatantly unjust verdict? The answer is: value consists in removing that delusion, not in protecting one's body. Of course, one may still contend that Socrates could have achieved this objective equally well by exiting from jail and then convincing the people about the correctness of his position; by doing so, he would have

upheld the value of self-preservation and the removal of error simultaneously. Our rejoinder to this would be: Socrates' self-sacrifice established him on the highest ground of morality. The act of escape would have brought him down, if not to the lowest, at least to the common level. And this, not only in the eyes of others, but also in his own being; and it would have deprived history of one of the greatest examples of a super-human deed. Nobody who has read *Apology*, *Creto* and *Phaedo* can say that the spirit was not of the highest value for Socrates. (If anyone views loyalty to friends as other-centric behaviour, he only shows his incapacity to understand the essence of friendship.) Here Gandhiji's example would be useful. Gandhiji did not feel any commitment to the laws made by an alien government. Similarly Jayaprakash Narayana and Subhash Bose also did not. All three broke the laws. Now, Jayaprakash and Subhash Chandra Bose escaped from prison and this action was quite consistent with their non-commitment to the law. But Gandhiji did not choose to escape from prison. By doing so, he was revealing the impropriety of that law on a much deeper level and, at the same time he was acting upon the Socratic principle that 'evil must not be returned by evil' (*Creto*). Clearly, all this is not socio-centricity.

A word about the Christian doctrine of original sin. This concept has nothing to do with society, it is concerned with the fact of being human. And this concept can be seen to be operating on an even deeper level in the Buddhist doctrines of 'Dvādaśa Nidāna Cakra' and 'Anādivāsanā' and also in the Vedāntic concept of 'Anādi Avidyā'. So far as the contradiction between effort and grace is concerned, it is one of those contradictions which is inherent in the human situation itself. Here we will not go into it beyond the hint that, after all, the same concept can be seen at work in Vaiṣṇavism as well.

Thus, what remains worth consideration among the examples of contradiction between the socio-centric determination of the individual and his responsibility is Marxism. But it is worth noting that neither is there any inevitable relationship between socio-centrism and the above contradiction, nor is this contradiction as real as it appears. For instance, Plato's *Republic* is very socio-centric, but it does not conceive of the individual as socially

determined. In a similar manner, the Indian conceptions of 'Lok-saṅgraha', 'Mahājano yena gatāḥ sa panthāḥ' and the concept of 'three debts' are only denotative of the important role or place of society in the value-system. Although it is true that these concepts have nothing to do with the doctrine of social determinism, but the same can be said about the ideals of Socrates and Plato also. As for the contradiction between determinism and responsibility, this contradiction can be seen in many attempts to come to terms with the human situation, as we have pointed out above. We have already noted the example of human diligence and divine grace above. Similarly, we can observe a contradiction between the concept of 'Anādi Avidyā' and the quest of 'Mukti', between the eternal cycle of fruits of action and the responsibility for one's actions. But all these contradictions are not real, only apparent. Let us take the instance of social determination and social responsibility. First of all, the idea of social responsibility follows from one's indebtedness to society, not from one's being determined by society. The proposition is: 'Because the individual owes everything to society, therefore it is his obligation to give something in return to society'. Isn't the same perception at work behind the concept of 'Yajña'? It certainly does not mean, 'because society is the cause and the individual the effect, therefore the individual is responsible to society'. Now, let us consider the question, 'how can the individual be a free agent, if he is determined by society', or, in Marxist terminology, 'if my thoughts are pre-determined by the class in which I happen to be born, how can they be true or false?' And if they are not true or false in themselves, how am I supposed to feel duty-bound? The answer to this question can be put thus: in the very idea of social determinism, the capacity for right thinking and the capacity of discriminating between right and wrong is also included: this determination is neither physical nor brutal; it is the human kind of determination. For example, we learn our language from society; without it, no individual can acquire any language and without language he cannot acquire the capacity to think at all. But, neither does the social character of language come in the way of the freedom of the individual to use it in his own way, nor does the language-rootedness of thought become an impediment to the free thinking individual.

Nor does it in any way impair his capacity to discriminate between right and wrong.

Thus, this so-called social determinism is factually—if not logically—the inevitable pre-condition of the freedom of the individual. Actually, the basis of the illusion in seeing a contradiction between necessity and freedom is the use of 'Man' and 'Society' as mutually contradictory terms. Almost everybody uses these terms thus and Daya Krishna too has done the same. But it is not correct. The word 'Man' comprehends both the human individual as well as society and, therefore, it can qualify both equally; secondly, even the terms 'individual' and 'society' are not always mutually exclusive. In some contexts they are co-operative, in others, complementary, and in yet others, contradictory. Mostly, however, they have been seen as contraries, because it is the very nature of logical thought that it can operate only through mutually exclusive categories. We have cited the example of language above, which is the medium of the individual's self-expression as well as of mutual communication between individuals; but in its being it is impersonally social. It is noteworthy that only one term of language is personal and that is 'I'. But even that is a pronoun and it becomes personal only when the speaker refers to himself. Even in such usage, this privacy is not altogether private: it is privacy towards the other. On the other hand, in language itself, it is merely a pronoun, for which all privacies are identical.

But the terms 'individual' and 'society' are also opposed in some cases; for example, democracy is mainly an individual-centred system and socialism, socio-centric. The concepts of society proposed by Rousseau and John Rollis—which are democratic concepts—conceive society as rooted in the decisions of individual human beings. As against both these concepts, there is feudalism which is not a socio-centric system because sociality is indifferent to the individual. A socio-centric system is present either in Plato's *Republic* or in the books of Marx and Engels. But both of these are utopias and they do not reflect the real situation of western civilization.

Daya Krishna may say that he has used the term 'socio-centric' only for that concept in which the centre of meaning is never 'I', but only 'the other' or 'we'. For instance, Christ sacrificed himself

to liberate others from the fruit of sin. The opposed instance is that of the Buddha pursuing the path of self-realization in complete indifference to the sufferings of others. Secondly, Daya Krishna may say that the idea of atonement—redeeming others' guilt through sacrificing oneself—is absent in Indian thought. This is correct; but the question is whether this Christian concept really characterizes the behaviour or even the thought of western civilization. For instance, no western philosophy made this concept of redemption the basis of its ethics; on the other hand, are we sure that this concept is altogether absent from Indian literature? For example, we can point out that there is a hint of such a concept in the myth of Lord Siva drinking poison. Similarly, there are instances of persons risking their own safety to counteract threats to their family, undergoing penance to relieve the suffering of some relative; such instances abound everywhere in our literature. But they may not be reflected in our society or philosophy. As for the question of holding the individual to be responsible towards society in Marxism and other social ideologies, that is an altogether different matter and that concept is found to be well-established in the Indian idea of three debts.

Daya Krishna has called Indian civilization and culture *ātman*-centric. Accordingly, to him, one main feature of this is the maximum devaluation of 'concern for the other'. If we characterize western civilization as 'concern towards the presence of the other' and understand the word 'concern' to mean 'consciousness of significance', then it would be a more correct description of western civilization and then it expresses its distinctness from Indian culture much better. But here we would like to add a footnote that its this feature or distinction is similar to the attempt to define man by his capacity to laugh merely because no other species of animals is blessed with this provision in its corporeal system.

The characterization of Indian culture as *ātman*-centric is partially appropriate, but only partially, because this very culture has given birth to the idea of 'yajña' or sacrifice—in which the concern for the other is basic and in which 'the other' comprises the whole universe, not just humanity. It was during the post-Vedic era that the idea of the essential unity of 'I' and 'thou' arose, but

it is to be noted that this view was first mainly accepted amongst the Buddhists—not among the brahmins. For example, this view is almost absent from Sanskrit epics, *purāṇas* and *smṛtis*. Daya Krishna calls the concepts of incarnation and Bodhisattva exceptions, whereas they formed the very substance of ancient poetry, the *purāṇas* and communal life. It is worth noting here that *Arthaśāstra* and *Kāmasūtra* were products of the living brahmin mind of this very period, and not the creation of the decadent mind which, according to his statement, had been debilitated by the concept of the transcendental self.

No doubt, it is this *ātman*-centricity which characterizes Indian culture in an important way. Only this could achieve the Advaitic vision of the Buddhists and the Vedāntins and the Sāṅkhyan concepts of transcendental witness and discriminative ability between self and not-self; only this could have made the resultant philosophy the prominent viewpoint of Indian society after Śaṅkarācārya. Daya Krishna's statement of this viewpoint is almost true, but we find ourselves in disagreement with an important conclusion related to it. According to him, 'the concern for others is the root of all ethics and consequently, Indian culture is not moral, but amoral'. But if it is so, then what kind of imperative can be read in the formula '*ātmarthe sarvaṁ tyajet*'? Daya Krishna's answer is: it is the command to transcend ethics. But then, what is meant by '*tyajedekam kulasyārthe*' (the individual must sacrifice himself for the sake of the clan)? He will, we hope, at least grant the status of a moral imperative to this dictum. Then, is not this imperative the necessary prerequisite or precondition for the other and ultimate imperative? Actually, wherever in the Vedāntic texts we come across the mention of '*adhikāri*' we find this principle of ethics emphasized. If it is so, then it is clear that the Indian cultural standpoint envisages not the neglect of ethical conduct, but the need to rise to an even higher ground of being through ethical living.

It really will not do to define ethics as 'concern for others' well-being'. It is much more appropriate to define it as 'realizing one's self'. Here, it would be in place to remember the 'Creto' dialogue of Plato, where Socrates rejects the advice to free himself from jail and enumerates the harms caused by such an act.

Soul (or self), according to him, will be the first thing that would be compromised and hurt by such an act; friend and country come next. Besides these we can take such universally accepted moral ideals as celibacy, truth and inner freedom from desire. Among these, obviously, the first and third are independent of 'the other' and, as for the second, even there, 'the other' is only apparently and not actually implicated, because the essence of 'truth' consists not in speaking the truth, but in being truthful in oneself. About Daya Krishna's view of ethics, we can at the most say that it is an aspiration for achieving perfection in the secular life and world, not an aspiration towards a trans-worldly, supernatural life of the spirit; also, that it includes the good of others, whereas in the Indian concept of the quest for spiritual perfection, the other is only the not-self. We must remember, however, that even within this secular concept of ethics, 'concern for others' is not accepted as an end in itself, but only as a means of attainment of the good.

In this connection, it would be relevant to refer to those existentialists according to whom the existence of the other causes anxiety and fear. If you base morality on your concern for the other, then this doctrine of existentialism becomes automatically immoral. But this school of philosophy sees the essence of ethics not in commitment to others, but in commitment to one's self and authenticity of the self. Similarly, for Kant, the essence of ethics consists in the goodness or perfection of will, which means the establishment of self in its transcendence, and attainment of freedom from phenomenality. Although Sartre's concept of bad faith is almost the opposite of Kant's concept, both are similar with respect to the idea of 'commitment to the other'. Neither of them posits the existence of the other as the root of ethics. Here it can be said that the ethical propositions of Kant are based on 'concern for others'. But this is not true. His propositions, in fact, establish the selflessness of moral perception and the identity (unity) of the self and the other in transcendental spirit—not the inevitability of the otherness of the other. One can find parallels to all the ethical precepts of Kant in the various collections of Sanskrit aphoristic literature.

It is true that Indian philosophers did not give detailed consideration to the problems of ethics. They thought it to be the concern of the law-givers (*smṛtikāras*). That only means that in their opinion, morality—that is, what is ethical conduct and what is not—was determinable by social tradition and they believed that the being of ethics was rooted in the quest for self-realization. We have to admit the fact that this view was responsible for a lot of damage. It made ethical conduct devoid of creativity, mechanical, and more a matter of practical life, divorced from spirituality. This situation made living with such a contradiction between *paramārtha* and *vyavahāra* so normal that even the Vedāntins who thought the distinction between the self and the other merely illusory and rooted in ignorance, could, in actual practice, not only tolerate but even vindicate the caste-system. The real reason behind such a state of affairs, however, was not what Daya Krishna calls *ātman*-centricity but a kind of cultural ageing. Otherwise, this fundamental cleavage between practical life and transcendental truth—ethical perception and actual ethical conduct—is found in Kant as well, and this is the context of his ethical philosophizing itself. The cleavage is in no way less conspicuous than we find in Vedānta or Sāṃkhya. But the awareness of this gulf was never seen as a justification of unethical conduct or exemption from the ethical code. On the other hand, '*Ātmanah pratikūlāni pareṣām na samācareḥ*' (Don't do to others what you would not wish to be done to yourself) was accepted as the norm of ethical conduct in India, as it is the norm in Kant as well. And like in India, there is no dearth of moral insensitivity or immoral behaviour in medieval or modern West. We all know how the followers of Christ propagated Christianity and we are also witnessing how they are presently propounding and practising the theory of 'armament for peace'. So far as the question of moral thinking by philosophers is concerned, we all know that a prominent school of philosophy called 'empiricism' sees morality as 'groundless' and hence not worthy of philosophical thought. As for psychoanalysis, existentialism and phenomenology, all of them are equally indifferent to moral considerations.

The third lecture has action (*karma*) for its theme. Only the Hindu view of *karma* has been discussed here. But even of that view, it is an entirely inadequate, and at some places even incorrect, exposition. Its inadequacy can be seen particularly in its complete disregard of *yajña*-oriented *karma*. He is mostly preoccupied with the *Gītā* and this seems rather unjust. But at the outset, in about two pages, he has given some thought to the role of 'the other' in action and the consequences of action. It seems necessary, therefore, to say a few words about that here. Other persons appear as either instruments of or as impediments to action. Now, according to Daya Krishna, the only alternatives in the latter situation is 'to coerce or cajole other persons who oppose and obstruct the realization of one's ends'. In both these forms, he says, 'there is obvious violation of the "otherness" of the other and the use of him as an instrument to one's own purposes. It is thus that action which was ostensibly undertaken for the securing of moral ends turns into the perpetuation of immorality' (p. 27). Now, what we find rather difficult to understand is, why does one need to cajole or coerce the obstructing other? Why can't he be won over through persuasion? And, secondly, how can cajolement or coercion reduce a person to an instrument? We do not cajole an animal or a stone; we only cajole a man. And there what we intend is simply this: 'If you do not agree with my views, it doesn't matter, but please let me act according to my ideas, because as a person, I have the same right to follow my ideas as you do.' As for coercion, this does seem to amount to a negation of the other's otherness, but actually, it is not so even there, if care is taken to ensure that this measure is not hurting the legitimate interest of the opponent and since he is deliberately and unreasonably obstructing my freedom, he is being unethical and therefore, naturally, 'he is seen as a person'. After all we are acknowledging his ability to realize that he is behaving unethically and that he is not making proper use of his moral ability.

Daya Krishna goes on to say that 'a minimum amount of hypocrisy seems inevitable when one acts as a member of a family, society or nation, which is immoral' (p. 28). In other words, immoral conduct becomes inevitable when we act as the member

of a group. Here also, perhaps, he wishes to draw attention to the necessary condition inherent in moral contexts, that on the one hand a community is presupposed for ethical conduct, and on the other hand the very presence of a community and its membership makes immorality inevitable. But if Daya Krishna would look at it a bit more closely, he would find that generally all communities and their members show laxity in observing even the accepted norms of moral conduct and always effect a compromise with their interest or convenience. In other words, it is only the norm of practical conduct or worldly morality that prevails in society as well as individual life and not the norm of ethical wisdom which is the real morality. If any person is totally committed to moral truthfulness and keeps his conscience always alert, he simply has no use for hypocrisy and society also does not expect it from him.

Now, we shall consider briefly Daya Krishna's critique of the *Gītā*. According to him the *Gītā* gives two contradictory directions for action. One is the direction of 'action done without regard to the fruits', and 'the other direction lies in sterilizing action through disconnecting it from egoistic desire and pursuing it for the sake of the Lord, or for the promotion and perpetuation of *dharma*'. According to him the second direction is opposed to the first, because the second is action done for the sake of specific purposes (pp. 31-33). This critique shows an incapacity in understanding the concepts of *niṣkāmatā* as well as *iśvarārtha*. One wonders how Daya Krishna interprets *niṣkāmatā* as purposelessness. To our mind it is only an inner freedom or composure towards success or failure in one's endeavour. On an ordinary level, the phrase 'sportsman's spirit' also hints at this meaning. Otherwise, how can any action be undertaken without any purpose? If we get up and start walking, it is only with the aim of reaching somewhere, or of enjoying a walk—unless we are downright mad and just loaf about. Now, *iśvarārthā* or dedication to the lord is only another name for detachment from the fruits of one's actions. It means 'doing actions' in the spirit of taking it to be God's will and considering the determination of its result to be beyond one's power, maintaining one's state of composure, even if the result is not favourable. Thus, *iśvarārtha* is only

an explanation of the concept of *niṣkāmatā*. Detachment from desire or from the fruits of one's action can be significant only if we either deem desire itself as not-self, or if we act in a spirit of dedication to God. The first of these is Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and the second, Bhakti-Yoga.

A little further, Daya Krishna speaks of the principle of *karma* rooted in suffering. But this idea is alien to the Indian mind. After proposing that 'in action, the mind is somehow concerned with something outside itself', he says that

this aspect of action gets a deeper twist, if the action happens to be moral action. Once one's consciousness gets filled with the claims of others, there is no respite, no release, no joy even in the little joys of life. Humanity is vast and its sufferings immense and one has to cultivate blindness and deafness that one may not see or hear what goes on around.

Further on, he makes his point even more explicit.

... if the action is moral, it has to be concerned with the fruits of one's action. Indifference in such a context is the sign of immorality and it does not matter at all if such a concern disturbs one's equanimity of being or consciousness. Rather one ought to be disturbed and if one is not so disturbed at the sufferings of others, one is not a human being. . . . The *Gītā* skirts past the basic conflict and recommends both the non-egoistic action for the sake of the Lord or the unmotivated action. . . . (p. 32)

Let us state clearly, at the outset, that the *Gītā* does not skirt this question, but is emphatically clear in its insistence on maintaining a state of undisturbed calm. Arjuna's despondency was based on the imminent destruction of relatives and the threat of chaos in society. In consequence, the feelings roused within him were feelings of renunciation and compassion, not cowardice or stupor. That is what Krishna had in mind when he said to him, 'You are grieving for things not worth grieving about.' Kant too says the same thing. According to him, 'if you help others out

because you are moved by pity, then your action will not be moral, because, then you would be acting upon a sentimental impulse, and not out of a sense of duty, rising above your sensibility.' Apart from this epistemological principle, one may ask, how is there moral grandeur in being moved by pity? Is it not more creditable to accept a painful situation as the decree of destiny and exert oneself in removing the pain as a part of one's duty or in obedience to the Supreme Power? It is but human to be moved by others' sufferings and do something due to that feeling, but it is superhuman to act disinterestedly in the spirit of a medium, or as an instrument of the divine.

Here we are reminded of an action of Gandhiji. There was a terrible earthquake in Quetta, which resulted in many casualties. Gandhiji called it 'the fruit of our actions'. Rabindranath Tagore was very annoyed at this remark and attributed it to Gandhiji's heartlessness. But the biggest help to the victims was rendered by Gandhiji. Now, which of these would be called higher morality—the passionate gesture of pity or the calm and solid response to the challenge for right action, in the philosophic or religious state of mind which accepts such accidents as part of a cosmic design, or the play of the divine or decree of destiny?

This is, of course, by no means to suggest that one should not exert oneself to ameliorate the sufferings of others, although it cannot be prescribed as a compulsive obligation of man. It would depend on the context in which you exist. For instance, Gandhiji went forth to help the victims of Quetta, and Sri Aurobindo did not; maybe he did not express any sympathy either. Surely this does not entitle us to call Sri Aurobindo immoral or indifferent to morality. To do so would be tantamount to calling a poet or philosopher a traitor if he does not join the army when his country is facing foreign aggression.

The fourth lecture has the title 'Perspectives of Freedom'. It discusses Indian and western concepts of freedom. Daya Krishna applies the Spenglerian adjective 'Faustian' to the western viewpoint and considers Vedānta and Sāṃkhya to be representatives of the Indian standpoint. He sees the essence of freedom in 'overcoming the other'. So, Vedāntic freedom consists in denying the

reality of the other and Faustian freedom in annihilation of the other. Daya Krishna sees no fundamental difference between the two; but even then according to him, there is this difference between them: that, in the Faustian view, the existence of the other is taken for granted, because otherwise there will not arise the motivation to annihilate it.

Daya Krishna has not given the logic or justification of thus viewing freedom as the absence or overcoming of the other. If the meaning or the necessary prerequisite of freedom be understood as absence of the other, then society would become non-existent. According to this concept of freedom, the very existence of society would become the existence of an innate obstacle to freedom. In fact, that is what Daya Krishna believes, although he does not say so plainly. At the root of this definition of freedom as 'absence of the other' or singleness, there seems to lie a confusion with the metaphysical doctrine that says that the existence of more than one substance would necessarily mean their mutual limitation. But it is clear from the philosophies of Kant and Descartes and also from Indian philosophical systems other than Sāṃkhya and Vedānta that this limitation is not necessarily restrictive of freedom. On the practical level, of course, otherness can become an obstacle to freedom, but it can equally become an auxiliary to freedom as can be plainly observed in the dialogues of Socrates and in the concept of '*sat sanga*'. In the Bhakti school, even the otherness of God has not been considered to be an obstacle to freedom. Moreover, if we consider the existence of the other to be necessary for morality, as Daya Krishna certainly does, then even morality would become an obstacle to freedom. In the same way, there could remain no scope for choice in freedom because even choice presupposes otherness of the things to be chosen or otherness of situations for choice.

As far as the question of defining western civilization in terms of the Faustian quest, and then, of defining this quest as 'the annihilation of the freedom of all others except oneself' is concerned, this also does not appear to be appropriate. One can consider it to be one tendency of the western mind, but cannot claim it to be its normal nature. Neither in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle nor in Christianity do we find this to be the norm.

Christianity gives the highest place to the concept of human brotherhood. Even the dialectics of Hegel and Marx do not amount to the seeking of self-aggrandizement through the annihilation of one party by another but the realization of the good of the self through a synthesis of both on a higher level.

Let us suppose that the perspective of freedom in the West is based on 'suspicion towards the existence of the other', and that western history is 'a perpetual process of each trying to subjugate the other to his own will' (p. 42). This would mean that the history of India is the history of trying to avoid such conflicts with the other. But it is not so. Daya Krishna finds the difference between the Advaitic and Faustian orientations in another state of mind. He contends that 'the wars fought in India—however fierce and prolonged, have seldom been ideologically oriented as in the West' (43). What is the proof for this claim? Next, what is this 'other' in the Faustian quest? Is it ideological or biological? Daya Krishna would claim it is ideological. But what is the basis for such a claim? According to him, in the Indian view, 'The temporal life of man with all its sufferings and struggles has no significance', whereas in the West, 'men and groups are real embodiments of values and their social conflicts between values and ideals of different kinds. Whether the vision be Jewish, Christian, Hegelian or Marxian, the historical process stands at the centre of the vision, and the struggles stand vindicated and meaningful in and through that context alone'.

But, then, in India too, the wars described in the epics had been fought for the vindication of certain ideals and values. Daya Krishna's rejoinder is that they were not secular but righteous wars in which, 'the task of establishing the reign and righteousness was left to the lord' (43-44). This is also a misleading depiction of both civilizations. The Christian, Hegelian and Marxian ideologies certainly view history as being a purposeful process but they do not see the vehicles of that history—individuals or societies—as motivated by that purpose. On the contrary, according to them, they fought because of mutual jealousy and clash of interests, but in spite of themselves they served a transcendent historical purpose. As for the religious origins of war and history, the Christian view of history is completely religious and the Hegelian

view is based on the transcendental-spiritual. On the other end of the scale, the wars of Indian epics are not wars between gods and demons. The Rāmāyaṇa war was fought to vindicate the social order against the destroyers of that order and the Mahābhārata war was fought to defend one's legitimate rights. The battles fought in more recent history by Guru Govind Singh, Shivāji and Pratāp were also inspired by pure thoughts and ideals. Thus, the difference between India and the West is not that the historical struggles of the first took place without any sense of values and those of the second to defend certain values. The real difference can be stated thus: For India, history has no transcendental reality, whereas for the West, it has.

We now come to the fifth lecture entitled 'The Search for a Measuring Rod'. Measuring rods can be qualitative or quantitative, and they can be moral or logical. Leaving aside the quantitative, we can classify all the others under 'qualitative' which describe in terms of better or worse as against the quantitative which describe in terms of more or less. In fact, however, more and less are not always quantitative as in the sentence—'Rāma is more handsome than Shyām'. The question that arises is: Which measuring rod shall we apply to freedom—qualitative or quantitative? The probable answer is, if the context is that of external impediments, it will be quantitative and if that of experience or volition, qualitative.

But, can any experience or state of freedom be possible without present, absent, or probable impediment? And, can any obstruction arise without the context of the experience of freedom? If the answer be in the negative, then in both these conditions the measuring rod cannot be quantitative. It can be quantitative only if individuals are presented with a questionnaire and their answers accepted as expressing freedom or its absence. To accept it as a criterion, as is being done today, can only be a mockery of intelligence, and nothing else. Anyway, Daya Krishna gives no reason to show how the measuring rod of freedom can be quantitative—let alone any theory. Of course, he repeats again and again that this is to be discovered by others and if they have not done it, it is sheer indolence on their part. According to him,

'the problem of the legitimacy of power has always seemed central to the discussions in political science. It is surprising, therefore, that little work seems to have been done with respect to the measurement of political liberty. . . .' (63-64) Similarly, 'For each of these sectors, the idea of freedom; immanent and relevant to it, will have to be operationally defined . . . the relations between the realms and the freedoms immanent to each of them and between the conditions requisite for the emergence of each of these freedoms have to be investigated and made the subject of both theoretical and empirical study' (53). But although he considers this task necessary, Daya Krishna neither accomplishes it himself nor tells us how it can be accomplished.

In the course of this lecture, Daya Krishna makes a significant remark, which though in itself familiar is nevertheless fatal to that search for a quantitative measuring rod—which he desires and recommends. To quote him, 'It is obviously wrong to search for a single criterion for freedom which would suffice for all countries and cultures.' All right; but what is the basis of this cultural difference? Is it not only that every culture has its own distinctive subjectivity? For example, in one culture, the choice of bride or bridegroom by others would be considered a great blow to freedom, whereas for members of another culture, it might well be something very natural. The question is: granted the subjectivity of freedom, is it not inconsistent to search for a quantitative criterion? What astonishes us is that although in the course of his last lecture, Daya Krishna had himself viewed the Indian concept of freedom as being grounded 'in one's own being', here he is talking of a quantitative criterion for it. Even more astonishing is his belief in the measurability of freedom in spite of his own admission that it is the essence of humanity as well as social life and in spite of the fact that he considers the reality of both the individual and society as valuational rather than natural. So far as the west is concerned, it is only in the modern age that this idea of insisting on quantitative measurability as an attribute of being has arisen. But we have to remember that even there, both democracy and Marxism claim to confer freedom on man and the protagonists of both are locked in a cut-throat competition, calling each other the enemy of human freedom. If this is the situation,

how can they accept one particular criterion of measurement? This is beyond our understanding.

The title of the sixth and last lecture of the book is 'Society, Reality or Utopia'. In the first chapter also the author has touched upon this theme. Hence one hardly expected any new thought here; only further explication and expression was expected. But it is not so; here Daya Krishna makes new observations which contradict the thoughts propounded earlier. Although he does try to make them cohere, but the attempt does not succeed because it cannot succeed. He begins with a reiteration of earlier propositions: 'What is the nature of society?', or 'How ought society to be correctly conceived of?' The question will be seen not as a cognitive question but as a valuational question masquerading in a deceptive cognitive garb. The question if correctly understood, is a demand for valuational decision. It asks what kind of society would you like to have or what kind would you prefer? (68) But, further on he raises the question, which has, in fact, been raised by many others: that, then there is no question of truth of society. It remains only 'to spell out your notion of utopia or what society ought to be.'

But, then, this would lead to a justification of such control and manipulation of views and thoughts which could be claimed to be necessary for carrying society forward in the 'right direction.' This is what dictatorial regimes do. It would be futile, then, to blame Hitler and Stalin, because it becomes necessary to censor such news and speeches which threaten to lead society in a supposedly wrong direction. In other words, according to the above-mentioned conception of society—'truth is what it ought to be'. Daya Krishna coped with this unintended conclusion of his reasoning thus:

This obviously is to give up the notion of scientific objectivity as usually interpreted and understood in most fields of modern knowledge. It seems almost a counsel of despair, an attempt to give up and renounce once and for all the seeking for objectivity and truth. But this is not necessary. The social scientist qua scientist need not become partisan in the pro-

cess of history. It is the supreme capacity of self-conscious thought to objectify everything and there seems no reason why it should fail in face of the peculiar situation found with respect to social reality in the social sciences. The realization that the theoretic postulations in the social sciences have inescapably a hidden value-dimension poses the challenge to make it explicit and bring it into the open. The scientist, however, need not identify himself with the value-consequence and the value-commitment involved in the postulation. He can work out alternative postulations with their alternative value-consequences and commitment and articulate them in the fullest possible manner. (71)

This is obviously contrary to what he had propounded earlier. It is true that self-conscious thought objectifies everything, but does not its uniqueness consist in objectifying itself? It is this objectification which is the basis of thought and speculative knowledge. This was well known to people of pre-scientific and pre-modern periods and they did possess the capacity for objectification in the same way as men of the modern scientific age do. If we hold that one compulsory pre-condition of objectivity is disinterestedness, then it would become controversial whether the modern age does not suffer from a scientific pre-disposition and is therefore lacking in that ideal. But leaving this aside as a digression, the question that poses itself here is: if the social scientist can view society and the quest of values, etc. in the spirit of value-neutral objectivity, then what is the meaning of the inevitable value-objectness of society? Daya Krishna says that the social scientist can devise alternative models or ideal types for society in a value-neutral spirit. We do not wish to oppose this proposal. We are also aware that many people follow his proposal very strenuously. But the question we have to ask is, what will then happen to that idea of Daya Krishna according to which society was said to be fundamentally value-object and which held that any proposition about society was bound to be valuational. Daya Krishna of course, tries to find a way out of this contradiction. He says, 'The ideal type shall merge with the ideal and provide a valuational idea to action' (74). He

further points out: 'But to think that one may construct an ideal type in the social sciences without it possibly turning into an ideal is to misunderstand the nature of the social sciences. . . . We have had "economic man", "sexual man", the "class man", the "race man" constructed as ideal types and affecting actual men in the process. Freud and Marx are household names in the twentieth century . . .' (75-76). Let us suppose this to be true; but then, how is the value-neutrality of the ideal type affected by its being executed as an ideal? And is there any logical necessity behind any type being realized as value? Is this execution not mere accident?

The main question is whether the above models are really value-free. Were they not the product of deep valuational prejudices or other kinds of prejudices? Similarly, is the so-called scientific point of view any less value-prone than religiosity—whatever may be the form of the value-judgment inherent in it! For instance, is it a less strenuous task to convert freedom into something which is measurable or to search for a criterion to measure it? Perhaps that is why Daya Krishna has not attempted it himself; he has only advised others to attempt it. Why, then, should anyone undertake such an exertion if he does not feel a deep valuational commitment to it? Here, we expect something else from Daya Krishna: he should tell us how he sees any consistency between his belief in the valuational nature of society and the value-free scientific determination as well as value-free objectification of it in the form of alternative models?

As we pointed out at the very outset of this critique, we find Daya Krishna's philosophical view of society quite convincing and congenial, and its exposition too generally correct. But, we find ourselves disagreeing on some points. Here we have chosen to highlight just those points and present our own views. It is quite possible that our criticisms may prove to be totally illusory; we may have failed to comprehend his arguments. Sometimes, moreover, it might be that our view of a particular situation represents only one aspect of it and another person may present us with a startlingly different aspect of it. Maybe, that is what we have been doing here. It is up to Daya Krishna now to respond to our critique and let us know where we stand.

A Critical Reappraisal of Daya Krishna's Views on Social Reality and its Relation to Philosophy

YOGESH GUPTA

This paper is a critical comment on some of the major contentions made by Daya Krishna in the following two articles: (a) 'Distinctions between Natural Sciences, Social Sciences and Humanities', in *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. XVI, 1964; and (b) 'Philosophical Theory and Social Reality', in *Philosophical Theory and Social Reality*, edited by Ravindra Kumar, 1984.

As the titles of both the articles suggest, the central problem discussed is more or less the same, i.e. the characterization of the nature of the inter-relationships between the realms of the social sciences, natural sciences and humanities. The fundamental issue is whether any radical distinction between the nature of the object or the reality studied in these realms leads to any corresponding distinction in their methodologies. In other words, is there a multiplicity of realities? And, do they belong to the same cognitive and methodological levels? Daya Krishna wants to emphasize that there are different types of objects of knowledge which require different ways of understanding.

My aim in this paper is two-fold. First, to give an exposition and critical assessment of the contentions in question. Second, to argue in support of the essential sameness of cognitive disciplines of the empirical sciences, i.e. the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities.¹ In this light the present article is divided into the following three parts:

- I. While giving an exposition of Daya Krishna's 1964 article in Part I, stress has been laid on those views which have been abandoned by him in his later article, i.e. the 1984 article.
- II. Part II of the present paper consists of two sections. Section I gives an exposition of Daya Krishna's views as presented in his 1984 article by citing some detailed quotations from it. Section II gives a detailed critical assessment of his views underlying these quotations.
- III. Part III of the article is positive. Here an effort is made to establish the thesis of unity of the disciplines of empirical sciences from four points of views, i.e. (i) the perspective of the content; (ii) the perspective of the method, (iii) the perspective of the attitude, and (iv) the perspective of the model of explanation. The first perspective can be treated at the methodological and epistemological levels. In the first two perspectives, the Sāṅkhyan model of *triṅga* is being used. In the third perspective the claim of unity is supported by extending Daya Krishna's views on the nature of philosophy to the realm of the natural sciences. In the last perspective, the claim is buttressed by maintaining the thesis of the unity of explanation on the basis of the deductive-nomological or inductive statistical or probabilistic model as an underlying explanatory model used in all empirical sciences.

PART I

The author begins his 1964 article by pointing out that there are radical differences between the three areas of the cognitive realm: the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities suffer from a situation of having diverse research trends which does not seem to be the case in the realm of the natural sciences. Moreover, for him, the distinction between the three realms is not of convenience alone but is embedded in the very nature of their concerns. He states that the natural sciences are primarily concerned with a description of the causal structure of

phenomena. The realm of ends, purposes and values is the concern of the social sciences, while the notion of meaning is the prime concern of the humanities. He also wants to make a sharp division between the humanities and the social sciences. The areas of the two, he suggests, are altogether different from each other. As he writes, 'To look at the humanities from the perspective of the social sciences or to see them as merely contributory to them is to miss their essential nature'. (p. 514)

Here it is not clear what precisely the term 'humanities' stands for. At one place for him, 'philosophy, history and literature are the pivotal points in the studies designated as humanities'. (p. 514) But he also states that 'The term "humanities" when applied to literature or the fine arts means primarily critical apprehension and appreciation. Usually it does not mean literature or the arts themselves'. (p. 514)

He also talks of the significance of the relation of embeddability rather than the relation of complete separateness among the realms. In fact, his talk of the relation of embeddability, justifying the notion of the interdisciplinary character of the realms, tends to militate against his thesis of alternative ways of understanding and of radical distinctness between the realms on the basis of their distinct concerns. In support of the interdisciplinary character of the disciplines he argues that in the social sciences the methodology is borrowed from the natural sciences and the humanities. A social scientist always suffers from a double temptation. As he remarks, 'In fact the intertwining of the causal and the valuational is so much a feature of the studies concerning man that one may almost sensibly feel the pull of each in the work of any thinker.' (p. 515)

His raising the following questions—(a) How does natural science research contribute to philosophical speculation, and, more particularly, to reflection on the problem of knowledge? (b) Where lies the borderline between psychology as a natural science and psychology as a social science?—also tends to support the interdisciplinary character of the sciences. The following quotation from his paper gives explicit support to this character of the social sciences:

The aspects they are concerned with are almost equally important and thus there seems a sufficient *prima facie* ground for the application of the inter-disciplinary approach. . . . However, it should be remembered in this connection that as each discipline is concerned primarily with one aspect only or with one field where that aspect is displayed most prominently, it inevitably tends to treat the studies in the other disciplines as instrumental to the understanding of the aspect or the field with which it is concerned itself. This is repeated with each discipline and thus we have the spectacle of each using the other but only instrumentally. (p. 518)

Interestingly, not only this contention, but also the following views which seem to me closer to truth are totally abandoned in his later article of 1984. Besides, the classifications of the realms need some clarification:

(a) His view regarding the relationship between the social sciences and the humanities has either changed or has led otherwise to an inconsistent position. The phrase 'social reality', as used in the title of the paper of 1984, refers to the realm which is constituted by belief where art is considered as a paradigmatic case of such type of reality. But, in his 1964 article, art is classified as a branch of the humanities which tends to show, contrary to his earlier thesis, that no distinction can be maintained between the humanities and the social sciences.

(b) In his earlier article, Daya Krishna, after drawing a distinction between the social sciences and the humanities, treats philosophy as a branch of the humanities; yet, in the later article, he treats philosophy or philosophical theory as the life-blood of social reality. To make these latter views meaningful would necessitate a widening of the scope of what is meant by 'social reality', i.e. it would have to include not only the objects of study of the social sciences and the humanities, but also the reflection in such studies. But this will again imply either an inconsistency or a change in his position from the one held in the earlier article of 1964.

(c) His views in support of the interdisciplinary character of the social sciences, that there is in the social sciences an intertwining of causal and valuational categories, seems to have

undergone a change in the latter article of 1984. This, to my mind, gives an incorrect analysis of the nature of the discipline of the social sciences and is also inconsistent with the views he held earlier. Here, issues raised in (b) and (c) will be seen later in detail in this article.

PART II

Section 1

Daya Krishna begins his 1984 article by making a distinction between the natural sciences and the social sciences on the basis of a distinction between 'believed to be true' and 'true'. At the end of his article he concludes that philosophy is the life-blood or essence of social reality. Before we evaluate these two major theses, we would like to enunciate some of the relevant passages from the article which, though overlapping, yet express his views on these issues along with some other equally crucial and inter-related ones.

On the issue of the unity of method or understanding of the realms

Regarding this, he says, 'the search for a monistic understanding of one type or the other is laudable, but whether it equally succeeds in all realms is questionable'.

On the nature of the realm of social reality

He says clearly and emphatically, 'What is given in these realms is, to a very large extent, what one believes to be given, and what one creates through one's action is again the result, to a very large extent, of what one believes to be the case. What is given is not there apart from the beliefs entertained about it by men, just as what one believes to be the case determines one's action irrespective of the fact whether or not the belief is true. In the realm of the mind, what is believed to be true functions almost in the same way as what is true and thus the radical differences between truth and falsehood is replaced by the dynamic difference between what is believed to be true and what is not so believed.' (p. 29)

On the issue of the inter-relationship between belief, knowledge and action in the context of social reality

He writes that 'the role of beliefs, whether true or false or whether held on grounds which are epistemically relevant or irrelevant, in constituting social reality can hardly be disputed. The difference in this regard between knowledge and belief as sought is irrelevant . . . what matters is the success or the failure of action or at a deeper level, of moral satisfaction or dissatisfaction, or perhaps of spiritual peace or joy or the opposite of these sentiments. In a profound sense, therefore, knowledge has been irrelevant to man except of the moral or the spiritual kind, or when it occurs in a causal context promising control and power over phenomena'. (pp. 31-32)

On the nature and uniqueness of social reality

He says, 'The trouble with the term "social reality" is that it not only means so many things, but also has so many levels, each substantially and even radically different from the other. Yet whatever the level, there is always a creative, and a collectively creative element in it which gives it that characteristic freedom which "nature" at least when it is cognitively apprehended, seems to lack entirely.' (p. 32)

On the nature of the relation of philosophy to the social sciences and social reality

'The life of philosophy, then, is the life of reason and the life of reason is the life of objection and counter-objection and though this may degenerate into a game where display of skill alone matters, at a deeper and more serious level it is always in the service of a restless search for the truth which can never rest at any particular place for long.' (p. 37)

And further, 'To give shape to thought, to provide it with the terms of its own articulation, to lay down the norms of meaningful discourse, and, at a larger remove, of meaningful living itself, are some of the things that philosophy does and, in doing so, shapes social reality both in its actual and in its ideal aspect. The categories of thought, the meaningfulness of questions, the relevance of answers, the perennialness of problems, the tentative-

ness of solutions . . . all these are as much the life-blood of philosophy as of social reality.' (p. 37)

Section II

Now we will attempt a critical assessment of each of the issues underlying the above-cited extracts from his article of 1984.

So far as the first issue is concerned, that is, whether the claim of unity is feasible, it seems to be based on a wrong assumption. It appears as if those who argue for the distinctness of the realms are partly awed by the implications of the logical positivist movement. There lurks an apprehension that to support the (logical positivist) slogan of unity of the sciences, or, in other words, the homogeneity between the realms, is to accept behaviourism, reductionism or physicalism. This idea of unity of the sciences was in fact first propounded systematically by logical positivists. It was rooted in their theory of knowledge and in their opposition to the idea of different kinds of sciences, different kinds of objects, different kinds of methods and different kinds of realities. Instead of laying emphasis on methods or on any other allied aspect, the logical positivist firmly believes, but to my mind incorrectly, that the idea of unity of the sciences can be established on the basis of content alone. Accordingly, they think that physical language or scientific language is the only basic or fundamental language, capable of comprehending or expressing the content of any discipline. They further believe that if such language is incapable of comprehending or translating the content of any other discipline it does not show that the idea of unity of the sciences is untenable. It only shows, as they believe, the necessity of devising some other language which may be more basic or adequate for the purpose.

We will discuss the issues involved in the second quotation along with the issues raised in the third and fourth quotations.

The third quotation which primarily deals with the analysis of human action seems to have an internal inconsistency. Before we note this, we would first like to recall in brief his views in the following three theses:

- (i) Knowledge is irrelevant to action except that of a moral and spiritual kind.
- (ii) The goodness of an action in terms of success matters only at the first level; what matters at a deeper level is moral satisfaction or dissatisfaction or spiritual joy.
- (iii) In the realm of action or in social reality one cannot make any objective distinctions between what appears to be true and what is really true; cause and effect and truth and falsity. Rather all of these epistemic distinctions are to be replaced by the dynamic distinction between what is believed to be true and believed to be false or not so believed.

So far as contention (i) is concerned the issue arises: what type of knowledge is of a spiritual and religious kind? Is it knowledge in a standard sense whose essential ingredients are truth-falsity and cause-effect categories? If so, how would this view be consistent with his main contention mentioned in thesis (iii) relating to the uniqueness of social reality? Otherwise, it is not acceptable. For, then, we will have to accept two types of knowledge.

Looking at thesis (ii) we find that his very analysis of the goodness of an action in terms of it being successful,² where an action based on false belief, i.e. a belief which may be 'believed to be true', can be called good if successful, is untenable. However, it is not clear what he means by saying that the goodness of an action in terms of success matters only at the first level. Does he want to maintain two levels of social reality; one, a superficial level, i.e. a level of appearance or a level of successfulness, and the other a deeper level, i.e. a level of reality and not of appearance, or a level of moral satisfaction not of successfulness? If it is so, does this imply that the cause-effect category is redundant only at a superficial level and not at a deeper level of social reality? If not, then what will be the distinguishing factor between the level of successfulness and the level of moral satisfaction or dissatisfaction? Otherwise, this goes against his central contentions made in the 1984 article in the following ways:

- (a) First, either the very first few lines stressing the unique

characteristic of the social sciences and social reality in terms of the absence of objective distinctions between truth-falsity and the redundancy of cause-effect category is not true, i.e. his contention (iii) will have to be given up; or

- (b) His talk of the levels of social reality, i.e. his contention (ii) will have to be given up or ruled out.

Looking at his thesis (iii), it seems that his analysis of action or of social reality, where the ontic status of the nature of what is given is replaced by what one believes to be given, i.e. what is given there is not only not-true apart from belief but is also created by what one believes to be given, is not correct. In fact what he says about the nature of social reality, namely, the role of belief whether true or false in constituting social reality, is much more relevant in the context of spirituality or more specifically in the Bhakti tradition than in any other field.

Contrary to his analysis, if we look at the various attempts at analysis of the concept of action done by philosophers of history or philosophers of the social sciences, we find the category of causality or its related concepts occupy a common/central assumption in all of them. In fact, in their analysis the very presupposition of an intentional action minimally requires:

- (a) a rational agent who is capable of achieving the desired end or purpose,
- (b) his ability to perform the action,
- (c) his causal knowledge about the action and its corresponding means to achieve the desired end, and
- (d) expectations of consistent behaviour regarding intention and corresponding action or inner and outer manifestation of an action. It shows that the causal category is fundamental in any adequate analysis of the concept of action.

If we look minutely at Daya Krishna's suggestion of redundancies of the notion of truth and falsity (like that of the causal category in the realm of social reality), then the situation would be worse or at least would not be philosophically desirable. For, it

is true that in actual practice most of our actions are guided by the appearance and inner manifestation or image of a person's action. These cases are cases where what is believed to be true or what is believed to be false functions as what is really true or false. But our philosophical theory of social reality, being not just a descriptive theory, should not be based or grounded on such empirical facts alone where 'what appears to be true' is equated with 'to be true'. It is necessary for any epistemologically and ontologically sound theory of social reality that it should also take into account other cases where the assumed identity does not work and one has to make a distinction between what is 'believed to be true' and 'what is true'. If there is a consistency between what one really is and what one appears to be, i.e. a consistency between inner and outer aspect, then it would not create any problem. For, in that case, what appears or is believed to be true would really be true. But if we look at the cases of disparity, i.e. cases where the manifest or appearance is at variance with what is real or actual than a theory of social reality becomes problematic. It seems that such cases of disparity should be treated as instantiations or illustrations of deviation from a model or a theory. But, because there are such cases of disparity it ought not to be assumed that what one 'believes to be true' is 'really true' or what is 'believed to be given' is 'really given'. Rather, one's cognitive responsibility lies in distinguishing false belief, rumour, or appearance, which are the cases of what one believes to be true, from what is really the case, i.e. actuality. This actuality will be discovered or confirmed or the false image destroyed only at a deeper level by seeing those rational grounds on which the manifest image/appearance was based; otherwise the theory based on identity would (a) either have very limited application, i.e. only to the cases where identity between what is 'believed to be true' and 'is true' can strictly be held; or (b) be too wide to include everything and thus would lapse into triviality (as it would not be possible to provide a single instance as a counter example to this identity); (c) moreover, there would then be no such thing as false or wrong. For, if whatever one believes or appears to be true or false is true or false, then, what is really false may well have the same cognitive status as what is true. This implies that in his view

there is no place for the word appearance or reality. For, the use of either of the words presupposes that there are cases where what appears to be true is not really true.

It is obvious that none of these alternatives accommodates the commonsense intuitions about these things and thus does not seem to be philosophically sound. In fact, the ontological distinction between reality and appearance based on the epistemic distinction of truth-falsity is not only necessary in the realm of the natural sciences and philosophy, but also has to be made in the social realm of human interaction. Various examples can be given to support this contention. However, the following cases can be considered as limiting cases of sense-deception, i.e. cases where what appears to be true is never true or is always false. In the case of nature, the perception of the sun moving round the earth, or a part of stick which is straight but looks bent immersed in water, can be seen as its illustrations. Similarly, in the context of the action of *avatāras* (incarnations), this disparity may be seen where the actions which look like the action of an ordinary human being are in fact not so. The analogue of this disparity, i.e. between what one really is and our vision or our perception about it, can also be found in the case of actions of realized soul (*mahā-puruṣa*). Some of the Upaniṣadic teachings on the nature of the world or worldly pleasures may also be considered as good illustrations.³

In the realm of philosophy the old distinction between appearance and reality has recently been reformulated as the distinction between logical form and grammatical form. The former is the actual form of a sentence while the latter somehow gives us only its pseudo-form. For, the latter sometimes hides the real structure of a sentence which appears to be true, though in fact, it is not really so. Similarly, in the case of social reality (or action-interaction) we have to make a distinction between observation based on the naked eye and action based on the microscopic eye. It is true that the whole system of social phenomena or social reality is based on belief and mutual faith. But in crucial or unusual cases, i.e. cases where faith is challenged or where there is a controversy or disparity, one would have to make a distinction between what is the case and what is not the case, or between the

sphere of actuality and the sphere of rumour, belief or subjective impression. In such cases the understanding of an action should not be based merely on outer manifestation or subjective impression or rumour unless the investigator is rationally convinced that it is really so. For this one needs to go deep and see whether what looks like the case is really the case or not; one has to have a face-to-face dialogue with the minimum requirement of honesty and also constant repetitive observation of an individual's actions or interactions like we have in a world of facts or physical objects or the realm of the natural sciences. This shows that the realm of human inter-relationships is very much (at least at the cognitive level) like the realm of physical objects studied in the natural sciences. The uniqueness of the former realm gets no support from the views of Daya Krishna in which subjective impression or image alone has predominance and the distinction between truth and falsity is replaced by the distinction between 'believes to be true' and 'believes to be false'.

The issues regarding the nature of reality studied in the social and the natural sciences raised in the fourth quotation also need some clarification and modification. The crux of the views stated therein is also partially mentioned in the second quotation. The main contention is that the natural sciences deal with such objects of study as are given, fixed and about which our statements could be rendered true or false in an objective sense. On the contrary, social reality by its very nature is not given, but is always created or constructed in terms of man's beliefs and thus any statement about it cannot be true or false in any objective sense. It always has a sort of freedom which is absent in the realm of what is studied in the natural sciences.

There are various issues regarding the nature of social reality. Following are some of them which need clarification.

- (i) The term 'reality' in general and 'social reality' in particular in the title of the 1984 paper needs clarification. Is the word 'reality' in general purely an ontological concept or an epistemological or methodological concept too? It seems that for him it is both. First, since the task of the nature of reality, for him,

is inevitably related with the methodological task of ways of understanding in the sense that there are not only levels of reality, but alternative ways of understanding too. Second, since the term reality in an ontic sense as an object of study, for him is also inevitably related with the epistemic distinctions of truth-falsity and what appears to be true and really true, and thus gives epistemic dimension to the concept of reality. This latter view indicates that the word reality has meaning only when we correlate it with the word appearance, i.e. without this there would not be any significant applicability of the concept of reality in general.

- (ii) If it is true, then, as has been seen earlier, there would be no place for the word reality or appearance in social phenomena in particular. For, if the domain of social phenomena is the domain of imagination, beliefs and prejudices, then what would be the nature of appearance in such domain? In other words, if appearances, beliefs and imagination are equivalent or co-terminus with reality, then there would be no disparity between what is real and what appears to be real and thus the distinction between them would collapse entirely.
- (iii) Further, it is not clear whether social reality, as it is used in the 1984 article, is concerned with the social sciences alone or with the natural sciences too.
- (iv) If the former is the case, i.e. if social reality deals with the object of study of the social sciences alone then what does the term socio-cultural reality stand for? If social reality and socio-cultural reality are not one and the same in his view, then what is the difference between them?
- (v) Further, is social reality a concern of the natural sciences too? If not, then what is the concern of the natural sciences? Is it concerned with nature alone? If it is, does nature mean physico-chemical reality alone or does it also mean psycho-physical reality?
- (vi) If the former is the case, i.e. if nature deals only with the physico-chemical sort of reality then how far will it be true to say that social-reality is embedded in nature, since

social reality for him includes not only the life of the mind, spirit but also the life of the body? It means that social reality would necessarily be wider than physico-chemical reality and thus should be treated as a locus in which all reality occurs or is presupposed by all disciplines. If it is so, then instead of claiming that social reality is embedded in nature, the relation of embeddability should be reversed. For that which is embedded is less wide than the realm in which it is embedded.

- (vii) If the latter is the case, i.e. the natural sciences deal with the nature and nature is identified with psycho-chemical reality, then how does such reality differ from social reality? For, the latter type of reality, as seen earlier, includes life of the body besides life of the mind and spirit which means that it deals with both, i.e. psycho-chemical as well as physico-chemical, human and non-human aspects. Can we then say that the term natural reality and social reality are synonymous, i.e. two different names of the same referent? But, then, how far his contention about the uniqueness of social reality will be meaningful remains to be seen.
- (viii) Furthermore, what is meant by empirical, physical and human reality? Are they all different names for socio-cultural or physico-chemical reality?
- (ix) In a nutshell, what precisely is the distinction and the inter-relation between natural, social, socio-cultural and physico-chemical reality?⁴ And why are the terms natural reality and humanistic reality not as common in use as the term social reality?

Moreover, it is not clear as to what Daya Krishna means by saying: 'the realm of social reality has a characteristic freedom'. If the word points to the absence of an objective distinction between truth and falsity then it is incorrectly used as it has been partly shown in earlier discussions relating to question III. If it means that since the subject matter of the social sciences is not given, is always in the process of construction and reconstruction by men's beliefs and is always growing in character and thus has a

characteristic freedom, while the reality in (object of study of) the natural sciences is given, fixed and closed, i.e. is not open and consequently lacks freedom and openness in the realm, then too, it does not seem to be tenable.

First, in a large number of cases objects are not given in the realm of the natural sciences as has been assumed in the above argument. Rather, they too are created by scientists themselves as a consequence of or as implied by their earlier theses, which they might not have conceived or thought of earlier. This can very well also be seen in the field of medicine. For a number of diseases were not there waiting for treatment, but were rather caused as after-effects of earlier treatment. However, even in the so-called hard core of natural reality, i.e. in the realm studied in physics, the confirmation of a hypothesis depends on the occurrence or happening of a phenomenon even in the future, i.e. a phenomenon which is not given and has not yet come into being. If the expected event occurs or takes place or comes into being in course of time then the concerned hypothesis or theory is confirmed; otherwise, not. In fact, the whole idea that the nature of the subject matter of the natural sciences is given, fixed and closed is mistaken. The nature of the object of study in the natural sciences too is growing in character and thus has a characteristic freedom like that of the reality studied in the social sciences. The openness of this realm, the tentative character of solutions, the possibility of different interpretations, all these facts are equally true about the former as they are about the latter. It seems to be true that, theoretically, there is a sense of plasticity in human behaviour or freedom, which is totally absent in the realm studied in the natural sciences due to the inanimateness of the nature of the object of study, i.e. there is a lot of possibility for flexibility or for changing one's views and actions which makes it impossible for one to predict the unknown future. But this theoretical possibility is vacuous. It is of no use. For, such freedom cannot be exercised in a group of consistent rational beings, or it can be exercised only to the extent that it does not go against the requirement of the standard or principle of rationality in action on the part of a group of human beings.

With regard to the issues relating to the fifth and second quo-

tations, it is not clear what precisely is meant by the term 'philosophical theory' together with the term 'social reality' as it is used in the very title of the paper. Is philosophical theory a theory about social reality or is there some similarity between these two? It is also not clear whether the social sciences would be regarded as a cognitive discipline or not. For, if the essential characterization of a cognitive discipline, as Daya Krishna states, is that it deals with a type of reality which is not a result of man's beliefs and about which true or false statements can be made objectively, the question would arise whether the social sciences can be considered cognitive disciplines at all. It seems that they can be so considered only by accepting the following two types of cognitive disciplines.

- (1) The realm to which the natural sciences belong, i.e. the realm where the distinction of truth and falsity is objectively maintained, independent of one's beliefs.
- (2) The realm to which the social sciences and the humanities belong, i.e. the realm where the objective distinction between truth and falsity is replaced by the distinction between 'believed to be true' and 'believed to be false'.

A cognitive discipline of the former type may be called the realm of reason or the realm of objective truth while the latter type may be called the realm of senses or the realm of subjective impression.

But, as was pointed out earlier, this view about the nature of the characterization of social reality is not only incorrect, but also philosophically harmful and, therefore, open to all those charges which have been raised against the sophists of old. Moreover, even if one accepts this characterization of the nature of social reality, one still fails to understand the other fundamental thesis that philosophy is the lifeblood of social reality, for, either the term social reality has been used in a totally different sense, or the nature of philosophy (in terms of the theory of knowledge) is incompatible with this characterization of the nature of social reality. In philosophy the distinction between belief and knowledge or truth and falsity as also other distinctions such as cause

and effect are of central importance. But they are redundant, according to him, in the realm of the social sciences. Thus, if the very distinction on which the whole foundation of the theory of knowledge is based is denied in the realm of the social sciences, philosophy cannot be treated as the lifeblood of social reality. In fact, it is surprising to find that these two opposite views (incompatibilities) are argued simultaneously by Daya Krishna, while, in fact, to hold one means to give up the other.

But, even if philosophy is accepted to be the lifeblood of social reality, why can it not be treated as the lifeblood of the natural sciences and the humanities also? In other words, if philosophy is the lifeblood of social reality in the sense that in the realm of social reality there is scope for a continuous dialogue in the form of question and answer, modification and remodification of the position, and the tentative character of the solution, etc., then this may equally be found in the other realms of the humanities and the natural sciences also. In fact, philosophy may be considered as the common ground of all cognitive disciplines (as gravitational force is the commonality in every phenomena of nature) in the sense that it exhibits the internal structure or hard core of any cognitive (rational) inquiry where critical imagination, and modification and re-modification of the position can be done meaningfully. In fact, any discipline, to be called a cognitive discipline, has to have these epistemico-methodological characteristics and hence cannot be treated as the lifeblood of the social sciences alone.

Besides, it is important to notice that Daya Krishna's views on the nature of social reality, which in fact is the central theme of his latter article of 1984, gives rise to the following corollary which, though not explicitly mentioned by him, yet may be seen as its necessary implication. The corollary is that the social sciences are not like the natural sciences. For understanding social reality we need a totally different set of categories. Here, before we examine the viability of the corollary we would like to consider, in brief, its underlying assumption where it is believed that the natural sciences are of a higher order or of a more paradigmatic character than the other disciplines of cognitive inquiry. It seems essential that in order to argue against the

former, one also needs to argue against the latter, i.e. its underlying assumption. Here we will first discuss the latter assumption.

The idea behind this underlying assumption seems to be analogous to the view of traditional society where the status of a particular class of people called Brahmans was regarded as more privileged or of a higher order than that of any of the other classes in society, i.e. the Kshatriyas, the Vaishyas or the Shudras. But neither the underlying assumption nor the analogy seems correct. As in a society, every person has to have equal fundamental rights, i.e. there should neither be any privileged class nor any deprived class, so also in the world of cognitive discipline all disciplines have to be regarded as equal; for any discipline to be called a rational cognitive discipline it has to fulfil the minimum epistemico-methodological requirements. There should not be, therefore, on principle, any discipline which is logically or ontologically of a higher or lower order. There are certainly some differences in various cognitive disciplines with regard to precision, clarity, the power of abstraction or the development and growth of a discipline in a systematized way. But these differences do not amount to a difference of higher or lower order, i.e. a categorical difference of cognitive status in a world of cognitive disciplines. We will not go further into the details of this issue, though in this context, the following two points are relevant and demand reflection:

- (i) Had the humanities or the social sciences been treated as the ideal of knowledge, what would have been the status of the natural sciences?
- (ii) If the advancements of quantum physics were made in the ninth century, i.e. earlier than classical mechanics, what would have been our attitude towards the prestige of the natural sciences?

To come back to the issue of the viability of the corollary that the social sciences are not like the natural sciences, it seems that this also is not correct.⁵ We can legitimately say that on the basis of *prima facie* categories like meaning, value, sensitivity, interruption, imagination, sympathy, reciprocity, etc., in the social

sciences or the humanities one cannot make a categorical distinction between the methods and categories of the two realms. In fact, all these concepts have a similar place in the natural sciences, though they do not have the same importance as they have in the realm of the social sciences. It is true that social reality has obviously an additional dimension of reality which is not associated with the object of study of the natural sciences. But this does not prove the categorical distinctiveness of the realms. In contemporary physics the dichotomy between subject and object or between knower and that which is known is not as clear and rigid as its supporter's 'thesis of duality of methods', 'the duality of reality' or 'the multiplicity of reality and methods'.⁶

Thus, it is misleading to think that one does commit a category mistake in explaining or understanding a phenomenon of one realm by the method or categories used for understanding the phenomenon in the other realms. In fact all the three realms of cognitive enterprise are complementary to and interdependent on each other and form a unity. This will be shown in the next section, i.e. the last part of this article.

PART III

In this part we will deal with the issue of the unity of the cognitive enterprise in the light of the following perspectives.

1. The perspective of content
2. The perspective of method
3. The perspective of attitude
4. The perspective of explanatory model.

On the basis of these perspectives an effort will be made to see that in spite of the unique characteristics of each discipline which enable us to differentiate one discipline from the other, there is an essential similarity between the realms.

To begin with the first, i.e. the perspective of content, as we noticed earlier, those who argue for the distinctness of the realms somehow believe that since the very nature of the objects of study of these disciplines are distinct, there are some ontologi-