

CHAPTER 6

Developments in Nyāya from Eighteenth Century Onwards

A Reconstruction Based on the Constructions
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The philosophical traditions of India which had already crystallized in different regions continued to develop without being affected in any substantial way by the vast political changes that were occurring such as the Mughal collapse after the death of Aurangzeb in A.D. 1707, or the collapse of the Marathas in A.D. 1818, leading to the total British supremacy in A.D. 1857. After Raghunātha Śīromaṇi (A.D. 1530) the Mithila-Bengal region had already seen the emergence of several great Naiyāyika thinkers among whom the most outstanding persons occurred within a short period of about forty years Jagdīśa (1620 A.D.), Mathurānātha (1650 A.D.) and Gadādhara (1660 A.D.)

The details of the developments that took place in Navya Nyāya thought from Raghunātha Śīromaṇi to Gadādhara have not been studied; yet the direction of the development is quite clear as already in Raghunātha Śīromaṇi's work, we find a specialized discussion of such topics as *ākhyāta*, *sāmānyanirukti*, etc. The developments in Navya Nyāya too seem to have had an immanent character determined more by the internal logic of the mode of analysis accepted and the ideal of philosophical precision attempted by the system than by any other considerations including those which generally arose from criticism by other schools as seems to have been the case with the developments in the Advaitic and non-Advaitic traditions of Vedānta.

The primary motive force for the developments in Nyāya seem to have occurred because of their basic acceptance that all knowledge is relational in character and that it was mediated through language which not only embodied it essentially but whose articulation or embodiment determined it in such a unique way as to destroy the distinction between what, in recent western philosophical thought, has been described in terms of 'sense' and 'reference'. Normally, we tend to think that linguistically different sentences may convey the same fact whose facticity remains unaffected by the different formulations that it may have in the same language or in different languages. The Naiyāyika does not

seem to accept this position and hence has not accepted the difference between sense and reference on the one hand and sentence and proposition on the other. This resulted in a situation where each different sentential formulation resulted in the postulation of a different meaning which then had to be analytically grasped by formulating it as a relational piece of knowledge where something was characterized by the way the sentence itself was formulated or constructed.

Normally, a sentence is supposed to have a subject and a predicate and the predicate is supposed to characterize the subject in a certain way but in an analytical framework in which different sentences may convey the same fact, the relation is embedded in a situation which is independent of the way it is known or the way this knowledge is formulated in language, and hence the distinction between substance and the attribute at the ontological level is supposed to provide the ground for the distinction between the subject and the predicate both at the epistemological and the linguistic level. In fact, even though the subject and the predicate at the linguistic level may apparently be different, they are not supposed to be so at the epistemological level if they refer to the same fact at the semantic level. The Naiyāyika does not seem to have accepted this position and hence the relational analysis of the "knowledge situation" that he attempted was determined by the linguistic formulation itself.

Also, it does not seem to have made a radical distinction between a sentence which predicates some property of an object and sentences which describe a relation between two objects; the predication was as much a relation for the Naiyāyika as, say, contact or conjunction. And, thus, the primary terms of the relationship were designated in terms of that which was characterized, that is, the *anuyogī* and that which characterized it or the *pratiyogī*. This appears to be very much like the traditional Aristotelian analysis of all sentences in terms of subject, predicate and the copula where everything that was said of the subject was treated as a 'predicate' and the predication was seen in terms of a timeless relation denoted by the timeless 'is' of the copula, characterizing the subject. However, the Nyāya analysis does not seem to have taken the term which the idealists appear to have imposed on the Aristotelian analysis by treating everything as a predicate and making 'reality' with a capital 'R' as the subject of all predicates denoted by a mere term such as 'it' or 'X' stripped of all predicates or as capable of taking any predicate whatsoever. The Nyāya analyst never seems to have wrestled with the problem as to how to distinguish between a sentence such as 'The jar is blue' and 'It is a jar'.

However, the Navya Nyāya analysis distinguishes among the predicates on the basis of the relation by which they were supposed to be related to the subject. The general term for relation was *sambandha* and these were distinguished as *samvāya*, *saṁyoga*, *svarūpa*, *tādātmya*, *ṛttitva*, *sāmānādhikarānya*, etc. But as the predicate could be related to the subject by any of these relations, it became necessary, in order to avoid confusion, to specify the relation through which (to use the technical Nyāya terms) the '*pratiyogī*' was related to the subject, that is,

the *anuyogī*. Also, in order to clearly and unambiguously specify as to what was related to what by which relation, a new technical concept was evolved which was to indicate the scope and the limit of the relationships operating in the analysis as a number of different relations could simultaneously be mentioned in a sentence. This was called *avacchedaka* and performed almost an analogous function in the Navya Nyāya analysis to what in modern logic is called the 'scope of a quantifier'. It is surprising that the Navya Nyāya analysis did not develop the notion of a quantifier which plays such a crucial role in Aristotelian and modern logic. Perhaps it did not do so as it developed an analogous notion of *vyāpka* and *vyāpaka* which perhaps played the same role in its analysis. Also perhaps it did not develop the pure notions of quantification as it seemed to have been too tied to specific empirical examples and did not develop in a clear cut form the notion of a purely formal logic.

Due to its acceptance of the notion of a universal as almost inextricably involved in everything that was perceived or talked about the thrust of the Navya Nyāya analysis took another direction. Thus, one did not merely have universals relating to objects, that were perceived for example, a cow but also of such a notion as, for example, the subject and the predicate or, to use the Nyāya terms, *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī*. In fact, as everything can also be treated as a property and as every property must also have a universal, an *anuyogī* will have in it the property of *anuyogitā*, which itself will have a corresponding universal, *anuyogitātva*. The same will also hold for *pratiyogī* which will have the property of *pratiyogitā* which will have a universal, *pratiyogitātva*. However, this universal will have to be related to the property which itself, in its own turn, will have to be related to that of which it is the property. In the examples given above, *anuyogitātva* and *pratiyogitātva* will, thus, have to be related to *anuyogitā* and *pratiyogitā*, respectively, which in their own turn, will have to be related to *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī* and these relations will have to be specified in terms of one or the other relations mentioned above. However, a mere mention of the relation without a mention of the scope of the relation or the *avacchedaka* or the limiter, as it is generally called, would be inconceivable as it might possibly lead to confusion. The Naiyāyika therefore has not only to specify the relation but also to qualify it with the relevant *avacchedaka* required for precision as also unambiguity of the statement concerned. But to make matters even more difficult for the ordinary student of Navya Nyāya, the *avacchedaka* itself has to have a property and a universal known as *avacchedakatā* and *avacchedakatātva* which will have to be related in the same way as the others. As sentences can be more complex having multiple subjects and predicates, one needs to indicate which is the primary subject and the primary predicate and which are secondary in character. Therefore there is the need to indicate what the Naiyāyika calls the '*mukhya viśeṣyatā*' and the '*mukhya prakāratā*'. However, as the subsidiary subjects and predicates will be subjects and predicates in their own turn, one can imagine the complications that a complex sentence can introduce for a Navya Nyāya analyst.

A radically new dimension was introduced by the new relation *viṣayatā* and *viṣayitā* which bypassed all other relations as it made each and all of them as objects to a cognition which then is treated as a subject in relation to it. *Viṣayatā*, it is contended, is itself another name for knowledge or *jñāna* in general which is supposed to consist of *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* and *samsargatā jñāna* according to Nyāya. In case this is correct, *viśeṣyatā* will just be another name for the complex property constituted by the analysis of 'knowledge' at the level of self-consciousness and its translation as 'knownness' would be incorrect. However, in case this is so, there is little point in coining a special term for the complex property constituted by *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* and *samsargatā*, particularly when it is systematically misleading in character as it tends to denote an 'additional' property which just is not there. But, if the situation is understood in this way, what happens to the notion of *viṣayitā* which is the correlate term of *viṣayatā*, as unless *viṣayatā*, were to be treated as a separate, specific property, there would be little point in talking about that to which it is related as an 'object'. Would we then, have to treat *viṣayatā* as an emergent property of knowledge or *jñāna* in the Nyāya sense, when by itself it becomes an object to another cognition in what is called *anuvyavasāya* or self-reflective introspection. In case this is so, and if we accept the possibility of an indefinite number of *anuvyavasāya*, then we would have a series of cognitions where each would have the characteristics of *viṣayatā* and *viṣayitā* in relation to each other except perhaps the first one from where the whole chain had started as this would only have *viṣayatā* in it and never *viṣayitā*. It is not quite clear if the *viṣayitā* can itself be treated as *viṣayatā* in a cognition that becomes self-conscious of itself, a phenomenon denoted by the term *anuvyavasāya* in the Indian tradition.

But if we accept that *viṣayatā* is an emergent property in a cognition (consisting of *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* and *samsargatā*) when it becomes an object of introspective reflection called *anuvyavasāya*, then what exactly will be the notion of *viṣayitā* and to what entity it will be supposed to belong. The problem arises as *viṣayitā* is supposed to be the co-relate relational term of *viṣayatā* and these together form a new relational complex where *viṣayatā* belongs to the first level cognitional whole which occurs at the *savikalpa* level. Whether *viṣayitā* and *viṣayatā* will themselves be related by the relation of *anuyogitā*, *pratiyogitā* and *Samsargatā* is unclear. For, according to the Navya Nyāya mode of analysis all knowledge above the *nirvikalpak* level is bound to have these three as necessary constituents of itself. On the other hand if *viṣayitā* is supposed to belong to the subject or the self in a self conscious reflective consciousness, then if this "self" or subject were itself to become the object of another self-conscious reflection or *anuvyavasāya*, then would it have the property *viṣayatā* in it?

An objection which may be formulated is that *viṣayitā* does not and cannot belong to any one single object of cognition such as self or subject. It belongs to the complex relationship of the *viṣayitā* and *viṣayatā* with some *samsargatā* relation between them if they are to become "objects" of the fact that while *viṣayatā* belongs properly to a differentiated complex of cognition at the level of

reflective introspection, the *viśayitā* is as its *anuyogī* in the Navya Nyāya framework of analysis. And though this new complex of *viśayitā* and *viśayatā* along with some relation between them has again to be treated as a complex object of some other, higher level, cognition, *viśayitā* in it will have to "belong" or be a property of something "other" than that to which *viśayatā* in this cognition is said to belong. The problem would occur at every level and, as far as we know, has not been seriously considered in the Nyāya uptil now. The problem, it may be noted, does not occur at the first level of *savikalpaka jñāna* as there it is quite clear to what the *viśayatā* belongs which, at this level, may be said to be the analogue of what is called *viśayitā* at other levels.

Regarding the discussion on whether *viśayatā* should be treated as a separate independent *padārtha*, Harirama Tarkalamkara, for example, seems to argue that unless *viśayatā* was accepted as a separate independent *padārtha*, one would not be able to distinguish between one piece of knowledge and another.¹ In fact, seems to distinguish not only between the *viśayatā* that belongs to *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* from the one which belongs to *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* but also that which belongs to *viśeṣyatā* as he seems to contend that the *viśayatā* which belongs to *viśeṣyatā* cannot be understood in terms of *prakāratā* which characterizes it.² Such a postulation, however, will make the situation even more complicated as not only *prakāratā* will have to have its own *viśayatā* but the *viśayatā* that belongs to the unity formed in *savikalpaka* knowledge by *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* and *samsargatā* will have to have its separate *viśayatā* distinct from the *viśayatās* which *viśeṣyatā* and *prakāratā* would have.

In fact the problem seems to have arisen because of the acceptance of *abhāva* as a separate *padārtha* sometime around A.D. 1000. The discussion about *padārthas*, *abhāva* have been added to the list already enumerated by Kaṇāda in his *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*. Some of the innovations of Udayana seem to confirm this and this perhaps explains why he self-consciously proclaims himself to be an "*ādhunika Naiyāyika*" as opposed to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa whom he explicitly calls as belonging to the 'older school (*jaran*)'. However, the clearest indication of the decision to add a totally new *padārtha*, that is, *abhāva* to the earlier six mentioned by Kaṇāda seems to have been taken by Śivāditya who entitles his work specifically as '*Saptapadārthī*'. Potter gives his date around A.D. 1150, but some date him earlier than this. But, whatever the differences and dispute about the dating of Śivāditya, there can be no doubt that after him *abhāva* was regularly accepted as an independent *padārtha* having the same ontological status as the other six *padārthas* of Kaṇāda in the Vaiśeṣika system.

The consequences of this acceptance of *abhāva* as an independent *padārtha* were far-reaching as the whole Nyāya tradition began to concentrate on the new type of entities and relations generated by the acceptance of *abhāva* as a *padārtha*. The new mode of analysis introduced by Udayana and carried forward by Gaṅgeśa led to a proliferation of new relational entities which demanded to be given the status of *padārthas* in their own right even though it was not clear as to under which of the seven categories they were to be placed. It has been suggested by

Professor V.N. Jha in his introduction to Harirama Tarkalankar's *Viṣayatāvāda* that Raghunātha Śīromaṇi's reformulation of the number of *padārthas* was done in the context of this discussion.³ However, unless further substantiated this suggestion, though interesting, needs to be judged in the light of the fact that Raghunātha not only argues for the acceptance of such new *padārthas* as *viṣayatā* but rejected many of the older *padārthas* on some ground of his own.

Besides, though the terms used are both psychological and epistemological, it is not clear whether the distinction is also linguistic, that is, whether it relates to what is called the subject and predicate in a sentence as cognition for the Nyāya analysis is determined by the *śābdabodha* or the way it is embodied in a linguistic formulation.

The Nyāya analysis of *śābdabodha* does not appear to distinguish between the speaker and the hearer or the one who writes and the one who reads, for if one does so, then one will have to accept the possibility of a non-linguistic cognition which articulates itself through language and may possibly fail to do so. It is, of course, true that the listener or the reader has nothing else but the sentential formulation through which to construe the cognition conveyed but even he can legitimately ask if this was the real meaning which was sought to be conveyed by the other and at least the speaker or the writer can always correct and reformulate what he has said or written as it did not convey what he wanted to say through the linguistic formulation. There are well-known cases where the corrections in what is written or even said are made by others and accepted by the writer or the speaker as conveying more adequately what one intended to convey. The case of Pound's correction of Eliot's '*Wasteland*' is well known but every author encounters the situation when his manuscript is copy edited by someone else. It is not quite clear how the traditional Nyāya formulations will take care of these situations.

Further, the Nyāya discussions on the subject seem to be prominently confined to the specificities of the Sanskrit language, even though most of the Nyāya thinkers, even in classical times, must have known that there were languages other than Sanskrit and that there were even translations from one language to the other. It is unbelievable, for example, that the Naiyāyikās would not have known of the translation of the *Gāthā Saptati* from Prākṛit into Sanskrit done as early as the first centuries of the first millennium A.D. Yet, the problem of translation does not seem to have troubled the Naiyāyikās nor the related question of how two different linguistic formulations could convey the same meaning when the *śābdabodha*, in the two cases, according to the Nyāya analysis was, and could not but be different. In fact, the very criterion of meaningfulness, at least of cognitive meaningfulness, with respect to which questions of truth and falsity may be meaningfully raised, demands that what has been said in a particular linguistic formulation can be said through some other linguistic formulation in any language. The issue was raised in the context of the Vedic utterances which, it was claimed, could be said in no other way except in the manner that they were

formulated by the Vedic seers at the very beginning of the philosophical tradition of India. Yāska refers to this view of Kautsa in his *Nirukta*.

It has been suggested that we must distinguish between cognitive meaning denoting truth and falsity in the ordinary sense of the used words and meaning which is primarily non-cognitive, as in the case of a poetic utterance which normally is difficult to translate. Most attempts at conveying what has been said in a word arrangement is different from the original tending either to say something more or something different from what was conveyed by the original sequence in which the words were arranged. But, even if one grants this, one will have to make a distinction between different kinds of non-cognitive meanings, as many of them can easily be conveyed in other ways which are different from the original sequence of words through which it was conveyed. Imperatives, interrogatives, requests, etc. may be considered as example of such non-cognitive meanings. On the other hand if meaning is conveyed primarily through the feelings, emotions, sentiments and attitudes that are aroused, it may be difficult to convey the same meaning through a different sequence of words than the one found in the original formulation. But whatever the difficulties, the emphasis on nontranslatability suggests a shift from cognitive to non-cognitive domains and even amongst non-cognitive domains, to those which are conveyed more through affective and attitudinal states than those which are not affected by them to any substantial degree.

It is, of course, true that Quine, in his well-known discussion of translatability has not taken this dimension into account and has confined his discussion purely to considerations of truth in the ordinary sense of the word and argued that the criterion of translatability as the preservation of truth in all senses of the word, if taken seriously, may make translatability impossible in principle. But, if truth is bound up so closely to any one specific linguistic formulation then it will not only become absolutely atomized but also monadic in character in the sense that the truth related to one linguistic formulation would have nothing to do with the truth related to another linguistic formulation, even though the two may be regarded as referring to the same state of affairs. Perhaps the criterion of *salva veritate* on which Quine relied will have to be given up in order to understand the notion of translatability and the objection which the *Nirukta* raised with respect to the Vedic utterances should be taken more seriously. One is, of course, not quite clear about the exact position of navya Nyāya on translatability of sentences into the same language or into different languages while preserving the meaning of the sentence concerned.

Mohanty's contention that Gaṅgeśa's definition of *pramā*, that is, valid knowledge combines both the epistemological and ontological part where *prakāratā* refers to the epistemological one. This does not take into account how such an understanding of Gaṅgeśa's definition, or even the notion of truth in general can be possibly accommodated within the theory of *śābdabodha* that the Naiyāyika accepts. Also, it is not quite clear as to what is the relation between meaning and truth in Navya Nyāya for while their doctrine of *Pramā* or valid knowledge seems

to have an essential reference to the notion of referential or semantic truth, their denial, or at least apparent denial, of any identity of meaning between sentences with different *anuyogīs* and *pratīyogīs* such as, say "Dasharatha is the father of Rama" and "Rama is the son of Dasharatha" seems to suggest otherwise. Normally, one would say that both the sentences refer to the same fact which makes them true. But in case, the Navya Nyāya analyst accepts this as the ground of their being true, then why should he hesitate to accept that both of them are saying the same thing or, in other words, they are different ways of saying the same thing. Perhaps, the Navya Nyāya analyst is concerned with sentential meaning which is integrally bound with the way the sentence is formed and thus neglects the questions of meaning which remain independent of the specific sentential formulation or even of the particular language in which it has been embodied. Therefore, it is not able to distinguish between psychological meaning and epistemological meaning which is at the root of the difference between 'sense' and 'reference' in the western philosophical tradition. When exactly this identification with psychological meaning occurred and what exactly its consequences were for the developments in Nyāya thought later are interesting questions.

In any case, it is fairly clear that by the latter half of the seventeenth century, the attention of the Nyāya thinkers had shifted to considerations other than those which related to the 'notion' of truth. In fact, as analysis of the *Vādagranthas* which began to be produced during this period and continued later into the eighteenth and even nineteenth century shows that most of them were concerned with issues of epistemology, language and meaning. In fact, a rough analysis of the *Vādagranthas* as given in Thangaswami Sarma's *Darśana Mañjarī* reveals that there are sixty which deal with epistemological issues, twenty-five that deal with language and meaning, fourteen with metaphysical and onto-logical themes, eight with issues relating to logic and five which treat moral and ethical issues.⁴

A cursory analysis of topics discussed under these various heads reveals the type of issues that engage the attention of Nyāya thinkers during this period. Some of the topics mentioned seem strangely 'modern' to the contemporary student of the subject. For example, issues concerning the distinction between universals and pseudo-universals and the formulation of criteria to determine what is a pseudo-universal. The technical terms for these are *jāti* and *jāti-bādhaka*. Though the issue was raised by Udayana earlier, it is not clear how the discussion developed after him and how the criteria offered by him were added to, modified or rejected by other thinkers. Another issue concerned knowledge of those entities which are ever present in experience as well as those which are for ever absent as knowledge proceeds by noting both absence and presence or similarities and differences. Where the possibility of these does not obtain how can knowledge occur? The issues relating to knowledge also extend to the problems relating to its definition. The notion of predication and properties, the definition of perception, the possible simultaneity of different cognitions; repeated observation as the ground for inference, the Occam's razor or the principle of

postulating the least number of entities in order to account for experience, etc. Many of these concerns are reflected in the discussion about language and its relation to meaning and many others are added to the discourse in the discussion regarding this important issue. There are, for example, discussions not only about the power of language to convey meaning and the criteria for determining whether meaning has been correctly grasped or not, but also a scrutiny of the relation between the unity of meaning and the diversity of the different words in a sentence whose separate meaning when combined together convey the unitary meaning.

The discussion seems to have had a long history starting from sometime in A.D. eighth century as the two rival views in this connection, *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhānavāda* are usually ascribed to Kumārila and Prabhākara, respectively. It is not clear however, as to what role these different views played in the interpretation of the Vedic injunctions, as presumably, that was the crucial issue for the Mīmāṃsakas and both Kumārila and Prabhākara are regarded primarily as Mīmāṃsakas and only secondarily as philosophers concerned with linguistic meaning. But, even though this is generally said in the tradition there seems to have been an earlier discussion of the issue in Bhartṛhari's *Vākya Padīya*.

The issue seems to have been concerned with what exactly is the unit of meaning in language. In other words, shall one consider word as the primary unit of meaning or the sentence as the primary unit, which alone conveys a full-fledged, complete meaning without which words cannot be said to have any meaning by themselves. A word when uttered or written is usually held to be incomplete and seen as requiring something else to complete or fulfill what is felt as incomplete. Not only this, the succeeding word may be seen as helping in the fulfillment of the demand which the earlier word makes for the realization of it's—still to be completed—meaning, or may be seen as completely irrelevant to it and thus frustrating the desired goal of the achievement of completed meaning. These two aspects are complimentary to each other and have thus been named as *ākāṅkṣā* and *yogyatā*, respectively in the tradition. The earlier word or set of words may be said to have an *ākāṅkṣā*, while the words that succeed may be said to have *yogyatā* or the 'fittingness' to fulfill the desired *ākāṅkṣā* of the earlier word or words, as may be the case. This process is supposed to go on till the *ākāṅkṣā* is realized and the completed meaning is actualized in what we call a sentence. But, as the terms *ākāṅkṣā* and *yogyatā* themselves imply, each word or set of words opens a limited domain of meanings in the context of which alone its incomplete meaning can be fulfilled, just as the succeeding word or words have also to belong to this domain in order to complete the meaning. Each word, therefore, simultaneously opens and closes the realm of possibilities in the world of meaning and this it could not do if it did not have any meaning at all. The words, therefore, must have some meaning, however incomplete it may be, as neither the notion of *ākāṅkṣā*, nor of *yogyatā* would make any sense if they had no meaning at all. An 'incomplete' meaning is not the total absence of meaning and, thus, words would have to be granted some meaning, however incomplete

it may be. But, if words are granted a meaning, as the protagonists of the *abhihitānvayavāda* or the word theory of meaning contend, then one will have to assume some relation between words so that the completed meaning may emerge in the sentence. The terms *ākāṅṣkā* and *yogyatā* refer indirectly to this relationship between words but do not specify in what this relationship consists.

The discussion assumes a new form in the context of Nyāya analysis of knowledge, and its linguistic expression. In Nyāya, all knowledge, at least at the *savikalpaka* level has a differentiated character which is expressed simultaneously in both thought and language. The judgemental form that knowledge always takes is that 'this is this' or "this is such and such"—a fact which is expressed in the Nyāya analysis by saying that all knowledge has *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* and *sāmsargatā* in it. Thus, the knowledge is an assertion or a denial of some *prakāratā* in something which therefore is considered to have *viśeṣyatā* in it. The usual English equivalents for these are 'qualifier' and 'qualificandum', and *sāmsargatā* is supposed to be the relation between the two. In the usual Aristotelian mode of analysis, the relation is conveyed by the assertion or the denial of whether the predicate belongs to the subject or not, and in case the actual situation obtains, the assertion or the denial is held to be true. The Nyāya analysis however is different in that it tries to specify the diverse possible relationships between what it considers as having *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* in knowledge and as, according to it, the two are always relative, that which is considered to have *viśeṣyatā* or *prakāratā* in one context may itself be considered to have *prakāratā* or *viśeṣyatā*, respectively in another context.

Thus, normally, one would not have expected any dispute regarding the presence or importance of *sāmsargatā* and *prakāratā* in conveying the content for meaning of any knowledge as it is bound to have both of these besides, of course, the *viśeṣyatā*, according to the Nyāya mode of analysis. But, in philosophy the so called 'normal' thing seldom prevails and we have the strange spectacle of a long debate between the so-called *sāmsargatāvāda* versus the *prakāratāvāda* view of meaning associated with Jagdīśa and Gadādhara, respectively.

The debate seems to have been engendered by the peculiarities of the Sanskrit language as well as the question whether, in a specific context, it would be more economical to assume that the meaning was fully conveyed by *prakāratā* alone if one could dispense with the postulation of *sāmsargatā* in that situation. However, in the event of such a possibility ever occurring it does not appear that it would adversely affect the Nyāya contention that *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* and *sāmsargatā* were necessary constituents of any knowledge at the *savikalpaka* level and that even at the *nirvikalpaka* level, they would have to be assumed to be there though, of course, completely amalgamated and hence undifferentiated from each other.

As the dispute and discussion centered around specific examples and questions of what was the ultimate unit of meaning it appears that the problem remained unsolved. Earlier discussions centering around *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhānavāda* seems to have assumed that either the word or the sentence

was the unit of meaning. But, as words are composed of letters and the letters themselves are ultimately composed of phonemes or what may be called the ultimate units which are arrived at by the analysis of language. These may be called atomic units out of which the successive combinations are made. The question then is whether these ultimate units of language are to be considered also as the ultimate units of meaning. As everything else, including the so-called words are made out of them, the same problem of meaning will arise in respect of the units and combinations at each level which had earlier arisen in connection with the so-called word and sentence theories of meaning. Also what of the relations between these ultimate units and of those that occur between the smaller and larger units at each level. One could perhaps, with some justification, transpose the whole vocabulary relating to atoms, molecules, etc. to the linguistic realm and even break the ultimate atoms of language into the numerous different types of forces which particle physics has discovered in the heart of the atom which was once supposed to be unbreakable.

There is some foundation for this idea which appears wierd if we recall the notion of *dhātu* present in the analysis of the Sanskrit language and the idea of *śabda śakti* or the force, energy or power that resides in words. That this direction is not usual in an analysis of linguistic meaning in the Indian tradition, is no reason why such hints and ideas that exist therein may not be developed further, taking a clue from the developments that have taken place in physics and chemistry in recent times.

Indian thinking on the subject however particularly in the Nyāya tradition, asked whether the *vibhakti* which is such an integral part of the Sanskrit language should be regarded as having a distinct meaning of its own independent of the word to which it is applied. It also queried the fate of the word's independent meaning, in case it is regarded as having one, when it, at least manifestly, disappears, according to the rules of the Sanskrit language in *saṅdhi* and *samāsa*. In case it is regarded as having an independent meaning, it obviously cannot be credited with that meaning when it is absent, and yet the meaning of the complex expression formed due to the rules of *saṅdhi* and *samāsa* have, at least in most cases, the same meaning. If this is accepted, then the function that was being performed by the *vibhakti* for the declension in the conveying of the meaning, would have to be performed by something other than itself as it has ceased to do so due to its absence in the new complex formed by *saṅdhi* or *samāsa*. The situation may be illustrated by a simple example. Take the expression 'Nīlaḥ Ghataḥ'. The expression will be regarded as consisting of four words *nīla* + *su* and *ghata* + *su*, if *vibhakti* is also regarded as a word, that is, an expression having a meaning of its own. Yet, if someone holds, as Gadādhara seems to do, that the two case-affixes added to the words *nīla* and *ghata* are 'meaningless' because they are only there for the sake of grammatical correctness then, really speaking, there will be only two words and not four and the unity of meaning will have to be conveyed by some unstated relation between the two which, according to Nyāya, is conveyed by *samabhivyāhāra*, that is the 'togetherness' or the joint

occurrence of the two words in close proximity to each other. This is what is meant by saying that the unity of meaning is conveyed by *sāmsargatā* in a sentence.

On the other hand, one may hold, as Jagadīśa does that while the affix (*vibhakti*) in the *ghaṭa* is there only for the sake of grammatical reasons and not for performing any function, the one in the word *nīla* is performing a distinctive function by its presence as it connotes a relation of identity or 'non-difference', that is *abheda* between *nīla* and *ghaṭa*. Thus, as the *abheda sambandha* is being conveyed in the expression by a 'pada', that is, the *vibhakti* concerned, the view held by Jagadīśa in this context will have to be described as *prakāratāvāda* instead of *sāmsargatāvāda*. However, if one accepts the *vibhakti* as independently conveying the relation of *abheda*, then one would have to face the problem as to how this meaning is related to the meaning of the word *nīla* on the one hand and that of *ghaṭa* on the other.

Jagadīśa describes these relations in terms of *pratiyogitāva* and *āśryatva*, respectively. But, in case this is so then, as these relations are not explicitly stated, they will have to be conveyed not by any *padārtha*, but only by *samabhivvyāhāra* and, if so, one would have to be a *sāmsargatāvādin* to that content.

The situation does not seem to be so clear cut as jagadīśa himself, in his *Śabdaśakti Prakāśikā*, seems to give a different analysis of the expression, *nīlam utpalam* which, when combined, becomes *nīlotpalam* by the rules of *saṅdhi* in the Sanskrit language. Following the earlier analysis of the expression, *nīlaḥ ghaṭaḥ*, he seems to maintain that the *abheda sambandha* is conveyed by the *vibhakti* in the word *nīla* in the expression *nīlam utpalam*, even though the occurrence of the same in the word 'utpala' is there only for grammatical purposes and has no independent meaning of its own. However, in the compound word, that is *nīlotpalam* formed out of the two expressions, the *abheda sambandha* is conveyed directly, that is, by the conjoint togetherness or '*sāmsargatā*' of the two expressions *nīla* and *utpala* which amount to holding the doctrine of *sāmsargatāvāda* in the context of understanding the meaning of the compound expression.

The point perhaps seems to be that the *vibhakti* whenever it occurs between two or more words itself divides them and hence stands in the way of their *sāmsargatā* which, however, in that situation would have to be regarded as occurring between the words and the *vibhakti* on the one hand and the *vibhakti* and the second word on the other. This, however, could only increase the number of *sāmsargatās* required to convey the meaning. Also, it would result in a radical difference in the analysis of the unity of meaning between expressions where the words are divided by *vibhakti* between them and those which are not so divided. Jagadīśa seems to be aware of the second problem and wants to hold a theory about the unity of meaning which does not differentiate between the two kinds of expressions, that is, the compound and the non-compound. He says, for example, that "*samāsavigrahayostulyārthakatva—hānyāpatteh*".⁵ But it does not appear to have given any satisfactory solution to the problem, not seeing that no such

solution can ever be given if one is prepared to accept *prakāratā* as performing the function of *sāmsargatā* in any linguistic situation whatsoever.

The Nyāya tradition itself is divided on the issue from the beginning. Gaṅgeśa, for example, is supposed to subscribe to the *sāmsargatā* view while Ragunātha opts for the *prakāratā* view. Gaṅgeśa also seems to have taken a strong position regarding the meaninglessness of 'ākhyāta' or the verbal suffix and he states that *gaurava* is not always a defect. In his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Gaṅgeśa states 'ākhyātasya nirarthakatvam' and 'phalamukham ca gauravam na doṣaḥ'.⁶

Another aspect of this issue is that the *sāmsargatā* relation, though always there, is never supposed to be directly stated. In fact, it is said that according to Nyāya, it can not be stated in principle as any attempt to state it will turn the relation into something else. Mohanty, for example, says, "The relational component in knowledge always remains unmentioned. Conversely, if a relation finds mention, it ceases to be a relational component in knowledge".⁷ He, however, seems to think that *sāmsargatā* is not a relation between words that gives rise to the unity of meaning but refers to actual relations themselves which may be of different kinds such as *samyoga*, *samavāya*, etc. In the example he has given (*parvato vahnimān*) he writes for instance, the unmentioned relational component is 'samyoga'. But in the knowledge, 'The hill has *samyoga* with fire', '*Samyoga*' no more functions as a relational component but has got metamorphosed into a qualificandum and/or a qualifier. The relational component now refers to the unmentioned relation of *samavāya*.

However, if *sāmsargatā* is taken to mean: (i) the relation between words without assuming which no unity of meaning can be conceived of and which is only revealed by *samabhiivyāhāra*, and (ii) also the *specific* relations which obtain between the objects mentioned in the sentence, then we would have two different kinds of *sāmsargatā* which, as far as I know, have not been distinguished. In the first sense, *sāmsargatā* can never be "mentioned" or "stated" in principle as, to use a Wittgensteinian phrase, it can only be "shown" and not itself mentioned or stated, while, in the second sense, the specific relation can always be stated, but it ceases to be a 'relation' when so stated or function as a relation which now would have to be assumed to be performed in some other way. The Nyāya analyst is always mentioning the relations but, if Mohanty is to be believed, they cease to function as relations when they are explicitly mentioned in the analysis.

Yet another problem which remained unnoticed by the Naiyāyikas was that if two expressions have the same grammatical form they should have the same analysis in respect of the way they are said to achieve their *vākyārtha* or completed meaning. For example, if the expression '*nīlaḥ ghaṭaḥ*' is analysed in one way, then '*rājñah puruṣaḥ*' cannot or ought not to be analysed in another way. But, if it is analysed in the same way, then we will have to admit an *abheda sambandha* between the two which of course is absurd. Thus, even though the grammatical form is the same, the meaning conveyed by it, whether we consider the first *vibhakti* as conveying a meaning or being their just for grammatical reasons,

cannot result in understanding the relation between 'rājñah' and 'puruṣah' in the same way as we do between 'nīla' and 'ghaṭa' in the expression *nīlaḥ ghaṭaḥ*.

As usual, however, the Nyāya thinker seems to be more concerned with the specific examples that create the problem, rather than with the generalized issue itself. Nor does he show any awareness of how the specific counter instance should lead to a reformulation of the theory. But, such an abstraction can perhaps be made out of the specific discussions that took place after Jagdīśa and Gadādhara regarding this issue in the eighteenth century and later.

Amongst the important Nyāya thinkers after Jagdīśa and Gadādhara, who tried in diverse ways, to support the contentions of these two in respect of the *sāmsargatā—prakāratā* debate in the tradition are: Gokulanātha Upādhyāya who flourished around A.D. 1720 and was regarded by P.B. Anantacharya, who edited his work for publication, as being even greater in some respects than such earlier masters as Jagdīśa and Gadādhara. His work is entitled *Padavākhyaratnākara* and carries the debate further, supporting the views of Jagdīśa as against those of Gadādhara. However, he seems to treat Jagdīśa as *prakāratāvādin* and argues in his defence against Gadādhara whom he considers as supporting the *sāmsargatā* view. Surprisingly, Bachcha Jha of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, regarded as one of the greatest Naiyāyikas this century has produced, appears to consider Jagdīśa as a *sāmsargatāvādin* and Gadādhara as a *prakāratāvādin*. Bachcha Jha mentioned this in his *Gūḍhārthatattvāloka** a work which ostensibly is a commentary on the well-known work by Gadādhara entitled, *Vyutpattivādaḥ*. However, there does not seem to be much unanimity among scholars regarding the ascription of *sāmsargatāvāda* or *prakāratāvāda* exclusively to either Jagdīśa or Gadādhara as the difference between them appears to relate to the interpretation of particular instances, rather than in taking a position on the total unity of meaning which is conveyed by a sentence. Thus, in understanding the unity of meaning when the constituent words of a sentence happen to be ostensibly *different*, all Naiyāyikas are supposed to subscribe to the same position, that is, *abhihitānvayavāda* which necessarily involves the *sāmsargatā* view regarding the question as to how the unity of meaning is achieved in spite of the apparent diversity of the different meanings conveyed by different words. But this, though true, does not explain the detailed controversy over an apparently trivial matter which, though relating to specific instances, yet exercised some of the subtlest minds in the Navya Nyāya tradition. Perhaps, the continued concern hides the fact that *sāmsargatā* itself may be of different kinds and the controversy might have flourished because of lack of recognition of this fact.

The problem of different kinds of *sāmsargatā* should have been obvious if the Navya Nyāya thinkers had considered that the problem of unity of meaning does not apply to a single sentence only, but extends to the sequence of sen-

**Vyutpattivāda* of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya with *Gūḍhārthatattvāloka* by Sri Dharmadatta Jha, (Bachcha Jha) edited by Pt. Krityānanda Jha, Chaukhamba Amarabharati Prakashan, Varanasi, 1976.

tences occurring one after the other. Thus, if we forget the so-called plurality of words and focus attention on the plurality of sentences, then we would see that the problem is larger and deeper than the narrow context of *pada* and *vākya* in the context of which alone it seems to have been considered in the tradition. The tradition, of course, is not unaware of the problem as it had raised the question of *eka vākyatā*, meaning thereby the unity of meaning of the whole text, or even the whole discourse, or even the whole tradition in its totality. Yet, it is also true that the issue in this form did not engage the attention of any of the thinkers in the Navya Nyāya tradition, or even those outside it. The work of Bhartṛhari entitled *Vākyapadīyah*, perhaps tried to show this direction in its distinction of different levels of meaning as *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*, the last referring to the ordinary level of spoken or written speech. But, though Bhartṛhari is supposed to have lived sometime in the fifth–sixth century, his work does not seem to have been the point of reference of the discussion between *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhānavāda* as far as we know.

The relation between different words and different sentences to generate unity of meaning is paralleled in the relation between the *viśeṣya* and the *prakāra* which, according to Nyāya, characterizes all knowledge at the *savikalpaka* level. Unfortunately, the problem has generally been considered only at the simplest level without taking into consideration the complex sentences which have clauses and subclauses within them where it is generally not clear what is the *viśeṣya* and the *prakāra*, as there seem to be, at least *prima facie*, many *viśeṣya* and *prakāra* occurring within the sentence itself. The Navya Nyāya analysis of *mukhya viśeṣyatā*, however does not answer the question of how one would determine what is *mukhya* and what is *gauṇa*, or what is primary and what is secondary. In the unity of meaning conveyed by a plurality of sentences, the distinction between *mukhya* and *gauṇa viśeṣyatā* does not reveal any awareness of the problem at all. Would it, for example, be necessary to postulate some over-arching *mukhya viśeṣyatā* in order to achieve this unity of meaning, and shall we have a hierarchy of these *mukhya viśeṣyatās* culminating in some final *mukhya viśeṣyatā* in the context of which everything else would function as *prakāratā*. The idealistic tradition of philosophical thought in the West has sometimes posited the ultimate reality as the only 'true' *viśeṣya* and all the rest as merely being a *prakāra* in relation to it.

But if one accepts the notion of an ultimate *mukhya viśeṣya* to which everything else is a *prakāra*, then the question will arise whether we have to distinguish between these different *prakāratās* and treat some as *mukhya* and the others as *gauṇa*. Also what relation exists between these *prakāratās* and the ultimate *viśeṣya* which they are supposed to qualify or characterize. The Advaitic position is well known that every qualification or characterization according, is only an *upādhi* or superimposition on that which by definition can never be characterized in any way whatsoever. This is the case even with the ultimate characterization in terms of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, as in the Advaitic thinking even these would have to be treated as not really characterizing the Brahmana, but as some sort of superimposition on it because of the finite and imperfect nature of the human

consciousness that tries to characterize it in some way or other even though it knows that it can never be characterized at all. The *viśeṣyatāvādin* might possibly hold such a position, but it is not clear whether such a position can be ascribed to it.

All such attempts to understand the unity of meaning ignore the facts of hidden 'incoherence' and contradictions that occur in any complex discourse and which destroy the unity of meaning at its very foundations. Thus, the unity apprehended will only be an apparent unity whose 'illusoriness' is realized only when one discovers the underlying incoherence or the contradictions which had escaped one's notice as well as of generations of thinkers spanning centuries and sometimes even millennia of human thought.

Earlier grammarians had attempted to deal with the unity of meaning through their doctrine of *sphoṭa*, but there seems little evidence of the *navya-naiyāyikas* showing much awareness of this discussion or of how the notion of *sāmsargatā* which they later postulate to account for the unity of meaning differs from the earlier attempt. Similarly, there appears to be hardly any discussion regarding the relationship between the notions of *samabhivyāhāra*, *ākāṅkṣā* (in the technical sense) and *sāmsargatā* which, many a time, are used in almost identical senses but some times also differently.

What of the unity of a multiplicity of distinguishable elements which has been discussed in the notions of *avayava* and *avayavī* in the Indian philosophical tradition? There seems hardly any attempt to bring the linguistic-cum-epistemological issues and meta-physical issues involved in the discussion together into one single focus and to see how the discussion in one field illuminates the discussion in the other. A parallel exists in the discussion of the difference between the reality of *bheda* and *abheda* between the Advaitins and the non-Advaitins similar to this debate on the identity of meaning apprehended through the multiplicity of meaning in linguistic cognition. If all these diverse discussions which have occurred in different contexts are interrelated they may illuminate one another. The notion of unity can also be further analysed into the different kinds of unities that are found in experience at all levels, particularly those, which have been referred to as organic unities in the western tradition.

Was it necessary to postulate *sāmsargatā* if the same function could be performed by *prakāratā* which, in any case, was always present in any *savikalpaka* cognition? Also the postulation of as few *sāmsargatās* as possible would reduce the unnecessary postulation of relationships where it could be easily avoided. There seems to have been a long history of such discussion in other contexts also, where some appear to have argued that there was no need for postulating an additional property or relationship if *prakārtā* could do the job. For example, this occurs in Harirama Tarkalankara's (or Tarkavagisha) work entitled, *Viśayatāvāda*,⁸ where it is contended that there was no necessity of postulating a separate property called '*vidheyatā*' when it could easily be understood in terms of *prakāratā*.⁹ The problem of avoiding the defect of *gaurava* seems to have played an important role in the *prakāratā/sāmsargatā* debate and Bachcha Jha, in fact, has given

this main argument as to why one view should be preferred to another. The postulation of *svarūpa sambandha* or what is usually called, 'self-linking' relation was supposed to do the same job in avoiding infinite regress which seems to have been necessitated by postulating relations which would relate the existing relations to the terms concerned. However, as pointed out earlier, even such an eminent authority as Gaṅgeśa appears to have argued that *gaurava* was not always a defect and that *lāghava* was not always a virtue. But we do not know whether he or any one else ever formulated the criteria on the basis of which one could judge whether *gaurava* was a defect or not. In any case, Bachcha Jha is supposed to have pointed out that if one accepts the *prakāratā* view one will have to accept 4320 *prakāratās* while if one opts for the *sāmsargatā* view then one would have to accept only 1440 *sāmsargatās*.

Partly, the problem is created by the nature of the Sanskrit language, wherein meaning is conveyed by the specific declension which a word necessarily has, as without it, it would have no meaning. But this language also permits the formation of compounds usually called *samāsa* where the particular declension disappears, so that whether the newly-formed compound has to be understood in terms of the previous declension or seen as arising afresh from the new conjunction that has been formed because of the formation of a *samāsa* is the issue. If the latter view is adopted, then it is the relational view of meaning, or what has been called *sāmsargatā* in the tradition. On the other hand, if the emphasis is on the declension or the *vibhakti*, then the contention is that meaning primarily arises from this declension, and not the so-called relationship or *sāmsargatā* which the *samāsa* generates. This may explain why Giridhara Upādhyāya, a student of Gokulnāth Upādhyāya, gave his work, the title *Vibhaktiyartha Nirṇaya*, in A.D. 1720.

Giridhara Upādhyāya also seems to have disputed Gadādhara's view propounded in his *Vyutpattivādaḥ* in the context of the understanding that the *abhāva* which is referred to by a *pratiyogitā* need not have a non-occurrence exacting relation which is called *Vṛtti aniyāmaka* as a necessary delimitator or *avacchedaka*. Gadādhara seems to have held that acceptance of such a limiter would unnecessarily multiply the entities which need to be postulated. Giridhara Upādhyāya points out that if a relation is not *vṛttinīyāmaka*, it means the cognition of a thing as residing in a locus, where such relations can never arise. If even such relations are the limits of *abhāva*, *pratiyogitā*, *avacchedakatā*, then such absences will have to be considered as universally present, since such absences are without any opposition. Therefore, he holds that a non-occurrence exacting relation cannot be considered as a limiter of an *abhāvapratiyogitā*.

Another dimension is added to the issue by the fact that the Naiyāyika wants to have a uniform analysis of all types of sentences including those which may assert existence or deny it in any sense of the term, or, in their language, assert the *abhāva*, or non-existence of something.¹⁰ The mode of analysis of such sentences is always in terms of *anuyogī*, *pratiyogī* and the *sambandha* between them. Thus, there inevitably, arises the question of what the *pratiyogī* would be in a sentence which asserts non-existence and what the relationship of this *pratiyogī*

would be in a sentence which asserts non-existence and what the relationship of this *pratiyogī* is, the existence of which is being denied or the non-existence of which is being asserted. Quine, in his well-known essay entitled, "On What There Is" has dealt with this problem and questioned the so-called necessity of postulating in some sense the reality of that which one denies in order that the denial may be significant. Moreover, as one may deny the existence of more than one object, one would have to deal with the conjoint absence of more than one object and with the mutual relations which would simultaneously be held between them. Not only this, the relations between all the possible *pratiyogins* and that in which their absences are supposed to reside or, to use the Nyāya terminology, the locus in which they are absent, would have to be specified. One may further make a distinction between the absences of those objects which are present somewhere else or which were earlier present and are now absent and those which by their very nature are incapable of ever existing. The Nyāya theoreticians do not appear to have made such a distinction even though they have talked of such things as *vandhyāputra* or a barren woman's son and a *khapuṣpa* or a sky flower. Similarly, no distinction is made between that which is logically impossible and that which is only empirically so. But they have the notion of *atyantābhāva* which, however, is different from the notion of a logical impossibility. Yet, though all these considerations can become relevant in the context of the Nyāya mode of analysis, the direction that their thought has taken is somewhat different. This was determined by the specificities of the Sanskrit language in the sense that the examples they take assume the structure and grammar of that language as a kind of given constant, which limits exclusively the horizon of their thought. Whether such problems have arisen in the context of other languages which also have declension as a necessary part of their grammar, and where the same type of conjunctions occur as they do in the Sanskrit language because of the rules of *sandhi* and *samāsa* could be explored.

In fact specific philosophical problems arise because of the particular nature of the rules which pertain to that language alone and others arise from the nature of language as such in the context of the various functions which any language, *qua* language, has to perform. Much of the recent philosophical discussion in the British-speaking world appears, for example, to arise from the specificities of the English language and the way in which certain words are used in it. The work of Ryle and Austin and the later Wittgenstein may be mentioned in this regard. In the case of Wittgenstein, it is not quite clear whether his later work was written primarily in English or was translated from German as was the case with *Tractatus*. In case it was first written in German, it would then follow that the problems he was pointing out arose not primarily from the peculiar usages of those words in the English language, but from those prevalent in the German language. It is, of course, true that some works such as *Philosophical Investigations* and *Culture and Value* posthumously published were originally written in German and later translated into English. However, the original text of the notes taken and published by his students at Cambridge later on, could only have been in

English as the question of translating from German did not arise. Is there any radical difference between these two types of works introduced by the nature of the language in which the primary thinking was being done? However, such an investigation has yet not been undertaken, even though the situation parallels the case of those writers who write with equal facility in more than one language and whose case has been specifically investigated by George Steiner in his work entitled, *Extra-territorial*.

Thus, the Navya-Naiyāyikas may be distinguished by the fact that they are primarily dealing with problems created by the specificities of the Sanskrit language relating to declension and those concerning conjunction or combination due to *sandhi* and *samāsa*, as well as problems primarily arising from sentences asserting the reality of absence or *abhāva*. Often, these two different sorts of problems may arise in the same context.

Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Arde who lived around A.D. 1800, for example, deals with the issue created not only by the joint absence of two such objects as *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, but also of *ghaṭatva* in the same locus, presumably because *ghaṭatva* is considered to be as much a *padārtha* as *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* by the Naiyāyika.

In the context of an earlier discussion by Gadādhara on the same issue, it is seen that from the eighteenth century onwards the problems discussed have a continuity with those dealt with earlier being refined by the raising of new objections and by attempts to meet these satisfactorily. In this exercise, the commentator is sometimes led towards a kind of explanation which makes the earlier text on which he is commenting appear inconsistent. When such a situation arises, he has also to make an attempt to show that the inconsistency is only apparent and that it could be met with by a subtler understanding of the issues involved. But, as the philosophical issues are deeply enmeshed in the specificities of the examples and the particular context of the discussion, it is not easy for a modern reader to appreciate this. To make these debates relevant to the ongoing philosophical concerns of the present times a knowledge of the nature of the controversies in which these thinkers were engaged and a philosophically sensitive approach to the wider relevance of the arguments and the issue involved is required.

Among the Navya-Naiyāyika thinkers Raghunātha Parvate Śāstrī, (A.D. 1850) deals with the same issue in a new light. According to him, the conjoint absence of any two things such as *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* in the same locus would also have to take into account their conjointness (here two-ness of *ubhayatva*) as being limited by the specific property of the two objects (in this case, *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*), for unless this is done, it can easily be found not only elsewhere, but even in the same locus as there is nothing to prevent any other two things being present there. Raghunātha Parvate Śāstrī has not exactly presented the objection in such a manner, but his remarks suggest the possibility of such an objection. There is nothing in the assertion of the conjoint absence of two objects such as *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* in the same locus to suggest that there cannot be any other two objects together in the same locus.

There is another subtle consideration introduced by Raghunāth Parvate Śāstrī which perhaps had escaped the attention of earlier Naiyāyikas. It relates to the question as to whether in the statement of the conjoint absence of *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* in the same locus, it is the *ubhayatva* which is to be regarded as the *avacchedaka* of the *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*, or the *avacchedakatā* should be regarded as residing in the *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva* which then are treated as the 'limitor' of *ubhayatva*. The point is obviously a subtle one, but unless the divergent consequences that flow from assuming the *avacchedakatā* in these two different ways are spelt out and their philosophical importance specified, it is difficult to say whether the new subtlety introduced by Parvate Śāstrin is of any substantive significance. That Paṇḍit Raghunātha Parvate Śāstrī is from Maharashtra provides evidence of the spread of Navya Nyāya outside Bengal and some parts of the south.

The issues relating to *sāmsargatā* and *prakāratā* on the one hand and those concerning the understanding of absence, that is, *abhāva*, specially in the context of the definition of *vyāpti* which is the ground of valid inference continue to exercise the minds of the Navya-Naiyāyikas in the twentieth century of whom Dharmadatta, or as he is more popularly known Bachcha Jha, is, by common consent, the most outstanding. He has commented, for example on the *Vyutpattivādaḥ* of Gadādhara taking part in the ongoing controversy concerning the *sāmsargatā* versus *prakāratā* debate on which Gokulnātha Upādhyāya and his disciple Giridhara Upādhyāya had earlier written. Similarly, in his commentary on the *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* of Jagadīśa, he has discussed and refined the depletion of *vyāpti* as given earlier by Gaṅgeśa and successively modified by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Jagadīśa in their discussion on the subject.

Gaṅgeśa's objection to all the definitions of *vyāpti* that were given before his time was that they relied on something being sometimes absent and sometimes present and hence could not apply to anything which was always present or always absent. In order to avoid such a situation, Gaṅgeśa seem to have adopted the strategy of combining the property which was always present with something that was sometimes present and sometimes absent, treating them together as a conjoint property, so that it could now be treated in a unified manner allowing both its presence and absence as one element of its integral property was sometimes absent and sometimes present. This ingenious solution to the problem is called *vyādhikaraṇa dharmāvacchinnābhāva*. It led to a lot of discussion amongst later Naiyāyikas including some who occur in the period of the eighteenth century onwards.

Bachcha Jha names all his commentaries, *Gūdhārthatattvāloka* implying thereby that he is bringing to light hidden meanings involved in earlier discussions on the subject that had not been clearly formulated. Unlike earlier commentators, however, he does not elucidate or explicate every point made in the original but concentrates only on those points in the discussion which, according to him, need further precise formulation as they suffer from an intrinsic ambiguity and thus, remain open to certain objections which could easily be avoided if the ambiguity were removed. In fact, he explicitly mentions certain earlier Naiyāyikas

such as Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma whose objections arise from a misunderstanding of these positions. The problems in the definition of *vyāpti*, primarily arise from the fact that concomitance between the ground, that is the *hetu*, and the consequent, that is, *sādhya*, should be of such a nature that wherever and whenever the former is present, the latter should be present and if the former is absent, the latter should be absent. As the latter states a relationship between two 'absences' or *abhāvas* it creates all the problems that a universalized statement of a necessary relation between two absences generates. In the western tradition, 'P implies Q' is always taken to imply 'not Q implies not P'. However, in a strict implication not only 'P implies', but 'not P implies not Q' also, that is, to put it in Nyāya terminology if the *hetu* is not present, the *sādhya* is also not present.

The correct definition of *vyāpti* which is the basis of all inference meets a basic objection from the possibility of those instances where what is inferred is always present and hence, can never be absent. The issue may be better understood in the context of, say, the definition of causality or even implication. The notion of strict causality is understood through what has come to be called the joint method of agreement and difference, that is, the effect is present where the cause is present and the effect is absent where the cause is absent. The definition however assumes that something can be absent for, in case it is of such a nature that it can never be absent, the definition will be inapplicable. A similar case is presented by something which is always absent and never present for, here the first part of the definition will not be applicable.

Gaṅgeśa seems to have been troubled only by the former possibility, that is, how is a *vyāpti* possible in case of those *sādhya*s which are always present. He did not seem to have taken into consideration the reverse possibility, that is, those case where the *hetu* is always absent. Perhaps he did not do so because he was only interested in the inference from the *hetu* to the *sādhya* and not conversely, from the presence of the so-called *sādhya* to the *hetu* where the relation between the two is formulated in such a manner that the *sādhya* is there, if and only if, the *hetu* is there. It would be interesting to find if the Nyāya thinkers have made a distinction between what is called strict implication and implication only.

Another problem raised by Gaṅgeśa is that can everything knowable be nameable. He does not however distinguish between statements which are true by definition or only analytically true and those whose truth depends upon experience. He assumes, for example, that the absence of nameability is impossible, but he does not give any reasons to show why it should be so. It is an unquestioned assumption of the system that everything knowable should be nameable but what if something is not knowable? Also, it has not been made clear as to what exactly is meant by knowability.

In any case, it appears that in order to avoid this difficulty he postulated the notion of *vyādhikaraṇa dharmāvacchinnābhāva* which means that, in case there is a property which, for some reason is always present, then one may make a compound joint property which consists of it along with some other property which is sometimes present and sometimes absent. Thus, for purely theoretical

purposes, 'absence' can be 'inducted' into the property which is always present by treating it as an element or part of a compound property the other element or part of which can be absent. This is reminiscent of the conjunction in modern logic where, if one of the sentences is false, then the whole compound sentence is considered to be false even if the other sentence is true. The conjunction, of course, may have more than two sentences as its members and, if so, the compound sentence so formed will be false if one of its constituent sentences is false even though all the other sentences may be true. It is not, however, clear what advantage is gained by this purely formal device and at least some Naiyāyikas seem to have rejected this way of solving the problem. It is not known, however, whether they offered any other solution to the problem concerned.

The idea of a property which jointly belongs to a number of objects in their togetherness and yet cannot be said to belong to any of them separately is developed by the Naiyāyika in his notion of *vyāsajyavṛtti*. The simplest example of this is that of number, where 'twoness' or 'threeness', for example, can be meaningfully said to belong to any two or three objects, but it would be meaningless to assert that property of any single object by itself. The Naiyāyika has raised the question here as to how the twoness or threeness can be said to belong as a property to the objects concerned when, taken individually, it can not be predicated of them.

The simultaneous presence and absence of the property is explained by saying that while such a property is present by *samavāya sambandha*, it is absent by a relation called the *paryāpti* in the Nyāya system. It is not however known whether the *vyāsajyavṛtti* is only postulated to account for numerical properties alone or there are other instances of its application. The example given by Professor Prahlada Char is not clear (see Appendix) as the conjoint absence of *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* will be true even if *ghaṭa* alone is present and *paṭa* is absent or, conversely, if *paṭa* alone is present and *ghaṭa* is absent. Also, if the example is to be made congruent to the example of twoness and threeness, then one would have to treat the quality of being both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* as being jointly predicated of something which individually cannot be characterized as either *ghaṭa* or *paṭa*. But this would reveal the absurdity of the reduction of the non-numerical qualities which are essentially qualitative in character to those which are numerical and hence essentially quantitative in nature. There is no such thing which is both a *ghaṭa* and a *paṭa*, simultaneously, though there may be two objects such as a *ghaṭa* and a *paṭa* on the floor, but then we are treating them as 'two' objects and not as *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* in their specificity. The point is that there is no difference in the ascription of twoness whether there be two *ghaṭas* or two *paṭas*, or one *ghaṭa* and one *paṭa*. The example given by Professor Prahlada Char, therefore, needs further elucidation.

The idea of *vyāsajyavṛtti* is clear at least when applied to numbers, but it seems quite unclear when applied to such a notion as *pratiyogitā*. For while it is true that *pratiyogitā* is a relational term, though it applies by *samavāya sambandha* to the terms it relates, it does not apply to the terms it relates by *paryāpti sambandha*

as is the case with twoness and threeness. In other words, the idea of its simultaneous application and non-application or presence and absence as is the case with twoness and threeness does not apply at all, for it will obviously not apply to the *anuyogī*, at least in that formulation in which it is a *pratiyogī*, as the moment one tries to do this, the *pratiyogī* will become an *anuyogī* and the *anuyogī* a *pratiyogī*. The contention that *ghaṭatvena ghaṭapatobhayābhāva*—universal absence cannot be understood without understanding it as *vyāsajya vṛtti* is not clear for firstly, the same would be true of *ghaṭatvena paṭābhāva* and, secondly, if it is held to be a *vyāsajyavṛtti* here, then it will have to be accepted as a *vyāsajyavṛtti* everywhere for one cannot say that *pratiyogitā* in one context is a *vyāsajyavṛtti* while in another context it is not. Perhaps, the problem arises because the nature of conjoint absence which is being asserted has not been analysed fully. Nor perhaps has the notion of the assertion of a meaningful absence for, unless the presence of the object concerned was expected, there is no point in saying that something is absent. One does not say, for example, that there is the absence of an elephant in the room or there is an absence of a whale in the forest or there is an absence of *vandhyāputra* in the world. The last case is interesting for the reason that it is not clear what exactly would be the *pratiyogī* of the *abhāva* in such an assertion. One can manufacture innumerable, meaningless absences as, for example, the absence of *tritva* in *ghaṭapatobhayābhāva*, etc. but the multiplication of these meaningless absences leads to no gain. Moreover if, following Gaṅgeśa, one brings in the notion of the absence of a relation into the picture as he seems to do, then one can juggle with such absences also and say that there is *pitṛtvābhāva* in the *putratva* relation of Rāma to Daśaratha. Ultimately, one will have to develop some criteria to distinguish meaningful absences from those which are vacuously asserted perhaps in the same manner as Udayana had tried to do with respect to universals.

There seems to have been an attempt in the Navya Nyāya tradition to distinguish between the genuine experience of absence and the vacuous absences formulated in the notions of *āpatti* and the related property of *āpādyatā* which meant that something is apprehended to be absent even though it is *imagined* to be there. Here the absence is positively apprehended as that which is absent was either expected to be there and for some reason, is not there or it is apprehended in imagination only and the perceived situation is found to differ from it. Harirama Tarkalankara in *Viśayatāvāda* has discussed whether such an apprehension of an imaginary object will have to be granted a specific *viśayatā* of its own. There is an added complexity in the situation as it is suggested by someone that the apprehension of an absence is always seen as a negation of something that is apprehended as an object in the imagination and thus the perceived situation is a *pratibandhaka* of that which is imagined. According to Professor V.N. Jha who has edited and translated this text, there seem to be a discrepancy in the text regarding the exact position which Harirama Tarkalankara adopts on the issue. His own solution is that while Harirama Tarkalankara rejects the idea of granting a special *viśayatā* to the imagined object of knowledge, Raghudeva, who

perhaps added the last seven–eight lines objected to this view of Harirama and treated it as a *pūrvapakṣa* concluding that a special kind of *viśayatā* has to be accepted in this situation. But, whatever be the specific position of Harirama on this issue, was pursued later in the Navya Nyāya tradition? The generalized problem, in the Nyāya context, is known as *ādhāryajñāna* but it is not clear what is the relationship of the general discussion to the specific issue which has been discussed by Harirama Tarkalankara.

In the apprehension of *abhāva*, the imagined object whose absence is perceived, is itself the result of ‘desire’ on the part of the mind as, otherwise, it would be difficult to understand why one would imagine it and hence perceive the absence if it is not there. There is an added discussion whether desire need be postulated as a cause or *uttejaka* of the occurrence of the imagined object.¹¹ The larger question is raised by the whole realm of objects created for imaginative apprehension alone. In art and literature, for example, the actual absence of that which is imaginatively apprehended is not only accepted as a necessary condition for their enjoyment but any possible reception into actuality would immediately destroy the whole wealth all together. No one, for instance, would like to see the situations associated with *vibhatsa*, *raudra*, *bhayānaka*, *karuṇā* and even *śṛṅgāra* to actually occur and be perceived as such. This, however, does not seem to have occupied the attention of the Nyāya theorists of *abhāva* whom we have been dealing with here. Nor is it clear whether the discussion relating to these aspects of the issue was carried further and, if so, how.

The relations of formal or ‘material’ implications and strict implications find a parallel in the distinction between the notions of causality and strict causality in the empirical domain. By ‘causality’ we generally mean that if the cause is present, the effect is present also, while in the assertion of strict causality it is implied that if the cause is absent the effect is absent as well. But, as Nyāya does not make a distinction between purely logical and empirical relations, it generally asserts the relation of *vyāpti* in terms of both strict causality and strict implication without making any distinction between the two. In the western tradition the distinction is drawn on the basis of a hidden assumption that in the case of causality there has to be an empirical, actual relation between the cause and the effect whereby the cause ‘results’ or ‘produces’ the effect. This assumption regarding the nature of the causal relation is given up in the case of purely formal implications giving rise to what have been called the paradoxes of ‘material’ implications. As Nyāya does not make this distinction some of its counter examples seem to arise because of the fact that it has not made this distinction.

However, they have expanded in almost six-hundred-year-long period. From Gaṅgeśa in the middle of the ‘fourteenth century to Bachcha Jha at the beginning of the twentieth (A.D. 1853–1918), deficiencies were revealed in the successive definitions offered of the *vyāpti* relation by some of the most acute minds in the Indian tradition. The relevance of this for the western formulations has been seen, particularly as the latter also postulates two absences, that is, ‘not P and not Q’ as the ground of inference whether causal or implicational.

Yet, inspite of the great reputation that Bachcha Jha enjoys amongst the traditional scholars of Navya Nyāya, he does not seem to have made any new innovations or departures in the traditional mode of thinking on the subject laid down by earlier thinkers.

What seems to have dominated the minds of the majority of Naiyāikas in this period were issues relating to the epistemological on the one hand, and linguistic meaning on the other. The discussion of course was not confined to epistemological issues or those concerned with language and meaning but also related to such issues as cosmic dissolution (*pralaya*) God (*Īśvara*) or the causes of liberation (*mokṣa*) (see appendix). But the interest in these seemed to be only marginal.

However, if the *Vādagrānthis* primarily dealt with a particular issue as pointed out above and thus evidenced a radical departure from the earlier mode of writing which primarily included *bhāṣya*, *vārttika*, *vytti*, *ṭīkā*, etc., the beginning of the writing of the *Kroḍapatras* reveals an even more radical departure in the history of Indian philosophy as it is concerned not with specific issues as the *Vādagrānthis* were, but with a specific point raised in the definition or arguments in the *Vādagrānthis* or even other *grānthis* which, in the opinion of the writer of the *Kroḍapatras* were thus a new genre of philosophical writing, perhaps never seen in the history of Indian philosophy before. Seen retrospectively, they seem to be a logical development of a type of philosophical mentality that is revealed in the *Vādagrānthis*. Philosophers increasingly see themselves as specialists and do not write like, say, Vātsyāyana, Udyotkara, Vācaspati Miśra or Udayana, who tend to include whatever they like whether it has anything to do with the matter under discussion or not.

At the very beginning of the eighteenth century, in A.D. 1700 we find, for example, a *Kroḍapatra* on Gadādhara's *Sāmānya Nirukti* written by Hanumada Bhaṭṭa. In fact, Gadādhara seems to be the favourite choice for persons writing on Nyāya. Veṇimādhava in A.D. 1750 appears to have written a commentary entitled *Prabhā* on Gadādhara's *Gādādharaṅ*. Saṅgameśvara in A.D. 1800 wrote a *Kroḍapatra* on Jagdīśa and in A.D. 1810 Kālīśaṅkara had written *Kroḍapatras* on Gadādhara, Jagdīśa and Mathurānātha. He seems to have been the most prolific writer of *Kroḍapatras* as he wrote on all the major thinkers who had occurred in the seventeenth century. This new style of writing in philosophy continued into the twentieth century; A.D. 1820. Patabhirama Shastri had written a *Kroḍapatra* on Gadādhara and in A.D. 1925 Vamacharana Bhattacharya I wrote a *Kroḍapatra* on Jagdīśa. Thus, it appears that beginning from A.D. 1700 a new style of philosophical writing which flourished till A.D. 1820 during which there were five eminent practitioners of the new genre. After A.D. 1820, the practice of writing *Kroḍapatra* seems to have declined till Vamacharana Bhattacharya revived it in A.D. 1925, though it does not appear to have caught the practicing Naiyāyika's imagination. Recently, Paṇḍit Gauda Subramaniam Shastri has brought out a collection of *Kroḍapatras* entitled, *Dākṣiṇātya Kroḍapatrasaṅgraha* but as it has not yet been studied and commented on by scholars, little can be said about it. It, however,

clearly shows that this style of philosophical writing has not only continued to attract the attention of Naiyāyikas but also that the fashion has spread deep into the south, far outside Bengal where it had first arisen.

Of the nature of the discussion in the *Kroḍapatras* a typical example, is provided by Kalisankara Bhattacharya and Candranarayana Bhattacharya in a discussion of the modifications introduced by Gadādhara and Raghunātha in the definition of *hetvābhāsa* by Gaṅgeśa. According to Kalisankara Bhattacharya the modifications introduced by Raghunātha and Gadādhara whereby they had added the terms *viśiṣṭa* and *yadrūpa* to the definition given by Gaṅgeśa do not remove the essential ambiguity in the definition as those examples to which the definition would not be applicable because of the nature of the object concerned are not clearly demarcated.

If, for example, one says that the inferential cognition that the "lake has fire because there is smoke" is not generally made because of the fact that it is the very nature of the lake not to have fire. This is supposed to follow from the fact that water, by its very nature, can never have fire in it, and the lake is generally full of water. What obstructs the inference in this case, therefore, is the fact that the apprehension of something having water entails the fact that it cannot have fire in it. Kalisankara Bhattacharya, in his *Kroḍapatra*, raises the issue regarding the specificity of the relation between the absence of 'fireness' in the 'lakeness' and suggests that it cannot be the same type of relation which obtains between the absence of a pot and the ground on which it is absent which is generally characterized as a *svarūpa sambandha*. The point seems to be that while both are 'absences', the nature of the absence in the two cases is radically different in character, for if the former were to be the same as the latter, it could not obstruct the fallacious inference. The point made by Kalisankara perhaps is that the relation between absence of 'fireness' in 'lakeness' has to be of a more positive character in order to obstruct fallacious inference in this regard.

There is a necessary connection between the 'lakeness' and the 'absence of fireness' which is the ground for obstructing the fallacious inference, and not just the accidental absence which characterized the absence of 'potness' on the ground from which it is absent. In the case of the latter, the ground could have had the pot on it, or may have it at some future time; but in the case of the lake, it can never have fire because it is the very nature of the lake not to have fire at any time whatsoever.

Kalisankara's suggestion that this positive character of the relation should be conceived as *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, that is, as 'copresent' in the same locus and not as *svarūpa*. But the solution suggested seems to indicate that he himself has not clearly understood the point of the objection as the basic question is whether the co-presence of absence is accidental or necessary.

To say that two or more properties belong to the same locus or have *sāmānādhikarāṇya* does not help us in discovering the criteria on the basis of which some properties or certain kinds of properties cannot in principle have the same locus or *sāmānādhikarāṇya* unless one wants to hold that any group of

properties may occupy the same locus without any restriction whatsoever. Kalisankara's discussion of *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, however, seems to move in a different direction as it is primarily concerned with the absence of precise formulation of the relation between the lake and the absence of fire in the Nyāya perspective. As for a Naiyāyika lake is characterized by 'lakeness' which in turn is characterized by the 'absenceness' and 'fireness' which together are further characterized by the 'absenceness of fireness'. This 'absenceness' characterized by 'fireness' itself characterizes 'lakeness' which characterizes the lake.

But Kalisankara is not satisfied even with this formulation and appears to suggest that the formulation would also prohibit the inference of the presence of fire in the mountain if for some reason someone were to think that the absence of fire was as much a characteristic of a mountain as it is of a lake. This objection is strange as the crux of the matter was that there is a radical distinction between lake and mountain and while the first can never be characterized by the presence of fire the other could possibly do so.

What Kalisankara seems to be groping for is the distinction between formal grounds for inference on the one hand and essential and inessential properties or necessary and contingent relations on the other. As the Nyāya framework of analysis does not normally permit these distinctions he is unable to formulate the objections clearly in the *kroḍapatra*.

The discussion regarding the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* is carried forward by Chandranarayana Bhattacharya. The issue that he is raising may perhaps be better understood if it is reformulated in the following manner: Can universals in their universality have *sāmānādhikarāṇya* which only particular properties are supposed to have when they characterize the same object? Chandranarayana also raises the issue as to why the term, *yadrūpa* cannot be understood as lake characterized by absence of fire.

The writers of the *kroḍapatras* also seem to be concerned with the problem of uniqueness of reference and how language, particularly the Sanskrit language, tries to attain this and the difficulties that are involved in the attempt. Here again the discussion in the *kroḍapatras* does not tackle the general problem but instead confines itself too narrowly to particular examples which are treated as paradigmatic and the particular specificities of the Sanskrit language from which the examples are chosen. For example, one of the sentences chosen is *Atra ghaṭaḥ asti* where the uniqueness of reference is supposed to be conveyed by the declension or the *vibhakti* which is attached to the word *ghaṭa* by the suffix. The objection raised to such an understanding is that one can use the sentence even when there are two or more pots on the ground and, in that case, the unique singularity of reference would not be conveyed by the suffix as it would be mistaken.

If as suggested the condition is added that no other object of the same kind should be present there, even this modification meets with certain difficulties. The Naiyāyika's ingenious imagination can think of situations which would render the definition inadequate for the purpose of conveying the uniqueness of reference which it was intended to ensure. The ambiguity is caused by the word