CHAPTER 8

Dharmaśāstra Literature from Eighteenth Century Onwards

The roots of India's social, political and legal thought can be traced to the literature known as the *Dharmasūtras*, the *Smṛtis*, the *Nītiśāstras* and the *Arthaśāstras*. The *Dharmasūtras* are perhaps the earliest literature dealing with the subject though they are said to form an integral part of that literature which consists of the *Śrautasūtras*, the *Gṛhyasūtra* and what is collectively known as the *Kalpasūtras*. These seem to deal respectively with the life of the householder centered in the performance of the Vedic ritual and the fulfilling of familial and social obligations. The earliest *Dharmasūtras* are supposed to be those of Gautama, Baudhāyana, Āpastambha and Hiraṇyakeśin. Of these Āpastambha is perhaps the oldest, as it is generally assigned to 300 B.C. Āpastambha belonged to the south and hence it is clear that as early as 300 B.C., outstanding Vedic scholars belonged not only to the North but also to the South and that they exercised as much authority as the former. The Vedic civilization thus already had a pan-Indian character and attracted scholars who attained eminence and authority from different parts of the country.

The *Dharmasūtras* ascribed to Gautama and Baudhāyana are apparently fairly old as they belong to approximately the same period. The date assigned to Hiraṇyakeśin is not exactly known, but if surmised approximately, the dates of these works would appear to be post-Pāṇini, which is very unlikely. Also, as they seem to have been written by the same family of scholars who have also compiled the *Śrauta sūtras* and as these relate to the performance of the Vedic ritual, it is unlikely that they would have been written so late. Perhaps, all these texts were composed much earlier and have been given a final shape in the period to which they have been assigned being thereby the final edition of texts which had gone into successive editions earlier.

The *Dharmasūtra* literature gave rise to what has been called the *Smṛti* literature later, the most important example of which is perhaps the *Manu smṛti* which is also known as the *Mānavadharmaśāstra* or *Mānavadharma Saṁhitā*. The earliest

example is supposed to be the *Hārita smṛti* which however has not exercised the same influence and authority as some of the later ones such as *Manusmṛti* and *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*. Besides the *Smṛti granthas* which deal with man both as a social and political being, the emphasis being on his moral obligations in both the contexts, we have a different kind of texts which are primarily concerned with *nīti* of which the first example is perhaps the *Cāṇakyanīti Darpaṇa*. It is not quite clear whether this is the same Cāṇakya who was the author of the *Arthaśāstra*, the first known systematic work on political thought and administration in India. His date is again sometime around 300–200 B.C.

The period during which independent *smṛtis* appear ends sometime around A.D. eighth century with fourteen well-known *smṛti* texts having been written up to this period. Thereafter begin the period of the commentaries which are generally called *ṭīkās* and not *bhāṣyas* or *vārttikas* as for the other foundational texts of the tradition. The first *ṭīkā* is supposed to have been written on the *Nāradasmṛti* perhaps around A.D. eighth century by Asahāya. The second most important *ṭīkā* is by Medhātithi on the *Manusmṛti* written in ninth century even though in the same century a *ṭīkā* by Viśvarūpācārya on the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* existed. It appears that from ninth century onwards, the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* enjoyed the same authority as the *Manusmṛti* as we find the same number of commentaries on it. In the eleventh century, for example, we have Govindarāja's *ṭīkā* on the *Manu smṛti* and Vijñāneśvara's *ṭīkā* on the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*. Thereafter in the twelfth century we have Aparāditya's *ṭīkā* on the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* and Sarvajñanārāyaṇa's *ṭīkā* on the *Manusmṛti*. In the twelfth century, an increased interest in the earlier *Dharmasūtra* literature occurs as we have not only the two *ṭīkās* mentioned above but also two *ṭīkās* by Maskarī and by Haradatta on the *Gautama Dharmasūtra* and one on the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* by Haradatta. In the thirteenth century, a continued interest in the *Manusmṛti* is evident from the writing of one of the most important commentators after Medhātithi, namely, Kullūkabhaṭṭa. The traditional *ṭīkās* continue in the fourteenth century with a *ṭīkā* on the *Parāśarasmṛti* by Madhavācārya, as evidence of the rise of interest in *smṛtis* other than the *Manusmṛti* and the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*. However, the interest in these two major *smṛtis* continues as we have a new *ṭīkā* on *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* by Śulapāṇi in this century and on the *Manusmṛti* by Rāghavānanda in the next. In the fifteenth century, we also have a *ṭīkā* on *Nāradīya Manusaṁhitā* by Bhavasvāmī, thus, giving an indication that there were different recensions and editions of the *Manusaṁhitā*. However, exact differences between these different versions have perhaps not been studied in detail up till now.

The seventeenth century sees a revival of interest in *smṛtis* other than those of Manu and Yājñavalkya as we have a *ṭīkā* on the *Viṣṇusmṛti* by Nandapaṇḍita which is one of the earliest *smṛtis* written by a Vaiṣṇava and ascribed to Viṣṇu. However, there seems to be no detailed study indicating how this differs from the others. Also, it had not been the subject of any special attention until this late period when perhaps it was the rise of Caitanya, etc. in the sixteenth century that might possibly have triggered an interest in this *smṛti*. However, the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*

continues to hold its own against the *Manusmṛti*, as we have a commentary written on it in this period by Mitramiśra. An increased interest continues in the eighteenth century in the *smṛti* and *Dharmasūtra* literature with two commentaries on the *Manusmṛti* by Nandanācārya and Rāmacandra, respectively and one on *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* called *Mitākṣara* by Bālabhaṭṭa Pāyagunḍe which is very famous. Besides, we have a new commentary on *Baudhāyana dharmasūtra* which is perhaps the first commentary on this work.

Besides, the *ṭīkā* literature which starts from eighth century onwards, we have a new genre of writing called the *nibandha* which being in the twelfth century and continues up to the eighteenth or nineteenth century. The first *nibandha* is entitled *Rājadharmakalpataru* by Lakṣmīdhara and appears to deal with the duties of a king. The *nibandha* form of writing from twelfth century onwards is exclusively concerned with matters of polity and deals either with *rājadharma* or *rājanīti*. There is a distinction between *rājadharma* and *rājanīti* and the difference is clearly reflected in a separate branch of literature called the *Nītigranthas*. While the first *nibandha* was on *rājadharma*, the second on *rājanīti* is entitled, *Rājnītiratnākara* written by Caṇḍeśvara in the fourteenth century who wrote another *nibandha* called *Vivādaratnākara*. In the sixteenth century we have a *nibandha* entitled *Nītimayūkha* by Nīlakaṇṭhabhaṭṭa followed by Mitramiśra's *nibandha* entitled *Rājanītiprakāśa* in the seventeenth and Anantadeva's *nibandha* entitled *Rājadharmakaustubha* in the eighteenth century.

This development denotes the rise of a very specialised kind of writing and an increasing concern with the political realm in the traditional political thought of India due to the emergence of Islamic rule in this country. What exactly are the concerns of these thinkers and how do they depart from earlier thinkers in this field appears to be reflected in the increase in commentaries on *Nītigranthas* from eighteenth century onwards such as the two commentaries on the *Kāmaṇḍakīya Nītisāra* by Śaṅkurāya and *Nītivākyāmṛtaṭīkā* by the same author and another commentary on *Śukranīti* by Jīvānandavidyāsāgara.

Thus, to tentatively outline a comprehensive picture of classical literature on society and polity in India the following divisions are suggested: *Dharmasūtra* from the sixth to the third century B.C.; *Smṛti Granthas* from the third century B.C. to eight century; and the commentaries on the *Smṛtis* from the A.D. eighth century onwards.

These texts dealing with society, polity and law thus naturally divide along the subject matter of primary concern, even though there may be some overlapping between them. The text relating to polity, for example, may deal simultaneously with the maintenance of the social order which is the primary concern of texts relating to *dharma* in general, as of the ruler has to mediate between the conflicting claims that inevitably arise between the interests of the different *varṇas* that constitute a society, this issue is of relevance here. The changing character of these texts and the interrelationships between them mirror the changes occurring in the socio-political scene of those times. The legal texts of necessity are even more specific as they have to "decide" in favour of one or the other party

and hence vague generalities about what is *dharma* or *adharma* cannot serve the purpose.

The primary issues with which a *rājadharma* or *rājanīti* work deals with, were bound to be different from works of thinkers who were primarily concerned with society and its functioning. However, some overlap was present as one of the rulers' duties, of course, was to maintain the smooth functioning of the social order. This could only be ensured by seeing that all the members of a society performed their functions with reasonable honesty and public spirit. Generally, this is a subject of what has been called the *varṇāśrama dharma* or norms governing the behaviour of four distinct sections of society necessary for the maintenance of a functioning social order. These, of course, are the well-known classes designated as the intellectual class, the mercantile or the trading class, the warrior class and those who are primarily engaged in physical labour of any sort in the process of production or services. The ruler's function, however, was also concerned with securing the safety of the state from other neighbouring kingdoms and to guard himself from possible aspirants to power within the polity itself. Thus, the political thinker was keenly aware of the dilemma posed by the ambivalent functions of the ruler who, on the one hand, was supposed to espouse the welfare of his people and to ensure the observance by them of the moral norms laid down by the *Dharmaśāstras.* On the other, by the dictates of statecraft the king was meant to use all fair and foul means both against the possible aspirants to power in his own realm and the kingdoms outside who could turn inimical at any time and wage war on his territory. Also, as offense is the best means of defence, the ruler himself was supposed to take the initiative by conquering the other kingdoms at an opportune time and to weaken them, by all means at his command. The ruler's primary duty, at least to his own people was to ensure justice and welfare for everyone concerned, even though the members of the polity were always prone to deceive the state and get all sorts of advantages out of it by every underhand means they could think of. Thus, even in the internal realm, the problem of the ruler was how to ensure honesty amongst the citizens, particularly amongst the trading classes which were primarily responsible for the creation of wealth and prosperity in the state. Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* is a classic example of a text which is not only aware of all these ambivalences and dilemmas but also gives detailed instructions regarding how to deal with such situations which are bound to arise for any one who exercises the ruling function. The ruler, or rather the ruling class, is itself exposed to all the temptations which power provides and the author of the *Arthaśāstra* and the subsequent texts on the polity are clearly aware of this also.

Thus the texts dealing with the realm of the political class had a different focus from those concerned with norms for the conduct of human beings in different situations and roles. The thinker who is primarily concerned with law, or *vyavahāra* as it is called in the Indian tradition, has to provide concrete guidelines for the punishments to be awarded to those who have committed offences of various kinds and provide clear, unambiguous, specific instructions regarding

what was to be considered an offence and the degree to which it required to be punished. The same is true of civil disputes where also a decision has to be arrived at in favour of one party at the expense of the other.

The problems that the writers on *dharma, rājanīti* and *vyavahāra* faced, have seldom been discussed or highlighted because of the undue emphasis by scholars on the ideal of *mokṣa* in the Indian tradition. It has seldom been realised that the acceptance of the ideal of *mokṣa* as the *param puruṣārtha* itself created a problem for these thinkers as they were dealing with the concrete problems of society, polity and law.

The most comprehensive survey of Indian thought on these issues from the Vedas to the most recent times has been attempted by Paṇḍit Laxman Shastri Joshi whose work, apart from that of P.V. Kane, is the most exhaustive on the subject. Joshi's work is primarily a reference work and is aptly entitled *Dharmakośa,* but it is not the usual kind of *Kośa* and not even similar to most Encyclopedia's. Instead, it divides the realms of *dharma* into 11 *kāṇḍas* comprising of *dharma* in the *Upaniṣads, saṁskāras, vyavahāra, rājanīti, vaṛnāśrama dharma, śuddha-śrāddha, prāyaścitta, śānti, Purāṇa-Āgama dharma, samaya* and *mokṣa.* Of these volumes only four of the *kāṇḍas (Vyavahāra, Upaniṣad, Saṁskāra and Rājnīti*), have been published along with the first volume of the *varṇāśrama dharma.*

Within these major divisions the discussion has been further classified into various important topics and is arranged chronologically from the Vedas down to the latest works available on these subjects. Original quotations from the text in support of the views on these issues have been given, mentioning the exact reference to the original which may be seen for greater detail. Brief introductions in Sanskrit to the issues that are discussed highlighting some of the important points are made therein.

The first published volume of the *Dharmakośa* was the *Saṁskāra kāṇḍa* in A.D. 1937 and though many years have passed since, this rich source material on all its aspects of *dharma* has remained unutilised by the social, political and legal thinkers of India. Even if we ignore, for the moment, the *Upaniṣad kāṇḍa* which deals primarily with the trans-social, trans-political and trans-legal dimensions of *dharma,* the remaining volumes deal with the totality of what is today called the 'secular' domain of life. A brief survey of the topics discussed in the volumes, dealing with *vyavahāra, samśkāra* and *rājanīti* reveal the variety in issues that engaged the attention of the political, legal and social thinkers of India and their changing attitudes to the same. There is, thus, a historical dimension to the discussions on these topics which is documented in these pages. But neither the structural nor the conceptual, nor the historical aspect has caught the attention of those who are interested in these subjects. Nor, for that matter, has their problematic thought been grasped so that the discussion, and the changing perspectives in respect of it, could make sense to the modern student of the subject.

By way of example, the safeguarding of the intellectual from the coercive power of the State, seems to have been dealt with through the legal formulation

that the Brahmins, the intellectual class *par excellence* should never be punished. The term used for this was *adaṇḍya* (one who cannot be punished). However, as this offended the sense of justice, the later thinkers argued for a differential theory of punishment. In other words, they said that as society expected different functions from different classes, and as these required different standards and norms of behaviours, the punishment meted out to them should also be in accordance with what was expected from them. Thus, it was argued that for many of the actions for which a *śūdra* need not be punished at all, such as, say, drinking or gambling, the Brahmin guilty of this offence should be severely punished. On the other hand, for some other offences for which the *śūdra* was to be punished severely, the Brahmin would not be punished at all or punished very lightly. Later thinkers argued that the Brahmin in no case should be given capital punishment. This, however, was also felt to discriminate in favour of the Brahmaṇs and the *Śukranīti*, which is supposed to be a later work ascribed by many scholars to as late as the eighteenth century, argued that not only the Brahmaṇs but no one else should ever be given capital punishment. Thus from *adaṇḍya* to *avādhya* we have a long debate in thinking pertaining to legal matters where the demand for equality and justice forced thinkers to change positions.

Similarly, the discussion regarding who shall be entitled to be a ruler or even, what exactly is the distinctive characteristic by which someone becomes a ruler and is recognised as such continued over a long period. Starting from the contention that only a *Kṣatriya* can be a ruler, the discussion leads ultimately to the position that whoever can rule efficiently and justly ought to be a ruler, no matter if he is even a *Śūdra.* An interesting formulation, for example, regarding the "collective" nature of the social and the political order took the form that whoever was a ruler shared in the merit or demerit, that is, *puṇya* and *pāpa* of his subjects as he was, at least partly, responsible for the fact that they engaged in actions which were virtuous or non-evil in character.

There is, however, an important distinction between the texts which are primarily devoted to *dharma* in the general sense and those which are specifically devoted to law or polity, as while the former deal with the subjects of law and polity in a peripheral or marginal manner, seeing them primarily from the point of view of the ideal, or what they should or ought to be, the texts mainly dealing with law and polity present them in terms of the dilemmas they present for the moral consciousness on the one hand, and the almost insoluble problems they pose for the value consciousness because of the very nature of the issues they deal with. Thus, a political thinker is intensely aware of the fact that a polity is always surrounded by other polities which can, and many a time do turn hostile to it. Also, that any one who is exercising the ruling function is always threatened by those within the polity who want to usurp power, by legitimate or illegitimate means. The problems of external and internal security are thus involved in the very nature of the realm with which the political theorist is concerned. Similarly, the legal thinker cannot avoid the problems of crime and the dispute about

property, or the nature of the evidence on the basis of which someone's statement is to be believed.

Another distinction that emerges from these structural differences in various works is that while the texts dealing with issues of law, etc. in the broadest possible sense tend to be unchanging in their concerns, the political and legal thinker shows a historical awareness of the changes in the times in which, and for which he is writing. Thus, while the texts on the *Dharma Śāstras* occur primarily in the form of commentaries on the few texts which are regarded as foundational in the tradition, new and independent works on *vyavahāra* and *rājanīti* continued to be written as these spheres demanded new thought to deal with the continuously emerging problems. For example, the basic texts of the *Dharma Śāstra* continue to be the two major *smṛtis*, that is the *Manu* and the *Yājñavalkasmṛti* which have been the subject of continuous commentary since the ninth century. There has been no such tradition however either in respect of the texts dealing primarily with matters relating to politics or law. Thus, the first independent legal text itself seems to belong to late eleventh or early twelfth century and its author is Jīmutvāhana. After him, we find that there are about 35 independent works from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century.

As for political science, the situation seems to be different as the *Arthaśāstra* ascribed to Kauṭilya is accepted by everybody as one of the earliest texts dealing with the subject and its authority, though not as recognized as that of the two major *smṛtis* mentioned above is fairly well recognised. The commentaries on it continue to be written right up to the twentieth century, the last one being that of Ganapati Shastri (1923) while the other, the work of Rajesvara Shastri Dravida was written later. Apart from these exist the independent texts of the *Nītiśāstra* and *Nibandha granthas* dealing with political thought. The earliest known *nibandha* seems to have been written by Lakṣmīdhara around A.D. 1100–1150 and is entitled *Rājadharma Kalpataru*. The tradition of *nibandha* continues in the later period. We have, for example, a *nibandh* entitled *Rājnīti Ratnākara* around A.D. 1314–1324 by Caṇḍeśvara after which we have *Nītimayūkha* by Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa ascribed to the fifteenth or sixteenth century. Mitra Miśra's *Rājanītiprakāśa* around A.D. 1623 and Anantadeva's *nibandha* entitled *Rājadharma Kaustubha* around A.D. 1650–1675. After the seventeenth century, the *Dharmakośa* does not mention any independent *nibandh* or *nītigrantha* dealing with the realm of politics. Instead, we have works in the *ṭīkā* tradition only on the *nīti* and the *Arthaśāstra granthas* such as *Kāmaṇḍakīya nītisāraṭīkā*, *Nītivākyāmṛtaṭīkā*, *Śukranītiṭīkā* (A.D. 1882), Kauṭilya *Arthaśāstraṭīkā* (A.D. 1923).

However, the texts mentioned in the *Dharmakośa* cover only some aspects of *dharma*, presumably because other texts dealing with the remaining aspects of *dharma* were to be the subject of later volumes. The volumes published so far deal primarily with *vyavahāra*, *rājanīti* and *saṁskāra* and hence mention only those texts which deal with them in one way or another. But some interesting texts dealing even with these subjects seem to have escaped the notice of the editor

of the *Dharmakośa*, as for example, an interesting documents called the *Ājñāpatra* is not mentioned in it. Perhaps, the most probable reason for this was that the text is not in Sanskrit but in Marathi and was written for the Peshwas by an explicit order from the ruler. This suggests that the works dealing with *rājanīti* were used for the education of the princes to make them aware of the nature and complexity of the problems in the polity. The original manuscript issued by Sambhājī of Kolhapur in A.D. 1716 sheds interesting light on the new problems that were being faced in the political life of those times. This consisted of the intrusion of a new class of trader-politicians from the West who, though ostensibly engaged in trading activities and requested facilities for the same, actually had the political interest also. That this did not escape the eyes of the Maratha rulers of those times is evidenced by the following passages in the *Ājñāpatras* which have not been paid attention to up till now:

> Among the merchants, the Portuguese and the English and the Dutch and the French and the Danes and other hat-wearing merchants also do carry on trade and commerce. But they are not like other merchants. Their masters, every one of them, are ruling kings. By their orders and under their control these people come to trade in these provinces. How can it happen that rulers have no greed for territories? These hat-wearers have full ambition to enter into these provinces to increase their territories, and to establish their own opinions (religion). Accordingly, at various places, they have already succeeded in their ambitious undertakings. Moreover, this race of people is obstinate. Where a place has fallen into their hands they will not give it up even at the cost of their lives.

Policy Towards Them: Their intercourse should therefore be restricted to the extent of only their coming and going (for trade). They should strictly never be given places to settle. They should not at all be allowed to visit sea-forts. If some place is sometimes to be given for a factory, it should not be given at the mouth of an inlet or on the shores of the sea. If land is given in such places, it may be that they remain obedient as long as they like; they would, however, establish new forts at these ports at some time or with the help of their navy to protect them. Their strength lies in their navy, in guns and ammunition. As a consequence so much territory would be lost to the kingdom. Therefore, if any place is at all to be given to them it should be given in the midst of two or four famous great towns about eight to sixteen miles away from the mouth of the sea, just as the French were given lands at Rajapur.[1] The place must be such that it must be low-lying and within the range and control of the neighbouring town so as to avoid trouble to the town. Thus by fixing their place of habitation, the factory should be permitted to be built. They should not be allowed to build (strong) permanent houses. If they live in this way by accepting the above conditions it is well; if not, there is no need of them. It is enough if they occasionally come and go, and do not trouble us; nor need we trouble them.

NOTES

1. A market town and inland post (not in the open sea) in the Southern Konkan where the pepper and cardamom trade flourished in 1649. The English had opened a factory there. It was closed in 1682–83.

CHAPTER 9

Developments in the *Alaṁkāraśāstra* from Eighteenth Century Onwards

Thinking that is centered on the arts is as old in India as the Vedas themselves. Right from the beginning the *mantras* which were to be chanted or sung were treated separately and in fact provided the ground for the collection of that part of the *Ṛgveda Saṁhitā* which is now called the *Sāma Veda.* The *mantras* included in the *Sāma Veda,* perhaps on the ground that they were specifically amenable to being sung, were further divided into those that were to be sung in the forests and those to be sung in towns or villages, that is, where settled human habitation occurred. These are called *Araṇya-gāna* and the *Grāmageya-gāna* respectively.

There seems to have also been an early controversy regarding the necessity of the exact order and enunciation of the words of the Ṛgvedic *mantras* in the context of singing, as the exigencies and requirements of singing necessitated a different emphasis on the way the words of the Ṛgvedic *mantra* were to be pronounced and the sequence in which they were to be uttered. It may be remembered in this connection that the utterance of a Ṛgvedic *mantra* had to conform completely to the rules laid down for this purpose and that there had to be a strict *varṇānupūrvī, śabdānupūrvī,* and *svarānupūrvī* to ensure this. The requirements of singing, however, led in a different direction and there is an interesting story in the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa Upaniṣad* which narrates how the singers of the *Sāma Veda* ultimately decided to get rid of the Ṛgvedic words from the *mantras* in order to achieve purity of singing.

Reflections on the singing of the *Sāma,* thus, appears to have provided the first occasion, at the very beginning of the tradition, for thinking about music as a pure art in which the involvement with words was seen to be as essentially secondary in character.

There is some reflection on art as representation in Yāska's *Nirukta* which is perhaps the earliest text to theoretically articulate the problems arising from an attempt to understand the Vedas and the Vedic ritual. The *Nirukta* discusses the

idea of *upamā* or simile in the context of the Veda and shows perhaps the earliest reflection on this essential element of poetic composition. The *Nighaṇṭus*, though accepted to be earlier than the *Nirukta*, are concerned only with pointing out the important homonyms and synonyms that occur in the Vedic lexicon so that it could be understood better. The Vedic altar and the ritual ceremony associated with the various Vedic sacrifices is of course supposed to be 'representative' of the cosmic processes and, in fact, believed not only to integrate man with the cosmic reality through the medium of the ritual but also to help in the restoration of the cosmic equilibrium itself.

The Vedic seer at places appears to be self-conscious of his power and role as a creative artist who fashions a poem out of the vision of the 'meaning' that he apprehends. This simultaneous fusion of vision and craftsmanship marks all art, but in the Indian tradition it was the seer-poet who first seems to have felt it self-consciously, as Poetry. Music and representation of the structure and processes of the cosmic reality seem to have directly emanated from a reflection on the Vedas themselves. On the other hand, it was perhaps the parallel *Āgamic* tradition associated with the name and form of Śiva, deriving perhaps from an even earlier pre-Vedic tradition stretching back to the Harappan civilization. Śiva himself is supposed to have danced at the very beginning of Creation, the world itself being a continuance of his cosmic dance. There appears to be, however, little evidence in the Vedas themselves with respect to dance as an original art form which required independent reflection. In fact, there is little evidence to show that dance forms an integral part of Vedic ritual.

The earliest reflection on dance as an art form is by Tāṇḍu who is supposed to have composed the first work on dance, analysing it into its component elements. The story regarding this occurs in the *Nāṭya Śāstra* of Bharata which self-consciously tried to combine all the different arts of music, dance and poetry into a dramatic form which was 'representative' not so much of the cosmic forces as in the Vedic ritual but of the human world with all its emotions and passions. However, besides this, it also theoretically reflected on what it was trying to do and developed in this connection a number of concepts which specifically related to the world of art. It also tried to 'understand' what this world consisted in and what its creators were trying to do.

The *Nāṭya Śāstra* of Bharata gave rise to a systematic thinking about the arts in general and the dramatic and literary arts in particular. This became the source of all subsequent reflection which depended heavily on the conceptual apparatus that it evolved for the understanding of the arts and it replaced, to a large extent, the earlier formulation which had developed in the context of *Sāma* and the art of representation in the Vedic tradition and of dance in the Āgamic tradition represented by the work of Tāṇḍu.

Bharata's thinking on the *nāṭya* revolves mainly around the central concept of *rasa* which, according to him, distinguishes the field of arts in general from all other realms. However, in his analysis of the notion of *rasa* he makes it heavily, and even exclusively dependent on notions and ideas which can be applied

meaningfully only in the case of drama. This has resulted in an essential limitation on all subsequent thinking about the arts in the Indian tradition as the concepts that it uses primarily seem to apply to one art alone. Thus drama in particular, and the literary arts in general began to assume a central place in India, ignoring or marginalising all other arts, including music and dance which had been the object of the earliest reflection in the tradition on this subject.

Bharata's *Nāṭya Śāstra* however did not employ only the concept of *rasa* for understanding the reality created by the world of drama. It also used *alaṁkāra, vṛttis, guṇa, doṣa, lakṣaṇa* as well as concepts such as *arthaprakṛtis, kāryāvasthā* and *saṅdhi* and *saṅdhyaṅgas* for understanding the aesthetic reality of drama.

After the *Nāṭya Śāstra,* a work by Kohala played an important role in developing the thought of Bharata further. But the most important thinker after Bharata seems to have been Bhāmaha (middle of the A.D. sixth century), who seems to have appeared after Bhartṛhari and Dignāga (as he refers both to *apoha* and *sphoṭa*) but before Dharmakīrti with whose views he is not familiar. He is also mentioned as an authoritative writer by Ānandavardhana (A.D. 850) and is supposed to have been responsible for the separation of the *Alaṁkāraśāstra* from the *Nāṭya Śāstra* so that the primary emphasis was no longer on dramatic presentation but on the literary production. Bharata had emphasised a combination of the different art forms where each was subordinated to the aesthetic values involved in the total dramatic representation. Bhāmaha's separation of the Alaṁkāraśāstra from Natya śāstra thus represents a continuity with the pre-Bharata period where each of the art forms was the subject of independent reflection. However, it is difficult to say whether such a tradition of reflection as exists on music and dance is also present in respect of the poetic compositions in the *Ṛgveda.* The self-consciousness in the poet, as we have already noted, was present as also the awareness of the direct metrical forms in which poetical compositions were to be created. But, there is little evidence of a second order critical reflection on the art of poetry itself. Bhāmaha thus seems to initiate a second order reflection on literary composition and, interestingly, he criticises in this enterprise, concepts from both Bhartṛhari and Dignāga. This is evidence of both a lively interaction between the philosophers and the aestheticians of that period as well as the carving of an independent discourse for aesthetics, especially poetry.

The concepts of *sphoṭa* and *apoha* are criticized by Bhāmaha who also elucidates the distinct nature of the poetic realm. He uses the interesting notion of *saušabdya* where words themselves become the objects of 'seeking' as their exact, apt and purified form alone would give rise to a poetic meaning which arouses both wonder and delight at the same time. He also uses the idea of *Kāvyānvaya*—the logic of poetry—to distinguish the methodology and norms relevant to the aesthetic domain proper, thus marking its autonomy from those fields where Nyāya is used as *anumāna* with its own syllogism in what may be called the *pramāṇa vyāpāra.* He elaborates the concept of *doṣa* in literary compositions as analogous to what is regarded as *hetvābhāsa* in the *Nyāya sūtra.* He also made an

attempt to distinguish between *pratibhā* (natural in-born creative impulse), and *vyutpatti* (learned, nurtured understanding) as the sources of poetic composition.

After Bhāmaha the most important work is supposed to have been that of Daṇḍin who not only wrote the well-known *Daśakumāracarita* and *Avantīsundarīkathā* but also a work on poetics entitled, *Kāvyalakṣaṇa.* There has been a lot of controversy about the relative dates of Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha but some scholars feel that after the discovery of *Avantīsundarīkathā* by Daṇḍin, it may be safely concluded that Daṇḍin occurred after Bhāmaha. Both of them presumably lived in the South. At least Daṇḍin definitely belonged to that region after he had migrated from Gujarat.

After Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin the scene dramatically shifts to the extreme north in Kashmir where, from the eighth century onwards, we have a galaxy of great aestheticians such as Udbhaṭṭa, Rudraṭa, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, the last two being justly famous in the history of Indian aesthetics as they started new trends in literary criticism and also propounded alternative theories to those which were dominant at that time.

With Ānandavardhana begins the famous new school of *dhvani* which attempts to replace the *alaṁkāra* theorists with a new alternative way of understanding poetic meaning. Its relation to the school which emphasises *rasa* does not seem to be very clear though it may perhaps be reasonably surmised that it laid more emphasis on poetic meaning rather than aesthetic emotion or delight. The emphasis perhaps was primarily on the unexpectedness of the new meaning generated by the poetic use of word and the consequent wonder that was the inevitable accompaniment of such an apprehension. Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka Viśvanātha, Rājaśekhara, Jayadeva, Kṣemendra, Śarada-tanaya, Bhānudatta, Rūpa Gosvāmī, Appaya Dikṣita and Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha were all well known as exponents of *dhvani.*

Thus there is an extraordinary presence of eight outstanding theoreticians who reflected on the problems of poetics and literary creation from the eighth to twelfth century.

After Ruyyaka, developments in this field seem to have shifted once again from the North to the South, perhaps due to political reasons. Among these a significant contribution was made by Appaya Dīkṣita at the beginning of the sixteenth century who developed the new notion of *arthālaṁkāra* and wrote three works on poetics, namely, *Kuvalayānanda, Citra Mīmāṁsā* and *Vṛtti Vārttika.* Of these, the *Citra Mīmāṁsā* is perhaps the most important as it started a controversy when it became the subject of criticism by Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha who lived during the reign of Shahjahan in the seventeenth century and wrote a work entitled, *Citra Mīmāṁsā Khaṇḍana.* Appaya Dikṣita III seems to have replied to Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha in his *Citra Mimāṁsā-doṣadhikkāra.* There appears to have been one Pradhāna Venkamatya who, in his "Alaṁkāra Maṇidarpaṇa" (unpublished) defended the views of Appaya Dikṣita I against Jagannātha. The controversy seems to have continued as Lakṣmaṇasūri came to the rescue of Jagannātha in his work entitled, "Sābhūpālaṁkāra" (unpublished).

The works on *Alaṁkāraśāstra* from eighteenth century onwards take off principally from where Appaya Dikṣita I and Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha had left the thinking on the subject in the seventeenth century.

A work which seems to have exercised a great influence both in style and content was written by Vidyānātha in the subsequent period. Entitled, *Pratāparudrīyayaśobhūṣaṇa* it was used as a model to such an extent that many of the writers of this period called their work *Yaśobhūṣaṇa* of one patron or another. One of the main characteristics of this type of writing was that it was written in praise of the patron of the poet-writer concerned and that he composed poetic creations of his own to illustrate the points made in the course of the discussion. There is thus a historical dimension to these works, along with the literary and rhetorical, where the one is so finely blended with the other that it is difficult to separate the two.

An increasing tendency to write expository pieces without going into the traditional method of anticipating objections and refuting the counter positions to the ones held by the author also becomes apparent. Besides this, an interesting amalgamation occurred of the two streams in Indian poetics—the first deriving from the *Nāṭya Śāstra* of Bharata while the other concentrated more on poetry and literature, deriving from Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha. Also, there seems to be a great influence of Candrāloka and Kuvalayānanda on their writings.

Another dimension to writing on the *Alaṁkāraśāstra* during the post-Jagannātha period relates to the increasing influence of the Navya Nyāya mode of analysis and its technical terms. But, while such a mode of analysis apparent in all cognitive enterprises in India, helps in achieving precision in the statements that are made, it also renders them unintelligible at least to those who are uninitiated in the vocabulary of the techniques of Navya Nyāya analysis. Many of these works deal with all the issues that were traditionally discussed in the *Alaṁkāraśāstra*, but there are many others which deal only with specific subjects or topics. In this, they show a distinct influence of the new trend in the intellectual life of India, as scholars begin to concentrate more and more on specialised problems, issues and often on only one or two important aspects of an issue.

The most important of these thinkers seem to be Nṛsimha Kavi, Venkaṭāmātya, Rāmasudhī, Acyutarāya and Viśveśvara Paṇḍita. Among these, Nṛsimha Kavi was an outstanding thinker in the south during the eighteenth century, and is reported to have been associated with the pre-Hyder Ali kingdom of Mummadi Krishnaraja Odeyar of Mysore, whose minister named Kalale Nanjaraja was his patron. His work is entitled, *Nanjarāja Yaśobhūṣaṇa.* His model was the well known work of Vidyānātha who had included the name of his patron in the very title of his work, the *Pratāparudrīya-yaśobhūṣaṇa.* Nṛsimha Kavi discussed exhaustively all the issues relating to both poetics and dramaturgy and even illustrated all these points through the composition of a drama which he himself wrote. His discussion of *Alaṁkāra* takes into account all the developments that had taken place since the time of Vidyānātha while introducing new points of his own. The notion of *Alaṁkāra*, like most other concepts, shows the dual tendency of being

narrowed down to some very specific characteristics alone with a possibility of being widened to include almost every characteristic which other thinkers had ascribed to some other concept. This, as we shall see later, has also been attempted with some interesting results in respect to the notion of *rasa* particularly in the work of Acyutarāya Modaka whose work is entitled, *Sāhityasāra.*

Venkaṭāmātya, a younger contemporary of Nṛsimha Kavi, was associated with Hyder Ali, and wrote a work entitled, *Alaṁkāramaṇi-darpaṇa.* He shows an awareness of the work of his senior contemporary, Nṛsimha Kavi, whose definition of *Kāvya* he criticises. Nṛsimha Kavi had emphasised the necessity of expression and thought being in conformity with prevalent poetic conventions (*Kavi Samaya*) already established with regard to the usage of *Vyañjanā Vyāpāra* while utilising the poetic devices of *guṇa, Alaṁkāra,* etc. Venkatāmātya did not accept this conformity to *Kavi Samaya* as essential as it could not become an exclusive characteristic of poetic creation. Instead, he emphasised *Sarasatva* as the distinct feature of poetry.

Evidence of the new tendency amongst writers of *Alaṁkāraśāstra* to use the phraseology, techniques and modes of analysis of hard-core philosophical disciplines such as those of Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā is also present in the work of Nṛsimha Kavi. In fact, this tendency reaches its climax in the work of Viśveśvara Paṇḍita whose work, entitled *Alaṁkāra-kaustubha,* is famous for its extensive use of the Navya Nyāya techniques to achieve precision in the definition of *alaṁkāras.* It is not clear, however, how this attempted precision in the various definitions achieves anything significantly new in our understanding of them.

Other prominent names in the *Alaṁkaraśāstra* tradition are those of Vidyārāma, Aśadhara Bhaṭṭa and Bhaṭṭa Deva Śaṅkara Purohit, who belong respectively to Mysore, Rajasthan and Gujarat. Little is known about Vidyārāma and Aśadhar Bhaṭṭa but there is important information about Bhaṭṭa Deva Śaṅkara Purohit who not only lived in the period of the Peshvas but has also explicitly written about some of them such as Raghunātha Rāo, Mādhava Rāo, Nārāyaṇa Rāo etc. He has also described the death of Viśvāsa Rāo in the third battle of Panipat. Thus, the work of Purohit is of interest not only to students of the Alaṁkāraśāstra in this period but also as it provides literary evidence for the history of this period.

Besides the historical dimension of Bhaṭṭa Deva Śaṅkara Purohita's work on the Peshvas, who were perhaps his patrons, he also explores the different dimensions of *arthālaṁkāra* in detail and discusses the views of his predecessor Rāja Cūḍāmaṇi Dikṣita in respect of *Kuvalyānanada,* differing from him on many points.

The work of Vidyārāma is interesting as he separately mentions *bhakti* as a distinct *rasa* and devotes the fourth part of his *Rasadīrghikā* to it. However, the work of Aśadhar Bhaṭṭa reveals thinking about language seen primarily as a commingling of *abhidā, vyañjanā* and *lakṣaṇā* together, like the meeting of Gaṅgā, Yamunā and Sarasvatī at Prayag where it is called Triveṇī. His work after this analogy is named *Triveṇikā,* explicitly stating therein that though *abhidā* appears

to be the primary meaning of language, the bluish thing to it is given by the *lakṣaṇā* and the hidden secret dimension is provided by *vyañjanā*. The third, though visible only to few, is the real heart of the language. This is what opens the language to the unmanifest transcendent and brings it to the region where it becomes accessible to man through its power.

Thus his thinking about language is essentially *vyañjanā*-centric which alone provides a key to the poetic use of language. Interestingly, among the grammarians, it is only Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa who has paid any thought to *vyañjanā* in his reflection about language.

It is, perhaps, in the work of Acyutarāya Modak that we find a new way of thinking. He, not only, classifies the notion of *rasa* into *laukika* and *alaukika*, but also divides the latter into those which arise in the context of day-dreaming, dreaming and imagining such as is evidenced in the activity of seeing figures in the clouds, etc. However, he does not seem to have applied the distinction of *sāttvika, rājasika and tāmasika* to *rasas* that are supposed to arise in the *laukika* and the *alaukika* realm. Nor is it clear whether the active imagination that results in the creation of a work of art is given a separate place in the context of those types of objects which give rise to the *alaukika rasa*. In any case, the whole discussion does not seem to distinguish between the emotion which arises in the context of a work of art and that which arises in respect of other kinds of objects. Nor does there seem to be any attempt to distinguish between different kinds of aesthetic objects with respect to which the aesthetic emotion is said to be engendered. Bharata's formulation of the theory of *rasa* in the context of dramatic representations seems to have been a stumbling block for the aestheticians of India though the increasing centrality of poetry as an art form in the discipline of aesthetics tried to free this from some of the limitations that Bharata's discussion had imposed on it. Still, since many forms of poetry are close to drama, and contain dramatic elements in them, the separation never seems to have been completely achieved.

Acyutarāya's acceptance of the notion of *laukika rasa* sounds strange as it would be difficult to accept the idea that the *rasa* which one feels in respect of an art object, can be transposed into an ordinary situation where any natural object is enjoyed by the senses. It is true that Bharata himself had initiated the conclusion by talking of *rasa* on the analogy of taste, thus, giving an impression that taste was something like *rasa* and as one could mix different tastes one could blend different kinds of emotions to get a more complex *rasa*.

The problem was further compounded by the controversies regarding the inclusion of *śānta* and *bhakti* amongst the *rasas* already mentioned by Bharata. The acceptance of these two in the category of *rasa* could mean that *rasa* need not be something which arises specifically and exclusively in the context of a dramatic representation of the human situations where emotions are first experienced in their raw form. *Śānta rasa* is obviously something that may be said to be directly and immediately experienced in the meditative consciousness, while the *bhakti rasa* may be said to be directly experienced when one worships the

Lord or engages in *bhajana* or *kīrtana*. In this context, the work of Vidyārāma who mentions *bhakti* as a distinct *rasa* and devotes the fourth part of his *Rasadīrghikā* to it, is significant. These, two *rasas* thus, are closer to the day-to-day experiences of *rasa* which arise through the contact of the various senses with their objects. One may, of course, treat the *bhakti rasa* as arising through the contemplation of the imagined life of the Lord as is done in *bhakti* or *śānta* as evoked by the stories of the great renouncers such as the Buddha and the Mahāvīra. After accepting this inclusion, it will be difficult to withhold the applications of the idea of *rasa* to all other realms which imagination creates. This, perhaps, is the reason why Acyutarāya Modak has included day-dreaming and imaginative fantasy in the category of *alaukika rasa* along with the creations of art which are generally included in it.

The problem of accounting for an almost total absence of *rasas* such as *vibhatsa, bhayānaka, raudra,* etc., will occur in this case as it is only in the realm of art that these can be experienced as *rasa.* In the *laukika* realm of experience these can never be experienced as *rasa,* and even in the realms which Acyutarāya Modak includes under the category of the *aluakika,* it would be difficult to say if *vibhatsa,* etc. can be experienced as *rasa* in the situations corresponding to them. It is true that the element of "virtuality" which informs works of art is also present in imaginary creations which are the result of day-dreaming referred to by Acyutarāya, yet, normally the "distancing" that marks an artistic creation is absent in them.

One may, possibly, treat *śānta rasa* in a way different from now as it has been treated in the Indian tradition. It may be understood as *catharsis* is understood in the western tradition, that is, as the ultimate culminating *rasa* to which all of the *rasas* contribute in a really great work of art. Therefore, according to this interpretation, there would be only one *rasa,* the *rasa* to which all other so called *rasa's* contribute, that is, the *rasa* of *rasas,* the *rasa par excellence* or the pure aesthetic emotion, unalloyed by any other element. The term *catharsis* has been used in the western tradition only to signify the effect that a great tragedy culminates in, but there is no reason why it cannot be extended to cover the essence of all aesthetic emotion—an essence which is more adequately conveyed by the term *śānta,* which has been used in the Indian tradition. It may perhaps be understood in the sense which is conveyed by the Shakespearean phrase "Rightness is All", or what the *Upaniṣad* suggests when it says "*śānto'yam ātmā*".

But if this is accepted, then *śānta rasa* will be the only *rasa* and all the other *rasas* would be seen as contributing to it or culminating in it as the different *bhāvas* are supposed to give rise to *rasa* which is seen as an emergent quality arising out of them. This, however, would leave the problem of *bhakti rasa* unsolved unless *bhakti,* in the aesthetic context is seen as emotion aroused by the inexhaustible realms of beauty revealed in and through the works of art in their myriad forms arousing an unsatiable longing for being with it and immersed in it eternally. This, obviously, is not what has been generally understood by *bhakti* in the Indian tradition.

But a reflection on what the *gopīs* have come to symbolize in the Indian tradition might reveal that our reformulation of the idea of *bhakti* is not too far away from it. Kṛṣṇa symbolises eternal, inexhaustible, unfathomable charm and beauty inherent in reality which ever attracts and enchants us and draws us towards itself again and again and we feel desolate and dry and foresaken when we are unrelated to it. The relation of the *gopīs* to Kṛṣṇa may thus be said to symbolize man's relation to Art which reveals in a transparent manner a living embodiment of that hidden dimension of reality which is conveyed by the well-known Upaniṣadic statement "*Raso vai saḥ*".

The *śānta* and the *bhakti* may thus be seen as the two poles of consciousness as it encounters the world of art and apprehends its reality through these two alternating modes of consciousness. Yet, the world of art is not the whole world, just as the Kṛṣṇa of the *Gītagovīnda* or even *Śrīmad Bhāgavat* is not the whole of Kṛṣṇa.

But can the idea of *rasa* which was developed by Bharata in the context of *nāṭya* and later elaborated in the context of *kāvya*, be extended not only to the other arts and get modified by a reflection on them, but to the whole of life which man lives and which he tries to transform, so that it may be more meaningful and beautiful? The attempt to introduce the idea of *māyā* as a *rasa* by Bhānudatta in the later part of the fifteenth century seems to have been a step in this direction. The world of *nāṭya* and, in fact, the whole world created by man has something of the character of *māyā* as understood in the Advaitic tradition. *Māyā* is said to be *sadasad vilakṣaṇa* i.e., neither *sat* nor *asat* and hence *anirvacanīya*, i.e., indescribable as either true or false. A work of art shares both these characteristics in a pre-eminent sense. In fact, Abhinavagupta is said to have discussed the question regarding the ontological status of a work of art and has concluded that it has a reality which is *sui generis* as it cannot be subsumed under any other category.

But, if the world itself has the character of *māyā* from an ontological point of view and man's artistic creations have that very character from the point of view of the world in which man normally lives, then he would have two levels of *māyā*, one created by man and the other created by Īśvara. In that case, however, we will have to distinguish between the *rasa* produced by the world of art created by man, and the *rasa* produced by the world in which man normally lives. Perhaps, the attempt to distinguish between *laukika* and *alaukika rasa* was an attempt in this direction. But, if the analogy has to be carried further then one will have to treat the *rasa* enjoyed by human beings at the *laukika* level of *vyavahāra*, as something akin to that which is enjoyed by the actual participants in a dramatic performance and the experience of *rasa* as it is, as it occurs in the mind of the beholder, that is, the *sahṛdaya* will have to be treated as more akin to that which presumably is enjoyed by Īśvara. But then what would be the distinction between *māyā* and *līlā*? Perhaps what is *līlā* for Īśvara is *māyā* for man, just as what is 'play' for the beholder is something different from that which is 'work' for the actors

who have to sweat for it. Shakespeare has said, "all the world is a stage", but he forgot to ask that if this was so, who was the "beholder" of this play.

Though in a different context, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, a thinker referred to by Abhinavagupta in his famous commentary entitled, *Abhinavabhāratī* expresses a similar view. According to Abhinavagupta, Bhaṭṭanāyaka is supposed to have said that the purpose of the creation of *Nāṭya* as an art form by Brahmā, the Creator of the world was to make men aware of the similarity between the apparently real, though essentially illusory world of *nāṭya* and the world in which he actually lives. Thus man may realize that this too is finally devoid of reality just as the world of dramatic representation which the spectator sees on the stage, participating in its joys and sorrows as if it were the real world. Bhaṭṭanāyaka uses the word *prapañca* which recalls the later use of it in Advaita Vedānta to convey the character of the world as *māyā*. But like Shakespeare, Bhaṭṭanāyaka also does not ask the question as to who is the spectator of this world play and, in case it is Brahma himself, then it is a sad reflection to think that the world he has created is so full of unnecessary pain, suffering, misery and ugliness when it could certainly be made better, unless, of course, one thinks with Leibnitz that this is the best of all possible worlds as any other world would have been worse than this.

If the different theories of *rasa* are applied to the non-representational forms of art what consequences would emerge? Would one, for example, be able to apply the concept of *māyā* to a non-representational work of art such as, say, the Chinese Jar which "moves perpetually in its stillness" or the *śuddha*, pure *ālāpa* of a *dhrupada* sung by a great vocalist. Some recent attempts at the extension of the concept of *rasa* in these fields especially music, will be examined later but it is surprising that most writers on *Alaṁkāra Śāstra* have rejected Bhānudatta's suggestion that the *rasa* of *māyā* be treated as a distinct kind of *rasa* different from all others. Their objections do not seem very convincing as they completely ignore the *māyā* character of *nāṭya* itself. The main objections relate to the beginninglessness of *māyā*, its *mithyātva* and its total difference from Brahman. For example, Cirañjīva Bhaṭṭacārya, Viśveśvara Paṇḍita and Ghāsīrām Paṇḍita appear to raise these objections. But, as far as the beginninglessness of *māyā* is concerned the Brahman also is as beginningless as *māyā* and as for *mithyātva* nothing at least in Advaita Vedānta can be regarded as "real" as Brahman. Also, as everything is different from Brahman the objection that *māyā* is different and hence cannot be regarded as something which can have *rasa* in it, is blatantly absurd, for in that case, neither *nāṭya* nor *kāvya* could be said to have *rasa* in them or produce it in the beholder. An interesting suggestion of Bhānudatta is that just as *nivṛtti* can be said to give rise to *śānta rasa*, so *pravṛtti* may be considered to give rise to *rasa* of *māyā*. But then *māyā* would have to be conceived as the only *rasa* excluding *śānta* and all the other *rasas* would have to be subsumed under it. It would be difficult to decide whether *bhakti*, if it is accepted as *rasa*, could be included under this classification. The suggestion of Ghāsirāma Paṇḍita that the *rasa* of *māyā* may itself be subsumed under the *rasa* known as *adbhūta* which is already accepted by the tradition, has not been taken seriously by those

who have considered the issue in detail. All in all, the important innovations suggested by Bhānudatta do not seem to have received the attention they deserve.

Two other issues which appear to dominate the thinking on *Alaṁkāraśāstra* during this period relate to first, the controversy between Appayadīkṣita I and Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha, and second, the increasing importation of not only the *Mīmāṁsā* and the Navya Nyāya terminology in the formulation of the issues relating to *Alaṁkāraśāstra*, but also the use of concepts pertaining to these domains for the understanding and illumination of some of the key problems in it. The controversy seems to relate to the definition of *alaṁkāra*, that is, the diverse linguistic, rhetorical devices to enhance the beauty of a poem and its relationship to *rasa* or the aesthetic delight which is supposed to be the essence of any poetic or dramatic creation. The linguistic and rhetorical devices are themselves divided into those which pertain exclusively to language and others which arise primarily because of the play on the diverse meanings of the words used. Appayadīkṣita is supposed to have contended that the use of *alaṁkāra* plays an important role in the production of aesthetic delight or *rasa* as it intensifies it in certain ways. This was denied by Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha who appears to have held that basically *alaṁkāras* have little to do with *rasa* and many a time stand in the way of its emergence, apprehension and appreciation.

The controversy was epitomized, long ago by Kālidāsa in the apprehension of the beauty of Śakuntalā by Duṣyanta when he sees her for the first time. The king was accustomed to seeing beautiful women in the palace adorned with all the ornaments which they had and therefore came to regard these embellishments as the inevitable accompaniment of anything that was to be considered as beautiful. His new response in the presence of the beauty of Śakuntalā is described by Kālidāsa in a marvellous sequence of lines. At first, he thinks of a lotus which is surrounded by the muddy water of the pond, and yet beautiful. Then he thinks of the moon whose beauty is enhanced by the spots it has. Finally, he moves on to the realization that basically Śakuntalā is prettier *because of* the ordinary rustic clothes she is wearing proving that there is no relation between real beauty and the myriad efforts at its enhancement through ornamentation. Kālidāsa, of course, is not involved in the controversy, but it has been perennial in the reflection on the beauty of a work of art even though it is associated, at least for this period, with the names of Appayadikṣita I and Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha.

The controversy over the *śleṣa* or double and multiple meanings has the same character. Ultimately the words and the meanings and whatever is suggested by them are so intimately fused with one another in a great poetic creation that it is difficult to separate one from the other. The Indian thinking on poetics seems to have been so enmeshed in the counting of numbers of different *alaṁkāras*, both *śabdālaṁkāras* and *arthālaṁkāras* that it seems to have lost the wood for the trees. When Mammaṭa enumerated the total number of *alaṁkāras*, he raised the inevitable question: whether there could be more *alaṁkāras* than the ones he had described and classified or could their number be reduced by

treating some as instances of others. This happens with all classifications. Many thinkers on poetics after him tried to increase the number of *alaṁkāras* by pointing out that there were other *alaṁkāras* which could not be possibly accommodated in his scheme. Inevitably others attempted to deny the necessity of this and Viśveśvara Paṇḍita is the most eminent name amongst the rhetoricians of the period to argue in favour of Mammaṭa and against his successors.

As for the use of the Mīmāṁsā and Navya Nyāya modes of achieving precision and distinguishing one concept from another, the writers of this period seem to be influenced by the general intellectual climate which prevailed in all branches of learning during this period. The Navya Nyāya concepts in respect of which the technique of *pariṣkāra* were used most are *sādṛśya āropa, adhyavasāya* and *sambhāvanā.* The thinkers who have attempted the method of *pariṣkāra* for analysing *alaṁkāras* such as *upamā, rūpaka, atiśayokti*, etc., are Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana, Vidyānātha Tatsat and Viśveśvara Paṇḍita. The Mīmāṁsā concepts which are used effectively, seem to be those of *aṅga* and *aṅgī, mukhya* and *gauṇa* and *phalabheda* and *āśrayabheda.* Thus the distinction between *vṛtti* and *rīti* is explained by the analogy of *phalabheda* and *āśrayabheda.* For example, the difference between *vṛtti* and *rīti* is said to be that, *vṛttis* suggest *rasas*, while *rītis* bring forth *guṇas.*

However, the thinkers in the tradition of *Alaṁkāraśāstra* do not always blindly accept the Nyāya or Mīmāṁsā doctrines in the context of their own thinking. The Nyāya doctrine, for example, that the *guṇas* cannot have *guṇas* of their own, is explicitly rejected by Acyutarāya even though the doctrine was supported by such an authority as Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha himself. His reason for rejecting the relevance of the Nyāya doctrine for *Alaṁkāraśāstra* was that the *guṇas* that one talks about in the context of *Alaṁkāraśāstra* are not the same as the natural *guṇas* such as *rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparśa*, etc. which the *naiyāyika* is talking about. But, Acyutarāya does not seem to realise the radical implications of such an assertion. If the *guṇas* which the *Alaṁkāraśāstra* deals with are totally different in nature from those which are dealt with in the *Nyāya Śāstra*, then what is their ontological status and how is knowledge about them validated. It is not surprising that the notion of *Āhārya Jñāna* has been used by thinkers of this period dealing with *Alaṁkāraśāstra* to provide a basis for discussing such problems. Yet, the larger problem of the epistemological validation of judgements relating to *kāvya* and *nāṭya* does not seem to have been discussed, even though the notion of *aucitya* seems to have played some role in their thinking. The idea of '*rasābhāsa*' which could have provided an important entry point for the discussion of this issue somehow got entangled in moral considerations which were totally irrelevant to the aesthetic domain.

The traditional concern with the question as to wherein the essential nature of poetry resides, or consists in, has continued to engage the attention of many persons in the older Sanskritic tradition continuing even into the twentieth century. Some of those who deserve mention are Professor Rewaprasada Dvivedi and the well-known scholar of Kālidāsa, Professor Brahmanand Sharma.

The former, Professor Dvivedi has extended the meaning of the term *alaṁkāra* to include other aspects of poetry such as *dhvani*, etc. in his book, *Kāvyālaṁkārakārikā*. However, he appears to consider *rasa* as the effect produced by poetry in the mind of the *sahṛdaya*, or one who critically and appreciatively apprehends its meaning in its various dimensions and depths.

Also, interestingly, he appears to consider the poetic meaning itself as symbolising something else which is the real essence of poetry and to which all the elements, that is, *alaṁkāra* in the usual sense of the term, *dhvani, guṇa* and *rīti*, etc. contribute and which produces *rasa* in the person who has developed the capacity and the sensibility over a long period of cultivating it through a continuous acquaintance with the great poetic works with which he has 'lived' almost the whole of his life.

Paṇḍit Brahmanand Sharma, on the other hand-disputes this symbolisation of poetic meaning as, ultimately what poetry conveys cannot be separated from the specificity of the words and the particular sequence in which they occur. Not only this, according to him, if the meaning of the term *alaṁkāra* can be extended as Professor Rewaprasad Dvivedi has done, the same can be done also with the other terms in the tradition such as *dhvani, guṇa* or *rīti* and they may then also be treated as symbolising something beyond them which introduces *rasa* as a consequent emergent quality in the consciousness of one who apprehends this symbolised meaning. Furthermore, the notion of symbolisation, which, according to him, Professor Dvivedi has used, would necessitate some further operation in the conveying of poetic meaning besides the one that is usually conveyed by the term '*vyañjanā*' in traditional vocabulary employed to understand the realm of poetic meaning. His own view on the contrary, is presented in his work entitled, *Kāvyasatyāloka*. He states that poetic meaning consists in a deeper apprehension of truth which ordinary declarative discourse cannot do, as it misses many of the most significant dimensions of the human personality which apprehends reality through them also. Poetry, for him, fuses these diverse dimensions of meaning into a unified, integrated whole which then is apprehended in its totality as true in the real sense of the term.

The central, yet hitherto unasked question, whether the theory of *rasa* can really be extended and applied to arts other than those of *nāṭya, kāvya* and *abhinaya*-centered *nṛtya* was raised and dealt with by Paṇḍit Omkaranatha Thakur. He delivered his lectures at the Baroda University in the days when it was a lively academic centre under the Vice-Chancellorship of Dr. Hansa Mehta. A well-known vocalist of north Indian music and a Professor of Music at the Banaras Hindu University, his lectures in Gujarati were later published under the title '*Rāganīrasa*'.

Paṇḍit Omkarnath Thakur in his lectures explores this idea in detail and suggests that the whole theory of *rasa* developed by Bharata in connection with human situations as depicted in dramatic representation could easily be transposed to music as it has developed in India from the time of the *Sāmaveda* onwards.

In fact, he finds a clue to his attempt in the *Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra* wherein the word "*sāma*" is itself understood to mean the unity of *Sa* and *am*, that is 'you' the feminine principle and 'I' the masculine. This strategy permits him to understand music in terms of a combination of masculine and feminine principles, a move that helps him bring in the theory of *rasa* in terms of what has come to be called the *nāyaka-nāyikā bheda* in the later Indian aesthetic tradition. The fact that Indian music is itself classified under *rāga* and *rāginīs* and that many of these have been represented in painting as if they were embodiments of masculine and feminine characters, helps him to easily make the required transition. However, the deeper point that he makes in this connection is that no emotional meaning can ever be conveyed without the help of the modulation of voice involved in the utterance of the word, which brings in music as providing that element which *alone* generates that central core of meaning without which utterance will become totally inert and dead. This suggests that musical modulations of the notes is an integral part of the communication of meaning at the human level as without it, it would relapse into the type of communication that may be supposed to occur between inert particles of matter. Perhaps, the whole world of living beings communicate in this manner and as life becomes more evolved, the more subtle and dominant becomes this aspect of communication.

Paṇḍit Omkarnath Thakur's subtle analysis of the different ways in which such emotive meaning is conveyed through different *rāgas* and *rāginīs* deserves special attention. So also, does his attempt at establishing correlations between the musical *rāgas* and *rāginīs* and the different types of *nāyakas* and *nāyikās* described so minutely in the Indian tradition. However, the overwhelming and unwarranted influence of the *nāyaka-nāyikā* mode of analysis in the traditional understanding of *rasa* and the inability of the learned Paṇḍit to expand the perspective is a limitation. Instead of treating music as an autonomous realm to be understood on its own terms, he seems to have made it subservient to a mode of analysis which was primarily developed in the context of different art forms, i.e. poetry and drama.

Similarly, according to this appreciation the emotions generated by music are too dependent on the words of the song which are sung, forgetting that in the *śuddha ālāpa* no words are needed at all and that deep and profound effects in the realm of feeling are still generated by the pure sounds which has no verbal accompaniments to them. The *ālāpa* of Dhrupad is well known in this context and in the hands of a great master it will produce effects which transcend all the so-called emotions generated by the *nāyaka-nāyikā* mode of analysis of the *Rāga* and *Rāginī*. Also, whether his theory can apply to all types of music, Indian or non-Indian, and whether even the trained listener will feel the same emotion if ever he/she were not to know the words of the song which is being sung, is not explored by him. Further, if this is accepted then the whole realm of instrumental music is completely neglected as there are no words to help one in understanding the emotion or the mood or the *rasa* that is being generated there.

Yet, in spite of all these limitations there can be little doubt that Paṇḍit Omkarnath Thakur questioned the application and relevance of the theory of *rasa* to other arts, besides those of drama and poetry in the context of which it was developed. Perhaps, the best way would be to explore the concept of *rasa* as immanently pursued in each of the arts without being constrained by the way it has been thought about up till now. One may, later on build a generalized theory of *rasa* which might take specific forms in different arts taking into account the relevant differences among them.

Paṇḍit Omkarnath Thakur's attempt seems to have been carried on further by one of his students, namely, Sri Pradip Dikshit who has written a book entitled, *Rāga Rāginī Vargīkaraṇa aur Nāyaka Nāyikā Bheda.* But the most radical and innovative move in this context has been made by Dr. Mukund Lath in his *Vatsal Nidhi* lectures entitled, *Saṅgīta aur Cintana.* He had made music the central reference point of his thinking and tried to understand the whole realm of creativity including that of thought in this perspective. He concentrates on the notion of *ālāpa* and distinguishes it from *dhuna* a distinction which may be found not only in all musical traditions, but also, in all realms of culture, which ultimately are nothing but a result of human creativity. Dr. Lath draws our attention to the fact that while in the case of *dhuna,* we are expected to *repeat* it without any alteration and to play or sing the same thing in the same tune over and over again, in *rāga* we are expected to innovate continuously within the broad structures provided by the *rāga,* and that this continuous creativity is exhibited in what is called as *ālāpa* in the musical tradition of India. Thus, while in the former any departure from what is treated as the norm or the standard is frowned upon and looked at as a "deviation" requiring correction, in the latter innovation, change, deviation is the heart of the matter. No one expects even a master to "repeat" himself and if he does so, it is treated as a sign of decline in creativity.

Dr. Lath has treated this distinction as a clue to understand the creative element in the process of thinking where, according to him, there is an element of what he has called *ālāpa* in the realm of music. In fact, the point relates to the question as to how a thought develops, and how thinking itself may be seen as a creative act demanding continuous variation and innovations as in *rāga* music.

This may be seen not only as an attempt in distinguishing different cultures and civilisations but also different realms within the same culture or civilization and the way it has varied over time. The recitation of the Vedic *mantras* with their fixed *svarānupūrvī, varṇanupūrvī* and *śabdānūpurvī,* for example provide an instance of what he has called a *dhuna* in the Indian culture. On the other hand, the evolution of *Gandharva* from *Sāma* might provide an example of the *rāga* in the Indian tradition.

In a bold attempt, he has tried to correlate the concepts of *śabda* and *svara* on the one hand, and *satya* and *rasa* on the other. One may question these co-relations as they blur the essential differences between the enterprises of thought and the enterprise which is embodied in the different arts. But there can be little doubt that he has pointed to an essential similarity which belongs to all domains

where creativity is the essence of the matter. In any case, it gives evidence of continuity and change on the concerns which have been evinced in thinking about the arts since the earliest times and it has continued right up to the present.

Dr. Lath's attempt, though interesting in itself, does not utilize the repertoire of concepts elaborated over millennia in thinking about *nāṭya* and *kāvya* which could have easily been done if he, like all the others, had not felt tied to the *specificity* of the meaning of these concepts in the Indian tradition, determined as they were by the *accidental* circumstances of their origin. The extension, modification, widening and deepening of the meaning of these concepts can easily be achieved if one were to search for the meaning of such terms as *vṛtti, rīti, alaṁkāra, rasa, dhvani, guṇa, doṣa*, etc. in arts other than those to which they were usually applied, that is, *kāvya* and *nāṭya*. Such an attempt would reveal the 'functionality' of the concept in the process of thinking and its intimate, interactive inter-relationship with the other concepts in association with which it forms the conceptual net with the help of which the thinkers in the tradition had tried to take hold of the reality of the aesthetic domain.

The focal concern is neither the work of art that is created, whether it be *kāvya, nāṭya*, etc., nor the *sahṛdaya* or the appreciator who enjoys the work of art, nor the critic who tries to 'analyse' its beauties and critically evaluate its qualities and defects, but rather the creator, or the creative consciousness which brings the original work into being and which has been seen in terms of *pratibhā* in the Indian tradition. If the definition of *pratibhā* as *nava navonmeṣa śālinī buddhi* were taken seriously, then wherever this consciousness is present and whatever its result, it would be analysable, in principle, in terms of the various concepts which the tradition has employed in its long history, modified to suit the specific particularities of each domain of creation. *Alaṁkāra*, for example, would not mean the same in music or architecture as it does in *kāvya* for the simple reason that there is neither *śabda* nor *artha* in the usual senses of these words. Similarly, *dhvani* would be very different and perhaps would be better understood if taken out of the context in which Ānandavardhana first employed it. It should be kept in mind that the concepts elaborated belong to entirely different dimensions of creativity and unless we are clear about the aspect to which it has to be applied, we would not be able to take hold of the complexity of the exercise in question. The concepts of *alaṁkāra, vṛtti, rīti* and *dhvani*, for example, apply primarily to the object that is created. The concept of *rasa*, on the other hand, applies primarily to the *sahṛdaya*, the audience or person who appreciates the work created. The concepts, *guṇa* and *doṣa* arise primarily in the context of the critic even though they are concerned with the work that is the object of their critical reflection.

The issue is complex and needs careful exploration and further elaboration but unless this is done the rich resources of India's thinking in the aesthetic domain will remain confined to the context of *nāṭya* and *kāvya* in which they arose and in the discussion of which they are usually presented. Paṇḍit Omkarnath

Thakur and others have in their diverse ways tried to open up the tradition for further thinking on this matter. So have the works of Paṇḍit Rewaprasad Dvivedi and Paṇḍit Brahma Dutta Sharma. The insights of these and of others like Acyutarāya Modaka have to be taken note of and utilised in the challenging task of carrying the Indian thought in the realm of aesthetic further.

CHAPTER 10

Some Developments in Jaina Thought from Yaśovijaya Onwards

Jaina philosophical thought has hardly been paid the attention that it deserves, perhaps because it is generally supposed to hold that every statement is true from some point of view or other. Its doctrine of *anekāntavāda, syādavāda* and *saptabhaṅgī naya* are well known, but the way they have been really presented has probably stood in the way of their being taken seriously by others. Anyone who says that everything is "true", rules himself out of court from serious discussion on any subject, as he is not contending that what his opponent is saying is false or mistaken. Surprisingly, the same fate should have befallen the other extreme position which holds that no statement or position is "true". Yet, both the Mādhyamika Buddhist and the Advaitin have held some such position and still been the subject of continued discussion and debate amongst the philosophical traditions of India. Both of them have dismissed the Jaina position perfunctorily without much discussion, as if it did not deserve to be seriously considered. In fact, the term "*anekāntika*" is usually used in the sense of a fallacy in the *Nyāya Sūtras* and enjoys this usage in other traditions of philosophising also. The reason for this lies obviously in the fact that thinking normally moves in terms of a two-valued logic where "truth" and "falsity" are opposed to each other in such a way that the same statement cannot be true and false together and has to have at least one of them as its value, that is, be it true or false. The law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle provide the basic structure on which all thinking proceeds and if one seriously denies them, it is difficult to see how one can argue with such a person or proceed in the activity of thinking any further.

Recent advances in logic have questioned the necessity of the law of excluded middle and of the two-valued logic which it presupposes. There have also been attempts to further differentiate the notion of negation on which the usual statement of the law of contradiction is based. But in spite of all the multifarious developments in logic, the foundational problem of "exclusion" remains as thought cannot move without "excluding" or "denying" something, a point that was firmly

grasped by the Buddhist in the doctrine of *apoha*. Furthermore, if this is the very character of the thinking process and if it is held to be unacceptable for some reason, then one would be driven to the conclusion that thought cannot, in principle, grasp the nature of that which is supposed to be "real" or "true". Both the Buddhist and Advaitin accepted this conclusion in different ways. The modern logicians, on the other hand, do not seem to accept this as an inevitable conclusion of what he seems to be essentially trying to contact for. He, in essence appears to be, at least *prima facie*, in the good company of the Jaina, who tried to do so long ago in the Indian tradition. Or, perhaps, he does not worry about the metaphysical consequences of what he is trying to do, for he sees himself as a pure "technician" who is only concerned with seeing what are the consequences of the various assumptions which one is "free" to make in respect of both the so-called "axioms" and rules or derivations.

Jaina philosophical thought has hardly been seen in a historical perspective, a neglect which all the so-called schools of Indian philosophies suffer from. It is treated as if all the distinctive doctrines which are ascribed to the Jainas were formulated all at once and that subsequent Jaina thinkers made no additions or modifications in them. Besides this, the treatment of Jaina thinking on philosophical issues has always been presented in such a way as to give the impression that it was not effected in any way by the other schools of Indian philosophy, even though this is not the case either with the presentation of the long debate between the Buddhists and the Nyāya logicians on the one hand and the Buddhist and the Advaitic thinkers on the other. The influence of Buddhist on Gauḍpāda is well known and Śaṅkara has been called, with some justification, a *Pracchanna Bauddha*. It is also well known that the Nyāya positions were greatly modified in the light of the Buddhist criticism of them. This, of course, occurred only in A.D. first millennium as the Buddhists had disappeared from the theatre of Indian philosophy after the destruction of Nālandā in A.D. 1200. The long debate between the Advaitic and Non-Advaitic Vedāntins on the one hand and between the Advaitins and the Naiyāyikas in A.D. second millennium on the other, does not seem to have the same effect as all the sides in the dispute appear to have stuck to their positions.

The Jainas, in contrast, to the Buddhist, the Vedāntins and to the Naiyāyikas, do not seem as apparent from a study of philosophic thought, to have entered in India into a long continuous debate with others on any of the philosophical issues that they held. Yet, even a brief acquaintance with some of the original Jaina arguments will be sufficient to make one doubt the truth of this impression. Sāmantabhadra, for example, is said to have given arguments against the Advaitin's denial of the reality of difference.

In fact, right from the time of Kuṅda king and Umā Svātī, the Jaina philosophical thinking may be seen not only as dealing with the same problems from its own point of view, but also "mirroring" the various conflicting doctrines of other systems in an attempt to reconstruct and reconcile them in as harmonious a way as possible. Thus, the changing philosophical scene in India may be recon-

structed from the writings of successive outstanding Jaina thinkers who tried to come to terms with it in their own way. In this attempt, many a time, the differences and conflicts become a part of the Jaina position itself, as elaborated by Jaina thinkers holding different positions on them. Thus, for example, a dispute seems to have risen whether the *jñāna* of the *kevalin* was simultaneous or successive in character. Or in other words, whether the Omniscience ascribed to the *Kevalin* consisted of a simultaneous knowledge of everything, past, present and future or it consisted of successive acts of such knowledge. Siddhasena Divākara (A.D. 700) and Jinabhadra Sūri (A.D. 1140) are supposed to have taken opposed positions on this issue. In fact, the developments in Jaina logic and epistemology can only be understood if they are seen in the context of the developments that were taking place in these fields amongst the other schools of Indian philosophy. The Jaina thinkers had to develop a *Pramāṇa Śāstra* of their own, just as they had to develop a whole complex theory of Nyāya in order to accommodate their own theory of knowledge. Surprisingly, they also took a lot from the *Yoga Sūtras* of Patañjali and modified this to suit their own tradition of meditative practices.

Thus, the philosophical developments among the Jainas were not a purely self-contained, immanent and internal affair of the Jainas alone. It is true that there are supposed to be deep differences between the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras on many crucial issues and that independent developments in the Digambara philosophical thought seem to have ceased very early. But, at least among the Śvetāmbaras, philosophical thinking seems to have continued vigorously and Yaśovijaya who appears at the close of the seventeenth century shows clearly in his writings the influence not only of Navya Nyāya, but also of *Advaita Vedānta*, the *Yoga Sūtra* and the *Bhagvad Gītā*. He takes into account the developments that had occurred in India's *Pramāṇa Śāstra* from Siddhasena Divākara onwards. In his well-known work entitled, "*Sanmati Tarka*" Divākara is supposed to have initiated new developments in Jaina thinking about the subject. So also, he is supposed to have integrated the later developments introduced by Haribhadra Sūri and Prabhācandra in the elaboration of the subject. But, his main innovative contribution seems to have been to make use of the Navya Nyāya modes of analysis to explain and strengthen some of the well-known contentions of *anekāntavāda* along with the doctrine of "Nyāya" that is entailed. Yaśovijaya made a clever use of the Navya Nyāya analysis of *abhāva* to establish the Jaina position that the *abhāva* of an object may still be said meaningfully to characterize it even when it exist. Similarly, Yaśovijaya also tried to assimilate or at least show the similarities between the notion of "nyāya" in the Jaina tradition and the notion of *avacchedaka* in the Navya Nyāya tradition, particularly as both tried to achieve absolute precision of statement without any ambiguity whatsoever. However, Yaśovijaya did not use only Navya Nyāya to establish and strengthen the well-known Jaina position against critics, but also took recourse to the discussions in Advaita Vedānta to emphasize the tenability and viability of some Jaina doctrines, which were not accepted by non-Jaina philosophers including the Advaita Vedāntins.

But, perhaps, the most interesting aspect of Yaśovijaya's work in this context is his use of the *Gītā* which at least *prima facie* seems surprising as it is not only supposed to be the word of the Lord himself, but deals with *karma* which, according to Jainism, is the primary cause of bondage. The *Gītā*, may be remembered, deals, amongst other things, with this problem itself and advises of *karma* done in a certain way so that it may not produce bondage at all. It argues that it is not action, *per se*, which is the cause of the bondage but the desire which prompts us to engage in action and which seeks its fulfillment through it. Thus, it suggest that there is a way of doing actions so that they may not result in bondage, as had been argued almost by everybody else, except perhaps the Mīmāṁsaka, in the Indian tradition. This type of action is well known as '*niṣkāma karma*', and it is surprising to find Yaśovijaya accepting or adopting it in the Jaina context.

The discussion on *karma* in the *Gītā* should be understood against the backdrop of the controversy between *jñāna* and *karma* in the Indian tradition, the arguments deriving from the Buddha Śramaṇik and the Upaniṣadic tradition on the one hand and those deriving from the Vedic and the Dharmaśāstra traditions on the other. Surprisingly, Yaśovijaya raises the issue once again in his writings and following the usual advaitic line, treats *karma* as only a means to achieving the state of *jñāna* which alone can lead to the highest state of consciousness which is held to be identical with liberation. Yaśovijaya accepts the notion of *niṣkāma karma* as propounded in the *Gītā* but still considers action of any type and at any level inferior to *jñāna*. In this, he follows Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *Gītā* forgetting like him, that the whole discourse of the *Gītā* was meant to inspire in Arjuna once again the will to fight the war which involved the killing of hundreds of thousands of people. Yaśovijaya also does not seem to take into account the dimension of *bhakti* which is not only propounded in the *Gītā* but with which it closes, recommending complete surrender to God and to none else.

Yaśovijaya seems to be heavily influenced by the *Upaniṣads* also and describes the reality of the *ātman* in terms of its famous formula of *sat-cit-ānand*. But, as he is also a committed Jaina thinker, he tries to reconcile the diverse conflict of thought with easy recourse to *anekāntavāda* and the doctrine of Nyāya forgetting that neither the Buddhists, nor the Advaitin or any other school of philosophy in Indian tradition permit such a reconciliation. In fact, the term "*anekāntic*" is generally used in other systems of philosophy to indicate a fallacy in thought. The ultimate Advaitic position relegates the realm of *anekāntavāda* and Nyāya to *Māyā* in the context of which alone it may be held to be true. Still his valiant attempt to incorporate the insights of Nyāya, Advait Vedānta, the *Gītā* and Yoga tradition shows that the Jaina thinkers were open to influences from other schools of Indian philosophy and that they were not as "isolated" or monadic in the development of their philosophical thought, as has generally been implied in the presentation of their thought by historians of Indian philosophy. In fact, all the so-called "schools" of Indian philosophy have continuously interacted with one another modifying their positions accordingly. Perhaps, the Jainas were more

"open" to outside influences in this respect because of their initial acceptance and espousal of *anekāntavāda*. The non-Jaina thinkers on the other hand seem to have interacted mainly amongst themselves as they excluded the Jainas from the philosophical arena because of the position that they held. One cannot argue with a person who holds that every statement is true, and as the Jainas held this position, nobody seems to have taken them "seriously". Thus, while sufficient evidence exists of the influence of other schools on Jaina thinkers, there is hardly any evidence apparent of the counter-influence of the Jainas on them.

Yaśovijaya appeared at the end of the seventeenth century and it is extremely unlikely that subsequent Jaina thinkers from the eighteenth century onwards were not heavily influenced by him or developed his thought further in various respects. In fact, there seem to have been a number of persons who wrote commentaries on some of his works, particularly on the *Jñānasāra* and the *Ādhyātmasāra*. Thus we have Deva Candra Yatipati in A.D. 1738 writing a commentary on his *Jñānasāra* and Lavanyasuri writing as late as A.D. 1946 on a number of his logico-epistemological works such as the *Navarahasya*. In between, we have Gambhīravijaygaṇi and Vijayanemisūri whose dates are not known. The former wrote in Gujrati, thus, giving evidence of his profound influence on a large number of people who did not know Sanskrit. The differences amongst various commentaries, as far as we know, have not yet been studied.

Yaśovijaya was however, not the only thinker during this period. There are many others whose works are mentioned in Potter's bibliography. A list of them has been given in the appendix but for some reason they have not attracted the attention of those who have concerned themselves with developments in Jaina thought during this period. Most of them have assumed that nothing of philosophical significance was produced after Yaśovijaya, and have concentrated mainly on the various sects that arose during this period and the reforming tendencies in them. The impression, though widespread may be as mistaken as we have found it to be in the case of other traditions of philosophising in India during this period. A considered judgement, however, is only possible after a serious study of at least some of these works. Till then, we can only say that it would be extremely surprising if the Jainas were to prove an exception to what we have found to be the case with all the other "schools" of Indian philosophy during this period.

SECTION THREE